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**A
COMPREHENSIVE
HISTORY OF INDIA

IN TWELVE VOLUMES**

Volume Five
The Delhi Sultanat
(A.D. 1206-1526)

A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF INDIA

Volume Five

The Delhi Sultanat

(A.D. 1206-1526)

Edited by

MOHAMMAD HABIB
KHALIQ AHMAD NIZAMI

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FOREWORD

THE PUBLICATION COMMITTEE and the Editorial Board of the *Comprehensive History of India* project of the Indian History Congress have great pleasure in presenting the Fifth Volume of the history, second to be published in the series so far. The Indian History Congress had decided at its Lahore Session in 1940 to prepare and publish a *Comprehensive History of India* in twelve volumes based on latest research to serve as a reference work for students of Indian history. The work was planned at the Aligarh Session in 1943 and a Board of Editors appointed and contributors selected. Thanks to the efforts of Dr Tara Chand, adequate funds were collected to finance the project.

It was hoped then that the volumes will flow in quick succession and the entire scheme will not take more than ten years to complete. And early success in preparing three or four volumes, whose chapters in manuscript were received by us, strengthened that hope. But many circumstances prevented realisation of that expectation. The tragic death of several editors and contributors necessitated changes. Political conditions as a result of partition also created a situation not congenial to scholarly pursuits. Nonetheless, one volume was sent to the press in 1951 which took six years, again because of circumstances beyond our control, to be published.

The issue of one volume had encouraged the belief that other volumes will not take much time to follow. But again thirteen years have elapsed for the second volume to be published. As Secretary of the Editorial Board, I owe an apology to the general public for this inordinate delay which sometimes is incidental in a cooperative work of this nature. Chapters written many years before have to be revised and rewritten to bring them in tune with the latest researches, and editing is a long and tedious affair. The present volume has taken five years to edit.

I express my grateful thanks to the joint Editors, Professors M. Habib and K. A. Nizami, for the devotion and industry which they have applied to this work in a spirit of dedication without which its completion would have been well nigh impossible. I am thankful

to the contributors who did not resent my reminders and without grudging time or energy have undertaken this labour of love to serve the advancement of Indian historical scholarship. Lastly I acknowledge with thanks the cooperation of the People's Publishing House who have undertaken to publish these volumes.

In conclusion I avail myself of this opportunity to record here our deep obligation to the donors and contributors whose generosity has made possible the preparation of the *Comprehensive History of India*.

21 May 1970

BISHESHWAR PRASAD
Secretary
Editorial Board

PREFACE

IT IS A PLEASURE for the Editors and contributors of the Volume V of the *Comprehensive History of India* to present to students of history this volume roughly covering four centuries of Indian history, which were fraught with momentous changes and developments.

This volume was planned by a Committee of the Indian History Congress which met at Aligarh in 1943. The plan of the committee laid down that there would be one chapter for each dynasty of the Delhi sultanat and one chapter for the dynasties of every province. We have kept this scheme unchanged. But the accumulation of historical material during these years had disturbed the neatness of the arrangement and chapters had to be divided into sections. Beyond that, the contributors had full freedom about sub-sections and passage headings.

The Editors have to convey their grateful thanks to the contributors for their invariable courtesy and kindness in considering such suggestions concerning the uniformity of spellings etc. as we ventured to make to them. But for their full cooperation, the production of this volume might have been difficult.

We deeply regret our inability to have followed any system of diacritical marks, the main reasons being (a) the difference of pronunciation of letters in India, Iran and Arabia, (b) the various systems of diacritical marks followed in the various regional languages of India; (c) the cost to the press and our lack of staff. We have, therefore, spelt proper names as they are pronounced in northern and southern India by persons who write their names according to pronunciation which has descended to us from the middle ages. But as far as possible we have followed a uniform system of spelling proper names. The responsibility of spelling Persian and Arabic names has had to be shouldered by the Editors; for the spelling of provincial names the contributors are responsible.

The basis of this volume is cooperation between scholars who have studied the history of various Indian regions and formed their opinion

on the best literary, epigraphic, numismatic and other evidence available. Every scholar has written according to his own opinion; the unity that underlies this whole volume is the fact that persons genuinely in search of historical truths not seldom come to the same conclusions. As Editors our only duty was to keep them informed of each other's contributions to prevent overlapping. Nevertheless we and the contributors have been of the opinion that a certain amount of overlapping is necessary for putting the facts concerning various regions in their proper perspective. We have to confess that our first attempt was to ask various contributors to write simultaneously. This led to chaos and some contributions had to be rewritten. Our second attempt, which has resulted in this volume, was to supply every contributor with the chapters that had been written for the previous period or which covered the history of the neighbouring regions for the same period. Thus the contributor on Rajasthan was supplied with necessary chapters on the history of the Delhi sultanat and his opinion was again used for the necessary corrections of the history of the Delhi sultanat.

It has not been possible for us to use more than a fraction of the material at our disposal, but the main object of the volume is to condense the most important information with reference to the past and to provide a starting point for future researches.

As the history of India is closely related with that of the countries to our north and north-west, we thought it better to begin the volume with a general account of these countries from the rise of Islam to the age of Babur so that the movements of Indian and Asian history may be seen in a wider perspective. It was intended to end the volume about 1525 but the contributors on the provincial dynasties have given a very brief account for the period from the first battle of Panipat to the annexation of the provinces to the Mughal empire. In the case of the Vijayanagara empire the story is continued for all its dynasties till about the time of Aurangzeb.

We have done the best we could with the material at present available but history is a progressive science and we are content if we have advanced it only by a few millimetres with reference to the thousands of miles which have to be traversed still. We express our grateful thanks to Dr Tara Chand, who collected the endowment which made the starting of this series possible, and to Dr Bisheshwar Prasad, the Secretary, Editorial Board, for his cordial and inspiring cooperation. The People's Publishing House has been extremely helpful.

We deeply regret that three of us—Professor Srinivasachari, Dr Daudpotā and Mrs K. Nurul Hasan—passed away before this volume could see the light of the day.

• A bibliography of source material will be found in the Appendices to this volume along with the glossary. Out of regard for world history as well as the history of India we have followed the Christian calendar, but days of Indian calendar have also been given where necessary.

27 May 1970

MOHAMMAD HABIB
KHALIQ AHMAD NIZAMI

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CHAPTER ONE

THE ASIATIC ENVIRONMENT

I. RISE OF MONARCHY AND THE GOVERNING CLASSES AMONG THE MUSALMANS

ARABIA BEFORE THE RISE OF ISLAM

THE ARABIAN PENINSULA is about one-third of the United States in size, but it is an arid region and could not under medieval conditions have supported a population of more than eight or ten millions. North of it lies the Fertile Crescent, where we find some of the earliest achievements of ancient civilization. For assistance in their constant wars with each other and for the protection of their frontiers against the unruly Arab tribes, the Byzantine and the Persian empires had organized two minor principalities in the north; the Ghassanids of Bostra were subordinate to the Byzantine empire and the Lakhmids of Hira to Persia. Nominally the subjects of both principalities were Christians, but Christianity does not seem to have taken a deep root in their hearts.

In southern Arabia there are sufficient periodic rains to warrant a systematic cultivation and here also we come across the remains of ancient civilizations. 'Of the four best-known kingdoms of ancient Arabia, viz. Saba, Ma'in, Hazramaut and Qataban, the first three—and these were the most important ones—are mentioned in the Old Testament.'¹ Though Arabia became a single community on the basis of one language some centuries before the rise of Islam, the distinction between south Arabian (or Yamanite) and north Arabian (or Modharite) persisted long into the Muslim period. The Arabic word for king is *malik*, but the Arabians never used the title of *malik* except for foreign rulers and the partially Romanised and Persianised dynasties of Ghassan and Hira; the kings of Banu Kindah formed the only exception to this rule.²

Between the principalities of Ghassan and Hira in the north, and

¹ Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, 42.

² *Ibid.*, 28.

Yaman and Hazramaut in the south lies the extensive region of Arabia Felix—not 'happy Arabia' to be sure, but Arabia which had never known any organized government or central executive authority. The climate is hot and dry; the mean temperature of the Hijaz low-bed is nearer to 90°F than to 80°F and that of Medina is a little over 70°F. The largest oases are not more than 10 sq. miles and their chief fruit is the date-palm.

Of course, human beings cannot live except in society, and society must be based on some 'security arrangements' so that the minimum of cooperation for social life may be possible. The basis of security arrangements in Arabia Felix—the Arabia that mattered primarily to the early Muslims—was the blood-tie. Families were organized into claus and clans into tribes. The tribes, in general, had no executive authority. In practice an Arab depended on his clan; if he was injured, he expected his clan to get him proper compensation; if he was murdered, he expected the clan to kill his murderer, or if that was not possible, his clan would kill some individual from the hostile clan or obtain compensation for his heirs. There was no judiciary, but arbiters could be appointed in special cases by mutual consent. The protection given by the blood-tie could be strengthened by *hulf*, or confederation of clans for mutual protection, and *jiwar*, the granting of protection by a stronger to a weaker clan. Clan conflicts and tribal conflicts tended to multiply and continued for years. 'Of the time of ignorance which preceded Muhammad,' Gibbon writes, '1,700 battles are recorded by tradition.'³ More serious than actual combats was the constant fear that haunted the minds of men, whose clans were at war.

There was no universally accepted principle for the internal organization of the tribe or the clan. The law of primogeniture was not known to the heathen Arabs and it has been rejected by Islam. The best son—or the best man—had to lead; primogeniture would have meant the ruin of the clan. The head of the tribe or clan may be elected or merely acknowledged, there could be no binding law or custom about it; if the acknowledged chief was slack or lazy in looking after the interest of the clan or behaved in an erratic or wilful manner, he would be replaced by a rival. In any case no chief could hold his post after he had lost the confidence of his constituency.

The moral ideal of the Arab tribes, generally referred to as *murawwah*, was in consonance with their social organization. Professor Nicholson has defined *murawwah* to mean 'bravery in battle, patience in misfortune, persistence in revenge, protection of the weak and defiance of the strong.' But the virtues of generosity, hospitality, loyalty,

³ *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chap. L, Bury's edition, 340.

fidelity and honour must be added to complete the list. The great repository of the principles of *murawwah* is the highly developed poetry of pre-Muslim Arabia, which, however, was not put into writing till the period of the great Abbasids.

The only three cities which we need mention here were dominated by the clan system. The religious centre of the whole of Arabia was the Ka'ba, the foundation of which (according to Quranic tradition) had been laid by Abraham and Ismail. It was, in any case, a very ancient structure, sacred to Allah, 'the Lord of the Worlds'. We have to imagine it as a roofless structure; the present small room was built during the youth of the Prophet and has been preserved in the same form since then. The rites of *haj* are performed not in the Ka'ba itself but in the ground round it, known as *Hatim*. Some twelve generations before the rise of Islam, one Fihir (or Quraish) obtained the custody of the Ka'ba and his descendants built the city of Mecca round it; they also made a reputation for themselves as merchants, for a large part of the commerce of India and southern Arabia with the west was in their hands. The Quraish made themselves the leading tribe of Arabia, but we have to remember that Mecca, described in the Quran as 'a valley without cultivation', had no income except from pilgrims and from trade. 'Almost the only organ of government in Mecca was the Council or *Mala*. This was the assembly of the chiefs or leading men of various clans. The Council was merely deliberative and had no executive of its own. Each clan was theoretically independent and could go its own way, and, therefore, the only effective decisions of the *Mala* were the unanimous ones.'⁴ Some four days' journey from Mecca is the city of Ta'if at the height of 6,000 feet, 'a bit of Syrian earth comparable with Lebanon'. It was inhabited by the Saqif tribe, but wealthy Meccans also had property there.

Yasrib, later called Medina (i.e. the city of the Prophet) was not exactly a city but a series of settlements, some 20 miles by 20 miles, several days' journey north of Mecca and some eighty miles from the Red Sea. Its strategic importance lay in the fact that, in alliance with the neighbouring tribes, it could stop Mecca's very profitable trade with the Byzantine empire. The Jews, their main tribes being Qainuqa, Banu Nadir and Quraizah, probably settled in Medina first; later on two south Arabian tribes, the Aus and Khazraj, pushed themselves in and became more prominent. But the Aus and Khazraj could not pull on together and the Jews were also drawn into the conflict. The two tribes fought a terrible battle at Bu'as about A.D. 617. Neither party could win, but the atmosphere of hatred, distrust and suspicion created

⁴ Montgomery Watt, *Muhammad in Mecca*, 8.

was such as to make life in each other's neighbourhood absolutely impossible. So both parties appealed to Muhammad to come and live with them and to decide all disputes on behalf of Allah as a neutral outsider.

The mass of the Arabs were idol-worshippers. They acknowledged Allah as the Supreme Being and His name came at the head of all documents. But Allah was not the object of worship. The Quran refers to three important idols—Lat, Manat and Uzza—whose intercession was sought as the daughters of Allah. It would be useless enumerating the idols of other tribes. Some 300 idols, or representations of idols, were put in the Ka'ba in spite of the small space available, but only one of them, Habal, was a statue. 'Nowhere do we find genuine devotion to a heathen deity.' The pagan Arabs had no religious scriptures and no deeply thought-out mythology. Colonies of Jews and Christians had settled at various places, but we find no anti-Christian or anti-Jewish sentiment among the heathen Arabs. The Jews in Arabia, as in world history, remained true to their tradition, even if not well-informed about it. With reference to the challenge of Islam, all we need say is that the Arabs, whether pagan or Christian, merely followed the religion of their forefathers; they did not like their traditional thoughts being disturbed or their ancestors being traduced. Meagre though may have been the faith of pagan Arabs in their idols, they did not like them being dismissed as non-existent. Above all, they resented the Prophet's demand that every belief should be subjected to a prolonged process of rethinking and criticism in terms of the spiritual history of mankind. After the Prophet had taken possession of Mecca, most Christians, who belonged to the heretical sects and would have been punished for their religion in the Byzantine empire, preferred to accept the Muslim creed.

THE PROPHET'S 'SECURITY SYSTEM'

Maulana Shibli, the greatest biographer of the Prophet in our country, does not estimate the Prophet primarily as 'a man of affairs' on the ground that he was essentially a spiritual and moral teacher. This is correct, and no biography of the Prophet, however brief, can ignore a reference to his religious teachings. Still from the viewpoint of the growth of political institutions, the main work of the Prophet was the establishment of a 'security system' for the whole of Arabia, except the regions subordinate to Byzantine and Persia. It was the rock on which his successors built.

* Muhammad, son of Abdullah, son of Abdul Muttalib, son of Hashim of the tribe of Quraish was born about the year A.D. 570. His father died before his birth and his mother, Amina, died when

he was six; he was, therefore, brought up by his uncle, Abu Talib, the head of the clan and the father of his cousin, Ali. Abu Talib's financial condition was not good; so Muhammad as a boy had to look after goats, but in his youth he made a good career as an honest and reliable executive in the management of *carawans*. He was twenty-five when he married Khadija, a rich widow of forty, whose *carawan* he had managed. It is unfortunate that the collectors of the biographies and the traditions (*hadises*) of the Prophet tell us practically nothing of 'the preparatory period' of his life. But two propositions may be safely laid down. When he had to manage the 'security system' for the whole of Arabia, it was found that he was so remarkably well-informed about the internal tensions and economic conditions of every tribe and clan that it was impossible to deceive him. Secondly, he must have made a careful study of Jewish, Christian and Hellenic ideas as they prevailed in Arabia. Tradition, probably correct, says that he used to retire for days together with his simple fare to meditate in the comfortless cave of Hira.

In his fortieth year Muhammad went through a prolonged spiritual experience which left him convinced that he was a *Nabi* (Prophet) and a *Rasul* (Messenger) commissioned by Allah to establish, or rather to re-establish, the age-old religion of mankind—the religion of Adam and Noah, of Moses and Christ and of all other prophets 'between whom we make no distinction.'⁵ (*Sura 2:136*). This did not mean that he accepted either Christianity or Judaism as current in his day. He had the greatest respect for Christ as the 'Spirit of Allah' and 'His

⁵ European writers have needlessly wasted their time and energy in applying their modern-minded psychology to discover what the Prophet felt and experienced. First, as Professor Watt admits, there are only 'scraps of source material' that have come to us from Az-Zuhri or Ibn-i Sa'd, who collected his material in the reign of Walid, over a hundred years after the event. Maulana Shibli insists that the whole story of Az-Zuhri should be rejected because it is not confirmed by earlier authorities. Secondly, the story consists of impossible legendary elements and completely ignores the Prophet's work as a thinker.

Both the Quran and the traditions are clear as to how Prophet behaved when he received a revelation. He would wrap himself up in a blanket and perspire profusely, whatever the temperature, and for a period, which never exceeded a few minutes, his thoughts were so concentrated that he could attend to nothing else. Then he dictated what had been revealed to him and his followers committed it to memory. These dictated revelations form the Quran. Obviously, a verse thus dictated and immediately published could not be changed or altered, but a later verse could cancel a previous verse.

'We must distinguish', says Professor Watt, 'the Quran from the normal consciousness of Muhammad, since the distinction was fundamental for him. From the first he must have distinguished carefully between what, as he believed, came to him from a supernatural source and the products of his own mind. Just how he made this

Word', but he was uncompromisingly hostile to the doctrine of Trinity in any shape or form. With reference to the Jews, he denied that there could be any 'chosen people'—chosen, that is, by birth. 'The pious amongst you are nearest to Allah', says the Quran. The Allah of Muhammad is not a tribal deity but the Lord of the Worlds (*Rabbul 'Alamin*). The pagan Arabs were told that the idols worshipped by them as 'daughters of Allah'—or as intermediaries in any form—were non-existent. Allah must be worshipped direct. 'Think of Me and I shall think of you,' says the Quran (*Sura 2:152*); and again, 'When My creature prays to Me, I am near.' (*Sura 2:186*). The basis of the new creed, called Islam, is an uncompromising monotheism. All Musalmans are equal and brothers and Islam will tolerate no monkery or ordained priesthood.

For about three years Islam was preached as a secret creed. Then the Prophet was ordered to preach it publicly and an opposition was inevitable. Abu Talib did not accept Muhammad's creed but extended to him the protection of his clan. Since the Quraish had no organised executive, they had no means of really persecuting the Musalmans. Slaves who accepted Islam could be tortured by their owners, and the Musalmans had no alternative but to purchase them. But free-born Musalmans, who had the protection of their clans, could only be abused and harassed, specially when they were praying in the Ka'ba. The Prophet advised some of his followers to migrate to Abyssinia and there were probably two migrations. The experiment of boycotting the clans of Hashim and Muttalib was tried for two years (*circa* 616-618) and then given up. The Prophet and his followers were only exercising that freedom of religious choice which Arabian tradition had given to all Arabs; also both groups were of the same blood and closely allied by marriages. So some ten years passed in a discussion or 'dialogue' which is preserved for us in the early verses of the Quran. No loss of life is recorded as the result of pagan persecution.

But in A.D. 619 the Prophet's wife, Khadija, and his uncle, Abu Talib, died, and Abu Jahl, as the new head of the Hashimi clan, publicly withdrew the clan protection from Muhammad. This left the Prophet practically in the position of an outlaw. Fortunately for Islam, he was invited to Medina by a combined delegation of Aus and Khazraj and

distinction is not very clear, but the fact that he made it is as clear as anything in history.' (*Muhammed in Medina*, 52-53). Professor Watt is here expressing the orthodox Muslim opinion. The distinction to which he draws attention is the distinction between the Quran and the *Hadises* (the precepts and actions of the Prophet). The Quran alone is the uncontested text for all Musalmans; it has been preserved from the very first both in writing and in memory.

went there in A.D. 622.

According to a document, generally referred to as the Constitution of Medina,⁶ some clauses of which probably belong to the first year of the Prophet's life there, he seems to have guaranteed the clan system at Medina and the powers he took to himself were extremely circumscribed. 'The clan chiefs', says Watt, 'retain their authority and no executive power, except in wartime, is given to the Prophet. His main power is judicial—the maintenance of peace.' Now according to the customs of the 'era of ignorance' Muhammad was not entitled to be the head of a clan, let alone a tribe. Nevertheless with the establishment of a 'Muslim home' at Medina, a new organization—the Muslim religious community or *millat*—began to develop and no one could deny that Muhammad was both its founder and supreme head. The order, 'Obey Allah *and* His Prophet' is repeated by the Quran about forty times, but the Prophet is also directed 'to consult the Musalmans about their affairs' and the principle—'they decide their affairs by common discussion'—is laid down for the general guidance of all Musalmans. The *millat* did not immediately cancel the executive power of the clan organizations, for the Prophet had nothing to put in its place. But the executive power of the clans and tribes was abolished by the first Caliph and his advisers as the result of the War of Apostacy (*Riddah*) and a state, properly so-called, was organized; still the memory of the tribal and clan organizations, their affections and hatreds, lived on till the end of the Umayyad dynasty. But so far as the Prophet was concerned, the Muslim *millat* of which he was the head, was from the very beginning superior to the Muslim clans.

It is difficult to say how the above-mentioned Quranic injunctions were interpreted. Some things are, however, clear. The Prophet respected the skill of all craftsmen and he demanded that in the sphere of 'religion-building', which was the sphere of his special skill, his orders should be obeyed, even if there was no direct Quranic injunction. As good examples we may quote his precepts to the effect that there is to be no monasticism in Islam, that devotions which have the mortification of the flesh for their object are not to be permitted, and that no one may leave more than one-third of his property by will and disinherit his heirs from what is left.

On the other hand the Prophet, by the very nature of his profession, had to make himself accessible to all men and women. He was there

⁶ This document is given to us by Ibn-i Ishaq, who wrote in the early days of the Abbasid dynasty. He does not quote his authority, but some clauses could only have been written in the year before the battle of Badr; others are clearly later additions.

to preach, to learn and to convince. But it was impossible to consult all men and women about public affairs. So we find a body of advisers, foreshadowing the governing classes of later ages, collecting round the Prophet. They consisted primarily of three groups—emigrants (*muhajirs*) from Medina who had rendered great services to Islam, the leading Muslim clan-chiefs of Medina (*ansars*) and men of military and administrative skill. The Prophet had no need for 'yes men' in his deliberations. He sometimes allowed his companions (*sahaba*) to override his preferences; sometimes he overrode their collective advice; on other occasions he asked them for their opinion and discussed a problem till a solution could be found. The final decision, however, lay with the Prophet; on a few minor matters we find him admitting his errors, but as a rule he succeeded in convincing his followers of the wisdom of his decisions. Apart from the group of *munafiqs* or hypocrites, to whom the Quran refers but does not name, there was always an element of genuine true believers, who criticised the acts of the Prophet in peace and in war and, particularly, in the distribution of spoils; records of these criticisms—and of the Prophet's answers—have been carefully preserved. Nevertheless, though in no sense an autocrat, Muhammad is the first executive officer or magistrate we find in the history of Arabia Felix. If he decided for war, he appointed the officers to lead his forces and collected volunteers to fight his battles. He had also by public subscriptions (*sadaqah* and *zakat*) to find the money needed for his campaigns. In case of victory he distributed four-fifths of the spoils to his men and kept in his hands one-fifth of it for eight specified public purposes.⁷ As the sphere of his influence expanded, he appointed 'agents' to act on his behalf and delegated such power to them as he considered necessary. Subject to public consultation and criticism, the final authority in all matters lay with the Prophet.

The Quran insists on the Prophet being properly respected, i.e. respected as a Prophet. Since he had no servants at his house, visitors were required to call three times for permission to enter. If no permission was given after the third call, they were requested not to take it ill but to call at another time. The Prophet, in his turn, followed the same procedure when calling on others. Persons talking to the Prophet were ordered not to raise their voices above his voice. When the Prophet entered the mosque, the congregation was not expected

⁷ The eight objects are—the poor; the needy; the incapacitated; (payment to) persons employed by the administration; reconciliation of hearts; setting free of slaves; helping persons in debt; and relief to travellers (*Quran*, Sura IX:60). The fact that all these items appertain to immediate needs has not been held to debar the state from undertaking long-term public enterprises, when it has the means to do so.

to rise up out of respect for him, but they were required to move a bit and make a place for him in the centre.

The Prophet had only one place, the mosque, for his five daily prayers as well as the transaction of all business. Maulana Shibli invites us to visualise the Prophet's mosque after the manner of an Indian Id-gah. A low *kachcha* wall enclosed a large area of land. A part of this area was covered by a thatched roof of palm-leaves standing on palm-tree trunks. The Prophet used to lean on one of these trunks when delivering his sermons, but later on a carpenter made for him a *nimber* or pulpit—a structure of three steps, on which he could sit or stand when speaking. The floor remained *kachcha* for many years, but then it was paved with small stones to prevent rain-water from collecting.

The Prophet had none of the paraphernalia of a government or state. He needed no treasury, for all money was spent on the day it was received. His 'agents' in distant parts were allowed to enrol a few soldiers, but the Prophet himself had no body-guard, soldiers or policemen. Muhammad remained throughout his life what a Prophet has to be—the most unprotected of men. The literature of later days refers to persons as his 'body-servants', but their services must have been purely honorary. We are also told of persons who acted as secretaries to the Prophet, but their services must also have been purely voluntary. The Prophet had no secretariat or office and we are not told how the treaties and other records, of which the Prophet must have preserved a copy for reference, were kept. The Prophet had a seal, and when he dictated a letter or made a treaty, the names of the persons witnessing it were generally given.

The following statement of Gibbon finds full support in all the authenticated traditions of the Prophet.

'The good sense of Muhammad despised the pomp of royalty; the Apostle of God submitted to the menial offices of the family; he kindled the fire; milked the ewes and mended with his own hand his shoes and woollen garments. Disdaining the penance and merit of a hermit, he observed without effort or vanity the abstemious diet of an Arab or a soldier. On solemn occasions he feasted his companions with rustic and hospitable plenty, but in his domestic life many weeks would elapse without a fire being kindled in the hearth of the Prophet. His hunger would be appeased by a sparing allowance of barley bread; he delighted in the taste of milk and honey, but his ordinary food consisted of dates and water.⁸ . . .

According to the tradition of his companions, Muhammad was distinguished by the beauty of his person, an outward gift which is seldom despised except by those to whom it has been refused. They applauded his commanding presence, his piercing eye, his gracious smile, his flowing beard, his countenance that painted every aspect of the soul and his gestures that enforced each expression of the tongue.'

The wars of the Prophet need only a passing reference here. His basic policy was to use both battles and alliances in order to win over the opponents of his religion by severe disciplinary punishments in a few cases combined with widespread forgiveness and generosity. The three battles due to the attack of the Quraish on Medina—battle of Badr (March, 624), battle of Uhud (March, 625) and the battle of the Ditch (March-April, 627)—failed to shake the Prophet's power at Medina; in fact it grew owing to the failure of his opponents, for in all the three battles the Musalmans were greatly outnumbered. The Prophet took a ransom from captives who could afford to pay it; the rest were set free unconditionally to reflect on the character and the creed of their opponents.

In March, 628, the Prophet decided on a pacific offensive and marched with 1,200 or 1,400 followers in pilgrim's garb and the necessary sacrificial animals for a pilgrimage (*umra*) to Mecca.⁹ But on reaching Hudaibiya on the precincts of the sacred territory, he was informed that the Quraish—then led by a triumvirate of Ikrimah bin Abu Jahl, Suhail bin Amr and Sufwan bin Umayyah—had decided to fight. Nevertheless, owing to the serious loss of their Byzantine trade, they were prepared for a treaty on the following terms:

- (1) Pilgrimage next year; (2) Every tribe to be free to ally itself to the Prophet or to the Quraish; (3) Peace between the Prophet and the Quraish for ten years during which neither party was to attack a tribe allied to the other; (4) 'Whoever of the Quraish comes to Muhammad without the permission of his protector (or guardian), Muhammad is to send back to them; whoever of those with Muhammad comes back to the Quraish is not to be sent back to him.'

The last clause did not apply to the heads of families or to married women, but it left the heads of the Quraish families free to torture and beat their dependents, who accepted the Muslim faith. In a clan-governed Arabia flight to Medina was the only protection converts to Islam

⁹ A pilgrimage to Mecca on the prescribed dates in Zil Hij is *haj*; a pilgrimage at any other time is *umra*.

could find. And now the Prophet was by treaty giving up that sole guarantee of protection to converts, with reference to the Quraish in the treaty itself, but by implication to all other heathen clans. The Prophet's greatest believers and closest friends never wavered in their faith and respect for him, but they were definitely against the treaty. Had it been subjected to a referendum of the Musalmans, the Hudaibiya treaty would not perhaps have been accepted. The Prophet, however, was determined to accept the treaty. He had confidence in the expanding power of his Faith. No Musalmans had gone back to idolatry, and all Arab idolaters would come to Islam in their predestined time. He had no intention of breaking the provisions of the treaty, but he felt sure that Allah would find a way. He sealed the treaty and invited his followers to take a pledge to him—the 'Pledge under the Tree'. Almost everyone present took the pledge.

The Hudaibiya treaty was really a victory for Islam. Leading Meccans began to migrate to Medina, the most important being Khalid bin Walid, the great military genius of early Islam, and Amr ibn al-'As, the future conqueror of Egypt. Some 70 converts to Islam, whom the Prophet refused to receive at Medina owing to the terms of the treaty, established themselves at an independent centre north of Mecca and began to plunder the Meccan *caravans*; the Quraish in their distress requested the Prophet to settle them at Medina so that they may be bound by the provisions of the treaty. Thus the unequal clause of the treaty disappeared.

The Meccan triumvirate should have used the ten years of peace to build up their commerce and lay the foundation of a great alliance to preserve their old creed. But they proved remarkably short-sighted. There was a quarrel between Khuza'ah, a tribe allied to the Prophet, and Banu Bakr, who were allied to the Quraish. Mecca and Medina should have remained strictly neutral. But the Quraish leaders helped the Banu Bakr to crush the Khuza'ah and then began to reflect on the consequences of their deed. The Prophet, on his part, decided on the *fatihah* of Mecca—the annexation of the territory, the winning over of its inhabitants and the raising of the sanctuary to a status it had never known before. But he could only do so if he had a force that made resistance impossible and he is said to have collected about 10,000 followers. The object of the enterprise was not revealed till the army was two stages from Mecca. Sufyan bin Harb (father of the future Caliph Mu'awiya), the Prophet's life-long enemy, came to see him and the Prophet granted protection to him and to all who sought refuge in his house. Later on protection was given to all who closed their doors and remained in their houses.

The city was entered by columns of the Muslim army from all the four sides (11 January 630) but stern orders were given prohibiting plunder and spoliation. The column led by Khalid killed 28 opponents, but the other columns occupied the city peacefully. The idols were removed from the Ka'ba and from private houses, and Usman bin Talha, the custodian of the Ka'ba, was reappointed to his post. *No one was asked to accept Islam as a part of the settlement.* A list of proscribed persons guilty of particular crimes was published, but appeals to the Prophet's clemency reduced it a good deal. Political and military opposition to the Prophet in the past was not considered a crime and his foremost opponents, like Sufyan bin Harb and the members of the Meccan triumvirate, served the new regime and prospered.

Having become the ruler of the Quraish, the Prophet had to meet the immediate challenge of their opponents, the Bedawin tribe of Hawazin and the Saqif of Ta'if, who had collected over 20,000 soldiers. They were defeated at the battle of Hunain, the chief feature of which was the unwillingness of both parties to kill. The Prophet took their cattle as spoils of war, but his opponents got back their wives and children by joining the new creed.

'There is no compulsion in matters of religion', the Quran declares (*Sura 2: 256*). During the first thirteen years of his preaching life, the Prophet had placed his religious programme on a purely peaceful basis. His conversations at Medina, as recorded by the most reliable traditions, prove that he wanted his religion to expand in the only way a religion should—by discussion, persuasion and acceptance. He was not prepared to tolerate the scriptureless idolatry of the pagan Arabs, but he made a clear distinction between them and the 'People of the Book' (*Ahl-i Kitab*); the Quran is firm in stating that the latter had started with truth but had deviated into error; consequently, though they are not accepted as men of 'faith' (*iman*), they are fully recognised as legal 'religions' (*dins*). Now after eight years of successful struggle, Muhammad was prepared to try the old experiment again. If the treaties handed to us by tradition are of any value, the Prophet felt no hesitation in being the head of a political organization consisting of Musalmans and the 'People of Book' and in guaranteeing the religious freedom of the latter. Owing to the privileges given to the 'People of the Book', the Muslim *ulama* of latter days have confined the term to religious groups whose scriptures are referred to in the Quran. But the Quran says clearly that it has not enumerated the names of all prophets and, by implication, the names of all revealed scriptures. The restriction made by the *ulama* has no Quranic justification.

Muslim historians designate A.H. 9 (April 630-April 631) as the year of Deputations (*Wafds*). Apart from the region controlled by the maliks of Ghassan and Hira, deputations came to the Prophet from every part of Arabia and he was able to establish by treaties a security system under the guarantee of Allah and His Messenger. The Prophet believed in having treaties put in writing; he also dictated letters in a brief, terse and clear style, which are often in the nature of treaties¹⁰. These treaties make provisions for Muslim clans and tribes and also for the organized tribes of Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians. To take the latter first, the treaties specified either a lump sum or a proportion of yearly produce, which the non-Muslim organizations had to pay; after this the treaties gave a guarantee that no more would be demanded and also that there would be no interference with their religious affairs. Typical examples of this are the arrangements with the Jews of Khaibar and the Jews of Magna in Ayla. His letter to the Magna Jews, after demanding the surrender of all fine cloth, war-material, slaves and a quarter of the dates produced, fish caught and cloth woven, ends with the sentence: 'Thereafter you are free from all tax (*jizya*) and forced labour.'¹¹ The deputation of the Nestorian Christians of Najran in southern Arabia came to see the Prophet in his mosque and its members were invited to say their prayer in it also. They were required to pay 2,000 suits of clothes twice a year and also to lend 30 armours, 30 horses and 30 camels in case of local wars in Yaman. In return for this they were promised 'for ever' the protection (*jiwar*) of Allah and His Messenger for their persons, goods and properties and for their churches and services. 'No bishop will be removed from his episcopate, no monk from his monastic position and no church warden from his church wardenship.'¹² Order was also given for levying the *jizya* from the Zoroastrians of the east Arabian province of Bahrain and for respecting their creed.

Three demands were made from the Muslims—*sadaqah*, *zakat* and *ushr*. *Sadaqah* is defined by the Quran as 'what you can spare' (*Sura* 2:219). *Zakat* was defined as 2½ per cent of income by later legists, who also insisted on charging it on 'unused capital' like gold and

10 These treaties and letters are now available to us in the *Tabaqat* (Volumes) of Ibn-i Sa'd. Ibn-i Sa'd collected his material some two centuries after the Prophet's death and he must have mainly relied upon living memory. The volumes of Ibn-i Sa'd have been collected with great difficulty by Professor Sachau and other European scholars. Maulana Shibli considers the work reliable, but he was unable to make full use of it, as Professor Watt has done, owing to his untimely death.

11 Watt, *Muhammad in Medina*, 358.

12 *Ibid.*, 359-60.

silver ornaments. *Ushr* meant one-tenth of the land-produce or one-twentieth, if cultivation was by buckets. No separate arrangement was made for pagan Arabs; they were expected to join Islam at their own convenient time. On the other hand, the conception of *jizya* as a separate, personal and additional tax on a non-Muslim for remaining a non-Muslim, which is expounded in the law-books of later Islam, finds no justification in the traditions of the Prophet.

It remains to be seen how Arabia was governed during the last two or three years of the Prophet's life. As has already been stated, the Prophet had no police force, no professional and standing army and, of course, no permanent civil service. It cannot be too strongly stated that the Prophet did not establish a government or a state; he was content to leave to the tribes and clans the freedom they possessed, and it was the only freedom consistent with the conditions of his age. He would have been horrified at the unlimited power of the 'dynastic monarchy', which his community built up as an integral part of its social and political structure. He never contemplated it and left no laws about it. Inclined by nature to appeal to reason instead of exercising autocratic and despotic authority, he was content to unify Arabia on the basis of the power the treaties gave him.

He appointed thirty-five or more 'agents' and delegated to them his authority under the treaties—the collection of taxes (*ushr*, *zakat*, *sadaqah* and *jizya*), the maintenance of peace and the enforcement of justice. His 'agents' who were at a too great distance from him were asked to collect the taxes from the rich and distribute them among the local poor. Tradition has preserved his conversation with Mu'az bin Jabal, who was appointed to some office in Hazramaut. On the Prophet's asking him what law he would enforce, Mu'az replied that he would enforce the Quran and where the Quran was silent, he would enforce what he had learnt from the Prophet. 'And where that is also silent?' In that case, Mu'az replied, he would enforce his own *rai*. *Rai* here does not mean 'opinion', but what modern law calls 'equity and good conscience'. The Prophet's 'agents' were not governors in any sense of the word. Having nothing but a handful of soldiers, they had to depend upon the loyalty of the local tribes. The basic distinction between cognizable and non-cognizable offences depends upon the existence of an organized state-force with its police and judiciary. Where, as in the Prophet's Arabia, no state-force existed, all offences were non-cognizable. It was for the injured party to demand compensation or revenge, and the utmost the Prophet's 'agents' could do was to rally local public opinion so that the injured party could get the compensation or the retaliation to which it was entitled. The Quran has the term, *hukkam* (rulers), which may mean

either the clan chiefs or the Prophet's 'agents'. But it has no terms equivalent to the conceptions of sovereignty, nationalism, imperialism, government or state.

The phrase, 'Allah and His Messenger', had to serve for all purposes. A leader, who was reluctant to interfere with the autonomy of the Arab clans, could not dream of conquering foreign countries by force. 'It would be unrealistic', says Watt, 'to suppose that Muhammad saw the later expansion of the Arabs in detail, and indeed no claim of this sort is made by the early Muslim sources. . . . Whether Muhammad was aware of the weakness of the Byzantine and the Persian empires is a matter of conjecture.'¹³ The Prophet was, however, afraid of Byzantine aggression. He had led an expedition in that direction in A.D. 626, and also sent two expeditions in 627 and 629. His last expedition of 30,000 men and 1,000 horse to Tabuk in A.D. 630 was due to a report, which proved to be incorrect, that a Byzantine army of 40,000 was going to attack Arabia.

'I do not know the future', Muhammad used to declare emphatically. A respectful student of his administrative system will not deny its achievements. But at the same time he will realize that his system was bound to be transitional. A state, properly so-called, had to be established in Arabia in some form.

After returning from Tabuk, the Prophet sent a number of his companions to establish the Muslim rites of the Haj pilgrimage. Next year (March 632) he performed his first and last Haj pilgrimage. About a hundred thousand men had collected on hearing that he would be present, and he took advantage of the occasion to deliver repeated sermons on the basic principles of his Faith.¹⁴

The Prophet had a sturdy frame and was endowed with excellent health; in spite of the great strains and stresses to which he was subjected, he had no serious illness till the age of sixty-three. But he developed some sort of fever on 14 or 15 May and died after an illness of some thirteen days. So long as his strength permitted, he led the congregational prayers in person, but when he was unable to do so, he assigned that duty to Abu Bakr. According to his widow, Ayesha,

¹³ *Ibid.*, 105-6.

¹⁴ A few sentences, quoted in Shibli's *Siratun Nabi*, are given here. 'All the customs of the era of ignorance are under my feet.' 'The Arab is not superior to the non-Arab (*Ajam*) or the non-Arab to the Arab; you are all descended from Adam, and Adam was made from the earth.' 'All Musalmans are brothers.' 'Feed and clothe your slaves in the same way as you feed and clothe yourselves.' 'Everyone is responsible for his own crimes; the father is not responsible for the crimes of his son nor the son for the crimes of his father.' 'If a negro slave with a slit-nose is your *amir* (commander) and leads you according to the Book of Allah, hear him and obey him.'

'the Prophet left no inheritance behind him—no *dirhams* or *dinars*, camels or goats.'¹⁵

According to the tradition of the Sunnis, the Prophet appointed no successor to his office. Silence on a question so important could not have been due to oversight.

THE PIOUS CALIPHATE (633-661)

As soon as they heard of the death of the Prophet, the residents of Medina (*ansars*) called a meeting to elect a ruler from among themselves; Sa'd bin Ubaidah of the Khazraj tribe was the candidate contemplated. Abu Bakr, Umar and Abu Ubaidah Jarrah, representing the Quraish, burst into the meeting uninvited and told them very politely but very firmly that only a Quraish would be accepted by the whole of Arabia as the successor or *Khalifa* (caliph) of the Prophet. After some unpleasant discussion, all present, with the exception of Sa'd bin Ubaidah, vowed allegiance to Abu Bakr. The choice met with general approval, but Umar declared later on that this was not the proper way of electing a caliph. It was fortunate for Islam that it had a caliph universally accepted, for it was soon to face the greatest crisis of its long history.

As the news of Prophet's death spread from tribe to tribe, a large number of them decided to rebel, while others preferred to sit on the fence. Three prophets and one prophetess also arose, preaching religions that were imitations of Islam; but they succeeded in finding followers, and Musailama, the most important of them, collected about 40,000 men. In spite of what these 'careerist prophets' taught, and we know little about their teachings, there was nowhere a return to idolatry. Objection was raised to the supremacy of Medina and to the taxes it demanded. The Prophet's 'agents' either retreated or were driven away. But Mecca, Medina and Ta'if remained loyal and some tribes sent their tribute. Other tribes, however, wanted a compromise: If Abu Bakr did not insist on tribute, they would adhere to the beliefs and rites of Islam. But the Caliph refused to discuss a compromise. 'If you but withhold the tithe of a tethered camel', was his reply, 'I will fight you for it.' The tribes and clans had torn up their treaties with the Prophet by their unilateral action; Arabia would have to be reconquered with the help of such loyal elements as remained; but Abu Bakr, one of the earliest converts to Islam and about sixty years of age, was prepared for the task. He fitted up eleven military columns to conquer all the provinces of Arabia, the most important being led

¹⁵ *Stratun Nabt*, Vol. II, 185 et seq.

by Khalid bin Walid, and within a year law and order was restored in the whole country by an unchallengeable central authority.

In the second year of Abu Bakr's reign, the Arab armies attacked both Chaldea (Iraq) and Syria, which were Arab countries. But the struggle was still continuing when Abu Bakr died on 13 August 634. In his last illness he appointed Umar as his successor, dictated an ordinance about it and obtained the consent of the Musalmans assembled in the Prophet's mosque. 'I swear that when I meet my Lord,' he declared, 'I will say unto Him, "I have appointed as a ruler over Thy people him that is best amongst them."'

Sunni Muslims consider the Pious Caliphate as the brightest period of their religious history. The four caliphs followed the traditions of the Prophet and lived a simple life; the fact that they led the five daily prayers and delivered sermons when necessary made them accessible to all the people of Medina as well as visitors. The leading companions of the Prophet were not given high military commands at the frontiers but kept as advisers or councillors of the Caliph at Medina. But it is impossible to keep the hands of the time-clock from moving. The clans had been able to rebel against Medina owing to the executive power left to them by the Prophet. When Abu Bakr re-established his authority, the executive power of the clans vanished and Medina became the capital of a centralised and unitary state. Further, Abu Bakr undertook the responsibility of appointing his successor, and this fact, twisted out of its context, became an unfortunate precedent for later ages.

Though precedence belongs to Abu Bakr, the second Caliph Umar (634-44) is nevertheless regarded as the ideal ruler by Sunni Muslims. His sense of justice was stern and unrelenting, his life was simple and open for all to see; no one could question his piety and selflessness. Moreover, he was a man of shrewdness, foresight and wisdom, and necessity rather than choice compelled him to become a great 'organizer of victory'. The three days' battle of Qudsiya (November 635) won by Sa'd bin Wiqqas brought Iraq and Madain, the Persian capital, under his sway. The genius of Khalid bin Walid won for him the whole of Syria at the battle of Yarmuq (20 August 636) and he paid a visit to Jerusalem. With these victories in lands inhabited by the Arabs (except the upper Tigris valley) Umar was content, and he ordered his victorious armies to stop their advance. But the Persian governing class was bent on reviving the old Persian empire and Umar had no alternative but to direct a campaign for the complete conquest of Persia. In 640-41 Amr ibn al-'As conquered Egypt with his permission.

The spoils of war were enormous and Umar is said to have wept when he considered the demoralising effect they would have. But

unlike Abu Bakr, who gave an equal share to all Muslims, Umar divided the Musalmans into grades—e.g. wives of the Prophet, persons who had fought at Badr or taken the Pledge under the Tree or fought against the apostates or in Syria and Persia. The highest grade got 10,000 coins and the lowest 200 coins. The distinction was well conceived. 'I give it', said Umar, 'by priority of faith and not for noble blood.' All Arab slaves were purchased and set free. There seem to have also been registers of the whole Arab race according to the tribal disposition of the forces. The cantonment-towns of Basra and Kufa were founded about 638 by the Caliph's order. Umar also took the title of 'Commander of the Faithful' (*Amirul Muminin*) as an alternative to designation of the 'successor (*caliph*) of the successor of the Prophet'. Umar, lastly, made Arabia a purely Muslim country by purchasing the lands of the non-Muslims and settling them elsewhere. The authenticity of the order of the Prophet, on which this policy was based, has been questioned; and it was certainly a violation of his treaties. Still a state has the right to purchase whatever it needs, provided it gives proper compensation.

In November 644 while leading the morning prayer Umar was attacked by a Persian slave, Abu Lu'lu'a, who inflicted six mortal wounds upon him and then stabbed himself to death. Umar was in no position to select a successor and obtain the consent of the Faithful for his choice. So he appointed six leading companions of the Prophet—Usman, Ali, Abdur Rahman bin Auf, Sa'd bin Wiqqas, Zubair and Talha—to select the next caliph from among themselves within a specified time. The moving spirit of this committee was Abdur Rahman bin Auf, a merchant-prince and a financial genius, and he succeeded in getting Usman elected as the next caliph.

The Caliph Usman (644-56) was elected at the age of seventy and martyred at the age of eighty-two. Muslim tradition says that 'the door of troubles was opened during his reign, never to be closed again'. The first two caliphs (generally known as the *Shaikhain*) lived in Médina like ordinary citizens and had nothing to protect them except the respect and loyalty of the people. In consultation with the chief companions of the Prophet they decided all affairs of the state—war and peace and settlement of the conquered lands as well as the appointment, dismissal and control of governors. Usman managed somehow to lose the respect and affection of the people. There was a complaint that he appointed persons from his own clan and neglected the claims of Bani Hashim, the Prophet's clan. The Arabs were the governing class of the empire because it had been built up by their conquests; but they were divided into the Quraish and other town-dwelling tribes, like the Medinites and the Saqif, who claimed to be

the genuine aristocracy, and the Bedawins of the desert, who were again divided into northern and southern tribes.

The great curse of the day was reckless ambition. Amir Mu'awiya, who had been appointed governor of Syria by the Caliph Umar, saw to the order and prosperity of his province, but elsewhere there were tumults against Usman's governors. At a meeting of the governors at Medina in 655, Mu'awiya declared his willingness to protect the Caliph, if he came to reside in Syria; he was also willing to send an army that would protect the Caliph at Medina. Usman rejected both suggestions. His officers commanded great armies in the provinces, but he would not quarter them at Medina for his personal protection. This gave the rebels their opportunity. They came to Medina from Egypt, Basra and Kufa and besieged him in his house. Only about 18 kinsmen and citizens were available for defending the Caliph, who was assassinated on 17 June 656 while reading the Quran. His blood-stained shirt and the fingers of his wife, Naila, which had been cut by an assassin's sword, were somehow taken to Damascus and hung up in the mosque as symbols of vengeance against the murderers of Usman.

For five days the regicides controlled the frightened citizens of Medina and led the prayer in the Prophet's mosque. Then they decided to elect a caliph. Ali held back and offered to swear allegiance to either Talha or Zubair, but in the end, pressed by the threats of the regicides and the entreaties of his friends, he yielded and was saluted Caliph on the sixth day after Usman's martyrdom.¹⁶ The caliphate of Ali (656-61) was mostly a period of war. First Zubair and Talha along with the Prophet's widow, Ayesha, marched from Mecca towards Basra. Ali had no alternative but to pursue them and they were defeated at the Battle of the Camel (656); Talha and Zubair were killed and the Prophet's widow was sent back to Medina with all the respect due to her.

In view of the long distance of Medina from the most prosperous parts of the caliphate, Ali decided to make Kufa his capital, and Medina was not destined to regain its old political status. Ali was recognized as caliph by the whole Muslim world except Syria. But Syria under Mu'awiya's excellent administration had sixty thousand soldiers and they were too strong to be suppressed. To Ali's demand that Mu'awiya should recognize him as the caliph, the latter had a ready reply. Ali must first punish the conspirators responsible for the murder of Usman, who held high posts in his army and government, and then raise the question. The two rivals fought a battle at Siffin,

¹⁶ Muir: *The Caliphate*, 235.

but before the conflict could lead to a positive result, Ali's soldiers agreed to the demand of their opponents that the matter should be decided according to the Quran, that is by arbitration. In this arbitration Ali's representative, Abu Musa Ash'ari, was cheated by Mu'awiya's representative, Amr ibnul 'As; after the former had declared that he had agreed to depose both the rivals, the latter said that he had only agreed to the deposition of Ali, and Mu'awiya, therefore, remained caliph.

Ali repudiated the arbitral award and so the war continued; but he was repeatedly paralysed by the revolt of the Kharijites or 'religious theocrats' in his own territory and was never able to bring an army against Mu'awiya again. In 658 Amr ibnul 'As, who had conquered Egypt for Umar before, reconquered it for Mu'awiya a second time. In 661 three Kharijites decided to murder Amr, Mu'awiya and Ali on the same morning. Amr was too ill to lead the morning prayer that day, and the person officiating in his place was killed. Mu'awiya was wounded but recovered. But Ibn-i Muljam, who had undertaken to assassinate Ali, succeeded in his task and the fourth Pious Caliph of Islam died on 25 January 661. Ali's eldest son, Hasan, was elected caliph by his party but he abdicated in favour of Mu'awiya (26 July 661) and retired to Medina.

There were merits in the Pious Caliphate which have endeared it to Sunni Muslims. But it had three shortcomings, which cannot be overlooked. If the head of the state lives the unguarded life of a private citizen, he will be in touch with the mass of the people, but his life will be in constant danger. Three out of the four Pious Caliphs were assassinated. If, on the other hand, the head of the state is given a bodyguard, he will cease to be the 'Commander of the Faithful' but only be a commander of those on his pay-roll. Secondly, no effective satisfactory law for the devolution of the caliphate could be evolved. The election could not be left to the people of a particular city, Medina or any other. The other alternative was to leave the caliph to select the best successor he could find in the whole community, but Abu Bakr alone was able to perform that duty. Lastly—and this is a fact that Muslim theological reformers have often forgotten—the Pious Caliphate could only last so long as the substance of power as governors of provinces, army commanders and advisers of the caliph remained in the hands of the Prophet's chosen companions. As Ziauddin Barani rightly points out, the Pious Caliphate was by its nature transitional.

MU'AWIYA AND THE DYNASTIC MONARCHIES OF ISLAM

. Mu'awiya was the son of Sufyan, who at one time had been the leader of the Quraish against the Musalmans and had been pardoned before the conquest of Mecca; he was also a brother-in-law of the Prophet and had acted as his secretary. He had been appointed governor of Syria by the Caliph Umar in 639, and from 661 to his death in 680 he was the sole ruler of the empire and he gave to his people some twenty years of peace. He is said to have been mild, generous and forgiving, and knew how to win over the Arab chiefs by grants of money and submission to their insolence. But his achievements as a statesman have to be judged primarily by 'the institution of the dynastic monarchy' which he founded. Mu'awiya blamed Umar for not appointing a successor in his life-time and thought he was creating a better precedent by nominating his own son, Yazid, to succeed him. His two great lieutenants, Mughira and Ziyad, approved the principle, but advised him to proceed cautiously by private canvassing in the first instance. But it was only after their deaths that he felt himself strong enough to take the necessary steps. First a series of officially inspired deputations called upon Mu'awiya and appealed to him to settle the matter of succession by nominating Yazid as his successor. Then he proceeded to canvass for Yazid among the leaders of Mecca and Medina. His opponents had the courage to tell him that he had only three alternatives; he could leave the matter undecided, as the Prophet did; he could appoint as his successor the ablest Quraish he could find, like Abu Bakr; or he could leave the selection of the caliph to a committee, like Umar. 'Only, like them, thou must exclude thy sons and thy father's sons.' But Mu'awiya was unconvinced. Islam must be saved from the danger of a disputed succession after the death of every caliph.

Ultimately state power was called into play; apart from a handful of courageous persons at Mecca and Medina (including Husain, son of Ali and Abdullah ibn-i Zubair) all leading men took the oath of allegiance to Yazid, who had no difficulty in succeeding his father. Husain (son of Ali and the Prophet's daughter, Fatima) was invited by the people of Kufa to become their caliph, but Yazid's officers had no difficulty in terrorising Kufa and martyring Husain with his male followers, who may have numbered about seventy, in the field of Kerbala, some twenty-five miles from Kufa. Yazid was not aware of what was happening; still he did not punish the officers concerned and must bear responsibility for the terrible tragedy (10 Muharram A.H. 61/10 October 680).

The Quran uses the term *khalifa* (caliph) in the sense of 'repre-

sentative'; man has been created as God's representative (*khalifa*) on the earth, because man alone of all creatures is obliged to follow a moral law. But in the hurry of the moment the term *khalifa* was the only title found available for the Prophet's successor. The term, *malik*, could not be used for it implied the principle of hereditary succession. Hence Abu Bakr's explanation: 'I am the *caliph* (successor) of the Prophet; I am not the *caliph* (representative) of God.' It is only out of regard for tradition and use that the term 'caliph' can be applied to the rulers of the Umayyad and the Abbasid dynasties, who attained to their position by kinship of blood and the nomination of their predecessor. Calling a king or caliph 'the shadow of God on earth' (*zilullah fil 'arz*) is a meaningless phrase for which there is no canonical authority, and it has not in practice prevented the Musalmans from killing their kings, whether called caliphs, sultans, amirs or khans. The basis of the Pious Caliphate was the right of the best among the Quraish to govern the state, whatever the process of discovering him. When that right was given to the nearest of kin nominated by the last ruler, the Pious Caliphate inevitably vanished.

It cannot be too strongly insisted that the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet say nothing about monarchy, whatever its form, as a political institution. Consequently, no school of Muslim religious law or *shari'at* says anything concerning the monarch or the devolution of his office; and since Muslim religious law does not recognize monarchy as a political institution, it also does not regard rebellions and conspiracies as crimes. Further no distinction—apart from their policy and their administrative success—could be drawn between a king, a tyrant and a usurper. 'Dynastic monarchy' among the Musalmans has no more authority than what Mu'awiya and the customs or necessities of the middle ages could give it. But these necessities seem to have been of a very compelling type.

The following secular argument for the unlimited power of the monarch was often put forward during the middle ages: 'If there was no ruler (*sultan*), men would devour each other.' While Europeans in the course of their history have known many other types of government—the oligarchies and democracies of the city-states of ancient Greece, the aristocracy of the Roman republic, the oligarchies of Genoa and Venice and the free-cities of the Holy Roman Empire—the Musalmans till the end of the nineteenth century knew of no organized form of government except 'the dynastic monarchy'. Now the great Muslim legists were not unaware of the contradictions between the Quranic law of the brotherhood and equality of all Musalmans and the brutal fact of the supremacy of one man and one dynasty. A few theoretical revolutionists, like Ibn-i Taimiya, imagined that the Pious

Caliphate could be brought back again; the great mystics found a solution by ignoring the government altogether. Nevertheless, the majority of the *ulama*, like Imam Ghazzali, realized that the legality of the rights of the subjects—the legality of the decisions of the law-courts, for example—depended upon the legality of the rights of the king. Therefore, in spite of his not being a caliph in accordance with the traditions of the Pious Caliphate, they were prepared to admit the legality of a king *de facto*; even the legality of the normal acts of the judiciary and the executive during the regime of a usurper were recognized, though the usurper himself, for very good reasons, may have been put to death.

Thus, in spite of the very great differences between the conditions of different Islamic countries, Islamic political history is dynastic history; and the two great features of dynastic history among the Musalmans are, first, the customs or conventions concerning the devolution of the monarchy and, secondly, the extraordinary powers of a capable king. In both these respects, monarchy among the Musalmans differs from the normal monarchy among other peoples.

The Abbasids accepted the procedure for the devolution of monarchy which had grown up among the Umayyads. Primogeniture was considered irrelevant; the Musalmans have not considered it a proper principle either for their public law or private law. The status of the mother was also generally, but not always, considered irrelevant. The ruling king could nominate one of his nearest relations—a brother or a son—and take an oath of fealty to him from his leading officers and prominent citizens. The experiment of the king taking an oath of fealty to a number of heirs to succeed him in the order he had fixed was tried but did not succeed; the danger was that the first heir would disinherit all others in favour of one of his own sons. During the caliphate of the Umayyads and the great Abbasids nomination by the caliph and the oath of fealty were enough. But during later dynasties a new condition was added; the nomination of the deceased king had to be ratified after his death by the great officers of the state and they could alter the succession *within* the dynasty. If a king died without nominating an heir, the great officers of the state could elect one of his near relations, preferably a son, to succeed him.

Two hideous and very unpleasant features appeared with the passing of ages. First, Muslim public opinion gradually reconciled itself to the fact that normal family affections, specially between brothers, had no place within the royal family.¹⁷ If a king had four sons, only one of

¹⁷ Parricide—killing of the father—was not, however, permitted by the traditions of Muslim royal families and examples of it are very rare.

them could mount the throne, while the other three would be his rivals and were sure to rebel either on their own initiative or at the instigation of conspirators; it was, therefore, imagined that the ruling king did a service to himself, to the state, to the community and even to God, if he ensured the maintenance of the public peace by the annihilation of all his rivals and near relations. Killing perfectly innocent near relations for no other reason except that they may become possible rivals to him never disturbed the conscience of the most pious Muslim kings. Secondly, since providing the king became the privilege of a particular dynasty, the members of that dynasty naturally rose in public esteem and it was believed that so long as any member of that dynasty survived, he had a right to the throne and may possibly assert that right. Consequently a king, who came to power by overthrowing the old dynasty, could only ensure the stability of his own throne and the throne of his successors by putting to death or blinding all members of the former dynasty whom he could find. The wholesale massacre of the Umayyads by the Abbasids set the first example and later rebels had no alternative but to follow it. It has to be added that both the Umayyads and the Abbasids had no hesitation in killing such descendants of the Prophet from whom they feared a danger to their dynasty.

'The royal crown', says the wise but unambitious Hafiz, 'is an attractive head-dress, but since it involves danger to life, it is not worth the headache it entails.' The challenges to a king's power, both from his own relations and rebels, were so continuous and persistent that no king could remain on the throne for fifteen or twenty years unless he was head and shoulders above his rivals. On a rough estimate more than half the Muslim kings, who ascended the throne, have been imprisoned and killed; minors placed on the throne have rarely survived, Akbar, the great, being a rare exception. On the other hand, the occupants of the throne had to put a large number of their nearest relations to death; ten per head would, perhaps, be a modest average. In estimating the power of the average and competent Muslim kings, minors and weaklings may be ignored. The powers they lost were won back by their able successors.

It is difficult to specify the powers of the Muslim king, but the following points are clear. Subject to the obligation of consulting his leading followers, the Prophet had the sole initiative in war and peace, and in the appointment, dismissal and control of his 'agents'. Abu Bakr in his first sermon admitted the right of the people to control the caliph: 'If I do well, support me; if ill, put me right; obey me as I obey the Lord and His Prophet; wherein I disobey, obey me not.' Nevertheless, the powers of the central government increased during the Pious

Caliphate; the 'agents' of the Prophet were replaced by the 'governors' of the caliph, and their appointment, dismissal and control became one of his main functions. Their 'governors', unlike the Prophet's 'agents', had the force necessary for executing the orders of the centre. When the Pious Caliphate gave place to the dynastic monarchy, the king took over all these powers; but since he had not the moral stature of the Pious Caliphs, he had by the dismissal or the execution of some of his highest officers to remind all concerned that this power was really in his hands. A king, who was not able to dismiss his officers, was not considered a king at all and his days were numbered.

We have seen the Prophet giving to Mu'az bin Jabal the power of acting according to his *rai* (personal opinion consistent with the Prophet's teachings, 'equity and good conscience') and it is reasonable to suppose that a similar power was given by the Prophet to his other 'agents'. Now the Prophet had never considered the conquest of foreign lands; and both the Pious Caliphs and the Umayyads had no alternative but to exercise their *rai*, which must now be called 'secular legislation', where the Prophet's precepts were silent.

Imam Abu Hanifa, the legist with the greatest followers in Islam, considered *rai* to be an integral part of the *shari'at*, but Imam Shafi'i disagreed with him. So far as Muslim Asia is concerned, Imam Abu Hanifa's teachings prevailed. But with the passage of time and change of circumstances, a further development of state power became inevitable. *Rai*, now developed into *zuwabit* or *u'in* (state law), instead of being a supplement to the *shari'at* became an alternative to it. There was a fundamental difference between the two. The *shari'at* was based on authority—Quran, *hadis* and *qiyas* (analogy). The state law, promulgated by royal authority, was based on a definite public objective (*ihitihsan*, *istislah*, reform, public welfare). Thus our Indian Ziauddin Barani in his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* defines the object of state law to be the protection of mankind from all misfortunes from which protection is humanly possible. He did not at the time he was writing (circa 1357) consider famines and epidemics as misfortunes preventable by human endeavour. Barani was also of opinion that in cases of conflict between them, the king was to override the *shari'at* by his state laws; still he is a good Musalman and advises the king, while not changing his policy, to appeal for God's forgiveness for violating the *shari'at* and to distribute a lot of money in charity.

The average able Muslim king had more powers than other monarchs of whom history tells us, except some Roman emperors and the European rulers of the Renaissance period. These immense powers were given to the monarchs because they were needed for the expansion of Islam in the early period and for the maintenance of peace

over immense areas during the middle ages. The problem of *state v. religion* is quite different in Islam than in Christianity or Hinduism. Islam has no organized and ordained priesthood; the *ulama* of Islam have no status apart from what their learning or public esteem may give them. Among the Christians the Pope, or someone else in non-Catholic countries, can speak on behalf of the priests. Among the Hindus a Brahman may speak on behalf of all other Brahmans. But among the Musalmans none of the *ulama* could speak except for himself, and it was always possible for the state to find an opponent for him. Secondly, among the Musalmans the state (or the caliphate) developed first. The Sunnis have very few books, apart from the Quran, surviving from the first century of the Muslim era. The foundations of Muslim religious learning were laid during the Abbasid period. The views of the state changed with reference to various religious schools from time to time.

Ultimately the orthodox Ash'ari school—with all its contradictions about God, space, time and causation—was accepted by all good Musalmans and also by the state. The relations of the state with the *ulama* were thus simplified. The king was a despot with plenty of money; most of the *ulama* were recruited from the lower middle class and their only hope was livelihood in the ecclesiastical or semi-ecclesiastical services of the state or failing that a pension or a land-grant (*madad-i ma'ash*) from the king. The mystics tried to be independent of the government. A few fanatic *mullahs* preached against the state as a state and were punished. In general the ecclesiastical budget of the state succeeded in keeping the *ulama*—‘the army of prayer’ as they were called—in proper order and subjection. There has been no ‘Reformation’ in Islam. The state has been all in all. All differences of religious opinion have been solved by reference to ‘orthodoxy’.

Since the average Muslim king has been a despot, and has had to maintain himself by despotic methods according to time and circumstances, it is impossible to enumerate all his powers. All we can do is to refer to two limits. First, the accepted principles of the *shari'at* with reference to personal laws sufficed, as a rule, to protect the life and private property of non-political persons, their professional incomes as well as their incomes from houses and small *zamindaris*. On the other hand, though there were no legal limits to the power of a Muslim king in punishing his opponents and rebels, he had always to live in fear of assassinations, palace revolts and conspiracies. It was easily discovered that the public would stand a lot of oppression before it appealed against a tyrant to the sword, but conspiracies were recurrent and would-be assassins were plentiful.

It remains to consider the relation of the king with the governing class. Persons in the service of the government could be divided into three groups—purely local officers of a low grade for whom no high promotion was possible; officers of the intermediate grade, generally appointed by the king, for whom promotion to a higher grade was possible; and officers of the highest grade in charge of the provinces or the departments at the centre, whom the king would normally consult about affairs of the state. *Whether appointed by the king or by his great officers, all employees of the state were believed to be servants of the king.* It was inevitable that the king should use his power of appointment and dismissal to build up a governing class on whose loyalty he could rely. As we pass from age to age, we will see this governing class changing.

THE UMAYYAD EMPIRE (661-750)

The Umayyad empire produced fourteen rulers and lasted for about ninety years.¹⁸ Since the Arabs had laid the foundation of the empire, they insisted on their exclusive right to govern it. This meant the oppression of the non-Arabs, specially the peasantry, whether converted or unconverted. A converted Persian had no legal standing unless he joined an Arab tribe as a *mawali* (servant) and even then all rights were not given to him; for example, the Arab could fight on horse-back but the *mawali* had to fight on foot. But the conquered, for the time-being, were in no position to protest or rebel; so the Arabs, having no rival to fear, could afford to break up into hostile groups. It was admitted that the aristocracy of the Arabs was the Quraish, but the Quraish were divided into two rival branches—the Umayyads and their allies, who had the monopoly of state power and high office; and their collaterals, the Hashimis (including the House of the Prophet) who were oppressed as possible rivals. Both branches had a common ancestor, Abd Manaf, but this fact only seems to have increased their bitterness. Add to it the Yamanite (southern) and Modharite (northern) Arab tribes insisted on carrying their hostility to every part of the empire. We should not be surprised that the oppressed people of Persia and Iraq based their hopes on the House of the Prophet coming into power and repeatedly fought for this object, not knowing that when the opportunity came, clever politicians would deprive them of their hopes.

Mu'awiya's son, Yazid, died after a reign of three-and-a-half years.

¹⁸ The following is the list of Umayyad rulers: 1. Mu'awiya, 661-80; 2. Yazid, 680-83; 3. Mu'awiya II, 683-84; 4. Marwan I, 684-85; 5. Abdul Malik, 685-705; 6. Walid I, 705-15; 7. Sulaiman, 715-17; 8. Umar II, 717-20; 9. Yazid II, 720-24; 10. Hisham, 724-43; 11. Walid II, 743-44; 12. Yazid III, 744; Ibrahim, 744; 14. Marwan II, 744-50.

Yazid's son, Mu'awiya II, was a consumptive who died after two or three months. So the leaders of the group selected Marwan bin Hakam as the next caliph and all the remaining rulers of the dynasty, called Marwanids, are descended from him. At the same time Abdullah ibn-i Zubair laid claim to the caliphate, and the struggle with him lasted for about nine years (684-92).

The Umayyad monarchs were, as a rule, personally mild, kindly and generous. They were also their own chief ministers. But this necessitated delegating enormous powers to their governors and punishing them for the inevitable misuse of that power. Mu'awiya had appointed his brother, Ziyad, as governor of Kufa, Basra and the whole of Persia, and Ziyad won respect and loyalty by his stern maintenance of law and order.

Abdul Malik suppressed Abdullah ibn-i Zubair and brought the whole Muslim empire under his control, and his son, Walid, added to his predecessor's work. 'The era of Walid I was glorious both at home and abroad. There is no other reign, not excepting even that of Umar I, in which Islam so spread and was consolidated.'¹⁹ Hitherto there had only been raids by the Arabs into the lands of the Turks in the east and the Berbers in northern Africa, but the raiders had been driven back and the boundaries of the caliphal empire had not been extended. Under Hajjaj bin Yuṣuf Saqafi, Walid's viceroy in the east, Qutaiba bin Muslim conquered and settled the land of the Turks from the eastern frontier of Persia to the border of China, while Muhammad bin Qasim, a cousin of Hajjaj, conquered Sind. Musa bin Nusair, governor of the lands east of Egypt, conquered and settled the whole of northern Africa, while his Berber slave-officer, Tariq, conquered and settled Andalusia or southern Spain. The curse of the Umayyad period were sectarian revolts or personal ambitions disguised under religious forms. Consequently, Umayyad officers, like Hajjaj, had no alternative but to suppress these revolts with a strong hand, and the Umayyad emperors have been considered more despotic than other dynasties.

The postulate on which the Pious Caliphate and Umayyad empire were based was that all Musalmans, regardless of all distinctions of language, race and culture, should belong to a single state; and this state, in the first century of Islam, could only be an empire of the Arab aristocracy. There was naturally a resentment against it among those Arabs, who had been deprived of their political rights, as well as among the Persian *mawalis*; and the 'House of the Prophet' or the 'House of Hashim', without specification of the candidate, seemed a war-cry that could draw all who were discontented against the hated Umayyads.

19 Muir, *Caliphate*, 360-61.

The descendants of Husain bin Ali, the Imams of the Shias, took no part in the revolt and reaped no advantage from it. But in the reign of Hisham (724-43), Muhammad, the great-grandson of the Prophet's uncle, Abbas, organized a propaganda in favour of his family in secret from his village, Homeima, in southern Palestine. He depended for his propaganda on merchants who travelled from city to city. In A.D. 743 on a visit to Mecca, he purchased a young Persian slave, Abu Muslim Khurasani, who was the stuff great revolutionists are made of. But Muhammad died; his eldest son, Ibrahim, was arrested and perished in prison, and Ibrahim's younger brothers, Abul Abbas and Abu Mansur, hid themselves in Kufa. In 747, after careful preparations, Abu Muslim Khurasani raised in revolt the black standard of the Abbasids in Herat and Merv. His cause found general support. Nasr, the eighty-five-year old Umayyad governor of Khurasan, died while flying back near Hamadan. It was impossible to stop the revolutionary tide. Kufa was taken; Marwan II was defeated at the Battle of the Zab (25 January 750) and killed in a church in Egypt. All Umayyads of any importance were brutally killed, the only exception being Abdur Rahman (*ad-Dakhil*), a grandson of Hisham, who succeeded in flying to Spain and founded his independent kingdom there. Homage was done to Abul Abbas, the first Abbasid Caliph, on 29 October 749. 'I am the Great Revenger', he declared, 'and my name is *as-Saffah*, the Shedder of Blood.'²⁰

THE ABBASIDS (750-1258)

The Abbasid is the longest ruling dynasty in the history of Islam; it lasted for over 500 years and produced thirty-seven rulers. But of these only the first eight—Abul Abbas Saffah (749-54), Abu Ja'far Mansur (754-75), Mahdi (775-85), Hadi (785-86), Harun Rashid (786-809), Amin (808-13), Mamun (808-30), Mu'tasim (833-42)—can be considered caliphs or emperors in the proper sense of the word. We are here only concerned with the chief features of the reign of the great Abbasids.

In two important respects they made really important contributions. The Abbasid revolution put an end to Arab monopoly of high offices. The main support of the new dynasty had come from Persia, and it largely depended on highly Arabicised Persians for its administration. Abu Muslim Khurasani, the moving spirit of the revolution, the Barmakides (Khalid, Yahya and Yahya's two sons, Fazl and Ja'far), who held the highest offices for about half a century, and Mamun's

wazir, Fazl bin Sahl, and his commander-in-chief, Tahir, are very good examples of Persian officers of the new regime. The Arabs were gradually eclipsed. There was no revival of the Persian language (as we have it now) till the end of the ninth century A.D. Persian politicians and scholars made the Arabic language their own; perhaps a careful examination will show that the greatest contributions to Arabic during the Abbasid period were made by persons of Persian blood, though they are mistakenly considered Arabs.

The second great achievement of the Abbasid period was in various branches of secular culture and religious learning. With the help of Christians who knew Greek, the Greek classics were translated, and though these translations seem to have disappeared quite early, text-books based upon them remained the chief source of secular learning during the middle ages. Great insistence was laid on Aristotle, 'the first teacher' (*mu'allim-i auwal*), and a knowledge of his works was passed on to the European nations through Spain. Translations were also made of Sanskrit works on science and astrology, and we find reference to a book, *Sind-Hind*, which was probably a translation of the *Brahma Siddhanta*. The great Abbasids followed a liberal policy about these matters. But help also came from an unexpected quarter. In a frontier skirmish in 751 the Arabs captured some Chinese, who could teach them the art of making paper, and before the end of the tenth century 'the paper of Samarqand' had made resort to papyrus and vellum quite unnecessary. Large books could now be written, copied and preserved, and education could be extended to the lower middle class.

In the sphere of Muslim religious learning the most important achievements were the establishment of the four schools of Sunni law or jurisprudence—Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali—and the compilation of the six (or seven)²¹ works on the Prophet's *hadises* (his precepts and his actions) of which Bukhari and Muslim are considered to be the most authentic. Religious learning naturally led to theological controversies. Mamun and his successors patronised the Mu'tazila sect, who among other things, declared in favour of 'free will' against 'Divine predestination', claimed that the Quran was 'not eternal' but 'created' and that God would never be 'visible' to 'human eyes'. The controversy remained long after the great Abbasids had vanished; ultimately Abul Hasan Asha'ri and his followers, like the great Imam Ghazzali, established orthodoxy on two principles—the suppression of Greek philosophy and freedom of thought, and the

21 Seven if we add the *Muwatta* of Imam Malik to the six compilations accepted by the Hanafi orthodox.

uncritical acceptance of all sorts of contradictions based on traditional theology.

The Shias also became divided into two groups—the orthodox or A'sna Asha'ris, who claim that their twelve Imams are perfect but go no further, and the Ismailis, who believe that their Imam is a Divine Incarnation, who can even alter the provisions of the Quran to suit the needs of time and circumstances. Imam Ja'far Sadiq (a contemporary of the Abbasid Caliph, Mansur) disinherited his son, Ismail, for being a drunkard and appointed Musa Kazim as his successor; also when Ismail died, the Imam called all the notables of Medina to his funeral. The Ismailis do not believe in the legality of what Imam Sadiq did or else they declare that the funeral was a mere pretence (*taqayya*) to hide the fact that the real Imam went to Muhammad, son of Ismail. Sunni literature is full of all sorts of charges against the Ismailis; in particular they are blamed for legalising incest. The real religious literature of the Ismailis has yet to be published. The strength of the Ismaili propaganda lay in the appeal it made for a much-needed 'Redeemer'. Professor Bernard Lewis in his *Ismailism* refers to a statement of the orthodox Imam Ghazzali to the effect that it was impossible to prevent the working class of Persia from being infected with Ismailism. Three Ismaili movements deserve to be noticed in the political sphere—the Carmathians of the Persian Gulf area, who sacked Mecca in A.D. 929 and took away the sacred Black Stone but returned it unasked; the Fatimid Caliphate of Egypt (909-1171); and the Imamate or kingdom of Alamut (1090-1256).

So far as capacity for war and administration is concerned, the Umayyads stand head and shoulder above great Abbasids. There can, in fact, be no comparison. 'The palmiest days of Islam', says Sir William Muir, 'after Abu Bakr and Umar were the days of the Umayyads. Mu'awiya and Walid are not eclipsed by either Harun or Mamun. . . . The Abbasid reign pales before the glory of the Umayyad, which by its conquests laid the broad foundations of Islam in the east and the west. Moreover, the wholesale butcheries, cold-blooded murders, and treacherous assassinations, which cast a lurid light on the court of As-Saffah and his successors, find, as a whole, no counterpart among the Umayyads.'²²

From the very beginning the Abbasids had failed to control the whole inheritance of the Umayyads; province after province went out of their control, and ultimately only Baghdad and a fluctuating territory round it remained within the caliphate. 'With Mu'tasim, the eighth of the Abbasids', says Gibbon, 'the glory of his family and

²² Muir, *The Caliphate*, 597.

nation expired.' The remaining minor caliphs²³ were first controlled by the Turkish bodyguard whom Mu'tasim had organized (842-945); then by the Buwaihids (945-1031); and lastly by the Seljuqian and Khwarazmian sultans (1031-1218). They got a breathing space of some forty years before their extinction by Halaku Khan in 1258. Of these 29 minor caliphs, 8 were killed, 2 were blinded, 2 were deposed but probably not killed and one was asked to abdicate. Nevertheless, people kept on repeating fabricated *hadises* to the effect that the Prophet had blessed the family of his uncle, Abbas. Also since the Quran is silent about monarchy, it was left to the caliph to assign to new Muslim royal dynasties some part of the legality—thin, weak and tenuous though it may be—which he himself possessed. Also reference to the 'Commander of the Faithful' on the coins, even when his name was not known, symbolised the unity of the Muslim world.

THE MINOR DYNASTIES OF AJAM

The mammoth empire, constructed by Walid bin Abdul Malik, could only be maintained by rulers of extraordinary capacity, who could suppress local rebels supported by local populations to whom their local liberties were dear, and who could also control the distant governors to whom almost sovereign powers had been assigned and who could afford to live like the kings whom they had displaced. *Ignoring some losses, like Spain, and some gains, like Indonesia, the boundaries of the Muslim 'populations' today are where Walid bin Abdul Malik left the 'frontiers' of the Muslim caliphate in A.D. 715.*

How this mass of population was converted to Islam is not known. The Christians have loved to record the labours of their missionaries; the Musalmans have no missionary labours to record, except during the life of their Prophet and the first Pious Caliph. Original material

23 Only the titles and dates of the minor Abbasid caliphs can be given here:

- | | |
|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| 9. Wasiq (842-47). | 24. Ta'i (974-99) |
| 10. Mutawakkil (847-61). | 25. Qadir (999-1031). |
| 11. Muntasir (861-62). | 26. Qaim (1031-75). |
| 12. Musta'in (862-66). | 27. Muqtadi (1075-94). |
| 13. Mu'tazz (866-69). | 28. Mustazhir (1094-1118). |
| 14. Muhtadi (869-70). | 29. Mustarshid (1118-34). |
| 15. Mu'tamid (870-92). | 30. Rashid (1134-35). |
| 16. Mu'tazid (892-902). | 31. Muttaqi (1135-60). |
| 17. Muqtafi (902-7). | 32. Mustanjid (1160-61). |
| 18. Muqtadir (907-32). | 33. Mustazi (1161-80). |
| 19. Qahir (932-34). | 34. Nasir (1180-1225). |
| 20. Razi (934-41). | 35. Zahir (1225-26). |
| 21. Muttaqi (941-45). | 36. Mustansir (1226-42). |
| 22. Mustaqfi (945-46). | 37. Musta'sim (1242-58). |
| 23. Muti' (946-74). | |

on the subject is lacking in almost all lands. Some points are, however, clear. The far-flung empire of the Umayyads could only be maintained by the unquestioned supremacy of the Arab race and the Arabic language. But in the century or more that followed the conquests of Umar I, the conquered peoples, specially the Persians, ignored their own language and equalled, or perhaps surpassed, the Arabs in every sphere, scientific or secular, in which the Arabian language had become the sole medium for communication between Muslim peoples. Islamic faith, and not Arab blood, now became a condition of membership of the governing class; the old religions had gone, never to revive; in the course of generations non-Muslims, perhaps as the result of unnoticed local group-decisions, thrust themselves into Islam in order to obtain an entrance to its universal brotherhood and full citizenship rights. Inevitably different parts of the Muslim world went in different directions.

Apart from their administrative incompetence, the Abbasid caliphs with their governing class of Arabicised Persians could not expect to retain the allegiance of Africa. Spain never came under their control. After the Caliph Mansur had killed two brothers, Muhammad and Ibrahim, whose chief fault was that they were descended from Hasan, a grandson of the Caliph Ali, the third brother, Idris, fled from Mecca to Tangiers and founded the Idrisi dynasty there. The Muslims of Africa, whether Arabs or Berbers, saw no reason for accepting the Abbasid caliphate. Conditions at its capital, Qairawan, were chaotic during the larger part of Mansur's reign; he brought the country, or at least its capital, under the control of the Abbasid government, but this control was not destined to last. Harun Rashid's general, Harsama, found the hostility at Qairawan so great that, having no hopes of eventual success, he applied for appointment elsewhere, and after his departure the Aghlabid dynasty of Qairawan was founded, which ultimately became independent.

Egypt saw the rise and fall of two minor dynasties—the Tulunids (868-83) and the Ikhshided (933-61). Finally, Abu Muhammad Ubaidullah, who claimed descent from Ismail, son of Imam Ja'far Sadiq, laid the foundation of the Fatimid caliphate (909-1171). He conquered the larger part of northern Africa and made Mahdiya (near Tunis) his capital. Sixty years later his successor conquered Egypt. The Fatimids claimed to be caliphs as the legitimate descendants of the Prophet and were, consequently, rivals of the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. But since the mass of the Egyptians were Sunnis, they followed a policy of religious toleration.

Meanwhile the lands of the eastern caliphate were also being appropriated by minor dynasties. They can only be listed in the space

at our disposal and no account can be given of their wars and constantly changing frontiers. Mamun was responsible for at least two of them.

(a) *The Tahirids* (820-72): In 820 Mamun appointed his commander-in-chief, Tahir, governor of Khurasan. After he had been in charge for two or three years, Tahir omitted the name of the Caliph Mamun from the Friday sermon and was found dead in his bed next day. Mamun appointed Tahir's son, Talha, in his place. Talha was followed by Abdullah, Tahir II and Muhammad, who was overthrown by Yaqub bin Lais, the Saffarid.

(b) *Samanid* (874-999): Mamun ordered the four sons of Saman, a converted Persian noble from Balkh, to be given the governorships of Samarqand, Ferghana, Shash and Herat. Herat was too far and went out of the control of the family, but Ismail, a descendant of Saman, consolidated his power in Trans-Oxiana in 874. The power of the family expanded into Khurasan and it lasted with varying fortunes till it was extinguished by the Qara-Khanids in 999.

(c) *The Saffarids* (861-900): Alone among the royal dynasties of Islam, we find the Saffarids proud of their working class origin. Yaqub bin Lais, the founder of the dynasty, started his life in a city of Sistan as a copper-smith (*saffar*) on the wage of 15 copper coins a month. His younger brother, Amr, also started life as a labourer. The two brothers may have resorted to highway robbery for a time, but they enlisted in the army of a Tahirid officer, Salih bin Nasr, who had been deputed to fight the Kharijis. In 861 Yaqub found himself commander of the army of Sistan and proceeded to conquer Herat, Kirman and Fars. His power over these distant provinces was recognized by the Abbasid caliph in 871 and Yaqub even conquered Kabul from its Turkish king, who was a Buddhist. Yaqub's conquest of Khurasan from the Tahirids in 872, however, could not but bring him into conflict with the caliphate. Yaqub, who had now about half of Persia under his control, decided to attack Baghdad, but he was defeated near the capital by Mu'affaq, the brother of the caliph, and died in Sistan some three years later. Amr, who succeeded his brother, prospered for some years. But having obtained Naishapur in 896, he also wanted to conquer Trans-Oxiana. But in the campaign that followed (A.D. 900) he was defeated and captured by Ismail Samani and sent as a prisoner to Baghdad, where he was probably left to die of starvation in his prison. A grandson of his entered the service of Sultan Mahmud.

(d) *The Ziyarid Dynasty* (928-1042): Mardawaj bin Ziyar laid the foundation of this dynasty by capturing Tabaristan and some other districts. It is known primarily for its patronage of letters. Albairuni dedicated his *Chronology of Ancient Nations* to one of its princes,

Qabus bin Washmagir; while Qabus's grandson, Kai Kaus, has left us the delightful *Qabus Nama*.

(e) *The Buwaihids or Dailamite Dynasty (932-1052)*: The founder of the Ziyarid dynasty bestowed the district of Karaj, south of Hamadan, on Ali, son of Buwaih, who with the help of his able brothers conquered Fars. The internal history of the dynasty is confusing. But the Buwaihids have to be remembered for two reasons. They were Shias and orthodox Shia literature prospered under them. They also, as we have seen, controlled the caliphate for about a century with the title of *Amirul Umara*. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni deprived the dynasty of most of its possessions and the Seljuqs took away what Mahmud had failed to seize.

(f) *The Qara Khanids*: East of the Jaxartes in Turkistan were the Qara Khanids, of whom little is known. 'In the kingdom of the Qara Khanids, as in all nomad empires,' Barthold tells us, 'the conception of patrimonial property was carried over from the domain of personal law to that of state law. . . It is impossible for us to determine with accuracy the chronology of the reigns of the separate members of the family.'²⁴ One ruler of the family, Bughra Khan, captured Bukhara in 990 but had to retire on account of his illness and died soon after. But in 999 Ilak Khan, probably another ruler of the same dynasty, occupied Bukhara without opposition and put an end to the Samanids.

(g) *The Ghaznavids (962-1186)*: In 962 Alptagin, a slave-officer of the Samanids, who was governor of Khurasan, took the wrong side in the succession question at Bukhara, and afraid of the punishment that might befall him, he marched to Ghazni and established himself there. He was succeeded by his son, Abu Ishaq and then by two slave-officers, Bilkatagin and Piray; the latter, who was a tyrant, had to give place to Subuktagin, another Turkish slave of Alptagin, in 977. The conquests of Subuktagin (977-99) and his son Mahmud (999-1030) gave rise to a new type of empire, called the *sultanat*, sanctioned by the caliph but based upon conquests.

Apart from the rise of the *sultanats* or the extensive empires governing the lands of the Persians and the Turks, the tenth and the eleventh centuries are to be noted for two other movements in the history of Ajam. The first is the supremacy of the Turks as a military and a governing class. The Caliph Mu'tasim had organised a Turkish bodyguard. The Samanids, though Persians in race, organised their Turkish army by putting it through a hard and stern discipline.²⁵

²⁴ Barthold, *Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasions* (Gibbs Memorial Series), 268.

²⁵ 'Nizamul Mulk (in his *Siyasat Nama*) describes the career of a Turkish slave at the Samanid court as follows. During the first year the slave (*ghulam*) served on foot

Not less important is the second movement, which Professor Browne calls the 'Persian Renaissance'. The Persians began to study and admire their ancient culture, which they had discarded in the first generations after the Arab conquest, and modern Persian, written in the Arabic script, became the second great repository of Muslim culture. If Persian literature can be said to have one founder, it is Firdausi with his great work, the *Shah Nama*. But Persian poetry, taken as a whole, is one of the greatest cultural achievements of mankind.²⁶ It was natural for the Abbasid caliphate to patronise Arabic as the common heritage of all Musalmans, but the minor dynasties began to help in the revival of the Persian language, first poetry and then prose. The greatest patrons were, of course, the Ghaznavids.

in the capacity of a groom; and not even in secret, under pain of punishment, did he dare mount a horse; at this period he wore garments of Zandani cloth (which derived its name from the Bukharan village of Zandan). After a year the *hajib*, in agreement with the commander of the tent (*wisaq*), gave him a Turkish horse with plain harness. In the third year he received a special belt (*qarachur*); in the fifth a better saddle, a snaffle ornamented with stars, richer clothing and a club; in the sixth year parade dress; in the seventh the rank of *wisaq-bashi*, i.e. commander of the tent, which he shared with three other men. The insignia of office of the *wisaq-bashi* were a black felt hat embroidered in silver and Ganja clothing (Ganja is the present Elizabetpol). He gradually rose to the following grades, *khatl-bashi* (section commandant) and *hajib*. At the head of the whole establishment was the Chief Hajib (*Hajibul Hujjab*), one of the first dignitaries of the kingdom.' (Barthold, *Turkestan*, 227).

²⁶ One of the greatest works on the subject in English is Professor E. G. Browne's *A Literary History of Persia* (4 vols.). According to Professor Browne the surviving pre-Muslim literature of Persia does not exceed the Old Testament in size. The *Shah Nama* does not touch real history anywhere before the rise of the Sasasanids; most pre-Muslim Persian history as well as alleged Persian wisdom has to be discarded as manufactured stuff.

II. THE KHWARAZMIAN EMPIRE

THE GHAZNAVID AND SELJUQ EMPIRES

THE CREDIT of being the first 'Sultan' in Muslim history is generally given by historians to Mahmud, son of Subuktagin, the famous invader of India. This title is not found on his coins, which simply designate him as *Amir Mahmud*, and it was not given to him by the caliph. Still it is not difficult to discover the institution, which the new term was intended to indicate. The caliphate as a governing authority had disappeared; the provincial dynasties with their constant wars had been a curse; but if one of these minor dynasties rose above all others, so that it liquidated the smaller kingdoms and maintained peace between the tribal chiefs, Ajam would have both prosperity and peace.¹

Sultan Mahmud (999-1030) deserved this title on the basis of his conquests in Persia and Mawaraun Nahr. Unfortunately neither Mahmud nor his son, Mas'ud (1030-40), were good administrators. But when Tughril, leading the Seljuq immigrants from the east, defeated Mas'ud at the three-day battle of Dandaniqan, north of Merv, he and his successors were able to give a better administration to Ajam. 'The Seljuqs', says the *Rauzat-us Safa*, 'have been the greatest of the Sultans.' The dynasty produced six great Emperor-Sultans—Tughril (1037-63), Alp Arslan (1063-72), Malik Shah (1072-92), Barkiaruz (1094-1104), Muhammad (1104-17) and Sanjar (1117-57).

The reign of Malik Shah, who probably gave to the whole of Ajam the best centralised administration it was destined to enjoy during the middle ages, has been described by Gibbon in his usual style:

'This barbarian, by his personal merit and the extent of his empire, was the greatest prince of the age. . . Beyond the Oxus he reduced to his obedience the cities of Bukhara, Khwarazm and crushed every rebellious slave or rebellious savage who dared to resist. Malik Shah passed the Sihun or Jaxartes, the last limit of Persian civilization; the hordes of Turkistan yielded to his supremacy; his name was inserted on the coins and in the prayers of Kashghar, a Tartar kingdom on the extreme borders of China. From the Chinese frontier stretched his immediate jurisdiction or feudatory

¹ The title, *Sultan*, was occasionally given to earlier rulers also (Barthold, *Turkestan*, 271).

sway to the west and south, as far as the mountains of Georgia, the neighbourhood of Constantinople, the holy city of Jerusalem and the spicy groves of Arabia Felix. . . He is said to have perambulated twelve times the wide extent of his dominions, which surpassed the Asiatic realms of Cyrus and the caliphs.²

These three empires—the Ghaznavid, the Seljuq and the Khwarazmian—were primarily the concern of a Turkish governing class, which had absorbed Persian culture and was bilingual in speech but was proud of its racial origin. 'The Turkish race', says Yazdi, the biographer of Tamerlane, 'has conquered the world through its unity and mutual cooperation; in its generosity and justice it exceeds all other groups of mankind; and owing to its high virtues it has proved itself worthy of the Quranic verse: "We have sent you as Our representative on the earth."' An examination of the achievements of the Turks will not justify this high claim. But it is true that, till the fall of the Timurids, military power in Ajam remained on the whole a Turkish monopoly, though the wizarat and the administrative departments were in Persian hands.³

SULTAN SANJAR AND THE GOR KHAN

Though Islam had ceased to expand for centuries, its western frontiers in Ajam seemed safe. But the reign of Sultan Sanjar was to see the first signal defeat of Muslim arms and the establishment of a non-Muslim power over several Muslim communities. *It was a warning that the Musalmans were not maintaining their position as leaders of world-standards, but thanks to the anti-scientific and soul-killing orthodoxy, which had permeated the Muslim mind, this grave warning went completely unheeded.* But to understand what happened we must cast a glance at remote, rational and religionless China.

'Taking advantage of the fall of the Tang dynasty, the Khita, an eastern Mongol tribe, began to press southward into China. In 938 they made their capital at Peking. The Khita rapidly absorbed Chinese culture. . . and reigned at Peking for more than 180 years. • But in 1114, they were attacked by a north Manchurian tribe, the • Kin Tartars, who eventually conquered Peking in 1123. A certain

2 Gibbon: *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapter LVII.

3 It is not easy to define a 'Turk'. A line drawn from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the north of the Himalayas would roughly divide the Persians from the non-Persian and non-Chinese groups, for whom at present we have no name. When members of these groups became cultured and took to the ways of city-life, they were called 'Turks'. The backward communities of the race were called by their tribal names or they were just dismissed as 'Turkomans'.

number of Khitains refused to submit to the Kins. We know that a band of fugitives, fleeing across the desert of Mongolia, was crushed by the Lion Khan, prince of Kashghar, in 1128 or a little later. Another sortie was destined to have a much more important consequence. Yeh-lu Ta-shih, a member of the Khitai royal family, managed to escape with a few hundred followers to seek protection from the Aighur prince of Beshbaligh. Here Ta-shih collected an army and embarked on a career of conquest as surprising in its way as that of Chengiz himself. In some half-a-dozen years (he died in 1135 or 1136), he built up an empire that extended from the Zangarian desert to the confines of India. To the Muslim world his people were known as Qara-Khita (Black Cathayans).⁴

The rulers of the Qara-Khita were called Gor Khans (Universal Khans). Our Muslim historians knew very little of the internal organisation of the Gor Khani state and the names of the Gor Khans as given by them are too inaccurate to be worth transliterating. 'The early Qara-Khitai rulers', Minhajus Siraj remarks, 'were just, courageous and equitable; they regarded the Musalmans with great respect, showed favour to their religious scholars and did not permit any created being to be oppressed.'⁵

Sultan Sanjar's empire was seemingly strong. 'His orders were obeyed in the east and the west, and owing to his extensive dominions and their great wealth, the amirs and high officers of his state became proud and began to oppress the people.'⁶ In 1142-43 Sultan Sanjar subdued Ahmad Khan, the paralytic ruler of Samarkand, and went out of his way to pick up a quarrel with the Gor Khan by seizing the flocks of some tribesmen who belonged to the Gor Khan's territory.

'The Gor Khan collected a powerful army and marched against the Sultan. The Khurasanis, in spite of their internal discord, imagined that a hundred Gor Khans would not be able to oppose them, quite unaware of the fact that pride and arrogance lead to ruin and disgrace. When the armies met, the enemy was beyond reckoning. Sultan Sanjar was surrounded on all sides; a great defeat befell the Muslim army and about thirty thousand men were slain. Sanjar was dismayed, for fighting and flying seemed equally impossible. Ultimately Tajuddin Abul Fazl exclaimed, 'Your Majesty! We should try to break through, for it is impossible to make a stand any further.' The Sultan attacked the infidel troops with some three

⁴ Arthur Walley, *Introduction to The Travels of an Alchemist*, (Broadway Travelers), 2.

⁵ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, Persian text, 325.

⁶ *Rauzat-us Safa*, Vol. IV, 112.

hundred brave soldiers and succeeded in breaking through with ten or fifteen men. He reached Tirmiz, where he was joined by his surviving, wounded and helpless soldiers... In this battle ten thousand notable followers of Sultan Sanjar were killed and his wife, Turkan Khatun, with many famous amirs, was captured.⁷

The Gor Khan sent back the queen and the prisoners, but the military prestige of Sanjar and, in fact of the Musalmans, had vanished. In 1152 Sanjar was defeated and captured by the Ghizz Turks, who proceeded to plunder the great cities of Ajam. Sanjar succeeded in escaping from captivity in 1156 but died heart-broken next year.

The Gor Khans did not try to establish their direct administration in Trans-Oxiana or Mawaraun Nahr, but contented themselves with levying a tribute. Still they held the premier military position for over half-a-century to come. 'When the trouble of the Ghizz arose and the power of Sultan Sanjar declined,' the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* states,

'the Qara-Khita became all powerful. The maliks of Turkistan overpowered each other with their assistance and sent them money and presents in the hope of getting their help; they strove to overthrow each other with the result that the Qara-Khita became rulers over all of them, and this domination continued for over eighty years. . . Their armies on several occasions crossed the Oxus and entered the territories of Balkh, Tirmiz, Amu, Taliqan, Kazrawan, Gharjistan and came on to the very frontiers of Ghur for the sake of plunder, and they sometimes captured the Musalmans of these regions. All (rulers) of Trans-Oxiana, Farghana, Khwarazm, and even some rulers of Khurasan, sent them tribute; apart from the Sultans of Ghur and Bamian, who alone remained independent, all the rulers on the frontiers (of Islam) became subordinate to the Gor Khans.'⁸

Among others, Atisiz, the ruler of Khwarazm, sent envoys to the Gor Khan and promised a yearly tribute of 3,000 gold *dinars* in goods and cattle.

FOUNDATION OF THE KHWARAZMIAN EMPIRE

But though contemporaries failed to see it, the foundations of a new empire had already been laid. Bilkatigin, a high Seljuq officer, had purchased a slave, Nushtigin of Gharjistan. Nushtigin rose in service by dint of intelligence and sagacity and was appointed royal *tasht-dar* (basin-holder); and since the revenues of Khwarazm were allotted for the expenses of the royal kitchen, he was also made *shuhna* of that

⁷ *Ibid.*, 112-13.

⁸ *Persian Text*, 328-29.

city. Nushtigin saw to the careful education of his son, Qutbuddin, at Merv; and Dadbek Habashi, governor of Khurasan during the reign of Sultan Barkiaruq, son and successor of Malik Shah, gave the office of 'Khwarazm Shah' to Qutbuddin in 1097-98.⁹ This office had often been given to government officers in the past, and the term 'Shah' did not imply either autonomy or independence. Qutbuddin governed Khwarazm for some thirty years; he used to pass every alternate year in service at Sanjar's court, and in the year he could not go, he sent his son, Atisiz, to serve on his behalf.

With the appointment of Atisiz (1128-56) in succession to his father, Khwarazm gradually became independent of the Seljuqs. Sanjar led three attacks on Khwarazm, but Atisiz's power could not be broken. When Sanjar was defeated by the Qara-Khita in 1142, Atisiz took advantage of the opportunity, 'looting the city of Balkh and making a lot of slaughter'.

Atisiz had proved disloyal to the Seljuqs under whom his father and grandfather had prospered and became a tributary of the Gor Khans; his only excuse for this disloyalty to his salt was that, after he had saved Sultan Sanjar from being assassinated by his slaves while hunting, the Seljuq officers had grown too jealous of him and he had to obtain Sanjar's permission to return to Khwarazm in 1135. Still Atisiz set a bad example of Machiavellian intrigue and disloyalty for the generations to come, and the tribute to the Gor Khans was to be a halter round the neck of the Khwarazmian empire.

Atisiz's son and successor, I-l Arsalan (1156-70), seems to have prevented a war of succession by imprisoning his younger brother, Sulaiman Shah. The affairs of Khurasan were in a confused state, but I-l Arsalan was not destined to put them right. He led a campaign against Samarqand in 1158 without any definite result. On the other hand, the army of the Qara-Khita and Trans-Oxiana marched against him in 1170, and at the battle of Amuya, a city on the bank of the Oxus, his army was put to flight and his commander-in-chief, Ayyar Beg, was captured. I-l Arsalan died on his way to Khwarazm in August 1170.

I-l Arsalan had appointed his younger son, Sultan Shah, as his successor, and Sultan Shah ascended the throne while his mother, Malika Turkan, took charge of the administration. His elder brother, Taksh, who was at Jund, claimed his share, and the conflict between the brothers began with an exchange of quatrains. Taksh, who was

⁹ Juwayni says that he got these facts from Razi's *Jurami'ul Ulum* (Encyclopaedia of Knowledge) which was written for Sultan Taksh, and Ibn-i Funduq Baihaqi's *Masharibut Tajarib*, which is a continuation of the famous *Tajaribul Umam* of Miskawaih.

not a poet, asked his son, Malik Shah, to reply to his uncle's challenging verses. Malik Shah suggested in a quatrain that Sultan Shah should have Merv and that Khurasan, still to be conquered, was to belong to Taksh. But Sultan Shah replied: 'Dear nephew! These matters are settled by the sword.' Taksh in despair appealed to the Gor Khan. The reigning Gor Khan at that time was a woman, and the affairs of the state were managed by her husband, Fuma. Taksh promised a large lump sum in treasures and jewels and a yearly tribute. Sultan Shah was unable to resist the joint armies of Taksh and Fuma; he fled without fighting from Khwarazm to Malik Muayyad at Shadyakh and Taksh ascended the throne of Khwarazm in December 1172. In the attempt to conquer Khwarazm, Malik Muayyad was captured in a battle and put to death. Sultan Shah and his mother fled to Dihistan; Taksh captured Dihistan and put the mother to death, but Sultan Shah succeeded in escaping.

The future was to show that Sultan Shah was not only a second-rate poet but also a restless warrior, without gratitude and without policy, and in general a political nuisance. He first fled to Tughan Shah, son of Malik Muayyad, and then to the Ghurian brothers, Ghiyasuddin and Shihabuddin. They received him as an honoured guest, but made it clear that they had no intention of helping him in his ambitions. But help came to Sultan Shah from another quarter. It was a complaint then and later that the Qara-Khitai ambassadors were insolent towards the Khwarazmian rulers; they insisted on sitting by the side of the Sultan on his throne and did not observe the conventions of the royal court. Taksh had no intention of tolerating Qara-Khitai insolence, now that his purpose had been served. 'He caused one of the notables of Khita, who had come upon an embassy, to be put to death on account of his unseemly behaviour, and there was an exchange of abuse between him and the people of Khita.'

The Gor Khan and her officers looked round for a pretender to the Khwarazmian throne and Sultan Shah was the only available candidate. Sultan Shah, on his part—and much to the relief of his Ghurian hosts—hastened at the summons of the Khitai envoys and succeeded in convincing the Khitai officers of his popularity with his people. But when Fuma reached Khwarazm a second time, he found no sign of any movement in favour of Sultan Shah; the roads had been flooded with water from the Oxus and the Khwarazmians were prepared to fight to the bitter end. Fuma decided to retreat, but Sultan Shah induced Fuma to lend him a contingent; he attacked Sarakhs without success but managed to conquer Merv from the Ghizz Turks.

Taksh was destined to expand the kingdom of Khwarazm into an empire. It is not possible to go into the details of Taksh's military

achievements but they are summed up in a quatrain of the poet, Qa-ani: 'Goods news! The Khwarazm Shah has conquered the territory of Isfahan; he has also conquered the two Iraqs in the same way as Khurasan.' For his unpleasant relations with the caliph, the main responsibility lies with the caliph's wazir, Muayyaduddin, who among other insolent demands wanted Taksh to walk before his horse. But after defeating the Caliph Nasir's army in 1195, Taksh made peace with him and succeeded in getting Nasir's *farman* appointing him Sultan of Iraq, Khurasan and Turkistan. Towards the end of his reign Taksh decided to crush the heretic kingdom of Alamut, but he died on his way to Tarshiz in A.D. 1200. He is said to have advised his successor to keep on good terms with the Gor Khan 'because he was a great wall behind which there were terrible foes.' Chengiz Khan had nearly completed the consolidation of Mongolia and Taksh was probably aware of what this meant.¹⁰

ALAUDDIN MUHAMMAD KHWARAZM SHAH

Taksh's successor, Alauddin Muhammad Khwarazm Shah, styled 'the Second Alexander' (1200-20), was the last of the old type of Emperor-Sultans, for Timur does not belong to this category. His tragic end was to prove that the system he represented was completely outmoded. Still fortune granted him eighteen* years of prosperity.

The great fact of the time was the remarkable growth of the power of Ghur both in its homelands and in India. Alauddin, according to Minhajus Siraj, appealed to Ghiyasuddin and Shihabuddin to treat him as their son and suggested a marriage between Shihabuddin and his mother, Turkan Khatun.¹¹ But Shihabuddin showed no inclination to be tied to that terrible woman, and in any case the Ghurians, incited by the caliph, had made up their mind to take the offensive. To start with, great success crowned their efforts. 'The whole of Khurasan came under their control and was cleared of the enemy.' Muhammad

10 *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Persian text, Vol. II, 89, Boyle's translation, Vol. I, 357.

11. Most historians refer to Turkan Khatun as a hideous monster. Among others, Juwayni writes as follows: 'By race she belonged to the Turkish tribes, called the Qanqali, and Turkan on account of her origin favoured the (Qanqali) Turks, who during her life-time were in the ascendancy. They were called Ajami and mercy and compassion were far removed from their hearts. Wherever they passed by, that country was laid in ruin and the people fled to their strongholds; and indeed it was their cruelty, violence and wickedness that brought about the fall of the Sultan's dynasty.' In order to ensure the power of her son, she used to have the hostages who were brought to Khwarazm drowned in the Oxus. 'At the time of her departure (from Khwarazm owing to the approach of Chengiz's army) she ordered a number of local rulers, who had been detained as hostages, to be cast into the Oxus, all except those who were not of royal rank.' (Boyle's translation, Vol. I, 465-66).

Kharang, a notable Ghurian warrior, who used to fight tigers and elephants, led a contingent that conquered distant Merv. Leading Ghurian officers belonging to the royal family were put in charge of the conquered cities. Malik Ziauddin, a cousin and son-in-law of Ghiyasuddin, was assigned the region of Naishapur; Sarakhs was assigned to Malik Tajuddin Zangi, a cousin of the two sultans; Herat had been captured by them some years before from a Seljuq slave-officer, Bahauddin Tughril. 'Every one who had a hand in the administration of the Khwarazmian ministry of revenue had his property confiscated by the Ghurians.'

The Khwarazm Shah, however, succeeded in recapturing Shah-dyakh and Sarakhs in 1200; and when next year he proceeded against Herat, its kotwal, Izzuddin Murghazi, sued for peace. But just then Sultan Shihabuddin once more marched towards Naishapur; the Khwarazm Shah, who considered a pitched battle inadvisable, retired to his capital, but at the same time he refused to surrender any part of Khurasan. Shihabuddin captured Tus, confiscated the property of the inhabitants and seized the corn that had been brought to Mashed in the hope that it would be safe there under the protection of the shrine of Imam Ali-ur Raza. 'For these hard reasons', says Juwayni; 'in addition to what had gone before, the minds of the nobles and the commons alike were filled with hatred of the Ghurian rule, and the people had even a greater desire to attach themselves to the Khwarazm Shah's party.'¹²

At this juncture Sultan Ghiyasuddin Ghuri died at Herat on 27 Jamadi I A.H. 599 (13 March A.D. 1203) and Shihabuddin had to beat a retreat. He kept Ghazni and his Indian conquests in his own hands, intending them to go to his senior slave-officers, but he divided the ancestral territory of Ghiyasuddin among his heirs. Ziauddin, the son-in-law of the late Sultan, was given the territories of Ghur and Garm-sir, including the capital of Firuz Koh, (the city of) Marwar Rud and Zamin-i Dawar. Ghiyasuddin Mahmud, his son, had to content himself with the city of Bust and the territories of Farah and Isfarar. Herat was given to Alp Ghazi, son of a sister of the two sultans. This distribution of Ghiyasuddin's patrimony is hard to justify, but experience was driving Shihabuddin (who now took the title of Mu'izzuddin) to the conclusion that his relations were worthless and that no reliance could be placed on the tribal chiefs of Ghur.

Mu'izzuddin's withdrawal had left Kharang at Merv unprotected. A Khwarazmian army captured Merv, cut off Kharang's head and sent it to Khwarazm. The Khwarazm Shah next marched to Herat in

person; Alp Ghazi claimed that he had Mu'izzuddin's authority to make peace and offered to surrender Herat. Mu'izzuddin, who had been embittered by the death of Kharang, repudiated Alp Ghazi's treaty and decided to end the struggle by marching against Khwarazm and seizing the capital of his rival. But the Khwarazm Shah anticipated this move by returning to Khwarazm by way of the desert. 'A holy war was declared against the Ghurian aggressor on the basis of the Prophet's precept: *Every man slain in the defence of his life and property is a martyr.*' He also succeeded in collecting an army of some seventy thousand men round his camp at Nuzwar, probably situated on one of the branches of the Oxus. The Ghurians encamped on the opposite side and began trying to find means of crossing the stream.

Mu'izzuddin had made a terrible mistake in embarking on a campaign so far from his base; he was probably surprised at the intense hostility of the civil population and his nerves failed him when he heard that the Gor Khan, in response to the Khwarazm Shah's appeals, had sent an army against him under his famous general, Taniku (or Tayanaku) of Taraz along with Sultan Usman, the 'Sultanus Salatin' of Samarqand. This relieving force very wisely decided not to march to Khwarazm but to crush Mu'izzuddin by throwing itself between him and Ghazni. Mu'izzuddin decided to run back and the Khwarazmians pursued him. Near the fortress of Hazar Asp he turned back to fight but was badly defeated. 'Many Ghurian amirs and leaders fell into the bonds of captivity and the rest of them limped and stumbled through the waterless desert.'

The rest of the campaign is thus described by Minhajus Siraj: 'As the conquest of Khwarazm was not possible owing to lack of equipment, the length of the campaign and want of fodder, Mu'izzuddin turned back from Khwarazm on the bank of the Oxus to Balkh. The army of Khita and the maliks of Turkistan had crossed the Oxus and were standing in the path of the army of Islam. When the Sultan reached Andkhud, the vanguard of the infidel army came up to the Sultan's camp after the *zuhr* (afternoon) prayer and began the battle. A'izzuddin Husain Kharmil, malik of Kazrawan and the leader of the Muslim advance-guard, defeated them and immediately came to the victorious Sultan and said: "Such has been the victory of the Musalmans and the defeat of the infidels; the proper thing for the king of Islam would be to order the Musalmans to mount immediately, pursue the infidels and attack them all of a sudden so that a great victory may be the result." "I have been in search of such a holy war (*ghazwa*) for years," the Sultan replied, "there will be no failure on my part. Tomorrow morning, with Divine assistance, I will fight the enemy and see to whom God grants success. In any case, I will have won the

rewards according to the *sunnah*."

'Kharmil, on observing the mental condition of the Sultan, realized that his words were inspired by his faith in Islam and his desire to protect it; but the army of the infidels was beyond computation and all their soldiers were in proper condition, while the army of Islam had been exhausted by the long campaign and would not be able to oppose the enemy. He came out of the Sultan's presence and with his own contingent, which consisted of five thousand horsemen, started for Kazrawan at night. Most of the troopers, whose horses were lean, also deserted Mu'izzuddin in a body.

'Next morning the Sultan drew up his lines and started the battle with his chosen slaves and the few horsemen of the centre, who were still left with him. The infidel army surrounded them in concentric circles. The Sultan's slaves represented to him that as only a few Musalmans were left, they ought to retreat, but he kept fighting at his post. Ultimately only about a hundred horsemen and slaves and a few elephants were all that remained with the Sultan. His Turkish slaves and his selected Ghurian officers (*sarkhail*) stationed themselves before his horse, killing the infidels and being martyred by them. Reliable witnesses state that the Sultan made such a vigorous stand that his august canopy was pierced with arrows (like quills on the back of a porcupine), but he would not turn back on any account. Ultimately, a slave, named Aihak Jogi, caught hold of the reins of his horse, dragged it towards the fort of Andhkhud and brought him safely inside the fort.¹³

The Khitains sat down to besiege the fort; a wall was breached and the fort would have been captured. But in the so-called 'infidel army' there were only ten thousand Khitai soldiers; the rest of the army consisted of the contingents of Muslim maliks, who were anxious not to harm Mu'izzuddin personally. Sultan Usman succeeded in arranging with Taniku that Mu'izzuddin would be allowed to proceed to Ghazni, provided he gave up all he possessed.

On reaching Ghazni messengers came to Mu'izzuddin from the Khwarazm Shah stating that it was Mu'izzuddin who had started the war and that in future there should be an alliance between them. Both had enough of the Khita. Mu'izzuddin agreed and ordered his officers to get ready in three years for a war against the Gor Khan. But next year (1206) he was assassinated by Ismaili devotees at a place called Damyak, near the Indus, and the anarchy that followed his death enabled the Khwarazm Shah to annex the homelands of the Ghurian kingdom, which had now split into three parts.

¹³ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, Persian text, 122-23.

(a) Alauddin Jahansuz had conquered Bamian and placed his eldest brother, Fakhruddin Mas'ud, in charge of it. Fakhruddin extended his frontiers till his kingdom covered the whole of Tukharistan or northern Afghanistan. The Khwarazm Shah conquered Tukharistan in 1213 from its last Ghurian ruler, Sultan Jalaluddin, and put him to death.

(b) There were a series of revolutions at Firuz Koh, the Ghurian capital. Ghiyasuddin Mahmud seized Firuz Koh from Ziauddin and obtained from the Khwarazm Shah a *farman* appointing him ruler of the place. But Ghiyasuddin was assassinated in 1212-13; his son, Baha-uddin Sam, a boy of fourteen, was dispossessed by Alauddin Atisiz, a son of Alauddin Jahansuz, with Khwarazmian assistance after he had reigned for three months. Alauddin Atisiz was killed as the result of wounds in a battle with Malik Nasiruddin Husain, who had been sent against him by Tajuddin Yilduz, the ruler of Ghazni. In 1212 or 1213 Malik Ziauddin, who had reigned at Firuz Koh once before, was taken out of his prison and placed on the throne, and Tajuddin Yilduz directed the canopy of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri to be taken from his mausoleum and sent to Ziauddin. A ruler subordinate to Ghazni did not suit the Khwarazm Shah, and he sent to Ziauddin a deed the latter had signed at Naishapur to the effect that he would not bear arms against the Khwarazm Shah again. Ziauddin, who seems to have been very religious minded, handed over Firuz Koh to the officers of the Khwarazm Shah in A.D. 1215 and passed the rest of his life in religious devotions at Khwarazm. This was the end of the Shansabani dynasty, which after laying the foundations of an Indian empire, quickly vanished in its homelands.

(c) Round the coffin of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri as it proceeded from Damyak to Ghazni in 1206 a severe struggle took place between his Ghurian officers and his Turkish slaves. The latter seem to have seized everything, and they placed Tajuddin Yilduz, the senior-most slave-officer, on the throne of Ghazni. Sultan Jalaluddin of Tukharistan, who wanted to take possession of Ghazni, was twice defeated, though he succeeded in carrying away a part of the spoils collected by Mu'izzuddin on two hundred and fifty camels, which ultimately went to the Khwarazm Shah. Yilduz tried to expand his kingdom in all directions, but with no success. About A.D. 1215-16 the Khwarazm Shah marched against him by way of Tukharistan. Yilduz fled to India where he was defeated and put to death by Shamsuddin Iltutmish.

Though the Gor Khan had saved Alauddin Khwarazm Shah in an hour of crisis in 1205, harmony between the two was not to be expected. The Khwarazmian empire was now almost as extensive as the empire of the Seljuqs had been, and Alauddin felt that paying tribute to the

Gor Khan was below his dignity. He withheld the tribute for three years till the Gor Khan sent his wazir, Muhammad Ta'i, to realize it. The Sultan, who was about to start on his famous campaign to the Qipchaq, left the matter to be decided by his mother, Turkan Khatun, and his mother decided to pay all that was due. But after his return from this campaign, the Sultan decided on a war against the Gor Khan. He had received many letters from the notables of Trans-Oxiana appealing for his assistance against the Gor Khan, whose officers, contrary to their former tradition, 'had begun to conduct themselves in a lawless and oppressive manner'. Usman, the 'Sultanus Salatin' of Samarqand, also promised to join him against the Gor Khan, because the Khan had refused to marry Usman to his daughter, a woman of remarkable beauty with whom Usman had fallen in love. So when in 1209 the Gor Khan's envoy, Tushi, took his seat besides the Sultan on his throne and began to behave in an insolent manner, the Sultan ordered him to be crushed to pieces and thrown into the Oxus.

This meant a declaration of war. The Gor Khan ordered Taniku to hold himself in readiness. The Sultan crossed the Jaxartes at Fanakat and a battle was fought at Ilamish on a Friday in August/September 1210. Taniku, who (according to Minhajus Siraj) had been victorious in forty-five battles, was wounded, captured and later on put to death. The battle had been indecisive, but the Sultan ordered it to be celebrated as a victory in all his dominions and the people responded. Only Saiyyid Murtaza of Shadyakh refused to rejoice. He was apparently aware of the rise of Chengiz Khan and declared: 'Today I am in mourning for Islam.'

The army of the Gor Khan, when it returned after its alleged defeat, found the gates of its capital, Balasaqun, closed; the inhabitants paid no heed to the advice of Muhammad Ta'i and the amirs; and ultimately the soldiers slaughtered the inhabitants for three days and nights and 4,700 of the chief notables of the city were counted among the slain.¹⁴ Meanwhile differences had arisen between the Khwarazm Shah and Sultan Usman; the latter had been married to the Sultan's daughter, but she complained bitterly against her husband. The Khwarazm Shah marched against Samarqand; and though Usman came out submissively with a sword tied to his neck, the Sultan ordered a general massacre till about ten thousand inhabitants had been put to death. His daughter demanded the death of her husband and he acceded to her wishes. Samarqand was then declared to be the capital of the empire.

• At this time affairs were complicated by the appearance of Kushluq,

¹⁴ *Jucayni*, Persian text, Vol. II, 92.

son of Tayang Khan, chief of the Naiman tribe. Chengiz had defeated and probably killed Kushluq's father and had married his grandmother, Gur Besu; he now wanted to kill Kushluq and make a drinking cup from his skull. But just then Chengiz was busy fighting the Kin empire of northern China and Kushluq remained unmolested for a time. The Gor Khan had received him cordially, but after some time Kushluq parted from the Khan on the excuse of collecting his men. He then found it more to his interest to make an alliance with the Khwarazm Shah against his former host on the following terms: 'If the Sultan gained a victory over the Gor Khan, he was to receive all territory as far as Khutan and Kashghar, but if Kushluq was the victor, he would get everything as far as the river (Jaxartes) at Fanakat.' The Sultan marched against the Gor Khan, but the battle that followed was indecisive and for some time all traces of the Sultan were lost. Kushluq, on the other hand, succeeded in falling upon the Gor Khan unawares. But he treated the Gor Khan well till his death after a year or two.

This victory placed the region beyond the Jaxartes in the hands of Kushluq, who was a fanatical anti-Muslim. He had been brought up as a Christian, but seems to have become a Buddhist after marrying a Khitai girl. He asked his Muslim subjects to choose between conversion to Christianity and the wearing of Chinese dress; since the first alternative was impossible, they accepted the second. 'The Muslim call to prayer — *azan* and *takbir* — were hushed.' Kushluq used to abuse the Arabian Prophet and a scholar, Alauddin Muhammad, who ventured to challenge him in a public debate, was killed with tortures. But then to the relief of the Muslims a Mongol army under Yeme appeared on the scene and Kushluq took to flight. The Mongols said they had no quarrel with anybody's religion and removed all restrictions on the Muslim faith. They also had no commission to fight any one except Kushluq, who fled to Badakhshan, where he was captured and beheaded and his skull was made into a drinking cup.

When Alauddin Khwarazm Shah got possession of Ghazni in 1215-16, he discovered in the Ghurian archives the letters of the Caliph Nasir 'wherein the Ghurians were incited to attack the Sultan and the latter's deeds and actions were reviled'. Alauddin's wrath was naturally aroused when he discovered that Nasir was responsible for the continued hostility of the Ghurians to him and his father. He did not deem himself inferior in any way to the Buwaihids and the Seljuqs, to whom the caliphs had been obedient and subordinate; and he obtained the assent of his religious scholars to three propositions: (a) that an *imam* or *caliph* who behaved like Nasir was unfit for the office; (b) that a ruler, who had spent his whole time in holy wars, had

the right of ejecting such a caliph and putting a proper person in his place; (c) and that the Abbasids were usurpers and that the caliphate should go to the descendants of Imam Husain. On the basis of this *fatwa* the Khwarazm Shah removed the name of Nasir from the *khutba* throughout his extensive dominions.¹⁵

In A.D. 1217 Alauddin Khwarazm Shah raised Saiyyid Alauddin Tirmizi to the caliphate and marched with an army of three hundred thousands, supported by the chiefs of Iraq, Khurasan and Mawaraun Nahr, against Baghdad. The Caliph Nasir prevailed upon the great mystic, Shaikh Shihabuddin Suhrawardi, to call on the Khwarazm Shah and appeal to him to go back. But the eminence of the Shaikh was not known to the Khwarazmian court; the Shaikh had great difficulty in obtaining an interview, and when they met the Khwarazm Shah, who was sitting on a carpet, neither replied to the Shaikh's *salaam* nor invited him to sit down. The Shaikh spoke in Arabic and it was translated for the Sultan. Alauddin's reply was brusque: 'What this man says (about the virtues of Nasir) is not correct. When I reach Baghdad I will put on the throne of the caliphate a person with the necessary qualifications. As to the statement that the Prophet has asked us not to injure the Abbasids, it is the Abbasids who have caused the greatest harm to each other and many Abbasid princes have been born in prison.' At that time, remarks the *Rauzat-us Safa*, a large number of the descendants of Abbas were in prison.¹⁶ When the Shaikh reported the failure of his mission, Nasir prepared to stand a siege. But that year the winter in Baghdad was unexpectedly severe; the tents of the invaders were surrounded by snow; the animals in the Khwarazmian camp died; the hands and feet of the soldiers froze so that they were unable to move; and the Khwarazm Shah had no alternative but to retreat. He promised to return again with the necessary equipment, but it was impossible for him to do so owing to the Mongol invasion.

THE ISMAILI STATE OF ALAMUT (1090-1255)

In spite of the great orthodox empires of the Seljuqs and the Khwarazmians, the Ismaili or heretic state of Alamut founded by Hasan bin Sabbah succeeded in maintaining its independence and expanding its power. Hasan's father had come from Yaman and settled in Iran.¹⁷ Hasan was brought up in the orthodox Asna Ash'ari

¹⁵ Alauddin Ata Malik Juwayni, *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Persian text (Gibb's series), 83, 86, 120, 122; translation of John Andrew Boyle, Vol. I, 303-53, Vol. II, 390-92.

¹⁶ For this campaign of Khwarazm Shah, see *Rauzat-us Safa*, Vol. III, 182-83.

¹⁷ When Halaku conquered Alamut, he allowed his Muslim secretary, Ata Malik

Shia creed but accepted Ismailism and was commissioned as a *da'i* or propagandist. He was in Egypt for a year and a half during the reign of the Fatimid Caliph, Mustansir (1035-95). In 1090 his followers captured a fort, called Alamut (Eagle's Nest), north of Qazwin, from one Mahdi, an officer of Malik Shah Seljuqi. Hasan gave Mahdi a draft of 3,000 *dinars* on a Seljuq officer, Muzaffar, who was one of his secret followers. Muzaffar seems to have paid this amount, and the Ismailis got a centre for their propaganda. Alamut could not have been of much importance then, for when Hasan was besieged by the Seljuq officers, he had only sixty men with him and had to summon three hundred volunteers from outside.

Hasan was destined to live for thirty-five years in Alamut, during which he studied, wrote and directed the administration from his house, but never came out of the fort. Hasan considered himself to be merely a propagandist, whose duty was to prepare the way for the advent of the Ismaili Imam; he never claimed to be anything more. Persian historians, though otherwise hostile, do not deny Hasan bin Sabbah's academic eminence, dialectical ability and administrative skill. He was also a strict adherent of the religious law of the Prophet. He had two sons whom he put to death on various charges. He would not allow in Alamut or his other possessions anything not permitted by the *shari'at*.

The state of Alamut, which Hasan bin Sabbah founded, had three remarkable features. First, it consisted entirely of hill-forts. Hasan and his successors continued to capture old forts and to build new forts till their state came to consist of one hundred and five forts — seventy in the Iranian province of Qahistan and the rest outside it, including Iraq and Syria. These forts gave the rulers of Alamut a strangle-hold over the commerce of the country. Secondly, no attempt was made to organize a field-force, apart from the garrisons of the forts. Such a force would have been useless against the trained veterans of the Seljuq empire. As an alternative, Hasan trained a body of devotees (*fida'is*), who would assassinate at his order and the order of his successors. If we remember that for two centuries past an Ismaili in Ajam was killed, and often killed with tortures, as soon as he was discovered, it will be possible to understand the dauntless courage that inspired these 'assassins'. They killed orthodox kings, who had

Juwayni, to examine its library. The works of Hasan bin Sabbah had been burnt by one of his successors, Jalaluddin. But Juwayni found there a biography of Hasan bin Sabbah, called *Sarquzashit-i Satiyyidina* (Biography of our Master). Most historians have depended upon the third volume of Juwayni's *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha* for their information about the Alamut kingdom. The *Rauzat-us Safa* follows Juwayni closely, but adds something to it.

been putting Ismailis to death, and also orthodox *mullahs*, who incited the kings and the public against them. It was retaliation, pure and simple. The popular story of a mock-paradise is not required to explain their courage.

Sultan Sanjar Seljuqi, the *Rauzatus Safa* tells us, was prepared to make an agreement with Hasan bin Sabbah on three conditions — they were not to construct any new forts or purchase more arms or carry on their propaganda for conversion. But the *mullahs* would not agree and accused him of sympathy with the Ismailis. So Sanjar was driven to act on his own responsibility. 'He allowed them', Juwayni declares, 'a pension (*idrar*) of 3,000 dinars from the taxes on lands belonging to them in the region of Qumish and also permitted them to levy a small toll on travellers passing below Girdkoh, a custom which has survived to this day. I saw several of Sanjar's orders (*manshurs*), which had been preserved in their library and in which he conciliated and flattered them... In short during his reign they enjoyed ease and tranquillity.'

Before his death in 1124 Hasan bin Sabbah appointed his life-long friend, Kia Buzurg Umid, to succeed him; he also appointed three other high officers to help him 'and charged them, until such time as the Imam came to take possession of his kingdom, to act in concert and agreement'. Kia Buzurg Umid (1124-38) carried on the work of Hasan bin Sabbah efficiently but before his death he appointed his son, Muhammad (1138-62), as his successor. The office, thereafter, became hereditary and in due course developed all the evils of a Muslim monarchy based on the stern principle of primogeniture.

Hasan (1162-66), son of Muhammad, claimed that he was the *caliph* (representative) and the *hujjat* (proof) of the Imam in 1164, but in his later circulars he laid claim without any disguise to be the Imam the Ismailis had been waiting for. The claim was apparently accepted and Hasan was given the title, 'On his Name be Peace' (*Ala zikrihus salaam*) by his followers. According to Juwayni, Hasan followed the philosophers in believing that 'the universe is uncreated, that time is unlimited, that resurrection (*qiamat*) will be spiritual and that Heaven and Hell are to be understood in a purely allegorical sense.' If Hasan had any programme for his community beyond the mere claim to the Imamatus, it was not revealed, for he was assassinated by his brother-in-law in 1166.

The next Imam, Muhammad, son of Hasan, had a fairly long reign of forty-five years (1166-1210); he was an educated man and devoted his life to establishing his claim to the Imamatus. But his son, Jalaluddin Hasan (1210-21), declared himself to be an orthodox Sunni; he cursed his ancestors and burnt the books of Hasan bin Sabbah. But

his reign of eleven years was not long enough to take his people back to orthodoxy; and on the accession of his son, Alauddin, at the age of nine, they went back to their old ways.

It was left to Alauddin (1221-55) to prove that the new experiment of the Imamatus was a failure. 'Since it is the belief of the Ismailis', says the *Rauzat-us Safa*, 'that the eminence of the Imam is the same whether he is a boy, a young man or an old man, and that every order he gives will be in accordance with the Truth, no one has a right to criticize him or to disobey him.' So whatever Alauddin said was considered to be divinely inspired and he was implicitly obeyed. After he had reigned for five years, he opened a vein without the advice of any physician and lost a lot of blood. This brought on melancholia or some nervous disease, and Alauddin became 'a man fit only to be kept in bonds and chains'. But an Imam cannot be deposed; so Alauddin's regime of madness completely ruined the administration of Alamut. Jalaluddin, his father, had wisely offered his homage to Chengiz, but Alauddin in his ignorance took no notice of the Mongols and the Mongols considered this equivalent to treason. In 1255 when Alauddin's madness had become excessive, and his son and heir, Ruknuddin Khurshah, was thinking of flying away to another fort, one Hasan Mazendarani, a favourite of Alauddin whom he had driven to madness by his continued persecution, cut off his head at midnight (1 December 1255).

Ruknuddin Khurshah immediately offered his submission to the Mongols, but it had been decided at the *Quriltai* of 1251 at Qaraqum that Khurshah and all his people would be put to death. Halaku gave him and his people false promises of security and killed them after they had surrendered to him. Ata Malik Juwayni gloats over the massacre of the 'heretics', and ignorant of what was to befall him and his brother at their hands, thanks the Mongols for their service to Muslim orthodoxy.¹⁸ The *Rauzat-us Safa* is more cautious: 'Such Musalmans as the Tatar sword had spared thanked Halaku for what he did.'¹⁹

¹⁸ Juwayni, Boyle's translation, Vol. II, 724-25.

¹⁹ Persian Text, Vol. IV, 85.

III. THE RISE OF CHENGIZ KHAN

THE STEPPE SOCIETY

ONE OF THE recurrent phenomena in ancient and medieval history has been the west-ward movement of conquering nomadic tribes from the vast steppe region that extends from the east of the Jaxartes to the north of China. Not all these movements resulted in conquests; in fact most of them were suppressed and crushed by the sedentary or city-dwelling peoples of the east. But we find them beginning centuries before the White Huns and the Red Huns and the fiercest of them has been the attack of the Chengizi Mongols or Mughuls;¹ it was also the most devastating and lasting in its effects.

The cities of Turkistan were only to be found on the eastern bank of the Jaxartes and south of the Taklamakan desert; thereafter the steppe—rocky hills and rocky mountains—extends for what used to be some three months' journey till the Manchurian frontier. About the middle of it, and south of the territory of the Mongol *uluses* or military clans, is the Gobi desert—a sea of sand (*registan*) or dried up seabottom, which must be clearly distinguished from the steppe (*dasht*), which seems to have been formed by the weight of the primeval ice.

The main sources of livelihood for the steppe-dwellers were cattle-breeding, horse-breeding, hunting and fishing. Agriculture was almost unknown; the *Yuan-Chao-Pi-Shi* (*Secret History of the Mongols*), our only extant authority on the early career of Chengiz Khan, makes no reference to any cultivated field or farmer. Since the shepherds could only find a sparse vegetation on the steppe, they had to be constantly on the move, carrying about their tents (*aqsus*) on their carts and forming temporary tent-villages (*urts*).² But some excellent pastures and sweet-water lakes (*kols*) were also to be found, where a shepherd-group, strong enough to drive away its enemies, could claim an exclusive right of pasturage. There were no cities, and city-life was regarded with contempt. The cattle provided the steppe society with its basic needs—milk, curd, meat, and skins for their clothes and their

1 Chengiz and his people called themselves 'Dada'. *Mang ku*, from which 'Mongol' is derived, is a Chinese term meaning 'brave'. It dates from the third century. The Musalmans gave the name of Tatar, Turk, Mughul and even Chinese to this horde. The Europeans preferred to call them Tartars (after the Greek hell, Tartarus).

2 An excellent account of this steppe society, as it existed in the last generation, is to be found in Skrine's *Chinese Turkistan*. Mr. Skrine, the English Consul in Chinese

tents. When necessity drove them to it, they could cut open a vein of their horse or camel, put their mouth at the spot, suck the fresh blood and then stanch the incision they had made.

To the Muslim intelligentsia, which considered physical purity to be a part of its religion, these nomads as a people seemed to be intolerably dirty and frightfully disgusting. Like some of the backward tribes of India, they ate all animals—mice, rats, martens and the like. The distinction between eatable and non-eatable flesh was not known to them. In spite of the fact that summer in some regions is frightfully hot, the custom of bathing was almost unknown, and bathing or washing clothes in a stream during the summer was punished with death. Men and women, they all stank horribly. Their unwashed clothes were full of lice and they were constantly scratching their skins. Many of them preferred to shave off the hair of their heads. Owing to their insufficient and unvaried diet, they had not the same body-weight and muscular strength as the sedentary people; their surviving pictures show thin arms, lean waists, sparse beards and leathery faces.

None of the steppe societies had a written script, except the Aighurs; and Chengiz Khan, who did not know how to read or write and could speak no other language except the Mongolian, arranged for the sons of his chiefs to be taught to write Mongolian in the Aighur script. The steppe society was divided into units or *uluses*. These *uluses* were military in their character; the genealogy of the chiefs alone counted, or, to be more exact, the genealogy of the followers was supposed to be the same as that of their chiefs. The ordinary shepherds were transferred from the *ulus* of one chief to another according to the fortunes of war. North of the Gobi desert lived the Dada *uluses* (or the original Mongols), whose chiefs traced their descent from Qublai, the first Khaqan (Qa-an or Emperor). East of the Mongols lived the Tatars and east of the Tatars lived the Manchus. The basic achievement of Chengiz was the unification of these steppe societies into a single organisation directed by a central authority.

The character of primitive societies—their priest-kings, taboos, idols, mythologies, etc.—has been carefully studied during the last three generations. It has to be insisted that the steppe society, in spite of the hard conditions of its life, was in no sense primitive. This

Turkistan (Kashghar), calculated that two women working together could put up a tent in forty-five minutes and pack it up in fifteen minutes. A whole family—men, women and cattle—lived in one tent, which had a flap at the top to let out the smoke. Social opinion required that no young man should marry till he had a tent of his own. The price of a tent—a round structure made of animal skin—was about three pounds sterling.

is clear if we look at its intellectual development in two great fields—military science and religion.

The constant struggle for the means of life—struggle against nature which provided so little and against the neighbouring *ulus* organizations which threatened to take away even that—had in the course of centuries taught the steppe society, both men and women, to be sturdy, self-reliant and self-sufficient. They had great powers of endurance, an immense capacity for suffering and inflicting pain, and an almost unbelievable power of bearing cold and heat, thirst and hunger. It is doubtful if any group of human beings has equalled them in this respect. Moreover, continuous fighting over the centuries had developed certain skills which lay at the basis of medieval military science—excellent horsemanship, rapid marching and counter-marching, planning of ambushes, reading of the stars at night, following tracks, scouting, cooperation in fighting which is the basis of military discipline, and above all the genius that could accommodate itself to varying circumstances—discover new means for attaining its ends and learn all that the enemy could teach. It is surprising how the Mongol generals, who had never known warfare except in its primitive steppe-form, succeeded in devising unexpected tricks for capturing great walled towns and hill-forts, which they had not seen even in their dreams, by utilizing all the military machines of their day and improving upon the strategy and tactics they had learnt from their opponents. But these achievements would not have been possible if the 'private war' of the steppe had not in the course of centuries trained soldiers and horsemen capable of executing the tasks assigned to them; and in the steppe society every man was a professional soldier.

Owing to the complete absence of written records, it is impossible even to guess what phases the religion of the Mongols had passed through. But in the final form in which we find it in the time of Chengiz Khan, it is crystal clear. The Mongols had no sacred scriptures, no gods and goddesses and, of course, no mythological stories; also no idols, no consecrated tents or temples, no priests, no holy places and no pilgrimages. They were strangers to religious rites and rituals and to all religious directions and prohibitions, except with reference to Mongol moral laws. They believed, simply and sincerely, in one God, whom they called *Tengiri* or *Il Tengiri* (meaning sky or space), who stood both for the physical universe and the moral order. But there were no prescribed forms of prayer. If a person wanted to pray to *Il Tengiri*, he would kneel towards the sun, or towards the west if the sun had set, sprinkle wine or water on the ground and pray in such words as came to his mind. Congregational prayers were

quite unknown. The steppe society was not shackled by any unscientific religious inhibitions. Two steppe-groups, the Naimans and the Keraits, were Christians, but apart from the use of some symbols, like the wooden bell (*naqus*), they in no way differed from their neighbours. Theism without humbug, that was the essence of the Mongol creed.

Religious hatred in any form was quite unknown to the steppe-mind. It was perfectly tolerant towards all creeds and allowed them full opportunity of religious propaganda. The Musalmans, whom Chengiz murdered in such enormous numbers, were surprised at his belief in *his* God and at his undoubted tolerance in religious matters. Having no priests of their own, the leaders of steppe society were remarkably tolerant to the priests of all other cults—Muslim, Christian, Taoist and Buddhist. Exemption from taxes was granted to them, and they were expected to pray to God in their own way for the success of the Mongols. Lastly, the Mongols had no objection to intermarriages, and even Chengiz gave one of his daughters in marriage to a Muslim chief, Arsalan Khan of Kayaliq.

EARLY LEGENDS TO YESUGAI BAHADUR

In A.D. 1228 a Mongol officer dictated a small book on all he knew about the traditions of the Mongols ('Dada') and the struggle of the *uluses* that made Chengiz Khan supreme in the country. This work survives to us in a Chinese translation with a Chinese title—*Yuan-Chao-Pi-Shi*.³ The author's geographical references have been checked and found correct. The book only gives a few dates; the events, as is likely to happen in a dictated composition, are not always put in proper sequence. But the parts of the book which we can test are so correct that we can safely trust the non-legendary part of the rest of the work. A Persian version of the same work known as the *Golden Book* (*Altun Daftar*) fell into the hands of Rashiduddin (author of the *Jamiut Tawarikh*) and later Persian writers (Abul Fazl and others)

³ Translated into English by Professor Dr. Wei Kwai Sun and published by the Department of History, Muslim University, Aligarh. In Europe, as in those parts of Muslim Asia which the Mongols could not reach, hatred for the Mongols was freely expressed. But later on the Muslim descendants of Chengiz and Timur occupied a large part of Ajam and their official historians were required to glorify Chengiz and his ancestors. In Europe Chengiz Khan—the 'Cambuscan bold' of Milton—became a figure of romance and he continues as such even in works like Sir Henry Howorth's *History of the Mongols*, not to mention Harold Lamb's *Chengiz Khan* and Murch of the *Barbarians*. Dr. Wei has for the first time put the Mongols in a proper historical setting. I freely acknowledge the great debt I owe to my Chinese pupil. A Chinese scholar is fortunately free from those concepts which sometimes misguide people belonging to Semitic creeds.

have expanded its legendary part, which is not historically acceptable, into a perfect hideosity.

The *Yuan-Chao-Pi-Shi* (*Secret History of the Mongols*) declares that the 'Dada' people are the descendants of 'a heaven-born grey wolf and a whitish doe', who settled at the foot of Mount Burkhan at the source of the Onan river, and had a man-child, Batachi Khan. Duban Mirgan, eleventh in descent from Batachi, had Alan Goa for his wife. She bore him two sons during his life and had three sons after his death. To her legitimate sons, who accused her of adultery with their only family servant, she explained: 'You do not know that every night there entered a golden hued man from my brightened window and came into contact with my bosom, into which his light penetrated... My other three sons are apparently the children of heaven.' This legend was obviously manufactured under Christian influence. Some Muslim writers have declared Alan Goa to be a contemporary of the early Abbasids.

Alan Goa's descendants prospered and multiplied. But so far as the knowledge of the author of the *Secret History* goes, Qublai Khaqan (or Qa-an), the great grandfather of Chengiz, was the first ruler of the whole 'Dada' people. His successor, Anhbai, who was not one of his seven sons, was captured by the Tatars and handed over by them to the Kin emperor. The Kin was a Tatar dynasty, which had been governing northern China since A.D. 1114 and had gradually adopted Chinese ways of life. Since 'kin' means 'gold', the Kin emperor is referred to by Persian historians as 'Altun Khan'. Anhbai sent a message asking his relations to avenge him. They fought thirteen battles with the Tatars but the result was inconclusive. During these wars, Chengiz was born in A.D. 1163.⁴ He was holding a clot of blood in his hands and was named Temuchin after a Tatar his father had captured.

Temuchin's father, Yesugai Bahadur, was the son of Bartan Bahadur, the second son of Qublai Khaqan. He had with the help of his two brothers captured Oyelun, the wife of a Merkit, named Yeke Chiradu, but they had not succeeded in capturing and killing her

⁴ There has been a controversy about the date of Chengiz's birth. The Turks and the Chinese put their years in cycles of twelve, each year being named after an animal. Now the *Rauzat-us Safa* says that Chengiz died in the same year of the cycle in which he was born; that is, he lived to an age that was a multiple of twelve. The *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* says that he was fifty-five when he invaded Khurasan. Chengiz's death in Ramazan, A.H. 624 (August/September 1227) was a world event. Both the above-mentioned conditions are fulfilled if we put his birth in A.D. 1163. Howarth is obviously wrong in putting it in A.D. 1155. Barthold's statement that Chengiz died at the age of seventy-two (*Turkistan*, 459) contradicts the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*.

husband, though they pursued him over seven hills. There was, consequently, something not quite legal about the marriage, for Mongol law did not consider such a marriage legitimate unless the previous husband had been killed. But the Mongols were not inclined to be finical about these matters, and Oyelun, who had been devoted to her first husband, also proved a good wife to Yesugai. She bore him four sons—Temuchin, Khasar, Khachiun and Temuga (Otchigin)—and a daughter, Temulun. In addition to them, Yesugai had two sons, Bektor and Belgutai, by another wife. When Temuchin was nine years, Yesugai affianced him to Bortei, daughter of Dae Sechen of the Ungira clan, and left him at the house of his future father-in-law. While returning home Yesugai was given poisoned food by the Tatars and died soon after.

EARLY STRUGGLES; TAICHUTS AND MERKITS

Yesugai seems to have collected a substantial number of followers, but a collateral branch, the Taichuts, took them all away. 'The deep water is gone', they said, 'and the bright stone is broken.' Thus Temuchin, on returning to his mother's tent, found that the family had to obtain its daily sustenance by its daily labour. 'Deserted by the Taichuts, the able and resolute mother of Temuchin resorted to picking fruits and digging roots in order to feed her sons,' the *Secret History* tells us, 'and her sons, who grew up under these hard conditions, developed princely qualities. Oyelun's sons, though reared on simple vegetable diet, proved strong enough to resist any aggressor.' But even under these conditions Temuchin and Khasar quarrelled with Bektor and killed him. Oyelun gave her errant sons a good round of curses, but she could not have realized that she had given birth to the world's greatest killer.

The aggressors also reappeared in due course. The Taichuts, fearing revenge, attacked Oyelun's family but said that they would be content if Temuchin was handed over. Temuchin, thereupon, escaped to the forest on his horse and remained there alone and hungry for nine days. But when he came out, the Taichuts captured him; they tied his head to a yoke (*kang*) and decided that he should be kept as a prisoner in a different tent every day. Temuchin, however, succeeded in escaping one night with his head still tied to the yoke, and hid himself in a shallow part of the Onan river with his nose just above the water. A Taichut, Sorkhan Shira, who alone happened to spot him, succeeded in inducing his companions to postpone a thorough search to the next morning. Later on Temuchin came to Shira's tent and Shira's two young sons decided to help him. They took off his yoke and hid him under the wool in their cart. Next day

when the Taichuts decided to make a thorough search of all tents, Shira succeeded in keeping them away from the wool-laden cart with the remark: 'In such a hot weather, how could any one survive under all that wool?' So Temuchin regained his freedom.

In the years that followed the prosperity of the family seems to have increased. Marmots and wild mice were still a source of food, but the family came to possess nine horses and Temuchin was in a position to send for Bortie and marry her. It was in these years that Temuchin seems to have established his reputation as an excellent captain of young men.

He had, however, much to learn. One early morning three Merkit groups attacked the Oyelun household. Since Yesugai had captured a Merkit's wife, the Merkits thought it their duty to capture Chengiz's wife, Bortie, in return. All other members of the family succeeded in escaping, but Bortie was captured and handed over as wife to Silchar, the strong. Years later Chengiz succeeded in capturing her along with her child, Juji, whom she seems to have borne to Silchar. According to the moral code of the Mongols, Juji was Chengiz's eldest son and Chengiz accepted him as such. But later on his legitimacy was questioned.⁵

CHENGIZ'S STRUGGLE WITH JAMUKHA, WANG KHAN AND THE NAIMANS

It is only possible to note the main stages of Temuchin's career in his homeland. A 'Dada' group, called the Keraites, lived in the Black Forest; its allegiance was divided between two brothers, Tughril, who had the habit of killing his relations, and Jamukha, who was inordinately ambitious and unreliable. Both brothers could put in a force of 20,000 in the field. Tughril had been a close friend of Yesugai Bahadur, who had rescued him in his distress when he had been attacked by his uncle, the Gor Khan, and had only a hundred men left. Temuchin, therefore, regarded Tughril as his father. Temuchin and Jamukha had played together during their childhood and regarded each other as sworn brothers or *andas*. At the appeal of Temuchin, Tughril and Jamukha marched with him against the Merkits, who were duly suppressed. The three hundred Merkits, who had attacked Chengiz's family and tried to capture him, were massacred without exception. 'Their wives, if fit for marriage, were taken as wives (by

• 5 For an altercation between Juji and Chaghatai on the matter, see the *Secret History of the Mongols*, 164-67. Juji did not claim legitimacy but challenged Chaghatai to fight. Chengiz remained silent. Ultimately the matter was settled on the ground that the princes should respect the feelings of their mother.

the conquerors); those who could only serve as maid-servants were enslaved.⁶ But Temuchin's friendship with Jamukha gradually turned into suspicion, and suspicion into hostility.

About the year 1196 Tughril got into trouble once more. He wished to kill his younger brother, Yarke Khan, and Yarke fled to the Naimans; the chief of the Naimans drove Tughril from the 'Black Forest to the Gor Khan, but Tughril rebelled against the Gor Khan and crossed the country of the Aighurs and the Tanguts (eastern China) with five she-goats and a camel. Chengiz Khan, however, came to his help and restored him to his old authority.

In 1201 Jamukha got himself elected as 'Khan' of eleven tribes, including the Naimans (who were not included among the 'Dada' people) and decided to attack Tughril and Chengiz. But in the battle that followed Jamukha was defeated. The Naimans returned to their own place; the confederacy vanished; and Chengiz, though badly wounded in the neck by an arrow, took advantage of this opportunity to exterminate the Taichut chiefs.

In 1202 Chengiz and Tughril defeated the Tatars, probably with the help of the Kin emperor's forces. In retaliation for the poisoning of his father by the Tatars, Chengiz ordered all Tatars 'who were as high as the axle of the cart' to be killed and the rest to be reduced to slavery. It was on this occasion probably that the Kin emperor bestowed the title of *Wang* (Prince) on Tughril and of *Chao Khuli* (Warden of the Marches) on Chengiz.

As a result of these victories Temuchin was elected 'Khan' at the *Quriltai* of 1203 with the title of *Chengiz Khan* (Very Mighty Ruler). This title was a definite challenge to Jamukha's claim to superiority. A second war was inevitable in which both parties mustered about 30,000 soldiers. But Jamukha's men had no stomach for fighting, and he marched back after having the heads of the chiefs, who were disloyal to him, boiled in seven large cauldrons. This left only three effective powers in the field—Chengiz, Wang and the Naimans. Jamukha proceeded to make Senkun, son of Wang, jealous of Chengiz on the ground that Wang would be succeeded by Chengiz, whom Wang had adopted as a son, and not by Senkun. Wang refused to believe in Chengiz's protestations of loyalty. The result was a three days' battle between Wang and Chengiz in the course of which the Kerait power was completely broken. Chengiz divided the conquered people among his followers. Wang Khan was killed by a Naiman soldier and Senkun by one of his own followers. Jamukha fled to the Naimans.

⁶ *Secret History*, 82. Bortei was recovered on this occasion.

Inancha Bilga, the ruler of the Naimans, observing that his son, Tayang, was a weakling, had ordered the administration to be carried on by his wife, Gur Besu, after his death. But seeing the power of Chengiz increasing, Tayang decided to fight him. 'I am coming to deprive you of your bows and arrows', was his message to Chengiz. In spite of the numerical superiority of the Naimans, Chengiz immediately accepted the challenge and marched up the Kerulen river. Tayang and his soldiers tried to find security by retreating up a mountain, but they were surrounded and compelled to surrender. Tayang was captured though his son, Kushluq, managed to escape. Gur Besu had to marry Chengiz Khan. Such 'Dada' *uluses*, as had hitherto followed Jamukha, now finally joined Chengiz. Jamukha was left with only five companions, who brought him to Chengiz and were, at Jamukha's request, put to death before his eyes. Lastly, Jamukha demanded an honourable death for himself—death without the shedding of blood. 'O my *anda*,' was his message, '*Il Tengiri* has preferred you all the time. Let a merciful order of yours put an early end to my existence, so that peace may be restored to your heart.' Chengiz was reluctant but yielded. 'He commanded Jamukha to be put to death at that spot and in that manner, and honoured him with a grand burial ceremony.'

CHENGIZ AS KHAN; ARMY ORGANIZATION, INVASION OF THE KIN

In the year A.D. 1206 Chengiz was enthroned for a second time at a second *Quriltai*. But this time he was not only the leader of the 'Dada' people after the manner of Qublai Khaqan but 'Emperor' (*Huang-di*)—'Emperor of the whole steppe society'. He did not, at this stage, claim any Muslim or Chinese territory. But claim to suzerainty over the whole steppe—and if suzerainty was not accepted, then to direct administration—was implicit in the new accession. All steppe chiefs were expected to make their choice. Subetai was sent against the Merkits, who still remained on the banks of the Irtish. Another general, Chepe Noyan, was sent in pursuit of Kushluq.

It was at this stage, if we may trust the *Secret History*, that Chengiz Khan devoted himself to the organization of his remarkable army. The basis of it was compulsory military service; all men who were capable of fighting were required to do so and were put into units of ten; these units of ten were combined into units of hundred and units of hundred into units of one thousand. Chengiz had at this time 95 commanders of one thousand. They were put under still higher commanders of the left wing, the right wing and the centre—each having 30,000 men under him. To this was added a specially

recruited royal body-guard of 10,000 designated as 'the central army', but its duty was to guard the Khan and it was not to go on any campaign except with him. A few officers, by special permission, were allowed to recruit from their own relations and tribesmen; otherwise Chengiz looked to military considerations only. He had slaughtered the chiefs who had opposed him; it is to be assumed that those who survived were forgiven. The old *ulus* distinctions were completely erased; Naimans, 'Dada' people, Merkits and Keraites all found themselves now in the same basic units of 10, 100 or 1,000. The highest offices were given to the members of the Khan's family, provided they came up to the standard required; next to them came officers who had won Chengiz's trust by their efficiency and loyalty. He was up to great enterprises, and favouritism and nepotism would have led to ruin. The horses and arms required by the soldiers were carefully prescribed; nothing impossible was demanded, but that which was necessary had to be kept ready. When orders were sent down, it was expected that every soldier would join his unit within twenty-four hours. When men were on military duty, all their work had to be done by women, so that the taxes may be duly collected and the civil work of society may not suffer.

No army more disciplined and more cruel has walked on this earth.

The chiefs nearest to Chengiz Khan were quick to realize the importance of the change. Three Turkistan rulers—Bardjut, the Idikut (ruler) of the Aighurs; Arsalan Khan of Kayaliq, who was a Musalman; and Ozar, ruler of Almaligh—came to pay their homage to Chengiz Khan in 1209 or 1210. Each of them was given a princess in marriage from Chengiz's own family.

China in those days was divided into three kingdoms. Reference has already been made to the Kin kingdom in the north. The south China dynasty, the Sung (960-1279), was purely Chinese, but it had many inherent weaknesses. The army had been raised from two lakhs to more than a million and a quarter. 'The larger the number of soldiers, the more unserviceable they proved', Dr. Wei remarks, 'they consisted of groups of volunteers drafted from vagabonds, refugees and able-bodied men from the famine-stricken areas.' Simultaneously, civil expenditure was also increased; the number of gazetted officers, who were recruited by competitive examinations, was more than doubled, and though the taxes were increased six times, the budget remained unbalanced. In western China and the very heart of Central Asia, the kingdom of Si-hsia (called Tangut by the Musalmans) had been founded as early as A.D. 976. It was the weakest of the three kingdoms and also nomadic in origin like the Kin.

In 1209 in reply to the demand for tribute made by the newly enthroned Kin ruler, Chang-hai, Chengiz addressed his officers, prayed to *Il Tengiri* and sent a Musalman, Jafar Khodsha (Khwaja), with a haughty message: 'The Kin could have war or peace, as it preferred, but Chengiz was not a subordinate.' He then marched with his army from the Kerulen river. The invasion was a great success. The whole of China north of the Yellow river was plundered and some ninety flourishing towns were sacked. There was no annexation of territory at this stage, but after two invasions of northern China, the Mongol army returned overloaded with spoils. Chengiz Khan was now as rich as any other ruler. More important than that was the fact that he and his officers had learnt the sedentary people's art of war. Chinese craftsmen, who had constructed catapults or *munjaniqs* for them, were brought to Mongolia in large numbers, may be 10,000 families. Considerable quantities of *naphtha* or gunpowder had also been obtained. The disciplined Mongol army had also learnt the secret of paralyzing large cities and reducing inaccessible forts to distress. The somnolent Musalmans of the west were now to learn what this meant.

IV. THE MONGOL INVASION OF AJAM

MUSLIM MERCHANTS had penetrated into Mongolia centuries earlier, but their difficulty was that the Mongols could give little in exchange; also a small group of Musalmans had been in the service of Chengiz from his early career. But circumstances changed completely when the Mongols returned from China loaded with spoils. First three Muslim merchants came to Chengiz with costly fabrics as well as ordinary cotton cloth. Chengiz purchased all that they had, and then asked his princes and officers to provide the requisite capital to his own Muslim merchants to enable them to get what they needed from the territories of the Musalmans. He also sent with them a message to the Khwarazm Shah to the effect that as they had become neighbours now, there should be peace and the free passage of merchants between them. But when these Muslim merchants, 450 in number, arrived at Otrar on the bank of the Jaxartes, Inalchuq, the governor of the place, who bore the title of Ghayir Khan and was a close relation of Turkan Khatun, mother of the Khwarazm Shah, arrested them all on the ground that they were spies. He may also have been annoyed at the behaviour of an Indian, who on the ground of old friendship, called him by his personal name and showed undue familiarity.

The Khwarazm Shah got Ghayir's message about these merchants while returning from his ill-fated expedition against Baghdad, and without pausing to think over the matter, he ordered the merchants to be executed and their property to be seized. He was not ignorant of the consolidation of Chengiz's power and his invasion of the Kin territory; in fact, he had taken care to keep himself properly informed, and at least one of his messengers had brought him a detailed account of the murderous behaviour of the Mongols in China along with Chengiz Khan's message of goodwill.¹

CHENGIZ DECIDES ON WAR

Ghayir Khan duly carried out his master's order, but one of the merchants managed to escape and took the news to Chengiz. The Khan was greatly upset; a sort of fever seized him, he prayed on a hill-top for three days and nights, and then decided on war. But the road to Samargand was long and arduous and careful preparations had to be made. Also two enemies, who stood in the way, had to be

¹ Saiyyid Ajal Bahaiddin, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, Persian text, 335-37.

disposed of. Chengiz, therefore, sent his eldest son, Juji, against Tughan, a fugitive Merkit chief, and Yeme (or Jeme)² Noyan against Kushluq. Both were defeated and killed. In the spring of 1218 the army of Chengiz started on its march. The allied rulers of Aighur, Kayaliq and Beshbaligh joined it on the way. Arrangements had been carefully made for the three months' march to Otrar.

The Khwarazm Shah spent the winter of 1217 in Samarqand and Bukhara. In the spring of 1218 he seems to have marched into the steppe beyond the Jaxartes at Jund. Here he came across the trails of a Mongol army—the army of Juji—and discovered a pile of dead men it had left on the battle-field. He followed it and overtook it next day. The Mongols said that they had no order to fight the Sultan, but if attacked, they would fight. The Sultan decided to attack. The battle raged from morning to night and the Mongol attack on the centre was so fierce that only the courage of his son, Jalaluddin, who came to his rescue from the right wing, saved the Sultan from falling into the hands of the Mongols. When night parted the combatants, the Mongol army lighted a large number of fires and marched off according to its programme. The Sultan, finding their camp empty, returned to Samarqand.³

THE KHWARAZM SHAH'S SUICIDAL MILITARY POLICY

The Sultan was quite upset. He had only met one of the two advance-guards of the Mongol army and had been virtually defeated. How would he meet the vast horde that was marching against him? Would Ajam share the fate of China? His mother, a murderess by nature whose influence he could not throw off, had decided that his youngest son, Azlaq Sultan, then a young boy, would be his successor, and this totally upset the calculations of such loyal officers as he had. Some of his officers thought that Trans-Oxiana could not be saved and wanted to make a defence on the banks of the Oxus. Others advised him to fly to Ghazni or Iraq or to some land which the hands of the Mongols and Tatars could not reach. Alone among the people around him, the Sultan's eldest son, Jalaluddin Mankbarni, gave him the correct advice. The royal family had for several generations lived on the taxes of its subjects; this implied a duty to fight for them. And

² Yeme (Jeme or Yama) was the son of a blacksmith, who had dedicated him to Chengiz's service. Subetai, the greatest of the Mongol strategists, was his younger brother.

³ There is a conflict of authorities about the date of this campaign, *vide* Barthold, *Turkistan*, 37. I have followed the dates and sequence of events given by Minhajus Siraj and Juwayni.

defence was only possible on the eastern side of the Jaxartes in the steppe beyond the cities on the banks of that great river. Once the Mongols crossed the river, it would be too late. He offered his services to fight Chengiz Khan, if no one else had the courage to do so, but the Sultan's nerves had been completely shattered, whatever the cause.

It is probable that if Jalaluddin, who was the eldest son, had also been the acknowledged heir, and the Sultan had placed him in complete charge, the Musalmans would have given a good account of themselves. There was no lack of men and material. Jalaluddin was young, probably below thirty, a bit rash and too much inclined to risk his life in personal combats. Nevertheless, a field-force led by him, which avoided pitched battles, wore out the Mongols by small skirmishes in a hostile land the language of which they did not understand, cut off their resources, protected the walled towns and gave strength and lead to the civil population outside them, had a fairly good chance of success. As the future was to show, Jalaluddin had the nerves, the courage and the resilience, which the crisis required. The mass of the people were loyal to him and as the head of the defence force they would have rallied under his banner.

But the Sultan and his courtiers were afraid of the leadership and reputation of Jalaluddin, who had the additional misfortune of being the son of an Indian mother and was dark in complexion; so misled by his courtiers, the Sultan took a fatal step, which ensured Chengiz Khan's complete success. He divided his immense army of four or five lakhs among his chief cities and forts with the order to hold them against the Mongols. All cities of medieval Ajam were fortified like those of India, but Ajam cities had an inner citadel—generally called the *ark*—in which the soldiers were stationed. After the soldiers had been put in the inner citadels, no field force was left to oppose the Mongol invaders anywhere. The open plain, the unfortified oases and villages and the fertile river-banks were left to the Mongols without even the show of a struggle. The Mongols could move from city to city at will and the hope that garrisons in the *arks* would be of any use proved an utter delusion.⁴

4 The causes of the collapse of the Khwarazmian empire are summarized by Barthold as follows: (a) To please his mother, Turkan Khatun, the Sultan had appointed his youngest son, Qutbuddin Azlaq Shah, as his heir; the provinces of Khurasan, Mazendaran and Khwarazm were assigned to Azlaq, but they were governed by Turkan Khatun and they did not, in practice, recognize the authority of the Khwarazm Shah. The territories of the former Ghurian kingdom, except Herat, were assigned to Jalaluddin Mankbarni, the Sultan's eldest son. (b) The relations of the Sultan and his mother became very bitter after his return from Baghdad. (c) Owing to the *fatwa* (decision) the Sultan had extracted from the *ulama* against the Caliph, the *ulama* became very hostile to him and this hostility was exacerbated by some acts of the

To this terrible error, the Sultan added three more for which his advisers cannot be held responsible. He spread panic wherever he went. 'If every soldier in the army which is about to attack us,' he told the people of Samarqand, 'were to throw in his whip, the moat of your city will be filled up.' He also advised the citizens to leave their habitations and to fly to some corner for safety, for the cities were sure to be attacked and crushed like the cities of China. Lastly, as the head of the state and the person responsible for its defence, he showed an undue concern for his own safety. He moved from Samarqand to Tirmiz (where an attack was made on his life) and reached Naishapur on 18 April 1220. Here, while his subjects were being slaughtered like sheep, he tried for some three weeks to forget all his troubles in the company of his *haram*-women and their petty affairs. But on hearing that a Mongol army had been despatched against him, he fled towards the east, and after contemplating many other plans, finally took refuge in an island of the Caspian sea and died there in 1220.

PERSONALITY AND CHARACTER OF CHENGIZ

Minhajus Siraj, who was about eighteen years old at the time and had met a few persons who had seen Chengiz Khan at close quarters, gives us an incomplete pen-picture of the great conqueror. But it is the best we have from a person who was free to express his opinion :

'Reliable witnesses have related that at the time of the invasion of Khurasan, Chengiz Khan was fifty-five years of age. A tall, well-built man with a robust frame, he had cat-like eyes and the hair of his sparse beard had become white. He was extremely brave, wise, far-sighted, clever and just, excellent in administration and in overthrowing his enemies; but he was also a terrible killer and a ferocious blood-shedder, and it is clear to all the world that he had some strange qualities.

'First, cunning and the miracles of the sinner (*istidraj*); they say some satans had become his friends. After every few days he would have a fit and during his unconsciousness he would say all sorts of things. It was like this. When he had his first fit and the satans, after

•Sultan, such as the execution of Shaikh Majduddin Baghdadi, a disciple of Shaikh Najmuddin Kubra, the founder of the Kubravi order of Muslim mystics. (d) 'Mercenary armies constituted the sole military force of the Khwarazm Shahs.' The Sultan gave preference to the soldiers over the civilians and the peasants, and could not, therefore, win the loyalty of the masses. (e) 'Nevertheless, in the struggle between the Sultan and his mother, the military class and the priesthood were on the side of the latter.' 'The Khwarazm Shah, therefore, could not depend upon a single element of the administrative system, nor a single class of the population' (*Turkistan*, 375-80). There seems to be an element of exaggeration in all these items. So far as the military miscalculation is concerned, Barthold agrees with me.

overpowering his mind, informed him of his forthcoming victory, he put the clothes and the cloak he was then wearing in a sealed bag and carried it about with him. Whenever this fit was about to overpower him, (he would put on these clothes) and talk about every event, victory, campaign, the appearance of his enemies, and the conquest of the territories he wanted. Someone would write down all he said, put (the papers) in a bag and seal them. When Chengiz recovered consciousness, everything was read out to him and he acted accordingly. Generally, in fact always, his designs were successful.

'*Secondly*, he knew how to interpret the shoulder-blades of sheep; he was always putting these shoulder-blades on fire, observing the roasting and interpreting from the burnt shoulder-blades; in this he was unlike the interpreters of Ajam (Persia and Central Asia), who merely look at the shoulder-blades.

'*Thirdly*, the justice of Chengiz Khan was so severe that no one, except the owner, had the courage to pick up a whip that had fallen by the road-side. Lying and theft were things quite unknown in his army and no one could find any trace of them.

'*Fourthly*, as to the women they captured in Khurasan and the whole of Ajam: "If a woman had a husband, no man could have any connection with her; but if an infidel (*kafir*) wanted a married Muslim woman, he had to kill the husband first and after that he could take possession of the woman." It was not possible for anyone to tell a lie; this fact is known to all.'⁵

POLICY OF CHENGIZ KHAN: REIGN OF TERROR, WHOLESALE MASSACRES AND PHYSICAL LIQUIDATION

Chengiz Khan, who sincerely believed that *Il Tengiri* had given him and his family and his officers the commission to dominate the world for all time and that defiance of him was resistance to a clear order of *Il Tengiri*, must have been delighted when he heard that he would have to face no field-force and that the enormous Khwarazmian army had been divided and sealed up in the inner citadels of cities or put on the top of inaccessible hill-forts. Though he probably left minor matters for on-the-spot decisions, the main features of his policy must have been decided before he reached the Jaxartes.

For a little less than six centuries the Musalmans had prospered in Ajam under chiefs of their own choice—in any case of their own faith and very often of their own speech and kindred. It was obvious that the power of Chengiz Khan and his family could not be perma-

nently established unless a very large number of Musalmans were massacred and at least half of their largest cities had been levelled with the ground. Chengiz was prepared to kill as many Musalmans as may be necessary, and, to be on the safe side, a lot more. In any case it was *Il Tengiri's* order; consequently, Chengiz in clear conscience was not responsible. This reign of terror through wholesale massacres was a warning to all mankind; there was nothing secret about it; Chengiz and his successors wanted it to be advertized to the whole world. Consequently, the official historians of the Mongols, like Juwayni and Rashiduddin, while justifying these massacres as due to 'disobedience and revolt', are careful in explaining their exact character and extent. Writers hostile to the Mongols, like Minhajus Siraj, relate the same massacres from a different angle. But there is no substantial difference in thier accounts. On the other hand, Chengiz Khan could hardly have failed to see that if he killed all the inhabitants, there would be no one from whom any taxes could be realized. Consequently, he followed a different policy with respect to different regions.

(a) Chengiz had no quarrel with the inhabitants of Turkistan; the few cities in that region had been harassed by Kushluq on religious grounds; when Yeme promised them religious toleration, they were quite satisfied. Muslim culture here was struggling for a footing in the cities with Chinese culture; it was not to be found in the steppe region. Also the Musalmans for about a century had been accustomed to non-Muslim rulers, and three of its leading chiefs, including a Musalman, Arsalan Khan of Kayaliq, had joined Chengiz with their armies. Consequently, there were no massacres in Turkistan. Since the region lay on the main route of the Mongols, its continued prosperity was necessary for the supply of provisions to passing troops.

(b) Trans-Oxiana or Mawaraun Nahr (including the cities east of the Jaxartes) was a different proposition. This region had been under the overlordship of the Gor Khans, but direct government had been in the hands of Muslim chiefs. In the heart of this region, on the banks of Zarafshan river, were the great Muslim cities of Bukhara and Samarqand, which had prospered as the cultural centres of Islam in spite of civil wars and continued maladministration. Chengiz had already decided to put this region under the direct government of his second son, Chaghatai, but his government would prove ephemeral unless it was established after fearful massacres and the total annihilation of local chiefs. At the same time some subjects and some revenue had to be left for Chaghatai. So it was decided to wipe off some cities like Samarqand and Bukhara and to spare the houses and inhabitants of others. But almost all cities were thoroughly plundered.

(c) The Khurasan of those days had a much larger area than the

present Iranian province of that name. Its four great towns were Merv (the former capital of the Seljuqs), Balkh in northern Afghanistan, Naishapur and Herat. Chengiz decided on the complete destruction of these cities, which have not been rebuilt on their old sites. Other towns, which offered any resistance, were to be wiped off and no family capable of leading an opposition to the Mongols was allowed to survive. The same treatment was to be meted out to Khwarazm and the towns in its neighbourhood, and also to the inhabited parts of the former kingdom of Ghur.

(d) Chengiz at this stage was not concerned with southern Persia, the rulers of which after seeing the fate of Khurasan, hastened to offer their submission. Jalaluddin, the ruler of Alamut, also offered his allegiance and Chengiz accepted it. Running across the centre of Iran is the great Kavir *dasht* and Chengiz did not waste his time in crossing it. Azarbaijan and Iraq were plundered by passing Mongol armies, but no annexation was attempted at this stage.

JUWAYNI ON THE EXTENT OF THE DESTRUCTION

Some idea of the havoc wrought is given by Juwayni, our primary authority on the subject:

‘Wherever there was a king or a ruler, or the governor of a city that offered him resistance, Chengiz annihilated him together with his family and followers, kinsmen and strangers; so that *where there had been a hundred thousand people, there remained, without exaggeration, not a hundred souls alive*, as a proof of which statement may be cited the fate of various cities, whereof mention has been made in the proper places.⁶ . .

‘When Chengiz took Bukhara and Samarqand, he contented himself with slaughtering and looting once only, and did not go to the extreme of a general massacre. As for the adjoining territories that were subject to these towns or bordered on them, since for the most part they tendered submission, the hand of molestation was to some extent withheld from them. And afterwards, the Mongols pacified the survivors and proceeded with the work of reconstruction, so that at the present time, i.e. in A.H. 658 (A.D. 1259-60) the prosperity and well-being of these districts have in some cases attained their original level and in others have closely approached it. It is otherwise with Khurasan and Iraq,⁷ which countries are afflicted with a hectic fever and a chronic ague. Every

⁶ *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Persian text, Vol. I, 17; Boyle's translation, Vol. II, 23.

⁷ This refers to the destruction of Iraq by Juwayni's master, Halaku, and not by Chengiz.

town and every village has been several times subjected to pillage and massacre and has suffered confusion for years, so that even though there be generation and increase until the Resurrection, the population will not attain to a tenth of what it was before. The history thereof may be ascertained from the records of ruins and midden-heaps declaring how fate has painted her deeds upon palace-walls.⁸

Hamdullah Mustaufi in his *Nuzhatul Qulub*, which was written about a century after the Mongol invasion, declared that Iran had not attained to even a third of its pre-Mongol prosperity.

The wonderful stupidity of Alaaddin Khwarazm Shah had indicated to Chengiz the policy he should follow. The walled cities, with their inner citadels full of soldiers, would give up all hope once they had been surrounded by the Mongol troops and could not expect the vanished Khwarazmian authority to come to their rescue. Chengiz had enough trained Chinese artisans to make the catapults (*munjanigs*) and other sieging apparatus necessary for battering down the city-walls; and he made it clear that in case of resistance both the civil population and the soldiers would be put to death while their women-folk would be enslaved and distributed among the officers and men, while in case of submission, the soldiers would be killed but not the civil population.

But the behaviour of the Mongols in the first cities that submitted to them left the civil population in no doubt as to what sort of survival it could expect. All the inhabitants, both men and women, were marched out of the city and kept out, while the Mongols plundered their houses. Then the young men were picked up and added as levy or *hashr* to march against the next town for such hard labour as the Mongol army required. Ten men of this levy were generally put in charge of one Mongol soldier. Most of the preparatory work before the siege, and the destruction of city-houses afterwards, had to be done by this Muslim levy (*hashr*) under the whip of the Mongols. As the Mongol army needed trained artisans, and there was also a shortage of such artisans in the steppe region, all good artisans were picked up and either carried along with the army or marched towards Turkistan and Mongolia. Finally, when a city was in Mongol hands, the soldiers in the inner citadel or *ark* were captured and killed while the citadel was levelled with the streets.

Faced with these cruel alternatives, the civil population of almost all cities decided to surrender and left the soldiers to their fate. Fighting men stationed on the top of inaccessible hill-forts, which

⁸ *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Persian text, Vol. I, 75. (Boyle's translation).

could not be reached by ladders or injured by *munjaniq*-stones, could defy Mongol troops for some months till their provisions were finished or they were paralyzed by epidemics, but no such resistance was possible for the populous cities of Trans-Oxiana and Khurasan. And the levies and artisans of every city that was reduced strengthened the Mongol army and its striking power.

If these features of the military situation are kept in mind, the various movements of Chengiz's seven years' campaign will be seen in their proper perspective.

FATE OF THE CITIES ON THE JAXARTES FRONTIER⁹

There was no army to dispute the passage of the Jaxartes with Chengiz. He despatched Juji against *Jund*; his second and third sons, Chaghatai and Ogtai, against *Otrar*; and his other officers against *Khojend*, *Fanakat*, etc.; while he personally proceeded against *Samarqand* and *Bukhara*. *Otrar* was defended by Ghayir Khan with an army of 60,000; the city resisted for five months after which Ghayir's subordinate, Qaracha, surrendered with his men in the hope of mercy but was put to death. The inhabitants, 'both wearers of the veil and those who wore *kulah* (hat) and turbans' were taken out of the city, while the Mongols plundered their houses. Young men were picked up for the levy (*hashr*) and the artisans for service. Ghayir Khan retreated into the *ark* with 20,000 soldiers. They held out for another month and died fighting. No other city in Trans-Oxiana was able to hold out for so long. Juji sent a Muslim merchant, Haji Hasan, who had long been in Chengiz's service, to ask the citizens of *Sughnaq* to submit. But some persons attacked Haji with cries of *Allah-o-Akbar* and put him to death. In retaliation for this, the Mongols slaughtered the whole population in seven days.

Ozkent and *Barligh-Kent*: There was no great resistance and no general slaughter. *Ashnas*: The garrison fought bravely and most of the soldiers were martyred. *Jund*: Qutlugh Khan, the commander of the garrison, retreated with his men to Khwarazm across the desert. The inhabitants were quite helpless when the Mongols arrived there on 21 April 1219. They were taken out of the city and kept on a plain for nine days and nights, while the Mongols plundered the city. Then one Ali Khoja, a person born near Bukhara who had entered the service of the Mongols long before their rise to power, was left in charge of the place. *Fanakat*: The garrison led by İltegu Malik fought for three days and then asked for quarter. All soldiers were put to

⁹ For the sake of clarity the names of cities in these two paragraphs have been put in italics.

death but the civil population, apart from the artisans and the young men required for the levy, was spared. *Khojend*: Timur Malik, the commander, fortified himself in an island and then escaped to the Khwarazm Shah after a series of heroic exploits, but *Khojend* shared the fate of other cities and its young men were drafted into the *hashr* (levy). Here the number of the levy is given as 50,000 while the Mongol army was 20,000.

SACK OF BUKHARA AND SAMARQAND

Though Samarqand was nearer, Chengiz decided to proceed first against Bukhara by way of Zarnaq and Nur. Both cities surrendered and were treated in the usual Mongol manner. They were required to provide levies against Bukhara but the people of Nur were left with the minimum required for their industry and agriculture. The citadel of Bukhara was in charge of Kok Khan, a Mongol who had fled from Chengiz and taken service with the Sultan. Kok decided to fight to the bitter end, but the citizens preferred to submit and sent their religious representatives to invite Chengiz into the town. Chengiz mounted the pulpit of the Friday mosque and demanded: 'The countryside is empty of fodder; fill the stomachs of our horses.' At that moment the great religious leaders were looking after the horses of the Mongols, while cases in which the Qurans used to be kept were being collected for use as mangers for the horses. He next summoned 280 of the richest men to his camp and his speech again was brief: 'I am the punishment of God; if you had not committed great sins, God would not have sent a punishment like me upon you. . . There is no need to declare your property that is above the ground; tell me what is under the earth.' A Mongol or Turkish *basqaq* was appointed over each of the 280 men to see that they collected all that was possible.

But the problem of Kok Khan and the garrison in the *ark* remained. They were fighting to sell their lives as dear as possible and sallied forth against the Mongols both day and night. Now the houses of Bukhara were made entirely of wood, apart from the Juma mosque and a few palaces; consequently, when Chengiz ordered the houses near the *ark* to be set on fire, the whole city was consumed by the flames. Ultimately the *ark* was captured and all soldiers were put to death. Further, as to the Qanqali Turks¹⁰, all male children, who stood higher than the butt of a whip, were put to death, and more than thirty thousand corpses were counted, 'while their smaller children and the children of their notables and their women-folk, slender as

¹⁰ *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Boyle's translation, Vol. I, 107.

the cypress, were reduced to slavery.' All the civil inhabitants of Bukhara, male and female, were brought out to the plain of Musalla, outside the city; the young and the middle-aged, who were fit for service in the levy against Samarqand were picked up, and the rest were spared. When Chengiz left the place, 'Bukhara was a level plain.'

The Sultan had thrown a garrison of 60,000 Turks and 50,000 Tajiks into Samarqand and strengthened its defence. It was thought that 'Samarqand could stand a siege of some years'; so Chengiz decided to subdue the country round Samarqand first, and when he had finished doing so, the fate of Samarqand was sealed. Chengiz did not fight for two days after he had encircled the city; on the third and fourth day there was some fighting; on the fifth day the civil population sent its Qazi and Shaikhul Islam to offer its submission. The city-ramparts were pulled down and next day the citadel was captured between the morning and afternoon prayers. About thirty thousand Qanqalis and Turks with some twenty high amirs of the Sultan were put to death; but some fifty thousand people whom the Qazi and the Shaikhul Islam had taken under their protection were left unmolested. The rest of the population was taken out and counted, while their houses were plundered. Some thirty thousand men were selected for their craftsmanship and an equal number for the levy; the rest were allowed to return to their desolated houses.' But these compulsory levies were required from Samarqand again and again, and owing to this the city was completely ruined.

Before the fighting at Samarqand had commenced, Chengiz sent his two great officers, the brothers Yeme and Subetai, with thirty thousand men to pursue the Sultan, and after the fall of the city he sent his sons, Chaghatai and Ogtai, against Khwarazm. He passed the spring of 1221 near Samarqand and then moved to the meadows of Naqshab.

K H W A R A Z M

The citizens refused to submit. 'They opposed the Mongols in all the streets and quarters of the town; in every lane they engaged in battle and in every *cul-de-sac* they resisted stoutly. . . The greater part of the town was destroyed; the houses with their goods and treasures were but mounds of earth and the Mongols despaired of benefiting from the stores of their wealth.' When the Mongols succeeded in capturing the town, which now lay in shambles, they drove the people into the open; more than a hundred thousand craftsmen were selected and sent to the countries of the east; the children and young women were taken away as captives. Order was given for the rest to be slaughtered; every Mongol soldier had to execute twenty-four persons.

No inhabitants were left. All the *dasht*—or the steppe region of the west—so far as the Mongol and Tatar horse may reach was given to Juji as his family inheritance.

CAMPAIGN OF YEME AND SUBETAI

The mission of these two brothers was to capture the Sultan alive; in this they failed. But Subetai succeeded in capturing Turkan Khatun and the Sultan's *haram* in the Mazendaran castle of Ilal along with his wazir, Nasiruddin. When they were brought before Chengiz at Taliqan, he had Nasiruddin tortured and all the male sons of the Sultan put to death. Jalaluddin Mankbarni and some other sons of the Sultan, who had kept him company till the last moment, succeeded in escaping the Mongols. Nevertheless, the circumambulation of the Caspian sea by Yeme and Subetai ranks as one of the great feats of military history. Their army of 30,000 was really insufficient for the conquest of the region, and very often Yeme and Sabetai had to march separately. They resorted to massacres wherever they could, in order to create an atmosphere of terror in which provisions may be forthcoming. Ultimately after plundering Azarbaijan and Iraq, they marched north through Darbend, a narrow passage between the Caucasus mountains and the Caspian sea, and returned to join Chengiz by way of the Qipchaq steppe, north of the Caspian. The real importance of this campaign lay in its exploratory character in northern Iran. Several important Mongol armies were destined to try this path again.

TULUI'S CONQUEST OF KHURASAN AND MERV

Chengiz had kept his youngest son, Tului, with him. But after the massacre at Balkh, he gave Tului one man from every unit of ten and sent him to conquer Khurasan and, in particular, to lay waste the great cities of Merv, Naishapur and Herat. Tului, who was destined to end his life as a wretched and paralytic drunkard, mortally afraid of the spirits of those whom he had killed, was singularly inhuman and efficient at this stage of his life. Opinion in Khurasan was keenly divided between those who wished to submit and those who insisted on resistance to the bitter end. Also fear of the Mongols had brought a lot of people to the Merv valley, including 70,000 Turkomans. Tului made short work of the Turkomans and compelled the city to submit. Then by an act of terrible barbarity, he crushed all opposition. All the inhabitants of Merv, both men and women, were brought out, kept on the plain for four days and nights and then ordered to be put to death. Every Mongol soldier had to execute three to four hundred persons. One Saiyyid Izzuddin Nasseba, along with some friends who

had escaped the massacre, passed thirteen days and nights in counting such corpses as they could easily discover. The total came to one million and three hundred thousand (February 1221). This does not seem to be an exaggerated figure in view of the fertility of the Merv valley. But people collected in the city again and again and were repeatedly destroyed.

NAISHAPUR

Naishapur seems to have made terms with Yeme, but the recurring Mongol demands for provisions had driven the people to acute distress. Now that the complete destruction of Khurasan cities had been decided upon, an excuse for attacking Naishapur was not difficult to find. While Tului was attacking Merv, Toghachar Kurgen, a son-in-law of Chengiz, appeared before Naishapur with an army of 10,000. He was shot dead by a stray arrow, and apologists for Mongol misdeeds have found in this a justification for the complete destruction of Naishapur. While waiting for Tului's arrival, Toghachar's army withdrew to attack smaller towns. Sabzwar (also called Baihaq) was captured after three days of severe fighting, a general massacre was ordered and 70,000 corpses were counted. Two other cities, Nuqan and Qar, were also conquered and their inhabitants slaughtered. Tului on his arrival refused to accept the submission of Naishapur. So the battle commenced on Wednesday (7 April 1221) and by Saturday the city-ramparts were in Mongol hands. All the inhabitants were brought out and slaughtered; Toghachar's wife then entered the city with her escort and slew those who had survived. Even cats and dogs were not spared.

'The only inhabitants of Naishapur left alive were forty artisans, who were taken to Turkistan on account of their skill. For seven days and nights water was flown into the city so that barley may be sown there. It is said in some histories that the dead were counted for twelve days and that there were one million and forty thousand corpses, apart from the corpses of women and children.'¹¹

The corpses of men had, for this purpose, been piled up in separate heaps from those of women and children. Nothing remains now on the site of the great historic city. 'I have shot sandgrouse within the area surrounded by the broken-down walls of ancient Naishapur, and I saw crops of barley growing in unconscious imitation of the Mongol sowings', Sir Percy Sykes tells us in his *History of Persia*,¹²

¹¹ *Rauzat-us Safa*, Vol. V, 37. Persian text.

¹² *History of Persia*, Vol. II, 81.

But there are two large mounds in the area covered with earth, consisting probably of the rubble of Naishapur houses collected by the local levy; for this operation was necessary before the city could be converted into sown fields.

HERAT

Malik Shamsuddin Jurjani, whom Alauddin Khwarazm Shah had placed in charge of Herat with about a hundred thousand soldiers, swore that he would under no circumstances submit to the Mongols and Tatars. So a stern struggle followed on Tului's arrival. But when the Malik died, opinion among the garrison was divided. Finally, when Tului personally spoke to them from the moat and assured them with fearful oaths that he would be content with half the tribute they used to pay to the Khwarazm Shah, they decided to submit. Tului put to death some 12,000 soldiers who were in the service of Sultan Jalaluddin Mankbarni, placed Shahzada Malik Abu Bakr in charge of the administration, subject to the control of a Mongol *shuhna*, Mantakatai, and then returned to join his father at Talikan.

But when Jalaluddin Mankbarni, after reaching Ghazni and reorganizing his army there, defeated a Mongol force at Parwan, rumour and wishful thinking interpreted this very temporary gain to mean a complete collapse of the Mongols. Both the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, a first hand authority for this region, and the *Rauzat-us Safa* tell us that the Musalmans of many cities of Khurasan rose in rebellion and put the Mongol *shuhnas* (kotwals) to death. Chengiz, taken aback by this sudden revolt, blamed Tului for not using his sword and spear effectively and sent Ilchikdai Noyan with 80,000 men and clear instructions to kill the whole population of Herat. Ilchikdai succeeded in reducing Herat after a siege of six months and seventeen days and forced his way into the city on a Friday morning (A.D. 1222). 'For seven days the Mongols devoted themselves exclusively to killing, burning and destroying the buildings. A little less than one million and six hundred thousand of the inhabitants were martyred.' Ilchikdai then proceeded against the fort of Kaliwayan, but he sent back a Mongol contingent of 10,000, who put to death about a hundred thousand Musalmans who had collected at Herat again.

'Ultimately only the *Khatib*, Maulana Sharfuddin, and fifteen other persons, whose names are recorded in the *Tarikh-i Herat*, were left. One of these fifteen came out of his hiding place after the Tatars had left. He seated himself before the (empty) shop of a sweet-meat seller (*hilwai*) and seeing no one within sight, he passed his hand over his face and exclaimed: "Thank God, I have

been able to breathe for a moment in peace." Twenty-four persons from the suburbs of Herat joined them, and for fifteen years there was no one in the city or territory of Herat except these forty men. They lived in the dome of the mausoleum of Malik Ghiyasuddin,¹³ which the Mongols had not destroyed. For a time if anyone managed to survive in some hidden nook or corner in the region from the Oxus to the territory of Astrabad (in Mazendaran), he had to live on dry bread and carrion.¹⁴

MARCH OF CHENGIZ TO THE INDUS

Towards the end of the summer, 1221, Chengiz advanced south to the city of Tirmiz on the northern bank of the Oxus. The people refused to submit. On the eleventh day the Mongols took the place by storm; Chengiz divided all the inhabitants among his soldiers for execution and the city-houses were levelled with the ground. He then fixed his winter-quarters at Kanqurt and Shuman, two places in Tajikistan, and sent his soldiers to subdue the territory of Badakhshan across the Oxus. In the spring of 1222 he crossed the Oxus himself. Balkh, south of the Oxus, was then a prosperous city and the number of its notable inhabitants alone came to 50,000.¹⁵ The inhabitants sent their representatives to Chengiz and submitted, but the sequel showed that in Balkh, as in the case of Herat later, Chengiz was not prepared to allow the inhabitants to survive. On the excuse that a census had to be taken, all the inhabitants were brought to a plain outside the city-walls and there distributed among the soldiers for execution.

Chengiz's apologists justify his crime on the ground that Sultan Jalaluddin had established himself at Ghazni. So far as the cities of Khurasan and Afghanistan were concerned, the same fate awaited the inhabitants whether they submitted to Chengiz's demand or decided to fight. The garrison of the Taliqan fort refused to be lured by Chengiz Khan's lying promises of survival in case of submission; they fought day and night for six months and showed what proper leadership could have achieved. Chengiz Khan was helpless till the arrival of Tului enabled him to capture the fort. As was to be expected, no trace of the fort or the inhabitants was left. At Bamiyan the elder son of Chaghatai was killed by a stray arrow. 'Chengiz in retaliation ordered his men to capture the place as soon as possible and to spare no living creatures—not even cats and dogs. The wombs of pregnant

¹³ Probably the mausoleum of Sultan Ghiyasuddin Ghuri is meant.

¹⁴ *Rauzat-us Safa*, Vol. V, 38-39.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

women were cut open, the heads of babies were severed; and the ramparts, palaces and houses were levelled with the ground.'¹⁶

CAREER OF SULTAN JALALUDDIN MANKBARNI

Alauddin Khwarazm Shah had assigned the conquered kingdom of Ghazni to his eldest son, Sultan Jalaluddin Mankbarni, who, unable to find a footing anywhere else, reached Ghazni after a series of hair-breadth escapes. Here a Khwarazmian army of 50,000 had been stationed under Amin Malik and a Ghurian army under Saifuddin Ighraq also came to his support. Jalaluddin spent the winter at Ghazni but with the advent of the spring, 1222, he marched against the Mongol generals, Tekechuk and Mologhor, and defeated them at the battle of Parwan, a place on the border of Bamiyan. But the popular desire for an able leader against the Mongols was paralyzed by the anarchic behaviour of the chiefs. Amin Malik and Saifuddin Ighraq quarrelled over a horse; Amin struck Ighraq on the head with a whip, and because Jalaluddin was in no position to punish Amin Malik, Ighraq and the Ghurians left the Sultan in a lurch. They were destined to perish within two months at the hands of each other and the Mongols. But Jalaluddin's strength was also shattered and he began to make arrangements for crossing the Indus and finding refuge in India. Chengiz's army overtook him just as he was about to cross the river. Jalaluddin after fighting valiantly drove back the Mongols, who had hemmed him on all sides, and then turning round plunged his horse into the Indus and swam across it, holding his royal canopy in his hand. On reaching the other side, he pitched his canopy on the ground and sat down in its shade. Chengiz was surprised. 'Such a son must a father have!' he remarked and ordered his Mongols not to shoot.

Jalaluddin's future career cannot be described here. He had left almost everything on the other side of the Indus—his family, his treasure and his troops. He attempted for a few years to establish himself in India but his repeated efforts having failed, he marched through Kerman to Isfahan and Tabriz, and after a career marked by vigour, courage and reckless personal valour, he was killed by some Kurds in 1231. Alone among the Muslim generals of his day, he had at no time been afraid of meeting the Mongols.

MONGOL CONQUEST OF GHUR

A few words are necessary to complete our account of the Mongol conquest of the former kingdom of Ghur. Uzbek Ta'i was sent to

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 38.

pursue Sultan Jalaluddin Mankbarni; he was unable to find the Sultan but defeated Qubacha; he laid siege to Multan till the advent of the summer heat compelled him to return and he plundered the suburbs of Lahore on the way. The people of Ghazni submitted to Ogtai; nevertheless all of them, except the chosen artisans, were put to death. Chengiz ordered the Indian slaves in his camp to scour four hundred *mans* of rice each; after they had finished this work, they were all executed.¹⁷ A contingent of Ogtai's army was sent against Firuz Koh in 1222; the inhabitants were killed and Firuz Koh was completely destroyed. Sayafrud and Tulak seem to have been the only forts that survived Mongol investments, but most of their inhabitants were killed by Mongol troops when they came down after the sieges were over.¹⁸ Alone among the forts of Ajam, Tulak succeeded in standing a siege of four years with success. Minhajus Siraj gives the names of five strong forts of Gharjistan; they were all conquered by Ogtai's contingents in 1222. More interesting is the case of the inaccessible forts of Kalwan and Fiwar, situated opposite to each other about sixty miles from Herat. They were besieged by Sadi Jazbi and Arsalan Khan of Kayaliq. Seizing them by force was not possible, but epidemics killed the garrisons of both forts in about a year and then the Mongols were able to capture them.¹⁹

The shoulder-blades of sheep, which he consulted, would not allow Chengiz to proceed to China by way of India; at the same time his agents informed him that the attitude of Tangut (Hsia) and the Kin was becoming hostile. Nevertheless, his homeward journey was leisurely. In the precincts of Samarqand he is said to have had discussions with two Muslim scholars and expressed his agreement with the Islamic belief in God and all its four rites except the Haj. 'God is everywhere, and you can find him everywhere.' He further gave an order exempting Muslim religious leaders (*imams*) and qazis from all taxes.

Chengiz Khan reached his homeland in 1224. His last years were devoted to the conquest of Tangut, but he died in Ramazan, A.H. 624, (August 1227) before the conquest had been completed. He was buried in the usual manner of the Mongols, or rather of the steppe chiefs throughout the ages. 'It is the custom of these people', says Minhajus Siraj,

17 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, Persian text, 361. A Persian *man* is meant; it would be roughly the amount of rice you could hold in your two hands.

18 *Ibid.*, 364-70. Minhajus Siraj, who fought in Tulak, gives details about both forts.

19 *Ibid.*, 357-60.

'that when one of their chiefs dies, they build under the ground a house or a cell (*suffa*) according to the status of the man, who has gone to Hell. They decorate the place with a throne, carpets, vessels and plenty of costly things. His arms and anything he was specially fond of are put there. Some of his women and slave-girls and any persons for whom he had greater affection than for all others are also placed in the cells. Then the place is filled up with the earth, and trees are planted above it, so that it becomes impossible to find the spot. This custom of theirs is very well known to all Musalmans.'²⁰

Chengiz's death was kept secret for three months to enable his officers to complete the conquest of Tangut. The whereabouts of his grave are unknown.

The man, who had gloried in dealing out death on the largest scale that history has recorded and had gloated over the rotting corpses of his enemies and made wine-cups of their skulls, was now summoned in his turn to be the victim of insects and worms. *His position as the greatest criminal in human history cannot be questioned.* He had seen life in all its phases, and his character and capacities had developed with experience. His ruthlessness had enabled him to unite the steppe *uluses* into a homogeneous unit by the complete annihilation of all rival chiefs. His high grade intelligence cannot be doubted nor his genius for organization. *But his military victory in Ajam, as the preceding account shows, was due primarily to his capacity for striking below the belt—in fact, to his meanness of character in attacking the civil population on a wholesale scale, a type of warfare which the sedentary Musalmans and Chinese had not expected.*

What the Musalmans suffered requires no further comment. But what about the shepherd-soldiers of the steppe, by whatever name we may call them—Mongols, Tatars or Turks, 'who knew not the difference between the clean and the unclean'? For them, as the future was to show, the whole enterprise had been an enormous swindle. 'The children and grandchildren of Chengiz Khan', Juwayni wrote about 1259, 'are more than ten thousand, each of whom has his position (*muqam*, status), *yurt* (territory), army and equipment.'²¹ Since the leaders of the local groups had been totally annihilated, the descendants of Chengiz and his officers dominated Ajam for a century and a half till Timur replaced them by an official group of his own choice. But what of the ordinary fighting men? Even victory meant death for many, while the spoils—fodder, cattle and the like,

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 307.

²¹ *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Persian text, Vol. I, 31; Boyle's Translation, Vol. I, 46.

which they collected—could not last. Gradually the steppe element among them died out, or, to use Napoleon's favourite phrase, it was 'consumed'. An attempt was made—and not without success—to Mongolize the unhappy Muslim levies, both Turks and Persians, who had been compelled to join the Mongol armies and they gradually replaced the steppe element.

Chengiz was tolerant in religious matters; he did not prevent his closest relations from embracing Christianity or Islam. But they were expected to continue his *yasas*—i.e. the supremacy of the steppe governing class along with its barbarous customs. To paint Chengiz Khan as a great legislator, after the manner of Sir Henry Howorth, is a terrible mistake. These *yasas*, no doubt, had a temporary value for conserving the supremacy of the steppe aristocracy. But a careful examination of these *yasas*, which can be easily compiled from Persian sources, shows that none of them was a contribution to human progress. The criminal *yasas* are barbarous and their only object was to maintain a high standard of military discipline. Concerning civil rights there are no *yasas* at all.

Still nothing succeeds like success. The total destruction of all independent and opposition leaders had ensured that for over a century all civil wars in Ajam would be between the descendants of Chengiz Khan and his officers, and that they would annihilate each other in the way he had taught them so well.

V. THE QA-ANS AND THE MONGOL ULUSES

THE ULUSES

HAVING NO OPPONENTS left in the territory he governed and which he reckoned as one year's journey, Chengiz proceeded to teach his sons and relations the benefits of unity by the sort of arguments we find in Aesop's *Fables*. They remembered his teachings for just twenty-four years; after that they began to kill each other with those refinements of cruelty which they had learnt from him. Chengiz's idea seems to have been that his four sons and their descendants should have their separate *uluses* (armies, hordes, kingdoms) and that the unity of his family and his empire should be maintained by a Qa-an, nominated by his predecessor and accepted by a *Quriltai* or Assembly of princes and high officers after his death.

The expansion of the Mongol empire continued till Chengiz's grandsons, Mangu, Halaku and Qubalai. Thereafter its separate parts began to shrink before their enemies. Chengiz had divided his empire between his four sons, but civil wars and revolutions made many changes. However, there were no enemies to fear, and we find the following *uluses* or kingdoms under the descendants of Chengiz.

(1) *The White Horde*:

Juji, Chengiz's eldest son, had been assigned the whole of the western steppe. He died during his father's life-time. His eldest son, Orda, became the ruler of the White Horde, north-east of the Jaxartes. It was united with the Golden Horde by Tughtamish Ghiyasuddin (1376-91).¹

(2) *The Golden Horde*:

Batu, the second son of Juji, ruled over the Golden Horde, which was destined to expand into Russia and eastern Europe and was the most fortunate of all the *uluses*. Its power was crushed by Timur. Persian writers refer to it as *Ulus-i Juji*.

(3) *Mongolia*:

Since inheritance by Mongol law went to the youngest son, the *uluses* of Mongolia were inherited by Tului. The Ming dynasty, which

¹ Stanley Lane-Poole, *Mohammadan Dynasties*, 321. This Horde had eight or nine rulers, but our Persian historians know little about it.

overthrew the Mongols in China, established its supremacy over Mongolia also. After 1634 the descendants of Tului were mere vassals of China.

(4) *The Yuan Dynasty of China:*

When Mangu Qa-an came to the throne in 1248, he decided that one of his brothers, Qubalai, was to be the ruler of China and the other, Halaku, was to be the ruler of Iran. Two dynasties ruling China, the Kin and the Hsia (or Tangut), had been already overthrown. Qubalai succeeded in overthrowing the Sung, the dynasty ruling southern China, by 1280. But the Yuan Dynasty founded by Qubalai was basically weak, and the Chinese drove the Mongols out of their country in 1370.

(5) *The Il Khans of Iran:*

Halaku succeeded in completing the conquest of Iran by 1258. His dynasty continued to govern the country till 1334.

(6) *The Ogtai-Chaghatai Ulus:*

The original territory assigned to Ogtai is hard to discover; it probably extended from Lake Balkash to the frontiers of the Golden Horde. Chaghatai was given Trans-Oxiana and Turkistan. During the *Quriltai* of 1251, many Chaghatai and Ogtai princes were put to death, but they succeeded in establishing their joint sovereignty over Central Asia in the reign of Qubalai. Only the last two *uluses* concern us here.

THE MONGOL QA-ANS: OGTAI

After careful consideration Chengiz decided that his third son, Ogtai, was the proper person to succeed him as Qa-an and he took the consent of Tului and Chaghatai to this arrangement. Chengiz's choice was duly confirmed by a *Quriltai* held in 1229. Ogtai was less hard-hearted than his brothers, and he was always so tipsy that they considered him to be generous. In the conquered territories there was certainly a lessening of the terror, but the expansion of the empire continued with the customary massacres. An end was put to the Kin kingdom and the last ruler of that dynasty burnt himself to death. Subetai, the Mongol military genius, was sent with several princes, such as Kuyuk (son of Ogtai) and Mangu (son of Tului) to help Batu against the princes of eastern Europe. They managed to reach Saxony and their progress was murderous as usual. Chamurghan, who was sent to Iran, succeeded in breaking the power of Jalaluddin Mankbarni and plundered Azarbaijan and Iraq. In India the Mongols

succeeded in plundering Lahore (1241), but the day after its fall news was brought that the great Qa-an's heart had stopped beating during a fit of drunkenness. Tului had died of the same complaint a little earlier. Chaghatai died soon after.

INTERREGNUM : TURAKINA KHATUN : KAYUK

Ogtai had nominated his grandson, Shirman, to succeed him but the matter had to be confirmed by a *Quriltai* and pending it, Ogtai's senior widow, Turakina Khatun, acted as regent. Turakina wanted her own son, Kayuk, to be elected; but as she was a woman with intense likes and dislikes and was moreover in the hands of a Muslim adventuress, Fatima, anarchy reigned supreme at the Mongol centre for five years.

Kayuk was elected Qa-an by the *Quriltai* of 1246. He put an end to his mother's misgovernment and she died soon after.² But Kayuk was unfit for his high office, and could not keep the descendants of Chengiz Khan together. In 1248 Kayuk and Batu, the premier Chengezi prince who had not come to the *Quriltai* of 1246, began marching against each other, apparently with the intention of fighting. But when they were at a week's journey from each other—Kayuk was to the north of Beshbaligh and Batu was at Ala-qama—Kayuk died suddenly at the age of forty-three.

MANGU QA-AN

On the pretext that he was suffering from gout, Batu summoned an informal *Quriltai* at his camp. He refused the crown for himself, but prevailed upon the princes present to accept Mangu, son of Tului, as their Qa-an. The princes of the Ogtai and Chaghatai branches had sent their representatives, who agreed with this decision. But when the formal *Quriltai* was held at Qara-Quram in 1251, these princes refused to come in spite of repeated summons; and on 1 July, the date fixed by the astronomers, Baraka, acting on behalf of his brother, Batu, placed Mangu on the throne. Later on some of the hostile princes came near the *Quriltai* encampment, but it was discovered in time that their carts were full of arms and it was suspected that they had planned a midnight attack on the princes, who were enjoying themselves at the *Quriltai*. They were tried, condemned and put to death. Mangu Khan, next, acting on the advice of Mahmud

² Kayuk was said to be a Christian but the following letter of his to Louis IX will give an idea of the sort of Christianity he professed: 'God has commanded my ancestors and myself to send our people to exterminate the wicked nations. You ask if I am a Christian. God knows! And if the Pope wishes to know also, he had better come and see.' (*Howorth*, Vol. I, 165).

Yalwaj, sent one army of a hundred thousand and another of twenty thousand to capture the hostile princes, who had remained at home. Some seventy princes and high officers were put to death. Batu, the ruler of the Golden Horde, was friendly but independent. The rest of the Mongol empire was brought under Mangu's control.

In accordance with the wishes of Chengiz and of Chaghatai himself, the latter had been succeeded by his grandson, Qara Halaku. But Kayuk set aside Qara Halaku on the ground that a grandson had no right to supersede a son, and placed a son of Chaghatai, Yesu, who was almost constantly drunk, on the throne. Qara Halaku appeared at Mangu's *Quriltai* and his throne was restored to him. But he died on his way home; Mangu settled the kingdom on Qara Halaku's son, but as he was a minor, Qara Halaku's widow, Orgina, was asked to carry on the government.

QUBALAI AND ARIQ BUQA

Halaku completed the conquest of Iran during Mangu's reign, but Qubalai's task was more difficult and Mangu marched to help his brother against the Sung. He died of dysentery in 1260. Qubalai at Peking, and after him his brother, Ariq Buqa, in Mongolia, proclaimed themselves Qa-ans after holding separate *Quriltais*. After a civil war of four years, Ariq Buqa submitted to Qubalai in 1264. His life was spared and he died soon after. The descendants of Chengiz were now governing the inhabited world from Peking to Hungary. But with the death of Mangu, the Mongol central government vanished.

HALAKU'S MARCH TO IRAN

Mangu made careful preparations to ensure his brother's success as the ruler or '*Khan*' of Iran. All Mongol princes were asked to send him two soldiers from every unit of ten. The desolated region of Khurasan, which had been administered successively by Chin Timur, Korguz and Amir Arghun, along with the whole of Afghanistan and the Punjab up to the Ravi, which the Mongols had seized, was transferred to Halaku; and all Mongol officers in these regions were directed to take their orders from him. The decision was also taken to annihilate the Ismaili state of Alamut and the caliphate of Baghdad.

Rashiduddin says that Mangu had asked Halaku to spare the Caliph in case he was subservient; but there was always a danger of the revival of the Caliph's power and Halaku was quite determined to liquidate both states. But diplomacy required that he should first win over orthodox Muslim opinion by attacking the heretic state, and then attack Baghdad after terrorizing the orthodox. Also Mongol diplomatic traditions, which required the maximum of territorial

gains with the minimum of fighting, induced Halaku to extend promises of security both to Muslim rulers and their subjects, which he had no intention of keeping; and the fact that surrenders in all cases were followed by wholesale massacres rightly won him the reputation of a liar, whose promises were not worthy of consideration. But this aspect of his character was not clear to the world till after the fall of the Abbasid caliphate.

ANNIHILATION OF THE HERETIC KINGDOM OF ALAMUT

Though the enterprise was decided upon by the *Quriltai* of 1251, Halaku did not cross the Oxus till the spring of 1255. The delay was due to diplomacy rather than to laziness. Summons were sent to all the 'sultans' and 'badshahs' of Islam as well as the smaller fry asking them to send their contingents for the conquest of Alamut; if they failed to do so, the fate of Alamut would also be their fate. Important Muslim chiefs came personally. First came Shamsuddin Kert of Herat and after him Atabak Sa'd from Fars and Izzuddin and Ruknuddin from Asia Minor (*Rum*). The Caliph sent a letter of submission but no troops. A Mongol army under Qaitu-Buqa, the senior officer of Halaku in this enterprise, had begun operating against the infidel forts in Qahistan in 1253. •

On 31 December 1253, Alauddin of Alamut was assassinated and his son, Ruknuddin Khurshah, succeeded him. When the main Mongol army had reached Qahistan, Halaku's ambassadors informed Khurshah that he was not responsible for the sins of his father and that no harm would come to him, provided he destroyed all his forts and then came down with his people and offered his submission. In spite of the madness and tyranny of Alauddin, the spirit of Hasan bin Sabbah still survived among the Ismailis, and a courageous ruler commanding the 105 inaccessible forts of the Alamut kingdom could have brought the Mongols to their knees. But Ruknuddin was weak, spineless and inexperienced; he made a show of dismantling some forts and asked for permission to come out after a year. Halaku, on his part, wanted to terrorize Khurshah into submission, to treat him well so that he may order the garrisons of all his other forts to surrender, and then to execute them to the last man.

On 3 November 1255, Halaku began to invest Maimun-Diz, the fort where Ruknuddin Khurshah was living, and gave him an ultimatum of five days. The conquest of the fort did not prove easy, but Khurshah came to Halaku on 2 December 1255, and offered him all his treasures, which were not up to their popular reputation. Khurshah was, for the time being, treated with great consideration; and a

yarligh of Halaku promising them security, backed by a command of Khurshah, induced the garrisons of the heretic hill-forts to come down and surrender themselves to the Mongols. But the fort of Lambsar (or Lamasar) held out for a year till it was paralyzed by an epidemic, and the fort of Girdkoh continued its resistance for full twenty years. This at least gives some indication of what brave leadership could have achieved. Khurshah fell in love with a Mongol girl and Halaku allowed him to marry her. Then he desired to go to Mangu's court and Halaku allowed him to proceed.

'There are divergent stories of the manner of Khurshah's death,' Rashiduddin tells us, 'but according to the correct narrative when Mangu Qa-an heard of Khurshah's coming, he said, "Why is he coming here? He should be put to death as soon as possible." He sent messengers who killed Khurshah on the way. On this side (in Iran) after Khurshah had been sent away, all his relations and followers—men, women and even children in the cradle—were put to death.'³ A whole community of several hundred thousand, or possibly over a million, was slaughtered like cattle. Degenerate Muslim orthodoxy considered this a service to Islam.

END OF THE ABBASID CALIPHATE

It was next the turn of the 'orthodox caliphate' of Baghdad. Halaku Khan summoned Baiju Noyan, the successor of Chormughan, and gave him a sound scolding. 'Apart from frightening the troops with the prestige and the dignity of the Caliph, what else have you done?' Baiju explained that he had conquered the whole of Iraq till the frontiers of *Rum* (Asia Minor) but his troops were not sufficient for the conquest of Baghdad. Halaku fixed his headquarters at Hama-dan and began to prepare for the liquidation of the caliphate. An order was sent to the Caliph Must'asim telling him that he had acted disloyally in not sending any troops against the 'heretics' and that his safety now lay in destroying the ramparts of Baghdad and filling up the ditch; he was then to come to Halaku personally, but if that was not possible, he was to send his wazir, Muayyaduddin Alqami, and his *Dawatdar* (Ink-bearer).

But would Halaku's Muslim allies prove loyal to him against the caliphate? It was necessary to set an example that would leave the matter in no doubt. Husamuddin Akka, the Caliph's governor of Dertang, had submitted to Halaku; after that he had begun intriguing with the Caliph and had undertaken, at a price, to defend Baghdad

³ *Jamiut Tawarikh*, Paris edition, 1847, 65. (This edition only covers the career of Halaku.)

with one hundred thousand horsemen. The Mongols, without revealing that they had discovered his conspiracy, induced Akka and his garrison to come down from their fort by the same sort of false promises of security that they had made to Khurshah and the heretics; and once Akka and his garrison were in their power, the Mongols slaughtered them to the last man. Nasiruddin Tusi, the famous scientist whom Halaku consulted, advised him to pay no regard to popular rumours as to what would happen in case the Caliph was killed. Many companions of the Prophet had been martyred and many caliphs had been killed, but nothing cataclysmic had happened. The conquest of Baghdad would lead to one result only—Halaku would reign there in place of Must'asim.

Meanwhile Baghdad was hopelessly divided between a peace-party led by the wazir, Muayyaduddin Alqami, and a war-party led by the *Dawatdar* and Sulaiman Shah. Both parties blamed each other, but neither party had a programme that could ward off the doom of Baghdad. 'The people', says Rashiduddin, 'were tired of the Abbasids and hated them.' So in complete ignorance of their own future, they developed no enthusiasm for the Caliph and the caliphate. The wazir advised humble and effective submission, so that the Abbasid caliphate may outlive the Mongols as it had outlived other imperial dynasties; the Caliph was to send Halaku a substantial part of his treasures and to put Halaku's name in the Friday sermon and on the coins.⁴ The *Dawatdar* said he would plunder these treasures as soon as they came out of Baghdad, and so nothing could be despatched. On the other hand, trained soldiers were not available; the war-party could only enlist city-hooligans and the Caliph was unwilling to waste his treasures upon them. So nothing was done.

Halaku started from Hamadan at the beginning of January 1357. Baiju and other officers were ordered to proceed against Baghdad by way of Mosul; Baghdad was to be surrounded on all sides, and particular care was to be taken that no boats may be able to fly up the river Tigres. Halaku had no objection to prolonged negotiations while he was subduing the territory round Baghdad and maturing his military plans. The Caliph told him of the greatness of his dynasty, but also promised to pay a yearly tribute if Halaku would withdraw. 'Having come all this way', Halaku replied, 'how can I return without seeing the Caliph? After I have met him personally, I will ask for his

⁴ Since the wazir, Alqami, was a Shia and Halaku appointed him to govern Baghdad after the Caliph had been murdered, the Sunnis have accused him of treason to his master. But there is no real justification for this charge. His advice was sincere, though the Mongols would have put an end to the caliphate, whatever the policy of Must'asim.

permission to withdraw.' Ultimately the terrible Mongol attack was delivered. The *Dawatdar* was defeated and fled back, and on 30 January 1258, the siege began and continued for six days. Halaku ordered six *yarlighs* (orders) to be written and shot into the town tied to arrows; they promised security of life to *qazis* (judges), *danishmands* (educated persons), *shaikhs* (mystics), the descendants of Hazrat Ali and to all who did not take up arms.

When the Mongols had captured the ramparts, the Caliph gave up all hopes and started negotiations. On 7 February 1258, the *Dawatdar* and Sulaiman Shah came out of the city, but they were sent back to bring out their troops, so that they may be allowed to proceed to Egypt or Syria. 'The soldiers in Baghdad decided to come out with them and also a lot of other people in the hope that they would be allowed to survive. But they were divided into groups of 10,000 and 1,000, and all of them were put to death. Those who remained in the city sought refuge in cellars and drains.'⁵ The *Dawatdar* was put to death on 8 February and after that Sulaiman Shah with seven hundred persons related to him was killed.

On 11 February the Caliph came out with his three sons and three hundred notables and presented himself before Halaku. Halaku talked to him courteously and showed no anger. 'Order the people of Baghdad to throw off their arms and come out, so that I may have them counted', he commanded. The Caliph sent messengers to the city to proclaim that the people were to throw away their arms and come out. The people came out, group after group, and the Mongols killed them.⁶ On 14 February the general plunder of the city began; the Mongol army entered the city and apart from a few houses belonging to herdsmen (*gawiyan*) and poor people, it burnt everything, wet and dry. On 16 February Halaku proceeded with his officers to the palace and ordered the Caliph to be brought. 'We are your guests. What presents have you for us?' The Caliph, who was trembling with fear from head to foot, offered 20,000 dresses, 10,000 dinars and other valuables. Halaku ordered them to be distributed among those present. But he was obviously dissatisfied. 'What you have above the ground is known and belongs to my people; tell me where your underground treasures are?' The Caliph confessed that there was a tank full of gold in the middle of the palace. Excavation revealed that it was full of 100-*misqal*⁷ gold pieces. It was found that the Caliph had a *haram* of 700 women and 1,000 servants. At his repeated

⁵ *Jamiat Tawarikh*, Paris edition, 92.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 93-94.

⁷ One *misqal* is equal to a dram and three-sevenths.

requests, one hundred of his women were left to him. The surviving citizens then sent a deputation asking for mercy and Halaku ordered the murders to be stopped.

On 21 February 1258, Halaku marched away owing to the stench of the decomposing corpses. 'Towards the end of the same day the Caliph was put to death with his eldest son and five servants in the village of Waqf.'⁸ Next day all those who had come with him out of the Kalwazi Gate of Baghdad were martyred. None of the Abbasids found were left alive, apart from some who were not deemed worth considering.⁹ The end of the Abbasid caliphate has been considered a great event by later historians. But the only feeling among contemporaries was that of regret. There were no political repercussions. The city of Wasit resisted and forty thousand of its inhabitants were massacred. The Mongol conquest of Iran and Iraq was now complete.

CAPTURE OF SYRIAN CITIES

The conquest of Syria and Egypt was an integral part of Halaku's plan and he started for Syria on 12 September 1259. The kingdom of Egypt had come into the hands of the *Mameluks* or slave-officers, but the cities and districts of Syria were ruled by the descendants of Salahuddin Ayyubi, the Muslim hero of the First Crusade. The rulers of Syria did not unite^{*} against the Mongol invader, though many of them fought bravely. The task of the Mongols in Syria was, therefore, simplified; it meant the reduction of cities and forts, one by one, with no field-force to fear. Aleppo resisted the Mongols for forty days but was captured in November/December 1259, and plundered for seven days. 'Makrizi says that the streets were encumbered with corpses and the Mongols marched over them. The number of women reduced to slavery he calculates at 100,000.'¹⁰

The inhabitants of the fort of Harim resisted the Mongols for a long time; Halaku promised them security, but when they came down, he ordered them all to be put to death. Malik Kamil, ruler of Miafariqain in Diarbekr, told Yeshmuth, son of Halaku, that his father was a liar and that he was not going to be deceived. Led by him the people of Miafariqain resisted the Mongols for a whole year but were ultimately driven to cannibalism for lack of provisions and forced to surrender. Malik Kamil was taken to Halaku, who ordered his flesh to be cut and put into his mouth till he died (1259). According to Rashid-uddin, Malik Kamil was a pious man, who earned his livelihood as a

⁸ The mode of killing him was kept secret and it is useless guessing about it now.

⁹ *Jamiut Tawarikh*, 96.

¹⁰ Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, Vol. III, 148.

tailor. Malik Sa'id, ruler of Mardin, also informed Yeshmuth that he could not trust the word of the Mongols, but after the siege had gone on for eight months, Sa'id was poisoned by his son, Muzaffaruddin, who decided to surrender. Halaku appointed him in his father's place and Mardin was not plundered. Under these circumstances Malik Nasir, ruler of Damascus, fled to Egypt and the inhabitants made terms with the Mongols.

EGYPTIAN VICTORY OVER THE MONGOLS

Fast runners brought to Halaku the news of Mangu Qa-an's death in the summer of 1260. He was greatly distressed and decided to retire from Syria, leaving charge of it to Qaitu-Buqa. But before doing so, he sent an ambassador with forty servants to Qanduz, the king of Egypt, with the usual Mongol insolence: 'God had granted the government of the world to the family of Chengiz Khan; Qanduz was, therefore, to submit, accept a tribute, present himself personally before Halaku and request for a Mongol *shuhna* to represent Halaku in Egypt.'

Qanduz and his people for once rose equal to the occasion. 'The Mongol power is so great', Qanduz told his counsellors,

'that there is no degradation in submitting to it. But Halaku's pledges and promises cannot be trusted. He promised security to Khurshah, to the Caliph, to Husamuddin Akka and to the ruler of Irbil, but once they were in his hands, he put them all to death. There are three alternatives—migration of the whole people to the west, treaty and agreement with Halaku, or war. Now migration is inconceivable.'¹¹

His officers added that agreement was equally impossible; so war was decided upon. At night they put Halaku's ambassador and his servants to death and then started on the campaign. Officers and soldiers of excellent calibre had been taking refuge in Egypt owing to the advance of the Mongols, and they were all available for the struggle. Unless they succeeded in the war, Cairo would be a second Baghdad; Halaku had shown his criminal hand so often that any further deception was impossible.

Baidar, the first Mongol commander they met, was driven back to the river Asi. 'Qaitu-Buqa, the chief commander, who was at Antioch (Ba'al Bakka), hastened against them with an army of about ten thousand like a river of fire with great confidence in his power and prestige.' In the battle that followed on 3 September 1260, the

¹¹ *Jami'ut Tawarikh*, Paris edition, 1847, 111.

Mongols were stupidly self-confident while the Egyptians showed first-rate tactical skill. Qanduz, leading the centre, retreated and the Mongols followed, killing the Egyptians. Then three Egyptian contingents, who were hiding in ambush at three different places, jumped at the Mongols. 'The battle raged from the morning to the afternoon prayer; it was impossible for the Mongols to make any further stand and they were defeated.'¹² A number of Mongols had taken refuge in a reed-forest; the Egyptians killed them by burning the forest. Qaitu-Buqa was captured alive. According to Rashiduddin, Qaitu-Buqa fought bravely and also talked bravely after he had been captured. But when he threatened them with the wrath of Halaku, they cut off his head to prevent him from talking further nonsense, and sent it to Cairo.

'The victory of the Egyptians', says Sir Henry Howorth, 'was a turning point in world history.' Its importance lay in the fact that it liquidated the idea of Mongol invincibility and put an end to the further expansion of Mongol power. Within the regions under their sway the Mongols had barbarously put an end to all opposition, and their power could be maintained there for some generations; but they could only cross their frontiers hereafter at the cost of their heads. Damascus was set free after the Mongols had controlled it for seven months and ten days. The Mongols were driven out of Syria till the river. The camp of Qaitu-Buqa Noyan was plundered and his women, children and followers were taken away as slaves. The (Mongol) officers and tax-collectors in Syria were all killed, except the tax-collectors of Damascus, who had fled on the night the news arrived.'¹³

Halaku was in no position to retaliate. Batu, the Khan of the Golden Horde, had been succeeded by his brother, Baraka in 1255 or 1256. Halaku resented the ways of Baraka as the senior prince. Baraka, who had become a Musalman, had even more serious complaints against Halaku's policy. Baraka's general, Buqa, who ventured into the territory south of Darbend, was defeated. But when Halaku's son, Abaka, marched north beyond the river Terek, he suffered an even more severe defeat. Abaka fought from the morning to the afternoon on 13 January 1263, and then fled across the frozen Terek, but the ice gave way and many of his soldiers were drowned.

Halaku had now to follow a defensive policy for he was surrounded by enemies on all sides—Egypt, Baraka, and the newly risen power of the descendants of Ogtai and Chaghatai in Central Asia. A Mongol general, Sali, had captured Kashmir and sent plenty of captives from

¹² *Ibid.*, 113.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 44.

there.¹⁴ But Halaku was in no position to send help to his officers in the Punjab, and remained on peaceful terms with the kingdom of Delhi. He died on 8 January 1264, at the age of forty-eight.

THE IL KHANS OF PERSIA

The descendants of Halaku, who exercised authority in Persia after him, are known as 'Il Khans'. They were eight in number—(1) Abaka Khan, son of Halaku (1264-82); (2) Takudar Aghul, brother of Abaka; he accepted Islam but was overthrown by his nephew, Arghun, and murdered (1282-84); (3) Arghun Khan, eldest son of Abaka (1284-91); (4) Gaikhatu Khan, son of Abaka (1291-95), killed by rebels; (5) Baidu Aghul, killed by Ghazan after he had been on the throne for eight months; (6) Ghazan, son of Arghun (1295-1304); (7) Aljaitu Khan Khuda-Bandah, son of Arghun (1306-16); and (8) Abu Sa'id Khan, son of Aljaitu (1316-34). Abu Sa'id ascended the throne at the age of twelve and after his death the central government disappeared. In the same year (1334) Timur was born.

The traditions of family good-will desired by Chengiz Khan had vanished after Mangu's massacres of 1251. Among the 'Il Khans', as Rashiduddin remarks, succession, even when it was legal, had to be ensured by the sword. The same insecurity appeared among the highest officers. Since the whole country had been thoroughly plundered, and no proper attempts at reconstruction had been made, the wazirs could not honestly perform the duty of balancing the budget; and as a result the wazirs of the 'Il Khans' were dismissed after short periods of office and put to death on the ground that they had embezzled public money. It is said that only one wazir escaped with his life, and among the wazirs killed were Shamsuddin (the elder brother of Alauddin Ata Malik Juwayni) and the great historian, Rashiduddin. Add to it, there was a constant conflict between the higher Mongol nobles and the 'Il Khans'. Malik Nauroz, a son of Malik Arghun, who had governed Khurasan for thirty years under the old regime, contributed greatly to putting Ghazan on the throne and then proceeded to fill up all the highest offices of the state with his own relations, so that he may remain in supreme control. Ghazan in retaliation ordered Nauroz and most of his relations to be put to death. Malik Chaupan, the premier officer of Abu Sa'id Khan, was killed along with many of his relations in the same manner.

Takudar Aghul, brother of Abaka, accepted Islam and took the title of Sultan Ahmad. The rebellion against him may have been partly due to resentment against his conversion. But when Ghazan accepted

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 44.

Islam under the name of Mahmud, public opinion was ripe for the change and most of his officers also became Musalmans. But it must be clearly understood that mere conversion did not mean the rejection of the *yasas* of Chengiz or the acceptance of the principle of the sanctity of human life, which is the essence of all great religions but which the *yasas* completely ignore. Thus Ghazan's reign was marked by a terrible role of executions and 'there is hardly a page of Rashid-uddin (his official historian) without the notice of the execution of some public functionary.'¹⁵ Both rulers and nobles killed each other with all the refinements of cruelty.

Under these conditions the 'Il Khans' had to follow a defensive foreign policy dictated by their weakness. They had neither an efficient army nor a loyal people nor enough money in their treasury. Bad relations with Egypt had been inherited from Halaku and victory on the whole lay with the Egyptians. Abaka was unequal to the Egyptian Baibar, who inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongols at Ablestin in *Rum* on 16 April 1277. Abaka thought there would be a chance for him after Baibar's death and he sacked Aleppo for two days in 1280. But his general, Mangu Timur, suffered a crushing defeat and Abaka found a solution for his troubles by drinking himself to death. The only other 'Il Khan' who could challenge the Egyptians seriously was Ghazan. A showy victory in 1299 enabled him to hold Syria for about a hundred days, and Damascus and the countryside were plundered in the usual Mongol manner. But in 1303 the Egyptians inflicted a terrible defeat on Ghazan's army outside Damascus; only one man out of ten returned home and his distress at this defeat probably hastened Ghazan's death at the early age of thirty-three.

From the east, Burraq, a Chaghatai ruler, attacked Khurasan and conquered most of it in 1267-68, and Abaka, who was at war with the Egyptians, offered to hand over the territory of Ghazni up to the Indus to Burraq in order to secure peace. But Burraq unwisely rejected the offer; he was badly defeated in a battle near Herat and was driven back to Trans-Oxiana, where he died in 1271 after becoming a Musalman. Frontier skirmishes between the 'Il Khans' and the Ogtai-Chaghatai princes of Central Asia thereafter became an annual affair. The 'Il Khani' officers also kept tinkering at the Indian frontier with their own resources and on their own responsibility; and traitors to the kingdom of Delhi, who came to them for help, had to return disappointed.

• When Sultan Abu Sa'id Khan died in 1334 without leaving any male issue, the central government of the 'Il Khans' came to an end.

¹⁵ Howorth, *History of the Mongols*, Vol. III, 421.

It was accepted on principle that only a descendant of Halaku could be a 'Khan', but Ghazan had decimated the royal family so thoroughly that nearly all princes directly descended from Halaku were living in greater or lesser obscurity. So rival groups of officers put up rival Khans and fought under their banners, but they denied to their Khans even the semblance of power. The country was disturbed by their constant conflicts but no group could establish its authority over the whole country till Timur appeared on the scene. The rise of the Muzaffarid dynasty in southern Persia, whose greatest ruler, Shah Shuja, was a patron of the poet, Hafiz, would have been a blessing, but unfortunately the princes of this dynasty were in the habit of killing each other, and the country could not get from them the peace it so badly needed.

THE OGTAI AND CHAGHATAI RULERS OF CENTRAL ASIA

It is difficult to piece together a connected history of the Ogtai-Chaghatai *uluses* of Central Asia, who made such desperate attempts to conquer India during the reign of Alauddin Khalji.¹⁶ When Mangu died in China in 1260, Orgina, widow of Qara Halaku, who was governing the *ulus* of Chaghatai with the help of Habsh Amid and his son, Nasiruddin, took the side of Ariq Buqa. But Ariq made the mistake of sending Ulghu, a grandson of Chaghatai, to this region. Orgina withdrew to Qara-Quram, but after the fall of Ariq Buqa she returned to her former territory and married Ulghu.

Then a new figure, Qaidu, son of Khash, son of Ogtai, appeared on the scene. 'Qaidu', says Barthold, 'must have been one of the most remarkable Mongol rulers.' But our information about him is scanty. His father had died of drunkenness; so he never touched any intoxicant. He was a true Mongol in appearance and had (according to Rashiduddin) only nine hair in his beard. He was with Ariq Buqa in the troubled years, 1260-64, but when Ariq decided to go and submit to Qubalai, Qaidu refrained from going with him and claimed the hereditary Qa-aniship of Ogtai. He seems to have created an army out of nothing, but the courage and discipline of his army became proverbial. 'He did not sacrifice the interests of the civil population to the army, whose prosperity reached a high standard during his reign.'¹⁷

Qaidu had to struggle hard with Ulghu, who died in 1265 or 1266.

¹⁶ Barthold's *Semirechye* brings together all the scattered facts that can be discovered in Persian works. Marco Polo refers to Qaidu as a great Khan. Howorth and Mirkhond have also collected what they could, but much remains to be done.

¹⁷ Barthold: *Semirechye*, 124.

After him Mubarak Shah, a son of Qara Halaku and Orgina, was proclaimed Qa-an. Qubalai resented this claim and sent an army against Mubarak under a Chaghatai prince, Burraq, who defeated and suppressed Mubarak. Burraq and Qaidu first fought two battles and then held a *Quriltai* on the bank of the Jaxartes, where they decided to be *andas* or closest friends. For the expansion of their joint empire, Burraq invaded Khurasan but was defeated and returned to die in 1271. In 1282 Qaidu selected Dawa Khan, a son of Burraq, to be joint-ruler with him. The two Khans had to fight on all fronts, but they had the most prosperous region of the Mongol empire in their hands and their power expanded. Following the example of Chengiz, Qaidu formed military divisions under the command of his sons. In the last years of his life he entrusted to them the defence of the marches of his kingdom. Urus was in command of the Chinese frontier, Bey Kecher on the border of the Golden Horde and Sarban in Afghanistan, from whence the troops of Qaidu and Dawa gradually dislodged the forces of the "Il Khans".¹⁸

Dawa seems also to have followed a similar policy. The two Khans made a strong effort to expand into India, the frontiers of which down to the Ravi had probably come into their hands a little before the accession of Alauddin Khalji in 1296; but the enterprise, though continued for several years, failed disastrously.¹⁹ Qaidu probably died in 1301 and was succeeded by his son, Chapar. Dawa survived till 1306. Thereafter the Mongols of Central Asia were too busy in fighting each other to think of foreign lands. Alauddin Tarmshirin Khan, who ascended the throne in 1326, invaded India and seemed, for a time, to carry all before him. But the invasion was a mistake for his power was too weak at home. In 1332 a revolt was led against him by one Bazan, also a Muslim, on the ground that he neglected the Chengizi *yasas*. Tarmshirin tried to fly to Ghazni, but he was captured and sent to Bazan, who put him to death.

It is not possible to give an account of all the complicated affairs of Central Asia here. In A.H. 733 (1332-33), Qiran Sultan Khan mounted the throne, but he was cruel and bloodthirsty; it is said that when he called an amir to a *Quriltai*, the latter would first make his will and then go to the Khan. In A.H. 746 (1345-46) Amir Qazghan, who held the territory of Shali Serai, north of the Oxus, led a rebellion of the discontented amirs against the Khan. Qazghan was defeated in the first

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 128.

¹⁹ Ziauddin Barani in his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* shows no knowledge of any 'Il Khan' after Halaku. But he refers to Qutlugh Khwaja as the son of Dawa, Khan of Mawaraun Nahr. Amir Khusrav in his *Khazainul Futuh* refers to the 'carrion-eaters of Qaidu' (Persian text, 36).

battle and lost an eye, while the Khan moved to Qarshi. But Qazghan challenged the Khan a second time, and Qiran was defeated and put to death after he had ruled Trans-Oxiana and Turkistan for fourteen lunar years. Thereafter the central government came under the control of Amir Qazghan; he first gave the Khanship to Danishmand Ughlan, a descendant of Ogtai Khan, but after two years he put Danishmand to death and gave the Khanship to Bayan Quli Ughlan, son of Surghuda, son of Dawa Khan.

Qazghan is declared by the historians to have been a good ruler and a brave warrior. He marched in 1351 against Malik Mu'izzuddin of Herat, who had begun to behave like a sovereign prince, but accepted his submission out of regard for the welfare of the people. About the same time his son, Amirzada Abdullah, conquered Khwarazm. In 1359 Qazghan was assassinated while hunting by his son-in-law, Qutlugh Timur Baraldai. His son, Abdullah, who seems to have been accepted as his successor, proved utterly unworthy of the post. Among other things, he put Bayan Quli Khan to death, because he wanted to take possession of the Khan's wife and to put Timur Shah Ughlan, son of Bisun Timur, in his place.

In order to punish Abdullah, Amir Bayan Saldoz marched from Hisar Shadman to Samarqand and was joined on the way by Amir Haji Birlas at Kish. Abdullah was defeated; he fled across the Oxus to Indrab and died there some time later. Timur Shah, the Khan, was put to death for no fault of his own. Bayan Saldoz and Haji Birlas could have established their power over Trans-Oxiana had they the energy and the capacity to do so. But Saldoz, though mild and humane in character, was too much devoted to the wine-cup and was hardly sober for a week during the year; Amir Haji Birlas, as the future was to show, was thoroughly incompetent. As a result the central power vanished, and the officers in charge of the eight or nine districts of Trans-Oxiana began to behave like independent war-lords. Yezdi, the official historian of Timur, enumerates them as follows—(1) Haji Birlas at Kish; (2) Bayazid Jalair at Khojend; (3) Amir Husain, son of Musalla, son of Amir Qazghan, was in possession of some territories and strove to attain to the power exercised by his grandfather; (4) Uljai Bugha Saldoz at Balkh; (5) Muhammad Khwaja Aparidi at Shaburghan; (6) Kaikhusrau at Khatlan; (7) Aljaitu Aparidi at Arhang; and (8) Khizr Yasuri at Samarqand. Add to it, Badakhshan was in the hands of petty rulers, called *shahs*, who secure in their high mountains, ignored all external authority. 'Every amir and noyan, wherever he was,' Yezdi remarks, 'considered himself leader and sovereign and raised the banner of oppression and independence.'

Meanwhile Turkistan (called Jattah by the historians of the period)

had separated itself from Trans-Oxiana. While in Trans-Oxiana almost all Mongol settlers had been converted to Islam and some of the leaders of the Jattah also had Muslim names, our authorities state that a large part of the Jattah Mongols had not been converted to Islam. Also Turkistan or Jattah had its own Khan, Tughluq Timur Khan, son of Ughul Khwaja, son of Dawa Khan, who considered himself entitled to rule Trans-Oxiana also.

VI. AMIR TIMUR

CRIMES, APOLOGIA AND CONFESSIONS

AMONG THE 'KILLERS' who have claimed to belong to the Prophet's creed, Amir Timur Gurkan, entitled the *Sahib Qiran* (Lord of Fortune), has surpassed all others with reference to the murder of peaceful non-combatant Muslims and, in a much smaller degree, non-combatant non-Muslims, who were beheaded by his orders or put to death in more original ways.

It was a well-known fact that after a reign of thirty-six years (1370-1405), characterized by unrivalled military and political successes and world-wide murders, Timur had gone to his account with a tortured mind, because crimes of this type cannot (according to Islam or any other creed) be forgiven merely owing to the repentance and prayers of the criminal. Also in the countries he had ravaged—the Arabian lands, in particular, where he was regarded as an anti-Muslim monster, a barbarian and a Hell-hound—there were not only murmurs of relief at his death but very audible curses of the dead tyrant. It was obvious that a good part of these curses would go into the historical literature of the Arabs and damn Timur for all time. Meanwhile the Timurid empire had vanished, the only remnants being the minor kingdoms of Herat, Fars, Trans-Oxiana and Kabul. Timur had left thirty-six descendants at the time of his death and the family had remarkable power of multiplying; nevertheless, the Timurid princes kept killing each other or were beheaded by their enemies. Under these circumstances Mirza Shah Rukh of Herat and his son, Sultan Ibrahim of Fars, thought it necessary to bring out an official history of Timur—the *Zafar Nama* of Sharafuddin Ali Yezdi—based upon the Chaghatai official records, information given by officers acquainted with facts and, finally, on royal decisions. The work was published nineteen years after Timur's death.

The *Zafar Nama* is intended to praise and justify Timur but, if the sugar-coating put for the sake of his royal patrons is taken away, Yezdi's *Zafar Nama* becomes a charge-sheet against one of the world's greatest criminals.¹

¹ The greatest of anti-Timurid works is the *Ajaibul Maqdur fi Ahwal-i Timur* of Ibn-i Arab Shah in Arabic. Gibbon characterizes it as 'malevolent' on account of its hostile expressions, but there can be no doubt that Ibn-i Arab Shah expresses the opinions of his educated contemporaries about Timur. But since, in spite of his efforts, he had not the correct facts which were available to Yezdi, I have preferred to base

'At a time when the truth was remembered by thousands (? millions),' Gibbon remarks, 'a manifest falsehood would have implied a censure on Timur's real conduct.'² Yezdi, therefore, admits the great massacres and destructions of Timur so that he may hide his smaller crimes. An attempt is made to justify Timur on the following lines, all of which end in a blind alley.

(a) Yezdi's work is full of Quranic verses, mostly irrelevant. The implication seems to be that Timur's life was directed by Quranic ideas. But the following well-known verse, which was bound to come to the mind of any of his readers acquainted with the Quran, is totally ignored: 'And he who kills a Musalman intentionally, his punishment is Hell, and it is a bad destination.' Is this a suggestion by silence?

(b) This Universe is a manifestation of the One in the Many. The organs of the human frame, a microcosm of the Universe, are kept in order by the human mind. In the same way the power and authority of the monarch keeps society in order. On the basis of this weak simile and a misinterpreted verse of the Quran, Yezdi expects us to accept the following conclusion:

'As successful monarchs and world-conquering heroes have a complete portion of Divine favour—"And We have sent you as Our deputies (*khalifa*) on the earth", the Quran says³—the Divine attributes of terror and kindness find their final expression through this highly honoured and distinguished group. Sometimes the lightning of their anger begins to fall and they burn the world with their wrath or overthrow a whole country, but when the wind of (Divine) favour begins to blow, they light a thousand lamps of mercy with their kindness and make a whole world prosperous.'⁴

But since such an argument would have justified every crime, provided it was committed on a large scale, like the crimes attributed to the Pharaohs by the Quran, it is not pressed home. It was, however,

this chapter on Yezdi's official work. In India everything that was derogatory to Timur was suppressed, e.g. the last part of Afif's *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*. The so-called 'Institutes' (*Tuzuk*), consisting of two parts, *Policy (Kankaj)* and *Regulations*, in which Timur is made to speak in the first person, are proved by their internal evidence to be the absurd compilation of later times. But an Indian pilgrim, Abu Talib Husaini, succeeded in rescuing a fragment of the confidential *Autobiography* prepared at Timur's order in Turkish verse; this work has survived in spite of being proscribed by Shah Jahan and I have had no hesitation in using it. An *Id-gah* inscription cursing Timur has also survived in Delhi.

² Gibbon: *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Chapter LXV.

³ The Quran (as already noted) says this not about kings (*maliks*) but about MAN, who alone among all living creatures is required to live according to a moral law.

⁴ *Zafar Nama*, Vol. II, 253-54.

taken up later on by Abul Fazl with reference to Akbar, but on a different plane.

(c) The following statement about Timur is repeated again and again :

'The real character of His Majesty was inclined to justice and the promotion of the prosperity of the people and the object of his high ambition was the building up of territories. The terror displayed and the destruction wrought *occasionally* by his world-conquering troops was due to the necessities of conquests, for countries cannot be annexed without punishments and the establishment of prestige.'⁵

But the term 'occasional' can hardly be applied to the plunder which his army collected year after year. 'The officers of the victorious troops', Sharafuddin admits, 'were better provided and wealthier than the officers of other days.' And as to the soldiers, it was understood on both sides that Timur's high standards of military discipline would be relaxed when his genius and their toils had made the plunder of a rich city or a rich countryside possible. Some misbehaviour of the conquered people could always provide an excuse, and where even this was hard to find, they could, like the inhabitants of Damascus, be punished for the crimes of their supposed ancestors several centuries earlier. Yezdi makes the most he can of Timur's very meagre constructive work.

(d) Another line of argument, repeated quite often, is to make Fate or Destiny responsible for Timur's crimes. If prosperous cities were destroyed, it was because God had so willed it from the beginning of Time. Did Yezdi expect us to forget that this sort of justification is available for every crime and every criminal?

There was a latent contradiction in Timur's life. Ibn-i Arab Shah is correct in saying that the *yasas* of Chengiz and the traditions of the Mongols were fundamental to Timur's character and policy, and that the Quran and Muslim traditions did not matter except as external forms. Nevertheless, his father and grandfather had been pious Muslims and he had been brought up in a Muslim atmosphere. So towards the end of his life, when he was face to face with death, his mind began to be tortured by the thoughts of the crimes he had committed.

Clavijs, visiting Samarqand about the end of his reign, found Timur inaccessible, though his officers would not say that he was ill. Abu Talib Husaini in his fragment of Timur's *Autobiography* refers to

two very horrid dreams of Timur at this time.⁶ First, Timur dreamt that he was sitting on an elevation while the people, whom he had murdered, assuming hideous shapes, had formed a large circle which was gradually closing round him. When he had been nearly surrounded, Timur woke up in a fright. He wrote to his *pir* (religious guide), and the latter advised him to be more careful about his prayers and religious rites. But the second dream left Timur no margin of hope. He dreamt that he was before a great *diwan* or office and went in to enquire about the country whose revenue records were kept there. 'We do not keep the revenue records of any country but of human lives', he was told. 'How much life is left to me?' he enquired. 'Hardly any', was the answer. This time even his religious guide could give him no consolation.

The facts were so well known that it was impossible to hide them; so Yezdi tried to put them in the best perspective possible:

'When the power of the Sahib Qiran rose through Divine assistance, the inhabited world had been under the firm power of tribal chiefs (*mulukut tawaif*) and various types of (petty) rulers for several years; and as the wars and struggles of the rulers of cities and districts are bound to ruin and destroy the people, peace and security had disappeared from the countries and the great land-routes. Robbers had obtained control of the countryside and lawless tyrants of the cities, and the affairs of mankind had deviated totally from the path of rectitude. When in the human body, which is the epitome of the universe, poisonous elements accumulate and health declines, it is obvious that cure is not possible without strong purgatives, which throw out the diseased material. And when the diseased material is thrown out suddenly, many healthy tissues are also lost with it.

'Since Divine destiny had pre-ordained that the affairs of the world would be brought back to normal conditions through the sweet and bitter *sharbat*—the kindness and the terror—of the unrivalled Sahib Qiran, God's kindness elevated him above his fortunate contemporaries and miraculously distinguished him with the grant of dominion. Consequently, by God's guidance, the claim for world-conquest and world-dominion began to germinate in his mind, and owing to Divine assistance he conquered the great countries of the world in a very short time. He seized them from the cruel tyrants of the time, adorned them with justice and equity and spread the carpet of peace in such a way that if a lonely man travelled with a vessel full of gold and silver from east to west, he would not be molested by robbers and wicked men.

⁶ Manuscript in the Muslim University Library.

'But in the course of these events, as has been described in detail in this Book of Victory, many horrible things—massacres, destructions, plunder, enslavements—had to be ordered for the purpose of conquest. So when His Majesty returned with good fortune to his capital after the conquest of Syria, *Rum* and Georgia and the establishment of his power over the whole of Iran from one end to the other, his eternal good fortune inspired him to make up for these faults by a holy war—"and one holy campaign is better than this world and all that it contains." Therefore after the marriage celebrations of his grandsons were over, he called the princes and amirs—in accordance with Quranic precept, "Consult them in your affairs"—to a special meeting and spoke as follows: "Almighty God has given me such good fortune that I have seized the world with my sword and I have subdued the kings of the world through force and terror. God be praised for it, for few kings have equalled me in the extent of their territory, the strength of their dominion, the proper execution of their orders and the large number of helpers and followers! And since such an object cannot be attained without terrorism, massacres and retaliations, during these campaigns and conquests, some events, which have led to the injury and distress of the people, have taken place as a matter of necessity. At this moment I am determined to do something to compensate for all these sins (*isms*). The virtue which every-man's hand cannot perform is war with *kafirs* (non-Muslims) and the overthrow of infidels, for this requires both power and prestige. It seems proper that I should take the army, owing to the campaigns of which these crimes have been committed, to China and Cathay, which are realms of infidelity, wage a holy war, destroy their fire-temples and idol-temples and build mosques and houses of (Muslim) worship in their place. Then, may be in accordance with the Quranic verse, 'Good things remove evil things', this will lead to the forgiveness of my faults.'" 7

The above argument is summarized by Gibbon as follows: 'The torrents which he had shed of Muslim blood could be expiated only by the destruction of an equal number of infidels.' But the Lord in His mercy had decided to save China, and the hand of death struck down Timur 'with his sins full blown' at Otrar.

CAUSES OF TIMUR'S SUCCESS

It is not difficult to point out the main causes that made Timur's career possible. There was no large territorial authority for him to challenge; he could overthrow the district war-lords one by one

and there was not the slightest danger of a combination between them.

Secondly, trained soldiers of a very high standard could be had in any number; most of the peaceful inhabitants turned into levies (*hashr*) by Chengiz and his successors must have perished, but those who survived had probably become professional soldiers. In any case Timur's recruiting officers had no difficulty in finding the soldiers he wanted and for the fixed time he wanted. But it was understood that within this time, short or long, they would get enough plunder to last them for the rest of their lives; and Timur knew well enough that if his soldiers did not get the plunder they wanted, he would not be able to get recruits later on.

Thirdly, in the countries conquered by the Mongols—Trans-Oxiana, Persia and Iraq—a Mongol governing class had been established; this class had been formally converted to Islam, but in most important matters it still lived by the traditions of the Mongols, which not only permitted but glorified wholesale massacres. Had any Muslim ruler before Chengiz ordered the wholesale destruction of cities, which had for centuries been the centres of Muslim culture and industry, he would have been treated as a lunatic—disobeyed by his soldiers, deposed by his officers and put to death. But Chengiz had established the tradition of massacring peaceful city-inhabitants and Timur was able to continue the tradition. To these considerations we have to add the personal genius of Timur—capacity of learning from experience, extraordinary administrative and military skill, faultless judgement, ability to use and improve upon all the scientific inventions of his day, power to control his subordinates through punishments and rewards, diplomatic trickery and craft, and, above all, a mixture of great daring and extreme caution so that we seldom find him taking a false step.

It is obvious that achievements like Timur's, which were due to the unremitting labour of forty-six years, could be only possible for a man blessed with excellent health, exuberant physical energy and a physical frame that could stand all the trials to which it was subjected in ceaseless campaigns. A wound in the foot gave him the reputation of being lame, but he could walk three or four miles when necessary. We often find him riding for twenty-four hours at a stretch, and applying himself to office-papers or to the arrangements of a siege or a battle after a sleepless night on horse-back. Unlike Jalaluddin Mankbarni, he won no reputation by his personal combats, but when challenged to a duel by a Turkish opponent of equal status, he did not hesitate to accept it.

The tragedy of Timur's career lay in the fact that he had no other

principle beyond mere personal ambition. The idea that God had chosen him to rule the world came into his mind some time after his accession, but it was clearly an inheritance from Chengiz. Yezdi quotes a remark of Timur to the effect that 'the inhabited world is not large enough for one great ruler'; and the people of Aleppo and other cities were punished for not immediately recognizing the following contention of Timur: 'The Divine Decree has subjected the whole world to my power and the eternal God has assigned all countries to my command.' And yet not a single public institution has come to us from Timur. Unlike the Seljuqs and other empire-builders of Ajam, he did not bring peace and prosperity to the peoples he had conquered; he was incapable of even devising a law of inheritance for the members of his own family which would prevent them from blinding and killing each other.

THE CONQUEST OF POWER

In later days a lot of fuss was made of the fact that Timur and Chengiz were descended from the brothers, Tomnah and Qachuli Bahadur, but this sort of honour Timur had to share with several thousand men then living. It is also claimed that Timur was descended from Qarachar Noyan, the wazir of Chaghatai, but the government of Kish and Qarshi had gone to a collateral branch, represented by his uncle, Haji Birlas. Timur's father, Taraghai, and his grandfather, Takl, had passed their lives in affluent middle-class conditions, but they had no official status. Timur was a member of the aristocratic class, Mongoloid and respectable, but otherwise, as Yezdi insists, he was a self-made man and the real founder of the dynasty.

Timur was born on the night of 7/8 April 1334. His father died when he was twenty-five and in the same year, spring of 1360, Tughluq Timur Khan (son of Ughul Khwaja, son of Dawa), the ruler of Turkistan (or the Jattah) invaded Trans-Oxiana to establish his hereditary claim. During the thirty-eight years that had passed since Tarmshirin Khan's death, there had been eight Khans in Trans-Oxiana and now there was no Khan at all. Three Jattah amirs were ordered to proceed against Kish; Amir Haji Birlas fled across the Oxus, but Timur parted from his uncle, met the three Jattah amirs, who welcomed him owing to his offer of allegiance to their Khan, and assigned Kish to him. But troubles at home compelled Tughluq Timur to go back, and Haji Birlas returned and took possession of Kish.

Next year, in the spring of 1361, Tughluq Timur Khan returned again. Haji Birlas fled once more to Khurasan and was slain in the district of Sabzwar. Timur presented himself before the Khan and was welcomed. But the Khan decided that his presence in his own

country was necessary and left Trans-Oxiana in charge of his son, Ilyas Khwaja, with Amir Bitichek as his chief adviser. Timur may have been appointed as a counsellor, but Bitichek made up his mind to crush him. There was no alternative for Timur but flight; any one who handed him over to the government of the day would reap a rich reward, and for the next two years he was a hunted man. His one companion in his misfortunes was Amir Husain, a grandson of Amir Qazghan and the brother of his wife, Aljai Turkan Agha.⁸

Takl, the ruler of Khayuq, attacked them with a thousand men. They fought and killed Takl, but as a result of the battle they had only seven followers left. They managed to reach the *chaul* or desert area west of the Oxus, but three of their followers, who were Khurasanis, fled away with their horses. Timur started for the oasis of Jauf. Being stopped in the way by some Turkomans, he hid his wife in a corn-well and prepared to fight. Fortunately, he was recognized by one Haji Muhammad, who told the Turkomans to behave properly and helped Timur to join Amir Husain at Mahmudi. But Timur's worst misfortune was yet to come. The Turkish⁹ ruler of Makhan, Ali Beg, son of Arghun Shah of the *ulus* of Chun-gharbani, sent sixty men to capture him and confined him for sixty-two days in a dark room so full of fleas that Timur could not prevent them from climbing up his feet. But Muhammad Beg, the elder brother of Ali Beg, sent him a message scolding him for this inhuman and purposeless ill-treatment of a brother Turkish aristocrat, and Timur was set free.

Amir Husain then proceeded to Garmsir in southern Afghanistan beyond the reach of the Jattah, and Timur, after spending some days in hiding at Kish and in his elder sister's house at Samarqand, joined him there after collecting some of his followers in the way. The ruler of Sistan asked them to fight for him against the Siksiz; in the battle that followed Timur was wounded in the foot and had to wait at Tuman till he recovered. Relief came to the two adventurers owing to the death of Tughluq Timur; Ilyas had to go home to ascend the throne of his father, and Husain and Timur succeeded in defeating the retreating Jattah forces at the battle of the Iron Bridge. They then held a *Quriltai* and elected Qabl Ughlan, a descendant of Dawa Khan who had been living in abject poverty, as their Khan. Amir Husain kept the Khan with him.

In May 1365, however, the Jattah forces attacked Trans-Oxiana once more. Husain and Timur were defeated after a stiff battle and

⁸ The term *agha* was at that time used as a title for princesses.

⁹ The term Turk and Mughal had gradually come to indicate the converted and the unconverted members of the steppe-groups.

fled for security to the region south of the Oxus. The victorious Jattah then marched to Samarqand, but the citizens led by two *mullahs* and a cotton carder, named Abu Bakr Kabir, defied the Jattah army for four months and forced it to retreat. Amir Husain and Timur then reappeared on the scene; they left the *mullahs* alone but punished all working class leaders who had defeated the Jattah. Lastly, Amir Husain insisted on collecting a heavy levy from the nobles, and Timur had to pay on behalf of his officers from his own pocket.

Timur was not prepared to be loyal to his senior partner, who was grasping and arrogant. He consulted his fellow-amirs; they advised him to fight Husain, but when it came to a show-down, they went against him. As a result, Amir Husain's power was established over the whole of Trans-Oxiana and Timur had to fly to the desert east of the Oxus. He had to face two more years of difficulty and want of the kind he had known before. In the midst of his misfortunes he surprised friend and foe by capturing Qarshi with 243 men, when it had 20,000 soldiers to defend it. The exploit was only important for its moral effect, for when Amir Husain advanced in full force, Timur had to fly across the Jaxartes. His last resource was to appeal to the Jattah, but since the majority of the Jattah had not yet been converted to Islam, the religious scholars insisted on an understanding between Timur and Husain. Timur agreed, and in the days of cooperation that followed, he helped Husain to conquer the *shahs* of Badakhshan in their Himalayan heights. Later on he described it 'as my stiffest fight'. According to Yezdi the following defects of Amir Husain's character were responsible for his downfall, because they drove the amirs to join Timur—'greed of wealth, stinginess, harshness of temper, violence of language, false ideas about himself, arrogance and haughtiness.'

Timur had no illusions about the amirs he had to deal with, but so long as the majority kept their word, he could ignore the promise-breakers. His terms seem to have been that Savurgamatish, a Timurid officer descended from Chengiz on whose loyalty he could rely, should be elected 'Khan' at the starting of the campaign, and that Timur himself should be elected 'king' with the title of 'Amir' and the designation of *Sahib Qiran* in case of success.

When all arrangements had been completed, Timur collected his forces and marched with the new Khan against Amir Husain, who was at Hinduan, a fort he had built near Balkh, which had been in ruins since the time of Chengiz. Though some of Timur's allies deserted him, the issue was never in doubt. Timur's message to Husain was simple and crystal clear: 'Come out and obey.' Husain ultimately tried to hide himself in the mosque of old Balkh, but he was captured

and brought before Timur with his hands tied. Timur shed crocodile tears and allowed him to depart all alone on horseback for the Haji pilgrimage. But two of Timur's officers put him to death before he could go very far; also two of his four sons were put to death while the other two succeeded in escaping to India. The fort of Hinduan was destroyed and Amir Husain's houses were razed to ground. On 13 April 1370 (12 Ramazan), Timur ascended the throne with the full ceremonial of a Mongol election; the assembled amirs knelt before him and 'promised to obey him with one heart and one tongue'. Timur decided to make Samarqand his capital.

THE JATTAH CAMPAIGNS

Timur's first duty was to secure Trans-Oxiana against the Jattah. In the first fifteen years of his reign, Timur and his officers led some six campaigns against the Jattah and in 1375 Timur encamped in their land for over five months. The hero of the defence was Qamruddin Dughlat, who gave a good account of himself and kept harassing Umar Shaikh, Timur's second son, who had been stationed at Andjan. By 1375 Timur had won great victories elsewhere but the power of the Jattah had not been broken. Timur's campaigns in the early years of his reign were repeatedly paralyzed by the rebellions of his officers, who could fly from him to the Jattah or to the White Horde of Urus Khan.

KHWARAZM

In the partitioning of Chengiz's territory between his sons, Khwarazm had gone to the *ulus* of Juji; it was now in the possession of a Turko-Mongolian family that had the surname of Sufi and belonged to the Ghangirat *sub-ulus*. Timur waged five campaigns against Khwarazm, and since it was not a part of Trans-Oxiana, Timur's policy towards it was one of terror and destruction. During the first campaign in 1372 the territory of Khwarazm was plundered, but so far as the city was concerned Timur accepted a treaty. In 1374 Hasan Sufi, who had invaded Timur's territory, submitted without fighting. Timur's third campaign was frustrated by the rebellion of his officers at home. In 1375 Hasan Sufi tried to take advantage of Timur's war with Urus Khan, and Timur, on his part, was not prepared for any further compromises. Khwarazm fell after a siege of three months and six days. The victorious army extended its hands in plunder and seized both men and property. . . The buildings were destroyed and all persons of note — men of education, trained slaves (*mawalis*), persons who remembered the Quran by heart and artisans — were marched to Kish. . . Women and children were enslaved and

the men were put to death with swords and arrows.'¹⁰ Lastly, when in 1389 an army of Tughtamish marched to Trans-Oxiana *via* Khwarazm, Timur, who was then returning from Persia, decided on its total destruction. 'The world-compelling order was enforced that all the inhabitants of the city and territory of Khwarazm were to be marched to Samarqand; the city was destroyed and sown with barley.'¹¹

TUGHTAMISH

Our authorities refer to three kingdoms east of the Jaxartes: Turkistan controlled by the Jattah; Mughalistan till the river Irtish; and west of it the White Horde of Urus Khan. Tughtamish, a Juji prince, was defeated by Urus and fled to Timur. Since Timur refused to surrender Tughtamish, the result was a war without any battle. Through three winter months of bitter cold, Urus Khan sat encamped at Saghnaq and Timur at Otrar, some eighty-four miles from each other. Then Urus Khan retreated, probably because he was ill; he died soon after and so did Tokhta Kia, his eldest son. Meanwhile Timur Malik Ughlan, a habitual drunkard, ascended the throne of the Golden Horde. As a result Tughtamish succeeded in obtaining the throne of the White Horde with Timur's assistance in 1376, and of the Golden Horde with its great capitals of Serai and Astrakhan through his own efforts.

FIRST KHURASAN CAMPAIGN: HERAT

Malik Ghiyasuddin Kert, the ruler of Herat, had considerably extended his dominions by the conquest of Naishapur and other districts, but he was in no position to withstand the assault launched against him by Timur in 1381. All the cities and forts along Timur's route submitted, but the garrison of Qushanj decided to resist; as a result the fort was destroyed and the garrison put to the sword. The city of Herat fell into Timur's hands, and Ghiyasuddin only attempted to defend the inner citadel. But the defence was paralyzed by Timur's order that soldiers who came to the ramparts to fight would be put to death but those who remained at home would be spared. Ghiyasuddin came out and submitted. The inner and outer forts of Herat were destroyed; the hoarded treasures of the Kert maliks came into Timur's hands; and the security-money from Herat was realized in four days. All the princes of the Kert family were arrested and put to death later.

Meanwhile Timur's officers had captured Naishapur and Sabzwar.

¹⁰ *Zafar Namah*, Vol. I, 299-300.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 448.

Timur marched north to Tus and directed Amir Wali, son of Sháikh Baisu, the ruler of Mazendaran, to appear before him. To give Wali a foretaste of his power, he struck at Isfarain, which was held by Wali's officers. 'All the inhabitants', Yezdi tells us, 'were massacred and the city destroyed; nothing remained of Isfarain except the name.'¹² Clavijo, who passed through Isfarain towards the end of Timur's reign, found the city in ruins, but some persons who were living in those ruins gave the travellers the food they needed.

SECOND KHURASAN CAMPAIGN

Timur spent the winter in collecting his troops and in the spring of 1382 he marched by way of Makhan and Kelat into Khurasan. Ali Beg Chun-gharbani, who had imprisoned Timur once, found himself in a Samargand jail. The Sadidis, a group of Ghurians who had tried bravely to defend the fort of Tarshiz, were captured and sent to defend the Turkistan forts of Timur. Khurasan, now cleared of enemies, was placed in the hands of Timur's third son, Miran Shah. A rebellion in Herat in 1383 was brutally suppressed.

SISTAN AND SOUTHERN AFGHANISTAN

Timur decided in 1383 to proceed against Sistan in autumn and to return by way of Garmsir, Qandahar and Kabul. The fort of Sabzwar, which had rebelled, was reduced. 'Nearly two thousand persons were seized, put over one another while still alive and built into a tower with earth and bricks, so that mankind, becoming aware of these punishments, may not be incited by the demon of pride to throw itself into the well of destruction and perdition.' The advance-guard of the army then ravaged the country up to the gate of Sistan city. Its ruler, Shah Qutbuddin, had no intention of fighting; he sent his emissaries to offer his submission and then came out and surrendered. But the resistance offered by some of his subjects was made an excuse for destroying the city. 'The warriors killed the inhabitants and dug up the city. All were slaughtered, men and women, old and young, from babies to men of a hundred years. Everything was burnt or plundered, even nails in the walls.'

The Tatar army then marched up the river Helmund. A useful dam across the river Helmund was totally destroyed. Tuman Takediri, an unconverted Mongol, preferred to die fighting, and three thousand of his unconverted followers, who were living in the fort of Hazar-Pazar, were thrown down the hill or beheaded. The fort of Dahna, held by a tribe called Ta'aji, met a similar fate. The fort of the

¹² *Ibid.*, 325.

Afghans of the Sulaiman hills was seized and the garrison distributed for execution among Timur's soldiers according to Mongol tradition. Qandhar submitted without a struggle. The campaign brought Sistan and Zawalistan (Ghazni) into Timur's hands.

MAZENDARAN

This Iranian province, with its capital at Astrabad, was governed by Wali, a descendant of Shaikh Baisu, an 'Il Khan' officer, but two districts of eastern Mazendaran adjoining the Caspian sea, Amil and Sari, had been captured from its Turko-Mongolian officer, Afrasiyab, by Saiyyid Qawamuddin and his disciples. Mazendaran has a heavy rainfall of about 80 inches a year, and consequently the forest in the region was very thick. In the spring of 1383 Timur cut his way through the forest to Astrabad in twenty days and then established his power there after a great slaughter. The Saiyyids of Amil and Sari were ordered to obey his governor at Astrabad, but were otherwise left undisturbed for the time-being. Timur then marched to Azarbaijan and captured Sultaniah, one of the capitals of the 'Il Khans'. Then thinking that his power there was safe, he returned to Samarqand. But in the winter of 1383-84 Tughtamish sent an army south *via* Darbend; it plundered Tabriz for ten days and then retreated. Since Tughtamish owed so much to Timur, his behaviour was unexpected, but a strong anti-Timurid party had been formed at his court.

THE THREE YEAR CAMPAIGN

Timur decided to take up the responsibility for the whole of Iran, ordered his recruitment officers to enlist an army for three years and started again in the spring of 1386. He re-established his power at Azarbaijan and this brought him into conflict with two new enemies — the Turkomans led by Qara Yusuf and later on by his son, Qara Muhammad, and Sultan Jalair, descendant of a famous 'Il Khan' officer, Husain Buzurg, who governed Baghdad and a part of Iraq. These enemies were destined to worry Timur up to the end of his life, but for the present he decided to attend to other matters.

(i) Malik A'izzuddin, the ruler of Lar-i Kuchak, was crushed; his fort of Khurramabad was captured and its garrison thrown down the hill-side. (ii) Timur carried fire and sword through Georgia in the traditional Mongol manner and called it a 'holy war'. The ruler of Tiflis, called Buqrat, was captured; he decided to become a Musalman and presented Timur with an armour which he claimed had been worn by the prophet David. (iii) Since the Ottoman emperor, Bayazid Ildrum (Thunder-bolt), had been annexing the territories of

the independent princes of Anatolia, Tahrtan, the ruler of Erzurum, decided to side with Timur. Timur marched to the fort of Erzenjan, reduced it in one day and handed it over to Tahrtan. Bayazid, curiously enough, took no notice of the fact. (iv) Timur then sent his forces in all directions. Both Malik A'izzuddin Sher, the ruler of Van, and Tizak, the Christian ruler of Armenia, submitted, but since the garrison of Van insisted on resistance, it was reduced after a siege of twenty days and thrown down the hill-side. (v) Timur's next objective was southern Iran, various districts of which were governed by princes of the Muzaffarid dynasty. Shah Shuja, famous owing to the verses of the immortal Hafiz in his praise, had appealed to Timur for his dynasty in a pathetic letter from his death-bed in 1384 and Timur had acceded to his request. Timur would have followed his usual policy of annexation, plunder and slaughter in any case, for he had to reward his soldiers and establish a reign of terror. But the behaviour of the Muzaffarid princes offered him a good excuse for their ultimate extermination.

Zainul Abidin, son of Shah Shuja and ruler of Isfahan, had been summoned by Timur, but instead of obeying the order, he had imprisoned Timur's messenger. When Timur marched against Isfahan, Zainul Abidin fled to his cousin, Mansur, who had him blinded. The notables of Isfahan, however, came out to offer their homage to Timur. Timur put one of his officers in charge of the city; the population was asked to surrender its arms and horses, and Tatar officers were directed to supervise the collection of security-money by the city notables. But at night one Ali Kachh, an ironsmith from Tehran, began to beat a drum and a city crowd killed the collectors of security-money and some 3,000 soldiers. This gave Timur the opportunity he wanted.

Next day he directed the city to be captured, and apart from the quarters in which the Saiyyids and *mawalis* (judges) lived and the house of Imamuddin Wa'iz, who had died in the previous year, he ordered a general slaughter of the citizens with every variety of cruelty. The houses of some people, who had protected the Tatar soldiers, also escaped. But the terrible order was given that every group of 1,000, 100 and 10 Tatar soldiers was to produce the number of severed heads allotted to it, and separate officers were appointed to see to the enforcement of this order. I have heard from reliable witnesses that many soldiers, who did not wish to commit murder, purchased severed heads from officers in charge of the enforcement of the order (*yasaqis*) and handed them over; at first the price of a severed head was 20 Kubki *dinars* but later on, when most soldiers had handed over the heads demanded

from them, a severed head was offered for half a Kubki *dinar* and no one would purchase it.'¹³

Some persons, who had not been slaughtered during the day, tried to escape at night, but as snow had fallen, they were traced owing to their footsteps to their hiding places and put to death. 'According to the recorded figures, at least 70,000 persons were put to death and their heads were piled up at various places outside Isfahan.'

When Timur proceeded to Shiraz, all the Muzaffarid princes came and submitted to him along with the Atabeks of Lar and Gurgin Lari, and the security-money for Shiraz was duly paid. Timur, who had received disturbing news from home, reassigned their territories to them and marched back, destroying Khwarazm on the way.

PARTIAL CRISIS OF 1388-89

Had there been any unity of plan between Timur's domestic and foreign enemies, he would have faced a real crisis. Still his power, though shaken badly, was re-established by his officers during his absence. First, an army of Tughtamish, marching by way of the *dasht* east of the Aral sea and the Jaxartes, inflicted a severe defeat on Timur's son, Umar Shaikh, whom he had put in charge of Andjan, at the battle of Jagdalik; Umar Shaikh fled back to Andjan; Timur's officers retreated to Samarqand to protect it, if necessary; and the invading army plundered the open country before retreating. Meanwhile another army of Tughtamish, marching by way of Khwarazm, crossed the Oxus; it was unable to reduce Bukhara, but it burnt Zanjir Serai and plundered the open country up to the Jaxartes before retreating.

Quite independently of Tughtamish, Ankatura, nephew of Haji Beg Arankut, marched with the army of Mughalistan by way of Siram and Tashkent and besieged Umar Shaikh at Andjan. But then for some unknown reason he retreated to his own land.

Too late in the day Muhammad Mirkah, the husband of Timur's daughter, Sultan Bakht Begum, rebelled at Samarqand and fled. He was pursued and captured by Umar Shaikh and put to death along with his brother, Abul Fath. The Burildai *ulus* rebelled in the south; it was pursued up to the Hindu Kush and its leaders fled for refuge to India.

After Timur's power had been re-established, Tughtamish marched across southern Siberia and attacked the cities east of the Jaxartes

¹³ *Ibid.*, 433-34.

in mid-winter. Though the snow reached up to the breast of his horses, Timur insisted on marching against the enemy. Tughtamish could accomplish nothing substantial and retreated.

THE EASTERN CAMPAIGN OF 1391

Though Timur was anxious to fight Tughtamish in his homeland, he accepted the advice of his officers that he should first attend to Khizr Khwaja Ughlan (son of Tughluq Timur) and Ankatura. Their advantage lay in the fact that they could wage a war in depth and their annihilation by Timur was not possible. Timur established his headquarters at Yilduz, a place two months' journey from Samarqand. An army was sent to pursue Ankatura; it reached the Irtish and Timur's officers crossed the river and carved their names on the tree-trunks on the other bank. The second army under Umar Shaikh marched up to a place called Qara Khwaja, three months' journey from Samarqand. Khizr Khwaja Ughlan was defeated but succeeded in escaping.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST TUGHTAMISH THROUGH THE QIPCHAQ

Timur undertook a long campaign of about five or six months across the Qipchaq (southern Siberia), so that by attacking the Golden Horde from the north, he may deprive it of its natural advantage of war in depth and make flight impossible. The sufferings of his soldiers were great but so were their spoils. Timur's military genius and his careful dispositions ensured the complete defeat of Tughtamish at the battle of Volga. The victorious army then spread itself to collect spoils — heads of cattle, horses, boys, girls, carts and a special type of portable tent (*khargha-i kotarma*). The soldiers of the army, who used to have great difficulty in earning their daily bread, had by now collected so many horses and goats that they got tired of driving them back and left some behind.¹⁴ Five thousand boys and girls were enslaved for Timur alone and the ordinary soldier also got his share. Timur stayed at Seraï for twenty-one days and then returned home by rapid marches. The main camp in charge of Amir Saifuddin reached the Oxus in December 1391, after a forward and backward journey of eleven months.¹⁵

14 *Ibid.*, 549-50.

15 The march across southern Siberia had to be carefully arranged; still Timur was not exploring a new region as is sometimes supposed. In fact it was a hackneyed path across which the armies of the Golden Horde had marched quite often. Timur asked his soldiers to leave a mound of stones at Alq Tiq; it may be there still.

THE FIVE YEAR CAMPAIGN (1392-96)

Timur ordered his officers to enlist soldiers for a five year campaign, and after a short rest he started again in the spring of 1392. Only a brief notice of his chief achievements is possible here.

(a) *Amil and Sari*:

Saiyyid Kamiluddin and other Saiyyids were unwilling to accept the terms offered by Timur and took refuge in Mahanasar. Timur cut his way through the forest at the rate of half a *farsakh* per day. 'The fort of Mahanasar was reduced to a mound and is so still.'¹⁶ The Ismailis and other people of erroneous faith were slaughtered, and the Saiyyids were sent to Tashkent.

(b) *Luristan*:

Atabek Pir Muhammad, ruler of the great Lur (*Lur-i buzurg*), came and submitted. Many places like Khurramabad, Wardjurd, Nehawand and Tustar were seized, and soldiers were appointed to suppress Kurds and robbers.

(c) *Southern Iran*:

During Timur's absence the Muzaffarid princes had been engaged in a bitter civil war. When Timur reached Shiraz, Shah Mansur attacked a Timurid force of thirty thousand with three or four thousand men only; but leaving the main battle, he succeeded in reaching Timur and struck two sword-blows on Timur's helmet. But soon after Mansur's severed head was brought to Timur by his youngest son, Mirza Shah Rukh. The other Muzaffarid princes came and submitted. At Qumsha on 9 June 1393, Timur ordered all Muzaffarid princes, old and young, to be put to death wherever they may happen to be, and assigned all the territory held by the Muzaffarids to his son, Umar Shaikh.

(d) *Baghdad, Diarbekr, Georgia*:

Timur's officers drove away Sultan Ahmad Jalair from Baghdad (August 1393). Timur stayed at Baghdad for two months and realized security-money from the inhabitants. He then proceeded to the Syrian province of Diarbekr and conquered a number of forts. Shaikh Ibrahim of Sherwan became his loyal ally and the rulers of Gilan promised submission and tribute. In the summer of 1395 Timur waged a holy war against Georgia for a second time and plundered it up to Tiflis.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 376-77.

When starting on this campaign Timur had assigned 'the whole empire of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni' to his grandson, Pir Muhammad, son of Jahangir. Later on 'the whole empire of Halaku' was assigned by him to his third son, Miran Shah. Umar Shaikh was coming to see Timur when he was killed by a stray arrow, shot from the fort of Kharmatu; the fort and its inhabitants were destroyed and Timur appointed Pir Muhammad, son of Umar Shaikh, a boy of sixteen, ruler of Fars in his place.

(e) *The Golden Horde and Southern Russia:*

Timur ordered a fresh recruitment; and then with an army, such as had not been seen since the days of Chengiz Khan, he proceeded north against Tughtamish, whom he signally defeated at the battle of the Terek (25 April 1395). Yezdi's statement that Timur plundered Moscow is probably not correct, but southern Russia was certainly plundered up to the Don and the city of Quban was sacked. Serai was captured, plundered and burnt. Astrakhan tried to protect itself by a wall of ice-bricks; nevertheless it had to submit; its inhabitants were marched out and their city was burnt before their eyes. It was calculated that, in addition to other things, every Tatar soldier got four or five girls as part of the spoils.

(f) *Hormuz:*

Before starting home from Hamadan in July 1396, Timur despatched his grandson, Muhammad Sultan, against Hormuz. Muhammad Sultan reduced the forts of the province and compelled Muhammad Shah, the malik of Hormuz, to submit.

THE INDIAN CAMPAIGN

Timur's grandson, Pir Muhammad, thought he could equal, or even surpass, the exploits of Sultan Mahmud and ended by getting himself into a mess. In the winter of 1396-97 he captured Uchch and Dipalpur, established his *daroghas* at various places and then besieged Sarang Khan, the elder brother of Mallu Khan, at Multan. The siege dragged on through the six summer months and after Multan had surrendered, the monsoon set in. The horses of Pir Muhammad's army died and he had to face the resentment of the people he had plundered. But Pir Muhammad, who was destined to degenerate into a worthless drunkard, was saved from his difficulties by the timely arrival of his grandfather at the village of Janjan by the Bias, forty *karohs* from Multan.

Timur's Indian campaign was planned as a pure plundering raid with an excellent time-table. The summer months of 1398 could be

spent in a leisurely march from Trans-Oxiana to the Indian frontier, but the campaign in India had to be finished in the course of the winter months of 1398-99. He had no time for long sieges. After his troops had been collected in the summer of 1398, Timur marched south. He had time enough to march from Indrab against two infidel groups of the Pamirs—the inhabitants of Katur and the people of the Black Robe (*Siyah Poshan*). Timur succeeded in crossing the high mountains surrounding Katur; he burnt the houses of the infidels in the valley and then killed them on the mountain-top to which they had fled. But his general, Burhan Ughlan, who had been sent against the Black Robes, was defeated by them and fled back like a coward. This campaign, which had to be waged on foot, took eighteen days.

Timur had to ensure the safety of his communications from Kabul through the territory of the Afghans by the building of forts and the punishment of the tribes. An Afghan chief, Musa, was induced to build the fort of Iryab and then put to death with his followers. The fort of Naghz was built by Timur's own officers. The massacre and destruction of two Afghan tribes, referred to as Purnian and Kalatian, in the usual Timurid style created an atmosphere of terror for the security of the routes. From Naghz Timur proceeded by way of Bannu to the Indus; with the help of tripods, boats and reeds, his experts built a pontoon bridge across the Indus, which was crossed on 21 September 1398.

Timur's real object was to plunder Delhi and he selected his route with care. Great cities had to be avoided; at the same time provisions had to be found for his soldiers by the plunder of helpless small towns and villages. He passed through a waterless tract or *chaul*, which the *Zafar Nama* calls the *Chaul-i Jalali*.¹⁷ The *muqaddams* and rais of the Salt Range (*Koh-i Judi*) helped Timur to cross their territory and obtained his favours. Shihabuddin Mubarak Shah, the ruler of Jazira, probably an island in the river Jhelum, tried to bar Timur's way, but he was crushed and forced to fly on his boats down the river. After marching for five or six days by the side of the Jhelum, Timur came to a fort at its confluence with the Chenab and ordered a pontoon bridge to be built. It was completed on 1 October 1398.

In trying to justify Timur's Indian invasion, Sharafuddin Ali Yezdi states that the central government of Delhi, though in Muslim hands, was weak. But that was no reason for extinguishing that helpless government altogether. The brutal fact was that Timur, as a robber, could afford to make no distinctions on religious grounds; apart from

¹⁷ That is, the wilderness which Jalaluddin Mankbarni had reached, when he fled from Chengiz Khan across the Indus.

sparing religious scholars and Saiyyids, who were not reputed for their wealth, he had to plunder indiscriminately and on an extensive scale. The Hindus and Musalmans also made a common cause against him. Timur's policy was clarified on 13 October when he reached the city of Talmi, thirty-five *farsakhs* from Multan. Here the notables of both communities—Hindu rais, Muslim maliks, Saiyyids and religious scholars—came out to meet him and offered two lakhs as security-money. Timur consented, but he had not come to India to collect subscriptions or to get public ovations; so while the security-money was being collected, he deemed it necessary to show his hand. 'The world-compelling order was issued that the soldiers were to seize grain wherever they could find it. So according to their habit they burst into the city, burnt the houses, captured the inhabitants and plundered whatever they could find; consequently, no one escaped from the holocaust except the religious scholars and the Saiyyids.'¹⁸

Timur marched from Talmi on 20 October and encamped next day near Jal by the side of the Bias and the village of Shah Nawaz. Jusrat Khokar, brother of Shaikha Khokar, defied the invader with his two thousand men. They were defeated and slaughtered, though what happened to Jusrat is not known. The inhabitants of Shah Nawaz, a very large village, had fled away, but there was more grain there than the soldiers could carry with them and Timur ordered it to be burnt. He next encamped by the side of the Bias opposite to the village of Janjan. Pir Muhammad met him here and was given 30,000 horses for his soldiers.

The Bias was crossed by swimming or on boats. The next stages given are Sahwal, Aswan and Jahwal. Timur ordered his main camp (*aghraq*) to proceed by way of Dipalpur and to meet him at Samana, while he started personally with some ten thousand horsemen. The inhabitants of Dipalpur, who had killed Musafir-i Kabuli, the *darogha* of Pir Muhammad, along with a thousand Tatars stationed there, had all fled to Bhatnir. Also when after a night's march Timur reached Ajudhan (Pakpatan), famous for the grave of Shaikh Farid Ganjshakar, he found that the saint's descendants along with most of the inhabitants had fled to the same fort. No one welcomed him there.

- The fort of Bhatnir is situated in a waterless region. Timur prayed at the grave of Shaikh Farid and then reached Bhatnir on 7 November 1398, after crossing over a hundred miles in one long night march. Rai Dulchin, the ruler of Bhatnir, was in no position to defend the Musalmans and Hindus who had fled to him for protection. But when the Rai submitted, his brother, Kamaluddin, a Musalman, continued

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 55.

the resistance, and Bhatnir could not escape the fate of other cities. 'The Hindus burnt their women, children and property by throwing all into fire; those who claimed to be Musalmans cut off the heads of their women and children as if they were goats; this done, the two communities determined to fight to the last.' About ten thousand Hindus were killed; the number of Musalmans dead is not given; the buildings were burnt or levelled with the ground.

The inhabitants of Sirsuti, who specialized in the rearing of pigs, had fled from their city; they were pursued and killed. The people of Ahrauni fort were plundered and killed and their fort was reduced to a few mounds. The task of the murderous invader was greatly simplified by the fact that all the inhabitants of Fathabad, Kaithal, Samana, Asundi and Panipat fled to Delhi in their panic, when common sense should have told them to fly further east to various parts of the Doab.

In the third week of November the main camp reached Samana; on 2 December the march from Kaithal began in full order; there was no resistance anywhere and on 11 December Timur crossed the Jumna and took up his residence in the Jahan Panah palace, which was two *farsakhs* from Delhi. Next day Mallu Iqbal Khan marched against the Tatars with 4,000 horse, 5,000 foot and 27 elephants, but he seems to have fled back after the first encounter. A hundred thousand Hindu captives, who were in Timur's camp and had shown delight at the idea of being rescued by Mallu, were all slaughtered.

Timur took every care to fortify his camp, but the decisive battle, which took place on 18 December 1398, is hardly worth describing. An army of 10,000 horse and 40,000 foot was all that Sultan Mahmud Tughluq and Mallu could bring into the field. They were beaten decisively and fled back to the city; sometime after midnight the Sultan and Mallu fled away by two different gates of southern Delhi, leaving the citizens to their fate. On Thursday, 20 December 1398, the notables of Delhi came to offer their submission by the side of the Hauz-i Khas (*Alai Tank*) where Timur had pitched his camp; they undertook to have the *khutba* recited in Timur's name and to collect security-money from the inhabitants. Timur, on his part, promised security to the 'inhabitants of Delhi', but his promise was given with a mental reservation, excluding the fugitives who had come to Delhi in large numbers and was, consequently, a mere deceit. The object of his whole journey had been the plunder of Delhi, but it suited Timur to behave as if his soldiers had gone out of hand.

Sharafuddin Ali Yezdi, who had cultivated the art of conveying the truth in flattering words so as to escape the censorship, and yet obtain

the patronage of his two royal masters, describes the sack of Delhi in the following carefully drafted paragraphs.

On Thursday, 27 December 1398, a body of soldiers collected at the gate of Delhi and began to attack the citizens; the great amirs were ordered to stop this. 'But as eternal Destiny had decided on the destruction of the city and its inhabitants, all means for its destruction were provided.' The royal ladies had come to see the Hazar Sutun palace, which Malik Jauna (Sultan Muhammad bin Tughlaq) had built in the Jahan Panah.

'The great amirs, revenue officers (*bitikchis*) and clerks were sitting at the gate and recording the security-money that had been realized. At that time some thousand horsemen, who had orders for seizing sugar and grain, entered the city. Further, the world-compelling order had been passed that every amir was to seize persons who had fled to Delhi from places that had rebelled, and for this reason also numerous Tatar soldiers had entered the city.

'When a large number of Tatar soldiers had entered the city, many groups of Hindus in the three towns of Delhi—Siri, Jahan Panah and old Delhi—became insolent and began to fight; a number of them set fire to their houses and properties and preferred to be burnt to death with their wives and children. The soldiers began to plunder; and Timur's officers, in spite of the insolence of the Hindus, closed the gates so that soldiers from outside may not be able to enter and further destruction may not take place. But at that time there were fifteen thousand soldiers in the city; they plundered and burnt the houses from the evening to the morning and at some places the Hindus fought fearlessly.

'Next morning the whole army entered the city; there was a great tumult among the soldiers; and on Friday, 28 December the general plunder began, and most quarters of Jahan Panah and Siri were sacked. On Saturday, 29 December plundering continued in the same manner. Every soldier captured about one hundred and fifty men, women and children; twenty captives was the minimum number a soldier obtained. It is impossible to make an estimate of the valuable commodities plundered—pearls, precious stones, in particular, diamonds, varieties of costly cloth, vessels of gold and silver; also cash in the form of Alai *tankas* was beyond computation. Most of the women captured were wearing ornaments of gold and silver on their fingers and valuable rings on the toes of their feet. No one paid any attention to things like vegetables, medicines and cattle.

'On Sunday, 30 December the soldiers moved to old Delhi for many Hindus had fled there and taken refuge in the Juma mosque.'

Two officers of Timur slaughtered them. On that day the whole of old Delhi was plundered. All captives were brought out of the city for several days and put in charge of the officers. 'The artisans were distributed among the princes and high officers who were on the spot and also sent to those who were at home.'

Sharafuddin Ali Yezdi praises Timur for the fact that he wanted to build a mosque at Samarqand. His justification for what happened runs on the following lines: 'Persons of insight will not fail to observe that though royal forgiveness had been extended to these doomed people, and the *khutba* recited in Timur's august name was a guarantee of peace and protection, still since the Divine order was to the contrary... the events which have been recorded took place.'¹⁹ In other words, Timur was innocent and virtuous; what appeared to be sheer criminality to superficial observers was really God's preordained will.

In the massacre of Delhi, the official historian refers to Hindus only. But there is no reason for thinking that Musalmans were spared. Apart from two 'holy wars' in Georgia, Timur and his Tatars had devoted all their energies to killing and plundering Musalmans—and the worst plunder of Musalmans was yet to come. It may be presumed that the surviving captives, apart from the artisans, were spared after being plundered; in any case, their being massacred is not recorded.

Timur stayed at Delhi for fifteen days. His next problem was to return home by a route on which he would meet with no serious resistance but on which his soldiers would find plunder of the type they wanted—women, children, corn and cattle. Guided by Mongol experience of the past, he selected the Dun—the area between the Himalayas and the Siwaliks. But the city of Meerut, which had defeated the luckless Tarmshirin Khan, stood in the way, and Timur's officers, who had been sent in advance, informed him that the citizens led by a Hindu, Safi,²⁰ and two Musalmans, Ilyas Afghan and the son of Maulana Ahmad Thaneswari, were determined to resist. Timur reached the precincts of Meerut after a long march of forty miles with 10,000 horsemen on the afternoon of 8 January 1399. Next day the Tatars seized the ramparts and entered the city. For some unexplained reason the defence collapsed. Safi died fighting; his two Muslim colleagues were brought bound before Timur; the inhabitants were slaughtered and their women and children enslaved.

The road to the Siwaliks was now clear. This was an area of small

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 124-25.

²⁰ This name seems to have been erroneously written.

rais and peaceful villagers, who were driven to fight in sheer desperation. Timur spent about a month (26 January to 24 February 1399) in plundering the prosperous territory between Hardwar and the Jumna; he is said to have captured seven forts in the region and fought twenty battles with the villagers; every Tatar soldier obtained one hundred to two hundred cows and ten to twenty captives.

It is noteworthy that no Indo-Muslim amir of any importance had joined Timur, and since he had to select some one as his representative, he preferred Khizr Khan.²¹ Bahadur Nahir came to see him on the way to Meerut. Sikandar, the fanatic Sultan of Kashmir, thought he would find Timur a kindred spirit and started to meet him; but when Timur's officers asked him to give 30,000 horse and 1,000,000 silver coins of 2.5 *misqals* each, he decided to go back. Shaikha Khokar had offered his services to Timur, and out of regard for this all Hindus appertaining to him had been spared. But when Timur was in the Siwaliks, Shaikha asked for permission to go home; thereafter he ignored Timur altogether and failed to pay the tribute he had promised. So the Tatar army that had been sent to realize security-money from Lahore ravaged his territory and brought him captive to Timur.

The Rai of Jammu was wounded and captured, but he declared that he had become a Muslim and reaffirmed this fact by eating beef with the Musalmans. Timur, who had just received very disturbing news from the western part of his empire, accepted the conversion as sincere; he had no further interest in India and leaving the main army to come at a leisurely speed, he hurried home. He crossed the Chenab on 3 March and reached the Oxus on 1 May. The time-table of his winter-campaign in India had worked to perfection.

THE SEVEN YEAR CAMPAIGN (1399-1404)

While Timur was in India, the Egyptian government had re-established its power in Syria and Sultan Ahmad Jalair had recaptured Baghdad. It was also found that Timur's son, Miran Shah, on recovering from a fall from his horse, had become so mentally deranged that even the Georgians inflicted a severe defeat on the Timurid army; Miran's wife, whom he had maltreated, came and informed Timur that he even intended to rebel. Timur ordered his recruiting officers to collect an army for a seven year campaign and started for Azarbaijan. He had stayed in Samarqand for four months only. Miran Shah was deprived of all power and his boon companions were

²¹ Khizr Khan had fled from fear of Timur to Mewat.

hanged. During this seven year campaign Timur conquered and ravaged four countries—Georgia, Syria, Iraq and Anatolia.

(a) *Georgia* :

Timur had twice invaded Georgia before; he now attacked it five times more, carrying sword and fire through the whole region. The reader can imagine the worst—wholesale massacres, churches destroyed, the houses of peaceful inhabitants levelled with the ground, vineyards and crops cut to deprive the inhabitants of their livelihood, and the small chieftains deprived of whatever they possessed—for all this is described in detail by Sharafuddin Yezdi. All the forts of Georgia were captured and destroyed. At last in August 1403, Timur's officers got tired, and when Malik Gurgin (or George), the leading Georgian chief, offered to respect Islam and the Musalmans and to pay a yearly tribute, the religious scholars, basing their judgement on the Prophet's arrangement with the Christians of Najran, declared that nothing more could be demanded. It was the first and last time that they ventured to say anything to Timur about political affairs.

(b) *Syria* :

Barquq, the king of Egypt, had died and his young son, Farj, had succeeded him. Timur expected that with a young king on the throne, the Egyptian government would be weak, but its real strength lay in the popular Arab hatred of Timur as a hideous, inhuman, anti-Muslim monster. The sequel proved this impression to be correct. Still there was no resisting the advance of Timur, who also knew the art of using gunpowder for mining fort-walls.²²

After Timur had reduced the Syrian cities of Bahisti and Antab, the forces of all neighbouring cities collected to fight him. Timur, who

²² The term *naphtha* originally meant Greek fire; in modern Persia it means petrol. What did it mean in the period of the Mongols and Timur? Gunpowder is a Chinese invention and Chengiz had brought some 10,000 Chinese siege-experts with him. Since we find *naphtha* being used again and again for the burning of houses by the Mongols, the reference can only be to gunpowder. This is clarified by Yezdi, who on occasions uses the term, *naphtha-i siyah* or black *naphtha*, which could only mean gunpowder. According to Yezdi, Timur's men first heated the stone of the fort-wall and then threw vinegar upon it. This reduced the stone to dust which was drawn out by a chisel. The process was proceeded with and wooden stakes had to be put to prevent the fort-wall from falling. When they had proceeded deep enough, the gunpowder mine was laid and set on fire. But a careful examination of Yezdi's account of Timur's sieges shows that exploding mines by gunpowder had not proved itself definitely superior to the old processes—throwing *munjanig*-stones and climbing up the ramparts with ropes and ladders. Yezdi also repeatedly refers to the *kaman-i ra'd* (how of thunder), which I take to be an early name for cannon,

had been advancing very slowly and very carefully, inflicted a signal defeat on the enemy at the battle of Aleppo. The soldiers, who tried to run back to the city, were massacred at the gates; those who tried to fly to Damascus were pursued and killed. Only one horseman, it is said, was able to carry news of the defeat to Cairo.

The cities of Syria easily fell into Timur's hands now. Farj had come to Damascus personally, but Timur inflicted a severe defeat on the Syrian army on January 1401, and Farj fled back. The outer city, 'the real Damascus' was easily captured, and Yazdak, the kotwal, who tried to defend the inner citadel was put to death. In their distress the notables, both secular and religious, came out to offer their homage to Timur and accepted security-money for their city.

To the Arabian scholars, who were summoned to see him, Timur complained again and again: 'Why had the inhabitants of Damascus helped the Umayyads and the Marwanids against the Family of the Prophet?' What followed is best told by Yezdi himself:

'This complaint permeated the minds of the soldiers, and on 17 March 1401, the world-conquering army stretched its hands to terrorize and plunder the city. The inhabitants of Damascus, both men and women, were enslaved, and all their wealth and property seized—gold, jewels, fine cloth and valuable commodities of every kind... In fact the valuables plundered here were so great that the horses, asses and camels, which the soldiers possessed, were unable to carry the load. I have heard from reliable persons, who were eye-witnesses, that many soldiers threw away their Russian and Egyptian spoils in order to load their beasts of burden with the cash, jewels and vessels of gold and silver they now obtained.

'The lowest storeys of the houses of Damascus were built of stones but the two or three storeys above them were built of wood, and since this wood was varnished and coloured, it became even more inflammable. In normal and peaceful times a fire could not be controlled by the united efforts of the *qazis*, government officers, the leading citizens and the mass of the people till a whole quarter (*mohalla*) or more of Damascus had been consumed by the flames. On 18 March 1403, without any intention on the part of anybody, a fire started in the city and the citizens in their distress were quite unable to extinguish it.'²³

Even the Juma mosque of the Umayyads, which had a wooden roof, was burnt and only one of its towers remained standing.

'The whole of Damascus', Yezdi tells us, 'was burnt. But whatever

valuables it contained had been already seized; also the whole territory of Syria had been plundered and ruined.' On his return journey Timur desolated what was left. Homs was sacked: the fort of Aleppo was razed to the ground, and the houses still standing were burnt.

(c) *Sack of Baghdad:*

Sultan Ahmad Jalair fled away in fear, but Farj, an officer of the Jalair tribe, made up his mind to resist to the last. Timur summoned all his forces and captured the city on 9 May 1401, after he had besieged it for forty days. The great city had survived the sack of Halaku but Timur destroyed it completely. 'As too many soldiers had been killed during the battle, the terrible order was passed that every soldier was to bring the severed head (of an inhabitant of Baghdad). . . The market of slaughter became so brisk that the broker of death sold a man of eighty and a child of eight at the same price, and the fire-grate of hatred burnt so bright that it consumed the man of wealth and the beggar in the same manner.' Ultimately Timur ordered the murders to stop at the appeal of religious scholars and mystics (*shaikhs*). 'But after the inhabitants had been slaughtered in this manner, it was the turn of their habitations. The order was given that, apart from mosques, schools and mystic houses (*khanqahs*), no building was to be spared; in accordance with this order the ramparts, markets, houses, buildings, palaces, mansions and everything else were turned upside down.'²⁴ This was the final end of the great Baghdad, built by the Abbasid Mansur, which had been the centre of Muslim political life, culture, industry and commerce for centuries.

(d) *Anatolia or Rum:*

Murad I, the father of Bayazid, had made the unique discovery that conquests in eastern Europe were easier than in Asia; this led first to Ottoman greatness and then to its decline. It is the glory of Bayazid (1389-1403) that by wiping out the independent rulers of Anatolia, he made the emergence of an Ottoman-Turkish nation possible, and that one achievement alone throws all the murderous glory of Timur into the shade.

There had been a bitter correspondence between Timur and Bayazid and continuous friction at the frontier. But in the spring of 1402 Timur realized that he had to plunder another country in order to keep his military machine in working order; so with the caution that was ingrained in his nature, he marched towards Ankara. Bayazid had no alternative but to march to its relief. At the battle of Ankara on 21 July 1402, the victory of Timur was decisive; Bayazid succeeded

in escaping but was captured and brought before Timur next day. He was not kept in a cage, as is sometimes said, but he died after eight months of captivity on 20 March 1403.

Ankara capitulated and the whole of Anatolia or Rum lay at the feet of the victor. Muhammad Sultan was sent to Bayazid's capital, Brusa, where the immense treasures of Bayazid fell into his hands. 'The inhabitants were plundered and their wooden houses were burnt.'²⁵ Timur stayed at Kotahuja, two stages from Brusa, for a month while his princes and officers plundered all the cities of the region—Adalia, Alania, Qara Hisar, Aq Shah, Qunia, etc. 'More plunder fell into the hands of every soldier than can be described.' Timur put his soldiers into winter-quarters in various cities while he personally proceeded to solve the problem of Smyrna (*Izmir*). Here the knights of St. Rhodes had constructed a city by the sea-side; and supported by the ships of European nations, they had defied a siege by Bayazid for seven years. Timur's genius found a solution. Enormous tripods of wood were put in the sea and a road of planks was constructed over them so as to surround Smyrna on the sea-side. The garrison had to capitulate after two weeks (December 1402). When too late in the day the ships of Europe appeared, Timur ordered the severed heads of the Smyrna garrison to be shot at them from his cannon (*kaman-i ra'd*).⁶

Before leaving Anatolia Timur divided the empire of Bayazid into pieces. He acknowledged two sons of Bayazid as rulers of the territories that had been left by Murad I or had been conquered by Bayazid himself. As against them, Amir Muhammad and Yaqub Chalpi were restored to the Anatolian territories Bayazid had seized from their fathers. If Timur expected to keep the Ottoman empire disintegrated by these arrangements, the experiment was a failure, for Muhammad I reunited all the territories of Bayazid within ten years, while Timur's own empire was disintegrating.

Timur then proceeded to make arrangements for his own family. Abu Bakr, the elder son of Miran Shah, was given Baghdad, Iraq and Diarbekr along with the custody of his father, Miran Shah. To Umar, the younger son of Miran Shah, he gave Azarbaijan and the so-called 'empire of Halaku'. The two sons of Umar Shaikh, Pir Muhammad and Rustam, were given Shiraz and Isfahan. Timur's youngest son, Shah Rukh, had been already installed at Herat. Timur said nothing at this time about any central authority for the members of his family or about the succession to the kingdom of Trans-Oxiana. He reached Samarqand in July or August 1404.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 451.

THE LAST CAMPAIGN

'The world grips hard on the hard-striving.' Hafiz may have had his contemporary, Timur, in mind when he wrote this line. For the great conqueror had now to face an enemy—DEATH—to whom he was not prepared to capitulate and whom he could not hope to conquer. The stupid arrangements he had made about his family in eastern Persia clearly show a disintegrating mind. Also forgetful of the way he had treated the death-bed appeal of Shah Shuja, he had a letter of enormous size, 3 yards by 17 yards, written to Farj, asking that Sultan Ahmad Jalair be sent to him along with the severed head of Qara Yusuf; the Egyptian government naturally ignored the dying appeal of a killer, who had massacred so many Arabs.

Timur sought two means for healing his tortured mind. The first was to forget everything in festivities. He arranged for the marriage of five of his grandsons, none of them above eleven, but these celebrations brought him no mental relief. Clavijo tells us that the public seldom got a glimpse of him and that his health was visibly failing.

The second psychological remedy for Timur's tortured mind and twisted conscience was a Chinese campaign in which he would be able to kill enough non-Muslims to make up for all his crimes. He gave the word of command, and his military machine began to work with its superb efficiency. Some two hundred thousand men were enlisted, and since the march to Peking would take about four to five months, it was planned to put the army into two winter-cantonments beyond the Jaxartes—at Tashkent under one grandson, Khalil, and at Siram and Yasi under another grandson, Sultan Husain. Arrangements were made to have for one soldier provisions that would suffice for ten, and the carts containing the provisions were passed over the frozen Jaxartes. With the advent of the spring the army would begin its march.

All seemed well and yet no one was deceived. It was too late for Timur to save his soul. 'A great fear', says Yezdi, 'haunted the people's hearts—and they began to speak about it. When such a large army was collected in such a short time, their doubts increased and their minds became anxious... During those days people used to have disturbing dreams.' Timur was seventy-one and no one doubted that his days were numbered.

He crossed over the frozen Jaxartes and put up at the residence of one of his officers, Birdi Beg, at Otrar. On 11 February 1405 he fell ill; the physicians confessed that his diseases were too complicated for them to handle. 'Pray to God for my soul',²⁶ was his appeal to the officers around him. He also appealed to them to see to the execution

of his will by which he had appointed Pir Muhammad, son of Jahangir, as his successor. This choice shows the extent to which his mind had become deranged. Pir Muhammad had no achievements to his credit; also he had no influence on Timur's officers and by that time he had become an incurable drunkard, who left all his administrative affairs in the hands of his *sharbatdar*, Pir Ali Taz.

On the night of 15/16 February 1405, Timur expired and the central government of Timurid empire vanished.

Pir Muhammad made no immediate attempt to obtain the throne of Samarqand. Only two of Timur's high officers, Shaikh Nuruddin and Shah Malik, were foolish enough to insist on carrying out his will. They were hustled out of Trans-Oxiana, and the remaining officers decided to put Mirza Khalil on the throne of Samarqand. He was only twenty-one but no prince older in age was on the spot. Khalil's short reign has only two achievements to its credit. He completely squandered away in four years the treasures Timur had collected; precious stones were weighed out to his favourites in big balances like grain and absolutely nothing was left.

During Timur's life-time, Khalil had secretly married Shad Malik, an ex-slave girl or concubine of Malik Saifuddin. Timur had ordered her to be put to death, but on being informed that she was pregnant, he had stayed the execution of his order. The old princesses naturally regarded the new queen of Samarqand with contempt. Shad Malik retaliated by inducing Khalil to distribute the wives and slave-girls of Timur among his officers in order to win over their loyalty. 'Khalil behaved towards these princesses, whom he should have respected as his mothers, in a way no wise man would approve; by compulsion and force he gave every one of them to an officer who had not the means of providing for her.'²⁷

Yezdi in his review of Timur's policy at the end of his book says that Timur, unlike other conquerors who were content with the mere submission of local rulers, either put a prince of his family or an officer of his own in charge of the administration of every territory he conquered. But outside Trans-Oxiana this had been only possible in Yezdi's homeland of Khurasan; in these two regions the descendants of Timur continued to govern for about a century.

As soon as the news of Timur's death was received, Shah Rukh proclaimed himself king at Herat and Umar at Azarbaijan. But Abu Bakr found this arrogance of his younger brother intolerable and a war between the two began. But they soon realized that they had to contend with new foes. Sultan Ahmad Jalair and Qara Yusuf Turkoman

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 727-28.

had first fled for safety to Bayazid and then to Egypt. They now returned to claim their own. Sultan Ahmad succeeded in seizing Diarbekr, Baghdad and Iraq. Qara Yusuf inflicted a severe defeat on Miran Shah and Abu Bakr on 16 April 1408; Miran Shah was killed; Abu Bakr succeeded in escaping but was killed in the following year and Umar met a similar death soon after. Thus the western princes of Timur's family were all beheaded and vanished from the scene.

Pir Ali Taz ordered Pir Muhammad, whose sins and drunkenness had passed all limits, to be put to death in February 1408, but he was himself killed soon after, and Shah Rukh put Iskandar Mirza (son of Umar Shaikh) on the throne of Timurid Afghanistan. In Trans-Oxiana Khalil was overthrown and captured by a Timurid officer, Khudasad Husaini, in 1408; but Khudasad acknowledged Shah Rukh as his superior, and Shah Rukh put his eldest son, Ulugh Beg Mirza, on the throne of Samarqand.

The kingdom of Herat was fortunate owing to the long reigns of Shah Rukh (1405-48) and Sultan Husain Mirza (1469-1506). During Sultan Husain's reign Herat became a real seat of learning and research owing to the efforts of his minister, Amir Ali Sher, a Turkish poet of eminence, who collected a body of scholars, with Maulana Abdur Rahman Jami at their head, and provided them with books, houses and pensions. But Sultan Husain Mirza's sons were unable to defend Herat either against Shaibani Khan Uzbek or Shah Ismail Safavi—the leaders of the Uzbek and the Persian national movements.

The Timurids of Samarqand were not so fortunate. Ulugh Beg had the reputation of an astronomer and a man of learning, but he was badly defeated by Burraq Ughlan, the Juji prince of Turkistan, and the Jattah plundered Trans-Oxiana. Worse than that he was planning to kill his own son, Abdul Latif, when the latter overthrew him and had him put to death in 1449. Some six months later Abdul Latif was killed by the officers of Ulugh Beg, who fixed his severed head above the arch of Ulugh Beg's *madrassa*. Abu Sa'id Mirza (grandfather of the emperor, Zahiruddin Babur), who now ascended the throne, strove for years to rebuild the empire of Timur, but his army was crushed by Hasan Beg Turkoman in January 1469, and he was put to death. His descendants, as Babur's *Memoirs* clearly prove, were unable to stand the onslaught of Shaibani Khan Uzbek. Thus the Timurids finally disappeared from both Trans-Oxiana and Persia; only those who succeeded in escaping to Afghanistan and India survived.

CHAPTER TWO

FOUNDATION OF THE DELHI SULTANAT

I. INDIA ON THE EVE OF THE TURKISH INVASIONS

THE CASTE SYSTEM

THE CENTURY AND A HALF that followed the exploits of Sultan Mahmud (999-1030) in Hindustan saw the rise of the Rajput kingdoms, the intensification of the caste system and the growing Turkish pressure on the Gangetic plain. The situation created by the operation of these forces in the political and social life of the country paved way for the Ghurid conquest of Hindustan. The Rajput polity gave birth to feudal institutions; the caste system created water-tight compartments in society and killed all sense of common citizenship, while Turkish reconnoitering activity exposed the basic weakness of the Indian position and encouraged and facilitated military action on a large scale.

A discussion of the different theories about the origin of the Rajputs is irrelevant for our purposes here. We do not find any reference to the 'Rajputs' as such in the *Kitabul Hind* of Alberuni. It appears that slowly and gradually the Kshattriyas of Alberuni had emerged as a virile warrior race, soaked in a spirit of romantic militarism and chivalry, and came to be designated as Rajputs or *Rajaputra*—'scions of the royal blood'. They brought the country from the Sutlej to the Son river under their control. The Ghurids had mainly to deal with this new aristocracy as the political scene in the 12th century was dominated by the Chauhanas of Sambhar and Ajmer, the Paramaras of Malwa, the Kalachuris of Chedi, the Chandellas of Bundelkhund, the Chalukyas of Gujarat, the Gahadavalas of Kanauj, the Palas of Magadha, the Suras and later the Senas of western Bengal. This multi-state system was the main feature of political life in Hindustan during the last quarter of the 12th century, and India was a bundle of states which were independent for all intents and purposes. Mutual jealousies and attempts at aggrandize-

ment of power had led to constant fluctuations in the frontiers of kingdoms and had perpetuated deep feelings of incurable hostility.

These Rajput governments were typically feudal in character. Each kingdom was divided into fiefs held by the members of the ruling house, the *kulas*. Referring to the obligations of the vassals during the earlier period, Dr. A. S. Altekar says that the feudatories were not permitted to issue coins and they had to (a) mention the name of the overlord (in epigraphs), (b) attend the imperial court on ceremonial occasions, (c) pay a regular tribute, (d) make presents on festive occasions and when daughters were married, and (e) send a certain number of troops.¹ But during our period even these obligations were neglected, while the power of the feudal lord to raise and maintain his own armies and to impose and realize his own taxes had resulted in the complete dispersion of political authority and had encouraged centrifugal tendencies. High offices in the state were a monopoly of this land-owning aristocracy, and had thus resulted in weakening of the authority of the king. Internecine conflict between these feudal lords—made possible on a large scale by the maintenance of their private armies—created further confusion.

When the Turks appeared on the Indian scene, feudalism had entered upon its last and by far the most disturbing phase of its history and the practice of sub-infeudation had gained ground. Most of the big feudatories had their own vassals, like *samantas*, *thakkuras*, *rautas*, etc. The Rashtrakutas, for instance, had their feudatories like the Gujarat Rastrakutas and the Silharas, who in turn had their own sub-feudatories.² In Kashmir the *dāmaras* (feudal lords) were the most disturbing factor in political life.³ They lived in small castles, maintained their contingents and defied the authority of the central government as and when it suited their interests. In fact the actual administration of the country, particularly in the interior, was in their hands.

But this political system merely reflected the basic weakness of the social structure of the time. The principle of caste, which formed the basis of the Indian social system in the 11th and the 12th centuries, had annihilated all sense of common citizenship and killed all patriotic sentiments. Whatever the circumstances under which the system originated, it had resulted in the total annihilation of any sense of citizenship or of loyalty to the country as a whole. The demoralization that it had brought in its wake, both from the point of

1 *The State and Government in Ancient India*, Banaras, 1949, 225.

2 A. S. Altekar, *Rashtrakutas and their Times*, Poona, 1934, 265.

3 *Rajutrangini*, tr. Stein, VIII, 1028.

view of the individual and the community, was terrible in its consequences. 'In the exaltation of the group', observes Dr. Beni Prasad,

'it (caste system) largely sacrifices the individual values. It strikes at the root of individuality and amounts almost to a denial of personality. It refuses to admit that every individual is, in his nature, universal and that he has the right to seek his own self-expression, to determine his own ambitions and pursue his own interests. The principle of caste is the negation of the dignity of man as man.'⁴

At the top of Indian society there were four *varnas* or castes—Brahman, Kshattriya, Vaishya and Sudra. Much, however, as these classes differed from each other, they lived together in the same towns and villages.

'The Hindus', writes Alberuni, 'call their caste *varna*, i.e. colours, and from a genealogical point of view they call them *jataka*, i.e. births. These castes are from the very beginning only four—Brahman, Kshattriya, Vaishya and Sudra.'⁵

The Brahman stood at the top of the social system. He was considered as 'the very best of mankind'.⁶ Religion was his exclusive monopoly. According to Alberuni only the Brahmans and the Kshattriyas could learn the Vedas and therefore *moksha* was meant for them alone.⁷

The Kshattriyas came next in the scale of social hierarchy. They were entrusted with the task of governing the country and protecting its frontiers. The two remaining castes—the Vaishyas and the Sudras—were assigned a lower place in the social hierarchy. The main function of a Vaishya was to cultivate land, breed cattle and do business either on his own behalf or on behalf of a Brahman. 'The Sudra is like a servant of the Brahman',⁸ remarks Alberuni. The Vaishyas and the Sudras were deprived of all sacred knowledge. According to Alberuni, if it was proved that a Sudra or a Vaishya had recited the Veda, his tongue was cut off.⁹ Commenting on this Professor Habib remarks: 'Such a policy may, or may not, have been necessary in the

⁴ *The State and Government in Ancient India*, 12.

⁵ *Kitabul Hind*, tr. Sachau, I, 100-1.

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 100-1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 104.

The view of the Hindu philosophers was, however, different. According to them 'liberation was common to all castes and to the whole human race, if their intention of obtaining it was perfect'.

⁸ *Ibid.*, II, 136.

⁹ *Ibid.*, I, 125.

period of the Rig Veda. But in the eleventh century—in the generation of Alberuni, Avicenna and Sultan Mahmud—it was stupid, mad and suicidal; and the Brahmins, themselves a rationalistic and highly enlightened group, were destined to pay a terrible price for the most unpardonable of social sins.¹⁰

Below these four *varnas* was the non-descript mass of humanity, known as *Antyaja*. They were not reckoned amongst any caste, but were members of a certain craft or profession. There were eight classes or guilds of them: (1) fuller, (2) shoemaker, (3) juggler, (4) basket and shield maker, (5) sailor, (6) fisherman, (7) hunter of wild animals and of birds, and (8) weaver. They lived near the villages or towns of the four castes 'but outside them'.¹¹ 'If anybody wants', writes Alberuni, 'to quit the works and duties of his caste and adopt those of another caste, even if it would bring a certain honour to the latter, it is a sin.'¹²

The lowest people were *Hadi*, *Doma*, *Chandala* and *Badhatu*. They were assigned dirty work like the cleaning of villages and other services. 'In fact', observes Alberuni, 'they were considered like illegitimate children,' and 'are treated as outcastes'.¹³ They were not allowed to live within the city-walls, and could only enter, presumably after due notice and at fixed hours, to perform that menial work of cleaning, etc., without which no city could exist.¹⁴

What exercised the most devastating influence on the social structure of early medieval India was the idea of physical pollution (*chut*). Alberuni has noted with disgust and amazement the working of this idea in the social life of the people. He remarks that everything which falls into a state of impurity, strives, and quite successfully, to regain

10 *Journal of the Aligarh Historical Research Institute*, April 1941, 86.

11 *Kitabul Hind*, I, 101.

This list cannot be considered exhaustive of all professions practised in India at that time. Alberuni, it appears, simply illustrates his point here on the basis of professions he saw in the localities he had lived in. The lives of the professional groups must have varied from district to district as it was characterized by diversity of cultural traditions and organizational patterns.

12 *Ibid.*, I, 103.

13 *Ibid.*, I, 101-2.

14 Though compiled more than a thousand years earlier, the following *shlokas* of *Manusmriti* have a relevance to the situation described by Alberuni and it may be safely assumed that the tide of public opinion was running strongly in favour of Manu's doctrines:

'51. But the dwellings of Chandalas and Shvapachas shall be outside the village, they must be made Apapratras, and their wealth (shall be) dogs and donkeys.'

'55. By day they may go about for the purpose of their work, distinguished by marks of the king's command, and they shall carry out the corpses (of persons) who have no relative; that is a settled rule.' (*Manu*, Chapter X).

its original condition of purity. The sun cleanses and the fresh air, and salt in the sea-water prevents the spreading of corruption. If it was not so, life on this planet would have been impossible. The Brahmanic conception of contamination was, however, contrary to this established principle of nature. If a Hindu warrior was taken as prisoner by the Musalmans, and was subsequently released, he was disowned by his caste or guild. 'I have repeatedly been told', writes Alberuni,

'that when Hindu slaves (in Muslim countries) escape and return to their country and religion, the Hindus order that they should fast by way of expiation, then they bury them in the dung, stale, and milk of cows for a certain number of days, till they get into a state of fermentation. Then they drag them out of dirt and give them similar dirt to eat, and of the like. I have asked the Brahman if this is true, but they deny it and maintain that there is no expiation possible for such an individual, and that he is never allowed to return into those conditions of life in which he was before he was carried off as a prisoner. And how should that be possible? If a Brahman eats in the house of a Sudra for sundry days, he is expelled from his caste and can never regain it.'¹⁵

These prisoners, disowned by their own community, often embraced Islam.

THE TURKISH PRESSURE

The period under review saw the Turks making persistent attempts at increasing the area of their influence in northern India. Their pressure was constantly felt in the Ganges valley. Their reconnoitering activity was aimed at securing footholds in areas beyond the Ravi. (1) According to Baihaqi, Ahmad Niyaltigin had penetrated as far as Banaras.¹⁶ (2) Mas'ud is reported to have captured Hansi.¹⁷ (3) The Rahan inscription of Madanpala refers to his father Govindachandra as having 'compelled the Hammira to lay aside his enmity by his matchless fighting.'¹⁸ (4) In an inscription of Lakhnepala of Badaun, his ancestor Madanpala, is mentioned as one who made Hammira's incursion into the 'river of the gods' (i.e. the Ganges) impossible.¹⁹ (5) The Sarnath inscription of Kumaradevi praises Govindachandra (1114-55) as one who had protected Varanasi from

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, II, 162-63.

¹⁶ *Baihaqi* (ed. Ghani and Fayyaz), 402.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 530-35.

¹⁸ *I.A.*, XVIII, 16.

¹⁹ *E.I.*, I, 64.

the wicked Turushka warrior.²⁰ (6) Under Mas'ud III, Hajib Tughatigin, the governor of the Punjab, penetrated up to a place across the Ganges which no one except Mas'ud had reached before.²¹ (7) Vijayachandra (1155-70) is also praised for his anti-Hammira activities.²² (8) The Delhi-Siwalik pillar inscription of Visaladeva, dated 1164, describes the king as one who had extirpated the *mlecchas*.²³ (9) An inscription of Prithvi Rai I, dated 1167, records the fortification of Hansi to check the progress of the Hammira.²⁴ (10) It appears from the *diwan* of Mas'ud Sa'd Salman that Badaun, Dahgan, Kanauj, Malwa and Kalinjar had to bear the brunt of attacks by the later Ghaznavid rulers.²⁵ (11) An inscription at Kiradu (Jodhpur), dated 1178, records that a lady replaced an image broken by the Turushkas.²⁶ (12) The Dabhoi inscription refers to the achievements of Lavanaprasada of the Chalukya Vaghela dynasty of Gujarat (*circa* 1200), against a Turushka king.²⁷ (13) The Sundha Hill inscription speaks of Kilhana (*circa* 1164-94) as having defeated a Turushka and having erected a golden gateway.²⁸

A study of the works of the poets of the later Ghaznavid period—Saiyyid Hasan, Mas'ud Sa'd Salman, Rumi, Sana'i and others—shows that India was a frequent topic of discussion in those lands, and incursions into India had become an almost regular feature of the life of the later Ghaznavid rulers.

The large scale military operations of the Ghurids in the last quarter of the 12th and the first quarter of the 13th century were neither abrupt nor unexpected. In fact they were the culmination of a series of sporadic incursions during the preceding century and a half, when areas were conquered and lost, and political influence was extended and pushed back. The frontiers of the Ghaznavid territory were thus in a state of constant flux.

MUSLIM SETTLEMENTS BEFORE THE GHURID CONQUEST

While the extension of Turkish political influence was stoutly resisted by the Rajputs during the later Ghaznavid period, Muslim

20 *E.I.*, IX, 319.

21 Minhaj, 22.

22 *E.I.*, IV, 119.

23 *I.A.*, XXX, 218.

24 *I.A.*, XLI, 19.

25. *Diwan-i Mas'ud Sa'd Salman*, (ed. Rashid Yasmi) 262-65, 307, 397, 170-71, 28, 247, 219.

26 *Pr. Rep. Arch. Survey W.C.* 1906-7, 42.

27 *E.I.*, I, 26.

28 *E.I.*, IX, 69.

traders, merchants, saints and mystics peacefully penetrated into the country and settled at a number of important places. These Muslim emigrants lived outside the fortified towns amongst the lower sections of the Indian population, first because of caste taboos, and, secondly, because of the facility of establishing contacts with the Indian masses.

It appears that nearly half a century before the Ghurid conquest of northern India, isolated Muslim culture-groups had secured a foothold in the country. Ibn-i Asir writes about Banaras: 'There are Musalmans in that country since the days of Mahmud bin Subuktigin who have continued faithful to the law of Islam and constant in prayer and good work.'²⁹ At Bahraich was the mausoleum of Saiyyid Salar Mas'ud Ghazi who 'was a soldier in the army of Sultan Mahmud'.³⁰ The fact that his name and his grave survived through the long years between the Ghaznavid invasions and the Ghurid occupation of northern India, shows that there was some Muslim population to look after the grave and to preserve for posterity the tradition of the Salar's martyrdom. Shaikh Mu'inuddin Chishti came to Ajmer before the second battle of Tarain³¹ and his deep humanism and pious way of life attracted a band of devoted followers round him. Maulana Raziuddin Hasan Saghani, the famous author of *Mashariqul Anwar*, was born in Badaun long before the Ghurid occupation of that town.³² The existence of a Muslim colony at Kanauj is borne out by the early Arab accounts.

In some towns of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar there are Muslim shrines attributed by local tradition to the pre-Ghurid period. The grave of Miran Mulhim in Badaun,³³ and of Khwaja Majduddin in Bilgram,³⁴ the grave on the Uncha Tila Mohalla of Mallawan in Bilgram,³⁵ the *dargah* of Lal Pir in Azmat Tola at Gopamau,³⁶ the graveyard on the Bilsa Road in Badaun,³⁷ the *Ganj-i Shahidan* of Asiwani in Unnao,³⁸ the graves of Jaruha near Hajipur in Bihar, the

²⁹ Elliot and Dowson, Vol. II, 251.

³⁰ Barani, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 491. See also Khusrau, *Ijaz-i Khusravi*, Vol. II, 155. No contemporary reference to Salar Mas'ud is available in any work of the Ghaznavid period. According to Utbi, Sultan Mahmud had forbidden the crossing of the Ganges. Salar Mas'ud's relationship with Sultan Mahmud may be a later fiction. He might have entered the country in the latter half of the 11th century.

³¹ *Siyarul Auliya*, 46.

³² See *infra* for a brief account of his life.

³³ *Kanzul Tarikh* (a history of Badaun by Raziuddin), 51-53.

³⁴ *District Gazetteer*, Hardoi, Vol. XLI, 178.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 130.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

³⁷ *District Gazetteer*, Badaun, Vol. XV, 190.

³⁸ *District Gazetteer*, Unnao, Vol. XXXVIII, 118.

grave of Imam Taqi Faqih near the western gate of Bari Dargah at Maner³⁹—are all considered to belong to the pre-Ghurid period and some families in these towns claim that their ancestors settled there during this period. Their claim may or may not be correct, but it is difficult to challenge local traditions with regard to the historicity of these graves, particularly when the existence of Muslim settlements in these areas is proved by evidence available from other sources.

The circumstances under which these Muslim colonies came to be established in India may be briefly indicated. India's trade-contacts with foreign lands date back to the Indus Valley Civilization, if not earlier. India produced certain commodities—like sugar, cotton, colouring material, in particular, indigo (*nil*) and *katha*—which the colder climes desperately needed, and foreign merchants were in a position to pay a higher price for them than the Indian consumer. India, on the other hand, needed foreign commodities—horses of good breed, dried fruits, pearls, precious stones of various types (the ruby of Badakhshan and the turquoise of Persia). A well-equipped warrior of the early middle ages, if we are to trust Persian literature of the period, had to provide himself with an Indian sword, a Persian bow and a Tatar lance.

The self-imposed dogmas of Hinduism, which we find in the *Manusmriti* and similar works, order the high caste Hindu to confine himself to the region where the *munja* grass grows and the black gazelles graze; he is not to cross the sea or to go to countries where non-caste people govern; and the lowest group of non-castes, according to the *Manusmriti*, are the Yavanas, Pahlawas and Turushkas (Greeks, Persians and Turks). How the expansive character of Hinduism of the earlier centuries was changed into insularity by the time of the *Smritis* does not concern us here. But the presence of the Arab traders in all parts of India (except Kashmir) and the complete absence of the Hindu trader from Persia and Central Asia prove that the mandate of the *Smritis* was effective and that the Hindu commercial classes, so efficient in their work throughout the middle ages, had to leave the export and import trade of India to foreigners.

'Princes, anxious to improve their commerce,' says Dr. Habibullah, 'accorded generous treatment to the people who commanded the main trade routes of the civilized world. Bearded men in long skirted tunics, congregating for prayer at fixed intervals, in a rectangular building which contained no idols, and adhering to no caste rules, presented a sight whose novelty wore out with the

³⁹ See Hasan Askari's article: Historical Significance of Islamic Mysticism in Medieval Bihar, *Historical Miscellany*, 10-11.

passage of time. As they established colonies and multiplied, they became an integral part of the population.'

These 'Tazik' colonies were established in the suburbs of many large cities with the consent of the *Rai*, who gave the Musalmans permission to build their houses, mosques, schools, store-rooms, shops, etc. and also a space for their graveyards. These colonies grew in size; this may have been due to mere growth of population, but perhaps when Shaikh Ali Hajweri says that he came to Lahore on account of 'unpleasant people' (probably the Ghuzz Turks), he is speaking for a large class of persons whom the recurrent political storms of Persia and Central Asia drove to this country, where they could earn a peaceful livelihood. A few cases, the accounts of which have survived, prove that these colonies attained to a high level of culture. The text-books were in Arabic; teaching was probably in Persian; but the mother-tongue was the local language.

Perhaps a digression about the lives of two Indian Muslims, one born before, and the other immediately after the Ghurid conquest of Delhi, may give a better insight into the life and conditions of these colonies.

1) *Maulana Raziuddin Hasan Saghani*:⁴⁰

This distinguished scholar of the Traditions of the Prophet and author of the *Mashariqul Anwar* was born in Badaun long before its conquest by the Turks. He received his early education in his home town which, it seems, had fairly developed arrangements for studies in Muslim religious subjects. An incident of his early student-days, which the Maulana could never forget, was that he once requested his teacher for the loan of a collection of *Hadises*, known as *Mulakh-khas*, but the teacher declined to lend it. His self-respect as well as his curiosity to learn was deeply hurt at this, but this might have been due to scarcity of books in those days. Later on—of course after the Ghurid conquest—he reached Koil (Aligarh) and became a deputy of the *mushrif* of Koil. One day the *mushrif* made some silly remark, which brought a smile on the Maulana's face. The *mushrif* felt insulted and threw his inkpot at Maulana Raziuddin, who left his job disgusted and distressed and said: 'One should not serve the ignorant'.

Later on he became tutor to a son of the governor of Koil on a salary of one hundred *tankas* a year. He could not, however, stick to

⁴⁰ For biographical references see *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 103-4; *Mu'jamul Udaba*, Yaquti, Vol. III, 211; *Fawatul Wafayat*, Ibn Shakir, I, 133; *Saroorus Sadur* (MS). See also *Religion and Politics in India during the 13th century*, 152-54; *The Contribution of India to Arabic Literature*, 25.

this job for long and took to extensive travels in India. His erudition and learning earned fame and respect for him wherever he went. When he reached Nagaur, eminent scholars, like Qazi Hamiduddin and Qazi Kamaluddin, gathered round him and requested him to give lessons to them in the Traditions of the Prophet. Maulana Raziuddin taught one of his books, *Misbahud Duja*, to the scholars of Nagaur and issued certificates also. One of the residents requested him to instruct him in mysticism. The Maulana apologized and said: 'I am busy here because the people of Nagaur learn the science of *Hadises* from me these days. At present I have no time to instruct you in mysticism. If you desire to learn it, you may accompany me on my travels in non-Muslim areas where there will be no such crowd. I will then teach this subject to you.'

From Nagaur the Maulana proceeded to Jalor and Gujarat. Conditions in those areas were such that he could not move about freely. He changed his dress and roamed about *incognito*. During this journey he instructed the above-mentioned person in mysticism. Later on he proceeded to Lahore and from there he made his way to Baghdad. His scholarship attracted the Caliph's attention and he was offered a government job. In 1220 the Caliph Al-Nasir sent him as his envoy to the court of Iltutmish. He came to Delhi again, a second time a few years later and stayed here till 1239. 'In those days', Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya once told his audience, 'Delhi was full of scholars. Maulana Raziuddin was equal to them in (other departments) of knowledge, but he excelled all others in the science of Traditions.' That Badaun could provide educational facilities in theological subjects to a young Muslim student long before Muslim rule was established there shows that these settlements had struck deep roots and had developed cultural institutions.

2) *Shaikh Hamiduddin Sufi*:⁴¹

This distinguished disciple of Shaikh Mu'inuddin Chishti of Ajmer was the first Muslim child to see the light of the day in Delhi after its conquest by Mu'izzuddin. In his early years he had led a very voluptuous life but when he joined the circle of Shaikh Mu'inuddin's disciples, he repented for his past sins and adopted a life of penitence and poverty. He settled at Suwal, a village near Nagaur, far from the hurry and bustle of city-life and took to cultivation. Whatever he needed—and his needs never exceeded a few maunds of grain and a few yards of rough hand-woven cloth—he himself produced and

⁴¹ For biographical details, see *Saroorus Sadur* (MS.); *Siyyarul Auliya* 158-64; *Siyyarul Arifin* 13-14; *Akhbarul Akhyar* 29-36. See also Nizami, *Religion and Politics*, 185-87.

scrupulously avoided coming into contact with the government of the day.

His life at Nagaur affords one of the earliest glimpses of Muslim family life in the Indian countryside. He lived in a small mud house and eked out his meagre subsistence by cultivating a single *bigha* of land. The principle of the rotation of crops being unknown in those days, he cultivated one-half of his land in one season and the other half in the next. He dressed himself like a typical Indian peasant and used two sheets of cloth to cover the upper and the lower parts of his body. He kept a cow in his house and himself milked it. His wife—a lady of fervent piety and strong mystic temperament—spent her time in cooking and spinning like a peasant woman. Like most of the villagers amongst whom he lived, Shaikh Hamiduddin was a strict vegetarian. His dislike for meat was so great that he warned his disciples against distributing meat-preparations for blessing his soul after his death. The family carried on conversation in *Hindivi*; mother was addressed as *mai* and brother as *bhai*.

Touched by his penitence and poverty, the *muqta* of Nagaur offered a plot of land and some cash to him. The Shaikh apologized and declined. The *muqta* then reported the matter to Iltutmish, who sent 500 silver *tankas* with a *farman* conferring a village on him. He hastened to inform his wife, just to examine her reaction to the prospects of a life of material prosperity and comfort. The couple was in such a state of penury at that time that the wife had a tattered *dupatta* on her head and the saint a grimy loin cloth on his body. 'O Khwaja!', replied his wife, 'Do you want to disgrace years of spiritual devotion and penitence by accepting this gift? Do not worry. I have spun two *sirs* of yarn. It will suffice for preparing a loin cloth for you and a *dupatta* for me.' Delighted at this reply, Shaikh Hamid told the *muqta* that he had decided not to accept the royal gift.

II. HISTORY OF GHUR DOWN TO THE RISE OF SULTAN MU'IZZUDDIN

GHUR

GHUR, THE REGION FROM WHERE the invaders came, lies in the west-centre of what is now Afghanistan, and comprises the basins of the upper Hari Rud, the Farah Rud, the Rud-i Ghur and the Khash Rud, together with the intervening mountain chains.¹ Minhaj gives the following account of its geography:

'The country of Ghur is intersected by five great mountain chains and the people of Ghur maintain that they are the loftiest in the world. First, Zar Murgh in Mayandish, at the foot of which the palace and capital of the Shansabanis was situated. The second mountain, known as Surkh Ghar,² is also in the territory of Mayandish near Tajiz.³ The third, Ashk, in the district of Timran, is greater in size and altitude than any other part of the territory of Ghur; and the district of Timran is (situated) in the hollows and (on) its sides. The fourth is the largest and the loftiest mountain range of Warani, which runs through the district of Dawar and Walisht and on which the palace (*qasr*) of Kajuran⁴ is situated. Roen, famous throughout Ghur for its inaccessible height, is the fifth range, according to some, but others give the fifth place to the Faj (defile, pass) of Khaesar, which in length, breadth and height surpasses the comprehension of man.'

These mountain ranges, which rise to over 10,000 feet and become considerably higher as they run eastwards to the Hindukush, made Ghur difficult of access and shut her out completely from all cultural and commercial contacts with the outside world. The extent of this cultural isolation from the neighbouring areas may be gauged from the fact that when Sultan Mas'ud of Ghazni led a campaign into Ghur

1 Ahmad Ali Kohzad who rode on horseback through Ghur gives a good modern description of this region (*Afghanistan*, VI-IX, Kabul, 1951-54, 6 parts: 'Along the Koh-i-Baba and Hari Rud'.)

The modern district of 'Ghuri' which lies to the south-west of Khanabad is distinct from the medieval Ghur.

2 Raverty, 318; *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (ed. Habibi) I, 328. *Ghar* in Pushto means a mountain.

3 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (Habibi ed.) I, 328.

4 *Ibid.*, 328.

in 1020, he had to employ local interpreters⁵ as the language spoken by the people was not intelligible on account of dialectical divergencies. Besides, geographical factors led to the fragmentation of political power in Ghur, and each fort came to exercise independent sway over the area immediately under its control. It was as late as the time of Qutbuddin Muhammad (ob. 1146-47) that a portion of Ghur—the petty principality of Warshada on the Hari Rud—developed a capital at Firuz Koh. Before that there was no centre from which the region could be controlled by a single ruler.

Ghur was mainly an agricultural area. Its valley-sides have, at present, deciduous woodlands covered with mulberry trees, walnut trees, apricots and vines. Even in the 10th century it was so fertile that Istakhri praised its fruitfulness, streams, meadows and tillage. There were no towns of note, but only agricultural settlements and—most typical features of the landscape—fortified places and towers (*qasr*, *qil'a*, *hisar*, *kushak*) in which a 'bad tempered, unruly and ignorant people' (*Hududul Alam*, 110), could defend themselves.⁶ The people enjoyed some fame as horse rearers. Besides, Ghur had a reputation for supplying slaves to the markets of Herat and Sistan.⁷

The mountain ranges of this area, however, had great metalliferous value and it appears that iron was available in large quantities in Ghur. The people of Ghur specialized in the production of weapons and war-equipment⁸ and exported them to neighbouring lands. The anonymous author of *Hududul Alam* says that 'from this province come slaves, armour (*zirah*), coats of mail (*jaushan*) and good arms'.⁹ According to Togan, the whole area from Ghur and Kabul to Qarluq was metal-working.¹⁰ It was probably on this account that the chief fortress of Ghur was known as *Pul-i Ahangeran*. When Mas'ud attacked Ghur in 1020, its chief, Abul Hasan Khalaf, brought him shields and cuirasses,¹¹ and when the stronghold of Jurwas was captured, a tribute of arms was levied.¹² The value of the Ghurid arms was recognized and appreciated by Mas'ud, who employed Ghurid officers as specialists in siege-warfare. When Izzuddin Husain of Ghur (493-540/1100-40) sent his annual tribute to the Seljuq Sultan Sanjar, it

5 Istakhri (ed. de Goeje), 281; Baihaqi (ed. Chani and Feyyaz), 117.

6 C. E. Bosworth's article, 'The Early Islamic History of Ghur' in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. VI, 1961, 118.

7 *Ibid.*, 118, 121.

8 *Ibid.*, 120.

9 *Hududul Alam*, 110.

10 Z.D.M.G. Vol. XC (1936), 33-34.

11 Baihaqi, 115, 119-20.

12 *Ibid.*, 116.

included particularly armours, coats of mail, steel helmets and other war material, together with ferocious watch dogs bred in Ghur.¹³

Thus Ghur, though it had very recently opened its doors to Muslim cultural influences, possessed two of the most important and essential requisites of war in the middle ages—horses and steel.

THE SHANSABANI DYNASTY

The early history of the Shansabani dynasty, to which Mu'izzuddin belonged, is wrapped in mystery and romance. It is difficult to disentangle fiction from fact as our only authority on the subject is Minhajus Siraj and he too regrets in his *Tabaqat* that he was unable, while writing his book, to consult the authorities he had with him at Ghur. They were left behind when he fled to save his life from the Mongols. He had therefore to depend on his memory. He however had access to the *Tarikh-i Nasiri*¹⁴ and the *Tarikh-i Haizam Nabi*¹⁵ which he utilized in his account of the early Shansabanis. As has happened with many other ruling dynasties of the east, which have risen from very obscure and local origins, the dynasty of Mu'izzuddin was provided with a legendary hero, Zuhak, as its 'first ancestor'.

Zuhak was a repugnant figure in the tradition of Iranian lands but he was popular in the region of Ghazni and Zabulistan, and was, therefore, picked up by the genealogists of Ghur for the dynasty of Mu'izzuddin. Originally an Assyrian divinity, Zuhak was assigned by the Zoroastrians to the pandemonium of devils. Firdausi, searching for a representative of the type which he intensely disliked but could not afford to ignore, decided to make Zuhak immortal by reincarnating him as a Saracenic Arab. His descendants were supposed to have settled in Ghur after Faridun had overthrown Zuhak's 'thousand-year dominion'.

Shansab, the eponymous founder of the dynasty, was a descendant of Zuhak. According to Minhaj, he embraced Islam at the hands of the Caliph Ali, who bestowed upon him a standard and a 'covenant'. This seems highly improbable because, though we find Musalmans tinkering at the borders of Ghur from the time of the third Caliph Usman, this region was never brought under actual Muslim control and the campaigns referred to by Tabari and Ibn-i Asir were nothing more than mere raids. 'Ghur's value', remarks Bosworth, 'was

¹³ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 47.

¹⁴ According to *Kashfuz Zunun* (Vol. II) this was one of the titles of Baihaqi's *Tarikh-i Al-i Subuktagin*. Abdul Hayy Habibi accepts this in view of the fact that Nasiruddin was the title of Subuktagin (*Tabaqat-i Nasiri* II, 282-83). This volume is extinct now.

¹⁵ For Habibi's note on this work see *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, II, 299-305.

as a reservoir of slaves, and these could be obtained by occasional, temporary incursions.' Actual annexation of this area or establishment of overlordship is a much later phenomenon. The author of *Hududul Alam*, who was in the service of the Ferighunids and lived in the adjoining province of Guzgan, says (in his work completed in 982-83) that his masters exercised suzerainty over Ghur¹⁶ and that the Ghurids, formerly pagans, were mostly Musalmans in his time. This account has been considered 'exaggerated' by Minorsky. In fact, any exaggerated implications derived from this account of *Hududul Alam* would make the campaigns of Mahmud and Mas'ud in this area utterly meaningless. Istakhri definitely describes Ghur as a 'land of pagans' (*darul kufr*) and says that the only justification for including it in his account was that there were a few Musalmans there and because 'it was the biggest pagan enclave within the borders of Islam'.¹⁷

Minhaj, however, says that every prince of the dynasty of Shansab had to subscribe to the 'covenant' of the Caliph Ali before ascending the throne. The Ghurids had so great attachment with the Alids that they refused to recognize the Umayyad caliphate.

It appears from the accounts of Tabari and Ibn-i Asir that campaigns were undertaken against Ghur in the years 47/667 and 107/725-26. The latter was led by Abu Munzir Asad. On this occasion the Ghurids concealed their possessions in inaccessible caves. Asad refused to be baffled by the situation. He let down men in crates (*tawabit*) at the end of chains and appropriated these valuables. Sporadic attacks of the Umayyads on Ghur continued throughout the period. But geography made it practically impossible to maintain any permanent control—political or cultural—over this area as the mountain routes, dangerous to traverse during summer, became absolutely blocked in winter.¹⁸ Minhaj says that when Abu Muslim Khurasani raised the standard of revolt against the Umayyads, one of the members of the Shansabani family, Amir Faulad, marched to his help. During the caliphate of Harun-ur Rashid some tribes approached the Caliph seeking arbitration of their differences. This again seems to be either pure fiction or an 'attempt to project into the past an explanation for the political situation of later times'.

Minhaj further states that during the time of Ya'qub bin Laïs (later 9th century) rival parties of Musalmans and pagans amongst the chieftains of Ghur were at daggers drawn with each other. This again

¹⁶ *Hududul Alam*, 110, 342.

¹⁷ Istakhri, ed. de Goeje, 245.

¹⁸ Minhaj, 113.

does not seem to be true in view of what Istakhri has categorically stated about the religious set-up of Ghur.

Gardizi¹⁹ and Baihaqi²⁰ say that about 369/979-80, the Samanid prince, Amir Nuh bin Mansur, sent Abu Ja'far Zubaidi to conquer Ghur, but he was forced to retire after taking a few forts. Later on, when Subuktagin was governor of Ghazni and Zabulistan on behalf of the Samanids, he made several attacks on Ghur. It appears from some *qasidas* of Unsuri that in one of these campaigns, Mahmud, who was a boy at that time, had also participated. Subuktagin levied a tribute on the Shansabani prince, whose name is given as Muhammad bin Suri.²¹

Muhammad bin Suri asserted his independence after the death of Subuktagin by withholding the tribute and harassing the *carawans*. This excited the fury of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni. In 401/1011 he sent Altuntash, governor of Herat, and Arslan Jazib, governor of Tus, as his advance-guards, and, undeterred by geographical difficulties, himself dashed to Ghur. Muhammad bin Suri entrenched himself in inaccessible hills and ravines and Mahmud had to resort to a ruse. He feigned flight. This drew out the mountain people into the plain in the hope of plundering the retreating army. Mahmud then inflicted a crushing defeat on Muhammad bin Suri and captured him and his son, Shis. In 405/1015 Mahmud marched to Khwabin, the south-western district of Ghur, and captured some forts. A few years later Mas'ud was sent against Tab, the north-western part of Ghur. He was helped by Abul Hasan Khalaf and Shirwan, the chieftains in control of the south-western and north-eastern regions of Ghur respectively. Mas'ud captured many forts in Ghur and with the possible exception of the inaccessible interior, brought the entire region of Ghur under Ghaznavid control. 'No one', remarks Abul Fazl Baihaqi, 'has penetrated so far into Ghur or performed such exploits there as Sultan

19 *Zainul Akhbar*, 46-47.

20 *Tarikh-i Al-i Subuktagin*, 134.

21 This name, given by Minhaj (74,320), creates considerable confusion. This is definitely a Muslim name and, if it has been correctly recorded by Minhaj and his later copyists, shows that Muslim political influence was fairly well-established in Ghur when Subuktagin turned his attention towards it. Uthi calls him Ibn Suri and says that he was a 'Hindu'. Perhaps the term 'Hindu' is used by him as a general term for 'pagan'.

The authors of *Tarikh-i Guzida* (G.S.M. facs, London 1910, 406-8) and *Rauzat-us-Safa* (ed. Riza Quli, Tehran, 1270-74, IV, 241) supply some interesting information about the descendants of Ibn Suri. According to them a grandson of Ibn Suri fled to India and took up residence in an idol-temple. His son, Husain, became a Muslim, went on to Delhi and grew rich as a trader, carrying goods between India and Ghur. But all this seems a later fabrication.

Mas'ud. Whether from compulsion or free choice, the chiefs (*amirs*) of Ghur came to pay him homage. They were terrified by his achievements and held their breaths in fear. Neither books nor traditions record that the Ghurids had been so submissive to a king as to Mas'ud.'

While Muhammad bin Suri was rebelling against Sultan Mahmud, his eldest son, Abu Ali, kept on assuring the Sultan of his loyalty and goodwill. This treason saved the dynasty from extinction. Mahmud placed Abu Ali on his father's throne. Abu Ali reigned until sometime during Mas'ud's reign. Minhaj says that many Islamic institutions were established in Ghur by him. 'He built Friday mosques and madrasas in the land of Ghur and endowed them liberally with *auqaf* (endowments). He held the religious leaders and *ulama* in great respect, and considered it his duty to venerate hermits and ascetics.'²²

Abu Ali allowed his younger brother, Shis, to return to Ghur and live there with him. But Shis's son, Abbas, effected a *coup d'etat* and threw his uncle into prison. Abbas made strenuous efforts to fortify, garrison and repair the castles and strongholds of Ghur, but he was a tyrant and the chiefs of Ghur were so tired of his ruthless behaviour that they invited Sultan Raziuddin Ibrahim, son of Sultan Mas'ud of Ghazni, to rid them of the tyrant. Ibrahim captured Abbas and took him to Ghazni. He did not, however, extinguish the family, but acting upon the precedent set by Sultan Mahmud, placed Abbas's son, Muhammad, on the throne. Muhammad maintained very good relations with his Ghaznavid overlord.

Before the narrative of the history of Ghur to the rise of Mu'izzuddin is resumed, a very important problem has to be considered. What was the religious pattern of Ghur at this time and what agencies worked to bring it into the fold of Islam?

CONVERSION OF GHUR

We know very little about the pre-Muslim religion of Ghur and no contemporary record of the conversion of Ghurids to Islam has survived. Since Tukharistan, Bamivan and Kabul were active centres of Buddhism, it may be assumed that the people of Ghur also believed in some sort of Mahayana Buddhism. It may also be noted in this connection that the lands to the south of Ghur—such as Zamindawar, Ghazni and Qusdar—adjoined the Indian world and until the 10th century were culturally, and often politically, a part of it. Kabul, Ghazni and Bust were key points in the commercial intercourse between the eastern Islamic world and India, and the geographers

often designate them 'the merchant's resort' or 'the entrepot' for India. The first two towns had in early Ghaznavid times colonies of Indian traders permanently residing there.²³ There is nothing improbable, therefore, in the region of Ghur being inhabited mostly by Buddhists.

The expansion of Islamic political and cultural influences in Ghur began with Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni (338-421/998-1030), who is reported to have appointed teachers to instruct the people of Ghur in the precepts of Islam after his campaign of 1010-11.²⁴

Sultan Māhmud, we are told, had patronized the Karamis.²⁵ It was probably due to him that this sect spread in Ghur and acted as a bridge between Mahayana Buddhism and Islam.

The Karami²⁶ sect is so known after Muhammad bin Karam (ob. 869), a native of Sijistan, who was persecuted in the early stages of his religious propaganda but subsequently his sect spread in Ghur, Gharjistan, Bamiyan and other adjoining regions. Baghdadi says that 'weavers' and 'distressed people' of the villages of Naishapur particularly felt attracted towards this sect.²⁷ Regarding its religious beliefs Baghdadi says: 'Ibn Karam urged his followers to ascribe corporeality to the object of his worship. He held that He is a body, possessing an end and limit below, where He comes into contact with His Throne.'²⁸ Thus the Karamis placed Allah on His Throne as Buddha had sat on his lotus. The Karami sect became, in course of time, a half-way house between Islam and Buddhism and assumed great importance in the religious life of Ghur. It seems that its followers succeeded in winning over the Shansabani chiefs also to their fold.

A serious tension appeared in the religious life of Ghur, which was largely dominated by the Karamis, when Sultan Alauddin Jahansuz received emissaries from Alamut, the centre of the Ismaili heretics, and permitted them to carry on their religious propaganda through the length and breadth of his territory. The 'heretics' of Alamut, according to Minhaj, had set their ambition on converting the people of Ghur

²³ Istakhri, 245, 280; Ibn Hauqal, 450; Maqdisi, 303-4; *Hududul Alam*, 111; Bosworth in *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. VI, 124.

²⁴ I.A., IX, 156 as cited by Bosworth, 122-23, 127-28, 'The Early Islamic History of Ghur'.

²⁵ Generally pronounced as *Karrami*, but Bosworth insists on its correct form being *Karami*.

²⁶ For an account of the life and teachings of the founder of the sect, see Sa'id Naficy's extensive notes in *Tarikh-i Balhaqi* (Vol. II, 915-68); *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (Vol. III, 773-74).

²⁷ *Al-Farq bain al-Firaq* (Eng. tr. by A. S. Halkins), Vol. II, 18-19.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 18-30.

to their faith and making them submissive.²⁹ Alauddin's attitude was perhaps determined by political considerations. By inducting the Ismailis into Ghur, he wanted to reduce Karami religious influence. Since the Karamis were opposed to the Batinis, there ensued a bitter conflict between the two. Sultan Saifuddin Muhammad (son of Sultan Alauddin Jahansuz) reversed the policy of his father, and ordered the execution of all 'heretics' throughout his territory.³⁰

According to Minhaj both the brothers—Ghiyasuddin and Mu'izzuddin—were initially Karamis.³¹ Later on they got converted to the Shafi'i and the Hanafi schools of Sunni law respectively. The circumstances in which their conversion took place and the reactions that it provoked have been described by Minhaj and Ibn-i Asir.

Minhaj says that when Mu'izzuddin ascended the throne of Ghazni, he found that the citizens of that region believed in Imam Abu Hanifa and so he conformed to their faith by accepting the Hanafi persuasion. It thus appears a simple decision based on a simple situation. But if—as Professor Habib asks—perchance, the citizens of Ghazni had still been Buddhists?

Ibn-i Asir gives a slightly different version. He says that it was due to the pressure exercised by the people of Khurasan, who were hostile to the Karamis, that the two brothers gave up their faith in the Karami doctrines. The conversion of Ghiyasuddin to the Shafi'i persuasion was the result of more deliberate thinking and was largely due to the efforts of Shaikh Wahiduddin Marwarrudi.³² The Karami scholar-priests resented this conversion and their leader, Imam Sadruddin Ali Haizam Naishapuri, a professor at a college in Afshin (Gharjistan), wrote a satire on the Sultan. The satire ran:

'There are plenty of Shafi'i merchant in Khurasan. Your Majesty will find them waiting before the palaces of all the princes. But you will search the seven climes in vain for a king who belongs to the Shafi'i sect. . . If it was necessary to change your *ancestral* faith, you might have become a Hanafi like other kings. . . By God! Imam Abu Hanifa and Imam Shafi'i will both tell you on the Day of

29 *Tabaqat-i Nasri*, 63.

30 *Ibid.*, 65.

31 *Ibid.*, 77.

32 Ibn-i Asir gives his name as Shaikh Wajihuddin Abul Fath. According to Minhaj, Ghiyasuddin dreamt one night that he was present in a mosque with Qazi Wahiduddin Marwarrudi, when Imam Shafi'i came in and led them both in prayer. Next day the Sultan asked the Qazi to deliver a sermon. Before commencing the sermon, the Qazi related a dream he had the previous night. It was in every detail the same as the Sultan's dream. This incident decided Ghiyasuddin's wavering mind and he adopted the Shafi'i persuasion.

Judgement: "It is not good to fly needlessly from one door to another." '33

It is, however, obvious that the abandonment of the Karami doctrines by Ghiyasuddin and Mu'izzuddin was connected with the extension of their power into Khurasan and Ghazni and was facilitated by the intensive religious activity initiated in Ghur and its adjoining areas by the Muslim mystics and philosophers. If the followers of Muhammad bin Karam attracted the people from Mahayana Buddhism to the Karami faith, it was the activity of mystics which facilitated transition from the Karami faith to orthodox Islam. The whole region was soon overrun by the Muslim mystics. On one side the city of Chisht,³⁴ only a few miles from Firuz Koh, emerged as a great centre of mystic propaganda and on the other side the movement of Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani (1077-1166) spread far and wide into the area. Later on the activities of Muslim philosopher-saints like Maulana Fakhr-uddin Razi (1144-1209) added momentum to these efforts at changing the religious pattern of Ghur.

Referring to the impact of the mystic movement of Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani on Ghur and its adjoining areas, Professor Habib remarks :

'For over a century, this (the Karami) sect, the most backward of Muslim sects, held the field in these hilly tracts. Then a great change came over the Muslim world. Shaikh Abdul Qadir of Jilan took the revolutionary step of publishing the esoteric doctrines of mysticism, which he in common with all mystics held to be the fundamental principles of the Muslim faith, broadcast among the Musalmans. The New Mystic Movement, if it may be so-called in contra-distinction to the esoteric mysticism of earlier days, developed with remarkable rapidity. The change inaugurated by the great Shaikh met with the approval of all thoughtful Musalmans. The mystics were organized into regular "orders" (*silsilahs*) and took to their work with an earnestness and zeal which has, in the history of Islam, been only surpassed by the fiery revolutionism of the early Saracens. Educating the Musalmans, most of whom were still immersed in the old-world ideas of anthropomorphic paganism, was as much the work of a mystic missionary as the conversion of the infidel. Now a mystic is the very opposite of a pagan.

33 Minhaj, 78-79. It appears from Ibn-i Asir that the Karamis had to put up a strong fight against the Hanafis and the Shafi'is. In 488/1095 the Karamis and the joint forces of the Hanafis and the Shafi'is staged a civil war at Naishapur (*Ency. of Islam* III, 773).

34 Maricq has now shown (*Le minaret de Djam*, 13-20, 55-64) that the 200 feet tall Minaret of Jam standing on the right bank of the Hari Rud between Chisht and Ahangeran marks the site of the Ghurid fortress-capital.

He lives by the light of his inner faith, preferring the unseen to the visible. He holds space and time in contempt and denies their reality. The materialistic references in sacred texts are explained, or explained away. God, the One, the Absolute, is the totality of Existence. There is no distinction between God and not-God; for God alone exists. The threats of Hell are as immaterial to the true mystic as the "hopes of paradise"—both are dismissed away as meaningless fears. We live for the Lord alone. . . . Even the hill-tribes of Ghur were included in the extensive propaganda of the New Mystic leaders.³⁵

Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani had tremendous powers of persuasion and eloquence.³⁶ 'His sermons are said', writes Margoliouth, 'to have effected the conversion of many Jews and Christians to Islam as well as of many Muslims to higher life.'³⁷ The Shaikh was a critic of the Karamis and there are critical references in his lectures and treatises to this sect. In his *Ghunyat* he speaks of the Karamis as still numerous in Khurasan.³⁸

Another important factor in the conversion of Ghur to orthodox Islam was the work of Imam Fakhruddin Razi (543-606/1149-1209), a distinguished philosopher, saint and scholar of exegesis. The process of converting the people of Ghur to Islam had started long before he appeared on the scene, but his discussions at the dialectical level with other Muslim sects played a very vital role in the religious history of Ghur. He had intimate relations with Sultan Ghiyasuddin and Mu'izzuddin and had lived in Ghazni for many years. Sultan Ghiyasuddin allowed him to open a school for the general public within the royal palace in Herat. His madrasa thus became a focal point for the dissemination of Muslim culture and learning in that region. It is said that more than three hundred of his disciples accompanied him when he moved from one place to another. He was opposed bitterly by the Mu'tazilites, the Karamis and the Carmathians on account of his trenchant criticism of these cults. His theological disputations with the Karamis are recorded by Ibn-i Asir and others. Once a *munazara* at Firuz Koh between the Karami scholar, Ibn Qudwa, and the Maulana led to a very serious situation and the Sultan had to ask him to move to Herat.³⁹ It is interesting that while Ghiyasuddin was patronizing

³⁵ 'Shahabuddin of Ghur', in *The Muslim University Journal*, No. 1, January 1930, 39-40.

³⁶ Shaikh Abdul Haqq, *Akhbarul Akhyar*, 12-15.

³⁷ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, 1st ed., Vol. I, 41.

³⁸ *Ghunyatul Talibin*, Cairo, 1288, I, 81.

³⁹ For an account of the Maulana's life see, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., Vol. II, 751-55.

the Maulana, his son-in-law and cousin, Malik Ziauddin Muhammad, (who later ruled in Ghur and Zamindawar with the title Alauddin), was a supporter of the Karamis. The Maulana has particularly criticized the Karamis in his *Asas-us Taqdis fi ilm-ul Kalam*.⁴⁰ 'He was an excellent preacher', writes Anawati, '... His preaching converted many Karamis to Sunnism.'⁴¹ It is pointed out by some scholars that he had exercised some influence over Ghiyasuddin in converting him from the Karami faith.⁴² The Karamis were so bitter against him that, according to Ibn al-Qifti, he was poisoned at their instigation.⁴³

THE SEVEN STARS

The Shansabani ruler, Muhammad, whom Sultan Ibrahim of Ghazni had set up on the throne, was followed by his son, Qutbuddin Hasan. It was about this time that the Shansabani princes began to show signs of imperialistic ambitions and sought to extend their authority beyond Mayandish, the principal centre of their power. Qutbuddin Hasan was killed while suppressing a rebellion and was succeeded by his son, Izzuddin Husain (1110-46), a very notable figure in Shansabani history for his sons are known as the 'Seven Stars' in the history of Ghur. An important development in the politics of this region led to an increase in the political position of Ghur. The Ghaznavid empire shrank and was reduced to southern and eastern Afghanistan and the Punjab. Ghur consequently became a buffer region between the truncated Ghaznavid empire and the powerful empire of the Seljuqs. As the Ghaznavid influence waned after Ibrahim (ob. 492/1099), the prestige of the Seljuqs began to wax and the Shansabanis were drawn towards the Seljuq sphere of influence. Izzuddin was initially confirmed in his position by Sultan Mas'ud III, son of Ibrahim of Ghazni, but in 1107-8 Sanjar attacked Ghur and Izzuddin was made a captive. This was a turning point in the history of Ghur. The Ghurids maintained close relations with the Seljuqs and recognized their overlordship by sending them armours, coats of mail and a local breed of fierce dogs as a tribute.

After Izzuddin Husain's death, his territory was divided by his son, Saifuddin Suri, amongst his brothers as follows: Saifuddin himself retained Istiya as his capital; Qutbuddin Muhammad got Warshad (where he founded the town of Firuz Koh⁴⁴ and assumed the

⁴⁰ Printed, Cairo, 1354/1935. In another work, *I'tiqadat fraq-ul Muslimin wa'l mushrikîn* (Cairo, 1356), Razi has referred to seven branches of the Karamis.

⁴¹ *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., Vol. II, 752.

⁴² Shahrzuri, *Tarikhul Hukama*, as cited by Abdus Salam Nadwi in *Imam Razi*, Azamgarh 1950, 11.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, ed., J. Lippert (Leipzig, 1903), 291-92.

⁴⁴ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 48, tr. 339. Recent excavations carried out by the French

title of *Malik ul Jibal*); Nasiruddin Muhammad got Madin; Alauddin Husain got Waziristan; Bahauddin Sam received Sanga, the chief place of Mayandish; and Fakhruddin Mas'ud was assigned Kashi. This division did not work, and Qutbuddin retired to the court of Bahram Shah Ghaznavi as a protest against this distribution of the patrimony. But Bahram's courtiers created difficulties for him. They poisoned Bahram's ears against him and assured him that the Ghurid prince was casting evil eyes on his *haram*. Bahram flew into rage at this report and threw Qutbuddin into prison and later poisoned him. This enraged the Shansabani princes and, inspired by feelings of brotherly devotion, they swore that his death would not go unrevenge. Saifuddin Suri consequently marched on Ghazni. He expelled Bahram and ascended the Ghazni throne with the title of 'Sultan'.

The people of Ghazni made outward professions of loyalty to him; he was thus lulled into a false sense of security and deceived into sending his army back to Ghur under his brother, Bahauddin Sam. As soon as winter set in, and all communications between Ghur and Ghazni were cut off, they sent secret messages to Bahram Shah and advised him to return. When Bahram reappeared in Ghazni, the people deserted Saifuddin and went over to him. Bahram now retaliated for the wrong done to him. He ordered Saifuddin's face to be blackened and had him paraded through the city on an old cow. Men, women and children jeered as his feeble cow plodded slowly through the streets. After being thus insulted, Saifuddin was later put to death.

Bahauddin Sam's blood began to boil when he heard about the treatment meted out to his brother. He started for Ghazni but died in 544/1149 of an ulcer on the way. The youngest of the 'stars', Alauddin Husain, now took upon himself the duty of avenging the wrong done to his brothers. Bahram Shah was defeated by him; he fled to India where he died soon after and was succeeded by his son, Khusrau Malik. Alauddin burnt ruthlessly the city of Ghazni and massacred the people. He earned the title of *Jahansuz* (World-burner) on account of this incendiarism. He was the first to call himself 'al-Sultan al-Mua'zzam', while the Shansabanis before him simply used to style themselves as Amirs or Maliks. He stopped paying tribute to the Seljuqs in 1152. In a conflict with Sanjar he met with a crushing defeat and was kept in captivity for some time. Impressed by his wit and

Archaeological Delegation have unearthed the city of Firuz Koh. The site has been identified with the present Jam, where a large minaret still exists. The town was destroyed by Ogatai, son of Chengiz Khan, in 1222. See A. Marieq and G. Wiet, *Le minaret de Djām. La découverte de la capitale des Sultans Ghurids (XIIe-XIIIe Siècles) & Mems. de la Delegation Archæologique Française en Afghanistan*, XVI, Paris, 1959, in which the discovery of Firuz Koh has been described.

interest in poetry, Sanjar set him free and sent him back to his capital. On his return he started the consolidation of his power in Ghur and the extension of his authority in Gharjistan, Bamiyan and the adjoining regions.

Alauddin Jahansuz gave imperialistic ambitions and expansionist zeal to the Shansabanis. Fortunately for him there was a vacuum of power in the region. The Ghaznavids had gone down; Sanjar had been captured by the Ghuzz. Alauddin took advantage of this situation and started expanding his power. A tripartite division of the Ghurid empire emerged out of this situation. The senior branch ruled over Ghur from Firuz Koh and looked for expansion westwards into Khurasan. When Ghazni was finally taken in 1173-74, another branch was established there and this branch looked towards India for its expansion. In the newly conquered Bamiyan, Fakhruddin Mas'ud was installed and he ruled over Tukharistan, Badakhshan and Shughnan up to the bank of Oxus.

Alauddin was succeeded by his son, Saifuddin Muhammad, who was killed in a feud. The next heirs to the throne were the two sons of Bahauddin Sam—Ghiyasuddin (1163-1203) and Shihabuddin, who later took the title of Mu'izzuddin (1173-1206).⁴⁵ Under them the Ghurid kingdom, according to Barthold, rose to the rank of a world power'.⁴⁶

On his return from Ghazni, Jahansuz had appointed his nephews to the governorship of Sanjah, but the efficient administration of this area by them roused his suspicions and he imprisoned them in a fort in Gharjistan. Saifuddin set them free, but they had a very hard time after their release. On Saifuddin's death, Ghiyasuddin ascended the throne. Shihabuddin was then appointed governor of Takinabad with instructions to capture Ghazni, which was then in the hands of the Ghizz Turks. After its conquest in 1173-74, Ghiyasuddin gave the kingdom to Shihabuddin. 'Though Shihabuddin's subordinate principality of Ghazni', writes Professor Habib, 'expanded into an empire, he always recognized his elder brother as his sovereign and abided by whatever orders Ghiyasuddin was pleased to give.'⁴⁷ Shihabuddin never undertook any campaign without his brother's permission.

⁴⁵ According to Minhaj the original name of both brothers was Muhammad (*Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 67), which in Ghurid dialect was pronounced as Hamad. Their mother used to call the elder one *Habshi* and the younger one *Zangl*, probably because they were dark in complexion. The titles of both these brothers were, however, Shamsuddin and Shihabuddin. After his accession to the throne, Shamsuddin's title became Ghiyasuddin. After his conquest of Khurasan, Malik Shihabuddin's title became Mu'izzuddin (*Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 68-69).

⁴⁶ *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 338.

⁴⁷ 'Shihabuddin of Ghur' in *The Muslim University Journal*, No. 1, January 1930.

III. INDIAN CAMPAIGNS OF SULTAN MU'IZZUDDIN (1175-92)

MULTAN

SULTAN MU'IZZUDDIN'S FIRST MILITARY movement towards India took place in 571/1175, when he attacked the Carmathians of Multan. Some hundred and fifty years earlier Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni had delivered a severe blow to the Carmathian rulers and had dislodged them from Multan, but soon after his death they had regained their position.¹ Mu'izzuddin succeeded in overthrowing their power again. It is not known what administrative machinery was devised for Multan by Mu'izzuddin, but the Carmathian power could never again be established in that area. However the bitterness that it left in the heart of Carmathians, who had a very effective secret organization, ultimately led them to assassinate Mu'izzuddin.

UCHCH

Having established his hold over Multan, Mu'izzuddin must have directed his attention towards Uchch. Minhaj does not mention the campaign of Uchch separately but he refers to it subsequently, when the Sultan marched towards Nahrwala (Anhilwara), as a Ghurid possession. According to Ferishta, Uchch was taken in 572/1176.² The Sultan assigned Uchch to Ali Kirmaj. It appears from the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* that Malik Nasiruddin Aitam³ was in charge of Uchch when the battle of Andkhud took place. Later on Mu'izzuddin assigned Uchch to Qubacha.⁴

NAHRWALA

In 574/1178-79 Mu'izzuddin marched through Uchch and Multan to Nahrwala. Epigraphic evidence shows that Turkish pressure had

1 *Adabul Harb*, f. 76a.

2 Ferishta, Vol. I, 56. Ibn-i Asir (XI, 77) gives an account of the conquest of Uchch which seems based on hearsay. It has been quoted by the Indian historians, Nizamuddin (*Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Vol. I, 36) and Ferishta (Vol. I, 56) with slight variations. According to this account Mu'izzuddin had intrigued with the wife of the Bhatti Rai of Uchch and had promised to marry her if she poisoned her husband. The story lacks confirmation. Besides it is doubtful if Bhatti rulers were in possession of Uchch. The probability is that it was held by the Carmathians.

3 Both the editions of *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (Habibi, I, 419; Asiatic Society, 142) give his name as Nasiruddin Aitam, but Raverty gives it as Nasiruddin Aetamur (531).

4 *Ibid.*, 142.

been felt in western Rajputana during the preceding decades. Nagaur was conquered by Bahalim, Bahram's governor of the Punjab.⁵ But the nature of this conquest was such that Shaikh Raziuddin Hasan Saghani had to change his clothes while moving in that region.⁶ Western Rajputana was thus a better known area to the Muslim soldiers than the Gangetic Doab. Mu'izzuddin thought of repeating the exploits of Mahmud and of reaching southern India and its temple-treasures through Rajputana and Gujarat. Mu'izzuddin's army must have been exhausted when it reached the foot of Mount Abu. This was his first encounter with an Indian ruler. The Rai of Nahrwala⁷ had a fairly strong army at his beck and call and a very large number of elephants. The battle was fought at Kayadra, a village near Mount Abu. Mu'izzuddin's army was completely routed in the conflict, but somehow he escaped with his defeated army from Gujarat.

PESHAWAR

The defeat of Nahrwala was a lesson in military strategy for Mu'izzuddin. If he thought of emulating Mahmud, he was mistaken. Resources, leadership and circumstances had made a tremendous difference in the situation. He revised his whole plan of operations in the light of experience. In 575/1179-80 he attacked Furshor (Peshawar), which was probably included in the Ghaznavid possessions of Hindustan at that time, and conquered it.

LAHORE

Peshawar was the first step towards Tarain. Within a couple of years (577/1181-82) he marched towards Lahore. But Khusrau Malik was too weak to offer any resistance and decided to negotiate with Mu'izzuddin. As a token of his sincere intention to maintain cordial relations with Mu'izzuddin, he sent him one of his sons along with an elephant. But this was bound to be a temporary arrangement only because the possession of Lahore was absolutely necessary to Mu'izzuddin for the further expansion of his power in the country; also in the background of Shansabani relations with the House of Mahmud this arrangement could hardly last long.

In 578/1182 Mu'izzuddin marched against Debal and conquered the whole area up to the sea coast. The Sumra ruler acknowledged his suzerainty.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁶ *Saroorus Sadur* (MS).

⁷ Minhaj says that Bhim Deo was Rai at this time (116). Epigraphic evidence, corroborated by Hindu records, however, shows that Mularaja II was the ruler of Anhilwara at this time. *I.A.*, 1877, 186, 198.

During the next three years there was a lull. In 581/1184-85 Mu'izzuddin's forces marched towards Lahore and ravaged the whole territory. Khusrau Malik was again forced to shut himself up within the city-walls. While going back to Ghazni, Mu'izzuddin gave instructions for occupying and garrisoning the fort of Sialkot.⁸ Husain bin Kharmil was put in charge of the fort. In the changed strategy of the Sultan, Sialkot was to occupy a very important place, and Mu'izzuddin wanted to strengthen it as a base of operations for further expansion in the country. Khusrau Malik, however, considered this consolidation of Ghurid power so close to his capital as a threat to his own kingdom. He mustered his available resources, and with the cooperation of the Khokar⁹ tribes he besieged the fort of Sialkot. But the siege proved a difficult one for him and he had to return to Lahore ignominiously. He had offended Mu'izzuddin without achieving anything. In 582/1186 Mu'izzuddin appeared before Lahore, determined to efface the last vestige of Ghaznavid power in India. Khusrau Malik, whose resources were meagre compared with the duties he was called upon to perform, started negotiations and came out to meet Mu'izzuddin. Undeterred by any moral scruples, Mu'izzuddin took him into custody and sent him to the fort of Balarwan in Gharjistan, where he was put to death sometime after 587/1192.¹⁰

Thus Lahore became a Ghurid possession. Mu'izzuddin now had his military stations from Debal to Sialkot and from Peshawar to Lahore. An important aspect of his conquest, which is generally lost sight of, is the consolidation of his power in Sind and the Punjab before he embarked upon a war with the Rajput kingdoms. That this whole area was to act as one unit is clear from the fact that Ali Karmakh, who was the Sipah Salar and *wali* of Multan, was stationed at Lahore. While Ali Karmakh was the military and the executive chief of the area, the duties of judicial administration were assigned to Maulana Sirajuddin, father of the author of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*; and a staff that needed twelve camels for its conveyance was assigned to him.

⁸ According to a late chronicle, *Raj Darshani*, I.O., 507 f.45 (as cited by Habibullah, *Foundation*, 35), Sialkot, which formed the boundary towards the state of Jammu, was hostile to Khusrau Malik. The Rai of Jammu, Chakra Deo, invited and helped Mu'izzuddin against Khusrau.

⁹ Minhaj, 117. According to *Raj Darshani* (f.45b) the Khokars were originally subjects of Jammu but had withheld the payment of taxes and had allied themselves with Khusrau. Upon this the Rai invited Mu'izzuddin and it was at his suggestion that Sialkot was garrisoned (*Foundation*, 36).

¹⁰ Minhaj gives three different dates for this event: 587 in 118; 588 in 74 and 598 in 27.

TABARHINDA

The next target of Mu'izzuddin was the fortress of Tabarhinda (Bhatinda).¹¹ It was occupied and put under the charge of Malik Ziyauddin Tulaki and a force of 12,000 horsemen, selected from the forces of Ghazni and the army stationed in India, was placed at his disposal. He was given the responsibility of holding the fortress of Tabarhinda for eight months—a period during which Mu'izzuddin had planned to come back again to India in order to conquer further areas and consolidate his position in Tabarhinda. Rai Pithora (Prithvi Rai III) realized the great danger involved in allowing Mu'izzuddin time to consolidate his position. His political instinct suggested prompt action and he immediately proceeded towards Tabarhinda, determined to dislodge the Ghurids from their strategic position. Mu'izzuddin instantly turned back and marched to meet Rai Pithora. Mu'izzuddin had probably not anticipated this conflict and was not prepared for a major battle with any Rajput ruler. Also it was not merely Rai Pithora who had come to the battlefield; 'All the Ranas of Hind were along with the Rai of Kolah.'¹² According to Ferishta his army consisted of 'two hundred thousand horsemen and thirty thousand elephants.'¹³ These are impossible figures.

TARAIN

The battle was fought at Tarain.¹⁴ Ferishta consolidates all Persian authorities and thus describes the battle:

'Mu'izzuddin's left and right wings were broken and not many men remained in his centre. At that moment one of the officers of the Sultan submitted: "The amirs of the left and right wings, who

11 There is some confusion and controversy about the identification of this place. In some Mss. of the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* it is given as Tabarhinda (Habibi edition, 398), in others as Sirhind (Nassau Lees edition, 118). Later historians give this place either as Sirhind (*Zubdatut Tawarikh* f. 7b) or Bhatinda (*Ferishta*, Vol. I, 57) or as Tabarhindah (*Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 7; *Muntakhabut Tawarikh*, Vol. I, 49). Dr. Habibullah's preference for Bhatinda is supported by local legends as well as archaeological evidence (*Foundation*, 57). The shortest route from Lahore to Hindustan lay through western Patiala, in which Bhatinda is situated.

12 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 118.

13 *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 57; *Ibn-i Asir*, XI, 255.

14 The location of this site is the subject of some controversy. Minhaj calls it Tarain (Bib. Indica edition, 118; Habibi edition, I, 399). Nizamuddin (*Tabaqat-i Akbari*, 38) and *Ferishta* (Vol. I, 57) follow Minhaj, but some later historians call it Nara'in. This later reading is obviously due to an inadvertent orthographical mistake in which the two dots of 't' have been reduced into one. *Ferishta*, however, makes a further statement and says that it was also known as 'Tarawari'. This led Elphinstone

have been brought up by your royal family, have broken and fled. The Afghan and the Khalji amirs, who formed the vanguard and always boasted of their manliness and courage, are not to be found on the field of battle. Under these circumstances the best course would be to turn your reins immediately towards Lahore." The Sultan was displeased at this advice. He drew out his sword and led his centre to an attack on the enemy. Friend and foe applauded his courage and dexterity. Khanday Rai's eyes fell on the Sultan and he moved his huge elephant in that direction. The Sultan also flew at Khanday Rai, lance in hand, and struck him so hard on the mouth that many of his teeth fell into his mouth. The Rai, however, displayed great coolness and courage and dealt such a blow on the shoulder of the Sultan that he nearly toppled down from his horse. At that moment a Khalji footman, who happened to observe the Sultan's plight, jumped on to his horse; and seating himself behind the Sultan, caught hold of him, spurred the horse out of the field, and carried him to the flying Ghurid amirs, who by now were twenty *Karohs* away. The Sultan's presence restored order in the remnants of his army.'

Ferishta then quotes an alternative account from the *Zainul Ma'asir*, in which it is stated that the Sultan fell from his horse but no one recognized him and he lay unnoticed on the battle-field. When a part of the night had passed, a number of his Turkish slaves came to the battle-field to search for him among the slain. The Sultan recognized the voice of his slaves and called out to them. They were overjoyed to find him alive. During the night they carried him on their shoulders by turns. Next morning they reached their camp and placed him in a litter.¹⁵

According to Minhajus Siraj: 'A number of amirs, Ghuri youths and other distinguished men noticed the Sultan along with that lion-like Khalji, recognized him, gathered round him, broke their spears to make a litter and a stretcher, and then bore him to their halting

to locate the battle-field between Karnal and Thaneswar (*History of India*, 355). Elphinstone's identification was accepted by Raverty (459, note 7), Vaidya (*Downfall of Hindu India*, Vol. III, 333) and the *Punjab Gazetteer*, Vol. I, 318. Cunningham (*Reports XIV*, 68-69) located Tarain between Bhatinda and Sirsa, and identifies it with a village called Torawana, 27 miles from Bhatinda and 20 miles from Sirsa. Cunningham's opinion has been accepted by Habibullah also (*Foundation*, 326). This identification fits in with the details given by some early historians, particularly Yahya Sirhindi who says that it was within the 'Khitta Sarsuti' (*Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 8). Since we know that Mu'izzuddin had just started on his way towards Ghazni, after capturing Bhatinda, there could not have been any other place except Torawana. But the names of villages change during the centuries.

¹⁵ Ferishta, Vol. I, 57.

place.¹⁶ The account of *Zainul Ma'asir* is difficult to reconcile with Minhaj whose information deserves greater credence. The story of the Sultan's lying unnoticed for long in the battle-field lacks contemporary confirmation. Minhaj thus states the circumstances in which the Sultan received his injuries :

'The Sultan attacked the elephant on which the ruler of Delhi, Govind Rai, was riding and was moving about in front of his ranks. . . He struck his lance at the face of the Rai with such force that two of his teeth fell into his mouth. The Rai threw a javelin at him and severely wounded his arm. The Sultan turned round his charger's head and retreated. Due to the agony of the wound, he was unable to remain seated on horseback and was about to fall on the ground when a lion-hearted warrior, a Khalji stripling, recognized him, sprang up (on the horse) behind the Sultan and, supporting him in his arms, urged the horse with his voice and brought him out of the field of battle.'¹⁷

Having defeated Mu'izzuddin the forces of Rai Pithora pushed ahead towards Tabarhinda (Bhatinda). Malik Ziyauddin defended the stronghold for 13 months but capitulated later. During this period Mu'izzuddin made preparations for another trial of strength with Rai Pithora.

MU'IZZUDDIN'S PREPARATIONS

Minhaj is too curt and brief on the preparations made by Mu'izzuddin to avenge his defeat. Ferishta, however, supplies some details, probably on the basis of some works which are extinct or on the basis of oral tradition. These details, however, fit in neatly with the character and temperament as well as the subsequent achievements of Mu'izzuddin. On his return to Ghur, where he had gone to meet his brother, Mu'izzuddin punished severely his Ghurid, Khalji and Khurasani amirs. He said nothing to the Afghans, probably because the areas inhabited by these tribes were the later acquisition of Mu'izzuddin and expediency demanded a lenient view of the crime with regard to them. Wallets full of grain were tied to the necks of the Ghurid, Khalji and Khurasani amirs and they were paraded through the city. If anybody refused to eat the grain, his head was chopped off. When Mu'izzuddin returned to Ghazni, his capital, he was so overwhelmed with a sense of grief and humiliation that he would neither eat nor drink. He did not go to his wife and

¹⁶ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 119.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 118-19.

did not change the clothes that he wore next to his skin. Day and night he spent in preparation for a major military action against Rai Pithora. All of a sudden, after a year's preparation, Mu'izzuddin took the road to Hindustan. When he reached Peshawar, an old officer of Ghur mustered courage and asked him about his destination. The Sultan told him about his objective and said that he had not allowed the Ghurid, the Khalji and the Khurasani amirs to enter his presence and was proceeding to India without them, having his trust in God. The old officer pleaded for the disgraced amirs and secured the Sultan's pardon. At Multan he promoted and rewarded such amirs as had been loyal during his absence. Isami says that on the border of Sind 40 Turkish horsemen—brave and warlike—joined his army.

According to the *Tajul Ma'asir*, Mu'izzuddin sent Qawamul Mulk Ruknuddin Hamza from Lahore to Rai Pithora in order to demand his submission. The Rai sent back a harsh reply and appealed to all the rais of Hindustan for help. According to Ferishta the strength of Rai Pithora's army was 'three hundred thousand Rajput and Afghan horsemen.'¹⁸ But it is difficult to accept this figure which is obviously exaggerated. Minhaj was informed by a trustworthy person, whose name he has given as Mu'inuddin Ushi, that the army of Mu'izzuddin at that time consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand fully equipped soldiers.¹⁹ Mu'izzuddin's army had four veteran war-lords of Ghazni—experienced, determined and dexterous—Kharbak, Khar-mil, Ilah, Mukalba. Each had under his command a huge army.²⁰ Besides them there were—Tajuddin Yalduz, Qubacha and Aibek.

The Sultan started from Ghazni in 587/1191,²¹ reached Tarain in 588/1191-92 and pitched his tent at the same place where he had suffered a serious defeat a year before. According to Ferishta, 150 Rajput rais had come to the field with Rai Pithora, determined to crush or be crushed.²²

BATTLE OF TARAIN

This time Mu'izzuddin carefully planned his tactics. He left the centre division—the baggage, standard, banners, elephants, etc.—several miles in the rear just to give a wrong impression of his strength to the enemy. This contingent was to act as his reserve force and was to be deployed only when the rest of the army had tried conclusions with the Rajput forces. Leaving this division behind, the

¹⁸ Ferishta, Vol. I, 58.

¹⁹ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 119. Isami gives the number as 130 thousand (78).

²⁰ *Futuh-us Salatin*, Madras edition, 73-74.

²¹ *Tajul Ma'asir* (Ms.).

²² Ferishta, I, 58.

rest of Mu'izzuddin's army advanced leisurely.²³ This part of the army, which comprised of light armed and unencumbered horsemen, was divided into four divisions to act against the Indian forces on all the four sides. Having thus divided his army, Mu'izzuddin issued instructions to 10,000 mounted archers to keep the enemy forces in play on the right, left, front and rear. 'When their elephants, horsemen and foot advance to attack,' he directed them, 'you are to face about and keep the distance of a horse's course in front of them.'²⁴ His object was to harass the enemy forces in this way and to keep it under the delusion that the entire enemy forces were on the battle-field. This is Minhaj's account of the disposition of forces by Mu'izzuddin. Ferishta gives some interesting details of incidents preceding the conflict:

'Inspired by their first victory with arrogance and pride, they (the rais) sent a haughty letter to the Sultan: "The strength and numbers of our army will be soon known to you, and reinforcements are coming to us from all parts of Hindustan. Be merciful, if not to yourself, at least to the misguided men you have brought hither. If you repent of your venture and go back, we swear by our idols that we will not harass your retreat; otherwise we will attack and crush you tomorrow with more than three hundred thousand horsemen, archers beyond all computation and an army which the field of imagination is not wide enough to contain." "Your message is wonderfully affectionate and kind," Mu'izzuddin replied, "but I have not a free hand in the matter. It is by my brother's order that I have come here and undertaken the hardships of the campaign. If you will give me sufficient time, I will send some messengers to inform him of your overpowering strength and obtain his permission to conclude peace on the terms that Sirhind, Multan and Sindh belong to me and the rest of Hindustan remains under your sway."'²⁵

It will be too much to put credence in this story mentioned by Ferishta. The Rajput rulers were not so wanting in common sense as to accept such a message at a time when the two armies stood almost face to face. However Ferishta thus continues his narrative:

'The Rajput leaders thought that the humility of the reply was due to the weakness of the Muslim army and went to sleep. But Mu'izzuddin spent the night in preparing for battle; and when,

²³ Minhaj, 119-20.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 120.

²⁵ Ferishta, I, 58.

in the morning, the Rajputs came out of their entrenched positions to satisfy the call of nature and wash their hands and faces, he fell upon them with his lines drawn in order. The Hindus were taken aback by the unexpected attack, but somehow or other, they hurriedly took up their arms and came to the field. The Sultan knew the fearless courage of the Hindu forces and had divided his army into four divisions, which came forward to fight the enemy by turns. When the Hindu elephants and horses attacked Mu'izzuddin's army, it fled away; but when the enemy, deceived by the trick, followed in pursuit, it turned back and with the blows of its axes relieved the bodies of the enemy of the weight of their heads. Thus the battle raged from forenoon to afternoon, when Mu'izzuddin put on his helmet and armour, and charged the enemy at the head of twelve thousand men with drawn swords and lances. The blood of brave warriors was mingled with the earth, and in the twinkling of an eye the Hindu lines began to break. At the same time Kharmil and the other amirs attacked the Rajputs on all sides and drove them away from the field.²⁶

The details supplied by Isami about the actual disposition of the armies are more interesting. According to him Govind Rai was the *muqaddam* of the Rajput forces. He fought in advance of Pithora's army; Pithora fought in the centre. The left wing of Pithora's army was under Bhola, who was the wazir; the right wing was led by Badamsa Rawal. The disposition of Mu'izzuddin's army was as follows: Mu'izzuddin himself led the centre; Kharbak was the leader of the *muqaddam* or advance-guard. The right wing was controlled by Ilah, while Makalba led the left wing of the army. Kharmil was at the back of the centre. Qutbuddin Aibek looked after the general disposition of the forces and kept close to Mu'izzuddin. The army of Mu'izzuddin which, according to Isami, consisted of one hundred and thirty thousand horsemen, had all soldiers fully equipped with steel-coats and armour. Govind Rai dashed ahead with an army of elephants and attacked Kharbak. Kharbak protected himself by putting a shield against his face and directed his archers to aim at the elephant-drivers. As soon as three or four elephant-drivers were wounded, the whole line of elephants was disturbed and it began to fly away from the field.²⁷ When the elephant line gave way, Kharbak

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 58.

²⁷ According to Yahya Sirhindi, the planning of Mu'izzuddin was as follows: 'When the elephants and the cavalry of the Hindus would fall upon one of his sections, the rest would make a simultaneous assault upon them from the other three sides.' *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 10.

intensified the pressure. When Mu'izzuddin saw the enemy ranks in disorder, he ordered a general attack from the right and left and himself led the centre. The Hindu columns gave way and took to flight.²⁸

Mu'izzuddin's tactics succeeded and Rai Pithora suffered a heavy defeat. He got down from his elephant, mounted a horse and fled from the field but was caught near Sarsuti. Minhaj says that he was immediately executed,²⁹ but according to Hasan Nizami³⁰ he was taken to Ajmer and was allowed to function for a time. But he was put to death on being found guilty of treason. The fact that he was allowed to rule is supported by numismatic evidence and also by a semi-contemporary Sanskrit account, *Viruddhavidhi-Viddhavamsa*.³¹ A few coins of Rai Pithora contain on the obverse the superscription: 'Sri Muhammad Sam'.³² This shows the acceptance of Mu'izzuddin's suzerainty by him. Even after the execution of Rai Pithora, the administration of Ajmer was not immediately taken over. Rai Pithora's son was allowed to rule for some time as a vassal ruler.³³

Govind Rai of Delhi was killed on the battle-field. But the same policy, which was followed with reference to Ajmer, was followed in Delhi also. Govind Rai's successor acknowledged the suzerain authority of Mu'izzuddin. Hasan Nizami says that the rais and the *muqaddams* of the area submitted and were allowed to continue when they agreed to pay *malguzari* and perform *marasim-i khidmati* (duties of submission).³⁴ A military station (*lashkar-gah*) was, however, established at Indpat.³⁵

28 *Futuh-us Salatin* (Madras edition), 77-78. Though no specific reference to its use at Tarain is available in contemporary records, the *karwa* was one of the most essential equipments of the Ghurid armies, and its use in the Indian campaigns cannot be ruled out. The *karwa* was a cover made of raw bullock-hide, stuffed on both sides with wool or cotton. This defensive covering protected the infantry like a wall and no weapon could pierce it. See Minhaj, 56.

29 Minhaj, 120. Isami also makes the same statement.

30 *Tajul Ma'asir* (Ms.).

31 I.H.Q., 1940, 567 *et seq.*

32 *Chronicles of the Pathan kings of Delhi*, 18, no. 15.

33 *Tajul Ma'asir* (Ms. Jaswal Institute, 97). Hasan Nizami gives the following heading to the chapter: 'Assignment of the "Imarat" of Ajmer to the son of Rai Pithora'.

34 *Ibid.*, 100.

35 *Ibid.*, 101.

IV. CONQUEST OF NORTHERN INDIA (1192-1206)

TARAIN WAS A MAJOR DISASTER for the Rajputs. Rajput political prestige, in general, and the Chauhana ascendancy, in particular, suffered a serious setback. The whole Chauhana kingdom now lay at the feet of the invader. As Tarain was a concerted action on the part of a very large number of Rajput princes, its repercussions were also felt on a very extensive scale and demoralization became widespread. Immediately following his success at Tarain, Mu'izzuddin annexed the whole of the Siwalik territory, including Hansi and Sarsuti. Having placed Aibek in charge of Kuhram, Mu'izzuddin returned to Ghazni.

CONSOLIDATION OF TURKISH POWER IN AJMER

As stated earlier, Rai Pithora, the ruler of Ajmer, was not put to death immediately after his defeat at Tarain. He was reinstated at Ajmer. But he did not continue in his loyalty and, when he was found guilty of treason, he was put to death. It appears that even after this Aibek was not prepared to eliminate the family of Prithvi Rai (or Rai Pithora) from the political life of the country. His son was placed in charge of Ajmer on condition of vassalage. The Chauhanas do not appear to have accepted this position. They drove out Prithvi Rai's son and occupied Ajmer.

The chief person who organized opposition against the Turkish ascendancy at Ajmer and the adjoining areas was Hari Rai, a brother of Prithvi Rai. He besieged Ranthambhor, which Aibek had placed under Qawamul Mulk. Aibek marched to meet him and Hari Rai, finding circumstances unfavourable, withdrew from Ranthambhor. He gave up his hold on Ajmer also, and Aibek reinstated Prithvi Rai's son.

Aibek had pressed hard on Hari Rai and had forced him to give up his hold over these places, but he was far from being crushed. The situation had not come fully under control when all of a sudden in 589/1193 Mu'izzuddin summoned Aibek to Ghazni. Hari Rai was now left free in the field to muster his resources and try conclusions with the Turks. When Aibek returned to Delhi, he heard about fresh troubles brewing in Ajmer. Hari Rai had again dislodged Prithvi Rai's son and was organizing an attack on Delhi. Jhat Rai was in charge of this contemplated military action. Aibek immediately moved forward

to check his advance. This sudden move from Delhi unnerved Hari Rai and his energetic general Jhat Rai. Jhat Rai took shelter in Ajmer, while Hari Rai put an end to his life by performing *jauhar*.

Aibek now decided upon the administrative reorganization of the Turkish possessions in Rajputana. Ajmer was placed under a Muslim officer, and Prithvi Rai's son was transferred to Ranthambhor and put in charge of that fort.

Hardly a few months had passed when another Rajput attempt was made to overthrow the Turkish power at Ajmer. The Rajput tribe of Mhers, which lived in the vicinity of Ajmer, rose in revolt, and the besieged Turkish army of Ajmer found itself under great difficulties in dealing with it. The Mhers had also sought the alliance and help of the Chalukyan army. Aibek immediately rushed to the front but he found the position extremely difficult and withdrew to Ajmer. The Rajput pressure on Ajmer began to increase and Aibek's position became extremely precarious. Timely help from Ghazni at this critical juncture saved the situation and the Rajputs were forced to withdraw.

POST-TARAIN EXPANSION AND PROBLEMS

Soon after the battle of Tarain, in Ramazan 588/September 1192, Jatwan besieged Hansi. Aibek rushed to deal with him and pursued him up to Bagar (western Rajputana) where he gave battle but was defeated and slain. Hansi was garrisoned again.

Aibek then returned to Kuhram, his seat of government, and organized his forces to cross the Jumna in order to establish a military foothold in the upper Doab. Almost all important places, including Meerut, Koil and Baran, were under the Dor Rajputs, who put up a strong defence against the Turkish invasion. Aibek proceeded from Kuhram to Meerut and occupied it in 588/1192.¹ Baran (modern Bulandshahr) was conquered at the same time. The conquest of Meerut and Baran had great strategic and geopolitical significance because from these two vantage points he could organize attacks against the Gahadavala kingdom. Later in 588/1192 Aibek marched to Delhi and occupied it.² By now Aibek had formed a sufficiently accurate idea of his own military strength as well as the resources and organization of the powers he had to deal with. Delhi appeared to him so strategically situated as to serve all his needs—both of defence

1 On page 139 of his *Tabaqat-i Nasri* Minhaj gives 587/1191 as the date of the conquest of Meerut while on page 120 he gives 588/1192. The latter seems to be the correct date.

2 Both *Tajul Ma'asir* and *Tabaqat-i Nasri* (120) give 588/1192 as the date of the conquest of Delhi.

and offence. He could keep in better touch with the Ghurid strongholds in the Punjab from Delhi and from here also he could launch his campaigns effectively against the Rajput powers. Initially the Tomara ruler was retained on the throne, but in 589/1193, when Aibek discovered that he was involved in some treasonable activities, he removed him from the throne and occupied Delhi.

In 589/1193 Aibek was summoned to Ghazni by his master. Why was he called at a time when he was in the midst of his military activities? Minhaj is silent on the point, but Isami says that some people had tried to poison the ears of the Sultan against Aibek, and had tried to create suspicions about his fidelity and loyalty. The Sultan demonstrated to them the hollowness of their reports by summoning Aibek to Ghazni. This seems highly improbable. Perhaps he was summoned in order to help the Sultan in the preparation of his plans for further expansion in the country. Aibek stayed in Ghazni for about six months.

On his return from Ghazni in 590/1194,³ Aibek crossed the Jumna and conquered Koil (Aligarh).

MU'IZZUDDIN'S BANARAS CAMPAIGN

Aibek had hardly completed his work at Koil when Mu'izzuddin arrived in India with the intention of overthrowing the Gahadavala power. He made recruitments at Delhi also and then proceeded towards Kanauj and Banaras with 50,000 horsemen. Aibek and Sipah Salar Izzuddin Husain bin Kharmil were made leaders of the van of the army. The battle was fought at Chandwar. There was a tough fight, but ultimately Mu'izzuddin came out of the struggle with flying colours. Whatever other immediate advantages Minhaj may have seen in the victory, he jubilantly records: 'Three hundred and odd elephants fell into the hands of Mu'izzuddin.' But in fact the victory was much more significant. Though the whole of the Gahadavala kingdom could not be brought under control, it provided an opportunity for establishing military stations at many places, like Banaras and Asni. There were important centres of the Gahadavalas which still retained their independence. For instance, Kanauj could not be annexed till 595/1198-99, and that too, it appears, could not be a permanent conquest for we find Iltutmish also launching an attack against Kanauj.

Perhaps Aibek had not fully consolidated his position in Koil, when he was called upon to join Mu'izzuddin in his campaign against

³ *Tajul Ma'asir* gives A.H. 590 but Minhaj (120) places it a year earlier, i.e. in 589.

Jai Chand. So, on Mu'izzuddin's return to Ghazni, Aibek turned towards Koil in order to stabilize his position.

MU'IZZUDDIN'S CAMPAIGN OF 1195-96

In 592/1195-96 Mu'izzuddin again came to India. This time he attacked Bayana, which was under Kumarapala, a Jadon Bhatti Rajput. The ruler avoided a confrontation at Bayana, his capital, but went to Thankar and entrenched himself there. He was, however, compelled to surrender. Thankar and Vijayamandirgarh were occupied and put under Bahauddin Tughril.

Mu'izzuddin next marched towards Gwalior. Sallakhanapala of the Parihara dynasty, however, acknowledged the suzerainty of Mu'izzuddin.

Aibek had to face the Mher rebellion in Ajmer, to which reference has already been made. Having dealt with that situation, he marched towards Anhilwara. He met the forces of Dharavarsha of Abu and Kelhana of Nadol at the site where a few years earlier Mu'izzuddin had suffered a defeat. Aibek gave the impression to the Chalukyas that he wanted to avoid an open battle, though in it lay his greatest chance of success. The Chalukyas came out and in the battle that ensued 'superior mobility and shock tactics decided the issue.'⁴ King Bhima II fled from Anhilwara. The city was plundered and, according to Ferishta, a Muslim officer was appointed to consolidate and stabilize the Turkish position in that region. But Anhilwara could not be easily integrated on account of several factors; in particular Rajputana, which could act as a safety valve, was still beyond the sphere of effective Turkish control. Ibn-i Asir says that Aibek decided to place the country under Hindu rulers. It was in keeping with the general policy of the Turks not to dislodge completely the old ruling families. Epigraphic evidence, however, shows that the Chalukyas forced out the Turks from Anhilwara, which remained in their hands till 1240.

In 594/1197-98 Badaun was conquered by Aibek. It appears that in the meantime the Turkish hold over Banaras had slackened and Aibek had to occupy it again. In 595/1198-99 Chantarwal (? Chandwar) and Kanauj were conquered.

After these operations Aibek turned his attention towards Rajputana. He captured Siroh (? Sirohi) and later, according to Fakhr-i Mudabbir, conquered Malwa in 596/1199-1200. But no other historian refers to the conquest of Malwa by Aibek; it must have been a mere raid.

⁴ Minhaj, 140, as cited by Habibullah, *Foundation*, 67.

Aibek then turned his attention towards the Chandellas of Bundelkhand. In 599/1202 Kalinjar, an important military centre of Paramardideva, was attacked. The siege dragged on for some time and then Paramardideva initiated negotiations with Aibek, but before any agreement could be reached, the ruler died. Ajayadeva, the chief minister of Paramardideva, started hostilities again. He had arranged water-supply from a hillside spring and was confident that it would not fail. When the Turks came to know of this, they immediately diverted the water course and cut off the source of supply. Ajayadeva had no alternative but to negotiate for peace. The Chandellas were allowed to evacuate the fortress and they went to the neighbouring stronghold of Ajaigarh. Kalinjar, Mahoba and Khajraho were then 'occupied and grouped into a military division under the command of Hasan Arnal'.⁵

MALIK BAHAUDDIN TUGHRIL

Among the Mu'izzi slaves who played an important part in the Ghurid conquest of northern India, the name of Malik Bahauddin Tughril al-Mu'izzi al-Sultani deserves particular mention. According to Raverty he was 'one of the greatest, most amiable and most accomplished of Sultan Mu'izzuddin's mameluks'.⁶ He was admitted into the slave-household of Mu'izzuddin during the early part of his reign. By sheer dint of merit he rose in the esteem of the Sultan. When the fortress of Thankar was conquered, it was made over to him. He administered it with great efficiency and took steps to develop it. In fact he was responsible for giving a forward pull to the urbanization programme of the Turks in India. He encouraged considerable Muslim settlements in that region. Minhaj writes: 'From different parts of Hindustan and Khurasan merchants and men of repute had joined him, and to the whole of them he was in the habit of presenting houses and goods which used to become their property, so that, on this account, they would dwell near him.'⁷

Finding Thankar inconvenient and uncongenial to his men, he founded the city of Sultan-kot, in the territory of Bayana, and made it his headquarters. This new headquarters was used by him as a base of operations for campaigns against Gwalior. When Mu'izzuddin retired from the fort of Gwalior without conquering it, he left the unfinished task to Bahauddin. He turned to the difficult job assigned to him by his master in great earnestness, and systematically planned his scheme of conquest of this area. He erected a new fort near the

⁵ *Tajul Ma'asir*, f. 185b; *Fakhr-i Mudabbir*, 25.

⁶ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 544, f.n. 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 145.

fort of Gwalior; it was intended to provide shelter to his army at night. After a year he besieged the fort of Gwalior. The defenders of the fort, on being reduced to straits, sent emissaries to Aibek and delivered the fort to him in 1200.⁸ This led to an estrangement between Bahauddin Tughril and Aibek. Probably there was no love lost between the two,⁹ because the rulers of Gwalior could not have thought of approaching Aibek with a proposition likely to create a conflict, if they had not known of some ill-will between them. According to Ferishta both officers prepared to fight but Tughril's death at this time solved Aibek's problem.¹⁰ Minhaj, however, pays eloquent tribute to Tughril's personal qualities and achievements. 'He left many public works as his memorials in the region of Bayana', remarks Minhaj.¹¹

MUHAMMAD BAKHTIYAR KHALJI

The conquest of the eastern region was the work of Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji, whose personality and achievements have assumed an almost legendary colour in the history of medieval India.

Malik Izzuddin Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji originally belonged to Garmsir. He came to Ghazni in search of employment. The head of the *diwan-i arz* found him 'humble and unprepossessing' and fixed a paltry amount as his salary. Bakhtiyar declined this appointment and left for Hindustan, which offered better prospects for young talent. But at Delhi also he was rejected by the head of army department on account of his ugly features. Thus rejected at Ghazni and Delhi, he proceeded towards Badaun, eager to find an honourable career for himself and determined to make his mark on the history of the times. Sipah Salar Hizabruddin Hasan Adib, the *muqta* of Badaun, took him into his service. This was, it appears from Minhaj's account, the first employment of Bakhtiyar Khalji.¹² According to Isami, Bakhtiyar's first employment was under Jaisingha of Jitur;¹³ this lacks contemporary confirmation and is improbable, though in some earlier

8 *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 24. Raverty—perhaps under the impression that such a situation could not have arisen during the life-time of Mu'izzuddin—holds that this surrender took place just before or immediately after the death of Mu'izzuddin. But, as has been explained later, both Aibek and Tughril were functioning in India as independent officers of Mu'izzuddin and under the circumstances such a conflict was not improbable.

9 Minhaj, 145.

10 Ferishta, I, 64.

11 *Tabaqat-i Nasri*, 145.

12 *Ibid.*, 146-47.

13 Probably Jaitrasingha of the Guhelot tribe is meant. He was at that time the ruler of Nagda, about 70 miles west of Chitor.

campaigns we find Afghan mercenaries fighting with the Rajput forces.¹⁴

Bakhtiyar did not belong to an obscure family. His uncle, Muhammad bin Mahmud, had fought against Prithvi Rai at the second battle of Tarain. Perhaps it was his performance there which attracted the attention of Ali Nagauri, who later became the *muqta* of Nagaur. He took him in his service, and when the *iqta* of Nagaur was entrusted to him, he honoured Muhammad bin Mahmud also and assigned to him the *iqta* of Kashmandi.¹⁵ Besides, he also conferred a kettle-drum and a banner on him as a mark of distinction. When Muhammad died, this *iqta* was assigned to Bakhtiyar. Little is known about Bakhtiyar's work as the *muqta* of Kashmandi, where he does not seem to have stayed long enough. He then went to Awadh and met Malik Husamuddin Aghul Bek, commander of the Banaras and Awadh divisions. Impressed by his gallantry, Aghul conferred upon him the *iqtas* of Bhagwat and Bhiuli.¹⁶ This provided him with a base for operations against the neighbouring areas.

Bakhtiyar supplanted the petty Gahadavala chiefs of this tract and made incursions into the territory of Maner and Bihar. The booty that he acquired in these raids—in the form of arms, horses and other materials—provided him with the necessary resources to extend the scope and frequency of his incursions in that region. Soon his reputation spread far and wide, and many Khaljis began to pour in to join his service. Aibek also heard about his ability and achievements and honoured him.¹⁷ Having thus established his reputation, he led an army to Bihar and ravaged that region. 'He had no siege-train for capturing strong Hindu forts; nor was it his policy to provoke any widespread commotion in the country. His object was to secure the maximum of booty with the minimum of risk and bloodshed. So he confined himself to scouring the open country, undefended by the field army of any organized state.'¹⁸

In 641/1243 Minhaj met at Lakhnauti one Samsamuddin, who had been in the service of Bakhtiyar, and from him he gathered his information about Bakhtiyar's exploits in Bihar and Bengal and the tragic circumstances of his death. Bakhtiyar, it was reported to Minhaj, had

¹⁴ Ferishta, Vol. I, 58.

¹⁵ Minhaj, 146.

¹⁶ The printed text of *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (147) has 'Silhat and Sihli'. Raverty has correctly identified these places with Bhiuli and Bhagwat. Bhiuli is the north-eastern pargana of Chunar tehsil; it touches the pargana of Bhagwat on the west. Both these parganas are in the south-eastern corner of the modern Mirzapur district.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 147.

¹⁸ *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, 3.

attacked Bihar 'suddenly' and with only two hundred horsemen in defensive armour. He threw himself into the postern gate of the place and captured the fortress. 'The greater number of the inhabitants of that place', writes Minhaj,

'were Brahmans, and all of them had shaved heads. They were all slain. There was a large stock of books there. When these books came under the observation of the Musalmans, they summoned a number of Hindus who might give them information regarding the purport of those books; but all the (literate) Hindus had been killed. On becoming acquainted (with the contents of those books), it was found that the whole of that fortress and city was a college, and in Hindivi tongue, they call a college *vihar*.'¹⁹

Minhaj, or perhaps the invaders themselves, 'mistook the Buddhist monks for Brahmans. According to Taranath, a 15th century Tibetan chronicler, Bakhtiyar also captured at this time the monastery-towns of Vikramsila and Nalanda and erected a fortress on the site of Uddandapur.²⁰ A Buddhist tradition tells us that in A.D. 1200 the famous scholar-saint, Sakya Sribhadra of Kashmir, visited Uddandapur and the Vikramsila monastery but found them in ruins.²¹

After this victory Bakhtiyar came to Aibek with great booty and gifts. Hasan Nizami says that he waited on Aibek on 8 Rajab 599/23 March 1203 at Badaun, soon after the latter's successful Kalinjar campaign and presented 'twenty mountain-high, blood-drinking, dragon-faced elephants . . . and many kinds of jewels and money in cash.'²² Aibek honoured Bakhtiyar for his achievements. This excited the jealousy of other Turkish military leaders. On one occasion his enemies even forced a combat upon him with an elephant. With one blow of his mace on the trunk, Bakhtiyar forced the elephant out of the arena. Aibek was so pleased with his courage and bravery that he not only honoured him but asked the amirs also to make presents to him. Bakhtiyar thereafter left for Bihar.²³

Bakhtiyar now stood on the Sena frontier. The fame of his bravery and courage reached the ears of Rai Lakhmania of Nadia. According to Minhaj, the Rai had been on the throne for eighty years, and had made an extremely favourable impression by his justice and generosity on the minds of the people. It is said that some astrologers represented

¹⁹ Minhaj, 148.

²⁰ *Indian Antiquary*, IV, 366-67.

²¹ S. C. Das, *Antiquity of Chittagong*, JASB, 1898, 25.

²² *Tajul Ma'asir* (Ms).

²³ According to the author of the *Riazus Salatin*, he consolidated his position in Bihar by establishing military outposts and by introducing military arrangements.

to the Rai that it was foretold in their old books that the country would fall into the hands of the Turks. The astrologers advised the Rai to leave the territory in order to escape the 'molestation of the Turks'. When the Rai enquired about any signs or symbols of the person who would subdue his country, they replied: 'The indication of him is that, when he stands upright on his two feet, and lets down his two hands, his hands will reach beyond the point of his knees and will touch the calves of his legs.' Reliable persons were despatched by the Rai to make investigations about this matter and they found these characteristics in Bakhtiyar. Thereupon most of the Brahmans and inhabitants of that place left and went to Sankanat, the cities and towns of Bang, and towards Kamrup. But Rai Lakhmania was not in favour of abandoning his capital and so he stayed on. But he also came under the devastating influence of superstition. Epigraphic evidence shows that in 1203 he had performed a great sacrifice, called *Aindri Mahasanti*, to propitiate the gods for help in averting the impending catastrophe.²⁴

The next year Bakhtiyar pressed on from Bihar and suddenly appeared before the city of Nadia. According to Minhaj not more than 18 horsemen could keep pace with Bakhtiyar; the main army followed slowly. On reaching the gate of the city of Nadia, Bakhtiyar did not molest anybody but proceeded onwards 'in such manner that the people of the place imagined that mayhap his party were merchants and had brought horses for sale.' When he reached the entrance of the palace of the Rai, he drew his sword and started an onslaught. The Rai was then at his meal. By the time he came to know of this development, Bakhtiyar had already dashed forward through the gateway. The Rai fled barefoot by the back-door; 'the whole of his treasures, his wives and (other) females, his domestics and servants, and his particular attendants were seized; the Musalmans captured a number of elephants, and such a vast booty fell to their lot that it cannot be recorded.'²⁵ Soon afterwards the main body of Bakhtiyar's army joined him and it was only then that the city of Nadia and the area around it was occupied. The palace was occupied by a stratagem and the city, then panicky and demoralized, was brought under control by a show of force. Rai Lakhmania fled away towards the country of 'Sankanat and the towns of Bang and Kamrup'. He ruled from Sonargaon for some years over the small remnants of his vast kingdom.

Bakhtiyar did not want permanent occupation of Nadia as he considered the place unfit for being the seat of his government. He

²⁴ *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal*, Letters, 1942, 17-21.

²⁵ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 151.

selected Lakhnauti, which was nearer to his base in Bihar, for this purpose. Both political and geopolitical considerations determined his choice of Lakhnauti. He soon realized that occupation and control of Nadia, which was in lower Bengal, was bound to be a difficult task and a severe strain on his limited military resources. That Bakhtiyar was correct in his assessment of the situation is confirmed by the fact that Nadia continued under Hindu control for many decades. Bakhtiyar consolidated his position culturally and militarily in the occupied portion of northern Bengal. A number of *masjids*, madrasas and *khanqahs* were founded in those parts and military stations were established at Lakhanor (Nagar in Birbhum district) and Deokot, and the *Khutba* was recited in the name of Mu'izzuddin.

Thereafter Bakhtiyar applied his time and energy to investigating about the life and conditions of the people and 'the mountain tracts of Turkistan and Tibet to the eastwards of Lakhnauti'. His motives in undertaking the Tibet campaign have been an enigma. It is surprising that he ignored the Hindu principalities that lay within the easy reach of his arms. When all facts are taken into consideration—the spirit of the Khalji adventurer, his movements, etc.—it appears that he was probably anxious to discover a new route—a short cut—to Turkistan. By thus establishing contact with Turkish lands, he could ensure the uninterrupted supply of men and material for further campaigns and the expansion of his territory in Bengal. Further, an ambitious and adventurous man like Bakhtiyar could even think of the possibility of establishing a kingdom independent of the control of Delhi.

It appears that Bakhtiyar had made very thorough preparations for this campaign. He had established contact with some tribes also which could be helpful in the realization of his objectives. Minhaj writes:

'In the different parts of those mountains which lie between Tibet and the country of Lakhnauti are three races of people, one called the *Kunch*, the second the *Mej* (Meg) and the third the *Tiharu*; and all have Turkish countenances. They have a different idiom too, between the languages of Hind and Turkish. One of the chiefs of the tribes of Kunch and Mej, whom they were wont to call Ali, the Mej, fell into the hands of Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji, and at his hand also the former became a Musalman.'

It was this man who agreed to conduct Bakhtiyar into those hills and act as his guide. He took him to Burdhan (kot).²⁶ 'A river, Begmati,²⁷

²⁶ A city said to have been founded by Shah Gurshasp of Iran during his legendary wanderings in the east.

²⁷ This was Old Tista as Blochmann has suggested.

flowed in front of that place and when it entered the country of Hindustan it was called, in Hindi dialect, *Samund* (Ocean). Up this river Ali Mej carried the army of Bakhtiyar for ten days, till he reached a place where there was a bridge of hewn stone, consisting of more than twenty arches.' When the army had crossed the bridge, Bakhtiyar installed there at the head of the bridge two of his amirs—one of them was a Turkish slave-officer and the other a Khalji—with troops to guard the bridge till his return. When the Rai of Kamrup came to know of this campaign, he sent a message to Bakhtiyar asking him to defer the campaign to the next year, when he offered to help him in the conquest of that area. Bakhtiyar did not accept his advice and pushed ahead towards the mountains of Tibet.

For fifteen days the army of Bakhtiyar kept on passing through the difficult defiles and passes of the Himalayas. On the sixteenth day the army reached the open country of Tibet. The area was well-populated and well under cultivation. Ultimately the army reached a strong fort and started ravaging the area. The people of the fort as well as the adjoining areas assembled to give battle, which started at daybreak and continued till sunset. Many Muslim soldiers fell on the field. 'All the defensive arms of that host', writes Minhaj, 'were of pieces of the spear-bamboo, namely, their cuirasses and body-armour, shields and helmets, which were all slips of it, crudely fastened and stitched, overlapping (each other); and all the people were Turks, archers, and (furnished with) long bows.'

At night the Muslim soldiers interrogated the prisoners, who informed them that at a distance of five leagues there was a city known as Karbattan; there were about 50,000 valiant Turkish horsemen and archers there, and they were expected to arrive next morning.

Minhaj's enquiries about Karbattan²⁸ during his stay at Lakhnauti brought to him the following information:

- 1) Karbattan had walls of hewn stone.
- 2) Its inhabitants were Brahmans and Nunis.
- 3) The city was under a *Mihtar*.
- 4) In the cattle market of that city about 1,500 horses were sold every day and all the horses which reached Lakhnauti came from that city.

When Bakhtiyar discovered the nature of the tract and found his soldiers exhausted and worn out by the march, he consulted his amirs. They advised retreat and suggested an invasion next year with better preparation. Minhaj thus records the fate of the retreating army of Bakhtiyar:

²⁸ It was in all probability Kumrikotah in Bhutan.

'When they retreated, not a blade of grass or a stick of firewood was to be found throughout the whole route. The inhabitants had burnt it all, and those who lived in the defiles and passes had moved off from the line of route. During these fifteen days the cattle and the horses did not get a *sir* of food or a blade of grass. The soldiers had to kill their horses and eat them till they came out from the mountains into the country of Kamrup and reached the head of that bridge. They found two arches of the bridge destroyed. The reason was that enmity had arisen between the two amirs (who were left to guard the bridge) and, in their discord, they had neglected to watch the bridge and protect the road, and had gone off. The Hindus of the Kamrup country came and destroyed the bridge.'²⁹

When Bakhtiyar reached the bridge, he found to his great misfortune that there were no means of crossing the river and no boats were available. Under the circumstances he had to halt at some place and construct some boats. He found an idol temple in the vicinity and sought shelter in it. He devised means for obtaining wood and rope for the construction of rafts and crossing the river. When the Rai of Kamrup came to know of these reverses he issued commands to the Hindus of the country, so that they came pouring in crowds, and round about the idol temple they began planting spiked bamboos in the ground, and weaving them together, so that it (their work) was appearing like unto walls.'

Bakhtiyar was quick to decide upon the course of action to be followed. He made a rush to break the fence and reached the open plain. On reaching the river-bank he halted with his army. Suddenly some soldiers urged their horses into the river. The water was fordable for a short distance only. As the soldiers rode further, it became impossible to swim and many soldiers got drowned. The Hindus followed them and occupied the bank of the river. When Bakhtiyar's soldiers reached the mid-stream, they all perished. Bakhtiyar and nearly one hundred of his horsemen succeeded with great difficulty in crossing the river.³⁰

The tribes of Kunch and Mej heard about the disaster that had

²⁹ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 154-55.

³⁰ 'Bakhtiyar's route on this expedition', remarks Dr. Habibullah, 'and the incidental details have long been a matter of controversy. While Bardhankuti (Bardhankot) still bears the name, the river Begmati has been difficult to identify. The identification of the stone bridge with the Silhako, discovered over the Barnadi flowing into the Brahmaputra, however, furnished a broad indication of the route. The recent discovery of a Sanskrit inscription opposite Gauhati, recording the destruction of a Turushka force in March 1206, has conclusively settled the question.' *Foundation* (2nd ed.), 76.

befallen the forces of Bakhtiyar. They made up their mind to extend a helping hand to him; particularly Ali Mej's kinsmen received Bakhtiyar and rendered him all possible help in reaching Deokot. But the catastrophe ruined Bakhtiyar's fame and career. As he rode out men and women raised lamentations and hurled invectives at him. Bakhtiyar was so deeply smitten with grief that he even gave up riding on horse back. During this adversity he used to say that perhaps some calamity had befallen the Sultan-i Ghazi (Mu'izzuddin) so that fortune had deserted him. It was true, for it was just about this time that Mu'izzuddin was assassinated at Damyak. The disaster broke the warrior's nerves and he fell seriously ill. On hearing of this calamity one of his amirs, Ali Mardan, came to Deokot. Bakhtiyar was confined to his bed at the time and nobody had seen him for the past three days. Ali Mardan reached his bed, drew the sheet from his face and thrust a dagger into his breast.

LAST INDIAN CAMPAIGN OF MU'IZZUDDIN AND HIS ASSASSINATION

Mu'izzuddin's defeat at Andkhud, which has been described already, seriously damaged his reputation. Recalcitrant elements became active in all parts of his empire and rumours of his death were circulated in order to create confusion in his realms. According to Hasan Nizami, one of his army officers, Aibak Bek, abandoned him on the battle-field of Andkhud and rushed to Multan, where he killed the governor and established his independent authority.³¹ Minhaj refers to the desertion of Husain Kharmil.³² According to the *Tarikh-i Guzida*, whose statement is not confirmed by any earlier authority but has been copied by Ferishta, one of the officers of Mu'izzuddin, Iladgiz, had even seized Ghazni at this time.³³

Rumours of this disaster had repercussions in India also. Bakan and Sarka, two Khokar chiefs, who lived in the region through which the Lahore-Ghazni route passed, created disturbances in the whole region and planned to capture Lahore. Their activities cut off the line of communications between Lahore and Ghazni. Realizing the magnitude of the problem, Mu'izzuddin himself marched to India in order to deal with the Khokars. The Khokars fought bravely but were defeated and crushed. Mu'izzuddin settled the affairs of Lahore and then, permitting Aibek to go to Delhi, started for Ghazni. While on his way to Ghazni, Mu'izzuddin halted on the Indus at a place known

31 *Tajul Ma'asir*, f. 178b as cited by Habibullah.

32 Minhaj, 122.

33 *Tarikh-i Guzida*, I, 411-12.

as Damyak and pitched his tent on a cool, grassy plot on the bank of the river. While he was offering his evening prayers, some assassins³⁴ surreptitiously entered the tent and killed him on 3 Sha'ban 602/15 March 1206 and turned the victorious army into a funeral procession.

³⁴ Different opinions have been expressed about the identity of the assassins. *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (123-24) has *Fida'i Mulahidah*; Juwayni (II, 59) gives *Fidayan*; Ibn-i Asir (XII, 82) has *Khokars*; Zahabi (*Duwal* II, 81) gives *Ismailis*. Ibn-i Asir says that when the assassins were caught, two of them were found to be circumcized. Since both the Khokars and the Ismailis were hostile to Mu'izzuddin, it is just possible that they conspired together for this murder. For identification of the place, see K. A. Rashid, *Historical Dissertations*, Pakistan Historical Society, Publication No. 30, 54-58.

V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TURKISH CONQUEST

MU'IZZUDDIN'S CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS

DIFFERENT ASSESSMENTS have been made of the character and achievements of Sultan Mu'izzuddin Muhammad bin Sam. In fact, his military career is often viewed with an almost unconscious attitude of comparison with that of Sultan Mahmud. That he was no comparison to the great Ghaznavid conqueror as a military leader can hardly be denied; his achievements in the broader perspective of Central Asian history seem less impressive. But this 'hero of three stupendous defeats—Andkhud, Tarain and Anhilwara', as Professor Habib calls him, has to his credit the establishment of one of the greatest empires of the middle ages, and in this he definitely rises above Mahmud of Ghazni. No doubt the weakness of the Indian social system, which found expression in the political and economic life of the people, had facilitated the conquest of northern India, but the contribution of Mu'izzuddin to the establishment of Turkish rule in India cannot be overemphasized. Only a military leader of great vision and tact could organize military campaigns over an area stretching from the Oxus to the Jumna, and only a careful, cautious and bold planning could hold this structure intact. The conquest of northern India was not an easy walk-over. It was stoutly resisted by the Rajput governing classes. Mu'izzuddin met all the challenges of the situation with perseverance and courage, and though most of the time he was away in his homeland, his eyes were fixed on the movements of his armies in India.

Our authorities tell us practically nothing of Mu'izzuddin as an administrator. But keeping in mind the general political and cultural climate of the period as well as the resources available to him, we may safely draw certain conclusions. Mu'izzuddin had no means of establishing a direct administration over the conquered areas. Apart from everything else, language alone would have been an insuperable difficulty. Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni had attempted no annexation beyond the Ravi, and so the area conquered by Mu'izzuddin was without any tradition of Muslim administration. But he was helped by one very significant situation. During the century and a half that followed Mahmud's military exploits in India, some Muslim settlements had appeared in northern India. A small bi-lingual minority of these Muslims must have been available to Mu'izzuddin while planning his administrative arrangements, but it was so small in number that it could hardly have sufficed for the purpose of the central, provincial

and district administrations. How to provide the administrative personnel needed to control an extensive area stretching from the Punjab to Bengal? Ghur could not give to Mu'izzuddin the men of talent he required and so he had to depend for higher commands on slaves carefully trained in the arts of war and administration. He had, however, the vision to see that a direct administration of the conquered territories in India was impossible, but if he only liquidated the top-most rais and left the rural areas and small towns in the hands of ranas and rawats, so that the change of the government was not felt by the masses, then his government could last. A necessary corollary of this situation was that the Ghurids could only control the larger towns of military and strategic importance and the great trade-routes. Besides, Mu'izzuddin realized that any alliance of the great rais would be too much for him; so he fought in a way that prevented their combination. He was content with a partial conquest of many regions and did not drive matters to extremes.

The two striking features of Mu'izzuddin's character were his dogged tenacity of purpose and his grim political realism. Twice he was defeated in India—at Anhilwara and at Tarain—but no defeat could dampen his spirits. A general of smaller stature and inferior mettle would have succumbed to these defeats. But Mu'izzuddin refused to take any reversal as final. He reorganized his forces and came again, determined to achieve the objective he had set before himself. He analyzed the causes of his defeats dispassionately and changed his policies as time and circumstances demanded. His thrust into the country from Rajputana proving abortive, he did not hesitate to change his plan. He did not plunge into political uncertainties, but proceeded cautiously and carefully, consolidating his power and taking all factors into consideration. At a time when he had to deal with many hostile powers nearer home, he never ignored the problems of his Indian possessions. When he was chastizing the Khokars in India, preparations were afoot in Ghazni for a campaign in Trans-Oxiana and a bridge was being constructed over the Oxus¹ and a castle, half of which was under water, had already been built on the bank of this river.² In fact his military strategy and planning covered an extensive area from the Ganges to the Hari Rud.

Mu'izzuddin's contribution to the cultural development of Ghur was not negligible. In fact it was he and his brother, Ghiyasuddin, who brought about a transformation in the culture-pattern of Ghur. He provided facilities to scholars, like Maulana Fakhruddin Razi, to spread

1 Ibn-i Asir XII, 138, as cited by Barthold, 352.

2 Juwayni, II, 59.

religious education in those backward areas and helped in the emergence of Ghur as a centre of culture and learning. He made some noteworthy contribution in the sphere of architectural traditions also. U. Scretto ascribes a unique type of glazed tile found at Ghazni to the period of Mu'izzuddin.³

Mu'izzuddin's conquest of northern India was only the thin end of the wedge. He was naturally unable to foresee that within fourteen years of his death the inhabitants of his homeland would be massacred by the Mongols, that independent Muslim Asian powers would disappear, and that Delhi would emerge as the sole authority that could challenge the Mongols. Simultaneously with all this a movement of tremendous impact—the organization of mystic orders (*silsilahs*)—was passing through its embryonic stages and was to sweep all Muslim lands immediately following the devastation of the Mongols. Persian mystic poetry was born in Ghazni and Herat under the later Ghaznavids, but it became a powerful vehicle for the expression of esoteric ideas and cosmic emotions with Shaikh Fariduddin Attar of Naishapur (ob. 627/1230). Not very far from Firuz Koh was the city of Chisht, in Hari Rud valley, which was destined to be the cradle of a mystic *silsilah* after its name. When Mu'izzuddin was busy planning the conquest of India, some of the most outstanding cities of his homeland—Ghazni, Herat, Jam, Chisht and Aush—were brooding over mystic ideas and preparing for a moral and spiritual rejuvenation of Muslim society.

MOTIVES OF THE CAMPAIGNS

Very often religious motives are read into the campaigns of the Ghurids. A careful analysis of all available data militates against any such interpretation. The soldiers were Musalmans, no doubt, but they were not the representatives of Islam. Besides, while on occasions religious sentiments may have motivated their actions, they were largely inspired by political objectives. The Ghurids spread their tentacles in India in the same way as they had sought an extension of their power in Persia and Central Asia. They fought the Hindus and the Muslims alike. In all probability the Ghurid armies, like those of the Khwarazmians, were made up of mercenaries. The poet, Sa'di, made it clear that the *lashkari* (professional soldier) fought for the wages he got; he did not fight for king, country or religion. The conduct of Mu'izzuddin, as well as of the early Turkish rulers of Delhi, amply bears out this view. Qutbuddin Aibek employed Hindu cavalry,⁴ and appointed Hindu

³ *East and West*, N. S. Vol. XIII/4, Rome 1962 article on 'Islamic glazed tiles with moulded decoration from Ghazni', 263-87.

⁴ *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 33.

officers. While describing Aibek's conquest and settlement of Asni in 1193, Hasan Nizami refers to his posting of ranas in every side for the administration of the people and the country.⁵ In Delhi and Ajmer no abrupt changes were made in the administration. Political sagacity, and not religious fanaticism and fervour, guided their steps. According to Ibn-i Asir, even Anhilwara was restored to the Hindu rulers.⁶

The Ghurid successes were not followed by any vindictive measures inspired by religious zeal or fanaticism. They handled the situation in the light of expediency and entered into a series of compromises without any religious partiality or prejudice. After the conquest of Ajmer, Mu'izzuddin did not take over the administration but entrusted it to Prithvi Rai's son on condition of vassalage. When Delhi was conquered, Khanday Rai's successor was allowed to rule over the territory. When the Chauhanas troubled Prithvi Rai's son, Aibek decided on direct annexation, but compensated the prince by placing him in charge of Ranthambhor.

The following account of Mu'izzuddin's last Indian campaign by Ata Malik Juwayni throws considerable light on the objectives of the Sultan in undertaking his Indian campaigns:

'Although peace had been concluded between the two sultans (i.e. Khwarazm Shah and Shihabuddin), yet Sultan Shihabuddin, in order to retrieve his previous defeat, was raising an army and collecting arms under the pretext of *ghazwa* (or holy war)⁷ till in A.H. 602 he undertook his Indian expedition, so that he might fully equip his army; for his activities in Khurasan during the last few years had cost him almost everything he had, and his troops were in a very wretched condition. When he reached India, one victory that God granted him was sufficient to repair his finances and set right the affairs of his army.'⁸

CAUSES OF TURKISH SUCCESS

Of the three contemporary chroniclers—Hasan Nizami, Minhajus Siraj and Fakhr-i Mudabbir—the first two say nothing about the causes of Turkish successes in India though they have described the campaigns. It is strange that for them neither strategy nor tactics nor any other military explanation had any relevance. 'Almighty God gave the victory to Islam', or 'Blīm Deo had numerous forces and many

5 *Tajul Ma'asir*, f. 125b, as cited in Habibullah, 252 (first edition).

6 *Al-Kamil fit-twarikh* XII, 79. A Chalukyan inscription (E 1, Vol. I, 22, 338-39; II, 439) however boastfully records the expulsion of the Turks from that area.

7 The object of this 'holy war' were to be the Qara Khitai Turks, who had defeated Mu'izzuddin at Andkhud.

8 *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Tehran edition, A.H. 1311, Vol. II, 37.

elephants and when a battle took place, the army of Islam was defeated and put to rout—such remarks can hardly be of any value. Hasan Nizami's statements are equally conventional and unhelpful. Fakhr-i Mudabbir's account of Turkish conquests is in the same strain but his *Adabul Harb* is of some help in this respect. His detailed account of the horse as the chief instrument of war and his condemnation of feudal levies reveal the strength of the Turkish and the weakness of the Indian armies from a purely military point of view. Apart from this, there is hardly any contemporary assessment of the causes of Turkish success. In fact no medieval historian ever attempted an explanation of this question.

British historians, who tried to put the history of medieval India in some perspective, have attempted to explain the success of Muslims in the 13th century. Elphinstone wrote: 'As his (Mu'izzuddin's) army was drawn from all the warlike provinces between the Indus and the Oxus, and was accustomed to contend with the Seljuks (?) and the northern hordes of Tatars (?), we should not expect it to meet much resistance from a people naturally gentle and inoffensive, broken into small states and forced into war without any hopes of gain or aggrandizement.'⁹ But this would leave the conquest of the Muslim regions by the Mongols in 1218-20, without even a battle, unexplained. Besides, Elphinstone ignores the fact that the Rajputs with whom the Turks had to contend were not, in the least, wanting in bravery, martial spirit and courage.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar's analysis of the causes of Muslim success is as follows:

- 'Islam gave to its followers (as H. A. L. Fisher has pointed out) three characteristic virtues which no other religion has inspired so successfully, and which imparted to natural soldiers like the Arabs, Berbers, Pathans and Turks, a wonderful military efficiency. These were: *First*, complete equality and social solidarity, as regards legal status and religious privileges. Thus all distinctions of caste and race were swept away and the sect was knit together like the members of one vast family of brothers. *Secondly*, fatalism, springing from an absolute reliance on God and the belief that what Allah wills must triumph over every human effort. This bred contempt of death in fighting. *Thirdly*, freedom from drunkenness. Wine drinking is a sin according to the Quran and a crime punishable by the state in Muslim countries. On the other hand, wine drinking was the ruin of the Rajputs, Marathas, and other Hindu soldiers, and made them incapable of far-sighted military planning,

conducting surprises, and even guarding their own camps with proper precaution.¹⁰

Various theories have been advanced and various explanations have been attempted to explain the Turkish conquest of northern India. The assertion that the Indians were defeated on account of their pacificism and hatred of war is not supported by historical facts. War was a Rajput 'profession' and the history of India in the 11th and the 12th centuries is one long story of internecine struggles, wars, conflicts and contests.

It would be equally unhistorical to seek an explanation of this Turkish success in the religious zeal of the Musalmans. The religious zeal of the early Arab conquerors was no longer an inspiring motive in the lives of these people. In fact many of the Turkish tribes, who came to India during this period, were not fully converted to Islam, while many of their leaders had only a very superficial knowledge of the faith. This, however, does not eliminate the possibility of religious sentiments, in however crude form they might have been, being aroused when the Turks came face to face with a people and institutions having polytheistic and idolatrous forms. But this could only have been a mere 'passing mood' and not a 'permanent objective' or inspiring motive of their campaigns.

The real cause of the defeat of the Indians lay in their social system and the invidious caste distinctions, which rendered the whole military organization rickety and weak. Caste taboos and discriminations killed all sense of unity—social or political. Even religion was the monopoly of a particular section, and the majority of the Indian people were never allowed a glimpse of the inside of a high-caste Indian temple. Thus for the bulk of the Indian people there was hardly anything which could evoke patriotic responses in them when face to face with the Ghurid invader. They watched with sullen indifference the fate of the Indian governing classes. The towns, consequently, fell like ripe fruits. Only the forts put up some resistance, but they became helpless when the enemy controlled the countryside. Had the Indian governing classes succeeded in enlisting the support of the masses for their defence plans, these forts and fortresses would have served as a fortified base of a very dynamic character by linking up all their striking force to a single state-centre. But under the existing social circumstances, these forts became a futile defence and could not protect even their own areas.

The caste system played havoc with the military efficiency of the Rajput states. Since fighting was the profession of a group, recruitment

¹⁰ *Military History of India*, 28.

was confined to particular tribes or castes. The bulk of the population was excluded from military training. The idea of physical pollution (*chut*) made division of labour amongst the soldiers impossible and the same person had to perform all sorts of work—from fighting to fetching of water.

From the purely military point of view the Indian armies had not kept themselves abreast of the developments that had taken place in the art of warfare in Central Asia. Apart from the fact that the feudal levies, from which the Indian forces were built up in the 12th century, made large Indian armies heterogeneous in character and divided in loyalties, there were basic differences in the principles on which the Indian and Turkish forces were organized, maintained and fought in the battle-field.

Mobility was the key-note of Turkish military organization at this time. It was the *age of the horse*, and a well-equipped cavalry with tremendous mobility was the great need of the time. Indian military strategy gave greater importance to weight than to mobility. The Rajputs believed in *crushing* rather than moving rapidly and striking. Huge and unwieldy phalanxes of armies headed by elephants with gorgeous trappings were bound to be signally beaten when face to face with a swift and easy moving cavalry, which could attack the flanks and the rear of the enemy forces.

This element of mobility was totally absent from Indian armies. Sir Jadunath Sarkar remarks: 'The arms and horses of these trans-border invaders gave them indisputable military superiority over the Indians. Their provisions, also, were carried by fast trotting camels, which required no fodder for themselves but fed on the roots and leaves of the wayside, while the Banjara pack-oxen of the Hindu commissariat were slow and burdensome.'¹¹

After mobility, as R. C. Smail¹² has pointed out, the second tactical characteristic of the Turks was their archery. They used the bow from the saddle and while moving. This gave them an added advantage over the heavy and slow moving Rajput armies.

IMPACT OF THE TURKISH CONQUEST

The Ghurid conquest of northern India, gradually but inevitably, led to some very vital changes in the political, economic and social life of the country. It paved the way for the liquidation of the multi-state system which had become a feature of Indian political life during the 11th and the 12th centuries. The political ideal of the early

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 26.

¹² *Crusading Warfare, A contribution to Medieval Military History*, 80-81.

Turkish sultans was a centralized political organization controlled by a monarch with unlimited powers. Feudalism with its two basic concepts—localism in administration and legal immunity of the feudal lord—did not fit in with the spirit of the new polity, and effective steps were, therefore, taken for its liquidation. The institution of the *iqtas* was employed as an instrument for breaking the feudal traditions of the various areas and for linking up the far-flung parts of the empire to one centre.

For centuries past the rais of India had been fighting each other almost every winter. Apart from the glory of killing and the joy of being killed, the only rational justification for this constant 'waste of wealth and loss of blood' could be the administrative unification of the country. But no Indian ruler had been able to give any administrative unity to northern India after the days of Harsha. And now a group of foreigners had accomplished in a generation what an Indian ruler should have realized five or six centuries earlier. They had in the very heart of northern India—and in a region not to be commended for its climate—given the country a capital consecrated by a tower. They had also given the country the skeleton of an all-India administration by bringing the chief cities and the great routes under the control of the government of Delhi. The great advantage of the Ghurids and Turks lay in the fact that (unlike the great rais whom they had displaced) they were acquainted with the fundamental conditions of an imperial (or large-scale) administration. The conception of an all-India service for the higher officers of the king and their appointments, postings, transfers, promotions and dismissals by him 'in his discretion', but after careful consideration and consultation with his high officers, would not have been possible for Prithvi Rai III with reference to his subordinate rais.

With the rise of a centralized monarchy in northern India there was a marked change in the political horizon. The political outlook became broader and the areas of isolation began to shrink. Sir Jadunath Sarkar remarks :

'The intimate contact between India and the outer Asiatic world, which had been established in the early Buddhist age, was lost when the new Hindu society was reorganized and set in rigidity like a concrete structure about the eighth century A.D., with the result that India again became self-centred and isolated from the moving world beyond her natural barriers. This touch with the rest of Asia and the nearest parts of Africa was restored by the Muslim conquest at the end of the 12th century. . . .'¹³

¹³ *India through the Ages*, 43.

Another important aspect of the Turkish conquest of northern India was, what Professor Habib calls, the 'urban revolution'.¹⁴ The old 'caste cities' of the Rajput period were thrown open to all types of people—high and low, workers and artisans, Hindus and Muslims, Chandalas and Brahmans. The Turkish government refused to recognize caste as the basis of social demarcation or as the principle of civic life. The working classes, labourers, artisans and the non-caste people and the unprivileged classes readily joined hands with the new government in building the new cities. In fact, the main strength of the early Turkish sultans lay in these cities, which placed the entire surplus of their working classes at the disposal of the government.

Militarily the impact of the Turkish occupation may be traced in the change of the character and composition of the Indian armies and the methods of their recruitment and maintenance. Fighting ceased to be the monopoly of any one caste or group and recruitment was thrown open to all properly trained soldiers, who could stand the strain of war. Thus Indian armies came into existence in which martial talent was drawn from all sources irrespective of caste, creed or colour. The practice of feudal levies was rejected in favour of strong standing armies, centrally recruited, centrally paid and centrally administered. Similarly, in the sphere of tactics the Turks were quick to bring India militarily on a par with Central Asian powers. The *paiks* (foot-soldiers) were replaced by the *sawaran-i muqatala* (mounted fighting-men), and mobility and striking force rather than heaviness and crushing strength came to be regarded as the basis of military organization.¹⁵ In fact, only these reorganized Indian forces could successfully check the Mongol inroads into the country.

With the restoration of contact with the outside world and the emergence of new 'working class' cities, trade received a new impetus. Uniformity of the legal system, the tariff regulations and the currency widened the merchant's world and facilitated movement from one place to another.

Another very important sphere in which the impact of the Turkish conquest was felt was the language of the administration. During the Rajput period the dialects and languages used for administrative and other purposes varied from area to area. The introduction of Persian at the higher level of administration throughout the Ghurid possessions in India introduced uniformity in the language of administration. Conscious of this aspect of Turkish contribution, Amir Khusrau remarks:

¹⁴ Introduction to Elliot and Dowson's *History of India*, Vol. II.

¹⁵ See also Nizami, *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics*, 86-87.

'But the Persian speech (*guftar*) is uniform in Hindustan from the banks of the river Sind to the shores of the sea. Such a great language is our medium of expression . . . and this Persian of ours is the original Persian (*dari*). The Indian dialects differ at every hundred *karohs*, but the Persian language is the same over an area of over four thousand *farsangs*. . . Here is the Persian language in which pronunciation of words is in complete agreement with their orthography.'¹⁶

In an earlier chapter reference has been made to the existence of Muslim settlements in India on the eve of the Turkish invasions. What was the attitude of the Turkish conquerors towards these Muslim settlements, and of the latter towards them? Our authorities are quite silent about the question. Amir Khusrau, however, gives us some idea of the attitude of the Muslims of the Deccan. When the army of Alauddin Khalji under Malik Kafur attacked the territory of Rai Vera Pandya, the Musalmans who were in his service fought the invader, but when the Rai decided to disappear, his Muslim soldiers had to submit.¹⁷ Nothing is known about the Muslims of the north. Had they either fought against the conquerors or helped them, the fact would have been recorded. Now since the Indian Muslims, taken as a whole, were not in the service of the Indian rais, the silence of our authorities about them seems to indicate two facts—that they took no part in the struggle on either side and that they were not considered eligible for any office of note. The only exception to this rule under the early Turkish sultans was Imaduddin Raihan and his brief career and fall is an evidence of the contempt with which the Turkish slave-officers regarded persons from 'the tribes of Hindustan'. Still the Delhi sultanat could not do without their services. Among the groups from which the soldiers and horsemen were recruited, the 'Hindustanis' are definitely noted, and this term must have included the Indian Muslims.

We cannot also ignore the language problem. All the 'state languages' of northern India at present are the product of the middle ages; in the time of Iltutmish the spoken, but unwritten, language of the people changed after every three or four districts. Turkish was too immature; Arabic was little known. The Hindus of the whole of India could only understand each other by writing in Sanskrit. The government of Delhi had no alternative but to use Persian as its official language. But the local languages of India were only known to those who had acquired them as their mother-tongue or by long residence in the region. They had no trained teachers, dictionary or grammar. It

16 *Diwān-i Ghurrat-ul Kamāl*, (Qaisari Press, Delhi), 33.

17 M. Habib, Translation of Khusrau's *Khazainul Futuh*, 90.

is inconceivable how the government of the early Turkish sultans could have operated all over northern India without employing the Indian Muslims as interpreters on a very large scale. To begin with, they were the only bi-lingual group available.¹⁸

An over-all view of the Indian situation in the 12th century leads one to the inevitable conclusion that it was the caste system and the idea of physical pollution which had held back the progress of the country and had created social anarchy and political heterogeneity in northern India. The Turkish conquest gave a rude shock to this system and very naturally enlisted the support of those elements which had suffered under the former social order. *The continuance of Turkish rule in India for a long period and the almost continuous expansion of its sphere of political influence is inexplicable except in terms of the acceptance and acquiescence of the Turkish rule by the Indian people. Had the Indian masses resisted the establishment of their rule, the Ghurids would not have been able to retain even an inch of Indian territory.*

18 After the Delhi sultanat had been stabilized, conditions became different. Prof. Habib hazards the following guess on the basis of his observation of Indians in Persia. 'Knowledge of conversational Persian is not hard to acquire for a north Indian. Persian verbs differ from those of the Indian languages, but a small percentage of nouns is the same, and the construction of sentences is similar. An illiterate north Indian (whether Hindu or Muslim), if taken to Persia and compelled to shift for himself in a purely Persian environment, can learn to express himself in Persian in six to eight weeks. A Hindu in Alauddin Khalji's Delhi could have learnt to speak Persian almost effortlessly in five or six months.' (*Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate*, 129-30).

CHAPTER THREE

THE EARLY TURKISH SULTANS OF DELHI

I. SULTAN QUTBUDDIN AIBEK

THE DYNASTIES: PROBLEM OF NOMENCLATURE

OUR PERSIAN HISTORIES divide the dynasties that governed India, or some part of it, during the thirteenth century into *Mu'izzi* (including Qubacha in the east and the Khaljis in the west), *Qutbi*, *Shamsi* and *Balbani*. This division, though genealogically correct, ignores the continuity that underlies the various phases of the government of the period. Modern writers have designated them as 'Pathans', 'Slave Kings', 'Early Turkish Sultans', 'Turkish Mameluks' and 'Ilbarites'. Since they were not Pathans for certain, the use of that appellation has no justification; as they were almost invariably manumitted before accession, it is a misnomer to call them 'Slave Kings'. The term 'Mameluk' is better as it signifies a slave born of free parents, but the connotation of slavery, nevertheless, persists. Shamsuddin Iltutmish, the real founder of the Delhi sultanate, was an Ilbarite Turk, but Aibek was not; Balban claimed to be an Ilbarite but the paragraph of Minhaj, his official historian on the topic, is so guarded as to amount to a disproof, and we have to consider Balban's claim to be an Ilbarite on the same plane as his claim to be a descendant of the mythical Afrasiyab. So considering all aspects of the question, it is better to use the term 'Early Turkish Sultans' for all the Indian rulers of the four dynasties mentioned above.

THE GOVERNING CLASS

Next to the royal dynasties comes the question of the governing class. The period, 1206-90, has a unity given to it by the monopolistic character of its governing class and even by its peculiar anarchical tendencies. Mu'izzuddin Ghuri at first appointed his highest officers from his own family and the tribal chiefs of Ghur, but they disappointed his expectations and, according to the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, he told one of his senior officers that he had based his hopes on his slaves,

who alone could shoulder his far-flung enterprises. Still he had some free-born Ghurian officers in charge of his contingents at the battle of Andkhud (1205), and owing to his unexpected assassination, he was unable to give any direction about the question of succession. The struggle for power that took place between the family of Mu'izzuddin and its supporters on the one hand, and his Turkish slave-officers, led by Yalduz on the other, will be described later. The victory of the Turkish slave-officers in the region now known as Afghanistan was shortlived, because within six or seven years Alauddin Khwarazm Shah had conquered the country and assigned it to his eldest son, Jalaluddin Mankbarni. So of all the hereditary and conquered territories of the two Ghurid brothers, the Indian lands alone remained in the hands of Mu'izzuddin's successors.

So far as the governing class is concerned, Ziauddin Barani divides the period before the accession of Balban into two parts. Though Turkish slave-officers themselves, Aibek and Iltutmish kept some sort of balance between their Turkish slave-officers and the Turks and Persians of honourable families, who had migrated to India in the hope of being appointed to high offices. It was in the interest of the crown that all high offices should not come into the hands of a single monopolistic group, which would succeed in depriving the crown of all real power. But in A.D. 1218 Chengiz Khan attacked Turkistan and Trans-Oxiana; two years later he had reached the bank of the Indus, and Afghanistan (Herat to Ghazni) lay at the feet of his officers. It was a part of Mongol tactics not to allow any Musalman to escape from the areas they had decided to subject to a massacre. Turkish and Persian fugitives to India could not, therefore, reach it by the land route, except by timely flight. But Chengiz's officers never crossed the great Persian desert (*Dasht-i Lut* or *Dasht-i Kavir*) that divides that country into two unequal parts, and southern Persia, though terrorized, was left unmolested for the time being. The Caliph and citizens of Baghdad were also allowed to live in a fancied security. A small trickle of immigrants from south Persia to the Indian sea-ports was, therefore, possible.

The successors of Iltutmish—his sons and grandsons—were not up to the mark. So long as there are noble-born officers, Barani remarks, who will consider that there is any dignity in slave-officers purchased in the market (*zar kharida*)?¹ Immediately after Iltutmish's death, his Turkish slave-officers combined to liquidate and kill all officers not belonging to their group. And since the king felt that his freedom of functioning depended upon at least a minority of non-slave officers,

¹ *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 27-28. The translation of the whole passage is given later.

they tried to put limits to the power of the king himself; and in the course of this experiment they put one king after another to death. Inevitably the country was thrown into confusion. Every Turkish slave-officer (as Barani puts it) proclaimed, 'I and none other', ignoring both his fellow-officers, the country and the king. Anarchy was the order of the day. While the Turkish slave-officers even made war on each other, the Hindu rais recaptured the strongholds they had lost during Iltutmish's reign; the great roads of the country became unsafe and Mewatis plundered the suburbs of Delhi.

One of the most active and intriguing figures of this second phase, whose career will be examined at the proper place, was Bahauddin Balban. He was a junior slave-officer at the time of Iltutmish's death. But we find his hand in every intrigue against non-slave officers and against the king. Though popularly known as the 'younger Balban' (*Balban-i khurd*), he was the power behind the throne when Iltutmish's grandson, Nasiruddin Mahmud, became king. He frustrated all attempts of Mahmud to exercise any real power and ultimately had him poisoned and ascended the throne. But as king he tried to undo the policy he had himself followed. The poison-cup and the assassin's dagger were freely used against the leaders of the Turkish slave-aristocracy, who like his cousin, Sher Khan, were an obstacle to the full exercise of royal authority. It must be frankly confessed that Balban was an excellent actor and held his audience spell-bound like a modern film-star, who captivates us for a time by imitating Alexander, Julius Caesar or Napoleon. But once the show is over, we are naturally impelled to ask what was it all about. Within the acknowledged limits of the Delhi empire, Balban did good work in suppressing recalcitrant tribal chiefs and in maintaining law and order. But that is about all. His policy of liquidating the Turkish slave-officers was continued by Nizamuddin, and ultimately Alauddin Khalji in the second or third year of his reign ordered them all to be imprisoned or killed while their properties were confiscated.

Balban never ventured to fight a Rajput rai. His excuse was the great power of the Mongols. But Halaku had died a year before Balban's accession and Balban must have known that the victory of the Egyptians had driven Halaku to an early grave and that the 'Il Khans' of Persia were no danger to a properly protected India. Judged by the standards of Iltutmish, not to speak of Alauddin Khalji, Balban failed all along the line. For all his pretensions and claims to the divine origin of his political power, he never ventured to attack a Rajput fort. In spite of his religious devotions and tears at religious sermons, he could not control his officers by public *farmans* (decrees) like a sovereign king but had to resort to the poisoned cup and the

assassin's dagger. Tughril, the rebel governor of Bengal, defeated the two armies which Balban sent against him, and Balban could only bring the province under control after a campaign of three years. A frontier officer of the Il Khan-i kingdom—a kingdom confessedly without any resources—succeeded in defeating and killing his elder son.

Though performing the policeman's duty of maintaining law and order, there is no legislation or regulation by which Balban can be remembered. That Jalaluddin Khalji, the mildest and oldest of revolutionists, should have overthrown the administration of the Turkish slave-officers, proves definitely how rickety and worm-eaten that structure had become. With reference to the accession of Jalaluddin Khalji, Barani remarks that 'since the citizens of Delhi had for eighty years been prospering under the Turkish maliks, the government of the Khaljis appeared impossible to them'.² The term, Turkish, here does not imply the Turkish race but only the Turkish slave-officers of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri, Aibek and Iltutmish and their descendants, who had a monopoly of high political office since Iltutmish's death and who used to spend in Delhi the spoils of the provinces.

THE EVOLUTION OF TURKISH SLAVE-OFFICERS

That a body of slave-officers should contribute to the establishment of an empire and for a time monopolize all high offices in it, is, from the view-point of the history of public administration, a matter of sufficient importance to deserve a digression. In the states of the slave-owners of early civilization—the Middle East, Egypt and Greek city-states—a slave had no more right to his life than tame cattle or wild animals. The slave had no legal personality and if he was killed or tortured by his own master, neither the state nor society would take cognizance of the fact. Pagan Arabia seems to have recognized the slave's right to life, for though the slaves, who accepted Islam during the Prophet's time, were tortured by their pagan owners, none of them was killed. Under Islam the chief rules regulating the institution may be defined as follows:

- (a) The Prophet's exhortation, that a slave-owner should feed and clothe his slave in the same way as himself, was left to the individual's conscience; it was obviously a principle the law courts could not enforce.
- (b) Obtaining freedom for slaves by paying compensation to the slave-owners was one of the eight objects of the Prophet's treasury, but for want of funds nothing very substantial could be done.
- (c) During the Pious Caliphate, when the

² *Ibid.*, 175.

spoils of conquered lands poured into the treasury of Medina, all Arab slaves were set free by payment of compensation to their owners. (d) Nevertheless, the slave-markets grew brisk for the non-Muslim captives, both male and female, were treated as slaves and freely distributed, sold and purchased. No Musalman should seek to defend this direct violation of the spirit and the letter of the Quranic creed—'And We have not sent thee (the Prophet) except as a mercy for mankind.' There were, however, three compensating principles. (e) It was not permitted to reduce a Muslim, or the subject of a Muslim state, to slavery. (f) When at the death of Walid bin Abdul Malik the caliphate reached its final frontiers, slavery became once more what it had been in Aristotle's days. 'The act of acquiring slaves—I mean of justly acquiring them—differs both from the art of the master and the art of the slave, being a species of hunting or war' (*Politics*, I, 8). Slaves could hereafter only be brought from beyond the frontiers, the curious law being that while a Musalman could not be enslaved by capture in battle or by purchase, the mere acceptance of Islam did not bring freedom to a non-Muslim slave. (g) *Lastly, the legal personality of the slave was fully recognized, and if the slave and his master came to an agreement that the slave would pay his master an appropriate part of his earnings, and the qazi or magistrate confirmed the agreement, the slave would be set free.*

The fact that the Caliph Umar was stabbed by Abu Lu'lu, because he would not agree to the proportion of his earning which Abu Lu'lu, a highly skilled working man, considered to be fair while the Caliph considered it to be too low, shows that this legal principle was acknowledged from the earliest times. Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya in the course of his conversations (*Fawa'idul Fu'ad*) says that the mystic, Nur Turk, lived on one copper coin a day given to him by his freed-slave, whose daily earnings were three copper coins. This legal procedure provided a means for the gradual elimination of slavery, subject to the condition that no new slaves were brought into the country. It is probably owing to this procedure that slavery has disappeared in most Muslim lands without any law for abolishing it or any compensation to the slave-owners.

However, during the early middle ages the slave-markets were brisk both in India and in foreign lands. But the mass of slaves do not concern us here.

Many slaves with capacity to organize, fight and govern, have contributed to the making of Islamic history, like Tariq, who conquered Spain, and Abu Muslim Khurasani, who overthrew the Abbasid

caliphate. But experience proved that if slaves for performing the highest duties, specially military duties, were needed, one would have to search for them among the Turks.

An attempt has been made in a previous chapter to examine the conditions which enabled the steppe society (both Turkish and Mongolian) to reach the highest military standards of the middle ages. This fact was recognized by the Caliph Mu'tasim, when he enrolled a Turkish bodyguard for the protection of the Caliph. It was also recognized by the Samanids, whose stern rules for their Turkish soldiers (summarized by Barthold from Nizamul Mulk's *Siyasat Nama*) have been quoted in a previous chapter. These rules were defective because they were purely military; the element of liberal education was completely lacking in them.

In many things of value, including the training of slaves, we have to go to the Greeks. 'The science of the slave', says Aristotle (*Politics*, I, 8), 'would be such as the man of Syracuse taught, who made money by instructing slaves in their ordinary duties and such a knowledge may be carried further so as to include cookery and similar menial arts.' The city-states of Greek slave-owners could not permit the education of slaves except for menial services as that would have meant infringing the rights of free-born citizens. But there was no need of such restrictions in Ajām during the two centuries that separate the fall of the Samanid kingdom from the establishment of the Delhi empire. The minor dynasties of Ajām and their high officers needed trained slaves for all sorts of duties, including the direction of the army and the control of the administration. For the ruler there were three legal and two socio-political advantages in assigning a government office to a trained and well-educated slave. The slave could not marry without the permission of his master; the children of the slave were, in their turn, slaves of the master and his heirs; lastly, the slave, when he died, was inherited by his master and not by his own children. The social and political advantages lay in the fact that, since he did not belong to any group of the people, he was entirely dependent on his master.

From the few figures that have survived, it seems that the price of a slave well-educated in the arts of peace and war—a slave who after a period of probation could be put in charge of a fairly responsible office—was phenomenally high. We need not be surprised to find that some enterprising slave-merchants carefully picked up a few of the most promising young Turkish slaves and trained them not for menial work, like 'the man of Syracuse', but for the service of kings and governors. These selected slaves were generally brought up with the sons of their master; but spending money on their education was an

investment that paid itself many times over, and a slave-merchant would have considered this expenditure an unnecessary wastage in the case of his own sons. They had to be taught all subjects necessary for government—the art of war, horsemanship, archery, wielding the sword, the shield and the lance; liberal education in the fine arts, Persian literature and poetry, basic Arabic and theology; court-etiquette, good manners, fluency of expression; ethics and the principles of loyalty to the master and to the throne. It is obvious that for war and administration academic instruction is not enough; a period of training and probation in actual work is necessary. But what the kings and high officers wanted were Turkish slaves to whom proper military and academic instruction had been given and who could be appointed to a responsible office after a few years of probation. To take two Indian examples. Iltutmish was purchased by Aibek sometime after the conquest of Anhilwara in 1197 and within four years we find him working as governor (*amir*) of Gwalior;³ Bahauddin Balban was purchased by Iltutmish in 1232 and before Iltutmish breathed his last (1236), Balban was a power behind the throne and a daughter of Iltutmish was in his *haram*.⁴

The Mongol conquest of Central Asia and Persia (1218-22) brought this enterprise of slave-merchants to an end, though (as has been repeated) the descendants of the slave-officers, whose number could not be increased by recruitment after the death of Iltutmish, continued to claim their monopoly of high office on the basis of the right of inheritance.

AIBEK'S POSITION AT THE DEATH OF MU'IZZUDDIN GHURI

Was Aibek appointed viceroy of his Indian possessions by Mu'izzuddin soon after the victory of Tarain or did he attain to that position later, gradually and by sheer dint of effort and as a reward for his military achievements? Dr. Habibullah writes on the authority of the *Tajul Ma'asir*: 'An occupation army was stationed at Inderpat, near Delhi, under the command of Qutbuddin Aibek who was to act as Mu'izzuddin's representative.'⁵ According to Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Aibek was formally invested with viceregal powers, promoted to the

3 Minhaj, 168.

4 *Ibid.*, 169.

5 *Tajul Ma'asir*, f.46, as cited by Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 59. The passage in *Tajul Ma'asir* (102 of Jaiswal Institute Ms.) is more rhetorical than factual. Hasan Nizami refers to the *ityalat* of Kuhram and Samana being entrusted to Aibek and then says that Aibek by his worth proved to be a worthy successor of Mu'izzuddin.

rank of *malik* and appointed *wali-ahd* for the Indian possessions in 1206, when Mu'izzuddin was on his way to Ghazni after crushing the Khokars.⁶ Both these statements retrospectively interpret a situation which arose much later. Aibek was never appointed *wali-ahd*, neither after Tarain nor after the Khokar campaign. It was a position which he achieved by hard struggle—both diplomatic and military—after the death of his master.

The administrative arrangement visualized by Mu'izzuddin for his Indian acquisitions seems to have been three (or more) independent officers subject to himself; he did not put all his Turkish slave-officers under Aibek's over-all control. Since his death was sudden, he had no opportunity of appointing an heir or of devising any machinery for continuing the unity of his empire. All we can say is that he had no trust left in any member of his family or in any of the tribal chiefs of Ghur; and that, by a process of elimination, he could only have trusted his 'slaves' to maintain his far-flung conquests. Suddenly his three premier slaves—Yalduz, Qubacha and Aibek—found themselves in a position of equality; Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji also (had he known it) had no superior left. Regarding Ali Nagauri and Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji, Aibek's appreciation of their achievements was based either on expediency or accident; he had no legal administrative control over them. Besides, the way in which the Rai of Gwalior negotiated with Aibek and by-passed Bahauddin Tughril shows that these two officers of Mu'izzuddin had absolutely equal and independent status. Muhammad Bakhtiyar's activities in the eastern region were carried on in the spirit of an independent functionary on behalf of Mu'izzuddin. When the Tibet campaign met with disaster, and Muhammad Bakhtiyar lay on his bed, broken, frustrated and gloomy, his mind went back again and again to his master: 'Perhaps some misfortune has befallen my master, Sultan Mu'izzuddin, that fortune has deserted me.' He never referred to Aibek or even thought of him, simply because he did not stand in direct or indirect subordination to him. In fact, if Muhammad Bakhtiyar had survived and consolidated the conquests of Bihar and Bengal, a real challenge to Aibek's power would have appeared.

The nebulous position which existed in India with reference to Mu'izzuddin's successor was not without obvious reasons. Mu'izzuddin was disappointed in his family, as is clear from his action in ignoring the claims of Ghiyasuddin's son, Mahmud, and assigning Firuz Koh to Alauddin Muhammad (Ghiyasuddin's son-in-law). He was also disappointed in the Ghurid chiefs, who had deserted him on the

⁶ *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 28.

battle-field of Tarain and again at Andkhud. His remark that his slaves were his sons and would succeed after him shows his utter distrust and disappointment in his family as well as in his Ghurid officers. It is in this background that the whole position should be viewed. His hopes lay in his slaves. 'Sultan Mu'izzuddin Ghuri', Minhaj tells us,

'had a passion for purchasing Turkish slaves and he did purchase a lot of them. Every one of his (Turkish) slaves earned a reputation for courage, fighting and self-sacrifice in all the countries of the east and the name of his slaves became famous throughout the world... Sultan Mu'izzuddin had purchased Yalduz while he was young, had assigned him duties from the beginning and raised him to the position of the head of the Turkish slaves. When he grew up, he was given Kirman and Sanqaran for his *iqta*... According to the Sultan's orders, one of Yalduz's daughters was married to Qutbuddin Aibek and the other to Nasiruddin Qubacha.'⁷

But Mu'izzuddin does not seem to have manumitted Yalduz or any of his senior slaves. It cannot be said definitely as to what ultimate arrangements, if any, Mu'izzuddin had in mind. Reference to the investment of Yalduz as heir-apparent in Ghazni and to Aibek as heir-apparent in India on the eve of his last campaign seem to have been after-thoughts of the contending parties, motivated by the desire to provide a legal basis in their struggle for power. The actual position seems to have been that Mu'izzuddin's death left Yalduz, Aibek and Qubacha to struggle for supremacy and decide the issue on the basis of the survival of the fittest. Aibek had, therefore, to work hard to get his position recognized.

On Mu'izzuddin's death the citizens of Lahore invited Aibek from Delhi and requested him to assume the sovereign authority. But why was he invited to Lahore when his headquarters was Delhi? This must have been due to the increasing dangers to which Lahore was exposed; Aibek was quick to realize the situation and he shifted his government to Lahore.

Though Aibek was decidedly the ablest of all the senior slaves of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri, it was only after considerable delay that his position as an independent ruler was recognized. In fact his *informal* accession took place on 17 Ziqad 602/25 June 1206, while the *formal* recognition of his authority, including probably the deed of manumission, was received in 605/1208-9. During this period of three years he had to content himself with being a malik and sipah salar,⁸ and

⁷ Minhaj, 131-33.

⁸ *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, 1911-12, 2.

could not, probably on that account, mint coins in his own name.⁹ This delay in recognition of his legal status was due to some complications in Ghurid politics to which a brief reference is necessary.

When the funeral of Sultan Mu'izzuddin started from Damyak for Ghazni, his Turkish slaves seized the Sultan's bier and his treasures, and forcibly kept away all Ghurid amirs and maliks. When the funeral reached Kirman,¹⁰ the position of the Mu'izzi slaves was further strengthened because Yalduz appointed Muayyidul Mulk Muhammad Abdullah Sanjari to escort the bier to Ghazni. Within a couple of days after the bier had reached Ghazni, a tussle started between the Ghurid amirs and the Mu'izzi slaves for selecting a successor to Mu'izzuddin. The Ghurid amirs supported the Bamiyan branch, i.e. the sons of Sultan Bahauddin Sam—Jalaluddin Ali and Alauddin Muhammad. The Mu'izzi slaves preferred Sultan Ghiyasuddin Mahmud, the son of Ghiyasuddin Muhammad and nephew of Mu'izzuddin. The support of the Mu'izzi slaves for Mahmud must have been, besides other things, due to the fact that he was the legal heir of the deceased Sultan and as such all his personal properties (including his slaves) were now owned by him, and he alone could give them deeds of manumission, which would be legal. The Ghurid nobles, particularly Sipah Salar Kharoshti and Sulaiman Shis, invited Jalaluddin Ali and Alauddin Muhammad from Bamiyan. Jalaluddin Ali quickly raised his brother, Alauddin Muhammad, to the throne of Ghazni and preferred the throne of Bamiyan for himself. The treasures of Mu'izzuddin were equally divided between them and each got 250 camel-loads of gold and jewel-studded articles and vessels of gold and silver. Jalaluddin carried his share to Bamiyan.

Though the Mu'izzi slaves seem to have submitted to Alauddin's authority, they were not at heart reconciled to it. Muayyidul Mulk, who was carefully watching the situation on behalf of Yalduz, advised him to come from Kirman. He defeated Alauddin and arrested all the Ghurid nobles. Subsequently, however, Alauddin and his supporters were given permission to return to Bamiyan. Jalaluddin came back with his dethroned brother, ousted the officers of Yalduz and reinstated him on the throne of Ghazni. Yalduz returned, invested the fort of Ghazni for four months, and succeeded in capturing the two brothers.

⁹ Except four copper coins, no coins of Aibek have so far been discovered. These four pieces which contain the appellation *Qutbi* were, according to Nelson Wright, probably issued from 'Kuraman'. *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 69, also 14-15.

¹⁰ The Kirman of Yalduz is not to be confused with the famous Persian province of that name. According to Minhaj it lay on the way from Ghazni to India and was not far from Ghazni.

An agreement was later reached and Yalduz allowed Jalaluddin and Alauddin to go back to Bamiyan. Finally, the two brothers quarrelled and Alauddin went over to Sultan Muhammad Khwarazm Shah, who took advantage of the conflict to occupy Bamiyan. Alauddin died about this time while Jalaluddin was put to death by Khwarazm Shah. Thus both the brothers whom the nobles of Ghur had supported perished.

Ghiyasuddin Mahmud, whom the Mu'izzi slaves had originally desired to place on the throne of Ghazni, was keen to have Firuz Koh when his father died in 1203, but Mu'izzuddin, who according to Ghurid tribal traditions had the authority of distributing the kingdom of his brother, ignored his claim and assigned Firuz Koh to Alauddin Muhammad, a son-in-law of Ghiyasuddin. Mahmud got Bust, Isfarar and Farah. After Mu'izzuddin's assassination, Mahmud marched to Firuz Koh and occupied it. Minhaj says that when Mahmud's power was established in Ghur, Gharjistan, Taliqan, Guzarwan, and the districts of Farah and Garmsir, Yalduz, Aibek and other Turkish slaves of Sultan Mu'izzuddin sent their messengers to his court and asked for deeds of manumission and investitures for ruling over the territories of Ghazni and of Hindustan.¹¹ Mahmud conferred upon Yalduz a *chatr* and a deed of investiture for the territory of Ghazni. When Aibek marched to Ghazni in 605/1206, he sent Nizamuddin Muhammad to Firuz Koh to expedite the grant of an investiture to him. On his representation, Mahmud conferred on Aibek a scarlet *chatr* and a deed of investiture for ruling over Hindustan.¹² This document seems to have included a deed of manumission also.

Thus it was the political situation in Ghazni, Ghur and Bamiyan which delayed the receipt of a formal deed of investiture for Aibek from the legal heir of Mu'izzuddin.

PROBLEMS OF AIBEK

In 1206 the Ghurid possessions in India comprised of Multan, Uchch, Nahrwala, Purshor, Sialkot, Lahore, Tabarhinda, Tarain, Ajmer, Hansi, Sursuti, Kuhram, Meerut, Koil, Delhi, Thankar, Badaun, Gwalior, Bhera, Banaras, Kanauj, Kalinjar, Awadh, Malwa,

¹¹ Minhaj, 89.

¹² *Ibid.*, 90.

On 140, however, Minhaj remarks that Sultan Mahmud sent a *chatr* to Malik Qutbuddin and conferred on him the title of Sultan and, in the year 602/1206 he determined to proceed from Delhi to the royal presence, and on Tuesday, the 17 Ziqad (26 June 1206) he ascended the throne in the royal *qasr* of Lahore. The implication seems to be that the deed of investiture was received in 602/1206, but the above statement is more probable.

Adwand (?), Bihar and Lakhnauti.¹³ But the Turkish hold was not equally effective in all areas. In fact in some places, like Kalinjar and Gwalior, their control had been weakened, if not actually overthrown.

The two other claimants to Mu'izzuddin's Indian legacy were Tajuddin Yalduz and Nasiruddin Qubacha. Aibek had to try conclusions with them before his authority could be established on firm grounds.

When Sultan Ghiyasuddin Mahmud confirmed Yalduz in his possession of Ghazni and granted him a deed of manumission, his position with reference to India became stronger than before, on the ground that India had been a part of the Ghaznavid empire. He could now pretend to a legal claim over the Indian possessions of Mu'izzuddin. Aibek could not ignore this development in the Ghazni politics. In fact for preserving—or for obtaining—an independent status of the Ghurid possessions in India, he had to watch the situation carefully, forestalling every untoward development.

As soon as Yalduz got his investiture, he set out from Ghazni with the intention of conquering the Punjab. Aibek marched to check his advance. Yalduz was defeated in battle and fled towards Kuhistan.¹⁴ Flushed with success, Aibek proceeded to Ghazni and occupied it. He then celebrated his success by giving himself up to pleasures and amusements.¹⁵ Considering it an opportune moment to overthrow Aibek, the people of Ghazni invited Yalduz. Yalduz's unexpected arrival in the vicinity of Ghazni made Aibek nervous and panicky, and he hurriedly escaped to India by way of Sang-i Surkh.¹⁶ The danger from Yalduz, which in the beginning seemed to have been averted, began to loom large again on the horizon. For reasons of effective defence Aibek fixed his residence at Lahore and made it his capital.¹⁷ It is difficult to explain why an experienced officer like Aibek should forget his duties owing to his pleasures at Ghazni, still (as Minhaj remarks) there was no bitterness in the struggle because Aibek was Yalduz's son-in-law. The situation completely changed when Aibek's place was taken by Iltutmish.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 127; Raverty, 491. It is significant that the historian makes no reference to the conquest of Debul.

¹⁴ *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 63.

¹⁵ *Minhaj*, 135.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 136. According to Isami (101), this was a very narrow pass which 'only one rider and one horse' could cross at a time. There are frequent references to this pass. Habibi writes it as Sang-i Surakh (meaning passage through a rock or hill).

¹⁷ *Tajul Ma'asir*, 532 (as cited by Aziz Ahmad).

EASTERN AFFAIRS

The affairs of the eastern part of the empire were also in great confusion. If the safety of Aibek's kingdom was involved in the protection of the north-western region, the eastern areas were a question of prestige. Ali Mardan's treacherous murder of Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji had provoked loyal reactions in Muhammad Shiran;¹⁸ Shiran seized Ali Mardan in his *iqta* of Narankui and put him in charge of its kotwal, Baba Kotwal Ispahani. On his return to Deokot, he was accepted as head of the Khaljis by all amirs. But in the meantime Ali Mardan won over the kotwal and effected his escape to Delhi. Aibek had a legal difficulty in the matter. The Khaljis were not the slaves of Mu'izzuddin and therefore Aibek, as his successor, had no legal title to Bihar. Ali Mardan persuaded Aibek to send the governor of Awadh, Qaimaz Rumi, to Lakhnauti with instructions to settle the Khalji amirs at suitable *iqtas*. Qaimaz assigned the *iqta* of Deokot to Malik Husamuddin Iwaz Khalji, who was in charge of Kankuri in the time of Muhammad Bakhtiyar. This offended Muhammad Shiran and other Khalji amirs, who marched upon Deokot. Qaimaz turned back and inflicted a crushing defeat upon them. Muhammad Shiran died later in an internecine conflict.

When Aibek marched towards Ghazni in 1206, Ali Mardan also accompanied him. But he fell into the hands of Yalduz, who threw him into prison. He secured his release somehow and returned to Aibek, who assigned Lakhnauti to him. Malik Husamuddin submitted to him and Ali Mardan brought back the whole territory under his control.

Aibek's attention after 1206 was diverted from the conquest of new territories to the preservation of areas already acquired. He was more anxious to give a form to his Indian possessions by organizing their administration and defining their nebulous contours rather than extending his authority at the expense of security. This could be done only if the Mu'izzi slaves and maliks were made to accept his superior authority. He tided over many difficulties, but the task was still incomplete when an accident cut short his life. He fell down from his horse while playing *chaugan* (medieval polo) and the raised pommel of the saddle pierced into his ribs. He died instantly in 607/1210.

¹⁸ Muhammad Shiran and his brother Ahmad Shiran were sent by Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji with a contingent towards Lakhnauti and Jajnagar when he started for Tibet. When the city of Nadia was sacked by Muhammad Bakhtiyar, Muhammad Shiran remained absent from the army for three days but returned after seizing about 18 elephants (Minhaj, 157).

ACHIEVEMENTS OF QUTBUDDIN AIBEK

Qutbuddin belonged to the Turkish tribe of Aibek.¹⁹ Early in his childhood he was separated from his home in Turkistan and was brought to the slave-market of Naishapur. Here he was purchased by Qazi Fakhruddin Abdul Aziz Kufi, a descendant of Imam Abu Hanifa.²⁰ The Qazi was known for his religious learning and piety and had, on that account, earned the title of Abu Hanifa, the second.²¹ According to Awfi, he was a qazi possessing *sultan-nishan*.²² He treated Qutbuddin with great affection and provided for him the same facilities of education as for his own sons, including archery and riding.²³ Qutbuddin very soon acquired proficiency in many arts—intellectual and physical. He learnt to recite the Quran in an extremely sonorous voice and so he came to be known as *Quran Khwan*²⁴ (Quran reciter). It appears that later on the Qazi or his sons sold him to some merchant who brought him to the slave-market of Ghazni. Here Mu'izzuddin purchased him and a new phase of his career began, which ultimately led him to the throne of Delhi.

Soon after his admission to the slave-household of Mu'izzuddin, Aibek attracted his master's attention by his intelligence and generous disposition of heart. One night Mu'izzuddin convened a convivial party and bestowed gifts upon his slaves.²⁵ Aibek also received valuable gifts but he distributed his share amongst the servants of the court. When the Sultan came to know of this act of generosity, he was immensely pleased with him and promoted him to a higher rank. Later on he became *amir-i akhur* (officer of the royal stables), an important assignment in those days. In the conflict of the sultans of Ghur, Bamiyan and Ghazni with Sultan Shah, Aibek had to look after

19 'Ai' in the Turkish language means 'moon' and 'bek' signifies 'lord'. This tribe was known for the charming features of its men and women, though Qutbuddin himself was devoid of comeliness (Minhaj, 137). In the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* we find at least six names of persons belonging to this tribe (*Tabaqa* or Chapter on the Shamsi maliks in which the biographies of twenty-five Turkish Khans and maliks, all of slave origin, are given in 229-324). Ibn Hajar Asqalani gives an account of eleven persons of this tribe (*Al-Durar al Kamilah*, Vol. I, 421-23). The impression that 'Aibek' means one having a broken finger is not valid. Qutbuddin Aibek had a broken finger and was, on that account, called *Aibak Shal*, i.e. Aibek who had a deformity (Minhaj, 138), in the same way as Timur is referred to as Timur Lang. Habibi's (Vol. II, 428-29) view that *Aibek* means idol, beloved or slave does not appear very relevant.

20 *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 21; Minhaj, 138.

21 Awfi, *Lubabul Albab*, Vol. I, 228; *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 21.

22 *Lubabul Albab*, Vol. I, 228. Awfi gives an account of his son Burhanuddin Muhammad, who was equally known for his piety and learning.

23 Minhaj, 137.

24 *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 21.

25 Minhaj, 138-39.

the maintenance of horses, their fodder and their equipment. One day while he was foraging for fodder, the enemy scouts arrested him and Sultan Shah ordered him to be put in an iron cage. When Sultan Shah was defeated, Aibek was rescued from his miserable plight and was brought in his cage before his master. Mu'izzuddin was deeply touched at the sight and bestowed great favours upon him. No details are known about the assignments he held subsequently.

In 1192 we find Aibek playing a prominent role at the battle-field of Tarain. He was subsequently entrusted with the administration of Kuhram and Samana and his involvement with Indian political life began in right earnest. Broadly speaking his life in India had three distinct phases: from 1192 to 1206 as officer-in-charge of certain parts of northern India on behalf of Mu'izzuddin; from 1206 to 1208 as malik and sipah salar of Mu'izzuddin's Indian possessions which were subordinate to Delhi and Lahore with informal sovereign authority; and from 1208 to 1210 as the sovereign ruler of an independent Indian kingdom. It is difficult to say which of these phases is more significant. The first was spent in military activity, the second in diplomatic moves and the third in outlining the sketch of the Delhi empire.

Aibek was a military leader *par excellence*. The conquest of northern India was as much due to his constant vigilance as to Mu'izzuddin's dogged tenacity of purpose. Mu'izzuddin planned and directed and Aibek executed his plans. At a time when Central Asian adventures frequently interrupted Mu'izzuddin's work, it was Aibek who successfully carried out his master's expansionist policy in India. So long as Mu'izzuddin was alive, Aibek could look to him for help in times of emergency, but after his death he had to depend exclusively on his own resources. He dealt with Ghiyasuddin Mahmud, Yalduz, Qubacha and Ali Mardan with great tact and used force, submission and persuasion, as circumstances demanded. He pursued his objective—the recognition of an independent status for the possessions of Mu'izzuddin in India—with single-minded application at a time when from Ghazni to Lakhnauti every part of Mu'izzuddin's empire was virtually in the melting pot owing to the anarchic ambitions of the late Sultan's officers. It was no mean achievement viewed in the context of the uncertain conditions then prevailing in the Ghurid empire.

Otherwise, also, Aibek was distinguished for his qualities of head and heart. Dr. Habibullah correctly remarks that 'he combined the intrepidity of the Turk with the refined taste and generosity of the Persian.'²⁶ All contemporary and later chroniclers praise the qualities of loyalty, generosity, courage and justice in his character. His

generosity won for him the sobriquet of *lakh bakhsh* (giver of lakhs).²⁷ As late as the seventeenth century tales of his generosity were circulating in distant Deccan, and Ferishta informs us that when people praised anybody for his unbounded generosity they called him 'Aibek of the time'.²⁸ It is a real tribute to his greatness that though his whole career in India was spent in ceaseless military activity, the impression that he left on the minds of the people was not one of destruction and damage but of justice and large-heartedness. This was due to his high sense of responsibility with reference to the dispensation of justice and the protection of the interests of the people when war-conditions had come to an end. Fakhr-i Mudabbir says that despite the fact that his troops were drawn from such heterogeneous sources as Turks, Ghurids, Khurasanis, Khaljis and Hindustanis, no soldier dared to take by force a blade of grass, or a morsel of food, a goat from the fold or a bird from the sown or extract compulsory lodging from a peasant.²⁹ Abul Fazl, who has criticized Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni for 'shedding innocent blood', is all praise for Aibek and sums up his assessment of his contribution in the words: 'He achieved things, good and great.'³⁰

ARAM SHAH

Aibek had been able to say nothing about his succession owing to his sudden death, and the Turkish maliks and amirs were suddenly called upon to choose his successor. Everything was in a fluid state and the slightest delay in deciding the issue would have exposed the infant Muslim state to the hazards of a war of succession. Acting in the best interests of the state, they raised Aram to the throne. Aram Shah was an obscure figure as he was never mentioned, even for once, during the preceding two decades of incessant military activity. Could there be no better choice? That more capable Turkish amirs were working in different parts of northern India cannot be denied, but the choice had to be restricted to some one readily available. It was availability rather than eminence or competence which led the Turkish officers stationed at Lahore to raise Aram to the throne. The throne just could not be left vacant.

Aram's identity has been a moot point. Arguments in favour of his being a son of Qutbuddin Aibek rest on extremely flimsy grounds. Juwayni categorically states that Aibek had no son³¹ and Minhaj refers only to his three daughters: two of them were married, one

²⁷ Minhaj, 137. But the lakhs were of copper coins or *jitals*.

²⁸ Ferishta, Vol. I, 63.

²⁹ *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, 33.

³⁰ *A'in-i Akbari* (Sir Syed edition), II, 198.

³¹ *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Tehran edition, A.H. 1351, Vol. II, 38,

after the death of the other, to Qubacha and the third to Iltutmish.³² The fact that in some manuscripts of *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* the word *bin Aibek* occurs after the name of Aram Shah in the chapter heading cannot be taken as a conclusive evidence on the point. It may be an inadvertent addition made by some careless scribe.³³

Since the choice of Aram amounted to precluding some of the more gifted Turkish maliks, who otherwise too had some claim to Aibek's legacy, his accession to the throne did not go unchallenged. It is difficult to determine exactly the period of his rule but it does not seem to have lasted for more than eight months.³⁴

Soon after Aram's accession the Turkish amirs in different parts of the country began to assert their right to govern independently or to select their ruler. Qubacha proceeded to Uchch and Multan³⁵ and, according to Ferishta,³⁶ occupied Bhakkar and Shewran. The Khalji maliks rebelled in Bengal and some independent rais also overthrew the yoke of the Turks.³⁷

The commander of the forces (*sipah salar*), Amir Ali Ismail, took the initiative in the matter and, acting in concert with the *amir-i dad* and some other Turkish maliks and officers, sent an invitation to Iltutmish, the governor of Badaun, advising him to rush to Delhi and occupy the throne. Iltutmish had to his credit a distinguished record

³² *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 141.

³³ As in the Mss. consulted by Nassau Lees (Bib. Indica ed., 141). Habibi's manuscript did not contain the headline (see 418) but he inserted it in his edition following the Bib. Ind. text.

But it is not only the scribes that are responsible. Later generations did not know where to place Aram Shah; so they put him down as a son of Aibek, for that would explain his election by the nobles without any consideration of merit. By the time of Isami (see 102) this had become the general belief.

In the text of his paragraph on Aram Shah, Minhaj does not say that he was the son of Aibek; in fact, the line of argument chosen by Minhaj assumes that Aram was not Aibek's son: 'When Sultan Qutbuddin was called to the mercy of God, the maliks and amirs of Hindustan considered it advisable as an immediate step to raise Aram Shah to the throne in order to prevent disturbances and to bring peace to the heart of the ra'yyat and the soldiers. Qutbuddin had three daughters... Qutbuddin had looked upon Iltutmish as the next ruler. He used to call him his son and gave him Badaun as his *iqta*. The maliks unanimously called him from Badaun and enthroned him at Delhi and a daughter of Aibek became his wife.' (141)

³⁴ No coin of Aram Shah has been discovered so far. Edward Thomas (*Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 40) and Longworth Dames (J.R.A.S., April 1908, 'The Mint of Kuraman') have ascribed some coins to him, but Nelson Wright has pointed out that Thomas mistook the coins of Bahram Shah and Dames a coin of Iltutmish for the coins of Aram Shah. (*The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 69).

³⁵ Minhaj, 141.

³⁶ Ferishta, Vol. I, 64.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

of service to the Turkish government in India and, besides consideration of his personal merits, the choice was guided by the fact that Aibek used to address him as 'son' and had assigned the *iqta* of Badaun to him, which was interpreted as an indication of his desire to nominate Iltutmish as his successor. Iltutmish quickly responded to the invitation and marched to Delhi, where he established himself without any difficulty. The occupation of Delhi provided Iltutmish with a strategic place for guarding his interests effectively in all directions.

Aram collected a strong force from Amroha and marched to Delhi in order to dislodge Iltutmish, but in the conflict that followed he was utterly routed. His two important Turkish leaders, Aqsanqar and Farrukh Shah, were killed on the field; Aram Shah himself was caught and slain. The liquidation of Aram Shah and his small group of supporters removed the first hurdle in the way of Iltutmish. But other Turkish amirs also questioned his authority, and though Minhaj does not give us all the details, the following statements of his are worth noting:

'When the Turks and the Mu'izzi amirs collected at Delhi, some of them would not agree with the rest; they went out of Delhi, collected together and planned mischief and rebellion. Sultan Shamsuddin went out of Delhi with the horsemen of the centre and his special troops, defeated them in the plain of Jud and ordered the heads of most of them to be cut off... On several other occasions also there were conflicts between him and "the Turks and amirs", but Divine help came to his assistance, and every one who opposed him or rebelled against him was overpowered.'

Minhaj then proceeds to tell us that Iltutmish established his power over the land that had been governed by Aibek—the territories of Delhi, Badaun, Awadh, Banaras and the whole of the Siwalik region. It must not be imagined that Hindu rais had recovered these cities. Iltutmish got them from the Turks and Mu'izzi amirs, who were opposed to him.³⁸

II. SULTAN SHAMSUDDIN ILTUTMISH

CONTROVERSY ABOUT ILTUTMISH'S NAME

THERE HAS BEEN considerable controversy during the last several decades regarding the pronunciation and the orthography of the Sultan's name. Contemporary Persian texts—*Tajul Ma'asir*, *Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah*, *Adabul Harb* and *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*—as well as the inscriptions on buildings and coins have been differently read and differently interpreted by different writers. Elphinstone spelt the name as 'Altamish';¹ Elliot as 'Altamsh';² and Raverty as 'Iyal-timish'.³ In 1907 Barthold suggested that the word was really 'Iltutmish'—'maintainer of the kingdom'⁴ and advanced convincing arguments in support of his view.⁵ He pointed out that the reading 'tut' was supported by a very fine manuscript of the *Tajul Ma'asir* (dated A.H. 829) in the university library of St. Petersburg, in which the 'U' vowel is shown. Barthold's view was confirmed by other sources also. For instance, many Persian verses of contemporary poets, in which the name of the Sultan occurs, rhyme properly only when it is pronounced as Iltutmish.⁶

During the last fifty years or so the name of the Sultan has been written as Iltutmish.⁷ In 1950, however, a Turkish writer, Hikmet

1 *History of India*, 5th ed. 1866, 371.

2 Elliot & Dowson, 320.

3 On page 597, Raverty remarks: 'My oldest Ms. gives the diacritical points. The first part of this compound word, which it evidently is, is the same as in I-yal-Arsalan, I-yal-duz, etc.; and the latter part of it is the same as occurs in Kaltimish and the like.'

4 Badauni's remark (*Muntakhabut Tawarikh*, Vol. I, 62) that the Sultan was so called because he was born on a night during an eclipse has led some scholars to attempt far-fetched linguistic interpretations of the word 'Iltutmish'. For Redhouse's explanation see Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 44.

It is absolutely clear from some verses of Amir Khusrau (*Dibacha Diwan-i Ghurra-tul Kamal*, 68; *Dawal Rani Khizr Khan*, 48) and a verse of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya quoted by Amir Hasan (*Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 156) that the word Iltutmish was synonymous with *alamgir* and *jahangir* (meaning world-conqueror).

5 ZDMG, 1907, 192.

6 For instance note the following verse of Minhaj: *An Shahinsha-i ki Hatim bazi o Rustam kushish ast/Nasir-ud dunya wa din Mahmud bin Iltutmish ast*/(*Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 202).

Verses found in the works of Tajuddin Reza and Shihabuddin Muhmara confirm this reading.

7 J. A. Boyle (tr. of *Tarikh-i Janan Gusha*, Vol. I, 328) prefers to write it as Il-Tutmish.

Bayur, discussed the entire question afresh and came to the conclusion that the name is *Iletmish*.⁸ It appears that Orientalists, particularly the editors of the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, have accepted Bayur's view. Habibi has given two extensive notes on this problem,⁹ but he does not seem to be aware of Bayur's view. His opinion that the Sultan's name was written by contemporaries—in books, inscriptions and coins—in a variety of ways, seems based on a careful scrutiny of the available data but no reasons have been given by him for this diversity. While the philological investigations of the Turkish and European scholars on this point are highly valuable—we being in no position to express any opinion about the linguistic aspects—it is difficult to accept any new form of the name of the Sultan unless it fits in with the rhyme requirements of the verses found in contemporary works and the Sultan's surviving inscriptions.¹⁰ We are only concerned with the way in which the Sultan himself and his contemporaries pronounced and wrote his name.

EARLY LIFE OF ILTUTMISH

Iltutmish belonged to the Ilbari tribe of the Turks. His father, Ilam Khan, was a leader of his tribe and had 'numerous kindred, relations, dependants and followers'.¹¹ Iltutmish was thus born in fairly affluent circumstances, and nature had endowed him with attractive features and sharp intelligence besides temperamental qualities of a very high degree.¹² In a tribal family consisting of a large number of brothers, half-brothers, cousins and others, he could hardly escape the jealousy of those less gifted. His brothers persuaded their father, who usually did not allow Iltutmish to go out, to permit him to accompany them to a horse-show. There they forcibly sold him to a slave-dealer. Thus cut off from his family, Iltutmish had to be at the mercy of slave-dealers for many years. He was brought to Bukhara and sold to a kinsman of the *Sadr-i Jahan* of that place. This was a respectable family and Iltutmish was treated well here. One very

⁸ *Belleten*, Ankara, Vol. XIV, no. 56, 567-88.

⁹ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (Habibi's edition), Vol. II, 376-78; 417-18.

¹⁰ His name on the Qutb Minar appears as Iltutmish (on the second storey), Iltutmish al-Qutbi (on the doorway) and Iltutmish al-Sultan (on the third storey). See *List of Muhammadan and Hindu Monuments*, Calcutta 1919-22, Vol. II, 5-6.

For numismatic evidence on the point see Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 69-71.

¹¹ Minhaj, 166-67. Minhaj's account seems to be modelled on the Quranic history of Hazrat Yusuf (Joseph) and he quotes one or two Quranic verses. But that is no reason for disbelieving the fact that Iltutmish belonged to an affluent Ilbarite Turkish family and was sold to slave-dealers.

¹² *Ibid.*, 168; *Tarikh-i Jahan Gushu* II, 38.

interesting incident of his life during his stay in this family was thus narrated by him :

'Once a member of this family gave me a small piece of money and said: "Go to the market and bring me some grapes." I lost the money in the way and as I was of tender age at that time, I began to cry out of fear. . . A *durwesh* took me by the hand, and purchased some grapes for me. He then asked, "When you attain to power and dominion will you always regard devotees and ascetics with reverence, and watch over their welfare?" I gave him my promise.'¹³

From the family of the *Sadr-i Jahan*, Iltutmish passed into the hands of a slave merchant known as Bukhara Haji. Subsequently another merchant, Jamaluddin Muhammad Chust Qaba, purchased him and brought him to Ghazni.¹⁴

It appears from Isami¹⁵ and other works¹⁶ that Iltutmish passed some of his time also at Baghdad which was having its last spurt of cultural florescence before being given a blood-bath by the Mongols. Here he came into contact with Shaikh Shihabuddin Suhrawardi, the famous author of the *Awarif ul Ma'arif*, Shaikh Auhaduddin Kirmani and other eminent saints of the period.¹⁷ This contact with mystics left a deep impact on his young mind and the mystic literature of the early period contains a number of anecdotes bearing on his interest in mystics and mysticism.¹⁸

When Jamaluddin Chust Qaba brought him to the slave-market of Ghazni, he attracted the attention of the entire market on account of his charming features and intelligent looks. His arrival was reported to Sultan Mu'izzuddin and the Sultan offered 1,000 gold coins for Iltutmish and one other slave, Tamghaj Aibek, who was put up with him.¹⁹ Jamaluddin declined the offer and the Sultan prohibited their sale in Ghazni. After staying a year in Ghazni, Jamaluddin proceeded to Bukhara, where he stayed for three years. Subsequently he came to Ghazni and had been there for about a year, when Qutbuddin Aibek,

13 Minhaj, 167.

14 *Ibid.*, 168. 'Chust Qaba' may have been a family name, for Minhaj tells us that, during the days when he was governor of Badaun, Iltutmish purchased Malik Saifuddin Aibek 'Yaghan Tut' from the heirs of one Ikhtiyaruddin Chust Qaba.

15 *Futuh-us Salatin*, Madras ed., 119.

16 *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 212; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Vol. I, 62; *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 60-62.

17 *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 212.

18 See Nizami, *Studies in Medieval Indian History and Culture*, chapter on 'The Religious Life and Leanings of Iltutmish'; also *Islamic Culture*, April 1946.

19 Minhaj has: *hazar dinar zar Rukni* (168). *Rukni* might mean pure. See Hodivala, *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, Supp. Vol. II, 57.

accompanied by Malik Nasiruddin Husain, came to Ghazni after his Gujarat campaign.²⁰ He was attracted by Iltutmish and solicited the permission of Mu'izzuddin to purchase him. The Sultan replied: 'Since his sale in Ghazni has been prohibited, let them take him to the city of Delhi and there he can be sold.'²¹ Aibek gave the necessary direction to Jamaluddin Chust Qaba and it was in Delhi that Iltutmish was purchased along with Tamghaj for a hundred thousand *jitals*.²² Tamghaj rose to be the *muqta* of Tabarhinda and lost his life in the battle between Qutbuddin and Yalduz.

What initial training had been given to Iltutmish cannot be ascertained with certainty but he was well educated. It appears from Minhaj that he was made *sar-jandar* (head of the bodyguard) almost straight away. This was unusual, because it was an important assignment and could not be given to a slave fresh from the market. However, Minhaj definitely says that Qutbuddin found him endowed with laudable qualities, and promoted him from one position to another until he was made *amir-i shikar*.²³ After the conquest of Gwalior (597/1200), he was appointed amir of that town. It means that within four years Iltutmish got an *iqta* to rule. Subsequently he got the *iqta* of Baran and its dependencies. He administered these areas efficiently, and pleased with his performance Qutbuddin entrusted to him the *iqta* of Badaun which, as Raverty points out, 'was the highest in the Delhi kingdom.'²⁴

When Mu'izzuddin marched from Ghazni to chastize the Khokars in 1205-6, he summoned the forces of Delhi also and Iltutmish accompanied Aibek with the Badaun contingent. Iltutmish displayed remarkable courage and zeal on this occasion. He drove the Khokars into the Jhelum, chased them to the middle of the river and started killing them there. Mu'izzuddin watched his heroic performance with

20 Minhaj, 168. Minhaj does not give the year of Aibek's arrival.

21 *Ibid.*, 168. This incident, apart from everything else, throws a significant light on the position of merchants in the empire of Mu'izzuddin. All that the Sultan could do was to ban the sale of the slave to the citizens of Ghazni; he neither expelled Jamaluddin from Ghazni nor banned his re-entry; and Chust Qaba felt so safe in Ghazni that despite the fact that the Sultan was displeased with him he came back again to transact business there.

22 It is difficult to calculate this amount in terms of modern currency. Dr. Aziz Ahmad's estimate, on the basis of the statistical information supplied by N. Wright (*The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 72-75), is that one lakh *jitals* would be equal to Rs. 2,083/5/- (*Early Turkish Empire of Delhi*, 161).

23 Incidentally, Iltutmish's appointment to these offices during the life-time of Mu'izzuddin shows that even the slaves of Mu'izzuddin obtained and maintained offices which had been considered the exclusive privileges of a medieval ruler.

24 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, Eng. tr., 604.

admiration and enquired about him. Subsequently he conferred a special robe of honour on Iltutmish and advised Aibek to treat him well 'for he will distinguish himself.'²⁵ He further ordered a deed for his manumission to be drawn up.²⁶ This was a unique honour. While Mu'izzuddin had not manumitted even his senior slaves, like Yalduz, Aibek and Qubacha, he manumitted Iltutmish, a slave of his slave. Thus Iltutmish was a free man even before Aibek was manumitted. Perhaps Iltutmish's manumission was not properly publicized because on his accession a deputation of the ulama headed by Qazi Wajihuddin Kashani, waited upon him to find out if he had obtained a deed of manumission.²⁷

THE PROBLEMS FACING ILTUTMISH

Iltutmish had to face great difficulties, both domestic and foreign, on his accession to the throne. The way in which he established his power over the former kingdom of Qutbuddin Aibek by crushing all rivals, both Mu'izzi amirs and Turkish slave-officers, has already been explained. But there were still three powerful potentates—Yalduz in Ghazni, Qubacha in Multan and Ali Mardan in Lakhnauti—with whom Iltutmish had to define the basis of his relationship. They had to be either accepted or liquidated; acceptance was tantamount to signing the death-warrant of the Delhi sultanat and liquidation was not possible without careful planning and the mobilization of all resources. The Hindu chieftains of Jalor and Ranthambhor had overthrown the yoke of the Turks and there was a general loosening in the control of Delhi over the different areas of the empire. After Iltutmish had suppressed his rival amirs, Yalduz sent him a *chatr* and a baton (*durbash*). These gifts implied that Iltutmish was a subordinate ruler, for in those days really independent rulers had to get an investiture from the caliphate. Still Yalduz was a senior Mu'izzi officer—the father-in-law of Iltutmish's father-in-law. Iltutmish accepted the subordination the gifts implied, and bided his time. Yalduz did not know that he was sitting on the crater of a volcano.

Broadly speaking, Iltutmish's reign of twenty-six years may be divided into three phases: (a) from 1210 to 1220, when he was mainly busy in dealing with rivals to his authority; (b) 1221 to 1227, when he had to direct his attention mainly towards the situation created by the invasion of Chengiz Khan; and (c) 1228 to 1236, when he was busy with the consolidation of his personal and dynastic authority.

²⁵ Minhaj, 170.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 170.

²⁷ Ibn Battuta, *Rihla* (Cairo ed. 1928) Vol. II, 21.

THE FIRST PHASE (1210-20)

The two most important rivals with whom Iltutmish had to deal during this period were Yalduz and Qubacha. When the Khwarazmians drove out Yalduz from Ghazni, he quickly moved on to Lahore, expelled Qubacha and occupied it. According to Ferishta he succeeded in occupying the Punjab up to Thaneswar. It was time for Iltutmish to strike because if Yalduz established his power in the Punjab, Iltutmish would not be safe in Delhi. So he marched out to check Yalduz's advance. Yalduz sent a message to Iltutmish in which he said that he was the real successor of Mu'izzuddin and had greater claims to the kingdom of Hindustan. Iltutmish replied: 'Times have changed. There is a new order now. What has happened to the Ghaznavids and the Ghurids? The times of hereditary descent are over.'²⁸ This reply was a firm indication of Iltutmish's resolve to blast every attempt to bring Delhi under the control of Yalduz. Iltutmish, however, offered to negotiate the matter with Yalduz, if both came to discuss it alone and unaccompanied. Yalduz decided to fight and at a battle at the historic field of Tarain,²⁹ Yalduz was defeated (1215-16). According to Isami he escaped to Hansi³⁰ but was captured and brought before Iltutmish. This does not seem to be correct in view of Hasan Nizami's statement that Yalduz was wounded by an arrow shot by Muayyidul Mulk Muhammad Junaidi and was captured along with many of his chiefs.³¹ He was then taken to Badaun and killed.³² This was a double victory for Iltutmish: the removal of one of the most dangerous rivals to his power and the final break with Ghazni, which ensured an independent status for the kingdom of Delhi.

It appears that Iltutmish desisted from immediately occupying Lahore and other areas in the Punjab. Some sort of agreement was arrived at between him and Qubacha and the latter was allowed to rule over Lahore for some time. But Qubacha's ambitions soared higher than Iltutmish could tolerate. According to Ferishta he even sought the extension of his authority to Sirhind. Iltutmish was not prepared to lose the Punjab. He decided upon immediate action and marched out against Qubacha in 614/1217. Qubacha fled away,

²⁸ *Futuh-us Salatin*, Madras ed., 110-11. Iltutmish's main ideas have been summarized here.

²⁹ Minhaj (135) has *hudud-i Tarain*; while according to Hasan Nizami (*Tajul Ma'asir*), the battle was fought at Samana.

³⁰ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 112.

³¹ *Tajul Ma'asir* (Ms.)

³² Minhaj refers to his 'martyrdom' and says: 'His mausoleum (at Badaun) has become a place of pilgrimage and is visited by people for his spiritual benediction in the fulfilment of their supplications.' *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 135.

avoiding an encounter with the forces of Iltutmish. He was chased and forced to fight a battle near Mansura, on the river Chinab, in which he was badly defeated. But his liquidation was still far off. Iltutmish occupied Lahore and put it under the charge of his son, Nasiruddin Mahmud.³³ What gave Qubacha a little respite from the attacks of Iltutmish was the arrival of Jalaluddin Mankbarni in India.

THE SECOND PHASE: CHENGIZ KHAN AND
MANKBARNI (1221-27)

The details of Khwarazm Shah's conflict with Chengiz Khan have been discussed earlier. Khwarazm Shah's eldest son, Jalaluddin Mankbarni, eluded the grasp of Chengiz and reached the Indus Valley. But closely following upon his heels came Chengiz Khan. 'The Sultan', writes Juwayni, 'was left between water and fire—on one side the water of the Indus and on the other an army like a consuming fire, nay on the one side he had his heart in the fire and on the other his face towards the water. Nevertheless he did not lose heart but quit himself like a man, preparing for action and kindling the fire of war and battle.'³⁴ He resisted the army of Chengiz Khan with a body of 700 men only—a unique military performance indeed. The final point in the crisis was, however, reached when Mankbarni was left with no space to manoeuvre. His cousin, Akhash Malik, realized the gravity of the situation, seized his bridle and drew him back. With 'a moist eye and a dry lip', he bade farewell to his family and children, rode another horse and having forced back the Mongol army, whipped his horse 'and caused it to leap into the water from a distance of ten ells or more.'³⁵ He reached the other side of the river safely. 'Chengiz and all the Mongols', writes Ata Malik Juwayni, 'put their hands to their mouths in astonishment, and Chengiz Khan, after witnessing the feat, turned to his sons and said: "Such a son should a father have."'³⁶

Iltutmish had to take note not only of the arrival of Jalaluddin Mankbarni but also of the Mongol conquest of Ajam. The burnt shoulder-blades of sheep consulted by Chengiz³⁷—or Chengiz's own

33 *Tajul Ma'asir*, as cited by Habibullah (*Foundations*, new ed., 94, 107).

34 *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha* (Eng. tr. by Boyle), Vol. II, 409.

35 *Ibid.*, 410. The place where he made his horse leap into the water is still known as *Chaul-i Jalali*. An ell is roughly equal to 45 inches.

36 *Ibid.*, 411.

37 Minhaj writes: 'He (Chengiz) was burning shoulder-bones (of sheep) continually and examining them, he used not to find permission augured that he should enter Hind' (Raverty, 1046-47). For an account of this form of divination see, W. W. Rockhill, tr., *The Journey of William of Rubruck to the Eastern Parts of the World*, London, 1900, 187-88.

good sense—had forbidden him to return to Mongolia and China by passing through northern India and then crossing the Himalayas; it was an impossible route and Chengiz only sent his officers across the Indus. Country after country had fallen before the Mongols and Iltutmish was determined that the kingdom of Delhi should not be drawn into the maelstrom. The Punjab and the upper Sind Sagar Doab now became a cockpit of struggle between the generals of Chengiz, Qubacha, Mankbarni and, to some extent, the Khokars. Iltutmish decided to wait and see. Whoever was weakened in the tussle, it was to the advantage of Iltutmish, provided the Mongols kept away.³⁸ When Mankbarni entered into a matrimonial alliance with a Khokar chief, Rai Khokar Sankin,³⁹ it was a disturbing development for Iltutmish. He, however, watched the situation quietly, determined not to take any false steps.

Chengiz Khan sent his emissaries to Iltutmish, perhaps to ensure that Mankbarni did not receive any help from Delhi. Nothing is known about the way Iltutmish received the Mongol envoys, but his policy shows that he took good care not to give the Mongols any cause of complaint. But so long as Chengiz was alive—he died in 1227—Iltutmish did not try to extend his authority in the cis-Indus region.

Having established himself in the Sind Sagar Doab, Mankbarni captured the fort of Basraur (Pasraur) in the Sialkot district. He was some two or three days' journey from Delhi when he sent an envoy, Ainul Mulk, to Iltutmish with the message: 'The vicissitudes of fortune have established my right to approach your presence, and guests of my sort arrive but rarely. If . . . we bind ourselves to aid and assist one another in weal and woe, then shall all our aims and objects be attained; and when our opponents realize the concord that exists between us, the teeth of their resistance will be blunted.'⁴⁰ He further asked Iltutmish to assign him some place where he could remain for a few days. Iltutmish was too intelligent to fall a prey to such specious messages. Ata Malik Juwayni says that he brooded over the matter for several days and ultimately excused himself on the ground that 'nowhere in that region was there a suitable climate nor any locality such as would be fit for a king.'⁴¹ Ainul Mulk was attacked and killed. According to Minhaj,⁴² Iltutmish himself led an army against Mankbarni, but Mankbarni avoided an encounter and turned towards the

38 Nizami, *Religion & Politics in India during the 13th century*, 330-31.

39 *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha*, Eng. tr., Vol. II, 414.

40 *Ibid.*, 413.

41 *Ibid.*, 414.

42 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 171.

'region of Bálala and Nikala' where he succeeded in raising an army of 10,000 soldiers.⁴³

Mankbarni then diverted his attention to Qubacha—to Iltutmish's great relief. His Khokar ally also supported him with an army. In a battle fought near Uchch, Qubacha's army was routed and he fled to Sakkar and Bhakkar,⁴⁴ and from there to Multan. Qubacha returned some prisoners he had taken with him, sent large sums of money and requested Mankbarni not to molest his territory. As the weather was getting unpleasant, Mankbarni left for his summer quarters in the mountains of Jud (Salt Range) but soon afterwards reports of Mongol activity made him leave his summer resort. As he passed by Multan he demanded *na'l baha*⁴⁵ (shoe-money) from Qubacha. It was too much for Qubacha, who came out to challenge him. But Mankbarni did not stay at the place for more than an hour and left for Uchch, while Qubacha was left fully entrenched in Multan.

In 1224 Mankbarni left India and Iltutmish was free to plan his programme of conquest and consolidation. But he could not, even then, take a haphazard plunge in the politics of Sind or the Punjab. So long as Chengiz was alive, Iltutmish avoided any serious involvement in the politics of these regions. The region that first claimed his attention after the departure of Jalaluddin Mankbarni was Bengal.

THE THIRD PHASE (1228-36): BENGAL AND BIHAR

Ali Mardan, who had established his authority in Bengal with the moral and military support of Qutbuddin Aibek, proved an inveterate tyrant, and his officers put him to death after he had reigned for about two years. Husamuddin Iwaz Khalji was then elevated to that position,⁴⁶ probably sometime after 1211. Iwaz adopted the title of Sultan Ghiyasuddin and began to function as an independent ruler.⁴⁷ Iltutmish was too deeply engrossed in the affairs of the Indus Valley to interfere in Bengal politics. Iwaz took full advantage of Iltutmish's preoccupations and extended his authority up to Bihar and exacted tribute from the states of Jainagar, Tirhut, Bang and Kamrup.⁴⁸

As soon as the clouds had cleared from the north-western frontier, Iltutmish turned his attention to the eastern region. He occupied all

⁴³ *Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha* (Eng. tr.), II, 414.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 414. Most probably the island fort of Bhakkar is meant. See also, Elliot & Dowson, Vol. II, 554n.

⁴⁵ A tribute which a king exacted from the ruler of a place in passing by, being the price of the shoes of the horse on which he was riding at the time. (*Ibid.*, 415).

⁴⁶ Minhaj, 160.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 161.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 163.

the districts of Bihar south of the Ganges and appointed a governor.⁴⁹ Having consolidated his position there, he marched along the Ganges in 622/1225. Iwaz marched from his capital to check the advance of Iltutmish but eventually decided to submit. He recognized the suzerainty of Delhi and paid a heavy indemnity.⁵⁰ Iltutmish appointed Malik Jani as governor of Bihar, but soon after Iltutmish's return, Iwaz came out again and, ousting Jani, assumed an independent status. Iltutmish delayed immediate retaliatory action but alerted his son, Nasiruddin Mahmud, then governor of Awadh, to watch the developments in the east closely and to strike at the opportune moment. This delay in taking action against him was interpreted by Iwaz as a sign of Iltutmish's weakness. He went on a campaign in the east, and as soon as Nasiruddin Mahmud came to know of this, he immediately invested Lakhnauti. Iwaz came back to defend his capital but was defeated and put to death.

Iltutmish's control was now established over Lakhnauti, and he put his son, Nasiruddin Mahmud, in charge of its affairs. Iwaz had ruled for about twelve years. 'When the author', Minhaj writes, 'went to Lakhnauti in A.H. 641 (1243-44), he saw the public works of this king in that region.' The most important of them was a series of bridges over the rivers between Lakhnauti and Lakhanor on one side and Lakhnauti and Dookot on the other. They covered a journey of ten to twelve days. 'During the rainy season the whole of this area is flooded and one can only travel in boats. In this reign owing to the bridges, these routes became passable for all men.' Iltutmish, when he went to east to suppress the rebellion of Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Balka in 1229 and witnessed the public works of Iwaz, always referred to him as 'Sultan'. 'There should be no objection', he remarked, 'in referring to a ruler who has left such good works as Sultan Ghiyasuddin.'⁵¹

RANTHAMBHOR AND MANDOR

In 1226 Iltutmish turned his attention towards the fort of Ranthambhor, which was famous for its impregnability. There was a tradition that seventy rulers had failed to conquer it. Iltutmish, however, conquered it in 623/1226. This was a great achievement and gave the Sultan a stronghold in Rajputana.

The next year, in 624/1227, Iltutmish marched against the fort of Mandor in the Siwalik region and conquered it.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 163.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 163, 171.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 162-64.

OPERATIONS AGAINST QUBACHA

Having created a few military stations in Rajputana, Iltutmish could think of more effective operations in Sind. But before he turned his attention to that region, he established his authority at Bhatinda (then called Tabarhinda), Sarsuti and Lahore. In 625/1228 he planned a simultaneous attack on Uchch and Multan. He himself proceeded towards Uchch while Nasiruddin Itmar, the governor of Lahore, was ordered to attack Multan. Qubacha pitched his tent near Ahrawat and the whole of his fleet of boats, on board of which the baggage and the followers of his army were embarked, was moored in the river in front of the camp'.⁵² Uchch put up a brave defence for three months but capitulated on 4 May 1228. Qubacha fled to Bhakkar and instructed his wazir, Ainul Mulk Husain Ash'ari, to convey his treasures there. But Iltutmish pressed hard and Qubacha found himself insecure even in Bhakkar. He sent his son, Malik Alauddin Bahram, to Iltutmish to negotiate terms of peace. Iltutmish demanded unconditional surrender to which Qubacha preferred death by drowning himself in the Indus. Iltutmish now undertook to consolidate his position in Sind and the Punjab. Multan and Uchch were placed under governors. A dozen strategic fortresses were occupied and the authority of the sultan of Delhi was extended up to Mekran. Malik Sinanuddin Habsh, the *wali* of Dewal and Sind, acknowledged his supremacy.

INVESTITURE FROM THE CALIPH, DEATH OF PRINCE NASIRUDDIN

On 22 Rabi I 626/18 February 1229, emissaries from the Caliph of Baghdad reached Delhi with a deed of investiture for Iltutmish. Though nothing more than a mere formality,⁵³ it was the fulfilment of a long cherished ambition of Iltutmish. It was the registration of an accomplished fact—the recognition of the independent status of the sultanat of Delhi. Iltutmish celebrated the event with great eclat and enthusiasm. The city was decorated and maliks and nobles, slaves and officers all were honoured on this occasion. The event marked the success of Iltutmish's two decades of persistent and arduous struggle to give an independent status to the sultanat of Delhi. His actual

⁵² *Ibid.*, 172.

⁵³ Iltutmish, however, had great respect for the Caliph and seems to have maintained some sort of contact with Baghdad. Maulana Raziuddin Hasan Saghani, an Indian born Muslim who had later settled in Baghdad, was sent by the Caliph to Iltutmish as his emissary (see Abdur Razzaq, *al-Havadisul Jamia*, Baghdad, 263). Barani refers to another envoy of the Caliph, Qazi Jalal Urus. He brought for Iltutmish a copy of *Safinatul Khulafa* which contained autographic inscriptions from Mamun. Iltutmish was immensely pleased with this gift. (See *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 103-5.)

achievements backed up by this legal sanction considerably enhanced his stature. By this time almost all his adversaries had been crushed. He was now the supreme master of Mu'izzuddin's Indian heritage. There were a few inconvenient pockets here and there, but on the whole his authority seemed secure and unassailable.

In Jamadi I 626/March-April 1229, Iltutmish suffered the most serious shock of his life in the death of his eldest son, Nasiruddin Mahmud. The sad news enveloped the capital in a pallor of gloom. The prince was an exceptionally gifted administrator and had held charge of such strategic areas as Hansi, Lahore, Awadh and Lakhnauti. The Sultan had placed all his hopes in him and with his sudden death his dynastic interests entered a state of crisis which he had not anticipated. Probably the tussle between the crown and the Turkish slave-officers, which characterized the history of the Delhi sultanat for thirty years after the death of Iltutmish, would have been completely averted had he succeeded his father. Coming soon after the legal recognition of his authority by the Caliph, this bereavement deepened its tragic impact on Iltutmish. But his valiant spirit refused to be cowed down by it, and for the remaining seven years of his life he relentlessly worked for the consolidation of the Delhi sultanat. He suppressed rebellions, conquered new areas and secured the recognition of his authority by many powers.

REBELLION IN LAKHNAUTI; GWALIOR, KALINJAR, MALWA

Taking advantage of the opportunity offered by the death of Prince Nasiruddin Mahmud, Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Balka rose in rebellion. Iltutmish marched against him in 628/1230 and caught hold of him. The 'throne' of Lakhnauti was conferred upon Malik Alauddin Jani.⁵⁴

Though Gwalior had been occupied during the time of Sultan Mu'izzuddin and had been even held by Iltutmish as his first assignment, it could not be retained and was lost subsequently. In 629/1231 Iltutmish marched to the fort of Gwalior and besieged it. It was stoutly defended by its Parihara ruler, Mangal Deva, for eleven months. Eventually, however, it was conquered on 26 Safar 630/12 December 1232, when Mangal Deva decamped from the fort at night. The administrative arrangements made by Iltutmish included the appointment of an *amir-i dad*, Majdul Mulk Ziyauddin Muhammad Junaidi, and a kotwal, Sipah Salar Rashiduddin. Minhajus Siraj was put in charge of the *quza*, *khitabat*, *imamat* and *ih̄tisab*.

⁵⁴ Minhaj, 174. The identity of Balka has not been established. Raverty is of the opinion that he was a son of Malik Husamuddin Iwaz but no early evidence has been cited by him in support of his view.

Two years after Gwalior had been conquered, Iltutmish assigned the *iqta* of Sultankot and Bayana along with the charge (*shuhnagi*) of the Gwalior fort to Malik Nusratuddin Taisi, a Turkish slave-officer of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri, who had risen in service by slow and solid work. Minhaj, who knew Taisi, says that though lacking in stature and personality, he was brave, courageous and wise. Taisi was required to live in the fort of Gwalior, but the contingents of Kanauj, Mehr and Mahaban were placed under his command so that he may plunder the territories of Kalinjar and Chanderi.

Taisi's attack on Kalinjar in 631 (1233-34) deserves a detailed mention; it shows how rapidly the Turkish officers had adapted themselves to their Indian environment and also gives us an insight into the position of the rais and ranas of the period. The Rai of Kalinjar left the defence of his fort to his officers and fled; Taisi, who had no intention of wasting his time in besieging a fort, found a Hindu guide and pursued the Rai. The guide led them for a night and a day but on the following midnight he confessed that he had lost his way and could lead them no further. Taisi ordered the guide to be put to death and himself undertook to act as the guide. He took them to an elevation where there was moisture on the ground, obviously due to the urine of men or animals. Persons in the army began to express their fears: 'It is night and we may find ourselves in the midst of the enemy.' Taisi got down from his horse and examined the spot carefully. 'Friends', he said, 'be of good cheer. This is the urine of tailed animals at the very rear of the army. Had it been otherwise, the footprints of men would have been visible on the moist ground, but there are no human footprints here.' So they marched on, defeated the Rai in the morning and deprived him of his canopy (*chatr*).

For some fifty days Taisi plundered the area and the Sultan's share—a fifth of the spoils—amounted to 25 lakhs of *jitals*.

But why not plunder the plunderer? This bright idea came to Jahar, the Rana of Ijar.⁵⁵ He stationed himself on the main route by which he expected the invading army to return, and also posted his men on the passes which the mountain torrents had made. Taisi was not feeling well at the time, but he divided his army into three contingents under three competent officers—the first contingent consisting of armed horsemen ready to fight, the second of baggage and camp-followers and the third of cattle and other spoils. Each contingent was directed to return to Gwalior by a different route. 'Thanks to God',

⁵⁵ 'Doubtless identical with Chahara Deva of the Jajapulla dynasty who later supplanted the Pariharas of Narwar.' Habibullah, *Foundations*, 103.

Taisi told Minhaj later, 'no one in India has seen my back in a battle-field. But that day the Hindus attacked us like wolves attacking a flock of sheep. I had divided my army into three contingents so that if the Hindus attacked me and the armed horsemen, the baggage and the spoils may reach Gwalior in safety; if they attacked the other contingents, I and the horsemen could turn back and attack them.' The Rana, whose idea was brilliant, made a sad mistake about Taisi's routes and arrangements. He stationed himself on the main road, came across the contingent of armed horsemen, who had no baggage to hinder their movements, and got defeated.⁵⁶

The next campaign was undertaken against Malwa. The fortress and town of Bhilsa were occupied; an idol temple the construction of which (according to Minhaj) had taken three hundred years was demolished. The Sultan subsequently marched to the city of Ujjain and destroyed the temple of Mahakal Deva. The effigy of Bikramajit and other historic relics were brought to Delhi.⁵⁷

In 633/1236, Iltutmish marched towards Bumyan, which was held by Saifuddin Hasan Qarligh, an officer of Jalaluddin Mankbarni, whom the Mongols had not been able to dislodge and who seems to have led a distressing but determined existence between Ghazni and the Indus. It was during this campaign that Iltutmish fell ill and returned to the capital on the first of Sha'ban (20 April) 'at the time chosen by the astrologers' in a covered litter. On 20 Sha'ban 633/30 April 1236 he breathed his last.⁵⁸

CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF ILTUTMISH

Iltutmish was one of the most outstanding rulers of medieval India. A shrewd, cautious and far-seeing statesman, he left a permanent mark on the canvas of Indian history. The history of Muslim sovereignty in India, rightly observes Dr. R. P. Tripathi, properly speaking begins with him.⁵⁹ It was he who gave the country a capital, an independent state, a monarchical form of government and a governing class. Through his indefatigable energy and application to carefully chosen objectives, he transformed a loosely patched up congeries of Ghurid acquisitions in Hindustan into a well-knit and compact state—the sultanat of Delhi.

⁵⁶ Minhaj, 239-41.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 176.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 176. Shaikh Jamaluddin of Hansi, a distinguished disciple of Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-i Shakar, wrote two elegies on the death of the Sultan. See his *Diwan*, Vol. I, 398-99; Vol. II, 210.

⁵⁹ *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration in India*, 24.

Iltutmish entered the service of Aibek as a slave in 1192 and within less than two decades he was at the head of the Turkish government in India. There were no doubt many other important Mu'izzi and Qutbi maliks—about whom he used to say that when he saw them standing in his court he felt inclined to come down from the throne and kiss their hands and feet⁶⁰—but by sheer dint of merit he worked his way to the top. When he ascended the throne the political atmosphere was confused and everything—from the theory of kingship to the boundaries of the empire—was in a nebulous and undefined state. There were no traditions to guide him and no leader, like Mu'izzuddin, to help him in moments of crisis. He had thus to find his way on an uncharted sea. His constructive abilities, however, rose up to the occasion and he planned his work so adroitly that when he closed his eyes in death after twenty-six years of ceaseless diplomatic and military activity, the sultanat of Delhi had already emerged with its clear and well-defined contours, a royal house had been firmly established and even the principle of hereditary succession had struck such deep roots in the political consciousness of the people and the governing class that for thirty years after his death it was deemed that only his descendants had the right to ascend the throne. When the supporters of Sidi Maula organized a *coup* during the reign of Jalaluddin Khalji, they planned the Sidi's marriage with a daughter of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud in order to enlist public support to his cause.⁶¹ Iltutmish created in the hearts of the people a deep respect and attachment to his family—a sentiment which Babur considered a *sine qua non* for the political stability of a dynasty.

Iltutmish was the real architect of the city of medieval Delhi, which with brief interregnums continued to be the focal point of medieval politics till 1857. Its minarets, mosques, madrasas, *khanqas* and tanks rose into prominence under him, and he gave it a cultural atmosphere which attracted and absorbed the Muslim talents, which had been scattered and demoralized by the disturbed conditions of Ajam. 'He gathered together in Delhi', writes Minhaj,

'people from various parts of the world. . . This city, through the (large) number of the grants and unbounded munificence of the pious monarch, became the retreat and resting place for the learned, the virtuous and the excellent of the various parts of the world. . . And those who, by the mercy of God, escaped from the toils of the calamities sustained by the provinces and cities of Ajam and the misfortunes caused by the irruption of the infidel Mongols,

⁶⁰ Barani, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 137.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 210.

made the capital of that sovereign, their asylum, refuge, resting place and haven of safety.⁶²

In fact he made Delhi not only the political and administrative centre of the Turkish empire in India but also the hub of its cultural activity. It is worth noting that in the literature of the sultanat period Delhi is never referred to merely by its name; it is called either 'Hazrat-i Delhi' (the majestic Delhi) or the City (*Shahr*).

The establishment of a dynastic monarchy was a political necessity for Iltutmish. Like Amir Mu'awiya, he found in it the best possible alternative to anarchy and applied all his energies to bringing together the ideological and structural material for it. He invoked Persian monarchical traditions and adjusted them to the Indian milieu. Perhaps the books, *Adabus Salatin* and *Ma'asirus Salatin*, which he had obtained from Baghdad for the instruction of his sons dealt with the principles of Persian monarchy, which he was eager to imitate in all their details at Delhi.

The monarchy set up by Iltutmish derived its strength and support mainly from an all-India military-cum-administrative service manned entirely by foreigners who, according to Minhaj, consisted of two groups—Turkish slave-officers (*Turkan-i pak asl*) and Tazik or non-Turkish foreigners of high lineage (*Tazikan-i guzida wasl*). Some words of explanation are necessary about both groups.

Whatever claims the heirs of Mu'izzuddin's family may have had over his slaves, they became free when all members of the Ghurid family were annihilated by the Khwarazmians and the Mongols. But Yaldüz, Qubacha and Iltutmish also had a passion (*ila*) for purchasing highly educated slaves. The Mongol conquest of Ajam deprived the slave-dealers of their main hunting field; still some slaves could be brought to Iltutmish by the sea-route from Baghdad or the south Persian sea-ports, like Sultan Balban, his brother and his cousin, Sher Khan. But they all seem to have come into the hands of the slave-dealers either before or at the time of the Mongol invasion. Now these slaves, brought from various parts of Ajam (Anatolia to Turkistan) and considered Turkish, deemed themselves equal and brothers; they were *khwaja-tash*—'slaves of the same master'. So long as Iltutmish lived they were his slaves, but after his death they called themselves *sultani*⁶³—the slaves or rather 'officers' of the Sultan whom they had put on the throne.

62 Isami says that celebrities from Arabia, Khurasan, China, Bukhara and other places made a bee-line to the newly founded city of Delhi 'as moths cluster round a candle'. *Futuh-us Salatin*, 114-15.

63 The term, *sultani*, was also used for themselves by officers of non-servile origin to show their excessive loyalty.

Now so far as the non-Turkish foreigners were concerned, they did not start coming to India immediately after Mu'izzuddin's conquest. In the period between 1192 and 1218 there was nothing to induce a well-to-do foreign Muslim to emigrate to the region east of the Ravi, unless he was a trader or a government employee or a person expecting employment by the government. Barring two groups from just beyond the Indian frontier—the Khaljis and the Afghans—who came to India in the hope of government service, there was no large-scale migration of Muslims immediately following the Ghurid conquests. But after Chengiz Khan had crossed the Jaxartes, many foreign Muslims, who were qualified in various fields, turned to India as a place of safety and decent livelihood. Though the migration was mainly westwards to Baghdad, Syria and Egypt, the nascent empire of Delhi also attracted many people. Barani says that the distress caused by Chengiz Khan drove many renowned princes, nobles, ministers and other men of eminence to the court of Iltutmish. Their presence so enhanced the stature and glory of his court that it began to look like the courts of Mahmud and Sanjar.⁶⁴

Amongst these non-servile Taziks who clustered in the court of Iltutmish were men like Nizamul Mulk Muhammad Junaidi, who acted as prime minister of the Sultan for many years, Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri, who had come to India after fighting the Mongols, and Fakhrul Mulk Isami, ancestor of the author of *Futuh-us Salatin*, who held high office at Baghdad and was taken in service by Iltutmish immediately on his arrival in India. These two groups—Turkish slaves and non-servile Taziks—formed the linchpin of Iltutmish's monarchy. So long as Iltutmish lived, he kept both these foreign elements in proper control, but the bitterness of the slave-officers against the Taziks (or Tajiks) grew during the reigns of his successors.

Our authorities are absolutely silent about the appointment of any Indian-born Muslim by Iltutmish; but local Hindu chiefs must have been continued in their administrations by Iltutmish. Thus the throne of Iltutmish was a Turkish throne supported by Turkish slave-officers and Taziks, who were both in the service of the Sultan; and also by local chiefs, who were bound to pay a tribute and to render some services for the maintenance of law and order, but who came to their offices by hereditary right and were not normally removable from their jurisdictions except for non-payment of tribute or rebellion. Thus Iltutmish's administration was run by two elements belonging to two different political backgrounds—one hereditary, and the other bureaucratic; one in the service of the king, the other enjoying hereditary

privileges. Iltutmish displayed great political tact and adroitness in weaving these diverse elements into one administrative pattern, but while the active cooperation of the local chiefs was always sought for, the Turks and the Taziks constituted the main prop of his monarchy.

The history of India from 1191 to 1210 had moved under the shadow of Ghurid traditions. Partly helped by the circumstances but largely guided by his own political considerations, Iltutmish cut Delhi off completely from the control of Ghazni and Ghur. He may thus be said to have constructed a government that was purely Indian, but the higher officers of which were exclusively Turkish slave-officers and Taziks. Under him the Indian possessions of Mu'izzuddin developed their own political individuality by severing all contact with Ghurid or Central Asian lands; and when the Caliph of Baghdad granted a deed of investiture, these possessions acquired a legal status also.

As the founder of the Delhi sultanat Iltutmish's contribution to the evolution of its administrative institutions was both significant and substantial. Mu'izzuddin could find no time for organizing a proper administration for India owing to his constant meddling with Central Asian politics, while Aibek had a very brief tenure as an independent ruler to achieve anything more than a stop-gap arrangement to keep the administrative machinery moving. Iltutmish gave form and content to the administrative structure of the Delhi sultanat. He organized the *iqtas*, the army and the currency—the three most important organs of the imperial structure of the Delhi sultanat.

(a) *The Iqtas*:

The institution of *iqtas* occupied a pivotal place in the administrative arrangements made by Iltutmish. Literally the word *iqta* means a portion; technically it was the land or revenue assigned by the ruler to an individual. Mawardi refers to two types of *iqtas*: *iqta-i tamlik* and *iqta-i istighlal*. The former covered land, fallow or cultivated or having mines; the latter related to stipends.⁶⁵ The *iqta-i tamlik* alone matters for our purposes here.

In the development of Islamic politico-economic institutions, the *iqta* has a long and interesting history. It existed since the early days of Islam as a form of reward for service to the state and passed through various phases of development under the Buwaihids, Seljuqs, etc. who used it to meet different situations and problems of political life. *The early Turkish sultans of Delhi, particularly Iltutmish, used this institution as an instrument for liquidating the feudal order of*

⁶⁵ *Ahkam-us Sultaniya*, Urdu translation, Hyderabad 1931, 303 et seq.

Indian society and linking up the far-flung parts of the empire to one centre. Through it the difficulties with reference to transport and communications were overcome; the collection of revenue in the newly conquered areas was ensured; and the maintenance of law and order in all parts of the empire was made possible. Besides, India had so far been governed through Hindu feudal lords. This had given rise to a number of local problems which could be tackled at the local level through some local apparatus. The *iqta* fulfilled all these needs of the time.

All *iqta* assignments had perforce to be of two types: big and small. The smaller assignments carried neither any administrative duties nor any financial liabilities to the central exchequer. These small *iqstadars* were permitted simply to realize revenue of some portion of land in lieu of military service. The larger *iqtas* (provinces), which were given to men of position, carried administrative responsibilities with them and the assignee was expected to maintain law and order in his territory and supply contingents to the centre in times of emergency.

Iltutmish granted *iqtas* to the Turks on a large scale. His object was intensive control of the conquered areas and liquidation of Indian feudal institutions. But the *iqta* system itself had elements which could develop feudal characteristics. He discouraged firmly localism in administration and rejected also the feudal concept of the legal immunity of the overlord. He emphasized the bureaucratic aspect of the institution of *iqtas* by transferring the assignees from one place to another. Besides, Iltutmish was the first to realize the economic potentialities of the Doab. By settling two thousand Turkish soldiers there, he secured for the Turkish state the financial and administrative control of one of the most prosperous regions of northern India.

(b) *The Army:*

Though specific details are not available, it may be safely assumed that it was Iltutmish who thought of organizing the army of the sultanat as the 'king's army', centrally recruited, centrally paid and centrally administered. The fact that Fakhr-i Mudabbir thought of writing a book on the art of warfare and dedicated it to Iltutmish shows, *inter alia*, the Sultan's interest in the problem of the organization of the army.

(c) *The Currency:*

Among the sultans of Delhi Iltutmish's contribution to the monetary system of the sultanat was the greatest, for it was he who

introduced the silver *tanka* and the copper *jital*—the two basic coins of the sultanat period. 'The reign of Iltutmish', observes Nelson Wright,

'stands out as a landmark in the coinage of Delhi. There need be no hesitation in advancing the proposition that this *tanka* was, as the weights indicate, the model on which the *tankas* of the subsequent sultans were based, and to them can be traced the modern rupee. . . To Iltutmish also, it would seem, belongs the credit of introducing the *jital* into the currency as a specific coin. Iltutmish was a great moneyer. That he established the silver *tanka* and the billon *jital* on a firm footing was in itself a remarkable achievement. . . Iltutmish may also be credited with extending to India the trans-frontier practice of putting on the *tanka* the name of the mint-town.'⁶⁶

Iltutmish must have made many rules for the procedure of the royal court and for the proper transaction of business so that the Sultan may be able to control the government of the country—without being paralysed by overwork. He must also have made rules for the organization of the higher services, though Minhaj has failed to record them. But we can form some idea of his methods of work and his court etiquette and organization from the following incidents recorded in early works:

(1) Iltutmish's government was firm but not ruthless; thus Kabir Khan Ayaz, a slave purchased at a high price and found to be a failure as governor of Multan, was recalled and given a village—Pulwal—for his livelihood.⁶⁷

(2) The *Fawa'idul Fu'ad* (Conversations of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya) records an incident which gives us some idea of how Iltutmish managed matters when sitting on the throne. A poet, Nasiri, who was very much in need of a royal award obtained the privilege of reciting a *qasida* he had composed in praise of Iltutmish, but after he had recited a few lines before the throne, Iltutmish had to attend to some urgent administrative matters and poor Nasiri thought he had been quite forgotten. But Iltutmish turned to him as soon as he was free, recited the first line of Nasiri's *qasida* and asked him to proceed. 'The Sultan had an excellent memory', Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya remarked.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ *Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 72. It may be noted that the *dirham-tanka* struck by Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni contained the name of the mint-town, Mahmudpur. (Thomas, *Chronicles*, 48).

⁶⁷ Minhaj, 234.

⁶⁸ *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 213.

(3) Equally sharp was the Sultan's intuitive intelligence. Soon after his accession, a group of *ulama*, as has already been referred to, came to see him with a view to asking him if he had been properly manumitted. Before they had said a word, the Sultan understood the purpose of their visit and took out from under his carpet his deed of manumission and placed it before them.⁶⁹

(4) It appears that there were raised and low seats in his court for distinguished scholars and saints. Once there was a quarrel between Shaikh Nizamuddin Abul Muwayyid and Saiyyid Nuruddin Mubarak Ghaznavi in his presence on the order of precedence.⁷⁰

(5) Iltutmish had his own ways of dealing with problems. Once a deputation of *ulama* came to see him. He asked his wazir, Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, to deal with them.⁷¹

Iltutmish was an intensely religious man in his personal life.⁷² According to Minhaj he had a laudable faith (*aqida*) and a heart responsive to cosmic emotions.⁷³ He spent considerable time at night in prayer and contemplation. 'But he never disturbed anybody (from among his attendants) in his sleep', Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya once informed his audience.⁷⁴ He showed profound respect to sufi-saints like Shaikh Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki, Qazi Hamiduddin Nagauri, Shaikh Jalaluddin Tabrizi, Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariya and Shaikh Najibuddin Nakhshabi. He is reported to have even addressed Shaikh Nakhshabi as 'Father'.⁷⁵ He placated the *ulama* also by holding frequent religious discourses in his court.⁷⁶ But his policies remained basically unaffected by the opinions and the exhortations of the orthodox theologians. He heard the sermons of Saiyyid Nuruddin Mubarak Ghaznavi⁷⁷ but ignored them completely in the formulation of his policies. He did not bother to consult the *ulama* while nominating Raziya as his successor. He, however, derived full advantage from the goodwill of the mystics that he enjoyed on account of his

69 Ibn Battuta, *Rihla* II, 21.

70 *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 193.

71 Barani, *Sana-i Muhammadi* (Ms. in Raza Library, Rampur).

72 See, Nizami, *Salatin-i Delhi Kay Mazhabi Rujhanat*, 100-32; Idem, *Studies in Medieval Indian History and Culture*; also *Islamic Culture*, April 1946, article on 'Iltutmish, the Mystic'.

73 Minhaj, 167. The historian has used the term *ab-i deedu* to indicate this emotional quality of the Sultan.

74 *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 213.

75 *Saroorus Sadur* (Conversations of Shaikh Hamiduddin Sawali Nagauri) Ms.

76 Minhaj, 175.

77 Barani, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 70-92.

pious personal life. Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariya's support helped him in the conquest of Multan and Shaikh Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki gave him moral support in the construction of the Hauz-i Shamsi.⁷⁸

Iltutmish had a rich legacy of incomplete and unfinished works—administrative, architectural and imperial—from his master. He not only completed them all but also initiated policies of his own. His realistic appraisal, careful planning and tactful handling of all situations that arose during the quarter of a century when he was at the helm of affairs guaranteed his success. His dealings with Chengiz Khan and Jalaluddin Mankbarni were characterized by superb statesmanship and remarkable diplomatic skill.

Aibek had merely visualized an outline of the sultanat; Iltutmish gave it an individuality and a status, a motive power and a direction, an administrative system and a governing class.

THE PROBLEM OF SUCCESSION

As already pointed out, Iltutmish had placed his hopes on his eldest son, Malikus Sa'id Nasiruddin Mahmud. When the robes of honour were received from the Caliph of Baghdad in 1229, Iltutmish had particularly honoured him by sending on to him a very costly dress and a red *chatr*. 'All the maliks and grandees of the kingdom of Hind', writes Minhaj, 'had their eyes upon him, that he would be the heir to the Shamsi dominions.'⁷⁹ Unfortunately he died soon after the receipt of the caliphal robes and the problem of nominating a successor began to exercise Iltutmish's mind. His choice fell upon his daughter, Raziya. It was a bold decision and shows his freedom from all social inhibitions.⁸⁰ He had seen and fully tested her capabilities as she, along with her mother, Turkan Khatun, had lived with him in the Kushak-i Firuzi.⁸¹ When Iltutmish went on the Gwalior campaign, he left Raziya in charge of the administration of Delhi.⁸² She discharged her responsibilities so efficiently that immediately on his return from Gwalior (1232), Iltutmish ordered his *mushrif-i mamlakat*, Tajul Mulk Mahmud Dabir, to prepare a decree naming his daughter as his heir-apparent.⁸³ When the document was being drafted, some

⁷⁸ Nizami, *Salatin-i Delhi kay Mazhabi Rujuhanat*, 128-29.

⁷⁹ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 181.

⁸⁰ There were, no doubt, precedents in Turkish and Iranian history of women exercising political authority (e.g. the widow of the Gor Khan and his daughter, Koyunk Khatun, Safia Khatun of Halab, Shajaratud Durr of Egypt), but considered in the context of the Indian situation the experiment was bold and courageous.

⁸¹ Minhaj, 185.

⁸² *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 68.

⁸³ Minhaj, 185.

amirs represented to the Sultan: 'Inasmuch as your Majesty has grown up sons who are eligible for kingship, what purpose is there in the Sultan's mind in nominating a daughter as heir-apparent?' To this Iltutmish replied: 'My sons are engrossed in the pleasures of youth, and none of them possesses the capability of managing the affairs of the country. *After my death it will be seen that no one of them will be found more worthy of the heir-apparentship than she, my daughter.*'⁸⁴ A commemorative coin was also struck on this occasion and the name of Raziya was inscribed along with that of Iltutmish.⁸⁵

Immediately after the death of Iltutmish, the nobles, particularly the provincial officers, raised Ruknuddin Firuz to the throne. Does this reflect a disregard of Iltutmish's wishes or was the action based on a reversal of his original decision by the deceased Sultan himself? The following facts give the impression that Iltutmish himself had changed his mind: (1) On his return from his last frontier campaign, when he had developed a serious illness, he brought Ruknuddin Firuz with him from Lahore.⁸⁶ (2) Minhaj says that this was done 'for the people had their eyes upon him since after Nasiruddin Mahmud he was the eldest of the Sultan's sons'.⁸⁷ (3) It was perhaps at this time that a silver coin bearing the names of Iltutmish and Firuz was issued.⁸⁸ (4) The unanimous acceptance⁸⁹ of Firuz's accession by the maliks does not seem to be a unanimous disregard of Iltutmish's wishes, but rather an acceptance of Iltutmish's decision in his last year.

84 Minhaj, 185-86. Immediately after this, Minhaj gives his own comment in the words: '*The case turned out as that august monarch had predicted.*' Written during the reign of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud, to whom the work is dedicated, this sentence, read along with the italicized portion of Iltutmish's speech, appears an indirect indictment of the reigning monarch also.

85 JASB, 1896, 218, no. 30. See also Nelson Wright (40, 76) who ascribes this coin to Raziya.

86 Minhaj, 182.

87 *Ibid.*, 182.

88 JASB, 1894, 66. Nelson Wright (38, 75) however, ascribes this coin to Firuz and remarks: 'It will be noticed that both Firuz and Raziya sought to enhance the security of their tenure of the throne by invoking the aid of their father's name on their coins.'

89 Minhaj, 182.

III. SUCCESSORS OF SHAMSUDDIN ILTUTMISH

THE FAMILIES OF FORTY (CHIHALGANI) SLAVE-OFFICERS

HAD SHAMSUDDIN ILTUTMISH been told that during the ten years after his death the Turkish slaves, whom he had purchased at a great cost and nurtured with sedulous care, would put four of his descendants on the throne and then kill them like sacrificial goats, and that thirty years after his death one of his slaves would totally exterminate all the male members of his dynasty, the great emperor would have been pained but not surprised. He had undertaken to found a ruling dynasty and he had seen too many dynasties swept off before his eyes. Nor would he have been surprised at the fact that all his well-born Tazik officers of any importance would be annihilated, in groups or individually, by his Turkish slaves whom he had appointed amirs and maliks.

Some sentences of Barani on the two great features of the thirty years following the death of Iltutmish—the weakness of the crown and the supremacy of the Turkish slave-officers—have already been quoted. But it is necessary to examine the whole of his passage on this question.

‘During the reign of Shamsuddin (Iltutmish)’, says Barani, ‘maliks and famous amirs, who had been administrators and leaders for years, along with wazirs and persons of distinction fled (from their own countries) to the court of Shamsuddin from fear of the massacres and killings of Chengiz Khan, the accursed Mongol, and owing to the presence of these peerless maliks, wazirs and persons of distinction, who were not only free-born men of noble and distinguished lineage but were also educated, wise and capable, the court of Sultan Shamsuddin had become stable like the courts of Sultan Mahmud and Sanjar. But after the death of Sultan Shamsuddin his forty Turkish slaves (*bandagan Turk Chihalgani*) got the upper hand. The sons of Shamsuddin did not grow up as princes ought to, and could not discharge the duties of kingship, which is the most important and critical office after that of the prophets. So owing to the supremacy of the Turkish slave-officers, all these men of noble birth, whose ancestors had been maliks and wazirs for generations, were destroyed under various pretexts during the reigns of the successors of Shamsuddin, who were ignorant of the ways of the world and its government.

‘After these men of noble birth had been destroyed, the slaves of

Shamsuddin rose to eminence and became "khans". Every one of them had his newly-won porter's lodge, palace, court and magnificence. The people of the time saw an illustration of the proverb attributed to Jamshed: "That till the tiger has left the forest, the pasturage is not safe for the deer, and till the falcon has not retired to its shed, it is not possible for the partridge and other birds (*masecha*) to fly." Till (well-born) nobles and leaders had not been overthrown from their high offices, it was not possible for vile and cash-purchased (*dirham kharidgan*) slaves to rise and become leaders and great officers.

'As the Shamsi slaves had one master (*khawaja tash*) and formed one group and all the forty had become great in the same way, none of them would bow or submit to another; and in the distribution of territories, forces, offices and honours they sought equality with each other. Nevertheless every one of them proclaimed, "I and none other", and each asked the other, "What are you that I am not and what have you been that I have not been?"

'Owing to the incompetence of the successors of Shamsuddin and the predominance of the Shamsi slaves, no dignity was left with the supreme command (*ulul amr*); and the court of Shamsuddin, which had grown in stability and power till it exceeded the courts of all kings of the inhabited world, was now a thing of no value.'¹

Still the office of the Sultan and the sultanat survived, and their rehabilitation under happier circumstances was not only possible but inevitable.

A very convincing proof of Barani's assertion is found in the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* of Minhajus Siraj, specially in his *Tabaqa XXII* on the 'Shamsi Maliks', which the author finished writing in September or October 1260. This *tabaqa* or chapter gives the biographies of 25 maliks. About half the chapter is devoted to a biography of Bahauddin Balban; the other 24 maliks or khans selected for the historian's notice are all Turkish slave-officers. No foreign non-slave officer is selected for a biographical sketch. Also Turkish slave-officers, like Qutlugh Khan, whose seniority Minhaj admits, are referred to in the narrative but are not selected for a biographical notice because they were opposed to Balban. Two or three of these slave-officers are distinguished by the title of Mu'izzi, and were apparently inherited by Iltutmish; one of them, for certain, came to Iltutmish from the family of Bahauddin Tughril. While referring to the purchase of slaves, Minhaj refers to Iltutmish as the 'Sultan-i Sa'id',² but in some

¹ *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 27-28.

² Reference to the Sultan as 'Sultan-i Shahid' in *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* of Barani is obviously a copyist's mistake.

cases he refers to the purchasers as 'the Sultan' and we cannot be sure whether he refers to Mu'izzuddin Ghuri or Iltutmish. Still most of the great Turkish officers who held the highest posts in 1260 had been purchased by Iltutmish, possibly at the average price of 50,000 *jitals* for highly accomplished slaves. The total number of Turkish slave-officers, referred to by Minhaj, certainly exceeds forty, but many families, like that of Kabir Khan of Uchch, had left no heirs. So forty may be accepted as roughly the number of the families who claimed monopoly of the highest offices of the state. Minhaj praises all slave-officers, whether dead or alive, but the only compliments we can accept for all of them are valour and courage on the battle-field and capacity of organization in civil affairs.

But the most clinching argument in favour of Barani has yet to be asked. Minhaj came from a family of distinguished scholars and gives us some account of his father and grandfather. He is also fond of recording genealogies as his *Tabaqa* on the Ghurid dynasty definitely proves. Why then does he not give us the names of the fathers of Aibek, Aram Shah, and some forty or fifty Turkish slave-officers, whom he knew intimately. For the very simple reason that they themselves did not know and could not tell him. Torn from their families by the slave-hunters in early childhood, thrown like sheep in a fold and then carefully selected on the basis of their physical, educational and other qualifications and brought up by the slave-merchants, who treated them and educated them as their own sons, they would have a clearer memory of the slave-merchants than of their own parents. The slave-merchants were also responsible for their names, which seem to have been given according to some system. Of the 25 officers whose biographies Minhaj has given us, 5 are Saifuddins, 4 are Tajuddins, another 4 are Ikhtiyaruddins and 2 are Izzuddins.

SULTAN. RUKNUDDIN FIRUZ SHAH

On the morrow of Iltutmish's death, Ruknuddin Firuz was raised to the throne (21 Sha'ban 633/April-May 1236). According to Minhaj he was remarkable for three qualities—handsome features, gentle temperament and unbounded generosity. But these virtues alone could hardly make a successful ruler in those days. His epicurean tastes rendered him utterly unfit for the throne of Delhi. His pursuit of pleasures gave an opportunity to his mother, Shah Turkan, 'a Turkish hand-maid, and the head (woman) of all the Sultan's *haram*', to control the entire administration. It may, however, be mentioned that Ruknuddin was not devoid of administrative experience. In 625/1227, he was assigned the *iqta* of Badaun which he administered with

the help of Aynul Mulk Husain Ash'ari, a former minister of Qubacha. After his return from Gwalior, Iltutmish entrusted to him the administration of Lahore. These *iqtas* were of considerable importance and required extreme vigilance on the part of the governor. But Rukn-uddin did not display any interest in administration after ascending the throne. He squandered the state treasures recklessly and plunged more and more in convivial pursuits.

His mother, Khudawanda-i Jahan Shah Turkan, had a reputation for her charities and her gifts to the *ulama*, Saiyyids and pious people; nevertheless when she obtained control over the affairs of the state, she started a reign of terror, maltreated other ladies of Iltutmish's *haram* and 'destroyed several of them'. When a son of Iltutmish, Qutbuddin, who was a youth of great promise, was blinded and put to death at the order of Firuz and his mother, the maliks began to distrust the government and rebellions broke out in different parts of the country.³ Malik Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Shah, a son of Iltutmish, rose in rebellion in Awadh and plundered the treasure of Lakhnauti, which was being taken to Delhi. He also sacked and plundered several towns and created lawlessness. Malik Izzuddin Muhammad Salari, the *iqtadar* of Badaun, also rebelled. The *iqtadar* of Multan, Malik Izzuddin Kabir Khan Ayaz, and the *iqtadar* of Hansi, Malik Saifuddin Kuchi, and the *iqtadar* of Lahore, Malik Alauddin Jani, collectively rose against Firuz. It was a formidable combination of some of the most influential and powerful maliks of the empire. Firuz marched from Delhi in order to deal with them, but the imperial officers themselves were either afraid of the power of the rebels or not loyal to the king. Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, the wazir, deserted the army at Kailugarhi and fled to Koil and from there went to join Malik Izzuddin Muhammad Salari. Junaidi and Salari then joined the forces of Malik Jani and Kuchi.⁴

The rebellion of the maliks and amirs spread like a wild fire. Firuz led an army towards Kuhram. At this time the Turkish amirs and slaves of the household, who formed the centre of the army of the Sultan, further complicated the situation by planning the murder of many Tazik (or foreign non-Turkish) officers in the neighbourhood of Mansurpur and Tarain. Minhaj has particularly named the following—Tajul Mulk Mahmud, the *dabir*; the son of the *mushrif-i mamalik*; Bahauddin Hasan Ash'ari; Karimuddin Zahid; Ziyaul Mulk, son of Nizamul Mulk Junaidi; Nizamuddin Shafurqani; Khwaja Rashiduddin

³ Minhaj, 183.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 183.

Malikani and Amir Fakhruddin, the *dabir*—as the victims of this organized massacre.⁵

Rebellions and disorders in the empire encouraged Raziya also to strike while the iron was hot. Her relations with Shah Turkan were far from cordial; in fact the latter had even planned to put her to death.⁶ Under these circumstances Raziya made up her mind to act boldly. She put on red garments, which used to be worn in those days by aggrieved persons demanding justice, and made a direct appeal in the name of her father to the people of Delhi, who had assembled to offer their congregational prayer, to rid her of the machinations of Shah Turkan. The mob attacked the palace and seized Shah Turkan.⁷

Firuz returned to Delhi at this time but the temper of the capital was against him. The army as well as the amirs had joined Raziya, pledged allegiance to her and placed her on the throne. She immediately sent a force to arrest Ruknuddin. He was imprisoned and probably put to death on 18 Rabi I 634/19 November 1236, after an unsuccessful reign of six months and twenty-eight days.⁸

Minhaj in praise of Firuz's munificence says that in a state of intoxication the Sultan used to ride on an elephant and drive through the bazars scattering gold *tankas*.⁹ He was by nature gentle and this led to his fall. His excessive indulgence in wine and venery paralysed the administration, and most of his money went to musicians, buffoons, eunuchs and other unworthy people. 'He did not wish to injure any living creature and this led to the decline of his kingdom.'

The reign of Ruknuddin had been a failure, but there was one silver lining to the cloud. Iltutmish had purchased a Turkish slave, Saifuddin Aibek, from one Jamaluddin Khubkar and appointed him *sar-jandar*. Saifuddin was entitled to something like three lakhs of *jitals* as fine, apparently from soldiers and horsemen who did not turn up at the review. He would not take the money and represented to the emperor: 'Your Majesty has given me collecting fines as my first post. It is impossible for me to be oppressive or to collect fines from the Musalmans or the *ra'iyyat*.' It is curious to find such an honest man among the Shamsi slaves. Iltutmish appointed him to the *iqtas* of Narnol, Baran and Sunam in succession and, finally, on the death of Tajuddin Sanjar Kazlak Khan in 629/1232, he was appointed governor of Uchch. Saifuddin Hasan Qarligh, who was always keeping an eye on the Indian

⁵ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 184.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 184.

frontier, marched to Uchch by way of Bunyan after the death of Iltutmish, hoping for an easy victory. But he had underrated the capacity of Saifuddin, who marched out of Uchch with a well-equipped army, defeated the Qarlighs and drove them back. 'This victory', says Minhaj, 'was a great achievement considering the circumstances of the time. The prestige of the Indian empire (*mamlakat*) had decreased in the hearts of the people owing to Iltutmish's death and its enemies from all sides desired to capture parts of its territories.' Unfortunately Malik Saifuddin died soon after owing to a fall from his horse.¹⁰

SULTAN¹¹ RAZIYA

Raziya's accession to the throne of Delhi was marked by several striking features:

(1) The people of Delhi had, for the first time in the history of the Delhi sultanat, decided a succession issue on their own initiative. Thereafter the support of the Delhi population constituted the main source of Raziya's strength. So long as she did not move out of Delhi, no rising against her could succeed and no palace revolution against her was possible.

(2) She gave her accession the form of a contract when she asked people to depose her if she did not fulfil their expectations.¹²

(3) It vindicated the choice of Iltutmish.

(4) It shows the virility and robustness of the Turkish mind in accepting a woman as ruler.

(5) It indicates the indifference or impotence of the theologians in matters of state as the elevation of a woman to royal authority was contrary to Islamic practice.¹³

¹⁰ Minhaj, *Tabaqat* 22, No. 4.

¹¹ Ignorance of the rules of Arabic grammar has led some writers to call her *sultana* which would mean the 'king's wife'. Minhaj calls her *Sultan Raziya al-Dunya wa'l Din bint al-Sultan* (185). In the coins her name appears either as *Sultan Jalalat al-Dunya wa'l-Din* (*Ind. Mus. Cat. of Coins*, II, 26 no., 93) or as *al-Sultan al-Muazzam Raziya al-Din bint al-Sultan* (Nelson Wright, 41, 76). In Sanskrit inscriptions her name appears as *Jallaladina* (Ray, *Dynastia History of Northern India*, Vol. II, 1095).

¹² *Futuh-us Salatin*, 132.

¹³ As late as the 16th century Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dihlawi expressed his surprise at the attitude of the *ulama* (*Tarikh-i Haqqi*, Ms.). The contemporary historian, Minhajus Siraj, who was a distinguished theologian and jurist of the period, does not say a word about this aspect of the problem.

There could be no question of the Muslim *shari'at*, for the *shari'at* does not recognize the legality of monarchy as an institution. However, one queen—the queen of Seba—is referred to in the Quran.

(6) The army, the officers and the people of Delhi had placed Raziya on the throne. Naturally the provincial governors, who constituted a very powerful section of the Turkish governing class, felt ignored and humiliated and, consequently, from the very beginning of her reign Raziya had to deal with their opposition.

That Raziya proved herself equal to the occasion can hardly be denied. Her very debut to power shows her politically alert personality. There could be no better time for a *coup* of the type that Raziya planned and so ably carried through. Minhaj correctly remarks that 'she was endowed with all the admirable attributes and qualifications necessary for kings.'¹⁴ But her sex was her greatest disqualification. This seriously handicapped a free exercise of her great qualities of head and heart. But it was not the cause of her fall. The opposition against her, as appears from the events of her reign, was organized on racial grounds. It was her attempt to offset the power of the Turkish nobles by creating a counter-nobility of the non-Turks, which excited opposition against her.

Raziya's first difficulty arose out of the refusal of Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, the famous wazir of Iltutmish, to accept her accession. He was supported by such eminent Turkish nobles as Malik Alauddin Jani, Malik Saifuddin Kuchi, Malik Izzuddin Kabir Khan Ayaz and Malik Izzuddin Muhammad Salari. They made a common cause against her and marched on Delhi from different directions. With the people of Delhi firmly in support of Raziya such an insurrection could hardly succeed, but their continued presence in the vicinity of Delhi as a rebellious faction created a serious problem for the security of her power. Raziya had appointed Malik Nusratuddin Taisi Mu'izzi governor of Awadh. She now summoned him to her assistance and he marched to help her with his army. But after he had crossed the Ganges, he was suddenly attacked and captured by Malik Saifuddin Kuchi. He was suffering from some illness and died in captivity. There is no reason for thinking that he was killed. Turkish slave-officers did not kill each other till Balban reversed their policy; and Taisi had been a slave of Mu'izzuddin.

Raziya made up her mind to break the rebel coalition. She came out of the city and pitched her tent on the bank of the Jumna. Encounters between the two forces did not yield any result and matters were sought to be resolved through other means. Malik Izzuddin Muhammad Salari and Malik Izzuddin Kabir Khan Ayaz secretly went over to the side of Raziya, and they planned the arrest of

¹⁴ Minhaj, 185.

Nizamul Mulk Junaidi and other rebel maliks. These maliks, however, came to know of this plan and hurriedly left their camps and fled. They were relentlessly chased. Malik Saifuddin Kuchi and his brother, Fakhruddin, were caught and put to death in prison.¹⁵ Nizamul Mulk Junaidi fled to the Sirmur hills and died there. Malik Alauddin Jani was killed at a village, named Nakawan, and his head was brought to Delhi.¹⁶ Thus all the recalcitrant elements were either crushed or brought under control by Raziya. 'In so defeating them she prevented the growth of a dangerous constitutional precedent—that of allowing the provincial officers a predominant voice in the ruler's appointment.'¹⁷

Having thus cleared the field of rebels, Raziya set about to reorganize the administration. Khwaja Muhazzabuddin, who had acted as deputy of Nizamul Mulk, was appointed wazir in his place and the title of Nizamul Mulk was conferred upon him. The army was placed under the charge of Malik Saifuddin Aibek Bahtu and the title of 'Qutlugh Khan' was conferred upon him, but due to his death soon after, Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri was appointed *naib-i lashkar*.¹⁸ The *iqta* of Lahore was placed under Malik Izzuddin Kabir Khan Ayaz. Raziya gave exceptional proof of her political sagacity in dealing with the recalcitrant elements and soon, as Minhaj observes: 'From Lakhnauti to Debal all the maliks and amirs submitted to her authority.'¹⁹

The first campaign undertaken, after settling these affairs, was against Ranthambhor, which the Hindu chief had recaptured after the death of Iltutmish. Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri was ordered to march against the Rai. It appears that all that the Malik was able to achieve was an easy evacuation of the Turkish maliks and officers from the fort.²⁰ The prestige of the Delhi sultanat received a serious setback. 'The Chauhans, thereafter, not only swallowed up the whole of north-eastern Rajputana, but also, in alliance with the predatory Mewatis, commenced an aggressive guerilla war which they carried, towards the end of Mahmud's reign, right into the Delhi territory itself.' A campaign to Gwalior undertaken during this time proved equally abortive.

Raziya had appointed army officers and governors to various *iqtas*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 186-87.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 187.

¹⁷ *IHQ*, Vol. XVI, 760.

¹⁸ Minhaj, 187. According to Habibullah (*IHQ*, Vol. XVI, 760) the office of *naib-i lashkar* was created by Raziya.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 187.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 187.

immediately after her accession; the officers of the imperial household were appointed subsequently. She appointed Malik-i Kabir Ikhtiyaruddin Aitigin as *amir-i hajib* and Malik Jamaluddin Yaqut as *amir-i akhur*. The latter appointment²¹ was resented by the Turkish maliks as Yaqut was an Abyssinian and the assignment had previously been held by Turkish officers only.

However, having set up a loyal and reliable administrative machinery, Raziya thought of having a direct control of affairs. This was not possible if she observed *purdah* and remained in seclusion. According to Isami, the throne on which she sat used to be separated from the courtiers and the public by a screen; also the arrangement was such that female guards stood next to her and then those related to her by ties of blood.²² This arrangement was found to be cumbersome and obstructive. Raziya abandoned her female attire and appeared in public with the *qaba* (cloak) and the *kulah* (hat). She rode out in public on the back of an elephant, and started transacting business like other rulers of Delhi. The public, Minhaj says, could clearly see her.

Raziya's more direct and assertive role in the administration and the appointment of non-Turks to important posts created an undercurrent of hostility amongst the Turkish nobles who began to plan her overthrow.²³ •

Malik Izzuddin Kabir Khan Ayaz (generally known as *Iltazar Mardah*) had been purchased by Iltutmish from the heirs of Malik Nasiruddin Husain, who had been slain by the Turks of Ghazni; but dissatisfied with his work as governor of Multan, Iltutmish had dismissed him and given him a place, called Pulwal, for his livelihood. Ruknuddin Firuz appointed him *iqtadar* of Sunam, so that he could once more take his place among the leading officers. When he joined Raziya, she appointed him to Lahore and all its territories.

We do not know the details, but a plot was being hatched against Raziya, and Kabir Khan, with the disloyalty and ambition that was ingrained in his character, decided to do better than the other slave-officers by anticipating their rebellion. But he seems to have been out of touch with the conspirators at Delhi; so that when Raziya marched against him in 636/1238-39, he crossed the Ravi and fled to the Sodra. Since Raziya had decided to pursue him and the land beyond the

²¹ Isami's remark that he was the *amir-i akhur* of the '*Shah* and *Shahzada*' (referring obviously to Iltutmish and Firuz) gives the impression that the appointment was not made by Raziya herself (*Futuhus Salatin*, 129) but, as Yahya Sirhindi clearly states, he was appointed by her (*Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 26).

²² *Futuhus Salatin*, 128.

²³ Minhaj, 188.

Sodra was in Mongol hands, he had no alternative but to submit. The *iqta* of Lahore was taken from him, but the *iqta* of Multan, which he had held formerly, was taken from Ikhtiyaruddin Qaraqash Khan Aitigin, to whom Iltutmish had assigned it, and was given over to him.

The effective rebellion against Raziya now began. Experience had proved that since the citizens of Delhi supported her, provincial governors who marched to challenge her power at Delhi would be risking their necks. Rebellions by individual governors, as the case of Kabir Khan had proved, were equally futile. Only the combination of a provincial revolt along with the revolt of the Turkish officers of her court at a place distant from Delhi could have a chance of success. It is obvious also that Raziya could only be deceived by officers whom she had herself appointed and on whose loyalty she thought she could rely. She had called from the Salt Range to the court Ikhtiyaruddin Aitigin, a Qara-Khitai Turk, whom her father had purchased from one, Amir Aibek Sunami; she first appointed him *iqtadar* of Badaun and later on gave him the very important post of *amir-i hajib* at the court. But gratitude was not a virtue of the Turkish slave-officers. The conventions of the time demanded that only a person from the Shamsi family could ascend the throne, but it was possible to transfer the whole control of the administration from the king to a *naib* or regent. But that would be only possible if the nobles elected Aitigin to that office along with a new king of whom, as *naib*, he would be independent. So he used the high office to which he had been appointed to overthrow his benefactress. Another slave of Iltutmish to whom Raziya showed great favour was Ikhtiyaruddin Altunia. He was only the *sar-chatrdar* (head of the canopy-bearers) when Iltutmish died; Raziya appointed him first to the *iqta* of Baran and later on to Tabarhinda (or Bhatinda). Surely Raziya had a right to rely on these two officers. Nevertheless, while she was away on the Lahore campaign, they planned a complete and effective conspiracy. Minhaj does not give us the details; Raziya had put him in charge of the Nasiriya College, so the conspirators would not have taken him into their confidence. Still what he tells us is significant:

‘As the minds of the Turkish maliks and amirs, who were Shamsi slaves, were alienated from Sultan Raziya owing to the high status (*qurbat*) of Jamaluddin Yaqut, an Abyssinian, and there was a firm bond of affection and friendship between Aitigin, the *amir-i hajib* and Altunia, the governor of Bhatinda, Aitigin informed Altunia of the change. So secretly Altunia began to lay the foundations of rebellion at Tabarhinda and removed his head from the yoke of obedience to the Sultan.’

In other words, while Raziya was away, Aitigin informed Altunia that in case he rebelled, Aitigin would see to the rest. But would he go half-and-half with his co-conspirator? The future was to reveal that there is no honour among such *thugs*.

Raziya reached Delhi after settling the affair of Kabir Khan on 9 Ramazan 637/3 April 1240. She heard of Altunia's rebellion on her arrival and started for Tabarhinda after ten days. 'In secret some amirs at the capital were in league with Altunia', Minhaj tells us. But the secret was well kept. As Raziya was out of Delhi, the recalcitrant elements got the upper hand over her. With her forces standing in front of the fort of Tabarhinda, the Turkish amirs raised the standard of revolt, put Yaqut to death, arrested Raziya and sent her to the fort of Tabarhinda. The Turkish amirs at Delhi, who were expecting such a fate for Raziya, were quick to act as soon as the news reached them and raised Mu'izzuddin Bahram to the throne.

At Delhi, deeming that Raziya was safe in Altunia's hands, the big guns proceeded to distribute the offices of the court and the *iqtas*, but ignored Altunia's claims. Aitigin was appointed *naib-i mamlakat* and was expected to control the whole administration by virtue of his newly-created office. But the new Sultan had Aitigin assassinated within a month or two and Altunia could expect no reward for his rebellion.

Raziya took advantage of this situation and married Altunia²⁴—an alliance which seemed to be of advantage to both. Raziya expected to win back her freedom and her throne through this alliance, and Altunia saw in it an opportunity to enhance his status. Altunia collected an army of Khokars, Jats and Rajputs²⁵ and won over to his side some disgruntled Turkish nobles—like Malik Qaraqash and Malik Salari—and marched towards Delhi with Raziya. Minhaj describes their end as follows: 'In the month of Rabi I 638/September-October 1240 Sultan Mu'izzuddin Bahram marched against them with an army from Delhi, and Raziya and Altunia were defeated and driven back; when they reached Kaithal all their soldiers deserted them, and they fell into the hands of the Hindus and were martyred. They were defeated on 24 Rabi I 638/14 October 1240 and Raziya was martyred on the following day.'

One of the most significant events of Raziya's reign was an attack of the Carmathians (or Ismailis) under the leadership of Nur Turk.

²⁴ According to Yahya Sirhindi (*Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 29), this marriage took place in Safar 638/September 1240.

²⁵ *Futuhus Salatin*, 132-37. Isami's account, however, is very confused in some respects.

Minhaj's version of the incident is as follows: 'A Carmathian scholar, Nuruddin Turk, generally known as Nur Turk, gathered together one thousand supporters from Delhi, Gujarat, Sind and the Doab. They began to condemn the Hanafi and Shafi'i doctrines and called the Sunni *ulama* 'Nasibi' and 'Murji'. On 6 Rajab 634/5 March 1237, they entered the Jama Masjid from two directions and started killing the people who had assembled there to offer their Friday prayer. When confusion spread, some persons from the city—Nasiruddin Aitam Balrami and Amir Nasiri—came armed with spears, steel caps and shields. They fought with the 'Mulahida' while the people threw stones at them from the roof of the mosque.²⁶

This account of Minhaj was, however, contradicted by Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya in one of his mystic gatherings.²⁷ He said that Maulana Nur Turk was 'purer than rain water'. Since he condemned the *ulama* of the day for their materialistic pursuits, Minhaj and others of his type felt bitterly hostile towards him. May be, this rising of the Carmathians in Delhi had nothing to do with the Maulana Nur Turk referred to by Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya.²⁸

Raziya, according to Minhaj, ruled for 3 years, 6 months and 6 days.²⁹ That she was the ablest of the successors of Iltutmish can hardly be denied. Very soon after her accession she realized that *purdah* was an impediment in the direct and effective control of administrative affairs and abandoned it. She discovered that the ambition of the Turkish nobles was a serious obstacle to the maintenance of law and order and set about to create a nobility of non-Turks as a counterpoise against the Turks. The chain reaction that followed this policy overwhelmed Raziya. The impression that there was something shady in her preference for Jamaluddin Yaqut is absolutely baseless. What antagonized the Turkish maliks and amirs against her were the dangers involved in her policy. No reliance can be placed on the bachelor Isami's misogynist approach in dealing with Raziya's character.

Raziya's capabilities were best demonstrated in her dealings with (a) the recalcitrant provincial governors like Malik Kabir Khan and (b) the Khwarazmian governor of Ghazni, Malik Hasan Qarligh. In 636/1238 Qarligh was dispossessed of his territory by the Mongols and he turned to the western provinces of the sultanat of Delhi. He sent his son to Delhi, probably to negotiate some sort of military

²⁶ Minhaj, 189-90.

²⁷ *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, 189.

²⁸ For detailed discussion see, Nizami, *Life and Times of Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-i Shakar*, 31-32; *Salatin-i Delhi Kay Mazhabi Rujhanat*, 136-39.

²⁹ Minhaj, 392.

alliance. Raziya received him with courtesy, and though she assigned the revenues of Baran for his expenses,³⁰ she declined to form a coalition against the Mongols. This was a sound political decision and saved the sultanat from a Mongol invasion.

MU'IZZUDDIN BAHRAM SHAH

Mu'izzuddin Bahram Shah ascended the throne on 27 Ramazan 637/21 April 1240, when Raziya was imprisoned at Tabarhinda. The maliks and the amirs pledged allegiance to him at the Daulat Khanah on 11 Shawwal 637/5 May 1240.³¹ The historians of the minor Abbasid caliphs have distinguished between two types of wazirs—the ordinary wazir and 'the absolute wazir' (*wazir-i mutlaq*). The absolute wazir could be appointed and dismissed by the caliph, but he was in sole charge of the administration with which the caliph had no right to interfere. This arrangement did not succeed; either the caliph had the absolute wazir assassinated or the absolute wazir planned to have the caliph killed. The policy of Raziya naturally drove the Turkish slave-officers to the conclusion that it would be best if the actual control of the administration was taken away from the Sultan and vested in one of themselves, so that their unchallenged supremacy in the administration may be assured. So a new post, that of *naib-i mamlakat* (also called *malik naib* or *naib-i mulk*), equivalent to the English term 'regent', was created. Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Aitigin was selected for the post; the election of Mu'izzuddin Bahram was made subject to his accepting Aitigin as the *naib*, and the oath of allegiance was taken both to the Sultan and to the *naib*. At the same time the post of wazir to be held by Muhazzabuddin was also maintained. So there were three claimants to the same power, and any one even with a superficial knowledge of the character of the persons concerned would have guaranteed the failure of the experiment. The post of the *naib* was really incompatible with the institution of monarchy, but we find it appearing and disappearing during the sultanat period.

Sultan Mu'izzuddin Bahram Shah, according to Minhaj, was a king with some commendable qualities; he was shy, informal and had no liking either for the formal dress or the outward pomp of kingship. But he was also a terroristic and fearless shedder of blood. Still the nobles had only known him as a prince without any authority, and they committed the terrible mistake of thinking that he could be kept on the throne while deprived of the control of the government. It only took him two months or less to show that he was the master—

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 392.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 191.

not a good master perhaps, but a master nonetheless. He, too, was a killer among killers.

Soon after his appointment as *naib*, Aitigin took all the strings of the administration in his own hands. Amongst his supporters was the wazir, Nizamul Mulk Khwaja Muhazzabuddin Muhammad Iwaz. In order to further strengthen his position Aitigin married a divorced sister of the Sultan, and put a *naubat* and an elephant at his gate, though these were considered to be the exclusive prerogatives of the Sultan. Before a couple of months had passed Mu'izzuddin Bahram began to feel uneasy at the ambitious behaviour of Aitigin and decided to get rid of him. On 8 Muharram 638/30 July 1240, a religious discourse was arranged in the *Qasr-i Safed* and Aitigin was also invited to it. Instigated by the Sultan, two Turkish assassins stabbed him to death in the audience hall. The wazir, Muhazzabuddin, was also attacked but he recovered from his wounds.³² All this happened in Delhi when Raziya was moving towards the capital along with Altunia in order to get back her throne.

Mu'izzuddin Bahram had appointed Badruddin Sanqar Rumi as his *amir-i hajib* but very soon afterwards he began to suspect him. Malik Sanqar also grew apprehensive of the Sultan and began to look for an opportunity to remove him. On 17 Safar 639/27 August 1241, he convened a secret meeting at the residence of the *mushrif-i mamalik* Sadrul Mulk Saiyyid Tajuddin Ali Musawi, to which the *qazi-i mamalik* Jalaluddin Kashani, Qazi Kabiruddin, Shaikh Muhammad Shami and some other amirs were invited. It was also decided to invite the wazir, Nizamul Mulk Muhazzabuddin, to the meeting, and the Sadrul Mulk was sent to fetch him for this purpose. When the Sadrul Mulk called on the wazir, a confidant of the Sultan was there with him, and the wazir hid him at a place where he could hear the Sadrul Mulk. When the Sadrul Mulk reported the purpose of his visit to the wazir, he told the former that he would start after performing his ablutions. In the meantime the Sultan's confidant rushed to the Sultan to report the conspiracy to him. Mu'izzuddin was quick to act before the conspirators could disperse and he rounded them up. The Sultan probably considered himself too weak to inflict any severe punishments on them. All that he could do was either to transfer or dismiss the rebels. Badruddin Sanqar was sent as *iqtdar* to Badaun. Qazi Jalaluddin Kashani was dismissed from the office of the qazi. Qazi Kabiruddin and Shaikh Muhammad Shami left the city in nervousness.

Badruddin Sanqar was, however, not prepared to pass his days in

³² *Ibid.*, 192.

the obscurity of Badaun. Within four months he returned to Delhi and was immediately thrown into prison. Subsequently, he and Saiyyid Tajuddin Ali Musawi were both put to death. The murder of these nobles frightened other amirs and a gulf began to develop between them and the Sultan. The wazir exploited the situation to deepen discontent against the Sultan.

To contemporaries the most significant event of Bahram's reign was the evacuation of Lahore by Ikhtiyaruddin Qaraqash on 16 Jamadi II 639/22 December 1241, and its sack by the Mongols on the following day.³³ It was a hideous fact but contemporaries overrated its significance. We have to set it in its proper perspective.

The conquest of northern India was never a Mongol objective till Dawa and Qaidu formed their short-lived empire during the Khalji period. During the reign of Ogatai (1227-41) all the resources of the Mongol empire in men and material, which were after all not unlimited, were used for an advance in eastern Europe. Still plundering was a regular source of income for the Mongol empire and its officers had complete discretionary power in the matter.

When Jalaluddin Mankbarni said farewell to Afghanistan, he left the region in charge of Malik Saifuddin Hasan and his Qarligh followers; and Saifuddin established his unstable regime over Kirman (the former capital of Yalduz), Ghazni and Bunyan.³⁴ All these places had been subjected to plunder and massacres under the supervision of Ogatai himself, but the industry of the countryside peasantry may have produced something still. Seeing no other alternative, Saifuddin Qarligh submitted to the Mongols, paid a tribute and accepted Mongols *shuhnas* as 'residents' at his court; and the same policy was followed by the maliks of Ghur and Khurasan. Meanwhile Malik Tajuddin Niyaltigin, a Khwarazmian officer, had made himself powerful in Sistan and the Mongols besieged him in the *ark* (fort) of Sistan for nineteen months (1228-29); the garrison died of a strange epidemic which killed its victims in three days, and the few who survived the epidemic and the long siege were killed by the Mongols.³⁵ This was roughly the situation in the region to the north-west of India at the time of Ogatai's accession.

Oudarwarta, the chief Mongol commander, died during the siege of Sistan, and Tair Bahadur, who had shown considerable valour

³³ *Ibid.*, 195. But elsewhere (396) he puts the sack of Lahore in Jamadi I A.H. 639.

³⁴ It is impossible to identify Bunyan and Kirman with any existing places; they seem to have disappeared or else their names have been changed. It is impossible to accept Raverty's contention that 'Binan' was in the Salt Range; Minhaj definitely implies that it was somewhere in Afghanistan.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 388-91.

during the operations, was appointed by Ogatai in his place. We may safely assume that Tair Bahadur had large discretionary powers and complete control of his subordinates; nevertheless, he had to depend upon his own resources. So we find him doing nothing for some years. But in A.H. 637 (1239-40) he summoned all his forces and suddenly attacked Saifuddin Qarligh; Saifuddin was defeated and left Ghazni, Kirman and Bunyan in the hands of Mongol agents (*gumashtas*) and fled towards Multan and Sind.³⁶

The Mongol conquest of Lahore has been referred to by Minhaj at several places, but his detailed description is as follows.³⁷

'In the year A.H. 639 (12 July 1241-42) it was decided that the Mongol armies should march on Lahore. Mu'izzuddin Bahram was king of Delhi, Kabir Khan Ayaz was governor of Multan and Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Qaraqash was governor of Lahore. When Tair Bahadur, who was controller (*mutasarrif*) of Herat and Badghiz, and other *noyans*, who were controllers of Ghur, Ghazni, Garmsir and Tukharistan, reached the bank of the Indus, Kabir Khan, in order to maintain his dignity put the *chatr* (canopy) over his head, collected his soldiers and prepared for a holy war (as an independent ruler). When this news reached the camp of the Mongols, their determination to march on Lahore was confirmed and they reached the gates of the city.

'There were neither provisions nor arms at Lahore nor any unity of hearts among its citizens. Many of the inhabitants were merchants, who had travelled in the northern regions, like Khurasan and Turkistan, during the Mongol regime, and out of regard for their future welfare every one of them had obtained a security tablet (*paiza*) from the Mongol authorities. Owing to this (false) sense of security, they did not help Malik Qaraqash in defending the fort-walls or fighting the Mongols. As the Turkish and Ghurid amirs were afraid of Bahram Shah, they would not collect together and no timely help could reach Lahore from Delhi. The struggle before the gates of Lahore continued for a long time; the Mongols placed *munjaniqs* round the Lahore fort and smashed its ramparts. Malik Qaraqash fought to the limits of his capacity, but he knew of the differences of opinion among the citizens, and the qazis and other distinguished men, whom he appointed to protect the rampart, were guilty of gross negligence. Qaraqash concluded that it was beyond his power to protect the city and that the affair would end in disaster. So under the pretext of making a night-attack, he came out of the city (on 16 Jamadi II 639/22 December 1241), broke through the Mongol army by a sudden onslaught and

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 392.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 392-96.

started for Delhi. But in the darkness of the night Qaraqash's own *haram* was separated from him, and some of his followers slipped down from their horses in the tumultuous darkness and hid themselves among the graveyards or in deep caverns. Many of his soldiers and persons from his own *haram* were killed.'

Next day when the citizens and the remaining soldiers of the Lahore garrison came to know of Qaraqash's flight, they were quite broken hearted. The Mongols captured the city and began their massacres in every *muhalla*. The inhabitants had no alternative but to fight back. Minhaj tells us of two groups, one led by the kotwal, Aqsanqar, and the other led by Dindar Muhammad, the *amir-i akhur*, who fought as long as breath remained in their bodies. Aqsanqar came face to face with Tair Bahadur and each inflicted a mortal spear-wound on the other 'so that Tair went to hell while Aqsanqar hurried to paradise'. Minhaj asserts that the Mongol loss was heavy. About 30,000 to 40,000 horsemen and at least 80,000 horses were killed. 'There was no one in the Mongol camp who had not suffered from a wound of spear, sword or arrow; many of their *bahadurs* and *noyans* were sent to hell.'

To the surprise of every one the Mongols retreated after the sack of Lahore. Then the Khokars and other tribesmen came to the city to find if anything worth seizing had been left. But they were put to the sword by Qaraqash who had returned. While flying from Lahore he had hidden gold-ingots and other state-treasure at a well-marked place under the water of the Ravi; it was not discovered by the Mongols and he got it all back. 'On the second day after the Mongol conquest of Lahore, merchants from Khurasan and Trans-Oxiana brought the news that Ogatai was dead.'³⁸ The *Yasas* of the Mongols demanded that all campaigns must stop at the death of the Qa-an. The central government of the Mongols came, in accordance with the *Yasas*, under the control of Ogatai's senior widow, Turakina Khatun, till the election of the next Qa-an. Minhaj is not correct in stating that Mongol custom required all campaigns to stop for a year and a half (which the Mongols consider equal to three years) after the death of the Qa-an, but that was probably the accepted opinion at Delhi.

Kabir Khan Ayaz had repudiated his allegiance to Delhi, but he died in A.H. 639 (1241-42), apparently soon after the sack of Lahore. He was succeeded by his son, Tajuddin Abu Bakr Ayaz. Tajuddin was a brave fighter; he defeated the Qarlighs several times before the gate of Multan and is said to have brought the whole of Sind under his

control. But he was destined to die young and with him the short-lived Ayazi dynasty of Sind disappeared.

Sultan Mu'izzuddin considered this an opportune moment to demand fresh expressions of loyalty and allegiance from the leaders of the people. He assembled them in the *Qasr-i Safed* and asked Minhajus Siraj to address them. A seasoned orator and preacher as Minhaj was, he soon moved the people to a pitch that they pledged their allegiance anew to the Sultan. Mu'izzuddin, however, could not enjoy their fealty for long. His excessive devotion to a religious eccentric, Ayyub, at whose instance he threw Qazi Shamsuddin of Mihr under the feet of an elephant, alienated the sympathies of the people and made them definitely hostile to him.

The Sultan despatched Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri and Khwaja Muhazzabuddin, along with other amirs, to check the advance of the Mongols and guard the north-western frontier. When the royal forces reached the bank of the Bias, Khwaja Muhazzabuddin sent a secret message to the Sultan saying: 'These amirs and Turks will never become obedient. It is advisable that an edict be issued by your Majesty directing myself and Qutbuddin Hasan to destroy all the amirs and Turks by readily available methods so that the country may be clear (of them).' It was a master stroke of duplicity for enraging the Turkish nobles against the Sultan. Mu'izzuddin, without giving to all aspects of the matter the careful consideration it deserved, wrote an edict to this effect and despatched it to the camp. Muhazzabuddin's trick was successful. He showed the edict to the Turkish amirs, who in their extreme anger even pledged themselves to Sultan Mu'izzuddin's dethronement at the suggestion of Muhazzabuddin. As soon as the Sultan came to know of this insurrection of the amirs, he sent Shaikhul Islam Saiyyid Qutbuddin to pacify the army. Shaikhul Islam, however, changed his mind when he reached the rebel camp, and not only expressed his sympathy with the amirs but returned to the capital with the rebellious army. Minhajus Siraj and some other *ulama* were asked to allay the sedition and bring round the rebellious army, but all their persuasions failed. Hostilities went on from February to May 1242, and there were considerable casualties on both sides. According to Minhaj, it was due to the evil influence of a *farrash*, Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah Farrukhi, over the Sultan that no amicable settlement could be arrived at. Minhajus Siraj himself was assailed for his support to the Sultan. Khwaja Muhazzabuddin hired assassins and paid them 3,000 *jitals* in order to attack him, but he was saved by his slaves.

On 8 Ziqad 639/10 May 1242, the amirs and the Turks occupied the town and imprisoned Mu'izzuddin Bahram Shah. On the 13th of

the same month he was put to death. The total period of his reign was two years, one month and a half.

SULTAN ALAUDDIN MAS'UD SHAH

Malik Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan (sometimes referred to as Balban-i Buzurg or the elder Balban) was one of the most ambitious of the Turkish slave-officers. He claimed to be the leader of the rebels, and since his troops entered Delhi on the first day of the capitulation of the city, he took advantage of that fact to capture the royal residence of Iltutmish, which our authorities refer to as the *Daulat Khana*, but which seems to have consisted of two palaces, the *Qasr-i Safed* and the *Qasr-i Firuzah*. Having taken possession of the palaces, Kishlu Khan mounted the throne and ordered himself to be proclaimed king. The Turkish slave-officers had killed two successors of Iltutmish and were about to kill the third. But they were not prepared either for a change of dynasty or for recognizing the legality of the way in which Kishlu Khan had seized the throne—i.e. merely by seizing the palaces and without the consent of his Turkish fellow-officers. The rebel nobles, such as Ikhtiyaruddin, governor of Kuhram, Tajuddin Sanjar Qutluq, Nusratuddin Itmar and other amirs met at the mausoleum of Iltutmish. Kishlu Khan had been proclaimed king only once when they ordered the proclamation to stop. Kishlu realizing his weakness joined the other nobles and gave up his claim to the throne in return for one elephant and the governorship of Nagaur.

The nobles then set free three *Shahzadas*—Nasiruddin, Jalaluddin and Alauddin Mas'ud—and 'took them from the *Qasr-i Safed* (White Palace) to the *Qasr-i Firuzah* (Turquoise Palace) in the *Daulat Khana*'. They proclaimed Alauddin Mas'ud, son of Ruknuddin Firuz Shah, as king and called upon the people to accept him. The next item on their programme was the distribution of central offices and *iqtas*. Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri was appointed *naib-i mamlakat* and Khwaja Muhazzabuddin Nizamul Mulk was made wazir and Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Qaraqash was appointed *amir-i hajib*. Qazi Imaduddin Muhammad Shafurqani replaced Minhajus Siraj as Head Qazi.³⁹

³⁹ It was the policy of our author, Minhaj, to keep on good terms with all parties, but it was not possible for him to remain in office during Muhazzabuddin's regime. He tells us that he resigned the office of the Chief Qazi four days after the fall of Delhi, and though Muhazzabuddin had been killed, Shafurqani could not be dismissed. So on 9 Rajab A.H. 640 (2 January 1243) our author started for his two years' journey to Lakhnauti. He expresses his gratitude to Tajuddin Qutluq, the governor of Badaun, and to Qamruddin Qiran Tamar Khan, the governor of Awadh. Izzuddin Tughril Tughan Khan, the governor of Lakhnauti, had invaded Kara with his army and boats. Under a normal government this would have meant high treason. But that was not

These appointments apart, adjustments were also made in the *iqtas* and assignments held by some important maliks. Nagaur, Mandor and Ajmer were assigned to Malik Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan; Badaun was made over to Malik Tajuddin Sanjar Qutluq.

Khwaja Muhazzabuddin, inordinately ambitious as he was, assumed considerable power and authority. He established a *naubat* and put an elephant at his door. He also appropriated Koil to his *iqta*. He had incited the Turkish amirs against Bahram Shah but now 'he deprived them of all power'. He should have known better the persons he was dealing with; the Turkish slave-officers treated each other like brothers—as the case of Kishlu Khan had shown—but they would tolerate no nonsense from a Tazik. So on 2 Jamadi I 640/28 October 1242 they united to slay him in the army-camp on the plain before the city by the side of Hauz Rani (Rani Tank). The office of the wazir was then entrusted to Sadrul Mulk Najmuddin Abu Bakr; Bahauddin Balban, who had got Hansi for his *iqta* after the fall of Delhi, was appointed *amir-i hajib* and Malik Qaraqash, the former *amir-i hajib*, was sent to Bayana as its governor.

Bahauddin Balban, who obtained the title of Ulugh Khan and the post of *naib-i mamlakat*, including the complete command of the army, on 7 October 1249, was one of the later additions to the Turkish slave-officers of Iltutmish. We know nothing for certain about his origin. During the turmoil of the Mongol invasion he was brought from Turkistan to Baghdad and purchased by Khwaja Jamaluddin Basri. Jamaluddin brought him along with other Turkish slaves by way of Gujarat to Delhi in A.H. 630 (1232-33). According to Minhaj, Iltutmish purchased all the other Turkish slaves on account of Bahauddin Balban and after some time appointed him to the post of *khasadar*. Among the Turkish slave-officers of India he also met his uterine brother, Saifuddin Aibek, who later on got the title of Kashli Khan; his father's brother's son, Nusratuddin Sher Khan, had also been purchased by Iltutmish. This is the only group of blood-relations which we find among the known Turkish slave-officers.⁴⁰

Minhaj's concern. Tughan gave him a right royal reception and took him to Lakhnauti. He was to return to Delhi under strange circumstances.

40 On the principle that gratitude is a necessary virtue, Minhaj has given a biography of his patron at the end of his *Tabaqa* on the *Shamsi Maliks* (281-324). This is what Minhaj tells us, but not from his personal knowledge. 'The father of Ulugh Khan and the father of Sher Khan were sons of the same mother and father. They were descended from the Ilbari Khans and were khans of ten-thousand households. Their descent is well known among the Ilhari Turks of Turkistan. At present (i.e. in A.D. 1280) the sons of their uncles are ruling the tribe as its chiefs. *I have heard this from Karbat Khan Sanjar.*' Several objections may be raised against this account. The author, an expert theologian and judge, fabricates evidence but takes

During the reign of Ruknuddin Firuz, Ulugh Khan fled to Hindustan with some other Turks and was captured and thrown into prison. During the reign of Raziya, he was again appointed *khasadar* and later on became *amir-i shikar*. The reign of Bahram Shah brought him the office of *amir-i akhur*. Malik Badruddin Sanqar Rumi, who was *amir-i hajib* at the time, took a paternal interest in him; Bahauddin Balban was appointed to the *iqta* of Rewari and sent there. When the officers besieged Bahram Shah in Delhi, Balban surpassed all Turkish and Tazik rebels in the courage he displayed. His immediate reward was the governorship of Hansi; after the murder of Muhazzabuddin he was appointed *amir-i hajib*.

Since the wazir did not count and the post of *naib-i mamlakat* seems to have vanished for the time-being, Bahauddin Balban had no rival at the court and he could guide the young Sultan as he thought best. It is necessary to examine the character and policy of the politician who was, with one short interval, to be the power behind the throne for the next quarter of a century and the Sultan of Delhi for two decades. Since he won no great battle and designed no classic campaigns, like Alauddin Khalji, we cannot list him among India's organizers of victory. Since to the very end of his life he retained all the prejudices and shortcomings of the Turkish slave-aristocracy, to which he belonged, and looked with great contempt at the children of the soil, we cannot class him among the great rulers of India. After all, there is no great or good work we can remember him by. But though extremely ambitious, he was gifted with wisdom, foresight and caution—specially with caution, for while doing nothing great or good, he never took a false step. The fate of Ikhtiyaruddin Aitigin had been a sufficient warning of the dangers that lay in the attempt at a rapid climb to power. Balban would proceed differently.

due care that the fabrication should be discovered by careful readers. Karbat Khan, who owed his appointment as *iqtadar* of Awadh to Ulugh Khan, is quoted as Minhaj's authority; but since Karbat Khan had been dead for over a decade, no reference to him by contemporaries would be possible. In a biographical note (No. 15) on Karbat Khan in the same *Tabaqa*, Minhaj definitely says that he was a Qipchaq (North Caspian) Turk; if so, he would have no means of knowing the conditions of Turkistan. The statement that Balban's cousins were ruling as chiefs in Turkistan in A.D. 1260 really confesses that the author is fabricating a legend.

Isami (173), who knew that Sultan Ghiyasuddin Balban was to annihilate the dynasty of his master, credits Iltutmish with insight into the future and says that he refused to purchase Balban owing to the mischievous ambition that was visible on his face. But the wazir, Junaidi, purchased him on behalf of the Sultan and Iltutmish accepted this as a decision of fate. Balban was first assigned duty in the royal stables, but there was a protest from the Turkish officers on the ground that this duty was too degrading for one of them and Balban's status was raised.

He would build up a party of his own among the Turkish officers, who dominated the court and controlled the provinces, and then wait patiently for what the future had in store. But if Bahauddin Balban formed a party of his own, an opposition party was also sure to appear. Minhaj does not try to hide the fact that his success excited the resentment of his peers. 'The political status (*kar-i daulat*) of Ulugh Khan rose so that other maliks began to envy his good fortune and the thorns of jealousy began to pierce their hearts. But God had decided that he would be greater than others; so while their jealousy increased, the fragrance of the aloes-wood of his power also increased in the censer of time.'⁴¹

Alauddin Mas'ud is praised by all historians for appointing 'with the consent of all the maliks and amirs' his uncle's sons,⁴² Jalaluddin and Nasirudin, to the governorships of Kanauj and Bahraich respectively on 1 Shawwal A.H. 640 (24 March 1243). There was, however, another aspect of the affair. Two *shahzadas* of the family of Iltutmish were now available as 'alternatives' to the Sultan, if need arose. Balban was to derive the greatest advantage from this fact, though all Turkish officers agreed in the matter.

Meanwhile there were troubles both in the east and the west of the kingdom.

When Iltutmish dismissed Malik Alauddin J̄ani from the governorship of Lakhnauti, he appointed to that high post a slave of his, Saifuddin Aibek, whom he had purchased from the heirs of Ikhtiyaruddin Chust Qaba and given the title of 'Yaghan Tut'. 'Yaghan Tut', who had been governor of Bihar, moved on to Lakhnauti, and Malik Izzuddin Tughril Tughan Khan, another Turkish slave-officer, was appointed to Bihar.⁴³ When 'Yaghan Tut' died in A.H. 631 (7 October 1233-24), Iltutmish appointed Tughan Khan to succeed him.

After the death of Iltutmish, Aibek Aur Khan, a brave but hasty Turk, who was *muqta* of (the city of) Lakhnauti, fought a battle with Tughan Khan, but was slain by an arrow-shot of the latter. 'This brought both sides of Lakhnauti, one known as Ral on the side of Lahkot and the other known as Birand on the side of Deokot, within the control of Tughan Khan.'⁴⁴ Tughan sent his messengers to Raziya and was distinguished by the grant of a *chatr* (canopy) and the red

⁴¹ Minhaj, 286. Minhaj only refers to our hero as Bahauddin Ulugh Khan Balban; the title of 'Ghiyasuddin' was taken by Balban at his accession and is not used by Minhaj.

⁴² Reading *har du banī 'amam* (two uncle's sons) for *har du'am* (both uncles) in the printed text of Minhaj, 199.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, *Tabaqa* 22, No. 5.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 243.

banner. Tughan got plenty of spoils by plundering Tirhut, but he sent presents to Delhi and remained loyal during the reign of Bahram Shah.

'But at the beginning of the reign of Alauddin Mas'ud, Tughan's adviser (*kad-khuda*), Bahandri Hilal Saudani, advised him to capture the territories of Awadh, Kara, Manikpur and even to entertain higher ambitions.' In days gone by when Tughan was *amir-i akhur*, Iltutmish had appointed Malik Qamruddin Qiran Tamar Khan as his deputy (i.e. as *naib-i amir-i akhur*). This had led to an intense hatred between them. On the death of Nusratuddin Taisi, Raziya had appointed Tamar governor of Awadh, and Tughan's movements against the territories of the sultanat may have been due to his hatred of Tamar; but he was unable to achieve anything and went back to Lakhnauti.

About 1243 the Rai of Jainagar, Nara Sinha I, began to molest the frontiers of Lakhnauti. Tughan marched into the territory of Jainagar or Orissa and got defeated on 17 April 1244, at a place which Minhaj (who was present) calls 'Katanin'. Tughan Khan appealed to Delhi for help and Tamar Khan was ordered to march to his assistance. Next year the Oriya army took the offensive. They slew Karimuddin Laghiri, the *muqta* of Lahkot and a number of Musalmans and reached the gates of Lakhnauti on 17 April 1244. But just then fast messengers brought the news that help was coming from Delhi and the Oriya army retreated.

Tamar fought a battle outside Lakhnauti with Tughan, whom he had been sent to support, and succeeded in driving Tughan into the city. Tughan asked our historian, Minhaj, to settle terms of peace. It was arranged that Tughan would hand over the province of Lakhnauti to Tamar and go back to Delhi with the officers who had been sent with Tamar. They reached Delhi on 23 July 1244; Tughan was well received and appointed to the vacant governorship of Awadh. Two great provinces of the sultanat had changed hands, and the central government had no control over the matter. Both Tamar and Tughan died on the same night about two years later.⁴⁵

The affairs in the west were managed better. Kabir Khan had

⁴⁵ For biographies of Tughan and Tamar, see Minhaj, *Tabaqa* 22. Minhaj could not be reappointed to his old post because it was not vacant, but he was appointed Director of the Nasiriah College with the power of managing all its endowments; simultaneously he could be appointed qazi of Gwalior, for the simple reason that Gwalior was not within the empire; but what endeared him to the public were his sermons (*tazkir*) in the Jama Mosque of Dehli. Years later Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya expressed his appreciation of these sermons. His appointment to the two posts was due to the recommendations of Bahauddin Balban.

declared himself independent at Uchch. But neither he nor his son, Abu Bakr, were destined to enjoy their independence obtained through treason to the Delhi sultanat. After Abu Bakr's death, Uchch had been in charge of a *khwaja-sera*, Aqsanqar, who was *amir-i dad*, and the kotwal, Mughisuddin. It was natural that Mankutah, a Mongol general, should march to the capital of this disorganized principality, which had cast off the yoke of Delhi but had no king of its own, in A.H. 643 (1245-46). It was even more natural that the surviving officers of the Ayazi dynasty should once more desire to come under the protection of the Delhi sultanat. Though other amirs were hesitant, Balban was firm in advising the Sultan to march against the Mongols. His plan was not to fight but to cause Mankutah to fly back by various tricks. And in this he succeeded. On 5 Sha'ban A.H. 643 (27 December 1245) when the Indian army had reached the Ravi at Lahore, news was brought that the Mongols had raised the siege of Uchch and were flying back after setting free their Hindu and Muslim captives. The Delhi army marched up to the river Sodra and reached Delhi again on 12 Zil Hij A.H. 643 (30th April 1246). This campaign brought back Lahore, which had lost its importance for the time-being, along with Uchch and Multan within the Delhi sultanat. It also brought Bahauddin Balban to the forefront. But he was conscious of the jealousy of his fellow Turkish slave-officers and in the next step he took—the conspiracy to replace Sultan Alauddin Mas'ud by Nasiruddin Mahmud—he managed to carry all senior Turkish officers with him and asked nothing for himself.

Minhaj, who had praised Alauddin at his accession as an esteemable prince, now changes his attitude to express the new thoughts of his patron. 'During the last campaign', he tells us,

'a body of worthless people had obtained access to Sultan Alauddin in secret and incited him to undesirable actions. He began to arrest and kill the maliks and was determined on this. His former praiseworthy qualities were changed, and he took to enjoyments, pleasures and hunting to such an extent that it began to affect the work of the government, and the affairs of the state were totally neglected. All maliks and amirs by common agreement wrote secret letters to Sultan Nasiruddin and asked him to come to Delhi.'⁴⁶

'On 23 Muharram A.H. 644 (10 June 1246) after a reign of four years, a month and a day, Alauddin Mas'ud was thrown into prison, where he met the mercy of God.' On the same day his successor ascended the throne.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 201.

IV. SULTAN NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD

GENEALOGY

SULTAN NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD was the grandson of Shamsuddin Iltutmish, and not his son, as is often erroneously stated. Isami, whose ancestors were officers of the Delhi court, is very clear about the matter: 'When *Shahzada* Nasiruddin, son of Iltutmish, the conqueror of Hind, died at Lakhnauti, he left a son who was born after his death.'¹ Ferishta speaks in the same strain. 'The name of the eldest son of Sultan Shamsuddin Iltutmish was Nasiruddin. After he (*Shahzada* Nasiruddin) had died in the territory of Lakhnauti, this son (Sultan Nasiruddin), who was *Shahzada* Nasiruddin's youngest son, was born. Out of love (for his deceased son) Iltutmish gave him the same name and strove to educate him.'² Iltutmish obviously wanted the young baby to be considered his son and not his grandson for dynastic reasons; so we should not be surprised at the fact that he was called the son (*ibn*) of Iltutmish all his life. Minhaj writes: 'Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud, son of the Sultan, partner (*qasim*) of the *Amirul Muminin*, was born after the death of (*Shahzada*) Nasiruddin at Delhi. Iltutmish gave him the name and title of his eldest son and sent his mother to live in a palace in the village of Loni, so that she may bring him up there.'³ Sultan Iltutmish could not have put away his wife for bearing him a son. Nasiruddin Mahmud's mother married a Turkish officer, Qutlugh Khan; this could hardly have been possible for a widow of Iltutmish.

ACCESSION, POLICY AND CHARACTER

We do not know when Nasiruddin was taken from the Loni palace to be interned in the Daulat Khana; if his government of Bahraich was good, the credit must go to the officers in charge, for he was too young to govern a district. Born in 1229, he must have been sixteen or seventeen when the Turkish maliks invited him to Delhi. His mother gave out that he was sick and that she was taking him to the capital for treatment. She put him in her own litter during the day, but at night he put on a veil and rode on a horse. So

¹ Isami (Dr. Mehdi Hasan's edition), 140.

² Ferishta, I, 70. Ferishta obviously implies that *Shahzada* Nasiruddin had left other sons also. *Shahzada* Jalaluddin, to whom references are made hereafter, was probably a step-brother of Sultan Nasiruddin, ,

³ Minhaj, 201-2.

accompanied by a few horsemen and footmen he reached Delhi as soon as possible and only those involved in the conspiracy knew of his coming. On 23 Muharram 644/27 May 1246 he ascended the throne at the *Qasr-i Sabz*; two days later he held a *darbar* in the audience hall of *Qasr-i Firuzah* and the people pledged allegiance to him.

Sultan Nasiruddin is generally painted as a man of saintly disposition, who had little interest in political or administrative affairs, being all the time devoted to prayers and religious observances.⁴ This assessment ignores the basic facts of his life. A deeper analysis of the pulls and pressures of the time leads us to the conclusion that if he turned to religious devotions and rites, it was to escape from the terrors of political life. He was essentially political in outlook, and that he could keep his head on his shoulders for twenty years under these circumstances is no mean compliment to his political tact and adroitness.

During the decade that had passed since Iltutmish's death (1236-46) four princes of the royal dynasty had been placed on the throne and then deposed and put to death. It was a warning to the young man of sixteen; the Shamsi maliks were his sole support; they were also his only source of danger. He was prepared to obey them for he had no other choice. 'He sought the goodwill of the leaders of the army,' Isami tells us, 'and was from his heart the well-wisher of every one of them.' The surrender was absolute. 'He expressed no opinion without their prior permission; he did not move his hands or feet except at their order. He would neither drink water nor go to sleep except with their knowledge.' This led at least to one good result. 'He reigned (or seemed to reign) like a free man and not like the (previous) harassed *Shahzadas*.'⁵ So long as the Shamsi maliks

4 Minhaj attributes to the king every martial, administrative and religious virtue he can think of, but the following sentence with which he ends his praises proves that he did not wish us to take him seriously. 'According to the unanimous opinion of contemporaries (these virtues) were not found in any sultan of the post or in any of the emperors (*muluk*) of ancient times.' (207). Minhaj had to praise both his patrons; so we find him giving the title of 'Sultan' to Bahauddin Balban and of 'Sultanus Salatin' to Nasiruddin Mahmud. In the fifteenth year of the reign Minhaj remarks: 'Though according to the Traditions of the Prophet, Ulugh Khan has the status of a father with reference to the king, he is more obedient and submissive than a thousand newly-purchased slaves.' (320).

5 Isami, unlike Minhaj, does not talk as if there were two sovereigns and the picture he gives is sufficiently clear. 'I have heard', he says, 'that Ulugh Khan served the king and controlled all his affairs; the king lived in the palace and Ulugh Khan governed the empire.' The long list of religious virtues attributed to Nasiruddin by tradition is first put together by Isami. The Sultan took nothing from the public revenue but earned his livelihood by making copies of the Quran and selling them

were united, Nasiruddin had no difficulty; he would sit on the throne and give the orders they recommended to him. But his difficulties would arise if the Shamsi maliks were broken into two nearly balanced parties and he would be risking his neck if he did not join the winning group. But in the early years of his reign his path was clear. Bahauddin Balban was the chief malik at the capital and the Sultan just did what Balban asked him to do. Among other things it was Balban's policy to take the royal standards (which included the Sultan) for a campaign every winter against the Mongols, independent Hindu chiefs or rebellious maliks. Minhaj recounts the events year by year for the first fifteen years and it will be convenient for us to do the same with some necessary digressions.

FIRST REGNAL YEAR, 644 (19 MAY 1246-47)

Bahauddin Balban decided on a military demonstration on the north-western frontier. There was no enemy to fight, but the Khokar chief had acted as a guide to the Mongols, 'for the simple reason that the government of Delhi was unable to protect the Indus frontier'. The royal standards started from Delhi in Rajab (November/December 1246) and the Ravi was crossed on 10 March 1247. The royal standards remained at the Sodra river, but Bahauddin Balban was sent forward to plunder the Salt Range (Koh-i Jud) and the precincts of Ninduna. He reached the Indus but had to return as no cultivated village or town had been left anywhere and no provisions could be obtained for the army. The Sultan started back from the Sodra on 15 March 1247. Balban and his troops probably returned later.

SECOND REGNAL YEAR, 645 (8 MAY 1247-48)

There was a civil war among the Mongols; so Bahauddin Balban decided on a campaign in the Doab. A fort called Talsindah, built by a Hindu chief in the Kanauij district, was taken after a stiff fight. The royal standards reached Kara on 17 March 1248. From here Balban was sent against a Hindu chief, whose name is incorrectly written as 'Dulki wa Mulki'. He was a *rana* in the territory between

secretly. 'He was one of the chosen people of God, always absorbed in thoughts of Allah... Some people say he was a saint, while others put him among the prophets... I have heard so many good things of this famous king that I cannot recount them all' (150-1).

We have no business to question the sincerity of Nasiruddin's religious devotions; where Isami after the passage of a century saw so much smoke, there must have been some fire. But no one claims that Nasiruddin, like the Umayyad Caliph Umar II, considered administrative matters on the basis of any religious principles or that he had any influence on the policy of the state.

the Jumna and Kalinjar.' The rana defended his place from morning to sunset and fled at night. What he could not take away fell into Balban's hands. The royal standards reached Delhi on 20 May 1248. Minhaj says that he wrote a short book of verse on the campaign, called *Nasir-i Namah*; and in reward for it the king gave him an annual *in'am* (gift), which he had been getting regularly, and Balban gave him a village in Hansi, the income of which was 30,000 *jitals*. Jalaluddin Mas'ud Shah, the king's step-brother, who was the *muqta* of Kanauj, came to see him and was granted the *iqtas* of Sambhal and Badaun. But after some time a sudden fear seized him and he fled from Sambhal to Santurgarh in the Sirmur hills, where he could expect the protection of the rana of the place.

THIRD REGNAL YEAR, 646 (26 APRIL 1248-49)

The king did not go far, but Balban and the maliks were sent with a large army to attack Ranthambhor and to plunder the *Kohpayah* of Mewat and the territories of Bahar Deva, who was 'the greatest of the rais of Hindustan'. Minhaj's account does not hide the fact that the campaign was a failure. Malik Bahauddin Aibek was killed by the Hindus at the foot of the Ranthambhor fort while Balban was fighting on another side. The discomfited army reached Delhi on 18 May 1249.

Charges were brought against the chief qazi of the empire, Imaduddin Shafurqani, and he was dismissed from his post at the *Qasr-i Safed* on 29 March 1249; Qazi Jalal Kashani was appointed in his place on 11 June 1250.

FOURTH REGNAL YEAR, 647 (16 APRIL 1249-50)

There was, according to Minhaj, a general desire that the daughter of Bahauddin Balban should be the queen or *malka-i jahan*; so she was married to the king on 2 August 1249. The following appointments were made on 16 October 1249. Bahauddin Balban was given the office of regent or *naib-i mamlakat* 'with full power to control the army and the administration', and in consonance with his new post his status was raised from that of a malik to that of a 'Khan'. The title *Ulugh Khan* or Premier Khan was considered most appropriate. Ulugh's younger brother, Saifuddin Aibek, who had formerly been *amir-i akhur*, was appointed to the post of *amir-i hafib*, now vacated by Ulugh and enrolled among the Khans with the title of Kashli Khan. Malik Tajuddin Tabar Khan was appointed *naib-i amir-i hafib* and Alauddin Ayaz Raihani (son of the historian Minhaj) was appointed *naib-i vakildar*. Ikhtiyaruddin Aibek *Mui-daraz* (of the long hair) was promoted from the post of *naib-i amir-i akhur* to that of

amir-i akhur. These appointments along with others, which Minhaj has not recorded, must have made Ulugh Khan all-powerful at the centre. It was high time for his rivals to move also. His early achievements, according to Minhaj, had made other (Turkish) maliks envious of him and the thorns of jealousy were rankling in their hearts.⁶

STRUGGLE OF IZZUDDIN BALBAN KISHLU KHAN WITH SHER KHAN

At the accession of Alauddin Mas'ud, Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan⁷ (also known as Balban-i Buzurg and Balban-i Zar, 'Balban of the White Hair') had given up his right to the throne, such as it was, in return for the territories of Nagaur, Mandor and the Siwaliks. When Ulugh Khan led Alauddin Mas'ud and his forces to the frontier and drove away the Mongol Mankutah, he assigned Multan to Kishlu Khan, and Lahore and Tabarhinda (Bhatinda) to his own uncle's son, Malik Nusratuddin Sher Khan Sanqar. Ferishta, on the authority of Barani, credits Sher Khan with the construction of the forts of Bhatinda and Bhatnir.⁸ Uchch, for the time-being, seems to have been left in the hands of the officers of the extinct Ayazi dynasty.

Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan came to Delhi and demanded Uchch and Multan in return for Nagaur and the Siwaliks. The king acceded to his demand, but after seizing Uchch and Multan he refused to hand over Nagaur, and the Sultan and Ulugh Khan had to march against him to secure his submission.

Nasiruddin Hasan Qarligh, whose position as the successor of Jalaluddin Mankbarni had been extremely difficult, attacked Multan by way of Bunyan but died during the struggle.⁹ His followers, however, kept his death a secret and succeeded in persuading Kishlu Khan to hand over Multan to them peacefully. When Kishlu found out their deception, it was too late, for the fort was in the hands of the Qarlighs. Sher Khan, however, succeeded in seizing the fort from the Qarlighs and put his own officers in charge of it. Kishlu

⁶ Minhaj, *Tabaqa* 22 on the Turkish Maliks, No. 24, Biography of Ulugh Khan.

⁷ To prevent confusion between the two Balbans, some medieval historians refer to Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan as Balban-i Buzurg or the senior Balban and to Bahauddin Balban Ulugh Khan (later Sultan Ghiyasuddin Balban) as Balban-i Khurd or the junior Balban. It is more convenient to refer to them by the titles they held as Kishlu Khan and Ulugh Khan. Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan must be carefully distinguished from Ulugh Khan's younger brother, Saifuddin, who had the title of Kashli Khan.

⁸ Vol. I, 70.

⁹ Bunyan is often referred to in the course of this reign. It was probably a town in Afghanistan, which has now disappeared.

retaliated by laying siege to Multan for two months in 1250 but his failure was complete.¹⁰ Sher Khan then laid siege to Uchch; the garrison closed the gates and prepared to fight. But Kishlu Khan, who happened to be outside Uchch at the time, went straight to Sher Khan's camp, relying upon that tie of brotherhood among the Shamsi maliks, which demanded that they should deal fairly with each other 'since they were of one family and of one "nest."' Sher Khan treated him well but would not set him free till he had ordered his officers in Uchch to hand over the citadel to Sher Khan. When this had been done, Sher Khan allowed him to proceed to Delhi. Ulugh gave to Kishlu Badaun as his *iqta*. The Siwaliks in future years are referred to as the *iqtas* of Ulugh Khan.

FIFTH AND SIXTH REGNAL YEARS,
648-649 (5 APRIL 1250-52)

Qazi Jalaluddin Kashani died in February 1251, and on 31 July 1251, Minhaj was appointed Head Qazi for a second time and also given the judicial government (*masnad-i hukumat*) of Delhi. 'On 25 Sha'ban A.H. 649 (12 November 1251) the royal standards moved towards Gwalior, Chanderi, Narnol and Malwa. Malwa was nearly reached during this campaign. Jahar (Deva) of Ijar, the greatest rai of the region, who had five thousand horsemen and two lakhs of footmen, was defeated and the fort of Narnol, which he had constructed, was conquered and destroyed.' It was a mere plundering raid and does not seem to have destroyed Jahar Deva's power.

The position at the end of 1250 was briefly as follows. The central government was under the control of Ulugh Khan as *naib-i mamlakat* and his younger brother, Kashli Khan, as *amir-i hajib*; the whole of Sind had come within the power of their cousin, Sher Khan, while distant Lakhnauti was in the hands of an erratic and disloyal officer, Yuzbek Tughril Khan, for whose appointment Ulugh Khan had been responsible. Apart from his over-all control of the empire, Ulugh Khan had been assigned the territories of Hansi and the Siwaliks and some minor regions; Nagaur, taken from Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan, had been assigned to Ulugh Khan's younger brother, Saifuddin Kashli Khan. What then of the rights of other

¹⁰ Minhaj tells us that he received a letter from his sister, who was somewhere in Khurasan, telling him of her distress. The king and Ulugh Khan provided him with 40 slaves and 100 ass-loads of goods to send to his sister. He had to proceed in the summer of 1250 to arrange for their transport from Multan to Khurasan. He met Sher Khan somewhere on the Bias. On the day he reached Multan, Izzuddin Balban also arrived to besiege it. He had no alternative but to remain in Izzuddin's camp. 'The heat was intense.' (290).

Turkish slave-officers?¹¹ Surely too much political power and territory had been monopolized by one family group and its allies, and it seemed to many Turkish officers that a readjustment was necessary.

SEVENTH REGNAL YEAR, 650 (14 MARCH 1252-53)

The chief topic of the remaining nine years of Nasiruddin's reign, of which Minhaj has left us an account, is the struggle of the two groups of Turkish khans and maliks for power, and it is necessary to examine his approach to the problem. 'Gratitude is a necessary virtue', he says, and since he owed more to Ulugh Khan than to any one else, he naturally praises Ulugh Khan more than others. But he was under obligations to almost all Turkish maliks, and so far as possible he overlooks their crimes even when they amounted, as in the case of Sher Khan and Kishlu Khan, to an attempt to deflect the Mongol invasions from Persia and China to northern India. Further, since he proposed to publish his book during his life-time, he had to protect himself and the interests of his family against any unforeseen changes in the Turkish political regime. On the other hand, he was under no obligation to Imaduddin Raihan, an Indian political adventurer, who had no following either among the Turkish officers or the public, and had been dead for about eight years when Minhaj brought his book to a close. The great maliks of the opposition party, though defeated, were still alive, and Minhaj had no desire to be unfair to them. But the dead Raihan could be blamed for all their faults and nobody was concerned to defend him.

The chief opponent of Ulugh Khan was Husamuddin Qutlugh Khan, son of Alauddin Jani, Iltutmish's governor of Bihar; he was considered by many to be the most senior of the Turkish maliks. Qutlugh's chief supporter was his son-in-law, Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan, whom Sher Khan had deprived of his frontier provinces. The rest were trimmers, who were induced in the end to cast their lot with Ulugh Khan. It must be added that both parties realized that the position of the Turkish slave-officers in northern India was so insecure that they could not undertake the risk of a civil war.

EIGHTH REGNAL YEAR, 651 (3 MARCH 1253-54)

'On 22 Shawwal A.H. 650 (27 December 1252) the royal standards started in the direction of Ghazni and Lahore by way of Uchch and Multan. . . In this campaign all the maliks and khans of the provinces joined the royal standards. Qutlugh Khan from Bayana and Izzuddin Kishlu Khan from Badaun accompanied them till the Bias.' The

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 215-16.

object was not to fight an enemy but to solve a domestic problem. Minhaj tells us that 'Imaduddin Raihan in secret changed the attitude of the Sultan and the maliks towards Ulugh Khan'. Whether he was commissioned for the enterprise by Qutlugh and Kishlu or offered them his services on his own initiative cannot now be discovered. But he certainly could not have started the enterprise off his own bat. Minhaj says that an attempt to assassinate Ulugh failed. But this suspicion seems unfair. Till that time the idea of assassination as a political weapon had not entered the mind of either party; what the opposition wanted was an equitable distribution of posts and territories. 'Since they could not achieve what they wanted, they agreed together, came to the royal pavilion and requested: "Ulugh Khan should go to his *iqta*."' The Sultan, who was then at Rohtak, ordered Ulugh Khan to depart and Ulugh Khan left for Hansi on the last day of Muharram A.H. 651 (1 April 1253).

In obeying peacefully the orders of the young Sultan of twenty-three, Ulugh Khan took the wisest course possible. Qutlugh, Kishlu and Raihan had got a temporary advantage, but the opinion of the Shamsi maliks on second thoughts was sure to change in Ulugh's favour. Raihan, according to Minhaj, insisted that Ulugh Khan should vacate Hansi and go to Nagaur so that the post of *amir-i hajib* along with the *iqta* of Hansi may be given to *Shahzada* Ruknuddin.¹² Again Ulugh Khan obeyed. His younger brother, Kashli Khan, was deprived of the office of *amir-i hajib* and sent to govern the *iqta* of Kara. The post of wazir was assigned to Malik Muhammad Nizam Junaidi in June or July 1253. The post of Head Qazi was taken from Minhaj and given to Qazi Shamsuddin Bahraichi (22 September 1253). Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan became *naib-i amir-i hajib*; Raihan was appointed *vakildar*. 'All appointments made by Ulugh Khan were changed or overthrown and the stable condition of the government was upturned owing to the improper judgement of Raihan.' Minhaj forgets to tell us what office or territory was given to Qutlugh Khan. Bahar Deva, the Rai of Ranthambhor—'the greatest, noblest and highest of the rais of Hindustan'—fought a battle with Ulugh Khan, but Ulugh won the battle and returned victorious to Nagaur.

The problem of Sher Khan, who held the Sind provinces, still remained. 'At the beginning of Shawwal (3 November 1253) the royal standards started for the conquest of Uchch, Tabarhinda and Multan.' But the Sultan remained on the Bias and an army was sent against Tabarhinda. Sher Khan, like his cousin, decided not to fight.

¹² He was the son of Sultan Nasiruddin, and must have been a minor.

He left India and went to Mangu Qa-an. Minhaj assures us that he was received by Mangu with honours, but the Mongol high command had already drawn up its extensive plans for expansion in China in the east and in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Egypt in the west. Sher Khan could not change these plans, but his going to the Mongol court rendered him unfit in all eyes for holding charge of India's frontier provinces after he had returned from his futile mission. His Indian *iqtas* were assigned by the reigning group to Malik Arsalan Khan Sanjar in February 1254; Sher Khan's officers seem to have offered no resistance.

Concerning the party now in eclipse, it is best to let Minhaj describe it:

The condition of the oppressed, who were subjected to dismissal and tyranny owing to the absence of Ulugh Khan and were driven to a corner, was like that of fish out of water and of the sick without sleep; from morn to night and night to morn they prayed to God that Ulugh Khan may return to power again, and that the darkness of Raihan may be turned into the sunlight of Ulugh Khan. The prayers of the distressed were accepted, and the victorious banners of Ulugh Khan moved towards the capital. The reason for it was this. The maliks and officers of the court were either Turks of pure birth or high-born Taziks. Raihan was an unworthy eunuch from the tribes of Hindustan; nevertheless, he commanded high-born officers. All were offended and could not bear the disgrace any longer. Owing to the minions of Raihan it was impossible for the author for six months or more to come out of his house or go to the Juma prayers. What must have been the condition of others, every one of whom was a Turk, a world-conquering malik and a commander accustomed to overthrowing his opponents?¹³

The attitude of the Qutlugh-Kishlu group was probably more liberal towards the Indian Musalmans and the Hindu chiefs as some future events were to show. But this fact must have gone against them among the closed circle of Turkish slave-officers. In any case, Ulugh Khan, working from Nagaur, succeeded in winning over the majority of Turkish officers, including even those appointed by the Qutlugh-Kishlu group, to his side. The scales were no longer evenly balanced.

NINTH REGNAL YEAR, 652 (21 FEBRUARY 1254-55)

Towards the fag end of the winter the Sultan marched to the source of the Rahib or Ramganga. The Hindus of Katehr (Rohil-

¹³ *Ibid.*, *Tabaqa* 22, No. 24 (Biography of Ulugh Khan).

khand), who had killed Raziul Mulk Izzuddin Damishi, were severely punished. On 27 April 1254, the wizarat was given to Najmuddin Abu Bakr for a second time.

After the rainy season news came of 'the gathering of the maliks'. 'In short, the (Turkish) maliks of Hindustan, from the territory of Kara and Manikpur and the city of Awadh, which is in the north, to Badaun, and from Tabarhinda, Sunam and Samana and the Siwaliks, requested Ulugh Khan to return to the capital. Arsalan Khan marched with his army from Tabarhinda and Ban Khan from Sunam and Mansurpur. Ulugh Khan collected his army in Nagaur and the Siwaliks, and Jalaluddin Mas'ud Shah joined them from Lahore. They moved towards the capital.' We are left to conclude that, in case no agreement was reached, Sultan Nasiruddin could be replaced by his step-brother, Jalaluddin.

The Sultan, under Raihan's guidance, moved from Delhi to Sunam while Ulugh Khan and the opposition maliks were at Tabarhinda. Raihan, who had already put his neck in the noose, may have urged the Sultan to fight, but the Sultan and the Turkish maliks with him had no such intentions. The two armies in their movements took care not to come within fighting distance but to remain near enough to negotiate. The Sultan's attitude, if one may attempt to interpret it, was one of non-concern; the two Turkish parties must decide their policy and he would accept any arrangement they desired. 'A number of amirs from the two sides began to talk of peace; the mischief-maker for both sides was Raihan.'

Minhaj tells us how the negotiations took place. 'Qirrat Qimar, a special slave-officer of Ulugh Khan, came from his army. Husamuddin Qutlugh (Khan), the malik of the black banner famed for his age, was appointed to discuss every matter in full with him and Qutbud-din Hasan Ali (Ghuri).' Both parties agreed that Raihan should be dismissed from the court and sent to govern Badaun. Qutlugh may have promised Raihan his personal protection, but both parties joined in compelling him to leave the court. The other terms of the agreement are not given by Minhaj. It seems probable that Qutlugh Khan was promised the governorship of Awadh and Kishlu Khan his former *iqtas* of Uchch and Multan; Ulugh Khan was to return to Delhi and hold his former post of *naih-i mamlakat* with full powers, and his control of the central policy left both opponents and neutrals at his mercy. 'To complete the arrangement, Izzuddin Balban Kishlu Khan was sent to the camp of Ulugh Khan on 15 December 1254, and Ban Khan Aibek Khitai came to the royal camp.' On 29 December Minhaj was commissioned to give the promises necessary to all opposition Turkish officers. Next day Ulugh Khan and officers of

both parties came and kissed the royal hands. Delhi was reached on 21 January 1255.

TENTH REGNAL YEAR, 653 (10 FEBRUARY 1255-56)

Minhaj says that the new year began with 'a strange event in the *haram* of the Sultan and no one knew of the secret'. But from what he proceeds to state this event could only have been the marriage of the Sultan's mother with Qutlugh Khan.¹⁴ 'The mind of the Sultan was alienated from his mother, the Malka-i Jahan, and as she was the wife of Qutlugh Khan, they were assigned the *iqta* of Awadh and ordered to go there (16 February 1255).' Minhaj was appointed Chief Qazi of the empire and given the judicial administration of Delhi for the third time (2 May 1250).

The most shocking event at the court was the public assassination of Malik Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri at Ulugh Khan's order. Minhaj was driven to utter an official lie, but Isami gives us the correct facts. Isami's grandfather, Izzuddin, who had brought him up under his fostering care, had been a *sipah salar* in Sultan Balban's army, and his great grandfather, Zahiruddin Isami, was a *vakildar* of Sultan Nasiruddin. A canopy or *chatr* in those days was one of the symbols of royal authority, and Ulugh Khan, returning to power once more, wanted Sultan Nasiruddin to hand over the royal *chatr* to him. He feigned to have fallen ill and did not come to the court for a few days. The Sultan became anxious and sent a *hajib* to inquire about his welfare. Ulugh Khan replied that he had fallen ill owing to his longing for the *chatr*, and that he wanted a white *chatr* with a willow-wand under it and a gold cup at the top in place of an eagle. The Sultan, whom circumstances had reduced to a nonentity, readily agreed to part with his *chatr* and humbly replied; 'I am prepared to part with my own *chatr*; do whatever you like.' The next day Ulugh Khan appeared in the court with a *chatr* over his head. This horrified the old nobility, and Malik Qutbuddin¹⁵ Hasan Ghuri made some sarcastic remarks. Ulugh Khan was incensed and made up his mind to set an example by punishing the insolent malik. One day he brought some assassins with him, and when Qutbuddin Hasan

14 It is difficult to guess the reasons for the lady's behaviour, for Qutlugh Khan was a man of advanced age. But a court dominated by Ulugh Khan and his daughter may not have been to her liking.

15 Since the murder of Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri was a well-known fact, Minhaj had to use his words with care and throw suspicions on the wrong quarters. 'During Rabi II they conveyed statements of Qutbuddin Hasan Ali, who had been *naib-i mamlakat*, to the royal ear. Since these statements were against the royal wishes, he was arrested on 23 Rabi II A.H. 653 (1 June 1255) and imprisoned and put to death.' (220).

entered the palace for a formal court assembly, they tore him to pieces. The Sultan asked Ulugh Khan what the tumult was about. 'Do not be afraid of this noise', the latter replied, 'There was a thorn that was doing permanent injury to the garden of the kingdom; I ordered it to be torn up and thrown down from the royal roof.' 'The king was deeply pained', Isami writes, 'but he could say nothing in the presence of Ulugh Khan.'¹⁶ This is the first recorded political assassination of which Ulugh Khan was guilty. When the Chengizi Mongols attacked Firuz Koh, Qutbuddin Hasan, son of Ali, was the most senior prince of the Ghurid or Shansabani dynasty. Minhaj in his *Tabaqa* (Chapter) on the Mongols gives some account of his attempts to resist the Mongols and of his reaching India after many hair-breadth escapes. Among the officers of the Delhi sultanat he was distinguished by his noble origin. He never took part in any intrigue, and was generally respected and trusted. Not being a Turkish slave-officer, he was unable to reach the status of a khan, but at the time of his assassination he held the *iqta* of Meerut, which was transferred to Kashli Khan.

- . 'Malik Tajuddin Mah Peshani had been assigned Bahraich and for this reason he had been arrested and imprisoned by Qutlugh Khan. But Tajuddin set himself free by a manly trick, crossed the Ghagra on a boat and marched against Bahraich with a few horsemen. Divine destiny had ordered the good fortune of the Turks to rise and of the Indians to decline. Raihan was defeated, captured and put to death in Rajab 653 (August/September 1255). His death ruined Qutlugh Khan's plans.'¹⁷

Nevertheless, Qutlugh Khan, as governor of Awadh, refused to obey the royal commands, which he knew to be the orders of Ulugh Khan, and other Turkish officers also joined him. The royal command finally transferred him from Awadh to Bahraich, but he disobeyed it also. An army was sent against him under Tajuddin Tabar Khan and Bektam Aur Khan; the two armies came face to face at Samramau in the Badaun district; Aur Khan was killed; Tabar retreated to Delhi and was appointed governor of Awadh. But Awadh had still to be conquered and it was obvious that the whole royal army would be needed for the enterprise. Ulugh Khan collected all the soldiers he could and reached Awadh in Muharram 654 (February 1256). Qutlugh and his officers retreated before the royal army, crossed the Ghagra and disappeared into the unknown. Ulugh's pursuit of them proved fruitless.

¹⁶ Isami, Mehdi Hasan's text, 152-56.

¹⁷ Minhaj, *Tabaqa* 22, No. 12 (Biography of Balban).

ELEVENTH REGNAL YEAR, 654
(13 JANUARY 1256-57)

As soon as the royal army had returned to Delhi, Qutlugh reappeared. 'But as he was unable to establish his power in Hindustan,' Minhaj says,

he retreated to Santurgarh and established his power in the Sirmur hills. Everyone served him for he was a great *mālik* and had claims on all officers of the court and the Turkish *maliks*. Wherever he went, they honoured him on account of favours received in the past and with an eye to the future. When he sought refuge in Sirmur, Rana Dilpat Hindi, who had a great position among the Hindus, consented to serve him for it is their custom to protect the innocent.¹⁸

Ulugh Khan succeeded in capturing Santurgarh, but both the Rana and Qutlugh Khan escaped and the latter moved westwards to join Kishlu Khan, who had rebelled.

TWELFTH REGNAL YEAR, 655
(19 JANUARY 1257-58)

After getting Uchch and Multan as the result of the settlement of 1255, Kishlu had got into touch with Halaku Khan through Malik Shamsuddin Kert of Ghur. He gave his son as a hostage and asked for a Mongol *shuhna* to be sent to his court. But Halaku was in no position to give him any assistance, and Kishlu decided to rebel against Delhi on his own responsibility. He was joined by Qutlugh Khan; 'they turned towards Sunam and Samana and began to appropriate territories'. Ulugh Khan with his brother, Kashli Khan, and his cousin, Sher Khan, marched from Delhi with the whole army of the kingdom; by an unfortunate oversight, Delhi was left quite defenceless. Somewhere in the precincts of Samana and Kaithal the armies came so near that there was a distance of 10 *karohs* only between them. All well-wishers of the Turkish regime were frightened at the idea of a conflict. 'The armies that came face to face', writes Minhaj, 'consisted of brothers and friends—two forces from one court, two armies from one house, two linings from one garment.' Ulugh Khan divided his army into two parts—one led by Kashli Khan and the other by Sher Khan. But at the same time he began negotiating with the opposition *maliks*; he was prepared to accede to their demands for offices and territories on condition of obedience and loyalty.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, *Tabaqa* 22, No. 12 (Biography of Balban).

But while war and peace were pending in the balance, some political *ulama* (*dastarbunds*), like Shaikhul Islam Qutbuddin and Qazi Shamsuddin Bahraichi along with some state-officers (*kulahdars*), wrote secret letters to Qutlugh and Kishlu, asked them to march on Delhi and promised to hand over the gates to them; simultaneously they began to canvass for them in Delhi 'and took an oath on the right hand from every one'. Their message, as given by Minhaj, seems to be substantially correct: 'The gates are in our hands. You should come to the capital. There is no army in Delhi. You are high officers of the court and there are no strangers in-between. If you come here and join the royal court, Ulugh Khan will remain with the army outside and matters will be settled according to your wishes.'

'How can a secret be kept', asks the Persian poet, Hafiz, 'to discuss which meetings have been called?' Ulugh Khan's agents informed him of what was happening and he sent urgent messages asking that the writers of the letters be expelled from Delhi. This was done and the city-gates were closed. Alauddin Avaz Zinjani, the *naib-i amir-i hajib*, Ulugh-bek, the kotwal, Jamaluddin Naishapuri, and the officers of the ministry of war did all they could to protect the city. On the most critical night even the amirs, *sarkhails* and the distinguished men of the city were asked to defend the ramparts.

When the letters from Delhi reached them, Kishlu and Qutlugh started immediately for Delhi. In spite of the summer heat, they rode about 100 *karohs* (some 200 miles) and reached the suburbs of Delhi on 21 June 1257. But they found the gates closed; their supporters had been expelled from the city two days before. They encamped between the Jud gardens, Kailugarhi and the city during the night and next day they went round the ramparts. But there was nothing they could do and they decided to return. Some opposition maliks went to the Siwaliks; Qutlugh Khan seems to have sought refuge with Arsalan Khan Sanjar in Awadh; Kishlu Khan returned with 200 or 300 horsemen to Uchch by way of the Siwaliks. But the rest of their soldiers sought and found service with the Sultan. The Indian soldier in the service of the Turkish slave-officers was not a politician but a wage-earner, and he could not afford to follow officers who were unable to pay his wages. Towards the end of the year the Mongols under Salin Noyan came from Khurasan to Uchch and Multan; Kishlu Khan made an agreement with them and joined the camp of Salin.

CAREER OF IKHTIYARUDDIN YUZBEK TUGHRIL KHAN

During these years of tension, Delhi had lost control of the eastern provinces and this gave Yuzbek, the governor of Lakhnauti,

an opportunity for his misdeeds. Yuzbek, a Qipchak Turk, had started his career as a slave of Iltutmish. He took a leading part in the slaughter of Tazik officers at Tarain during the reign of Ruknuddin Firuz. He was thrown into prison by Bahram Shah but was set free on his fall. Alauddin Mas'ud appointed him to Lahore and Tabarhinda for a time, but he quarrelled with one of his fellow-officers, Nasiruddin Muhammad Bandar, and began to oppose the king. In 1246 Ulugh Khan brought him to Delhi and recommended to the Sultan that his past offences be forgiven. After some time Awadh was assigned to him, but he came to Delhi and got the assignment of Lakhnauti in its place. 'Fury and love of domination', says Minhaj, 'were ingrained in Yuzbek's mind.'

Yuzbek fought three indecisive battles with the army of Jainagar, but Minhaj says that he succeeded in the fourth battle. He conquered the territory of Armardun; the Rai fled and all he had fell into the hands of Yuzbek.

'On returning to Lakhnauti he began opposition to the king, and raised three canopies (*chattr*s), red, black and white (over his head). He brought his army from Lakhnauti to the city of Awadh and had his *khutba* recited under the title of "Sultan Mughisuddin". After two weeks a royal contingent in Awadh sent a Turkish amir running to him to frighten him with the report that the whole royal army had arrived. Yuzbek was disheartened; he got into a boat and returned to Lakhnauti. All the inhabitants of Hindustan—Hindus and Musalmans, religious scholars and state-officers—considered this act of Yuzbek to be unpleasant. He had been guilty of treason and rebellion against his own king. Inevitably the result of this evil deed overtook him and he was overthrown root and branch.'¹⁹

Yuzbek next decided to attack Kamrup. The Rai of Kamrup was in no position to resist him and retired to a corner while Yuzbek plundered the city and captured the Rai's hereditary treasures. The Rai sent messengers promising to pay a heavy tribute, if he was reinstated; he was also prepared to keep the coinage and the *Khutba* in Yuzbek's name, but Yuzbek would not hear of a compromise. Then the Rai tried another trick, which seems odd, but we have to remember that Yuzbek was a very odd man. The Rai ordered all his soldiers and subjects to offer their allegiance to Yuzbek on condition that he would sell them his corn at any price he may fix. The trick succeeded and Yuzbek sold away all his corn. Before the *rabi* crop could be cut,

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 263.

the Rai and his subjects revolted. They also opened all the river-dams. Left without any food, the Lakhnauti army decided to retreat. But the Hindus had closed all routes by water as well as the open plain. Yuzbek found a Hindu guide to lead them by the foot of the hills. But here too the Hindus blocked their progress. Yuzbek while riding an elephant was mortally wounded on the breast by an arrow, and his family and followers were captured. Brought before the Rai, Yuzbek asked for a last favour—to have a look at his son. The favour was granted; Yuzbek looked at his son and gave up the ghost.

THIRTEENTH REGNAL YEAR, 656
(8 JANUARY 1258-59)

Sher Khan wanted to seize Tabarhinda from Arsalan Khan, to whom it had been legally assigned and who was prepared to defend it. Both were summoned to Delhi for a settlement. Arsalan Khan was given Awadh and Sher Khan was given Tabarhinda for the time-being. But the conflict between him and Arsalan Khan continued. Both had been in touch with the Mongol high command and Ulugh Khan was not prepared to trust either of them with a frontier province. So next year (February 1259) he called Sher Khan to Delhi for a second agreement. The frontier town of Bhatinda was given to Nusrat Khan Sanqar Sufi, and Sher Khan was given the territories of Koil, Bayana, Bilaram, Jalesar, Mihr, Mahaban and the fort of Gwalior. He was in possession of these lands when Minhaj finished his book in June or July 1260.

FOURTEENTH REGNAL YEAR, 657
(28 DECEMBER 1258-59)

In the previous year there had been fear of a Mongol invasion and all officers had been summoned to Delhi. Report was brought that Arsalan Khan and Qutlugh Khan had delayed in coming. The Indian summer had set in but Ulugh Khan insisted on marching against them in spite of the heat. Qutlugh and Arsalan dispersed their soldiers among the villages, and sent a message that if the royal army was withdrawn, they would present themselves as loyal officers at the court. True to their promise, Qutlugh and Arsalan appeared before the Sultan on 27 May 1258. In spite of the opposition and the disturbance of the territories of which they had been guilty, Ulugh Khan received them with great honour and dignity.²⁰ Further, on his recommendation, Lakhnauti was assigned to Qutlugh Khan and Kara to Arsalan Khan within two months. But, as Ferishta rightly

²⁰ *Ibid.*, *Tabaqa* 22, No. 12 (Biography of Balban).

remarks, the end of Qutlugh Khan is hidden behind a veil. He may have died a natural death, but it is more likely that, in consonance with Ulugh's new policy of doing away with the rivals who had harassed him for a long time, he was either poisoned or assassinated. Minhaj makes two statements* about Lakhnauti which completely ignore Qutlugh's appointment and existence. 'On 18 December 1258 the territory of Lakhnauti was assigned to Malik Jalaluddin Mas'ud Jani.²¹... On 8 June 1259 a treasure, cash, plenty of costly vessels with two elephants came from Lakhnauti to the court; Ulugh Khan acknowledged the service and sent to Izzuddin Balban Uzbek, who had despatched the elephants and treasure, a *misal* for the whole territory of Lakhnauti.'²²

Ulugh Khan's younger brother, Kashli Khan, who was governor of Meerut, died in June or July 1259; his post and territories were granted to his son, Alauddin, generally known as Malik Chajju. On 19 September 1259, a son was born to the Sultan from the daughter of Ulugh Khan.

FIFTEENTH REGNAL YEAR, 658
(18 DECEMBER 1259-60)

The main event of this year was the arrival of Halaku's envoys.²³ Ulugh Khan ordered them to be kept waiting at Marutha till he had prepared a proper spectacle for them—a mass of devoted soldiers and inhabitants and a large number of human heads and corpses to show the two aspects of the power of the state.

21 *Ibid.*, 225-26.

22 *Ibid.*, 313.

23 The coming of the Mongol envoys had no political or diplomatic purpose, but since they had come, a proper reception for them had to be arranged. The curious circumstances that led to their coming are thus explained by Minhaj.

Nasiruddin Hasan Qarligh wanted his daughter to be married to Ulugh Khan's son. Ulugh considered the matter to be of sufficient importance for the despatch of a special envoy, Jamaluddin Ali Khalji, for the purpose. Jamaluddin was captured by Kishlu Khan's officers and taken to his court. There, in the presence of the Mongol envoys, he declared that he was going to Halaku and his envoys informed Halaku of Jamaluddin's coming. Consequently, Nasiruddin Qarligh at Bunyan had no alternative but to write a letter to Halaku in the name of Ulugh Khan, but of course without his knowledge, and send Jamaluddin with some presents to Halaku. Halaku at Tabriz welcomed this envoy from a distant land. When Jamaluddin was returning, Halaku ordered the *shukna* of Bunyan, the son of Amir Yaghrish, a well-known Musalman, to go with him (to Delhi). *He also ordered that no Mongol horse under the control of Salin Noyan was to step into the territory of Sultan Nasiruddin, and if any horse did so, its hands and feet were to be cut off.* This was an order to Salin Noyan only; it was not a treaty and it was not binding on Salin's successors.

This account raises one difficulty. Nasiruddin Hasan Qarligh had died at the siege of Multan before 1250. Why did Halaku's envoys take such a long time in coming?

'In the hill-tracts round the city,' Minhaj tells us, 'there lived wicked men who robbed travellers, plundered the Musalmans and desolated the villages of Haryana, the Siwaliks and Bayana.'²⁴ Three years before this, Malka, a Hindu of gigantic stature, had stolen the camels belonging to Ulugh Khan's officers and distributed them up to Ranthambhor. Ulugh Khan was unable to do anything at the time owing to the fear of a Mongol invasion. Now he went to this hill-tract and plundered it for twenty days. His public offer was one *tanka* for a severed head and two *tankas* for a live rebel. In addition to this 250 notables were captured along with 142 horses; and six bags of *tankas*, amounting to 30,000, were seized from the rais and ranas. After Delhi had been ornamented in the Mongol fashion with sufficient severed heads and corpses stuffed with straw, and 200,000 footmen and 50,000 horsemen had also been collected, the Mongol ambassadors were taken from Kailugarhi (or Shahr Nau) to the *Qasr-i Sabz*, where the Sultan was holding his audience. The public stood in twenty rows, shoulder to shoulder, on both sides of the street.

The show, which probably took place in April 1260, led to no public treaty or understanding. But it certainly showed Ulugh Khan's capacity for controlling affairs.

Minhaj before closing his work in the summer of 1260 records that Izzuddin Kishlu Khan had gone to Halaku's court and returned, that he was sending messengers to Delhi and it was to be hoped that all would be well.²⁵ Isami, however, tells us that Ulugh Khan marched to Multan and captured it.²⁶ Kishlu Khan had gone to the Punjab, leaving Multan in charge of his son, Muhammad. Ulugh treated the young man well, but he fled to his father after three or four days. Kishlu decided that it would be unwise for him to challenge the army of Delhi in the Punjab. So he established himself at Bunyan and from here, with Mongol help, he made two unsuccessful attempts to reconquer his old *iqtas*; these attempts failed and we hear no more of Kishlu Khan. This was the end of Ulugh Khan's second great rival. His control of the Delhi sultanat seems to have been complete.

END OF THE SHAMSI DYNASTY; ACCESSION OF BALBAN

When Ulugh Khan compelled Sultan Nasiruddin to hand over the royal *chatr* or canopy to him and arranged for the assassination of Malik Qutbuddin Ghuri during a public meeting at the palace, he

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 313.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, *Tabaqa* on the Shamsi Maliks (No. 10).

²⁶ *Futuhus Salatin*, 148-50 (Dr. Mehdi Hasan's edition). Here, as elsewhere, Isami makes an error about the sequence of events.

was, in fact, giving notice to all persons connected with the court and the government that his ambitions were not to be trifled with. But knowledge of his designs for the throne was not confined to politicians only. Amir Khurd in his *Siyarul Aulia*, while referring to Ulugh Khan's visit to Shaikh Farid at Ajudhan during Nasiruddin's reign, says that 'in those days Ulugh Khan Balban had an excessive desire to acquire kingship.'²⁷ Unfortunately, we have no contemporary political history either for the last six years of Nasiruddin's reign or for the whole reign of Balban, though we have contemporary records of some events, like the death of Balban's son, Khan-i Shahid. Balban's power as *naib-i mamlakat* was very great but insecure, and he felt this painfully. Why then did he stay his hands for six years? Several reasons suggest themselves. He was afraid of the Mongol power, but Halaku's defeat at the hands of the Egyptians and his subsequent death must have brought relief to Ulugh. Mangu had died in China in 1260 and with him the central power of the great Mongol empire had vanished. Ulugh had crushed Qutluq and Kishlu, but he had to make sure of the attitude of the other Turkish slave-officers whose consent was necessary for the *legality* of his accession.

Ziauddin Barani is silent about the mode of Sultan Nasiruddin's death; presuming on this silence, the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* declares that the Sultan died of an illness, and this comfortable conclusion has been accepted by most medieval writers. But this statement, first, leaves unexplained the complete physical annihilation of all the descendants of Shamsuddin Iltutmish. Secondly, two authorities now available were unknown to our medieval historians. Ibn-i Battuta, who in his *Rehla* gives a brief account of the preceding sultans of Delhi, explicitly states: 'Subsequently his *naib* (i.e. *naib-i mamlakat*) killed him (Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud) and became king.'²⁸ Isami, whose *Futuhus Salatin* was not properly studied by any medieval historian, emphatically declares that Sultan Nasiruddin was poisoned, and that this fact was known to the citizens of Delhi.

It must be remembered in this context that when Saffah and Mansur killed all living members of the Ummayyad dynasty in order to make their own Abbasid dynasty secure, they were setting the pattern for all later Muslim dynastic revolutions. It is not known how

²⁷ *Siyarul Aulia*, 79.

²⁸ *Rehla*, Arabic text, Vol. II, 22. It was perhaps not explained to Ibn-i Battuta by his Indian friends that the word *naib* here does not mean deputy or lieutenant but indicated a special office like the *wazir-i mutlaq* or absolute wazir of the Abbasids—a wazir whom the king could appoint or dismiss but with whose work he could not interfere.

far Ulugh Khan's knowledge of Islamic history went, but he had no alternative but to follow that pattern.

By 1266 Sultan Nasiruddin had probably reached his thirty-sixth year. Ulugh Khan was twenty or perhaps twenty-four years older. Nasiruddin had four sons—Malik Ruknuddin Firuz Shah, Malik Shihabuddin Muhammad Shah, Malik Tajuddin Ibrahim Shah and Malik Saifuddin Bahram Shah. Whether the son whom Ulugh Khan's daughter bore the Sultan in 1259 is included in this list is not known. When in 1253 the Qutlugh-Kishlu group came into power, they appointed *Shahzada* Ruknuddin as *amir-i hajib*, but since he was too young, the duties of the office were to be performed by Kishlu Khan as *naib-i hajib*. When Ulugh Khan returned to power, the young *shahzada* was deprived of his office.²⁹ In addition to these four *shahzadas*, many other descendants of Ilutmish must have been living at the time (1266-67).

Isami says that the two young sons of the Sultan used to go about enjoying life with the two young sons of Ulugh Khan. Once while drinking together in a garden, the sons of Ulugh claimed that their father was 'the wisest and the most prudent man of the age'. 'Though he has the maturity of age and we are inexperienced,' the two *shahzadas* replied, 'we can by a trick make him alight from his horse.' A bet of eighty *dinars* was made. Some days later when one of the *shahzadas* was riding in the field with Ulugh Khan, he dropped his whip, as if by accident, and then looked helplessly at the Khan. The Khan jumped down from his horse, picked up the whip and gave it to the *shahzada*. Later on when his sons informed him of the bet, he ordered the eighty *dinars* to be paid. But he began to reflect—as he must have reflected a thousand times before. 'He said in his heart', Isami tells us, '“that the sons of the king have begun to resort to tricks. One day by trickery and deceit they will arrest me, bind me and put me to death.”' It was a question of survival between him and the Shamsi dynasty and its well-wishers. 'He reflected over the matter day and night', Isami continues, 'and I have heard that after careful planning he carried out a wicked design. Poison was administered to the king, there was a tumult all over the city, but the king died in A.H. 665 (1266-67).'³⁰

29 Both Minhaj and Barani give a list of the Sultan's sons, near relations and high officers at the beginning of every important reign, but owing to the negligence of the copyists difficulties arise in interpreting them. Thus with reference to the four names here, some copies say 'abna' (sons) while others say 'aqraba' (relations), but since Minhaj refers to Ruknuddin as *Shahzada* in the text itself and has added the suffix of *Shah* to the names, the word 'abna' (equal to *shahzadas*) is obviously correct.

30 Isami, 156-57,

But whatever the tumult in Delhi, Ulugh Khan had no difficulty in ascending the throne with the title of 'Ghiyasuddin Balban'. He took all necessary steps to extinguish the old dynasty. 'Overtly or secretly', Ferishta tells us, 'he killed many of the descendants of Shamsuddin Iltutmish whom he considered to be his rivals for the throne.'³¹ 'When Ulugh Khan ascended the throne,' Isami remarks, 'the teeth of the officers were broken; they all came under his control without any argument or reasoning.' Many khans and maliks, who had figured so prominently in the former reign, are not referred to now. We do not know what happened to Minhaj and his son, Ayaz, and to 'the earthly goods' Minhaj had collected so carefully.

Ghiyasuddin Balban, on his part, began to talk and behave like a superman and a hereditary king, a descendant of the mythical Afrasiyab, who by a gift of God was above 'all those ills that flesh is heir to'.

³¹ Ferishta, Vol. I, 76.

V. SULTAN BALBAN AND QAIQUBAD

PROBLEMS FACING BALBAN AFTER HIS ACCESSION

BALBAN WAS CONFRONTED with a number of problems after his accession to the throne. As a matter of supreme policy, he had to make those very weapons, which he had used for his rise to power, ineffective and blunt, so that no one else may be tempted to use them again. This necessitated a complete readjustment of the relations of the Sultan with his nobility. The maliks and amirs were to be taught that kingship was beyond them and that there was absolutely no question of rivalry or competition between the crown and the nobility. He had to close a long chapter of the tussle of the Turkish slave-officers, in which he himself had played a very prominent role in a capacity which he was not prepared to recognize now. Apart from everything else it necessitated the reestablishment of the power and dignity of the Delhi sultan and—for India—a new, if transient, theory of kingship.

The second and more immediate problem before Balban was the restoration of law and order. As *naib-i mamlakat* he had attempted to maintain peace by erratic and wholesale killings; he could not have failed to realize that law and order could only be maintained by a permanently established military and police regime, but either a Mongol invasion or the rebellion of a malik had prevented him from doing the needful. Balban realized that his position as a sultan would be judged by the peace—or, as he preferred to call it, the justice—he gave to the country. With respect to law and order, there were four problem-areas before Balban—the suburbs of Delhi; the Doab; the trade-routes, specially the road to Awadh; and the rebels of Katehr (Rohilkhand). Concerning the first three, the disorder that prevailed and the measures taken by Balban are graphically described by Barani.

I have heard from reliable narrators that Sultan Balban devoted the first year of his reign to cutting the forest round Delhi and suppressing the Meos. He came out of the city, pitched his army-camp and considered the suppression of the Meos the most important of state enterprises. Owing to the worthlessness... of the successors of Iltutmish and the weakness of Sultan Nasiruddin, who had reigned for twenty years, the Meos in the neighbourhood of Delhi had grown in power and multiplied in numbers. They came into the city at

night, broke through the walls into the houses and molested the people in other ways. The people of Delhi were unable to sleep owing to the fear of the Meos, who had also plundered all the inns in the neighbourhood of Delhi. And just as the Meos had multiplied and become bolder, so jungles of thick and large trees had also grown all round Delhi. Mischief-makers in the Doab and on the side of Hindustan boldly indulged in robbery. The roads (to Delhi) were closed on all sides, and it was impossible for *carawans* and traders to come and depart. Finally, owing to the fear of the Meos, the western gates of the city were closed at the time of the afternoon prayer, and no one had the courage to go out of the city after that time either to visit the sacred tombs or to enjoy by the side of the Sultani (Shamsi) tank. But even before the afternoon prayers (the Meos) molested the water-carriers and slave-girls, who went to fetch water from the tank; they took off their clothes and left them nude.

'Balban devoted a whole year to suppressing the Meos and cutting the forest round Delhi. He put many Meos to the sword; he built a fort at Gopalgir and established many *thanas* (military posts) and assigned them to the Afghans; the land (allotted for the maintenance) of the *thanas* was made tax-free. In these conflicts Yak Lakhi, a favoured slave of the Sultan, was killed by the Meos. The Sultan with his sword secured many people of God from being molested and plundered by the Meos. From that time till now the city has been secure from the Meos.'¹

After suppressing the Meos, the Sultan turned towards the Doab. 'The towns (*qasbas*) and the territories of the Doab were assigned to *iqtadars*, who had the requisite means. Balban ordered the villages of the disobedient to be totally destroyed; the men were to be killed and their women and children were to be seized as spoils. The forests were to be cut down completely. Some great amirs with their enormous armies sat down to accomplish this task. They annihilated the disobedient, cut down the forests, removed the mischief-makers and reduced the *ra'yyat* of the Doab to obedience and submission.'

Barani continues:

'After completing the Doab enterprise, Balban twice marched out of the city to open the road to Hindustan (Awadh). He went to Kampil and Patiali and stayed in those territories for five or six months. He put robbers and rebels unhesitatingly to the sword; the route to Hindustan was opened and *carawans* and merchants could come and go in peace. A lot of the plunder of that region came to Delhi, where slaves and cattle became cheap. At Kampil, Patiali and

¹ Barani, 58.

Bhojpur, which were the great centres of robbers on the road to Hindustan, strong forts and high and spacious mosques were constructed. The Sultan assigned all the above-mentioned three forts to the Afghans and the arable land attached to the forts was made tax-free (*mafruz*). Owing to the Afghans and other Musalmans enjoying tax-free land, the towns (of the region) were made so strong that highway robbery and plunder of travellers were totally removed from the route to Hindustan. From that time till now some three generations (*qarns*) have passed, and owing to the construction of the forts and the stability of the military posts (*thanas*) the route to Hindustan has become a well-trodden path and robbery has been totally suppressed. Also during this campaign the fort of Jalali was constructed and assigned to the Afghans; thus the houses of robbers became a military post. The land of Jalali was also made tax-free. Jalali, which had formerly been the home of robbers, who plundered, now became the homeland of the Musalmans and of the guardians of the roads—and has remained so since then.'

While the Sultan was busy with these enterprises, it was continuously brought to his notice that the rebels of Katehr had grown in numbers. 'They plundered and desolated the villages of the *ra'yyat* and molested the territories of Badaun and Amroha; their insolence was a public fact; they had become so powerful that they ignored the authority of the *iqtadars* of Badaun and Amroha, and owing to their strength the *walis* (rulers) of the neighbouring districts could not interfere.' Balban decided that the suppression of Katehr was a task for the imperial army. He returned from Kampil and Patiali to Delhi and ordered the contingents of the central army to get ready, giving out that he would go hunting to the hill-tract (*Kohpayah*). But when the army was ready, he marched towards Katehr and reached the place after two nights and three days. Barani writes as if Balban ordered a general massacre of all male population. But this is absurd, for the Sultan had gone there to protect the peasant against those who plundered him. However, Balban remained in the territory for a few days. The blood of the mischief-makers (*mufridan*) of Katehr flowed on the ground; corpses were piled up before every village, and the stench of the decomposing corpses reached the bank of the Ganges... From that time to the end of Jalaluddin's reign, no rebel raised his head in Katehr.²

Later Balban marched to the foot of the Jud hills (the Salt Range) and punished the rebels there. As a result of these military operations he got so many horses that their price went down in the market and

a horse could be purchased for 30 to 40 *tankas*.³ Thus within a few years the Sultan created peaceful conditions in every disturbed area and made all recalcitrant elements obedient to his authority.

CONSOLIDATION PREFERRED TO EXPANSION

As soon as law and order was established in all parts of his kingdom, Balban had to choose between 'consolidation' and 'expansion' as the guiding principle of his administrative policy. Though every inch an imperialist, he preferred to adopt a policy of consolidation. This decision was based on a realistic appraisal of the situation. (1) The Hindu chiefs within the empire were on the look out for an opportunity to overthrow the yoke of the Delhi sultan; their activities had to be watched and they had to be brought under the control and hegemony of Delhi. (2) The Mongol presence so close to Delhi as the Bias was a source of grave concern, and if effective checks were not created, the storm could burst any moment. When his generals, Adil Khan and Tamar Khan, suggested to him the conquest of 'Gujarat, Malwa and other provinces of Hindustan which had been under the sway of Aibek and Iltutmish', Balban thus stated his policy:

'It will not be an act of wisdom to leave Delhi and to go on distant campaigns in these days of turmoil and insecurity, when the Mongols have occupied all the lands of Islam, devastated Lahore, and made it a point to invade our country once every year. . . If I move out of the capital, the Mongols are sure to avail themselves of the opportunity by sacking Delhi and ravaging the Doab. Maintaining peace and consolidating our power in our own kingdom is far better than invading foreign territories, while our own dominion is insecure. Further, the newly-conquered areas will require competent officers and well-equipped armies, which I am unable to spare at the present juncture. I have, therefore, made up my mind to face the Mongols with strong and organized forces; but if I get an opportunity, I shall undoubtedly subdue the rest of Hindustan and extend the frontiers of my kingdom.'⁴

Balban devoted all his energies to the consolidation of areas already under his control and never allowed his imperialistic ambitions to gain the upper hand.

THEORY OF KINGSHIP

Balban is perhaps the only sultan of Delhi who is reported to have discussed at length his views about kingship. He never missed

³ *Ibid.*, 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

an occasion for saying something about the exalted office of the sultan and the obligations of the king. That this was necessary in order to place the crown on a high and dignified pedestal and eradicate all possibilities of conflict and contest with the nobility can hardly be denied, but one cannot fail to discern the complicated working of an inferiority complex and guilty conscience behind these frequent exhortations. By dinning into the ears of his maliks and amirs, most of whom were his quondam colleagues, again and again that kingship was something divinely ordained, he wanted to wash off the stigma of being a regicide and impress upon their minds that it was Divine Will that had brought him to the throne and not the poisoned cup and the assassin's dagger. Besides, the absence of any reference to his manumission in the pages of Minhaj and Barani is significant. Perhaps he was never manumitted and this basic legal disqualification to rule over the people, he tried to cover under a shrewdly designed mask of 'divine commitment' of regal authority.⁵

Balban's theory of kingship derived its form and substance from Sassanid Persia, where kingship had been raised to the highest possible level, and its supernatural and divine character was publicly accepted, so that only a member of the Sassanid imperial dynasty could ascend the throne. He looked to the legendary heroes of Persia as his political ideals and tried to emulate them as best as he could. The basic elements of his theory of kingship were the following:

(1) Kingship is the vice-regency of God on earth (*niyabat-i khudai*), and in its dignity it is next only to prophethood. The king is the shadow of God (*zilullah*) and his heart is the repository of divine guidance and radiance.⁶ In the discharge of his kingly responsibilities, he is at all time inspired and guided by God. The actual implication of this concept was that the source of a king's power lay, not with the nobles or the people, but with God only, and consequently his actions could not be the subject of public scrutiny. This was a subtle religious device to sanctify the exercise of his despotic authority.

(2) External dignity and prestige were emphasized as essential for kingship.⁷ Balban maintained throughout his reign a great distance from the masses, and carried it to such lengths that he firmly refused to talk to the common people. A rich man of Delhi, Fakhr Baoni, bribed the officers of the the household to secure him an audience

⁵ *Ibid.*, the substance of Balban's theory of kingship will be found in his advice to Sultan Muhammad (68-80) and to Bughra Khan (92-106).

⁶ *Ibid.*, 70.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 33-35.

with the Sultan, but the Sultan turned down the request of his officers.⁸

(3) His emphasis on the dignified parts of kingship made him a stickler for decorum. He never appeared in the court without his full regalia and royal paraphernalia. Even his personal servants never saw him without his royal apparel, socks and cap.⁹

(4) A distinction between the high-born and the low-born was constantly emphasized by Balban, and any contact with low-born people or their appointment to any office in the administration was considered by him as derogatory to the dignity of a ruler. He dismissed low-born persons from all important offices and sharply rebuked his courtiers for having selected Kamal Mahiyar, a convert to Islam, for the post of *mutasarrif* of Amroha.¹⁰ 'When I happen to look at a low-born person, every artery and vein in my body begins to agitate with fury,'¹¹ he is reported to have remarked.

8 *Ibid.*

9 *Ibid.*, 33.

10 Barani (36-37) gives us an idea of how Balban behaved on such occasions. As soon as Kamal Mahiyar confessed that he was 'the son of a Hindu slave', Balban got up in wrath and retired from the court to his private chamber. Every one was afraid of what would happen. First, Adil Khan Shamsi Ajami, Tamar Khan, Malikul Umara Fakhruddin Kotwal and Imadul Mulk Rawat-i Arz were called to the royal presence; after them the five officers (*kardaran*)—Alauddin Kashli Khan, Malik Nizamuddin Bazghala, the *naib-i amir-i hajib*, the *naib-i vakildar* and *khas hajib* Isami—who were concerned in making the recommendation, were also summoned and asked to sit. 'Today', Balban said, addressing the first four high officers, 'I have tolerated in my brother's son, Kashli Khan, and Nizamuddin Bazghala something I would not have tolerated in my own father; they have brought the low-born son of a slave before me with the recommendation that he should be given the *khwajgi* of Amroha on the ground that he is capable and efficient in office-work.' Then he turned to Adil Khan and Tamar Khan and added: 'You are old friends and comrades of mine. You know very well that I am a descendant of Afrasiyab and that the genealogy of my ancestors can be traced to him. I know that God has created me with the quality that I cannot bear the sight of a mean and low-born man in a government office of responsibility and trust.'

One has to admit that power is never ridiculous—while it lasts. But power based on such foundations does not last long.

11 *Ibid.*, 36-37. Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir Samnani (ob. 1405) gives the name of the officer involved in the recommendation of Muhammad Mahiyar and says that he was an expert in audit and accounts (*ilm-i muhasiba wa hindusa*) and was selected for appointment to Chanderi. (*Maktubat-i Ashrafi*, Aligarh Ms. f. 67a).

Barani is our only source of information for Balban's *theory of kingship* and of his views about the high-born and the low-born. Isami does not say a word about the subject. Since Barani himself held similar views concerning birth, it is difficult to determine as to how far he has attributed his own views to Balban. It should not be forgotten that in his *Fatowa-i Jahandari* he has mentioned all these views as his own. (See English translation: *The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate*, by Prof. Habib.

(5) Genealogy became a fad with Balban. He traced his own genealogy to the mythical Afrasiyab of Firdausi's *Shah Nama* and mentioned it in his court with a deep sense of pride and arrogance.¹² Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir Samnani writes in one of his letters that Balban made very thorough inquiries about the families of all his officers and government servants. Expert genealogists had assembled in Delhi from all parts of the country to help him in determining the family status of these persons.¹³

(6) Balban believed that kingship was not possible without emulating Persian customs and ways of life. In every detail of his family and public life he meticulously followed Persian traditions. To his sons born *before* his accession to the throne he gave the names of Mahmud and Muhammad, but his grandsons, born *after* his accession, were named Kaiqubad, Kaikhusrau and Kaikaus after the Persian kings.

Balban looked upon the administration of justice as one of the foremost duties of a king.¹⁴ This was one of the redeeming features of his despotic government and must have won the affection and admiration of the common man. Whenever any case of injustice or harshness towards the common man came to his knowledge, he flew into a rage and did not hesitate to punish his officers or even his relatives. His *barids* (intelligence officers) kept him fully posted with the activities of the imperial officers in different parts of the empire.¹⁵ If a *barid* failed to report any act of high-handedness on the part of the local officers, an exemplary punishment was inflicted upon him. A *barid* of Badaun was executed and his body was exhibited on a gibbet for such a dereliction of duty.¹⁶ Malik Baq Baq, father of Qara Beg, the *iqtdar* of Badaun, and Haibat Khan, father of Malik Qiran, the *iqtdar* of Awadh, were severely dealt with—the former being put to death and the later being forced to pay 20,000 *tankas* as *diyat* (mulct or compensation money for murder) for killing menial servants.¹⁷

But though just in disputes concerning individuals, Balban threw

and Dr. Afsar S. Khan, 97-101). The probability cannot be ruled out that what Barani presents as the contemptuous treatment of the low-born by Balban was really the treatment of non-Turks, which Barani twisted in order to suit his theory of birth.

¹² *Ibid.*, 37, 39. For Afrasiyabi Turks, see Raverty, 900-10 footnote; *JRAS*, 1898, 467-502.

¹³ *Maktubat-i Ashrafi*, (Ms.), f. 76a.

¹⁴ Barani, 40, 44.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 45.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 40-41. Both Qara Beg and Qiran had distinguished careers under Alauddin Khalji.

overboard all his principles concerning justice and fairplay when cases of an individual *versus* the state came before him, or where his own personal and dynastic interests were involved. In such cases he cared neither for justice nor for fairplay nor for the *shari'at*, and acted in the most unscrupulous manner.¹⁸

Very often Balban referred to the need of obtaining sanction from the Caliph for the exercise of political authority. He knew about the fall of Baghdad and the fate of the Caliph, but he insisted on the recognition of political authority from the Caliph, as the supreme head of the Muslim political community. The name of the deceased *Khalifa* was inscribed on his coins and read before the congregation in the *Khutba*. 'It was', observes Dr. R. P. Tripathi, 'a sort of challenge to the Mughal Khaqan, for it amounted to: "The Khalifa is dead, long live the Khalifa."' ¹⁹

BALBAN'S COURT

Balban organized his court on the Iranian model and emulated the etiquette and ceremonials of the Sassanids meticulously in all details.²⁰ With his face bright as the sun and his beard shining like camphor,²¹ he sat on his throne with the dignity of the great Sassanid kings. A sixteenth century writer, Fazuni Astarabadi, says that he had a long face, a long beard and a very high crown so that from the tip of his beard to the top of his crown it measured nearly a yard.²² To the effect of this awe-inspiring personality were added the grandeur of the court and the meticulous adherence to minor details of etiquette and ceremonial. *Hajibs*, *salahdars*, *jandars*, *chaushes*, *naqibs*, etc. stood around him in solemn silence. The Sultan insisted on *sijda* (prostration) and *paibos* (feet-kissing) being performed by all enjoying the privilege

18 *Ibid.*, 47. 'I have also heard from the narrators of the Balbani regime, that in spite of his generosity and justice and lots of prayer and fasting, which have already been described, Balban was a cruel tyrant in punishing rebels and opponents. He would annihilate a whole army and city for the crime of rebellion. In meting out punishment to rebels he did not waver a needle's breadth from the traditions of tyrants. In establishing the awe and prestige of kingship, he showed no fear of God. In killing and binding bold rebels, he threw aside all the principles of religion and did whatever he considered to be beneficial for his few days of kingship, whether permitted by the *shari'at* or not. The love of power totally overcame him when punishing rebels. May be, he got secretly poisoned in their wine or *sharbat* many Shamsi khans and maliks, whom he considered to be his partners in the kingdom and a danger to the throne, but killing them publicly would have earned him a bad reputation and reduced his prestige.'

19 *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration in India*, 36-37.

20 Barani, 25, 50.

21 *Ibid.*, 30.

22 *Buhara* (printed at the press of Mirza Amanullah, Iran, A.H. 1328), 12.

of appearing before him. No joke or loose talk was possible in his presence.²³ Only a few trusted maliks and confidants sat behind the throne; all others kept standing before him in order of their rank and position. The Sultan maintained the dignity of his exalted office by his grim and serious looks. Nobody ever saw him laughing or talking in a light mood. Storms of personal grief came in his life with unexpected fury but, though they killed the man in him, they could not disturb the routine of the Sultan.²⁴ To the last moments of his life this stickler for court-decorum scrupulously followed every detail of that exacting programme which he had set for himself.

On festive occasions the court presented a gala appearance. Embroidered carpets, brocade curtains, variegated cloths and gold and silver vessels dazzled the vision of the spectators. The voice of the ushers went as far as two *karohs*. 'For days after these festivals', writes Barani, 'people talked about the decorations of the court.' Emissaries of foreign countries were dazed and bewildered when they visited his court. When the Sultan rode out in procession, Sistani soldiers accompanied him with unsheathed swords. 'The shining of the sun, the glittering of the swords and the brightness of his face all taken together made a remarkable show.' The shouts of '*Bismillah*', '*Bismillah*' (In the name of God), rent the atmosphere as the royal cavalcade moved out. This display of power, authority and dignity, which was inseparably associated in his mind with his theory of kingship, made the most recalcitrant elements in the country submissive and struck awe and terror into the hearts of the people.

BALBAN AND THE TURKISH NOBILITY

A chip of the same block, Balban knew fully the strength as well as the weakness of the Turkish governing class. His strength lay in the support of this class, but he had to guard against three things: (a) Repetition of the earlier story of the tussle between the crown and the nobility; (b) Competition between his sons and the Turkish nobles for the crown of Delhi after his death; and (c) Monopolization of power by the Turkish nobles in the frontier areas. The methods that he used for this purpose proved quite disastrous in the larger interests of the Turkish governing class in India. (1) He mercilessly killed every member of Iltutmish's family. (2) He made free use of both poison and dagger in order to remove talented Turkish nobles who might challenge his descendants. (3) He delivered a death blow to the group of 'Forty' (*Turkan-i Chihalgani*) to which he himself belonged, killed

²³ Barani, 33.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 110.

its leading members and completely destroyed its corporate life, which, despite mutual rivalries and jealousies, could have been successfully used in times of conflict with the non-Turkish elements. (4) He killed his own relatives, like Sher Khan, on grounds of pure jealousy. Barani, who does not seem to have had the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* of Minhaj within his reach, depicts Sher Khan as a valiant defender of the Indian frontier against the Mongols. This is absurd. Minhaj does not refer to any battle in which Sher Khan fought the Mongols. Worse than that, he had gone to Mangu Qa-an. The Mongols offered him no immediate assistance, but very naturally there was a suspicion that he had sold himself to them. Balban, who was then *naib-i mamlakat*, rightly decided that Sher Khan could not be trusted with frontier provinces like Uchch and Multan, and gave him in return extensive territories round about Delhi, where he would be under the eyes of the central government. Sher Khan did not come to Delhi at Balban's accession and during the next four or five years. Then Balban had him poisoned.²⁵

Anxious to secure his personal and family interests, he completely ignored the interests of the Turkish governing class. He destroyed the talent amongst the Turkish nobles so ruthlessly that when the Khaljis entered the field as competitors for the throne against them, they were completely outmanoeuvred and defeated. Balban's responsibility for the fall of the Turkish power in India cannot be denied. His consolidation programme, no doubt, ensured the continuance of the Delhi sultanat and paved the way for the further expansion of the sultanat under the Khaljis, but his attitude towards the Turkish nobility crippled it and reduced its life-span.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

Balban's political experience had taught him that the army was the main pillar of the government; hence it had to be reorganized before any other department of the state.²⁶ The traditions established by Iltutmish had received a setback and, therefore, a complete reorganization of the army was necessary.

(1) Balban increased the numerical strength of the forces and appointed several thousand loyal and experienced officers in the central contingents (*qalh-i a'ala*) of his army. Their salaries were increased and villages were assigned to them in lieu of their salaries.²⁷

(2) Enhancement of the emoluments of the soldiers and keeping

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 65.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 29.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 29.

them happy and satisfied was an essential part of Balban's military policy. He advised his son Bughra Khan: 'Consider no expense for the army as too great and let your *ariz* (muster-master) engage himself in maintaining the old and recruiting new troops and keeping himself informed about every expenditure in his department.'²⁸

(3) To keep the army vigilant and active, he emphasized the need of frequent military exercises. Every winter, in the early hours of the morning, he proceeded towards Riwari under the pretext of going for a hunt, took with him a thousand horsemen and a thousand archers on foot, and returned late at night. This may be correct. But Barani very stupidly adds that information of what Balban did was carried to Halaku, that Halaku complimented Balban on his foresight and that Balban was happy at the compliment. It is unfortunate that our historian (Ziauddin Barani), who claims that no history like his had been written for a thousand years, should have been ignorant of the fact that Halaku had died before Balban's accession. He makes a similar error, but more preposterous, when he says that Halaku (then dead) invited Balban's nephew, Alauddin Kashli Khan, to enter his service and promised him half the revenue of Iraq.²⁹

(4) Balban kept the object of all campaigns a close secret and nobody knew beforehand about his movements or targets. It was only on the night previous to his march that he called the outstanding maliks and disclosed his aims to them.³⁰

(5) When his armies were on the march, he took particular care to see that no harm was done to poor and helpless persons. He would himself sit and wait with his army and give preference to old and sick persons in crossing rivers, bridges and marshes.³¹ Thus while his army was used as a powerful instrument for the liquidation of rebels, it won the golden opinion of the common man.

(6) Balban appointed men of exceptional integrity and devotion to look after the army.

Balban's *qazi-i lashkar* was a man of integrity and honesty, whom the Sultan and the public respected. But we know very little about him. Barani fortunately gives us a somewhat detailed account of Imadul Mulk, who was the maternal grandfather of the poet, Amir Khusrau. Imadul Mulk, generally called '*Rawat-i Arz*', started his career as a slave-officer of Iltutmish and rapidly rose to the post of *arz-i mamalik* (minister of war). During the thirty troubled years following Iltutmish's death, Imadul Mulk kept this important post.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 101-2.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 53, 114.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 60.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 45.

Balban confirmed him on his accession. He enjoyed his master's full confidence on account of his honesty, integrity and loyalty. He was made independent of the financial control of the wazir. The prosperous condition of the army during the reign of Balban was, in no small measure, due to him. He used to reward the officers of his ministry from his own pocket and took a very keen and conscientious interest in their welfare. Very often he entertained his office-staff and requested it to abstain from taking bribes from the representatives of the *iqtadars* and not to misappropriate any portion of the salary of the soldiers.³²

(7) Balban had an old and experienced contingent of one thousand soldiers from his *khanate* days, which he always kept with him. Even when he went on hunting excursions these soldiers accompanied him. Barani says that Balban recognized by his face every one of the soldiers of this unit.³³

(8) Balban was against purposeless campaigns. He deliberated in his mind long before undertaking any military expedition. All preparations were made well in advance—without disclosing the target—and a year before the actual campaign orders were issued to the *diwan-i wizarat* and the *diwan-i arz* to keep the forces alert and ready and to expedite production of war material in the *karkhanas*.³⁴

RESUMPTION OF 'IQTAS' IN THE DOAB

As a part of his programme for the reorganization of the army, Balban instituted an inquiry into the conditions and tenures of *iqtas* given to Turkish soldiers.³⁵ Iltutmish had granted *iqtas*, big and small, on a large scale. Among others, two thousand Turkish soldiers were given *iqtas* in the Doab. The purpose of the grant was two-fold: first, to reward the Turkish soldiers for the military services they had rendered to the Turkish government in India, and, secondly, to utilize them for the consolidation of Turkish rule in the most prosperous part of the empire. These assignments carried neither any administrative duties nor any financial responsibilities to the central exchequer. These small *iqtadars* were permitted simply to realize revenue from some portion of the land in lieu of military service. The dangers inherent

³² *Ibid.*, 114-16. Barani would have us believe that the office-staff of the *Rawat-i Arz* got its midday meal at his cost. The minister was also very fond of *pan*; he was constantly asking for more and more *pans* to be brought, and since good manners required that persons who came to transact business with the minister should be offered *pans* in the same way, some fifty or sixty slaves were kept busy in preparing and serving *pans* (betel-leaves).

³³ *Ibid.*, 55.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 60.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 62 *et seq.*

in the system were eliminated by Iltutmish's careful and vigilant control of the administrative machinery, but during the years of anarchy that followed his death, the entire *iqta* administration broke down and the *iqtadars* adopted an attitude of defiance towards the central authority. The institution of *iqtas*, which had been adopted in order to accelerate the process of centralization, now tended to disintegrate and decentralize the political authority. This state of affairs was incompatible with Balban's ideals of a centralized government. He instituted an inquiry into the terms and tenures of the *iqtas* given to two thousand Turkish soldiers in the Doab. Many of the original grantees had died by this time, and those who survived were too old and infirm to render any military service. With the connivance of the *diwan-i arz*, they retained their hold on the *iqtas* and claimed hereditary rights over them. Balban's view was that these *iqtas* were given in lieu of military service; when the grantees discontinued to perform their part of the obligation, the contract on the basis of which they held these *iqtas* became null and void. The *iqtadars* were probably inspired by the Seljuq traditions in claiming hereditary rights over these *iqtas*, but Balban, who looked to Sanjar for guidance in many other matters, refused to be guided by this example in the matter of the grant of *iqtas*.

After a thorough inquiry, Balban issued orders for the resumption of these *iqtas* with payment of some compensation to the holders. He assigned 20 to 30 *tankas* as pension to infirm and old soldiers, while those who were young and able-bodied were enlisted as soldiers in the regular army and were granted cash salaries. As was natural, this order created a great commotion among the grantees concerned. Some of the Turkish leaders approached Malik Fakhruddin, the famous kotwal of Delhi, to secure the withdrawal of the imperial order. They had brought presents for Fakhruddin, but he declined to accept them saying: 'My words will carry no weight if I accept any bribe from you.' On going to the court, he stood at his place with a melancholy and sad face. When the Sultan enquired about the reason for his worry, he explained: 'I have heard that old people are being dismissed from the ministry of war. It makes me gloomy to think of my own fate on the Day of Judgement, if old people are to be expelled from the favour of God.' The Sultan understood what Fakhruddin meant. Tears trickled down his eyes and he withdrew the entire order.³⁶

³⁶ Dr. Habibullah says that only the order concerning the old *iqtadars* was rescinded. The rest appears to have been enforced (*Foundation*, new edition, 186). But Barani is quite clear in stating: 'The rights of all *iqtadars* were preserved as they stood.' (64).

ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES AND ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

'Nature had sewn the gown of kingship on the body of Sultan Balban',³⁷ remarks Barani describing the administrative achievements of the Sultan. When he ascended the throne of Delhi, every official was in a defiant mood and the entire administrative machinery was out of gear. He screwed up all its loose joints and made the bureaucracy loyal and subservient to the royal authority.

Balban's government, like most medieval governments in east and west, was half civil and half military; this was due to the medieval conditions of warfare, for government officers could not function unless they combined both civil and military capacities. Military training has become a highly specialized subject now owing to the development of modern science. During the middle ages the art of wielding the sword and the pen had often to be taught simultaneously.

Balban checked with an iron hand the fissiparous trends that prevailed in all spheres of political life. He believed in a centralized political authority. Most official appointments were directly made by him or with his approval. That an almost insignificant appointment in Amroha³⁸ could attract his attention shows that he kept a strict watch over the entire bureaucratic machinery. Provincial governors had to submit periodical reports to him. A very efficient audit system controlled the financial activities of the governors. In view of the difficult position of the frontier provinces, Multan and Lakhnauti, he ultimately appointed his sons as governors of these regions. Balban was not prepared to give an opportunity to any noble or officer to consolidate his position in a sensitive part of the empire and give him the trouble that Tughril had done. If the wardenship of the western marches was to be a stepping-stone to kingship, none except his eldest son was to be in charge of that area.

Since Balban himself had been once instrumental in devising institutions—like the *naib-i mamlakat*—for curtailing the power of the monarch, he saw to it that there was no great concentration of power in the hands of any officer. He reduced the position of the wazir by taking away the military and the financial powers from him. The appointment of Khwaja Hasan as wazir was an indication of his attitude towards the institution of the wizarat and the type of functions that a wazir was expected to perform. With the separation of financial and military authority, the chances of usurpation of power by any government functionary were totally eliminated.

³⁷ Barani, 32.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 36.

Balban felt that a despotic government needed the services of an efficient and loyal spy system for its smooth functioning. His secret reporters kept him well posted with all that happened in every part of the kingdom. The activities of his sons,³⁹ relatives, provincial governors, army officers, government servants and the public were watched and reported by the spies. Balban took particular care in the appointment of *barids* (intelligence officers). It was only after a thorough investigation about his character, integrity and even genealogy that a person was appointed as *barid*.⁴⁰ The successful maintenance of *barids*, who were officers known to the public, as well as secret spies, without creating demoralization and distrust among the people, required great tact on the part of the Sultan. On this point Balban thus advised his son: 'Informers and spies should not be allowed to come anywhere near the court, for their closeness to the ruler terrifies obedient and trustworthy friends and their confidence in the king—which is the basis of good government—vanishes.'

Balban's political views and administrative principles may be gleaned from the two long discourses to his sons, from which Barani has extensively quoted. The following principles emerge from these exhortations:

- (1) A government should promulgate protective laws and safeguard the interests of the weak against the high-handedness of the strong.
- (2) Moderation should be the watchword of government. There should be neither harshness nor leniency in dealing with the people. Taxes should be neither so heavy as to make people poor and helpless nor so light as to make them disobedient and insolent.
- (3) The government should see that enough grain is produced for the requirements of the people.
- (4) Government orders should be firmly enforced and there should not be frequent changes in government decisions.
- (5) The finances of the state should be properly planned and managed. Only half the annual revenue should be spent; the other half should be put aside for a rainy day.
- (6) A government should strive to keep the merchants prosperous and satisfied.
- (7) The salaries of the soldiers should be regularly paid and the army should be kept happy and contented.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.

Within the framework of these basic principles Balban built up a strong and efficient administrative structure and gave to the people 'peace and justice' for which they had been longing for decades. Barani's account of the Sultan leaves upon one's mind a clear impression of the fact that while Balban was harsh and exacting towards his maliks and amirs, from whose ranks he had risen, he was extremely kind and considerate towards the common man. He displayed 'paternal concern' for the welfare of the people—in spite of his contempt for the low-born.

REBELLION OF TUGHRIL AT LAKHNAUTI

Balban's army was a good show-piece, with its Sistani and Turkish soldiers. But Indians, whether Hindus or Muslims, had no prospects in his army and its officers were not recruited from the people at large. Would it stand a military test? It had to meet this test both in the east and the west. Iltutinish and his son, *Shahzada* Nasiruddin, had no difficulty in suppressing the rebellions of the rulers and governors of Bengal. Balban, his officers and his army, faced with the same problem, proved themselves extraordinarily inefficient and clumsy. They won but after more than six years of struggle and through sheer weight of numbers. In the west the position was different. In spite of the great care Balban had taken about the army, his son and his officers completely collapsed before the army of a Mongol frontier officer.

Barani, who knew nothing of conditions in Persia, talks as if Halaku was still alive and he (or his successors) were a danger to the existence of the Delhi sultanat. This is absurd. Persian histories make it quite clear that Halaku's power had been completely shattered after his defeat at the hands of the Egyptians and Baraka, the Mongol head of the Juji clan, who had become a Musalman. Since the Mongols had massacred most of the peasants of northern Persia, specially the wonderfully fertile south Caspian region, the financial resources of Halaku's successors, called the 'Il Khans', were very meagre. They could never balance their budget and, in spite of their efforts, the Egyptians drove them out of Syria. Under these conditions the governors of the Il Khan-i frontier provinces could only maintain themselves by plundering the neighbouring lands. Delhi itself was never in danger till the organization of the Dawa-Qaidu empire in the time of Alauddin Khalji. Of course, the 'Il Khan' officers had a more efficient conception of strategy and tactics than the generals recruited from the decreasing number of Turkish slave-officers in India. These facts should be kept in mind concerning the two military events of Balban's reign.

Tatar Khan, son of Arsalan Khan, who was governor of

Lakhnauti, sent Balban sixty-three elephants in the year of Balban's accession. Tughril, who succeeded Tatar Khan as governor of Lakhnauti, was a slave of Balban.⁴¹ He was known for his cleverness, courage, generosity and enterprise. According to Isami, Tughril rebelled against Balban in the eighth year of the Sultan's reign (A.D. 1275). This was probably the first major rebellion of a slave of the Sultan; apart from everything else, it was an indication of the cracking of the whole institution. If a slave could rebel with success, the whole imperial Turkish slave-system became quite useless.

What encouraged Tughril in his contumacious designs was his successful Jainagar campaign. He obtained from there considerable treasures and many elephants and appropriated them. He did not send anything to the Sultan, thinking that he was too old and too preoccupied with the Mongol problem to chastize him. He proclaimed himself king of Lakhnauti with the title of 'Sultan Mughisuddin', and assumed also all the emblems of sovereignty, including the canopy of state, the *Khutba* and the issue of currency. His generosity attracted the people to his fold and 'they forgot the wrath and ruthlessness of Balban'.

The report of this rebellion came as a shock and a surprise to Balban. He was so deeply upset at the news that he could neither eat nor sleep at night. He immediately despatched the governor of Awadh, Malik Aitigin Mui-daraz⁴² (of the long hair), entitled Amin Khan, to Lakhnauti with a large army and a number of other experienced maliks and officers, like Tamar Khan Shamsi and Malik Tajuddin, son of Qutlugh Khan Shamsi. Tughril challenged Amin Khan as soon as he crossed the Sarju river (modern Ghagra) and defeated him. Besides, Tughril also won over a number of amirs and soldiers of Balban's army through lavish grants of gifts. On its retreat the imperial army was harassed and plundered by Hindu tribes. Balban was enraged at the performance of Amin Khan; he ordered Amin Khan to be killed and his body he gibbeted at the gate of Awadh. This execution, Barani says, was deeply resented by the people, who read in it the beginning of the doom of Balban's power.

Balban's anger and distress at the defeat of his army by a former slave of his knew no bounds. The governor of Awadh and his army having failed, Balban assigned the task of suppressing Tughril to the

41 Barani, 'Rebellion of Tughril', 81-92. Barani says that Tughril rebelled in the fifteenth or sixteenth year of Balban's reign. But this is not possible, for Balban reigned for twenty years only.

42 Mui-daraz is referred to by Minhaj among the officers appointed when Ulugh Khan returned to power. Isami, while giving the same facts, calls him 'Taramati' and implies that Taramati means 'brave'.

army of Delhi led by one of his chosen officers, Bahadur. In the battle that ensued, Tughril struck straight at Bahadur's centre; Bahadur fought courageously, but some contingents of the imperial army took to flight and their example proved infectious. In spite of Bahadur's efforts, the army of Delhi melted away. When Bahadur with his fugitive soldiers reached Delhi, Balban wanted to put him to death, but Bahadur's friends succeeded in saving his life by giving proofs of his courage on the battle-field, and Balban was content with exiling him from the court.⁴³

Two generals—Amin Khan and Bahadur—had been defeated by Tughril. It caused Balban great concern. He waved his aged arms in fury at the defeat of these armies. His life became miserable and he considered these defeats a serious loss to his prestige. So in A.H. 680 (1280-81) he decided to march personally to deal with Tughril, but he wanted to entrust matters at Delhi and the areas around it in safe hands before embarking on such a distant campaign. He first went towards Sunam and Samana. These two provinces were in charge of his second son, Mahmud Bughra Khan. Balban broke the two provinces into small territories under military amirs, and the over-all charge of Sunam was given to Malik Sonj, the *sar-jandar*. Samana was assigned to Balban's eldest son, Sultan Muhammad, whom he had designated as his heir, with the title of 'Qa-an Malik'. Sultan Muhammad had first been in charge of Koil and other territories. But later on he was assigned the whole of Sind, with plenty of officers whom Balban thought capable.

Balban then proceeded to the Doab without returning to Delhi. He wrote to Sultan Muhammad assigning him the army of Samana in addition to Sind and asked him to meet the Mongol danger in the best way he could. He also wrote to Malikul Umara Fakhruddin, the kotwal of Delhi, appointing him *naib-i ghibat* (regent in absence); he was to keep the Sultan informed, as far as possible, but he had the authority to issue all orders concerning state-affairs according to his discretion and without waiting for the imperial sanction. Then taking Bughra Khan with him, Balban marched eastwards regardless of the rainy season. 'On reaching Awadh, he ordered a general enlistment and some two lakhs of men—horsemen, foot-soldiers, *paiks*, archers, *Kahars*, *Kaiwani* (bow-men), riders on ponies, arrow-shooters, slaves, servants, merchants and shopkeepers were entered in the registers.' Owing to the rainy season the imperial army had to stop for ten or twelve days at various places. Tughril decided to fly to Hajinagar, a

⁴³ Barani's memory of this campaign is very dim but Isami devotes more than two pages to it (161-63).

place several marches east of Sonargaon (near the modern Dacca), but he gave out that he would return and reconquer Lakhnauti after Balban had gone back to Delhi.

Balban reached Lakhnauti and stayed there for a few days to re-equip his army. He appointed *Sipah Salar* Husamuddin (maternal grandfather of the historian, Barani), who had been *vakildar* to Malik Barbek Bektars, to the post of *shuhna* of Lakhnauti with instructions to send to the Sultan all papers received from Delhi three or four times a week. After some days of continuous marching, the Sultan reached the precincts of Sonargaon. Dhanuj Rai, the *rai* of Sonargaon, came to meet him, and the Sultan took a promise from him that he would capture Tughril whether he fled by land or sea. Balban, not knowing Tughril's real plan, seemed at that time to think that Tughril would seek his personal safety by flying across the sea. Nevertheless, Balban moved eastwards by continuous marches till he reached within 60 *karohs* (120 miles) of Hajinagar, but no trace of Tughril could be found. As the main army moved slowly, Balban directed Malik Bektars to march as an advance-guard ten or twelve *karohs* ahead. The advance-guard, in turn, sent a few men to find the whereabouts of Tughril through interpreters. Ultimately a party sent under Malik Muhammad Sherandaz and others came across some corn-dealers and enquired from them about the whereabouts of Tughril. They pleaded ignorance. Malik Sherandaz, thereupon, struck terror into their hearts by cutting off the heads of two of them. They then disclosed that the camp of Tughril was only half a *farsang* (about a mile) from that place; today he is encamped by the stone-tank dam and tomorrow he will reach the territory of Hajinagar. Sherandaz immediately communicated the news to Malik Barbek Bektars.

Tughril's army was enjoying rest at the time; the horses and elephants were grazing on the green ground, and owing to a false sense of security no sentinels seem to have been posted. Without losing any time, Sherandaz dashed into the camp and shouted loudly for Tughril. Tughril was terrified by the suddenness and confidence of the shouting; so in great nervousness he slipped out of his bath-room, jumped on an unsaddled horse and rode hard to a river nearby. Malik Muqaddar and an officer, named Ali, followed in close pursuit. Tughril had nearly reached the river when Ali struck him with a short battle-axe and knocked him down from his horse. Malik Muqaddar immediately got down from his horse, chopped off Tughril's head and threw his body into the river. As Tughril's soldiers were searching for him, the Malik buried his head under the soft earth by the side of the river and started washing his clothes. Shortly

afterwards Malik Barbek Bektars arrived and Tughril's head was sent to the Sultan. When Muqaddar arrived to report the details to the Sultan, he was at first angry at the risk Malik Muhammad Sherandaz and his group had taken. But all had gone well, and the Sultan raised the rank of all those concerned in the enterprise. Ali was given the title of '*Tughril-Kush*' (Tughril-slayer) and equal *in'ams* were given to him and Malik Muqaddar.⁴⁴

When Balban returned to Lakhnauti, he ordered a row of gibbets to be erected on both sides of the market for more than two miles and all friends, supporters and relatives of Tughril were impaled on them. 'I have heard from many aged officers', Barani writes, 'that no king of Delhi had meted out such extensive capital punishments as Balban did at Lakhnauti.' Soldiers of Tughril's army, who belonged to the capital, were kept under guard for punishment at Delhi.

The Sultan assigned Lakhnauti to Bughra Khan, and then turned to him and asked: 'Mahmud! Didst thou see?' He repeated the question thrice and on receiving no reply, he explained. "Did you see my punishments in the bazar? If mischievous and intriguing persons induce you to break from Delhi, recall the punishment inflicted by me on Tughril and his supporters.' He advised Bughra to remain loyal to Delhi, even if the occupant of the Delhi throne belonged to another dynasty.

The Lakhnauti campaign was a great strain on Balban in his old age and it was only after three years that he could return to Delhi. His success was celebrated in the capital. The Sultan addressed Malik Fakhruddin as 'brother' and gave him the cloak that he was wearing. Charities were distributed and prisoners were set free in order to celebrate the occasion. Subsequently, Balban ordered the execution of all those Delhi soldiers who had supported Tughril and directed gibbets to be put up in the streets of the capital. But many of these prisoners had their kinsmen in Delhi and their laments filled the capital. The qazi of the army, whose recommendations were always sympathetically considered by Balban, interceded on their behalf and secured the Sultan's pardon.⁴⁵ An idea of the mental agony of the supporters, servants and slaves of Tughril may be formed from the fact that we find one of them seeking spiritual solace in the *jama'at khana* of Shaikh Farid Ganji Shakar at Ajudhan.

⁴⁴ Isami and Barani differ about the way in which Tughril was killed. Barani is more reliable. But writing in his old age, he could not recall the personal name of *Tughril Kush*. Isami says his name was Ali.

⁴⁵ Barani, 108.

SULTAN MUHAMMAD, THE MARTYR PRINCE

Balban adopted a number of measures to guard his western frontier. In 1270 he visited Lahore and ordered the reconstruction of its fort. The Mongols had also destroyed and depopulated most of the villages round Lahore and Balban took measures to rehabilitate those areas. The city of Lahore had been seized and plundered by the Mongols in 1241, but immediately afterwards news arrived of the death of Ogatai and, in consonance with their *Yusas*, which required that all campaigns should stop at the death of the Qa-an, the Mongol armies went back. Lahore city thereafter remained in charge of governors appointed by Delhi. The frontier was fluctuating, but Lahore, Dipalpur, Sunam, Samana, Uchh and Multan were almost always in the hands of Delhi officers. There was no danger of a Mongol conquest of India during Balban's reign but a Mongol raid was always to be feared. After making several experiments, of which some account has been given, Balban placed the over-all charge of the western frontier in the hands of his son and heir-apparent, Sultan Muhammad, known to later generations as the 'Khan-i Shahid'.

Balban had only two sons. He had no expectations from Bughra Khan to whom he had assigned Lakhnauti with the wise advice of being at least outwardly loyal to Delhi so that a conflict may be avoided. All the hopes of the old Sultan were concentrated on his elder son and heir, Sultan Muhammad. The fact that Muhammad was unlike his father in many respects did not interfere with Balban's affection. Balban used to hold three or four drinking parties every week before he ascended the throne; he never touched a drop of wine after his accession. Sultan Muhammad drank but never to excess. Unlike his father, Muhammad was affable, courteous and distinguished for his excellent manners; by birth a prince, it was not necessary for him to resort to the mannerisms of a superman, which made his father so dignified in the eyes of the masses and so ridiculous in the eyes of the discerning. Unlike his father, Muhammad was a highly educated man. Showering all possible praises on Balban, Minhaj is unable to list him as a patron of culture and learning. Sultan Muhammad's court at Multan, on the other hand, was full of able and highly educated men. 'His courtiers read the *Shah Nama* (of Firdausi), the *Diwans* of Sanai and Khaqani and the *Khumsa* of Nizami. Wise men discussed the verses of these great poets before him.' The prince's discerning judgement picked up Amir Khusrau and Amir Hasan and they remained in his service for five years. His ambitions as a patron of literature went higher still.

'Owing to his extraordinary discernment, the Khan-i Shahid twice sent messengers with expenses of the journey and invited Shaikh Sa'di to Multan. His idea was to construct a *Khanqah* for Shaikh Sa'di at Multan and to endow sufficient villages for its maintenance. But Shaikh Sa'di was unable to come owing to his old age. On both occasions he sent a *ghazal* in his own handwriting to the Khan and apologized for his inability to come.'⁴⁶

Balban had at first assigned Sunam and Samana to Tamar Khan, a distinguished member of the famous Forty (*Chihalgani*) Turks. But he may have remembered that both Kishlu Khan and Sher Khan had gone to seek help from the Mongols; so he transferred these two provinces to his younger son, Bughra Khan, on whose loyalty he could rely but whose efficiency was questionable. Balban was driven to appoint *barids* to keep him informed of Bughra Khan's actions and succeeded in keeping his administration at the proper level. 'In those days', says Barani, 'the Mongol soldiers often crossed the Bias and entered (Indian) territory. Balban would send Sultan Muhammad against them from Multan, Bughra Khan from Samana and Malik Barbek Bektars⁴⁷ from Delhi. They would go to the Bias and drive back the Mongols. Very often they were victorious and the Mongols had not the courage to cross the Bias. There were seventeen or eighteen thousand horsemen in each of these armies.'

When Bughra Khan was appointed to Lakhnauti, Sultan Muhammad was given complete charge of the western frontier.

Isami, without giving the date, says that two Mongol armies crossed the Sind frontier. Sultan Muhammad sent his officers against them; a battle was fought at Dhandi Kandali and the Mongols won owing to their superior numbers. Muhammad wanted to fine his officers, but as this would have lessened their prestige, he ended by giving them robes of honour and *in'ams*.

During the summer after his return from Lakhnauti, Balban found his physical powers failing him; so he decided to hand over the kingdom to Sultan Muhammad and asked him to come to Delhi immediately. Balban's messenger reached Multan on the tenth day. Sultan Muhammad had some urgent affairs of state to attend to and replied that he was starting immediately. Balban, on cross-examining the messenger, discovered the contradictions between Muhammad's words and deeds. Balban sent a letter of complaint, but by that time affairs had taken a gruesome turn.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 67-68.

⁴⁷ According to Barani (61) he was the most trusted confidant of the Sultan.

Sultan Muhammad marched against the Sumrah tribes in A.H. 684 (A.D. 1285), possibly because they had rebelled against him, and pitched his camp in the precincts of Jatral, in order to proceed with the suppression of the Sumrahs. Whether by chance or design, Tamar, a frontier Mongol officer, marched with thirty thousand Mongol horse-men against him at the same time. The Mongols either marched very swiftly or succeeded in keeping their movements a secret, for Sultan Muhammad only got a letter informing him of the Mongol advance when they were at a distance of five *farsangs* only.

Sultan Muhammad consulted his officers. Their loyal advice was that he should quietly slip back to Multan and let them do the fighting; the battle would be serious; they could be replaced but he was irreplaceable. But Sultan Muhammad decided to fight. 'It does not become *shahzadas* to turn their bridles on seeing the enemy.' Next morning the Mongol advance-guard could be discerned. 'Group after group', the poet Khusrau says, 'they crossed the river (Ravi) and came on suddenly.' But the Indian army had mounted by the time the Mongols appeared in full force. The battle raged till the afternoon, without victory to either side. But in the army of Sultan Muhammad, there was a Ghizz Turk officer, named Mangli, whom the Mongols knew to be a coward. They discovered his whereabouts and suddenly attacked his lines, which broke and fled. The Mongols rushed forward and the discipline of the Indian army was completely broken. 'As the Mongol army was more numerous,' Isami says, 'it exerted its full strength everywhere. The Indian lines were completely shattered and the Mongols began to slaughter the Indians.'

Sultan Muhammad, after fighting bravely for several hours, found no one by his side and turned his horse towards the river (Ravi). But he was shot dead by a Qaruna⁴⁸ of the Mongol army, who proceeded to appropriate his horse, sword, bow and arrows. One of the two singing girls of Sultan Muhammad, whom the Mongols had captured, recognized his famous horse on which the Qaruna was riding, and incited by her loud cries, the Mongol officers compelled the Qaruna to take them to the dead body of the Khan-i Shahid. They put his body in a coffin with the intention of taking it to their own country. But Rai Kalu, the father-in-law of the Khan-i Shahid, sent the Mongols enough money from his territory and bought the body of the Khan from them.⁴⁹ The Mongols as usual retired after collecting their spoils.

48 The Qarunas are often referred to, but the meaning of the term is not settled. Provisionally we may take a Qaruna to mean the son of a Muslim mother and a Mongol father.

49 We have two *marsiās* (elegies) on the death of the Khan-i Shahid, one in prose written by Amir Hasan and the other in verse written by Amir Khusrau. Perhaps

THE LAST DAYS OF SULTAN BALBAN

Sultan Muhammad's death was a smashing blow for Balban, who had reached his eightieth year, for the prince had been the sheet-anchor of his earthly hopes. In his death Balban heard the death-knell of his dynasty, and a tragic end of his life-long efforts to perpetuate kingship in his family. May be, the ghosts of Nasiruddin Mahmud, Qutbuddin Hasan Ghuri, Sher Khan and others, whom he had murdered in order to make the crown safe for his dynasty, began to dance before his eyes.

As a last resort he summoned Bughra Khan from Lakhnauti and appealed to him to remain at Delhi. His grandsons, Kaikhusrau and Kaiqubad, were young and inexperienced; unless Bughra was prepared to bear the burden, the kingship of Delhi would become a 'children's game' (*bacha-bazi*), as it had been for a whole generation after the death of Iltutmish. Balban's argument was convincing, but Bughra was a prince of hasty temper, ignorant of the cataclysmic changes in states. He remained by the side of his father for two or three months; then there was a slight improvement in the Sultan's health and the desire of returning to Lakhnauti took possession of Bughra's mind; so making the recovery of the Sultan an excuse, he left for Lakhnauti without the Sultan's permission. Isami has given a deeper touch of poignancy to this tragedy by narrating the following story. Some persons alleged to have minted coins (*qalb-kari*) were brought before the Sultan. Amongst them was the only son of an old widow. He was innocent but had been wrongly arrested. She made pathetic representations to the Sultan but they were not heard; it was not his rule to show leniency in crimes against the state. All persons implicated in the case were put to death. This put the old woman's heart on the rack. Every night she appeared before the imperial palace to bemoan the death of her son and to demand Divine punishment for the Sultan. Her pathetic cries used to disturb the Sultan in his sleep and the officers of the Sultan used all possible methods to dissuade her from raising her heart-rending cries. But she ignored all admonitions. She was not afraid of 'iron' and could not be tempted by 'gold'. After the death of the Khan-i Shahid, she did not come near the palace again and all attempts to trace her whereabouts failed.⁵⁰

The old Sultan's spirit was at last broken. All day long he

no poem of Amir Khusrau evoked so many tears as this *marsia*, which has been quoted in part by Badauni in his *Muntakhabut Tawarikh*. Historically Isami's account of the death of the Khan-i-Shahid is best we have (166-76).

⁵⁰ *Futuhus Salatin*, 177-78.

transacted the business of the government as usual, but when he retired to his chamber he wept and cried and put dust on his head. He did not long survive his son's death. Realizing that his end was near, the Sultan summoned Malikul Umara, the kotwal of Delhi, Khwaja Hasan Basri, the wazir, and other high officers and gave his instructions about the succession.

'I have appointed Kaikhusrau, son of my eldest son, Khan-i Shahid, as my heir; put him on my throne; he is a young man of promise but lacks age and experience and cannot perform the obligations of kingship. But what else can I do? Mahmud (Bughra Khan), for whom people have a regard and from whom something could be expected, has gone to Lakhnauti and there is not enough time to call him back. I have no alternative but to nominate Kaikhusrau.

He then asked the maliks to depart. Three days later he died. 'The kotwal and the kotwali officers were bold, capable and in touch with the public mind. On account of facts, the revelation of which appertains to women, they had no good inclination towards the Khan-i Shahid and thought that it would be a disaster if Kaikhusrau was to ascend the throne. So during the day they sent Kaikhusrau to Multan, placed Kaiqubad, son of Bughra Khan, on the throne with the title of Mu'izzuddin, and towards the end of the night they brought Balban's funeral from the Koshak-i Lal (Red Palace) for burial in the Darul Aman.'

All the usual formalities were performed, or perhaps overdone, at Balban's funeral. The maliks and officers threw dust on their heads and tore their garments. They all followed the bier to the graveyard bare-headed; and when his body was being lowered into the grave, Malik Fakhruddin Kotwal paid his last compliments to his master and saw in his death the extinction of old and respected families. He slept on the ground for six months and other eminent maliks and amirs followed his example. Many people of the city distributed food in alms to bless the soul of the departed Sultan.⁵¹

ACHIEVEMENTS AND FAILURES OF BALBAN

Balban's dynasty did not last for more than three years after his death. His officers, if any, who believed in his statements that 'the king is the deputy of God' and that 'the king's heart is the recipient of Divine revelations', must have been surprised at the contradictions between Balban's claims and the character of his successor. Balban's

⁵¹ Barani, 120-23.

policy of killing the leading Turkish slave-officers was continued by the government of Kaiqubad. Jalaluddin Firuz Khalji deprived them of their monopoly of high office, but did not put to death those whom he retained in his service. They showed their appreciation of his generosity by constantly conspiring against him. Finally, some twelve years after Balban's death all the descendants of Turkish slave-officers were imprisoned or put to death by Alauddin Khalji. That was the end of the regime.⁵² At the time of my composing the *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* (in 1357), Barani states, 'seventy years or two and a half generations (*qarns*) have passed since Balban's death. No one survives today from his family or the families of his sons, slaves or officers in spite of their large numbers.'⁵³

But though Balban's family vanished, the government of Delhi survived and it is in the context of this institution that Balban's life's work has to be judged.

In one matter we can unhesitatingly agree with the praises Barani showers upon him. By his forts and military posts he established law and order in the main provinces of the empire from Haryana to Bihar. Without this preliminary work, the achievements of the Khalji era would have been impossible. This peace, as we shall see, was maintained in the cities and the *Khalisa* villages by the officers of the sultanat and in the remaining areas by the hereditary Hindu chiefs.

It must be admitted that in almost all other matters, Balban's reactionary attitude—his insistence on high birth which meant servile Turkish origin or foreign origin—did more harm than good. During the forty years that Balban controlled the state two great movements were taking place to which he did not—and could not—adjust his policy. First, by a series of group-decisions many Hindu working class guilds or *biradaries*—e.g. weavers, butchers, elephant drivers, etc.—were adopting the Muslim creed. They were not prepared to tolerate an Indian government based on the assumption that all high offices belonged to the Turkish slaves of the sultan by right of conquest. Secondly, a large number of Hindus had been learning Persian and this made it possible, in fact necessary, for the government to undertake enterprises in new fields, particularly the land revenue, in which lack of bilingual clerks and accountants had been the main difficulty. Balban kept the old state-machine working long after it

52 By regime here is meant the regime of Turkish slave-officers—i.e. of Turkish slaves who had been educated by slave-merchants and purchased by the kings—Mu'izzuddin, Aibek, Iltutmish and even Balban. Free-born Turks were destined to play a prominent part in Indian history till they were finally absorbed by the Muslim population of India.

53. Barani, 48.

had lost all its utility. Consequently, the long delayed change, when it came, took a revolutionary form.

Balban's failure is best seen with reference to his army. Balban advised his son, Bughra Khan, not to rebel against Delhi because 'a king of Delhi could conquer Lakhnauti by the shaking of a bridle.'⁵⁴ Nevertheless, it took Balban six years or more to crush the rebellion of Tughril and a riff-raff of two hundred thousand had to be enlisted at Awadh to strengthen the regular army. Balban did not challenge any of the great Hindu rais, because his primary duty was to fight the Mongols. Nevertheless, his officers failed against the raids of frontier Mongol officers. With reference to the two frontier battles he describes, Isami, on the whole our best authority on military matters, says that *the Mongol victories were primarily due to their superiority in numbers*. But why should the Indian army be inferior in numbers? Isami, no doubt slightly exaggerating, says that Alauddin Khalji could raise a hundred thousand soldiers within a day from Delhi and its suburbs. Why then was the army of Delhi so insufficient in numbers that Sultan Muhammad and his officers were massacred by a frontier force of thirty thousand horse? There can be only one explanation. In the appointment of civil officers Balban was very particular about the principle of good birth—that is, of foreign origin. The same principle was inevitably applied to officers of the army, for the officers who did the fighting had to be administrative officers or *iqtadars* also. This meant a limitation of the officers available, and the limitation of officers would seriously limit the number of soldiers they could enrol. We must not forget that only a decade divides the death of Balban from the accession of Alauddin Khalji. Alauddin only cared for loyalty and efficiency and never bothered about anybody's genealogy; it was the only principle on which an efficient state could be built. Balban with his fad for high birth was quite out of date by the time he died. Both in the civil and the military field Balban and his governing class had been tried and found wanting.

REIGN OF MU'IZZUDDIN KAIQUBAD

Kaiqubad was a young man of seventeen or eighteen years—handsome, cultured and benevolent—when he ascended the throne in A.H. 686 (1387). He had been brought up strictly under the care of his grandfather and was never allowed by his tutors to look at the face of a beautiful girl or to taste a drop of wine. He had received instruction in all physical and intellectual arts, including calligraphy, literature, archery, spearmanship, etc. As soon as he ascended the

throne his life took a somersault; he gave himself up to debauchery and spent all his time in wine and venery. The court of Balban, which was known for its strict discipline and stoic atmosphere, was now turned into a centre for buffoons, pleasure-seekers, dancing girls and musicians. He built a magnificent palace⁵⁵ on the bank of the river Jumna at Kailugarhi⁵⁶ and began to live there in a world of pleasure and revelry. Barani describes in detail how young girls, 'whose breasts had not yet developed', were taught archery, horsemanship, dancing and singing Persian and Hindi songs for presentation to the court, where both the girls and their trainers got princely rewards. The misfortune of the young king was that he could not restrain himself from overindulgence in coition, 'which made his face pale and his body weak'. Isami, a mystic-minded middle-aged bachelor, is more emphatic in his statements:

'Day and night the king was engaged in his pleasure-parties; he had no time for anything else... There were no companions for him all the time except moon-faced maidens with rosy lips. I have heard concerning this king, who was a slave of his sex-desires owing to his youth: "that even when he drove his horse gently, it would take him ten miles in the course of one night". Yes! Youth, kingship and madness combined with the constant association and intimacy with young women was as dangerous as the proximity of fire and cotton-wool. Ultimately, the royal horseman, impelled by the heat of sex-desire, drove his horse with such unheeding recklessness that it left half his body paralysed.'⁵⁷

Obviously, the burden of the state had to be shouldered by other persons. 'I have heard from Qazi Sharafuddin Sarpain', Barani writes, 'that the kingdom of Kaiqubad could not have lasted for a week had Malik Nizamuddin and Malik Qawamuddin Ilaqa Dabir not been the pillars of his state; they were among the remnants of the Shamsi and Balbani maliks and were unrivalled in wisdom, discernment and the capacity of controlling affairs.' Qawamuddin, however, did not meddle in politics and left the direction of state-policy to his colleague.

Malik Nizamuddin, nephew and son-in-law of Malik Fakhruddin Kotwal, who was officially a mere *dadbek*, in practice became the

⁵⁵ Amir Khusrau gives a beautiful description of it in the *Qir'anus Sa'datin*, 54 *et seq.*

⁵⁶ The general impression that Kaiqubad founded the *Shahr-i Nau* or Kailugarhi is not correct because Minhaj refers to it even during the time of Nasiruddin Mahmud (Raverty, 634 f.n. 2).

⁵⁷ Isami, verses 3521 and 3800-05.

naib-i mamlakat, and assumed charge of all affairs of the administration. Probably he fully exploited Fakhruddin's support to Kaiqubad, and under this mask consolidated his own position. He made appointments of his supporters to the offices of *naib-i vakildar*, *amir-i hajib*, and *sarjandar*. His ambition soared higher and higher as the Sultan sank deeper and deeper in his pleasure-pursuits, and ultimately he began to plan for the throne. While he looked after the administration, his wife controlled the palace; she was called the Sultan's 'mother'.

One of the charges brought against Nizamuddin is the murder of Kaikhusrau, who was the nearest successor to the throne. Barani simply says that he got an order for the assassination of Kaikhusrau from the king when drunk, and had him killed at Rohtak. But what other authorities tell us certainly lessens Nizamuddin's responsibility. According to Ibn-i Battuta, at the time of Balban's death, Fakhruddin Kotwal prepared a forged document to the effect that all maliks and amirs had accepted Kaiqubad's accession, showed it to Kaikhusrau and advised him to fly to Multan; he had the city-gate opened and the prince fled. Yahya Sirhindi says that Malik Beksariq, the wazir, Hasan Basri and others, who supported Kaikhusrau, were taken into custody and subsequently exiled.⁵⁸ Isami says that Kaikhusrau brooded over his misfortunes at Multan for some months and then, being 'self-willed and inexperienced', he did the wrong thing. He left Multan under the pretext of hunting and went to Ghazni and from there to the country of the Mongols. But the Mongols were engaged in a civil war, and after spending all his money Kaikhusrau returned to Mandoli in Hindustan. Nizamuddin, rightly or wrongly, warned Kaiqubad against a cousin, 'who for the sake of the throne had promised submission and tribute to the Mongols'. So Kaikhusrau was beheaded at Mandoli at the Sultan's order.⁵⁹

Other punishments also followed on the recommendations of Nizamuddin. The wazir, Khwaja Khatir, was placed on an ass and paraded through the streets of the capital. These acts horrified the nobility and Nizamuddin came to be despised and feared by all important Turkish maliks and amirs, but he was so firmly entrenched that opposition to his authority was not possible. Nizamuddin, on his part, chalked out a plan to get rid of all important Turkish amirs. At a *darbar* held at Kailugarhi, he read out a forged report from the governor of Multan intimating the triumph of the imperial forces against a Mongol invasion. On this pretext all maliks and amirs were

⁵⁸ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 52.

⁵⁹ Isami, 190-2.

summoned to offer felicitations to the Sultan. When they presented themselves at the court, some of them were killed and others were exiled. Posts were reassigned, and only those who enjoyed the confidence of Nizamuddin were appointed again.

While Nizamuddin was busy purging the administration of all elements whom he considered undesirable, Tamar Khan invaded India and ravaged the country from Lahore to Multan. Khan-i Jahan, the *barbek*, was sent to deal with him. The Mongol army retreated as soon as it heard about the arrival of the imperial forces. Some Mongols were captured and killed. Later Nizamuddin deceitfully obtained the Sultan's order for the execution of those Mongols (called New Muslims) who had earlier embraced Islam and settled in India.⁶⁰

Nizamuddin relentlessly followed his policy of executing the maliks and amirs, and pushed on the dangerous process of eliminating talented Turkish officers, which had been initiated by Balban. Nizamuddin further put to death Malik Alauddin Shaikh, governor of Multan, and Malik Nasiruddin Tuzki, governor of Baran, both of whom were important maliks of Balban.

Nizamuddin's policy made Malik Fakhruddin Kotwal, now an old man of ninety, apprehensive of Nizamuddin's fate. He exhorted him to give up the idea of royalty and stick to his proper business. Barani, following his favourite method of putting dialogues in the mouths of his characters, makes Fakhruddin deliver a long harangue dissuading Nizamuddin from his ambitious schemes :

'Nizamuddin! I have brought you up and educated you; you are like a son to me. My father started his career as the king's personal attendant, and rose to the position of *kotwal*, which we have held for about eighty years. It is the maximum to which we can aspire. Our success has been due to the fact that we have never meddled with the politics of the state.'⁶¹

Nizamuddin replied that he had gone too far in the matter and if he retraced his steps, he would be killed. In utter disgust Fakhruddin cried out: 'Then consider ourselves, our families and children as dead and destroyed.' Nizamuddin, nevertheless, moved ahead with his policy of removing Turkish maliks.

When Kaiqubad ascended the throne at Delhi, his father, Bughra Khan, proclaimed himself king at Lakhnauti with the title of 'Sultan Nasiruddin' and had the currency and the *Khutba* put in his own name. There was a constant correspondence between father and son.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 181-82.

⁶¹ Barani, 134-38. In view of what Fakhruddin Kotwal had done to eliminate Kaikhusrau, this last statement cannot be accepted.

Bughra Khan knew that his son was leading a dissipated life and that Nizamuddin was inducing him to kill the leading maliks and amirs with the ultimate intention of putting an end to Kaiqubad himself. He tried by hints and indirect suggestions in his letters to draw Kaiqubad's attention to the matter, but Kaiqubad paid no heed to the written advice of his father. So after two years of his reign had passed, Bughra decided to see his son personally.

Amir Khusrau⁶² and Ziauddin Barani⁶³ have given us two different accounts of the circumstances in which the father and the son met. Khusrau says that Bughra Khan marched from Lakhnauti with the intention of conquering Delhi. When he reached Bihar, Kaiqubad decided to march out and challenge him. Barani says that the initiative was taken by Kaiqubad who started with a large army to see his father. When Bughra Khan reached near his son, he gave up his military objective (if he had any), and his march assumed the complexion of a social visit. He, however, sent his *dabir*, Shamsuddin, to Kaiqubad with the message: 'The kingdom of Delhi is mine, but if it has passed to my son, he should not contend with his father. For me the kingdom of Lakhnauti, the heritage of my father, is most desirable.' Kaiqubad replied that he had kept the throne for his father and protected it from the Mongols. The following day Bughra Khan sent his chamberlain to deliver a message to his son. The boat was in the middle of the river when Kaiqubad shot an arrow at it and the chamberlain returned disappointed. Bughra Khan sent him another message: 'My son! Banish the idea of revolt from your mind. I am the heir to the throne and you can obtain it through me.' Kaiqubad sent a fiery reply: 'Do not be proud of your ancestry, for nobody inherits a kingdom without having to fight for its preservation. I have a claim over the throne by virtue of three descents: Iltutmish, Nasiruddin Mahmud and Balban.'⁶⁴

Bughra Khan was sorry for his son's behaviour but he realized that it was due to Nizamuddin's mischievous planning. Ultimately, he wrote an affectionate letter in which he sought an interview with his son whom 'he was as anxious to see as Jacob had been to see Joseph'. Bughra sent his youngest son, Kaikaus, to Kaiqubad with presents, and Kaiqubad sent his son, Kaimurs, to his father. Nizamuddin was all the time anxious to bring about an armed conflict between Bughra

62 His *masnavi*, *Qir'anus Sa'dain* (ed. Maulvi Mohd. Ismail, Aligarh, 1918), gives a graphic account of the historic meeting.

63 *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 139-56.

64 *Qir'anus Sa'dain*, 118. 'Iltutmish's daughter was Bughra's mother; Nasiruddin's daughter was Kaiqubad's mother; Balban was his paternal grandfather.' See also *Qir'anus Sa'dain*, 22.

and Kaiqubad. He suggested that Kaiqubad should insist on the performance of all humiliating court ceremonies by his father. Bughra Khan behaved with remarkable equanimity and by accepting every servile form of court-etiquette foiled the schemes of Nizamuddin.

'Kaiqubad (sitting on the throne) affected a stony dignity and with kingly unconcern looked on as his father, bowing and kissing the ground, approached the throne and prostrated himself at his feet; but at the end he broke down and threw himself at his father's feet and in tears, which melted the hearts of all the spectators, conducted him to the throne.' The details of this meeting have been vividly described by Khusrau with all the felicity of his powerful poetic imagination. When all the festivities were over and Bughra Khan decided to return to Lakhnauti, he advised Kaiqubad in the presence of the maliks to refrain from indulging in his pleasure-pursuits. While parting he whispered into Kaiqubad's ears and advised him to get rid of Nizamuddin.

For a short while Kaiqubad abstained from wine and venery, but the large number of charming young courtesans, who were always with him, brought him back to his old ways within a week. Excessive indulgence and dissipation told upon his health and he fell ill. He ordered Nizamuddin to proceed to Multan but Nizamuddin delayed going on various prettexts. The Turkish officers found the time opportune and poisoned Nizamuddin. Barani has expressed his strong disapproval of the ambitious character and unscrupulous methods of Nizamuddin, but he seems to have been deeply impressed by his administrative abilities. After his death, the administration became chaotic, though many of the old nobles of Balban's court returned to serve under Kaiqubad.

When Nizamuddin was removed, Kaiqubad summoned Malik Firuz Khalji from Samana and appointed him *ariz-i mamalik* and governor of Baran with the title of Shaista Khan. Malik Firuz (later Sultan Jalaluddin Khalji) had served Balban for many years along with his brother, Shihabuddin, the father of Ali Gurshasp (later Sultan Alauddin Khalji), and had earned distinction as a military officer in the wars against the Mongols.

Ultimately, the conflicts and ambitions of the nobles got crystallized into two hostile groups—one led by Malik Firuz Shaista Khan Khalji and the other by Malik Aitmar Surkha. The former comprised of persons who sought the ascendancy of new elements; the latter wanted to retain the house of Balban in power and stood for safeguarding the interests of the old Turkish nobility, which had so long enjoyed a pre-eminent position in the state. While Kaiqubad, incurably paralysed

in body and mind, lay helpless in the Kailugarhi palace, Malik Kachchin and Malik Surkha raised his son, Kaimurs, to the throne with the title of 'Shamsuddin II' and the coronation ceremony took place at the Chabutra-i Nasiri. Their aim was to maintain the dynasty of Balban and the power of the Turkish aristocracy.

The Turkish maliks next hatched a conspiracy to get rid of the group led by Malik Firuz Khalji. They prepared a list of maliks, with Firuz Khalji's name at the top, who were to be put to death. The Khalji malik was at that time inspecting the royal forces at Bhugal Pahari.⁶⁵ When he came to know of this conspiracy from Malik Ahmad Chap, the *naib-i amir-i hajib*, he at once moved his quarters to Ghiyaspur. He also called his relatives from Baran on the pretext of needing them for an impending Mongol invasion. Many non-Turkish officers, who were included in the purge programme of the Turks, joined the Khaljis. Next day the Turkish group started its operations. A message was sent to Firuz Khalji asking him to present himself at the court of Kaimurs. The Khalji malik was reviewing the Kanauj forces at that time; he apprehended the purpose of the order and decided to delay compliance with it. Soon afterwards Kachchin arrived with a more urgent message. Malik Firuz conducted himself with great tact and coolness and gave Kachchin the impression that he knew nothing of the conspiracy. He pointed to the review and requested Kachchin to allow him to finish it. But as soon as Kachchin went to relax under a tent-shade, his head was chopped off and his body was thrown into the Jumna. Open conflict between the two hostile groups then began. Firuz Khalji's sons dashed into the palace, caught hold of Kaimurs and brought him to their camp. Some Turkish officers, including Aitmar Surkha, came out to get back the boy-king but they were captured and killed. Some sons of Fakhruddin, the kotwal, were also captured; and afraid for their lives, the kotwal dissuaded the people of Delhi from making an effort to recapture the boy-king.

The Khaljis, it appears, were not prepared at the time to assume royal power. Probably all that they had done was essentially defensive in character. When the initial storm had subsided, Firuz Khalji installed Kaimurs at the Kailugarhi palace. He offered the regency to Malik Chajju and himself opted for the wardenship of the marches—the provinces of Multan, Bhatinda and Dipalpur. Chajju rejected the offer and preferred the governorship of Kara and Manikpur. Fakhr-uddin Kotwal also declined to accept the regency. Rejected by Chajju

⁶⁵ Barani (172) has Baharpur, but Isami (203) and Yahya Sirhindi (57) give it as Bhugal Pahari, which can be identified even today.

and Fakhruddin, the regency of the boy-king fell to the lot of Malik Firuz Khalji. Kaimurs was retained on the throne for a little over three months.⁶⁶ Some of his coins dated 689/1290 have also come to light.⁶⁷ But this farcical arrangement of political power could not be continued for long. Firuz Khalji decided to act. Kaiqubad was dragging on his melancholy existence in an apartment of the Kailugarhi palace. A malik, whose father Kaiqubad had killed, was sent to do the needful; he wrapped his paralytic body in his bed-sheet and kicked him into the Jumna. With him also disappeared the monopoly of power which the Turkish slave-aristocracy had exercised from the time of Sultan Mu'izzuddin.

⁶⁶ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 61. Yahya Sirhindi's account of these movements is more detailed than Barani's. He, however, disagrees from Barani in many details. See 57-58.

⁶⁷ Wright, 66; Rodgers, *Lahore Museum Catalogue*, 84; Brown, *Coins of India*, 71.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE KHALJIS

I. JALALUDDIN FIRUZ KHALJI

ACCESSION OF JALALUDDIN FIRUZ

SHAIKHA KHAN JALALUDDIN FIRUZ KHALJI'S eventual assumption of sovereignty at the Kailugarhi palace in June 1290 signified more than a dynastic change. Unlike Balban's accession twenty-five years earlier, it meant the end of an age, for with the Mameluk dynasty also passed away that racialism, which had characterized the political attitude of Qutbuddin, Iltutmish and their successors. The Turk had initiated the conquest, and with singular energy had fought back his enemies, but in organizing the state he had weighted it heavily with racial affiliations; even the formal allegiance to the universal *Khilafat* could alter little of its Turkish character. Improvised as a Turkish concern, the sultanat's mainstay was sought to be confined to those who, as a result of the Mongol invasions and the influence of environment, increasingly found themselves unable to preserve it as their exclusive proprietary right, and had to resort, as in Balban's reign, to the desperate method of violently destroying rival elements. The easy victory of the allegedly non-Turkish Khalji party only underlined the proven fact that racial dictatorship could no longer sustain the state. For it had reached a stage when new forces and aspirations insistently demanded adjustment, and the improvisation of the process of conquest could no longer counteract the inherent disruptive tendencies. A planned administration even more than the long-deferred expansion called for a new outlook and a new society.

The Sultan's conciliatory temperament seemed to augur well for the new programme. Seeking to make the transition as easy as possible, and respecting the Turkophile feelings of the discomfited citizens, he delayed his entry into Delhi and set up his court in Kaiqubad's unfinished palace at Kailugarhi. In the reorganization of the government that followed, his own kinsmen and supporters naturally received the key positions, but a general dispossession of the old nobility was prudently avoided. Balban's friend and the leading citizen of Delhi, Malikul Umara Fakhruddin was confirmed as the

kotwal of the capital while Khwaja Khatir retained the wizarat. During his regency Firuz had agreed to Malik Chajju's request for the governorship of Kara, and thither the remaining members of the Balbani family were now allowed to repair. From among his relations, Firuz's brother, Yaghrash Khan, headed the army ministry, while his nephew Ahmad Chap became the *naib-i barbek*.

JALALUDDIN FIRUZ'S FEELINGS AND SENTIMENTS

Within a few months, however, the hostility of the citizens almost turned into admiration as they heard of the Sultan's innate modesty and his anxious regard for the feelings of his opponents. Induced by the hope, as Barani points out, of rewards and offices, they journeyed, at first hesitatingly, to make their peace with him and were reassured by his genuine eagerness to win their affection. To their astonishment, they found in the Sultan an exceptionally peaceable and kind-hearted man, then past his seventieth year, who nourished no other ambition than of ending his days as a pious Musalman, warring constantly in the service of God. They still remembered the awe-inspiring hauteur and coolness of Balban's demeanour and so were almost scandalized when Firuz, on his first state entry into Delhi a few months later, made an unashamed display of his human emotions and impulses. To the intense chagrin of his power-drunk kinsmen, he insisted on dismounting at the entrance to the Red Palace inside which, as he said in reply to Ahmad Chap's remonstrance, he had often stood for hours together in front of Balban. He refused to take his seat in the royal audience-hall except in the place assigned to the officers. Overcome by sentiment, he cried aloud and declared that the crown had been forced upon him by the malicious intents of Kachchin and Surkha and that he was forced to endanger the future of his children, kinsmen and dependants, 'for, how could he, with such a humble origin as his, and with so few followers, ever hope to retain and bequeath the crown to his children, when it had passed away from the family of even such a strong-willed and well-established king as Balban within three years of his death?'

Such sentiments reveal an extraordinarily guileless and sincere heart, unsullied by power and rejoicing in a child-like want of equivocation. To the simpler, unpolitical minds he, therefore, appeared as a saintly ruler, for by subordinating state-craft to the dictates of his heart he showed himself in a perfect and agreeable contrast to the earlier despots. His reign typifies, perhaps, a conscious departure from the prevailing 'blood and iron' method of government and, as Barani implies, it was no fault of the kindly old man that his faith in the power of love was abused. Among the realistic politicians,

schooled in the traditions of the stern and cold-blooded Balban, Firuz's emotional out-pourings and impulsive actions, however, evoked misgivings, for the situation demanded a more aggressive exercise of the royal authority. To canalize all loyalties to the new dynasty and to provide for order and security by the restoration of the overawing powers of the central government were tasks whose urgency brooked no experimentation. It was only by unrelenting ruthlessness that Balban had been able to ensure peace in the kingdom, but in the eastern provinces, despite his terroristic methods, Delhi's authority was no more. The pitiful end of the late king had impaired the crown's prestige and called for more vigorous measures. And, besides, sentimental tenderness ill-fitted a king, whose primary task was to dislodge the Mongols from the western Punjab and to initiate the expansion of the sultanat.

REVOLT OF MALIK CHAJJU

But Firuz remained true to his heart, firmly refusing to shed Muslim blood and to inflict misery on his fellow-men 'for the dubious glory of a few days of power'. Very soon, however, his pacificism was put to a severe test. In August of the same year (1290) Malik Chajju Kashli Khan, Balban's nephew and head of the old royal family, raised the banner of revolt at Kara. Malik Chajju had earlier declined the offer of regency when, as the *ariz-i mamalik*, Firuz had foiled a conspiracy against the Khaljis and raised the infant Kaimurs to the throne. Chajju may not have been involved in the conspiracy, but his sympathy with the cause was natural and was perhaps not unknown to Firuz. Prudently, therefore, he had sought to live in the east, away from the *de facto* ruler, secretly hoping to organize a wider resistance, with the ultimate backing, if possible, of his cousin, Bughra Khan, who had assumed independent sovereignty in Bengal in 1287.¹ Firuz's reluctance was overcome by the counsel of the venerated Fakhruddin Kotwal—himself no warm supporter of the new regime—and the malik was given the *iqta* of Kara and allowed to take with him all the surviving members of the Balbani family.²

At Kara the malik made his plan and, as it appears, was enthusiastically joined by Amir Ali Hatim Khan, governor of Awadh, and other nobles of the old regime, who held assignments in the east.³ The house of Balban commanded wide loyalty also among the

1 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 54.

2 *Ibid.*, 59.

3 Barani (181) calls Hatim Khan *Maula Zada-i Sultan-i Balban* (Freedman of Sultan Balban). He was appointed *sarjadnar* (head of the royal bodyguard) by Kaiqubad (*Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 53). On the accession of Kaimurs, he appears to have

Hindu chiefs of the trans-Gangetic tract, for Chajju was joined by a large number of ranas and rawats with their famed infantry (*piyada*) and archers (*dhanuks*). The rawats accepted betel-leaves from Chajju—symbol of loyalty and friendship—and boasted that they would break the royal canopy of Firuz.⁴ With such support and with the knowledge that in the capital and the neighbouring districts the Khaljis had not yet found favour with the legitimists, Chajju, as reported by Barani, felt confident in proclaiming himself as 'Sultan Mughisuddin' and in assuming the prerogatives of sovereignty by striking his coins and having the *Khutba* read in his name.⁵ Whether this step followed Bughra Khan's refusal or inability to collaborate in the project cannot be ascertained now.⁶ As report of the massive preparations for the revolt spread, loyal officers, stationed in the Doab and beyond, felt unsafe in their isolated locations and began to withdraw to the west. Confident of the partisan support in and around the capital, and of his numerous following 'like ants and locusts', as Barani puts it,⁷ Chajju decided to advance on Delhi. Aiming apparently to approach the city from the Amroha region, he moved northwards along the left bank of the Ganges and followed the Ramganga through Badaun, where two of his supporters, Malik Bahadur and Alp Ghazi, awaited him with their troops.⁸

been posted as governor of Awadh, and the post of *sarjandar*, now split into two, went to Ahmad Chap and Malik Hiranmar (*Mubarak Shahi*, 62). Among the officers of the east were Malik Alp Ghazi, assignee of Kark (?), Malik Bahadur, Malik Mas'ud (the *Akhurbek*) and Malik Muhammad Balban (*Mubarak Shahi*, 64). Barani (183) adds the names of Malik Ulughchi, Malik Tajudar and Malik Ahjan.

4 Barani, 182. Amir Khusrau in his *Miftahul Futuh* (edited by Professor A. Rashid, Aligarh, 1954, 14) calls them 'Hindu thieves'. The *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* (63) gives the name of one of these chiefs as Biram Deo or Bhim Deo Kotla, who was slain in the final engagement. This unity of the two old governing class groups is significant. One of the causes of the alliance may have been the fact (to which the *Miftahul Futuh* refers) that the Hindu chiefs had not paid their tribute to the central government for some years.

5 Barani, 181.

6 Bughra's reign doubtless terminated towards the end of 1289, for his son and successor, Ruknuddin Kaikaus, struck his coins in 1290 (*Journal, Bengal Asiatic Society*, 1922, 410). The *Riyazus Salatin* records a tradition that on the accession of Jalaluddin Firuz, Bughra Khan gave up the insignia of royalty (Translation, A. Salam, Calcutta, 1904, 90). Since he did not accept the suzerainty of Delhi and was succeeded by his son, Kaikaus, who retained all the prerogatives of sovereignty, is it possible that Bughra's abdication and his son's succession were connected with the events in Awadh, Bughra's desire to join Chajju having been opposed by his realist ministers, who set up Kaikaus?

7 Barani, 7.

8 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 63. They had joined together at Kurk (?) and then, recrossing the Ganges, encamped at the village, Bahlana.

It was no contemptible strategy. But Firuz's mildness concealed a seasoned warrior, who could appreciate a straight military challenge. Leaving his eldest son, Khan-i Khanan, in charge of the capital, he mobilized his troops and marched through Koil (Aligarh) towards Badaun, ostensibly to close the route through Rohilkhand.⁹ He sent a detachment ahead under his second son, Arkali Khan, to seek out and intercept the pretender. Marching ten to twelve *karohs* ahead of his father in the direction of Amroha, the prince came upon the insurgent army moving on the other side of the Rahib (Ramganga). For lack of boats, which had all been seized by the enemy, Arkali Khan could only send a raiding party at night on rafts and skiffs.¹⁰ The raid proved a success and spread confusion among the enemy who, Amir Khusrau reports, broke camp and hastily moved towards the north 'to the hills of Jubala'.¹¹ For two days Arkali Khan plundered the deserted camp and then hastened in pursuit. While the Sultan, crossing the Ganges at Bhojpur, near Furrukhabad, advanced through Rohilkhand and engaged the Hindu-Muslim supporters of the pretender, the prince contacted the enemy at the Ramganga crossing. Chajju fought with determination for the whole day and by sundown the battle had remained undecided. At night, however, an agent of one of his Hindu supporters, Rai Bhim Deva,¹² brought report of the Sultan's imminent approach from the rear. This news unnerved him and he secretly left the camp with a few followers. In the morning Arkali Khan crossed the river and had almost a walk-over during which Bhim Deo and Alp Ghazi were slain and Malik Mas'ud and Balban were taken prisoners. The leaderless insurgents then surrendered.¹³ A few days later Chajju was also captured from a walled village (*mawas*), where he had sought shelter and whose headman turned him over to his pursuers.¹⁴

Firuz, who was still in Rohilkhand when Arkali Khan joined him with the prisoners, now turned to the eastern districts bordering the Sarju (Ghagra) river in order to chastize the local supporters of the old regime and incidentally to clear the robber-infested forests along the route to Hindustan. Some, like the chief of Rupal, submitted and offered heavy tribute; others, like the chief of Kahsun, had their areas

9 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* mentions 'Kabar' as the site from which Chajju might have come. Elliot (III, 539) in a footnote says that Kabir is in Rohilkhand.

10 *Miftahul Futuh*, 12-13.

11 *Ibid.*, 13. The *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* (63) calls it 'Juyad'.

12 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* writes it as Biram Deva Kotla.

13 *Miftahul Futuh*, 17.

14 Barani, 184.

plundered. Hindu recalcitrants were executed and Indian Muslims were sold as slaves.¹⁵

FIRUZ'S MAGNANIMITY

Having thus vindicated the soldier in him, Firuz in dealing with the vanquished nobles showed a magnanimity that shamed his erstwhile enemies, but which he overdid by sentimental effusions. He was in his camp in Rohilkhand when the imprisoned nobles were brought in. As he espied the fallen nobles being led up the *darbar* grounds, bareheaded, chained and in soiled and tattered garments, the Sultan cried out in pain, covered his eyes, and indignantly ordered the prisoners to be dressed and entertained 'as in the olden days'. Later he astonished the orthodox politicians by inviting Amir Ali *Sarjandar* and the higher nobles to a feast and convivial party.¹⁶ As the cup went the rounds, he spoke to the crestfallen and speechless nobles words of kindness and consolation and, to the great consternation of the cautious Ahmad Chap, warmly commended their loyal and devoted exertions in the cause of their master's family.

Disappointed in his expectation of the rebels' punishment *a la Balban*—for the king took no sterner measure than to send Chajju in honourable confinement to Multan and to release his comrades—the indignant nephew pointedly demanded kingly firmness or abdication. But in a spirited avowal Firuz frankly confessed his inability to rule with tyranny and bloodshed, and expressed his readiness to make room for any one amongst his relations, who was prepared to barter his elementary humanity for this 'ungodly, man-killing kingship'. He could not, at the fag-end of his life, unfeelingly kill or disgrace these eminent men, his honoured friends and patrons. Could he ever forget the days when, with his brother, he used to stand in the rank of the officers, fondly hoping that Hatim Khan would respond to their salutations? May be, the rebels would have given him no quarter, but then, he argued naively, 'the guilt of shedding Musalman blood would be upon them and God would consign them to Hell'. 'I showed my gratitude for victory by being kind to them for, after all, they are human beings and Musalmans and can surely appreciate generosity, and from a sense of gratitude they will stay their hands from doing

¹⁵ *Miftahul Futuh*, 21-23.

¹⁶ Barani (173) says that he was told of this incident by the poet, Amir Khusrau. The Sultan was sitting on a *mondha* (reed-chair) and Khusrau stood by his side. Barani definitely refers to Amir Ali *Sarjandar*, Malik Ulughchi, son of Malik Targhi, Malik Tajudar, Malik Ahjan and other great amirs being among the captives with yokes (*du-shakhas*) round their necks. Malik Chajju had not yet been captured.

me any further harm.' For once, at least, his faith was not betrayed, for the defeated nobles gave no further trouble.

FIRUZ'S MILITARY EXPEDITIONS

Soon after his return, the Sultan was called upon to meet another military challenge.¹⁷ The Sunam-Dipalpur-Multan border, to which Arkali Khan had just been appointed, was once again invaded by the Mongols under one Abdullah.¹⁸ Firuz, who had grown old in his frontier command and delighted in opportunities of fighting the infidels, set out immediately with his army.¹⁹ The invader was contacted at a place named Bar-ram by the chroniclers.²⁰ After some days of preliminary skirmishes between the advance-guards, in which the Delhi forces gained the upper hand, the Mongols agreed to withdraw without fighting. The Sultan exchanged friendly greetings with Abdullah, whom he called his son. But while Abdullah retreated across the frontier, a party of Mongols headed by Ulghu, another grandson of Halaku, embraced Islam, remained behind and desired to be allowed to stay in India. The Sultan was delighted and magnanimously invited them to settle in Delhi where they were given quarters, allowances and even social rank.²¹ But ordinary administration was made almost

17 Although the sequence of events is narrated differently by the chroniclers, Isami and the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* agree in placing the Mongol invasion immediately after Chajju's rebellion and before the Mandawar-Ranthambhor expedition. Amir Khusrau also seems to hint at it when describing the Sultan's return from the campaign against Chajju (11, 23, 12-16). That the Mongol invasion must have taken place before the Sidi Maula trial is proved by the fact that Ulghu, the Mongol chief, who settled in Delhi after Abdullah's invasion, reported Sidi's treasonable intent (*Mubarak Shahi*, 65). The Sidi was arrested by Arkali Khan at Delhi while the Sultan was away owing to the Mandawar campaign. Khan-i Khanan, according to the *Mubarak Shahi* (64), died soon after the Mongol invasion, and Arkali Khan, a rival to his brother, had been recalled from Multan and left in charge of Delhi. Apparently, if Khan-i Khanan, an ardent disciple of the Sidi, had been alive, the Sidi would not have been arrested.

18 Barani (218) calls Abdullah 'the grandson of the accursed Hallu (Halaku)'. The *Mubarak Shahi* (64) calls him 'son of the prince of Khurasan'.

19 As an instance of his transparent honesty, Barani (196-97) relates how, in view of his life-long war against the Mongols, he spoke to his wife after his accession of his wish to be designated '*Al Mujahid fi Sabilillah*' (Fighter in the Way of God) and desired her to suggest to the qazi and shaikhs of the city, when they came to offer felicitations on the occasion of the wedding of her youngest son, that they should petition the Sultan to permit them to include this title in the Friday *Khutba*. But after she had done so and Qazi Fakhruddin Naqila had actually made the request on the occasion of the new-moon felicitations, the Sultan in great humility declined it, confessing his guilt of having desired the honour which, on later consideration, he realized that he did not deserve.

20 Isami, *Futuhus Salatin*, (ed. Mehdi Husain, 205); Barani, 218.

21 Barani, 219.

impossible when the Sultan extended this magnanimity even to such hardened criminals as the *thugs*, of whom about a thousand were rounded up for proved offences of murder and highway robbery. Pitying their lot, and accepting their regrets and promises, the Sultan had them shipped off to the lower Ganges and released on the Lakhnauti frontier.

Nevertheless, the Sultan's military energy remained unimpaired. In the same year he led an expedition into Rajputana against the Chauhanas, whose power was then centred at Ranthambhor under the famed Hamira Deva and was expanding in all directions. They had practically isolated Ajmer; and even the province of Haryana felt their pressure, already intensified by the Mewati tribesmen, whom even Balban's exertions had failed to reduce. A large-scale offensive against them was indeed as urgent as the recovery of the Indus frontier. By inclination and long experience, Firuz longed for an opportunity to carry on 'holy war and fight open battles'; but, as the sequel showed, a sustained campaign to re-impose paramountcy required more calculated aggressiveness and persistence than what he admittedly possessed.

Passing through Rewari and Narnaul, the royal forces entered Alwar and invested Mandawar,²² perhaps the northern-most outpost of the Chauhanas. The fortress offered no great resistance and the ravaged countryside yielded a rich booty in cattle. Advancing towards Ranthambhor through the Kerauli region, west of the Chambal, the royal forces arrived in two weeks near Jhain, which guarded the approaches to the Chauhana capital. A reconnoitring party sent under Qara Bahadur having repulsed a Rajput sally, a larger detachment was sent the next day, which, pushing to within two *farsangs* of the fort, signally defeated a much stronger force of Rajputs, who foolishly came out of the fortress to engage the attackers in a frontal battle. The Chauhana commander, a renowned warrior named Gardan Saini, was killed and the vanquished Rajputs, fleeing in all directions, were pursued across the Chambal, Kunwari and Banas rivers. Following this defeat, the commandant evacuated the Jhain fortress and retired to Ranthambhor. Jhain was then dismantled.²³ While the soldiers plundered and gathered booty, the Sultan's iconoclastic zeal sought

22 Barani and *Mubarak Shahi* call the place 'Mandor', but Isami has 'Mandawar' and the *Tabaqat-i Akbri* has the impossible 'Mandu'. It is impossible to identify it with any other place except Mandawar in the Siwalik hills. Only Isami (208-9) and *Mubarak Shahi* (64) refer to the capture of the fortress, which according to the latter, took four months. This duration presumably covered the campaigns against Jhain and Ranthambhor also.

23 *Miftahul Futuh*, 21-30.

satisfaction in breaking the idols even though he admired the sculptures and the carvings.²⁴

While Jhain was thus reduced, reportedly with surprising ease, the capture of Ranthambhor proved a more difficult proposition. The fortress was strong and situated on a steep hill. The Sultan decided on a siege and from his camp at Jhain issued orders for the construction of the necessary catapults (*maghrabis*), *sabats* and *gargajes* and the preparation of a *pasheb*. While the work was in progress, Firuz rode out to inspect. But as he looked at the impregnable fort and considered the cost of the assault in terms of the sufferings of his troops, he became sentimental; and his determination, already weakened by reports of conspiracy in the capital and in his own camp, finally gave way. Refusing to risk 'the hair of a single Musalman for ten such forts', he ordered an immediate withdrawal. The protesting Ahmad Chap pointed to the danger of thus emboldening the Hindus and asked him to follow at least such kings as Mahmud and Sanjar, whose undoubted piety never limited their kingly action. But Firuz countered it with no more convincing argument than to reaffirm his old convictions and with a righteous, but illogical refusal, to be compared with such worthy kings whose dominions, unlike his, 'contained not a single idolater'.²⁵

FIRUZ AND CONSPIRATORS—CASE OF SIDI MAULA

It was evident that the idealist monarch would never learn statecraft, and while Barani, equally unpolitical, showered praise on his 'essential goodness', murmurings among his courtiers grew loud and persistent. In private gatherings and over wine-cups, they discussed his excessive humility and woeful incapacity to inspire fear. In one such gathering during the Mandawar-Ranthambhor campaign, held at the house of Malik Tajuddin Kuchi, with wine adding to the unrestrained expression of feelings, some of the Sultan's closest adherents uttered mouthfuls about killing the old man and raising Tajuddin Kuchi to the throne. The report of such seditious, though drunken, talk incensed even the mild Firuz; but he merely summoned them to a private audience and confronted them once again with the impassioned reiteration of his humanitarianism. He stung their conscience when, warming up, he drew his sword and dared them to kill him. The interview ended, as that of the Kara rebels had done, over blissful cups of wine, the poetry-reciting Sultan melting in tears as

²⁴ *Miftahul Futus* (30) says that in the whole operation against Jhain only one Turkish soldier was wounded, while thousands of Rawats were slain!

²⁵ Barani, 214-18.

the court wit, Nusrat Sabbah, made a clever and flattering confession, and asked forgiveness for the 'loquacious boozers'. The most persistent of his detractors, however, were banished to their *iqtas* for the period of one year.²⁶

In only one instance of a suspected conspiracy Firuz took firmer action, but even this was of a piece with his impulsive nature. This was the execution of the popularly venerated, foreign-born recluse, named Sidi Maula, the attraction of whose ascetic piety was heightened by a mysterious source of great wealth with which he maintained a vast *khanqah*, lavishly entertaining people of all classes. Sidi evidently belonged to an unorthodox sect of *durweshes*, and from the reign of Kaiqubad his astonishing charities had increasingly made him an institution which, latterly drew to him, along with religious devotees, most of the dispossessed Balbani amirs and officers. Among his constant visitors were also some leading men of the new regime, the scheming Qazi Jalal Kashani, and the religious-minded Crown-prince, Khan-i Khanan, who, however, died on the eve of the Mandawar expedition. The saint may not have been entirely disinterested in the resulting potentiality of his position but the report, made by the immigrant Mongol chief, Malik Ulghu, of a conspiracy to have the Sultan murdered on a Friday by two Hindu officers of the old regime, Hathya Paik and Niranjan Kotwal with a view to his own installation as the *Khalifa*, was never proved.²⁷

A near-contemporary author, however, stresses the jealousy of a rival sect of *durweshes* to whose accusations the violent-tempered Arkali Khan, with his dislike for his elder brother's friends, lent a credulous ear and had the accused arrested and prosecuted while the Sultan was away at Mandawar. They were brought before the Sultan on his return. Unable in any case to substantiate the firmly denied charge, and the *ulama* interdicting a suggested ordeal by fire, the Sultan, seemingly convinced of their guilt, executed the two Hindus, Hathya and Niranjan, banished Qazi Jalal and the Balbani officers, and then hotly turned to the Sidi for meddling in politics. As the latter repeated his denial, Firuz lost his composure and, in impatient anger, appealed to a group of *qalandars*, eagerly waiting for the opportunity, to avenge him 'on this man'. And, with a callousness

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 190-92.

²⁷ Barani says (210): "The *maulazadas* (freedmen) of Balban, who were the sons of maliks and amirs and were without means of subsistence, jobless, without *iqtas* and without soldiers, and Niranjan (or Biranjtan) Kotwal and Hatya Paik, who belonged to the group of reckless wrestlers (*pahilwans*) and had a living grant of one lakh of *fitals* a year in the reign of Balban but had been reduced to penury during the Jalali era; these and other dismissed high officers began to frequent the *khanqah* of Sidi Maula."

surprising in a nature so gentle and merciful, he looked on approvingly as the Sidi, pounced upon and mercilessly knifed, was finally crushed under the feet of an elephant on Arkali Khan's instruction. A violent dust-storm, followed by a drought lasting long enough to create famine conditions in the city and in the Siwaliks, together with the tragic end of the Sultan, continued to furnish the Sidi's admirers with the looked-for proofs of his innocence.²⁸

Nonetheless, the sultanat survived the Sultan's foibles and held together, as a tribute to the solidity of Balban's work and the efforts of Firuz's unenviably placed officers.²⁹ If his heart recoiled from the sanguinary implications of a strong, centralized and expansionist state, he at least trusted his governors with the freedom to rule with conventional vigour and enterprise. While this ensured a fairly orderly administration, it also opened the way to eventual expansion, and, in so doing, ended the stagnation to which Firuz's passivity threatened to subject the state. The process, almost symbolizing the pitiless appraisal of history, however, swept off the man himself, who with so tragic courage clung to an ideal that the world has yet to appreciate.

CONSPIRACY OF ALI GURSHASP

To the vacant governorship of Kara, Jalaluddin had appointed his deceased elder brother's son, Ali Gurshasp (later Sultan Alauddin), whom he had brought up from infancy and had given his daughter in marriage. The young man had grown up a perfect opposite of his uncle, calculating, unscrupulous and aggressive, with an ambition which he found constantly thwarted by his haughty, sharp-tongued wife and his mother-in-law. But domestic misery only increased his thirst for avenging himself on the family and his unsympathetic critics by deeds that would free him from the galling family tutelage and ensure him an independent, perhaps glorious, existence. At Kara he found Malik Chajju's erstwhile supporters only too willing to help him to realize his dreams and, as money was the first requisite, raids on the neighbouring Hindu states seemed to assure a working capital. Since Delhi appeared to have its eyes fixed on Rajputana, Ali turned to the Paramara state of Malwa, a country progressively declining from the turn of the century and now in the process of dismemberment by the neighbouring Baghela, Yadava and Chauhana powers,³⁰ and

²⁸ Isami (211-14) says that the famine lasted for two years; Barani more correctly (210) says that in the following year (1296) the monsoon was heavy.

²⁹ 'During the reign of Jalaluddin', Barani tells us (205), 'it was impossible for the officers to behave in a high-handed manner with the people.'

³⁰ For an account of the Paramara Kingdom in decline, see D. C. Ganguli, *History of the Paramara Dynasty*, Dacca, 1933.

whose temples, though occasionally plundered in the past, could still yield great religious and material satisfaction. With the Sultan's sanction, given with more zeal than calculation, Ali accordingly led, towards the end of 1293, a raiding expedition *via* Chanderi to Bhilsa. With resistance given no time to foregather, he amply rewarded himself on the ancient town and its richly endowed temples. He returned with an immense booty, in cattle, precious metals and the inevitable idol to be trampled under the zealot's feet. All this Ali shrewdly invested in winning the Sultan's greater confidence and affection. But the most valued asset he kept to himself—the assiduously gathered knowledge of the fabled wealth of the southern Hindu kingdoms, the state of their defences and the routes thereto. South of the Vindhyas was almost virgin territory for Muslim arms, for the Yadava kingdom, with a fatal unconcern for the significant course of events in the north, was merrily pursuing the age-old chivalric wars of dynastic rivalry. Ali Gurshasp, therefore, planned to enrich himself by a well-concealed raid on this kingdom and therewith to strike for independent sovereignty.

His move succeeded, for the Sultan, confronting his nephew's detractors with what he fondly believed was additional proof of his loyalty, marked his appreciation by giving him his deceased father's office of *ariz-i mamalik* and adding Awadh to his governorship. He further granted Ali's request for permission to utilize the surplus revenue (*fawazil*) of his province in enlisting extra troops to be used, as he represented, for enriching the Sultan's treasury by raids into the wealthy but lightly defended countries beyond Chanderi.

In about a year Ali had collected his equipment, and at the beginning of the winter of 1295 he set out at the head of about eight thousand picked cavalry for an assault on Deogir (Devagiri), the Yadava capital, then under Rama Chandra Deva (1271-1310), basking in the reflected glory of his earlier exploits. It was an amazing feat, performed with exceptional daring. He left Alaul Mulk, uncle of the historian, Ziauddin Barani, in charge of the Kara administration with instructions to keep Delhi constantly deluded about his real destination, and struck across Bundelkhand. His eight weeks' march through the difficult and unfriendly country was eased by the assumed manner of a fugitive fleeing from the wrath of the Sultan of Delhi, so that he met with little prepared defence at the Yadava frontier town of Ellichpur. Passing almost effortlessly through the Ghati Lajaura, he descended with the directness of lightning on the capital. With his army away on an expedition with the crown-prince, Singhana, and with provisions running low, Rama Chandra was too unnerved to accept the challenge of a siege and offered submission. But before

the invader could collect the promised ransom, the impetuous Singhana returned with the army and, heedless of his father's importunities, counter-attacked. But Ali's resourcefulness more than neutralized his initial setback and the twice-defeated Rai of Devagiri had to pay a far heavier indemnity than before, and also agreed to the victorious soldiers plundering the city. The resulting gain, in gold and silver, pearl and precious stones, silk-stuff and slaves, elephants and horses, exceeded the victor's wildest dreams, for the kingdom had for centuries attracted, through its ports and trading centres, vast overseas wealth. No sultan of Delhi had ever possessed anything like it.

News of Ali Gurshasp's exploit had meanwhile trickled through to Firuz who, although slightly hurt by his nephew's secretiveness, was yet pleased at the prospect of so vast a treasure coming to him. So he moved to Gwalior to receive the victorious prince who, he fondly hoped, would come to meet him before returning to Kara.³¹ When rumour of Ali's return journey direct to Kara began to circulate among the people, the Sultan summoned his council to deliberate on the proper course of action. Realists like Ahmad Chap, who knew Ali better, urged strong measures against such an unauthorized campaign and warned him of the consequences of allowing the ambitious young man to carry all his wealth straight to Kara. The Sultan was, therefore, urged to march at once to intercept Ali at Chanderi. But Jalaluddin's faith in his nephew could not be shaken and in spite of Ahmad's despairing cry to 'kill us all if your Majesty means to return to Delhi', he journeyed back to the capital, to wait hopefully for Ali's presentation of the spoils and to accept his apologies. In his court was Almas Beg, Ali's younger brother, also married to one of the Sultan's daughters, who, on instructions from his returning brother, schemed to keep the old man deluded with assurances and pleasant expectations while Ali speedily marched back to his province. From there he sent a detailed report, confessing his guilt and asking for a letter of pardon under the Sultan's *tauqi* (signature) before he could dare present himself, 'for he was uncertain as to what his enemies might have done to poison his uncle's mind during his one year's absence'. The Sultan was only too ready to send the letter through special messengers. But the latter, astounded at what they learnt at Kara of Ali's military strength and designs, were detained and prevented from communicating with Delhi. Ali's plan, in pursuance of which he had already arranged to secure a passage over the Ghagra, was to seize Lakhnauti, a country which had lately asserted its independence and was now under Balban's grandson, Sultan Ruknuddin Kaikaus. But his uncle's

credulity held out a richer possibility. Almas Beg succeeded in persuading the guileless old man that his brother was deeply and desperately weighed down by his sense of guilt and that, unless the Sultan personally conveyed his pardon, it was to be feared that he would commit suicide as he always carried poison in his handkerchief. Greatly concerned, and with his affectionate heart welling up for his nephew, Firuz decided to see him at once and sent Almas ahead to keep him from self-destruction with the assurance of his own expeditious arrival.

ASSASSINATION OF JALALUDDIN FIRUZ KHALJI

And so, 'his doom pulling him by the hair', as Barani puts it, heedless, and even resentful, of all counsels of caution, Firuz set out straight for the trap laid for him by his beloved nephew. Directing Ahmad Chap to take the main army by land to Kara and only a thousand soldiers journeying along the river with him, he embarked, early in the month of Ramazan 695 (July 1296) on a barge to journey down the Ganges, then swollen by heavy rains. As the royal barge neared the town of Kara on 17 Ramazan³² (20 July), Ali, leaving nothing to chance, sent Almas over to induce the Sultan to leave the troop-laden boats on the other side, 'lest his brother take fright and kill himself'. Even the few confidants who remained with the Sultan were, on the same plea, made to unbuckle their weapons, and their hearts sank as they saw Ali's troops, armed to the teeth, alarmingly drawn up on the bank of the Ganges at its confluence with the Jumna. Complaining feebly of Ali's lack of courtesy in not coming forward even now to receive him, to which Almas gave a suitably deceitful reply, Firuz resignedly sat back to recite the Quran while his attendant nobles despaired of their lives. At the landing Ali came forward with his retinue, and ceremoniously threw himself at his uncle's feet. Jalaluddin affectionately raised him, kissed him on the cheek, and chiding him for doubting his uncle's love, drew him towards the barge. The signal was then given. The first blow proved ineffectual, but as the Sultan ran towards his boat a second stroke felled him, and his severed head, raised aloft on a spear, fixedly stared under the setting sun as the faithless nephew, quickly spreading the royal canopy over his head, proclaimed himself king.³³ The

³² Barani gives 17 Ramazan 695, as the date of Firuz's assassination and the proclamation of Alauddin's accession at Kara. But Amir Khusrau gives the date of Alauddin's accession as Wednesday, 16 Ramazan 695 (19 July 1296). Khusrau's date is more reliable.

³³ Barani, 223-26. Only Isami (219, 233) mentions Alauddin's proper name, which is supported by Barani also (174, 234).

nobles and soldiers on the boats were killed and the army marching by land under Ahmad Chap returned to Delhi in great distress.

Although inconsequential at the end, Jalaluddin's reign bridged the experimental age of the Mameluks with the planned imperialist economy of Alauddin. History used him as an instrument to end the retrogressive, outmoded racial polity of the Turks and to set the stage for an integrated Indo-Muslim state. In this task his stubborn romanticism proved a necessary equipment, for it doubtless eased the process of transition and blunted deep-seated prejudices. Like the reformed Asoka, he aimed at ruling by human love and faith, but if he paid for its failure nobly with his own life, it was an indictment which mankind has since done little to expiate.

II. ALAUDDIN KHALJI: CONQUEST OF POWER (1296-1301)

CAPTURE OF DELHI

ALI GURSHASP, WHO WAS PROCLAIMED Sultan with the title of 'Alauddunya wad Din Muhammad Shah-us Sultan', while the head of his murdered uncle was being circulated on a spear in his camp in the failing sunlight to be sent to Awadh later, was the eldest son of Jalaluddin's elder brother, Shihabuddin Mas'ud. He had three younger brothers, Almas Beg, Qutlugh Tigin and Muhammad, but only Almas Beg finds a place in history.¹ Heinous as the murder of Jalaluddin was, a student of Muslim monarchy has to admit that such crimes were quite in consonance with its century-old traditions and, what is equally important, they did not prove that the conspirators were necessarily guilty of any moral turpitude. Amir Khusrau, who wrote in the time of Alauddin,² and Isami, who wrote when Alauddin's family had vanished, agree in describing Alauddin as 'a man of destiny'—a chosen instrument. 'When God helps a man', says the latter, 'the whole world is obedient to him.' Such assertions suffer from oversimplification. In the years to come Alauddin was to pride himself on the fact that, though a stranger to book-learning, he had learnt in the one school that matters—the school of experience; and as we follow his career year by year, we find him patient, cautious, bold, ruthless, and capable of planning and organizing. In fact, confronted by new and unexpected situations, he rapidly developed all the faculties that are required for the governance of men, and to strengthen his mind and will-power (we assert on the basis of good authorities) he had a firm faith in God and was confident that all his actions would be forgiven because his real object was the service of 'the people of God'.³ According to Hajiud Dabir, he was about thirty at the time of his accession and died at the age of fifty.⁴

India has had a cultural unity from time immemorial; but Alauddin gave it such administrative unity as was possible under medieval conditions of communication and transport for the first time after the Gupta era. He knew how to say his prayers, but he never fasted and, quite against the general tradition of Muslim

¹ Isami, 220.

² *Dawal Rani*: 'When help from the Unseen comes to the chosen man, his desires are realized beyond his expectations.'

³ *Khairul Majalis*, 341.

⁴ *Zafar-ul-Vakil*, 785; quoted by Dr. K. S. Lal, *Khaljis*, 41.

kings, he did not go to the Friday congregational prayers. The only contemporary in whose sanctity he believed was Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, but it was against the principles of the Shaikh to meet persons of worldly authority, and Alauddin did not seek a personal interview which the Shaikh would have refused. He insisted that he was 'a Muslim and a born-Muslim' and thus acquainted with the Muslim ways of life and traditional faith. But so far as the Muslim *ulama* were concerned, he allowed this 'army of prayer' to be controlled, managed and provided for by his *Sadrus Sudur*. He took no interest in them or in their opponents, 'the Muslim philosophers'.⁵ His mind was thus, fortunately, free from all *a priori* prejudices and fanaticisms, and he brought to his task a freshness of outlook and a capacity to learn that had been wanting in all the previous rulers of Delhi.

The first two days after his accession at Kara were devoted to the formation of a provisional government and preparations for the march to Delhi. The Sultan's brother, Almas Beg, was given the title of Ulugh Khan; Malik Nusrat Jalesari of Nusrat Khan; Malik Yusuf Hizhabruddin of Zafar Khan; and Sanjar, the brother of the Sultan's wife, Mahru, (who according to Isami⁶ had royal blood in his veins) got the title of Alp Khan. 'Alauddin raised his confidential friends to the status of amirs, and those who were already amirs were raised to the grade of maliks.'⁷ The rainfall was severe. 'The Ganges and the Jumna looked like the sea and every streamlet had swollen to the size of the Jumna and the Ganges.' This suited Alauddin, for his first task was to enlist soldiers. So he started in the midst of the rains and directed his officers to enlist as many soldiers as possible without insisting on traditional technicalities, like testing a soldier's capacity or asking him to produce sureties. To draw attention to the Sultan's munificence, a small wooden *munjaniq* or catapult was constructed and five *mans* of gold-pieces were shot from it at the waiting multitude at the pitching of the royal tent in the evening.

Alauddin decided that his army was to march to Delhi in two sections, the first led by himself and Nusrat Khan *via* Badaun and Baran (Buland Shahr) and the other led by Zafar Khan *via* Koil (Aligarh). Alauddin knew the value of trained soldiers for military tasks, but the enterprise before him was not military but political.

⁵ Barani, 338: 'He was extremely slack in performing the obligations of the *shari'at* and did not know what it was to pray or fast. He had strong faith in traditional Islam—like the ignorant. He neither knew nor heard nor uttered the expressions (of heretical Muslims) of bad religion and bad faith.'

⁶ Isami, 240.

⁷ Barani, 242.

What he wanted was numbers and an upsurge of political opinion in his favour. 'Within two or three weeks the news that Alauddin was marching on Delhi, while scattering gold among the people and enlisting as many horsemen as he could find, spread through the villages and towns of Hindustan, and all sorts of people—military and nonmilitary—came running to the Sultan.' By the time he reached Badaun, 56,000 horse and 60,000 foot had collected under his banners. At Baran (Buland Shahr) the great Jalali nobles—Tajul Mulk Kuchi, Malik Abaji *Akhur-bek*, Malik Amir Ali Diwana, Malik Usman *Amir-akhur*, Malik Amir Kalan, Malik Umar Surkha and Malik Hiranmar—who had been sent against him, decided to join him. Alauddin gave every one of them 30, 40 and, in some cases, even 50 *mans* of gold, and their soldiers got a reward of 300 silver *tankas* per head. 'This broke the Jalali family and the nobles at Delhi began to waver.' But the boats of the Jumna were not under his control and Alauddin had to wait till the rising of the Canopus in October, when the river became fordable.

Alauddin had naturally kept himself informed of the events at Delhi. On receiving the news of Jalaluddin's murder, the court observed three days of mourning and then, without consulting the nobles, the *Malka-i Jahan* placed her youngest son, Qadr Khan, a youth incapable of managing state-affairs, on the throne with the title of Ruknuddin Ibrahim. Then she removed the court from Kailugarhi to the *Qasr-i Sahz* inside Delhi, began to distribute the *iqtas* among the Jalali nobles and to pass orders on state-papers. Her second son, Arkali Khan, who had retired to his governorship of Multan without his father's permission, was deeply wounded by his mother's behaviour and decided not to come. Alauddin was cautious, if not afraid, of Arkali, who alone could match his military reputation. On hearing that Arkali was not coming, he ordered his drums to be beaten in joy. When the Jalali nobles joined Alauddin at Baran, the *Malka-i Jahan* wrote to Arkali in despair, asking him to come in haste, to forgive his stupid mother's faults and to seize his father's throne. But Arkali was unmoved. It is too late, he replied. Whether Arkali could have reached Delhi in time after his father's death may be doubted. But it is difficult to explain why he did nothing to ensure his future security.

ACCESSION AND THE COALITION GOVERNMENT

In the second week of October Alauddin crossed the Jumna fords and encamped at Siri. Ruknuddin came out to oppose him, but at about midnight the left wing of his army raised a tumult and went over to Alauddin. Towards the end of the night in utter distress

Ruknuddin re-entered the city by the Badaun Gate, collected in haste whatever cash and horses he could, and took the road to Multan by the Ghazni Gate. He was accompanied by his mother and the *haram*, Ulghu, Ahmad Chap and Malik Qutbuddin Alavi and his sons.

All officers of Delhi, who wanted to keep their posts, hurried to submit to Alauddin—ministers, *qazis*, *sadr*s, *shuhnas*, and kotwals with the keys of their forts. It was unnecessary for him to bother about anybody's individual acceptance. On 21 October 1296, (Monday, 22 Zil Hij A.H. 700) he ascended the throne at the White Palace (*Qasr-i Safed*) of Iltutmish and the Red Palace (*Qasr-i Lal*) of Balban. Till the construction of the *Ilazar Sutun* (thousand column) Palace at Siri, the Red Palace remained the royal residence.

In the years to come Alauddin was not afraid of challenging and crushing opposition. But at the start of his reign he wisely decided that his best course was to obtain general acceptance; so he organized a coalition government consisting of three elements—the nobles of the old Mameluk regime, who were still in office; the officers of Jalaluddin who had come over to his side; and officers appointed by Alauddin himself. The wizarat was assigned to Khwaja Khatir, 'the best of wazirs'. Qazi Sadrudin Arif, who was appointed *Sadr-i Jahan* and Head Qazi of the empire brought dignity and honour to his two offices; he was not distinguished for his learning, but he knew the Delhi underworld and none of its prominent rascals could practise any fraud or deception in his court.⁸ The *Saiyyid Ajal*, *Shaikhul Islam* and *Khatib* of the old regime were confirmed in their posts. The *diwan-i insha* (central secretariat) was assigned to Umdatul Mulk Ala Dabir. Of his two promising and brilliant sons, Malik Hamiduddin and Malik A'izzuddin, one was given a high status in the court and the other was directed to look after the affairs of the secretariat. Malik Fakhruddin Kuchi, who had accompanied Sultan Jalaluddin to Kara but had been arrested and forgiven, was appointed *dad-bek* of Delhi.⁹ Nusrat Khan, though he held the higher office of *malik naib* (or regent), was appointed kotwal of Delhi during the first year of the reign. Zafar Khan was appointed minister of war; Malik Abaji Jalali got the post of *akhur-bek*, and Malik Hiranmar the post of *naib-i barbek*. Alaul Mulk, uncle of the historian, Ziauddin Barani, was assigned the territories of Kara and Awadh, and the historian's father,

⁸ *Ibid.*, 350.

⁹ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 69. His great claim to forgiveness at the hands of Alauddin lay in the fact that he had always given the wrong advice to his predecessor. The Kuchi family had survived from the Mameluk period.

Mu'idul Mulk, who had been an officer of Arkali Khan but had stayed on in Delhi, was given the governorship (*nayabat wa khwajgi*) of Baran (Buland Shahr). Malik Jauna Senior¹⁰ (*qadim*) was appointed *naib-i vakildar*. State-grants of all types and charitable endowments, etc. were not only confirmed but even increased, and new state-orders (*misals*) to this effect were issued. Barani sums up his impressions of this year, but primarily as a citizen of Delhi:

'The court of Sultan Alauddin was adorned by the Jalali and Alai khans and maliks in a way that no previous reign had witnessed. . . . The old army with the new recruits had grown in size and every man was given the salary of one year and six months as *in'am* in cash. In this year both the nobles and the commons had such delights and enjoyments as I have not seen in any other reign, and those older than me also cannot remember such a happy year.'¹¹

But the sultanat of Delhi had to be seen with reference to the rest of India and its prospects seemed gloomy. Ninety years of Turkish domination over northern India had only partially succeeded in consolidating the power of the sultans of Delhi. The task of enforcing the imperial authority and of initiating even a seemingly effective system of administration was far from complete. Numerous discordant elements were threatening on all sides. In the west, the Ravi was the limit of the sphere of the Sultan's authority. Samana and Dipalpur were regarded as the most important frontier outposts. Beyond Lahore, the Punjab was almost a no-man's land, constantly convulsed by the risings of the Khokars or the invasions of the Mongols. Multan, at the moment, was in the hands of Arkali Khan, who was bitterly hostile to Alauddin and extended protection to fugitives from Delhi. The Rajput states still boasted of their independence. Chitor and Ranthambhor were the great centres of Rajput power; and only five years before the pride of Jalaluddin had been humiliated in an unsuccessful attempt to reduce the latter to subjection. Further south lay Gujarat, where the Vaghelas were continuing a glorious tradition of triumph and prosperity. In Central India, Dhar, Ujjain and Chanderi only occasionally succumbed to the military pressure from the north. All round the kingdom of Delhi there was a strong belt of opposition to the Turkish rule; the intrepid defiance of the chiefs of this region had been a constant source of headache to the Delhi authorities, and even strong rulers like Balban had to lead frequent military campaigns

¹⁰ So called to distinguish him from Muhammad bin Tughluq, who got this title later.

¹¹ Barani, 248.

for their suppression. Further east, Bihar and Bengal were virtually independent. The country south of the Vindhya was in a state of chronic political struggle as before. The Yadavas of Devagiri had recovered their lost prestige and power. The Kakityas of Warangal, the Hoysalas of Dwarasamudra, the Cholas, the Cheras and the Pandyas kept fighting with each other and had not the least idea of what the future had in store.

MULTAN

For an ambitious ruler like Alauddin, whose desire was to become the emperor of India, the range and variety of problems were stupendous. He may, or may not, have realized their intensity and extent, but if we may judge by results, he seems to have devoted the first two years of his reign to observing the working of the government, planning and thinking. Later on his ambition increased owing to his successes, and his military and civil talents developed through experience.

His immediate task was to eliminate the surviving members of the former Sultan's family. He entrusted the work to his two trusted generals, Ulugh Khan and Zafar Khan, who marched to Multan at the head of an army thirty to forty thousand strong. They closely invested the city, and although Arkali Khan had made adequate provisions for its defence, he was betrayed by the kotwal and the leading citizens, who saw clearly that there could be only one end to the struggle. The unfortunate members of Jalali family sought the intercession of Shaikh Ruknuddin (grandson of Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariya), who succeeded in persuading the generals to promise them security of life. But the promise, if given, was not kept. Multan was occupied and the two sons of Jalaluddin with their family and followers were taken into custody. While Ulugh Khan and Zafar Khan were escorting the prisoners to Delhi, Nusrat Khan, who had brought instruction from the Sultan, met them at Abuhar and took charge of the prisoners. Arkali Khan, Ruknuddin Ibrahim, Ulghu and Ahmad Chap were blinded, their women were arrested, and their slaves and property confiscated. The sons of Sultan Jalaluddin were imprisoned in Hansi, and the sons of Arkali Khan were put to death. The *Malka-i Jahan* and other ladies of the *haram* along with Ahmad Chap were brought to Delhi, where they were kept under surveillance in the house of Nusrat Khan.

THE INVASION OF KADAR, BATTLE OF JARAN-MANJUR

In the winter of 1297-98 Alauddin had to face a Mongol invasion. Reduced to simple prose, the contemporary and official account of

Amir Khusrau runs as follows.¹²

'The Tatar army, like a deluge, marched boldly from the Sulaiman mountains (*Koh-i Judi*) and crossed the Bias, the Jhelum and the Sutlej. They set fire to the fields (*nai*) of the Khokar villages; the houses of Qusur were destroyed; and the light (of the burning houses and villages) could be seen from the suburbs of the city. In any case, the tumult they raised was such as could not but reach the imperial ear. The deceased Ulugh Khan, who was the right hand of the state, was directed to march with the right wing of the army and the necessary officers. Crossing the distance of two marches in one day, the Khan reached Jaran-Manjur on the bank of the Sutlej on 5 February 1298 (Thursday, 2 Rabi II A.H. 697) and directed his soldiers to cross the river without the help of boats. The Mongols, who pretended to such bravery before the army of Delhi had crossed the river, fled like ants and locusts and were trampled like ants. To be short, 20,000 Mongols were sent to eternal sleep. As to the personal *tuman* of Kadar, the wounded were beheaded and the survivors were put in chains. Ulugh Khan celebrated this victory over the carrion-eaters of Qaidu and then brought the prisoners to Delhi where they were trampled to death by the elephants.'

THE FALL OF THE OLD NOBILITY

In the second year of the reign Nusrat Khan was appointed wazir; we are not told whether Khwaja Khatir was dead or had been dismissed. Alaul Mulk came to Delhi with the maliks, amirs, elephants and treasures, which Alauddin had left with him at Kara. As he had grown very fat and inactive, the office of the kotwal of Delhi was transferred to him from the slave-officers (*mameluks*) of Malikul Umara Fakhruddin, the former kotwal of Delhi, and all non-Turkish municipal employees (*bandiyan-i Tazik*) were placed under his control.

Alauddin now decided to overthrow the coalition government he had formed by liquidating all officers not appointed by him—the remnant of the officers of the old Mameluk regime as well as those

¹² *Khazainul Futuh*, 33-37. Barani (250) is probably correct in saying that the army was led by both Zafar Khan and Ulugh Khan. But since Alauddin had developed a dislike for the memory of Zafar Khan, Khusrau makes no reference to him anywhere in the *Khazainul Futuh*.

Khusrau uses Tatars, Mongols and even Turks and Chinese as equivalent terms. The reference to 'the carrion-eaters of Qaidu' makes it clear that this Mongol army had come from Central Asia and had not been sent by the Il-Khan of Persia.

who had deserted to him from the family of his uncle. Barani is our only direct authority on the matter, but the record of future years is not intelligible except on the basis of what he says.¹³ The great curse of the Mameluk regime had been the constant conflict between the crown and its nobles or highest officers, and the persistent effort of the nobles had been to put the crown into commission, so that one of their own groups may control the whole government. The rebellion of Chajju and Amir Ali *Sarjandar* against Jalaluddin, and the treasonable talk of the Mameluk nobles at the court itself had shown what stuff this nobility was made of. Alauddin decided now to show his hand in a way that would leave the country in no doubt as to who was the real master. 'After the government of Alauddin had grown firm', Barani tells us, 'all the Jalali maliks—who had betrayed the family of their master and joined Alauddin and obtained *mans* of gold and offices and *iqtas* from him—were arrested in the capital or in the army; some were thrown into forts and imprisoned: others were blinded and the rest were put to death.'¹⁴ The money they had obtained from Alauddin was seized along with their own goods and properties. Their houses were made the property of the Sultan and their villages and gardens were brought into the *khalisa*. Nothing was left for their sons. Their families were overthrown, and their soldiers and slaves were assigned to the Alai amirs. Only three persons from among the Jalali maliks were spared, and till the end of Alauddin's reign they received no injury at his hands—Malik Qutbuddin Alavi; Malik Nasiruddin Rana, the *shuhna* of the elephants; and Malik Amir Jamal Khalji, father of Qadr Khan.¹⁵ These three had not deserted Sultan Jalaluddin and his sons nor taken any money from Sultan Alauddin. So these three remained safe, while all other Jalali amirs were torn up, root and branch. This year Nusrat Khan realized a *karor* of cash by his demands and confiscations and put it in the treasury.'¹⁶ According to the Muslim *shari'at*, a slave is inherited by his master, he cannot marry without the permission of his master, and his children are also the slaves of his master. Whatever reasons may have inspired Sultan Mu'izzuddin Ghuri to organize a bureaucracy of slaves, the tendency of strong monarchs

¹³ Barani, 257.

¹⁴ With two or three exceptions, no persons from the families of the liquidated nobles are referred to in future years.

¹⁵ It is obvious from their surnames that none of the three nobles spared belonged to the Mameluk regime. At a rough guess, Jalaluddin at his accession had taken one-third of his high officers from the Mameluk regime. They were, of course, included in the liquidation of the Jalali officers.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 250-51.

hereafter was to impose, though with considerable modifications, these obligations of slavery on a public service recruited from free-born men.

CONQUEST OF GUJARAT

Alauddin now embarked upon the first project of territorial expansion in his reign. According to the tradition recorded by a Rajput bard, Nainsi, the campaign originated owing to the importunities of Madhava, who came to Delhi to solicit the help of the Sultan against his master, Karan Vaghela, who had abducted his wife during his temporary absence from the capital of the kingdom. The story of the curse uttered by the unfortunate lady, Rup Sundari, as related in the *Rasmala*, lends support to such a presumption. Otherwise, it is inexplicable why the Sultan should select for his first attack such a distant province, which had not so far been effectually subdued by any Turkish army, and which could only be reached either through Malwa or Rajputana, both of which were outside the pale of the authority of Delhi. The Sultan was not in a position to hazard a venture unless he was assured of its success; but when such an assurance was forthcoming from a minister of Gujarat itself, there was little hesitation in launching a military project for conquering the territory.

The imperial army left the capital on 24 February 1299, under the joint command of Ulugh Khan and Nusrat Khan. In the course of their progress through Rajputana the generals were compelled by the Rana of Chitor to keep within limits, though they did not spare Jaisalmer. Then they crossed the Banas and seized the fort of Radosa. Having set foot on the soil of Gujarat, Ulugh Khan and his colleague subjected the country to wholesale plunder and terrorism. Karan Vaghela, having been taken by surprise, sought safety in a precipitate flight. During the pursuit which followed, his treasures and his women, including the chief queen, Kamla Devi, fell into the hands of the enemy. She was honourably escorted to Delhi and Alauddin took her into his *haram*. Besides the capital, Anhilwara, other prosperous towns of Gujarat were all sacked and an enormous booty was collected by the invaders. The temple of Somnath, which had been rebuilt by Kumarapala (1143-74), was demolished. Amir Khusrau has thus described this act of vandalism: 'They made the temple of Somnath prostrate itself towards the dignified *Ka'bah*. . . . You may say that temple first offered its prayer and then had a bath.'¹⁷ Nusrat Khan then proceeded to Khambayat (Cambay). He

¹⁷ *Khazainul Futuh*, 48.

seized cash and valuables from the Muslim merchants (*khwajas*) of Khambayat, who had become extremely rich. He took the slave, Kafur Hazardinari, who was later to become the *malik naib* of the empire, by force from his master and brought him to the Sultan.

Gujarat now passed into the hands of the ruler of Delhi. The rapidity and ease with which it was occupied shows that either its ruler, Karan, was unpopular among his subjects, or that his military and administrative organization had become obsolete. No near-contemporary historian has discussed the causes of its fall. But Isami tells us that when Rai Karan consulted his ministers (*wazirs*) at Anhilwara, they frankly told him that there was no alternative to flight. 'The enemy has come and you are unprepared; you are asleep and he has drawn his sword.' But after the Turks had departed, he could collect an army and reconquer the land.¹⁸ Ferishta adds: 'Rai Karan fled to Rama Deva, the ruler of Devagiri in the Deccan, for safety, but after some time he marched to Baglana, which is a territory of Gujarat adjoining the Deccan, and established himself there with the help of Rama Deva.'¹⁹ Alp Khan, the Sultan's brother-in-law, was appointed governor of Gujarat and Karan seems to have been left in peace till the winter of 1306-7.

On their way back, near Jalor, Ulugh and Nusrat had to face a serious mutiny. The soldiers, Isami tells us, had grown very rich owing to the plunder of Gujarat and they resented Ulugh Khan's demanding the Sultan's share by tortures. 'Four officers, Muhammad Shah, Kabhru, Yalhaq and Burraq²⁰—who were Mongols and converts to Islam but could plunder like the Afghans—had collected a lot of booty, which they were not prepared to surrender.' So very early one morning they attacked the camp of Ulugh Khan with two or three thousand horsemen. Ulugh Khan, who was in the lavatory, succeeded in escaping to Nusrat's camp. But the rebels slew Malik A'izzuddin, brother of Nusrat, who was Ulugh's *hajib*. They found the son of a sister of Alauddin asleep in the camp and thinking that he was Ulugh Khan, they slew him also. Then the imperial horse and foot collected before Nusrat's camp and the New Muslim amirs and horsemen took to flight. Some of them, like Muhammad Shah and Kabhru, sought the protection of Rai Hamir of Ranthambhor; others, like Yalhaq and Burraq, went to Rai Karan, who was then staying at Nandurbar. Though the conspirators escaped, their women and

¹⁸ Isami, 244-45.

¹⁹ Ferishta, 103.

²⁰ The *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, on the basis of an authority not mentioned, gives the following list of Mongol rebels—Yalhaq, Kisra, Baqi, Tamghan, Muhammad Shah, Tamar Bugha, Shadi Bugha and Qutlugh Bugha.

children at Delhi had to pay for their sins with their honour and their lives. The wives of A'izzuddin's murderers were exposed to the humiliation of scavenger's embraces and their innocent babies were struck on their heads till they were smashed to bits. 'The arrest and punishment of women and children for the crimes of men', Barani tells us, 'began from this year. Before this in Delhi women and children were not molested on account of the offences of their men.'²¹

SIWISTAN

The year that saw the invasion of Gujarat also witnessed the invasion of Siwistan (Sibi) by the Mongol Saldi, who occupied the fort. Zafar Khan was sent to deal with the invaders. In spite of a barrage of arrows from the garrison, he forced his way into the fort and compelled the Mongols to make an abject surrender. Saldi and his brother with their entire following were brought in fetters to Delhi. This established the reputation of Zafar Khan, who was then governor of Samana, in the public mind. Ulugh Khan became jealous of him, and Alauddin, so Barani tells us, began to ponder as to what steps he should adopt to get rid of such a brilliant officer—poison him or blind him or send him with an army to conquer Lakhnauti and establish himself there. Barani's suspicion is not justified. Alauddin trusted Zafar Khan implicitly till the latter disobeyed his express orders at the battle of Kili. After that his attitude to the memory of Zafar Khan changed as is proved by the fact that Khusrau's *Khazainul Futuh* intentionally omits all references to him.

PROPHET AND ALEXANDER

Some time after Zafar Khan's return from Siwistan, Alauddin's critics spread two rumours about him, which Barani, writing over half a century later, asserted to be proved facts and which medieval as well as modern historians have carelessly copied from him. Alauddin (so Barani wants us to believe) declared that the Arabian Prophet had Four Friends (the Pious Caliphs) with whose help he had spread his Faith so that his name will be remembered till the end of time. Alauddin too had four 'Khans'—Ulugh, Nusrat, Zafar and Alp—who had attained to the grandeur of kings. He would with their help establish a new religion and attain to eternal fame. There are several difficulties here. If Alauddin wanted to get rid of Zafar Khan, how could he consider him as one of the co-founders of a new faith? Secondly, as Barani is never tired of telling us, Alauddin never associated with the Muslim *ulama*; and *his faith in Islam was*

²¹ Barani, 253; Isami, 244-45.

firm like the faith of the illiterate and the ignorant. How could such a man think of establishing a new creed? No principle of the new creed is given to us by Barani, who is our only authority for this baseless gossip. Isami is silent about the matter; other writers of the period, like Amir Khurd and Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh, had a deep respect for Alauddin in spite of his failure in the sphere of religious rites and bring no such charge against him.

Alauddin had about this time assumed the title of 'the Second Alexander' (*Sikandar-i Sani*) and had it recited in the *Khutba* and superscribed on his coins. This was nothing novel; other Muslim kings, the ill-starred Alauddin Muhammad Khwarazm Shah for example, had also assumed this title. But it should not be imagined that Alauddin ever thought that he could rival the conquests not only of the Alexander of history but of the Alexander of Persian romance—the conqueror of the *rub'-i maskun* or the fourth inhabited part of the globe.²² Barani gives to his uncle, Alaul Mulk, the credit of removing Alauddin's erroneous ideas. The Sultan promised that no words about the establishment of a new religion would ever cross his lips. As to the plans of conquests, the kotwal drew Alauddin's attention to the fact that the proper sphere of his activity was the 'territory of Hindustan'. He had to stop the Mongol invasions and to crush the independent rulers of northern India; after this had been done, he could sit safely on his throne and send his officers to plunder the treasuries of distant rais and levy an annual tribute from them, but they were to be left to rule their kingdoms as before. It cannot be too strongly insisted that these 'two designs' are utterly incompatible with the character and state-policy of Alauddin, even as they have been portrayed to us by Barani himself. The greatest crisis of his life was soon to prove that Alauddin was not a drunkard talking nonsense with his flattering friends but a stern realist and a warrior-statesman of the highest calibre, who insisted on keeping all important affairs under his personal control.

INVASION OF QUTLUGH KHWAJA; BATTLE OF KILI

Towards the end of 1299 Dawa, the Khan of Trans-Oxiana, despatched his son, Qutlugh Khwaja with 20 *tumans* (200,000 soldiers) to conquer Delhi.²³ It was a journey of six months and the Mongol

²² According to medieval Muslim geographers only one-fourth (*rub'*) of the globe (Eurasia and northern Africa) was inhabited; the rest of the globe was covered by water.

²³ Since his *Khazainul Futuh* is devoted exclusively to the 'victories' of Alauddin, Amir Khusrau does not notice the battle of Kili. But he devotes to it sixteen verses of his *Dawal Rani* and refers both to Ulugh Khan and Zafar Khan (60-61). Both

preparations must have been carefully made. Since their object was to conquer and govern the country, they plundered no cities and reduced no forts on their way. The route followed is not given, but one may guess that, like Timūr in 1398, Qutlugh Khwaja chose a route that had no large cities on the way and on which the countryside and small towns could just supply his army the cattle, grain and fodder it needed. 'When the Mongols crossed the Indus, all the forts on the route began to tremble.' The army of Multan took refuge in its forts; their garrisons had only courage to attack the Mongol camp during the dark nights. Zafar Khan, who was at Kuhram, invited Qutlugh to battle, but the latter paid no attention to him. 'Kings only fight kings', he told Zafar's messenger, and invited Zafar to meet him under his master's banner at Delhi. As was to be expected, Delhi was filled with fugitives and there was not enough space for them in the mosques, shops and even the streets. The *caravans* failed to come and the prices of commodities rose very high. The Mongols finally encamped at Kili, some six miles from the Delhi suburbs.

Isami tells us that Alauddin had only a week or two at his disposal; so probably news of the Mongols was sent to him only after they had crossed the Indus. He came out of the Red Palace, fixed his military camp by the bank of the Jumna at Siri and summoned post-haste all officers whom his orders could reach. It was a critical hour; and Alaul Mulk in strict confidence advised him to follow the precepts of former kings (and of text-books) and not to risk his kingdom on the doubtful result of a single battle. The Delhi army was accustomed to fighting Hindu rais; it was not acquainted with Mongol tactics of retreat, ambush and the like. Why does the Sultan not resort to diplomacy and negotiations by sending messengers to the enemy and at least gain some time? Alauddin summoned his nobles in order to give a public reply. After repeating Alaul Mulk's arguments and paying him a sincere compliment—'He deserves the wizarat but I

Barani (254-61) and Isami (245-61) give us fairly long accounts, which though differing in some details, agree in substance. It is possible to reconstruct the events by a critical study of the two authorities. Barani says that the Mongols started at the end of third year of the reign; so we may safely put their campaign in India in the winter of 1299-1300.

The figure of 20 *tumans*, or two lakhs, is too large, even if women and camp followers are included. It would have been impossible to find food for so many men and women and fodder for their horses. Medieval army figures have to be taken with a grain of salt. The army with which Chengiz Khan marched from Mongolia did not amount to one lakh, and in order to find provisions for it, he had to march it in separate contingents. Qutlugh Khwaja is said to have kept his soldiers together and would not allow even ten men to separate themselves from the main army. This would have made the task of finding provisions even more difficult,

have only appointed him kotwal of Delhi on account of his incapacitating corpulence—he proceeded to give his decision as the head of the state.

‘There is a proverb—“You cannot steal a camel and expect to disappear unseen”. Similarly you cannot govern the empire of Delhi and escape the challenges it entails.²⁴ The enemy has traversed two thousand *karohs* to challenge me to battle under the Minar of Delhi. If at this moment I show any weakness, neither the mass of the people nor the brave warriors of the land will have any respect left for me; add to it, posterity will laugh at my beard. No, happen what may, I will march tomorrow from Siri to Kili and give battle to Qutlugh Khwaja and see to which of us God grants victory.’

He put the city and the Palace in charge of Alaul Mulk and ordered him to kiss the keys, hand them over to the victor, and serve him loyally and faithfully. He had no desire to drag down Delhi and the country in his fall. After Alauddin had left, Alaul Mulk closed all the gates of Delhi except the Badaun Gate, obviously for flight to the Doab if it should be necessary.²⁵

A careful examination of the battle of Kili conclusively proves that the Mongols were no longer worthy of the reputation Chengiz had won for them. Their ambitions remained, but their capacity had vanished. Also since Halaku’s defeat at the hands of the Egyptians, the invincibility of the Mongols had become an old wife’s tale. It was hardly worthwhile undertaking a six months’ journey to fight such a battle.

At Kili the two armies were arranged in the formal medieval order. The river was to the right and a mass of thorns and bushes to the left of the Delhi army. Alauddin took up his position in the centre. Towards the right he placed Zafar Khan supported (among others) by the distinguished rais and Indian-born (Hindu) warriors. On the left Alauddin placed Nusrat Khan; Ulugh Khan was stationed behind Nusrat to give him the support necessary. Akat Khan and his men were ordered to stand in front of the Sultan. The army covered several miles from right to left and it was difficult to control it from the

²⁴ Though Alaul Mulk only throws out vague hints, a compromise was only possible on two conditions—submission to Dawa Khan as overlord and a surrender of Alauddin’s Devagiri treasure. Alauddin was, consequently, not prepared for any negotiations. At the same time he had a shrewd idea that he could win without fighting, for the Mongols were unaware of the resistance Delhi could put up. Isami makes no reference to Alaul Mulk’s suggestion or Alauddin’s reply.

²⁵ Barani, 255-59,

centre. Still Alauddin had no intention of staking the fortunes of Delhi merely on a soldier's battle; so he issued a firm injunction to the effect that 'no officer was to move from his place without the Sultan's order; and if he did so, his head would be severed from his body'. The officers knew fully well that this was not an empty threat. 'In the Mongol army Qutlugh Khwaja commanded the centre, Hijlak the left wing and Tamar Bugha the right wing,²⁶ while Targhi was given a *tuman* (10,000 soldiers) to hide in ambush and attack where necessary.' According to Isami four envoys came to Alauddin from Qutlugh Khwaja with a message: 'No one remembers of such a king and such an army in Hindustan. The request is that my envoys be permitted to go round your camp and inquire about the name of your chief officers.' It suited Alauddin to give this permission and the messengers duly reported back to Qutlugh Khwaja.

When the two armies, ready for battle, stood face to face, Alauddin was in no hurry to give the order to fight. He had to take an over-all view of the situation. More and more officers and soldiers would be coming to him from the east. Behind the enemy were so many forts, garrisoned by his soldiers, and cities loyal to Delhi. The Mongol army, consisting of both men and women, must have been tired after its long journey, and its provisions may fall short. If the Mongols made a sudden onslaught in the hope of capturing Delhi, he was there to fight, but delay was certainly in his favour and he would prove to the Mongols that their wisest policy was to go back from a country where no one wanted them. But at this moment his plans were frustrated by his greatest officer. Zafar Khan's impulse to fight overcame his better judgement. Without obtaining the Sultan's permission, he attacked Hijlak's army in front of him and he followed it in hot pursuit without caring for the rest of the battle-field. This gave the Mongols an opportunity of following their well-known device of feigned retreat. Zafar's foot-soldiers were left behind and even the best of his horsemen could not keep him company. When after pursuing the enemy for about 18 *karohs*, he turned round to take stock of the situation, he found that he had only a thousand horsemen with him. Since the other wings of the army had remained stationary (according to Alauddin's order), Targhi was able to put his ten thousand men between Zafar Khan and the Delhi army. Zafar Khan could not return; Targhi's men covered an area of two miles behind him. He consulted his officers—Usman *akhur-bek*, Usman Yaghan, Ali Shah Rana and others—in such way as was possible under the

²⁶ Isami (232); it is not clear as to whether Hijlak or Tamar Bugha commanded the force in front of Zafar Khan.

circumstances. If they returned to Alauddin, he would punish them for disobedience. But return was impossible as the Mongols had completely surrounded them. So they decided to die fighting to the last man. Since there were no survivors, it is difficult to say what happened. But Isami states that Zafar succeeded in killing one-half of Targhi's men. Then he was killed by an arrow which passed through his armour and pierced his heart.²⁷

Zafar Khan's reckless attack established his reputation for valour and showed that man for man the Indian could fight and defeat the Mongol. Still technically the Mongols were victors on the first day and the Indian officers were depressed. When the armies met in battle order next morning, Alauddin's officers approached him with the suggestion that he should withdraw behind the security of the Delhi ramparts and fight the enemy from there.²⁸ But Alauddin, who had his own calculations, would not hear of it. 'If yesterday a section of the army has been destroyed because it disobeyed my orders in its haste', he replied, 'the past cannot be recalled. I am not ignorant of the dangers that surround me on all sides; yet if I have to move at all, I will only move forward.' Still he would not give the order to attack, and since Qutlugh was equally reluctant, the armies stood face to face from morning to sunset. On the third day the armies again stood face to face, but after nightfall the Mongols retreated ten miles towards their homeland. Alauddin considered it wisest to give the enemy a safe exit and returned to Delhi. 'The whole city was thrown into jubilation,' Isami says, 'no one cared to think of the dead.' Qutlugh Khwaja died soon after his return to Trans-Oxiana.²⁹ Alauddin's reputation for over-all command had been fully established. The officers were allowed to go to their *iqtlas*.

CONQUEST OF RANTHAMBHOR; THE THREE REBELLIONS³⁰ (1299-1300)

Modern international law permits a state to give asylum to political refugees from another state; even in case of ordinary crimes, extradi-

²⁷ Isami, 258, says that Alauddin was genuinely sorry at the death of Zafar Khan, in spite of his disobedience. The fact that the Sultan placed him in charge of the right wing proves that he enjoyed the full trust of the Sultan.

²⁸ This was not practicable. According to Barani, the fort-wall had not been repaired; also Delhi and its suburban towns had spread far beyond the fort-wall. The sad condition of the fort-wall is also certified by the *Khazainul Futuh*, 27-28.

²⁹ *Mubarak Shahi*, 82-83; *Dawal Rani*, 61.

³⁰ Amir Khusrau gives a brief account of the Ranthambhor campaign in his *Khazainul Futuh* (50-52) and *Dawal Rani* (65-66). According to the *Dawal Rani*, the circumference of the Ranthambhor fort was three *farsangs* and it was ten days' march

tion can only be demanded on the basis of treaties. In medieval India conditions were different; giving asylum to political refugees from another kingdom was considered an 'unfriendly act', though not necessarily a cause for war. On returning to his governorship of Bayana, Ulugh Khan sent messengers to Hamir Deva of Ranthambhor asking that, as he was a friendly ruler, he should either put to death Muhammad Shah, Kabhru and the Muslim Mongols who had sought refuge with him or send them to Ulugh Khan; if he failed to do so, he should prepare for war. Hamir's counsellors earnestly advised him not to endanger his dynasty for persons who had no claims on him. But Hamir refused to yield. 'O Khan', his reply ran,³¹ 'I have enough money and enough soldiers and no desire to quarrel with any one. But I am not afraid to fight, and I will not give up the two or three Turks³² who have fled to me from fear of their lives.' So the die was cast. When his Hindu secretaries explained Hamir's reply, Ulugh started for Ranthambhor. Sultan Alauddin, who must have been kept informed of everything, ordered Nusrat Khan, who was governor of Awadh that year, to proceed to help Ulugh Khan. The two khans captured Jhain³³ and then laid siege to Ranthambhor. But one day, while directing the siege operations, Nusrat Khan went too near the ramparts; he was hit by a *munjaniq*-stone³⁴ and died after two or three days. This caused a consternation in the besieging army and Hamir took advantage of it. He came out with his twelve thousand horse and a lot of foot-soldiers, defeated Ulugh Khan in battle and drove him back to

from Delhi. Khusrau does not refer to any of the three rebellions, but details are given by Barani (272-78) and Isami (261-69). But Isami (269-71) commits the error of putting the rebellion of Akat Khan during the Chitor campaign.

31 That is, as framed for the Rai by Isami (261-63), who is our only authority for this correspondence.

32 The Mongols, Muhammad Shah and Kabhru, must have had a number of followers, for the *Khazainul Futuh* (51) states: 'Some New Muslims from among the ill-starred Mongols, who had turned their faces from Islam and joined the Saturnians... had lighted fires in three towers of the fort.'

33 Jhain, after its capture, was given the name of the New City (*Shahr-i Nau*). Dr. K. S. Lal writes in his *Khaljis* (101n): 'Neither Jhain nor any site bearing its changed name, *Nau Shahr*, is traceable on the maps now. A small place "*Naigaon*", which exactly means *Shahr-i Nau*, lies at a short distance from Ranthambhor. This may probably be identified with the Jhain of Barani.'

34 Dr. K. S. Lal writes: 'In all probability the *sang-i maghrubi*, or western-stone, was some kind of missile used in warfare in Alauddin's days.' He very correctly refuses to identify it with the cannon-ball. (*Khaljis*, 102n). The *munjaniq*-stones were artificially rounded stones, smaller than foot-balls but considerably larger than cricket-balls; the stroke of the beam of the *munjaniq* took them a fairly long distance with considerable force. (I found a lot of these stones in the crumbling ramparts of the Chitor fort in 1922. The marks of the chiselling could be clearly seen—EDITOR: II).

Jhain. Ulugh informed the Sultan of his distressing situation; it would be a blow to the imperial prestige if he gave up the siege, but if he remained where he was for a month or two, he would be overpowered by the Hindus. Sultan Jalaluddin had been right in his estimate of the strength of Ranthambhor; only the genius of Alauddin and his over-all command of the resources of the state could reduce the fort.

Akat Khan's Rebellion

Alauddin ordered his officers to meet him at Tilpat, the first stage from Delhi,³⁵ but while his men were collecting, he spent his time in hunting. This gave an opportunity to Sulaiman Shah Akat Khan, son of the Sultan's deceased brother, Muhammad, who held the post of *vakildar* and had been given the command of the right wing at Kili after Zafar Khan's death. One night the Sultan with a few soldiers remained in the hunting field and did not return to the royal tent; early next morning he ordered the horsemen to draw a circle (*nargah*) to drive the game towards him, while he sat on a *mondha* (reed-chair) waiting for them to complete their work. At that moment Akat Khan and the Mongol Muslims in his service, who had conspired to kill the Sultan, rode forward shouting 'Tiger! Tiger!' and began to shoot arrows at him. Alauddin used his reed-chair as his shield; a slave, named Manik (or Nayak), threw himself in front of the Sultan and received four arrow-wounds; then his *paiks* (personal guards) moved forward and protected him with their shields. It was winter-time and the Sultan's coat and cloak (*qaba wa dagla*) were stuffed with cotton. Still he received two deep arrow-wounds in his arm and fell down unconscious owing to loss of blood. When Akat Khan came near, the *paiks* faced him with drawn swords, but since at the same time they shouted—'The Sultan is dead; why cut off the head of a corpse?'—Akat was satisfied and proceeded to the royal camp, where he took his seat on the throne and declared that he had killed the Sultan. Like the automats they were, the court-officers began to welcome the new king and the amirs present offered their congratulations. After all no one would have ventured to sit on the royal throne unless he had really killed the Sultan.

It was only when Akat Khan wanted to enter the *haram* that he met with resistance. Malik Dinar, the officer-in-charge of the *haram* and his subordinates, put on their armours, met Akat Khan at the *haram*-gate and told him that they would not allow him to enter

³⁵ Tilpat is a plain about 12 miles east of old Delhi and south of Kailugarhi (Dr. K. S. Lal, *Khaljīs*, 104n).

Alauddin's *haram* unless he showed them Alauddin's head. The head, as Stanley Lane-Poole appropriately remarks, soon appeared but on its own proper shoulders. When Alauddin recovered consciousness, his first instinct was to fly to Ulugh Khan at Jhain because he suspected a deep-laid plot. But Malik Hamiduddin advised him not to let the conspiracy mature; if a night passed without the emperor's whereabouts being known, those who accepted Akat Khan would be driven to cling to him from fear. Alauddin acted on this advice. By the time he reached the royal camp, he was surrounded by five or six hundred horsemen and Akat's show completely collapsed. He fled to Afghanpur, but two officers pursued him, cut off his head and brought it to Alauddin. The Sultan felt sad. 'I have often had that head in my lap', he said. Akat's younger brother, Qutlugh Khan, was put to death immediately. During the time he stayed at Tilpat to recover from his wounds, Alauddin inquired into the conspiracy and all whom he considered guilty were severely punished.

A direct assault by horse and foot on Ranthambhor was out of the question. In shooting *munjaniqs* and arrows and throwing stones and fire, the advantage lay with the garrison. Alauddin determined to reach the top of the fort by the prolonged and arduous process of constructing a *pasheb*, which was sure to cost a lot of lives. Some idea of how this was done is given by Barani.

'The fort had been already surrounded; after the Sultan's arrival the siege was pressed with greater vigour. Weavers were brought from the surrounding country and the bags sewn by them were distributed among the soldiers. The soldiers filled the bags with earth and threw them into the ditch. Thus with shouts of "Haiy! Haiy!" they laid the foundation of the *pasheb* and raised the *gargaj*.'³⁶

The *maghrabis* had been installed and shot stones at the garrison. But the garrison kept destroying the *pasheb* by throwing stones and fire. Many people were killed on both sides. 'The Delhi army plundered the country till Dhar and brought the territory under its control.'³⁷ It took a long time before the mound of sand-bags could rise to the top of the ramparts and an ascending road built upon it for horse and foot to cross. The loss of life among the besiegers must have been heavy, but Alauddin's firm discipline—he demanded back three years' pay from every deserter—kept the army to its duty and

³⁶ We have to contemplate a road ascending to the top of the fort on these earth-filled bags. The lower part is obviously the *pasheb* (from *pa*, foot) and the upper part is the *gargaj*.

³⁷ Barani, 288.

not a single horse or foot deserted from the front. According to the *Khazainul Futuh*, the full siege began in March or April (Rajab) and continued through the summer heat into the rainy season. There were two more rebellions but Alauddin had determined to conquer Ranthambhor and did not stir from the spot.

Rebellion of Malik Umar and Mangu Khan

Two sons of a sister of Alauddin—Malik Umar, governor of Badaun, and his brother, Mangu Khan, governor of Awadh (probably appointed in succession to Nusrat Khan)—rebelled on seeing Alauddin busy at Ranthambhor and began to enlist the soldiers of Hindustan. But they could do nothing serious. Officers sent by Alauddin captured and brought them to Ranthambhor. The Sultan had them put to death in his presence; 'their eyes were carved out like slices of melon'.

Rebellion of Haji Maula: When Alaul Mulk was appointed kotwal of Delhi, the lower and middle grade Indian-born (*Tazi*) staff of the Delhi municipality had not been dismissed; there could be no danger from it in normal times. Alaul Mulk seems to have died some time after the battle of Kili. He was succeeded by two officers; Bayazid Tirmizi³⁸ was appointed kotwal of Delhi, but the kotwalship of Siri, where the Sultan was constructing a new palace and city, the fort-wall of which seems have been completed, was assigned to Alauddin Ayaz (father of the more famous Muhammad Ayaz, wazir of Muhammad bin Tughluq). Bayazid Tirmizi was intensely unpopular in the city owing to his harshness; and this, along with the Sultan's pre-occupation at Ranthambhor, gave Haji Maula, a freed-man of Fakhruddin, the former kotwal and one of his senior staff-officers, who was now *shuhnah* of the township of Bartol in the Doab, the chance of raising a rebellion in Delhi. The Haji, according to Barani, was a vicious, wicked and reckless mischief-maker, who had won the kotwali staff of the old regime to his side.

On a midday in Ramazan (10 May to 8 June), when the intense summer heat had driven every one in-door, Haji Maula entered the Badaun Gate with some soldiers; and proceeding to the house of Bayazid, summoned him from his underground room (*firo-khana*) to hear an order he had brought from the Sultan. The unsuspecting kotwal came out alone in his slippers and the Haji ordered him to be killed. He showed to the people around him a document which he

³⁸ Barani calls him Tirmizi, but that could only be his surname after the well-known town of Tirmiz on the Oxus. Ferishta calls him Bayazid on the basis of some authority not mentioned.

alleged was a *farman* of the Sultan in obedience to which he had put the kotwal to death. He then summoned Alauddin Ayaz, but the latter was informed of his evil designs and closed the gates of Siri. Helped by the kotwali employees and the hooligans he could muster, the Haji captured the Red Palace, including the royal treasury, armoury, horse-stables and prison. He set the prisoners free and some of them undertook to follow him. He then rode from the Red Palace to the house of an Alavi, who was known as 'Shahinshah' and was the descendant of a daughter of Sultan Iltutmish;³⁹ he brought the Alavi by force and seated him on the royal throne. All officers whom the Haji could capture were compelled to kiss the Alavi's hands, while the Haji assigned the imperial offices among the rebels. A free distribution of the state-treasure, weapons and horses enabled the Haji to control Delhi and to terrorize its citizens for about a week. On the fourth day after the rebellion, Malik Hamiduddin,⁴⁰ the *amir-i koh*, along with his sons and relations, and some horsemen of the late Zafar Khan, who had come from Anroha for review (*arz*), broke into the city through the western or Ghazni Gate. After two days of street fighting, Hamiduddin succeeded in driving the Haji and his men towards the Bhandarkal Gate and there, in the street of the shoemakers, he dragged the Haji down from his horse, sat on his breast and, though the Haji's followers kept striking their swords at him and wounded him in several places, he did not get up till he had put the Haji to death. He then proceeded to the Red Palace, executed the unfortunate Alavi and paraded his head through Delhi on a spear.

The punishments that followed can well be imagined. The first concern of the restored regime was the royal treasure. 'All persons who had taken money from the Haji were captured and imprisoned, and all money he had distributed was brought back to the treasury.' After some six or seven days, Ulugh Khan was sent post-haste to Delhi and alighted at the Mu'izzi Palace outside the city. All rebels

39 An Alavi means a descendant of Hazrat Ali by one of his wives other than the Prophet's daughter, Bibi Fatima. The descendants of Ali and Fatima have the status of *Saiyyids*. Ferishta says the Alavi referred to was generally known as 'Shahinshah' Barani calls him *Nabisa-i Shah Najaf* (Grandson of Shah Najaf—i.e. Hazrat Ali) but this seems to be a clerical mistake.

40 According to Ferishta, Malik Hamiduddin went out of the city by the Badaun Gate, collected the loyalists (including the late Zafar Khan's horsemen) outside the city and then re-entered the city by the Ghazni Gate. Barani simply says that he forced his way into the city by the Ghazni Gate. Since Hamiduddin was present at Tilpat and also at the siege of Ranthambhor, Dr. K. S. Lal (*Khaljis*, 110) seems to be correct in saying that Alauddin kept the revolt a secret but sent Malik Hamiduddin to suppress it.

were taken before him and he ordered them to be put to death. Though the grandsons of Malikul Umara Fakhruddin, the former kotwal, knew nothing of the rebellion, they were all put to death and no trace of his family was left.

The news of the revolt was carried to Alauddin as quickly as possible, but he left the matter to his officers and kept it secret from the army. By the beginning of July the *pasheb* seems to have been completed. But at the same time the provisions of the garrison had also been exhausted. 'The distress in the garrison was such', Amir Khusrau tells us, 'that people wanted to purchase one grain of corn for two grains of gold and could not get it. . . . Owing to lack of water and green leaves, the fort had become a desert of thorns.'⁴¹ One night Hamir lighted a big fire for the *jauhar*-rite. The ladies, led by his senior rani, Ranga Devi,⁴² perished in the flames; then Hamir Deva marched with his men to fight and die at the head of the *pasheb*. Most of the Mongols died fighting. When the Sultan entered the fort on 10 July 1301, he found Muhammad Shah lying wounded. 'If I have your wounds treated and you recover, how will you behave towards me?' the Sultan asked. 'If I recover,' the wounded Mongol replied, 'I will kill you and raise the son of Hamir Deva to the throne.' The Sultan in anger ordered Muhammad Shah to be trampled under the feet of an elephant; but afterwards on recollecting the courage and loyalty of the dead man, he ordered him to be buried decently.⁴³ Ranmal and other Rajputs, who had fled to the Sultan from the Rai, were put to death. They had been disloyal to their own chief and Alauddin said that he did not expect them to be loyal to him.⁴⁴ The fort with all it contained was handed over as a present to Ulugh Khan and the Sultan returned to Delhi. But as he was angry with the citizens and had exiled many *sadrs* from Delhi, he did not enter the city for a month but passed his time in hunting at Andri

⁴¹ *Khazainul Futuh*, 52-53.

⁴² Khusrau and all Persian historians refer to the *jauhar*-rite; the name of the senior rani is given by Dr. K. S. Lal (*Khaljis*, 112) on the basis of Har Bilas Sarda's *Hammira*, 44.

⁴³ Ferishta, 108.

⁴⁴ Ferishta (108) only refers to 'Ranmal and others', but Dr. K. S. Lal (*Khaljis*, 113) on the basis of Har Bilas Sarda's *Hammira* (38-42) writes: 'Ranmal, who had gone to Alauddin to settle terms on behalf of the Rajputs, agreed to desert to the Sultan, and obtained a written statement from him granting him complete amnesty. Ranmal showed this document to his Rajput friends and some of them together with Ratanpal left the beleaguered fortress for the royal camp.' Both Ranmal and Ratanpal are stated to have been ministers of Hamir.

and Thala.⁴⁵ Ulugh collected a large army for the conquest of Warangal and Ma'abar, but he died after four or five months while on his way to Delhi. The Sultan was greatly depressed and gave a lot of money in charity for the salvation of his brother's soul.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Isami, 269. Barani says that 'as he had caused resentment among the citizens and exiled many *sadrs*, Alauddin did not enter the city but stayed in the suburbs' (112).

⁴⁶ There is no reason for believing in Isami's statement that Ulugh Khan had been poisoned at Alauddin's order. Isami is very confused here.

III. ALAUDDIN KHALJI: MEASURES FOR PREVENTING REBELLIONS; LAND REVENUE REFORMS; CHITOR; TARGHI (1301-03)

FOUR MEASURES FOR SUPPRESSING REBELLIONS

THERE HAD BEEN THREE REBELLIONS since Alauddin's accession; so while pressing the siege of Ranthambhor the Sultan held meetings of his confidential council (*majlis-i khas*) to answer the question: 'What are the causes of rebellion?' 'If these causes are discovered', the Sultan said, 'I will immediately remove all these causes.' Most of the highly efficient officers to whom he owed his initial successes had died. But their successors were up to the standard. Barani refers to Malik Ainul Mulk Multani and the brothers, Malik Hamiduddin and Malik A'izzuddin (sons of Ala Dabir), by name but adds that some other wise officers were also summoned. In listing the causes of rebellion after some days and nights of discussion, the council showed no fear of the Sultan and no regard for the interests or the opinions of its own official group.

'There are four causes of rebellion. *First*, the ignorance of the king concerning the good and bad acts of the people. *Second*, liquor; people having organized drinking parties, talk freely, ally themselves with each other and hatch conspiracies and rebellions. *Third*, the unity, affection and relationships of the maliks and amirs and their frequenting each other's houses, so that if one of them is punished, a hundred other nobles will join him owing to their blood-ties and affection. *Fourth*, money; if there is no money in the hands of the people, they will apply themselves to earning their livelihood and no one will think of rebellion or conspiracy.'¹

(1) *Confiscation* :

Alauddin gave precedence to the seizing of money, but Barani's exaggerated language should not lead us to believe that the Sultan went beyond what was strictly permitted by medieval legality. No one was plundered on account of his wealth. At his accession Alauddin had not only confirmed but increased charitable endowments and state-grants of all types. Now he issued an order cancelling them: 'Wherever there was a village held by state-grant (*milk*),

¹ Barani, 282-87. Though Barani alone describes these measures in detail, confirmatory evidence is available from other contemporary authorities.

state-gift (*in'am*) or charitable endowment (*waqf*), it was by a stroke of the pen to be *brought back (baz arand)* into the *khalisa*.' Nothing was taken into the *khalisa*, which did not originally belong to it; also the medieval state claimed to be the final authority with reference to all charitable endowments, by whomsoever made. We know for certain that Alauddin permitted many exceptions to his order.² Even Barani admits that a few thousand *tankas* were left to the assignees in Delhi. Still the general order was meant for the whole kingdom. 'In Delhi', Barani tells, 'little gold was left except in the houses of maliks, amirs, state-employees (*kardaran*), the Hindu Multani merchants and Hindu bankers (*sahas*).'

(2) *Organization of the Intelligence System*

Since it was necessary to keep the Sultan well-informed, it was arranged that he should receive regular reports from three sources—the officer-in-charge; the *barids* or intelligence officers, whose duty it was to collect information and send it to the king; and *munhis* or spies.³ The two chief places concerning which information was required were the houses of the nobles and the public markets. Everything that happened in the houses of the nobles was conveyed to the king in the reports of the spies; nothing in the reports was overlooked and proper explanations were demanded. The nobles trembled in their houses from fear of the spies, and when they went to the royal palace they preferred to communicate to each other by signs. 'In short they were guilty of no word or deed that would deserve a reprimand or punishment.'

(3) *Prohibition in Delhi*

There were no religious elements in Alauddin's prohibition, for he did not object to drinking as such. But since the measure was politically necessary, he personally gave up drinking. The royal drinking vessels of glass and porcelain were broken before the Badaun Gate, and wine from the royal jars was poured out, creating mud and mire as in the rainy season. Then officers mounted on elephants proclaimed

² e.g. the two villages granted to Isami's ancestors were not taken back. Isami, 382-83.

³ The *barids* or intelligence officers were publicly known to be such; they had authority to make official inquiries and it was the duty of the local officers to keep them well-informed. For a short account of the duties of the *barids*, see Barani's *Fatawa-i Jahandari* in the *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat* by Habib and Afsar Begum, Advice VIII, Section i (30-33). The *munhi* (literally a person who informs concerning things forbidden) was really a spy and Ferishta is not wrong in substituting the word *jasis* for Barani's *munhi*.

in the streets and lanes of Delhi that no one was to drink or sell liquor or go near it. The licensed tavern-keepers and distillers of liquor were driven out of Delhi and the revenue from them was written off. Persons with self-respect gave up drinking at the first warning. But others distilled liquor from sugar in their houses and sold it at a high price; they also tried to get jars of liquor from outside the city hidden in carts under wood and grass. Alauddin ordered dry wells to be dug near the Badaun Gate, and persons who were found disobeying his order were thrown into them; most of them died, and those who survived regained their health only after prolonged treatment. It was possible at the worst of times to go ten or twelve *karohs* out of Delhi for a good drink. But no drink was available within four or five *karohs* of Delhi in suburbs like Ghiyaspur, Indarpat and Kailugarhi. Ultimately, Alauddin relented and passed an order that if a man distilled liquor in his own house for his own consumption but was not guilty of selling it or of calling a drinking party, he was not to be molested and the spies were not to enter his house. Gambling and the smoking of *bhang* were also prohibited.⁴

(4) *Control of the Nobles*

Officers surviving from the previous reigns had been totally liquidated by Alauddin; this lesson must have been sufficient. He had now to deal only with officers appointed by himself and they were in no position to protest. Writing about half a century after the event, Barani recorded as follows: 'The Sultan ordered the maliks, amirs, officers of the court, and persons of responsibility and status not to go to each other's houses or to collect parties at banquets; there were to be no intermarriages among them unless the Sultan had been informed and his permission obtained; also they were not to permit the public to frequent their houses.' Barani insists that these orders were sternly enforced. Hospitality and entertainment disappeared from the houses of the nobles; they lived with great care and did not allow any conspirator, mischief-maker or man of bad reputation to come near them; and even when they met in the royal palace, they could not sit shoulder to shoulder and talk at ease. Ferishta adds: 'If

4 Since the addition of salt turns wine into vinegar, Alauddin's prohibition has been referred to by Khusrau (*Khazainul Futuh*, 17-18) as follows: 'This pure Being (i.e. the Sultan) has caused wine, which is the daughter of grape, the sister of sugar and the mother of all wickedness, to be reformed along with all her vicious associates, so that wine has sworn, out of regard for the claims of salt, that she will always remain in the form of vinegar.' Khusrau then proceeds, in the same florid language, to state that the Sultan compelled the prostitutes to get married, but it is difficult to take this statement seriously.

occasionally a noble had to put up a guest or to arrange a marriage-alliance, he had to write to Saiyvid Khan Wazir, whom contemporaries called *Fitna Angez Khan* (Mischief-Maker) and flatter him a lot so that he may obtain the Sultan's permission at an appropriate moment.⁵ That *esprit de corps*, which had been the curse of the Mameluk nobility, was not allowed to grow up in the nobility of Alauddin. Perhaps the pendulum swung too much to the other extreme. The officers were so habituated to obeying the Sultan that they extended (as we shall see) the same unquestioning obedience to his favourite, whatever his worth, and even to his murderer.

THE SULTAN AND THE HINDU CHIEFS

The land revenue system of India cannot be properly understood unless the theological literature of the Musalmans on the subject is completely ignored. Arabia is a desert studded with some God-given oases; some four or five districts of Iran south of the Caspian sea have a rainfall of about 80 inches a year, and there is a very weak monsoon in the Iranian provinces of Shiraz and Fars. But apart from this, the extensive region from Iraq to the Chinese frontier has an average cyclonic (not monsoonic) rainfall of about four inches a year and depends entirely upon canals and artificial irrigation by *qanats* and *kareezes*; the two latter terms indicate underground channels built by the efforts of generations. In this extensive region it is not land-rights but water-rights that matter most for the purpose of cultivation, and obviously principles that have worked there cannot be applied to a country like ours, which depends primarily on the monsoon for its cultivation. This idea was first put forward by Mr. Moreland, who finding Imam Yusuf's famous work, the *Kitabul Khiraj*, useless for his purpose, did not proceed any further. We have to start with the Hindu system as our basis.⁶

'I have chosen the term intermediary', says Mr. Moreland, 'to denote all the various classes authorized or permitted by the king to collect his share and to retain a portion or the whole. Intermediaries may be classed as chiefs, representatives, assignees, grantees and farmers.'⁷ Now the independent ruler of medieval India is the *rai*. But since the title of *rai* was also assumed by subordinate chiefs, the really independent rais took high-sounding Sanskrit titles, which our Persian authorities have not cared to translate. The chiefs of the Hindu period have been classified by Dr. Irfan Habib as 'Samantas,

⁵ Ferishta, Vol. I, 109.

⁶ Moreland: *Agrarian System of Moslem India*, Chapter I(3).

⁷ *Ibid.*

Ranakas (Ranas), Rautas (Rawats), Thakuras (Thakurs) and Rajputras'.⁸ The terms Samantas and Rajputras (or Rajputs) are not found in the historical literature of the Delhi sultanat. Moreland's 'representatives' are to be identified with Barani's *khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis*. They were the chief figures in what Moreland calls 'group-assessment'. A village or a group of villages was assessed at a fixed amount, probably based on tradition, by the Delhi ministry of revenue and the 'representative' undertook to collect this amount from the cultivators or the peasants. Moreland restricts the term peasant to the cultivator in order to distinguish him from the 'farmer' or pure speculator, who contracted with the state for the collection of revenue for an extensive area. Finally, whatever the written terms of an assignment or grant, they were legally always revocable by the Sultan at his pleasure.

It is unfortunate that after making such clear distinctions, Moreland fails to apply them with reference to Alauddin's land reforms. In the territory of a *chief*, the Sultan was not legally entitled to interfere between the chief and the cultivators so long as the agreed tribute was paid. But the Sultan had the legal right to see that the *representatives* did their business properly. Alauddin's reforms were confined entirely to the *representatives*—i.e. to *khuts*, *chaudharis* and *muqaddams*. But it is better first to examine two remarks by contemporaries, which were not within Moreland's reach.

In a work written for presentation to Alauddin Khalji in 1311, Amir Khusrau writes with reference to the year 1305: 'When the spearmen of the victorious army had put antimony with their spear-points in the eyes of the more myopic rais, some of the great zamindars (*zamindaran-i huzurg*), who were more far-sighted, laid aside their insolence (independence) from fear of the eye-piercing arrows of the Turks, and with open eyes came to the sublime court. His

8 Dr. Irfan Habib: 'The Social Distribution of Landed Property in Pre-British India'. (Paper read before the International Economic History Conference, Munich, August, 1965). The term, *Rajputra*, probably meant the sons, or at least near relations, of a rai. With reference to the evolution of the term, *Rajput*, which is never used by the historians of the Delhi sultanat, Dr. Irfan Habib makes the following suggestion: 'A very interesting development, to which little attention has been paid so far, appears to be the social consolidation of this superior rural class, through the absorption of its various elements, as clans or sub-castes, into the great Rajput caste over the larger part of Northern India. Both the term *Rajput* (*Rajaputra*) as name for the caste, and the sense of the unity of its components, appear suddenly in the Persian authorities of the sixteenth century, and must, therefore, have quietly evolved in the preceding period. This caste-cohesion of the rural aristocracy possibly developed from a real class-cohesion, as the higher elements were pressed into the lower ranks of the rural aristocracy' (p. 34).

imperial Majesty regarded each of them with the eye of kindness and cast more rays of favours on their heads than they had expected. As a result no insolent Hindu (rais) remained in the realm of Hind; they had either closed their eyes on the (red) coloured bed of the battle-field or opened their eyes after prostrating their heads before the royal threshold.⁹ Alauddin, we have to conclude, was prepared for a compromise with the Hindu rais, who came to his court; and they were obviously numerous with reference to the court held on 4 Jamadi II A.H. 711 (19 October 1312), for Khusrau remarks: 'Owing to the prostration of the great maliks (before the throne), the earth seemed to rise in hillocks, while owing to the prostration of the rais the ground was coloured saffron owing to the *tikas* on their fore-heads.'¹⁰

Learning at the feet of experience—and of experience alone—and discarding as stupid all *a priori* theories of the ecclesiastics, Alauddin realized the limitations of his power. He was a Muslim ruler of a non-Muslim land and he knew that he could only govern on principles acceptable to the Hindu masses. From his point of view the real difference between the Hindus and the Musalmans lay in the fact that while the Hindu masses as well as classes believed in the principles of heredity and caste, the educated Musalmans, who were casteless, wanted a political regime in which career was open to talent. So that, while in consonance with the tradition of ages, he could dismiss all Muslim officers in government service, and he exercised this power without recognizing any limits, he had to leave the hereditary rais and their people to their traditional ways of life, subject, of course, to such tribute to the central power as the rais had promised to give. If an independent rai was overthrown, a similar arrangement had to be made with the rawats or chiefs, who had been subordinate to him. The life of the average Hindu in the territories of the rais was not disturbed. Life was greatly changed in the great cities of the Delhi empire, but within the rai-governed India, custom—and the principle of heredity—survived in full force.

We know from many sources that this policy of the administration

⁹ *Khazainul Futuh*, 55. From the context of the work, 'Hind' here means northern India or Hindustan.

¹⁰ *Khazainul Futuh*, 168. When a Muslim prostrated himself before the throne, the heralds (*naqibs*) cried, *Bismillah* (In the name of God!) but when a Hindu did so, they cried, *Hadakallah* (May God lead thee aright!). Mystic disciples used to prostrate themselves before their *pirs* or *shaikhs*; this practice was justified by Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya and his arguments in favour of it are summarized in a paragraph of the *Fuwa'idul Fuw'ad*, but his senior disciple, Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh, deprecated the practice.

to compromise was bitterly criticized by a small but virulent party of extreme Muslim ecclesiastics, who were so impractical as to imagine that they could liquidate Hinduism in India in the same way as the Prophet had liquidated polytheism in Arabia. There was a difference in view-points, but there was no difference about facts. The two following paragraphs from Barani's *Fatawa-i Jahandari* (written after 1357) are a fair specimen of this extreme ecclesiastical opinion of the impractical, extreme right.

'The Muslim king will not be able to establish the honour of theism (*tauhid*) and the supremacy of Islam unless he strives with all his courage to overthrow infidelity and to slaughter its leaders (*imams*), who in India are the Brahmans. He should make a firm resolve to overpower, capture, enslave and degrade the infidels. All the strength and power of the king and the holy warriors of Islam should be concentrated in holy campaigns and holy wars; *and they should risk themselves in the enterprise* so that the true faith may uproot the false creeds; and then it will look as if these false creeds had never existed, because they will have been deprived of all their glamour. On the other hand, if the Muslim king, in spite of the power and position which God has given him, is merely content to take the poll-tax (*jizya*) and tribute (*khiraj*) from the Hindus and preserves both infidels and infidelity and *refuses to risk his power in attempting to overthrow them*, what difference will there be in this respect between the kings of Islam and the rais of the infidels? For the rais of the infidels also exact poll-tax (*jizya*) and tribute (*khiraj*) from the Hindus, who belong to their own false creed, and fill their treasuries with money so obtained; in fact, they collect a hundred times more taxes.'

The sultanat of Delhi grew and flourished for a little less than two centuries for it gave to India something India needed. But India did not need a 'holy war' of the type Barani contemplated and all sultans of Delhi rejected the idea of a 'theological mission'. Barani knew this better than anyone else. He continues:

'But the desire for overthrowing infidels and knocking down idolators does not fill the hearts of the Muslim kings (of India). On the other hand, out of consideration for the fact that the infidels and polytheists are payers of tribute and protected persons (*zimmi*), these infidels are honoured, distinguished, favoured and made eminent; the kings bestow drums, banners, ornaments, cloaks of brocade and caparisoned horses upon them, and appoint

them to governorships, high posts and offices. And in their capital (Delhi), owing to the status of which the status of all other Muslim cities is raised, Muslim kings not only allow but are pleased with the fact that infidels, polytheists, idol-worshippers and cow-dung (*sargin*) worshippers build houses like palaces, wear clothes of brocade and ride Arab horses caparisoned with gold and silver ornaments. *They are equipped with a hundred thousand sources of strength.* They live in delights and comforts. They take Musalmans into their service and make them run before their horses; the poor Musalmans beg of them at their doors; and in the capital of Islam, owing to which the edifice of Islam is elevated, they are called *rais* (great rulers), *ranas* (minor rulers), *thakurs* (warriors), *saḥas* (bankers), *mehtas*¹¹ (administrators) and *pundits* (priests).¹²

ALAUDDIN'S LAND REVENUE REFORMS

It was necessary to quote Barani at some length, because the only account we have of Alauddin's land revenue reforms is from his pen. Barani makes it clear that the *rais* had full power of taxing, or over-taxing, their subjects. And the power of taxing implied the power of having forts and keeping armed soldiers. Many *rais* and *rawats* were under an obligation to come to the help of the local or the central administration; keeping soldiers in arms would, therefore, also be a duty. Since Hindu law is traditional law, caste-law or tribal law, the *rais* and *rawats* would have their own judiciary. We hear of no judicial appeals from them to Delhi.

Barani came from a family of government officers and could not have failed to distinguish the *rais*, *ranas* and *rawats* from the smaller fry of the headmen of one or more villages whom he calls *khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis*. *Muqaddam* is an Arabic word meaning the leading man or first man, and in our context it means the headman of a village or a village-group. *Chaudhari* is a widely used Hindi word but Barani uses it as equivalent to *muqaddam*. *Khut* is a non-Hindi word; its first and last letters are Persian or Arabic, but when it fell into the hands of persons ignorant of Persian, its form changed. The nearest Persian word to it is *khat* or deed by which the *khut* may have undertaken to collect the revenue of the villages put

11 The term, *mehta*, as used by Barani, does not seem to mean a clerk but an officer of a much higher status. Barani himself tells us that when Muhammad bin Tughluq deposed a *rai* in Gujarat, he appointed a *mehta* in his place. So the word 'administrator' is a suitable equivalent.

12 Habib and Afsar Begum; *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat; Fatawa-i Jahandari*, Advice XI, 46-48.

in his charge by the government. Moreland is correct in using the term, 'group-assessment', for the villages with which we are here concerned, but, unlike Barani, he does not make a clear distinction between the chiefs (rais, ranas and rawats), with whose peasantry the revenue ministry did not interfere, and the village headmen, whose work was subject to the control of the ministry. Persian histories of the thirteenth century tell us nothing about the land revenue system, but it is a fair supposition that since the government had no proper staff in the rural areas, it did not bother about the treatment of the agricultural under-dogs so long as the fixed revenue was paid. Alauddin was the first ruler to take a step in organizing a new revenue system in villages which had been subject to 'group-assessment'.

First as to the complaints about them which the Sultan made to Qazi Mughisuddin of Bayana. 'It has been repeatedly reported to me that the *khuts* and *muqaddams* ride fine horses, wear excellent clothes, go out hunting, shoot with Persian bows and make war on each other. (a) But they do not pay a single *jital* in *khiraj*, *jizya*, *ghari* and *charai* from their own lands. (b) In addition to this, they levy the perquisites of *khuti* (*huquq-i khuti*) from their villages. They hold parties, drink wine and show their pride in a hundred ways. Some of them do not come to the revenue office, whether summoned or not, and pay no regard to the revenue collectors (*muhasilan*) . . . Not even a hundred *karohs* of my territory are obedient to me in the proper way.'¹³

What remedy? 'Alauddin', Barani tells us, 'next asked his wise men for measures by which the "Hindu" may be suppressed. . . and every one from the *khut* to the *balahar* may pay *khiraj* on one principle and the *khiraj*-burden of the strong may not be thrown on to the weak.' By the term, 'Hindu', Barani always means the upper class Hindu,¹⁴ and in this context, the headman. The term, *balahar*, has been interpreted to mean the 'sweeper' but Barani uses the term to indicate the cultivator of the lowest caste.

'For the realization of this object, which is the basic object of all administration, two laws (*zabitas*) were laid down. First, every one who cultivates, whether his plot be large or small, must do so

¹³ Barani, 291.

¹⁴ Moreland, *Agrarian System*, 32n: 'Barani speaks of the "Hindus", but here and in various other passages where the phrase occurs, the context makes it plain that he means the upper classes, not the peasants. Taking his book as a whole, I would infer that he thought of the kingdom as consisting not of two elements but of three—Muslims, Hindus and the "herds" or peasants.' Had Mr. Moreland studied Barani's *Fatawa-i Jahandari*, he would have been convinced that our author also included all low-born Muslims' among the herds.

according to *measurement and produce per biswa* and they were without any variation to pay half. In this payment there was to be no difference between the *khuts* and the *balahars*. No perquisites of *khuti* were to be left in the hands of the *khuts*.¹⁵ Secondly, with reference to buffaloes and goats—in fact all milk-giving cattle—the pasture was fixed and *assigned*, and the demand of tax (for the pasture-land) was made at the house of the peasant. Thus there was to be no corruption—“no camel-cat business” (*shutur-gurba*)—in the collection of revenue (*khiraj*); the burden of the strong was not to be thrown on to the weak; the weak and the strong were to pay according to the same principle (*hukm*).¹⁶

Ferishta, without indicating his authority, states that the following maximum of cattle was fixed for the *muqaddam* as well as for the ordinary peasant—four bullocks for cultivation purposes, two cows, two buffaloes and twelve goats and sheep (*gosfand*). If this is correct, there must have been no lack of pasture-land.

These two laws for the first time brought the state into direct relation with the cultivator. Barani implies, but forgets to state explicitly, that this needed the employment of an enormous staff, which he classifies as *muhasils* (demanders of tribute), *amils* (revenue collectors), *gumashtas* (agents), *mutasarrifs* (accountants or auditors), *uhdadaran-i dafatir* (persons in charge of offices) and *nawisandas* (writers or clerks).¹⁷ The basic record was the *bihi* (register) of the *patwari* or village-accountant. He could not have kept his records in Persian; so we have to conclude that a large proportion of revenue officers, who worked at the centre and at the district levels, had to have a knowledge of Persian as well as the local language, which for the larger area would have been Hindi. It is also probable that a large proportion of the newly employed persons were Hindus.

Alauddin seems to have had no difficulty in suppressing the *chaudharis*, *khuts* and *muqaddams*, who were soon deprived of their real or supposed wealth. ‘Their obedience reached such a pitch that a footman from the town revenue office would tie the necks of twenty *khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis* together and kick and

¹⁵ Ferishta interprets this as follows: ‘The perquisites of the *muqaddams* were collected and put into the treasury (109).’ But this would raise the demand of the state to more than half the produce and still leave a difference between the demand made on the *khut* (*muqaddam*) and the ordinary cultivator. It would be more in consonance with Barani’s own statement to conclude that these perquisites were totally abolished.

¹⁶ Barani, 287.

¹⁷ It is not possible to find exact English equivalents for these officers, clerks, etc., but Barani’s list gives a rough idea of the work that had to be done.

thrash them for the realization of tribute. It was impossible for the Hindu (village headman) to raise his head. No gold, silver, *tankas*, *jitals* or superfluous commodities, which are the causes of rebellion, were to be found in the houses of the Hindus, and owing to their lack of means, the wives of the *khuts* and *muqaddams* went and worked for wages in the houses of the Musalmans.'

The real problem was to organize the new revenue system. 'Sharaf Qaini (or Qai), the revenue minister of the empire, who was unrivalled and excelled all his contemporaries in the art of writing and calligraphy as well as technical knowledge, sagacity, efficiency, eloquence, and the capacity of making investigations, applied himself to this work for several years and put in the greatest efforts. (As a result) the villages in the neighbourhood of Delhi and (its) towns (*qasbas*) the territory of the Doab and from Bayana to Jhain and from Palam to Dipalpur and Lahore and the whole territory of Samana and Sunam and from Rewari to Nagaur and from Kara to Kanaudi and from Amroha and Afghanpur to Kabar and from Dibhai to Badaun and Kharak and Kopla and the whole of Katehr (Rohilkhand) was, for the purpose of the *khiraj-demand* in accordance with the principle of measurement and produce per *biswa* and *ghari* (house-tax) and *charai* (pasture-tax), treated (as if) it was a single village.¹⁸ He made his work so effective that disobedience, rebellion, (and the habit of) riding horses, keeping arms, wearing good clothes and eating betels totally disappeared from among the *chaudharis*, *khuts* and *muqaddams*. There was a uniform law for all in the exaction of the *khiraj*.'¹⁹

In view of Barani's confused geography, one is inclined to accept Moreland's interpretation: 'Taking the list as it stands, we learn that the regulations were applied by degrees to Delhi, the River Country and the rest of the Doab. To the east, Rohilkhand was included but not Awadh or Bihar, to the south, portions of Malwa and Rajputana

18 Both the grammar and the geography of this sentence of Barani leave much to be desired. It has been translated literally and intentionally left unpunctuated, as in the original.

Karhi and *Charai*—*Charai* obviously means the tax on pasture-land collected from the houses of the cultivators. The word *Karhi* is meaningless. Professor Hodivala suggests that it should be read as *ghari* (from Hindi *ghar*—house). If so, we have to assume either that there was a separate house-tax in addition to the agricultural tax and pasture-tax or that, since the pasture-tax was always collected at the peasant's house (unlike the agricultural tax, which could be more conveniently collected at the field, specially when it was in kind), Barani uses the words, *chari* and *ghari*, as names for the same tax—the tax for the pasture-land collected at the peasant's house. The latter seems to be the more rational interpretation (Hodivala, 273).

19 Barani, 288.

were included, but not Gujarat; while on the west all the Punjab provinces are indicated with the exception of Multan.²⁰ Unfortunately, after coining two very useful modern terms, first *chiefs*, which neatly agrees with the *rais*, *ranas* and *rawats*²¹ of contemporary writers, and secondly *representatives* or cultivators representing their fellow-cultivators for the purpose of land-assessment, who are the *chaudharis*, *khuts* and *muqaddams* of Barani, Mr. Moreland writes as if Alauddin liquidated all the chiefs in the territory mentioned.²²

In the course of some four pages Barani refers to these headmen (*khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis*) and their rights at least eight times. He was only too well-acquainted with the terms, *rais*, *ranas* and *rawats*, but does not use them in this connection; he certainly would have been glad to do so, if they had been involved. But it was not Alauddin's policy to interfere with the peasantry of the chiefs or to undertake responsibilities for which he had not the proper trained personnel. We have, therefore, to conclude that within the area confusedly indicated by Barani, and more precisely by Moreland, *the regulations were only enforced in villages for which the land revenue had been paid by the headmen and that these villages, interspersed perhaps with villages of the chiefs, were the true 'khalisa' of Alauddin*

20 *Agrarian System*, 34.

21 Khusrau in his *Khazainul Futuh* uses the term *rawats* for chiefs subordinate to their *rais*, but for military purposes he occasionally calls them *muqaddams*. He has only once used the term, great zamindars (*zamindaran-i buzurg*).

22 Mr. Moreland's identification of the headman with the chief led him to the following conclusion, which it is difficult to accept. 'A demand of half the produce cannot have left the ordinary peasant with any substantial surplus, and would thus strike at the private revenue which the chiefs were suspected of levying, while the assessment of the chiefs' holdings at full rates would reduce them practically to the economic position of peasants, and the grazing tax would operate to diminish their income from uncultivated land. The economic result would be to draw the bulk, if not the whole, of the producer's surplus into the treasury; to stereotype the standard of living of the ordinary peasant, and to reduce the standard of living of the chiefs, who would not be in a position to maintain troops, or accumulate supplies of horses and other military requirements.' (*Agrarian System*, 33)

There are difficulties here. (1) Barani's statement that Alauddin required half the produce in all cases should not be taken too literally; Alauddin himself suggested its modification in extreme cases. (2) The liquidation of the headmen was only temporary; Ghiyasuddin Tughluq 'recognized' them again and Barani declares that they were prosperous when he wrote his book in the reign of Firuz Shah. (3) The chiefs (*rais*, *ranas*, *rawats*) had fought under Alauddin's banner at Kili and there was no question of their liquidation. (4) Alauddin had not the means, even if he had the wish, to draw the whole of the producer's surplus into the treasury at a stroke of the pen. It needed a staff which he could not control, and which, in any case, was not available. Had he made the attempt, the bulk of the producer's surplus would have gone into the black market.

Khalji. In these villages the government dealt with the peasants direct; Alauddin did not believe in assigning *khalisa* villages to his officers. The territories of the chiefs were left untouched. Of course, while the Delhi sultanat was strong, these chiefs paid their dues regularly and, consequently, references to them are only occasional. But after the death of Firuz Shah, they came into prominence with pre-Alauddin genealogies and as leaders of castes, tribes or groups that had survived from the pre-Muslim period. Dr. Irfan Habib's suggestion that Alauddin consciously utilized the conflict between the two rural 'classes' by standing forth as the protector of the 'weak' against the 'strong' in these villages is perfectly reasonable, provided by the 'strong' we only understand the 'lower' rural aristocracy or the headmen. As to Barani's statement that one-half of the produce was to be taken 'without any variation', we have to remember that Barani also attributes to Alauddin an order that 'the cultivators were to be left with so much of agricultural produce and milk and curd as may suffice them from year to year but they were not to accumulate wealth'. In the practical philosophy of Alauddin Khalji, protection against famines and similar misfortunes was a function of the state; the peasant's resources could never suffice for such contingencies.

It is impossible to say why in some villages the tribute had been levied, obviously separately for every village, through the headmen and was in other cases demanded for the whole of his territory in a lump sum from the chief. Probably the distinction was an inheritance from the Hindu period, or, in cases where the chiefs had been liquidated owing to war, the Delhi ministry of revenue may have assigned the duty of collecting the tribute to a number of headmen.

Barani is firm in stating that direct collection of tribute from the peasants led to another evil—corruption among the officers and workers of the revenue ministry. Mere dismissals for corruption or bribery went unnoticed. 'The same Sharaf Qaini, *naib wazir*, took extreme measures to realize everything that was due from the officials (*kar-kuns*), accountants (*mutasarrifs*), persons in charge of offices (*uhdadaran-i dafatir*), agents (*gumashtas*) and demanders of tribute (*muhasils*). He discovered from the *bihi* (registers) of the *patwaris* (village accountants) every *jital* that was due from every one of them, and in accordance (with this record) exacted it by blows of the stick, racks, bonds and chains. It was impossible for any one to obtain even a *tanka* dishonestly or take anything in bribe from the Hindus or the Musalmans. He reduced dishonest *amils*, accountants and other (corrupt) revenue officers to such destitution and poverty that, owing to their inability to meet demands of one thousand or five hundred *tankas*, they remained in bonds and chains for years. People

considered the work of an *amil*, accountant and revenue officer as worse than fever; revenue clerkship was considered a great disgrace and people would not give their daughters in marriage to a revenue clerk; accountancy was accepted only by persons who were sick of their lives; and most of the days of the accountants and *amils* were passed in prison under kicks and blows.²³ Alauddin estimated that about ten thousand revenue officers had been reduced to destitution in Delhi alone. The number of prisoners set free by Mubarak Shah at his accession in Delhi and the provinces is estimated by Barani as amounting to seventeen or eighteen thousand, but according to Isami this number included both corrupt revenue officials and political offenders.²⁴

CONVERSATION WITH QAZI MUGHIS

The discovery of Barani's *Fatawa-i Jahandari* enables us to dismiss as unhistorical the speeches attributed to various persons by Barani in his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, unless he was personally present or quotes reliable authorities. One of the persons speaking only expresses the opinions we find in Barani's *Fatawa-i Jahandari*, even to the extent of repeating Barani's errors. The speech of the other person is framed by Barani in consonance with what Barani conceived to be his character, much as a modern dramatist would do. Now Barani gives us a detailed account of a conversation between the Sultan and Qazi Mughisuddin of Bayana, which, so he alleges, took place after the revenue regulations had been enforced. It is impossible to say that no such conversation took place; but some fifty years had passed and Barani has obviously composed the speeches of both parties. To make the conversation effective, he had to make the Sultan more ignorant of Islam than a person who had reached the throne of Delhi by his own efforts could possibly have been; on the other hand, it was not possible for Barani to endow Qazi Mughis with a knowledge of Muslim theology and scriptures he himself did not possess.

'Sultan Alauddin was a king devoid of education, and he never associated with religious scholars (*ulama*). When he attained to kingship, he was quite convinced that government and administration were affairs quite independent of the rules and orders of the *shari'at*; and that while the former appertained to kings, the latter had been assigned to *qazis* and *muftis* (jurisconsults). In accordance with this conviction of his, he did whatever he considered to be good for the

²³ Barani, 288-89.

²⁴ Isami, 347. It is very difficult to guess the total number of the revenue staff from the number of those who were punished.

administration of the state, whether permitted by the *shari'at* or not. He never inquired about any religious principle (*mas'ala*) concerning the administration and very few scholars frequented his company. However, Qazi Ziauddin of Bayana, Maulana Zaheer Lang and Maulana Mushhid Kuhrami were invited to the royal meals and dined with the amirs in the outer hall. Qazi Mughisuddin of Bayana had access to the Sultan and sat in the confidential Majlis (*Majlis-i Khilwat*) with the amirs.'

The conversation of the Sultan with Qazi Mughis covered four points.

(1) *First*, what is the status of the Hindus as payers of tribute? Honesty would have required the Qazi to say that the Hindus are not referred to by name either in the Quran or the authentic collection of the Prophet's *Hadises* (precepts), and that the *ulama* have based their arguments merely on analogy (*qiyas*) from the Prophet's peaceful arrangements with the Zoroastrians of Bahrain; and that there was considerable difference of opinion on the matter. Instead of this the Qazi uttered two provable lies—lies very dear to Barani's heart, but lies nonetheless. First, that 'the Hindus were the greatest enemies of the Prophet Muhammad and that the Prophet has ordered the Hindus to be killed, plundered and enslaved.' The Prophet never came across a Hindu in his life and no such order is found in the six authentic Sunni collections of the Prophet's *Hadises*. Secondly, that while Imam Abu Hanifa, 'to whose school we belong' has permitted peace with Hindus on the payment of the *jizya*, other religious scholars have left no alternative for them except 'Islam or the sword'. This again shows a terrible ignorance on Barani's part, which he repeats with greater emphasis in the *Fatawa-i Jahandari*.²⁵

(2) *Secondly*, Alauddin inquired, has the *shari'at* said anything about the punishment of corrupt state-employees, who steal public money, accept bribes, make incorrect totals, etc? There could be only one answer to the question, for it was notorious that the *shari'at* was absolutely silent about public law. 'I have not read about this in any book', the Qazi replied. The Sultan could punish corrupt officials in such way as he thinks best, 'but it is not permitted to cut off a

²⁵ See Habib and Afsar Begum: *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, Advice XI, 49-51. The editors prove by quotations from Imam Shafi'i's works that he never had the ideas Barani attributes to him; on the other hand, he looked at the Treaty of Hudaibia between the Prophet and the Quraish, which ensured the freedom of religious choice to the Arabs, as the greatest of the early victories of Islam. When misrepresenting Islam, Barani is quite often below contempt.

man's hands for stealing from the public treasury.'²⁶ The Sultan remarked that he had ordered decent salaries to be paid to the employees of the ministry of revenue, but they misbehaved nonetheless.

(3) *Thirdly*, to whom did the treasure of Devagiri belong? Alauddin claimed that it belonged to him personally. He had obtained it before he ascended the throne and he had kept it separate from the public treasury. A true interpreter of the *shari'at* would have declared that this plunder or loot was unlawful misappropriation,²⁷ but Barani, who believed that plundering non-Muslims was justified in all circumstances, made the Qazi declare that it belonged to the 'Public Treasury of the Musalmans'. The Sultan dismissed the suggestion.

(4) *Fourthly*, the Sultan wanted to know what claims he and his family had on the public treasury. Here again the Quran and the *Hadises* are silent. The Qazi said that there were three alternatives—according to the Traditions of the Pious Caliphs the Sultan was only entitled to the salary of 234 *tankas* a year, which he gave to his horsemen; if he desired to follow a moderate path, he would take the same salary as he gave to his highest officers; if he wanted to act according to precepts of worldly religious scholars, he could take something more than he gave to these officers. But he hastened to add that, if his opinion was wanted from the view-point of *political prudence*, he would advise that the royal expenditure be increased a thousand times, for the dignity of the king conduces to the stability of the state.

At this stage Barani, who was writing long after Alauddin's family had vanished and *used to wonder what would happen to Alauddin on the Day of Judgement*, composed two paragraphs to show how Alauddin tried to justify himself before Qazi Mughis and might try to justify his ways before God himself.

'You say my acts are against the *shari'at*. Now this is how I act. From the horseman who fails to come to the review (*arz*), I have ordered three years salary to be demanded back. I cast into dry wells all who drink or sell liquor. If a man rapes (*sifah mi-kunad*) another man's wife, I order the man to be castrated (and the woman I order to be killed).²⁸ In cases of rebellions, I slay both

²⁶ Misappropriation between partners does not amount to theft (*sirqah*) for which the Quran prescribes the severance of the hands. So in his *Fatawa-i Jahandari*, Barani remarks: 'For misappropriation and other offences against the Public Treasury (*Baitul Mal*), in which all Musalmans are partners, there is neither death-penalty nor amputation of hands.' (*Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 62).

²⁷ This was the opinion of the Qazi of Ghazni concerning the plunder of Sultan Mahmud. (See Habib, *Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni*, Preface to the Second Edition.)

²⁸ The addition of this clause is probably the error of some copyist.

the good and the bad, the mature and the immature; and I reduce their women and children to poverty and destitution. I demand back public money from corrupt revenue officers by kicks and blows, and till the last *jital* has been realized, I keep them in bonds and chains. Political offenders I imprison for life. Will you say all this against the *shari'at*?

When the Qazi, who claimed to have prepared for death, came to see him next day, the Sultan gave him the robe he was wearing, presented him a thousand *tankas* and continued the conversation. 'Maulana Mughis! Though I have no knowledge and have read no book, still I was born a Musalman and my ancestors have been Muslims for so many generations. To prevent rebellions in which thousands of lives are lost, I give such orders to the people as I consider to be beneficial for them and the state. But the people of these days are bold, heedless and do not obey me properly; so it has become necessary for me to mete out harsh punishments to them to ensure obedience. I issue commands which I consider to be beneficial to the state and appear prudent under the circumstances. I do not know whether they are permitted by the *shari'at* or not. I do not know how God will treat me on the Day of Judgement. But, Maulana Mughis, I say one thing in my prayer to God: "O Lord, thou knowest that if one man violates the wife of another, he does me no harm in my kingdom; if he steals, he takes nothing from my inheritance; if he drinks wine, he does me no personal harm; if he takes his salary and does not come to the review, the work of the review is not held up by the absence of ten or twenty horsemen. Considering these four groups I carry out the orders of the Prophet."²⁹ But in these days men have appeared who from one to a lakh, and from a lakh to five and ten lakhs, have no other work in life except talking sedition and twirling their moustaches, heedless of this life and the next. And I, an ignorant man who can neither read nor write—I am unable to read anything except *Alhamd*, *Qul huwallah*, *Dua-i Qunut* and *At Tahiyat*³⁰—I have ordered that if in my kingdom a married man rapes another man's wife, he is to be castrated, but in spite of this harsh and fearful order, so many persons are brought to my court who have raped the wives of others.³¹ In spite of the fact that three years'

29 It is impossible to coordinate the actions of Alauddin with the authentic injunctions of the Prophet, for the simple reason that the circumstances of Alauddin's time were entirely different.

30 These are necessary parts of the Muslim prayer and are recited in Arabic. So Alauddin must have known the alphabet and the vowel-points.

31 The *shari'at-books*, on the implicit understanding that their recommendations were not to be enforced, prescribed stoning to death as the punishment for adultery.

salary is demanded back from them, there is no review at which one hundred or two hundred horsemen are not absent; they take the money, do not come to the review and then pass their lives in prison. Owing to the corruption (*duzdi*) of revenue clerks (*nawisanda*) and *amils*, I have reduced ten thousand of them to destitution and put worms in their bodies. Still they do not give up their ways, you might say that revenue clerkship and corruption were twins! For the sale and consumption of liquor, I have killed so many persons by casting them into dry wells, and continue to do so. What liquor will they drink or sell in these wells? *But no one has succeeded in putting right the people of God. How will I?*

INVASION OF WARANGAL; CONQUEST OF CHITOR

For the winter of 1302-3 Alauddin was in a position to organize two campaigns. The plunder obtained from Devagiri naturally suggested a campaign against Warangal, the capital of Telingana, which was then governed by the Kakitya Rai, Pratap Rudra Deva, whom the Persian historians call 'Laddar Deo'. Ulugh Khan had begun to prepare for it, but his death put an end to his plans. Alauddin, while deciding to march personally against Chitor, directed all the amirs and horse and foot of Hindustan to proceed against Warangal. The supreme command was given to Malik Jauna (senior), the *dadbek-i hazrat*, and Malik Chajju, governor of Kara, who was a nephew of the deceased Nusrat Khan. We do not know when this army started and it has been suggested that, since Malwa had not yet been conquered, it may have marched through Bengal.³² But all we can say for certain is that it took a long time over the journey and failed disastrously in the enterprise. 'When they reached Warangal, the monsoon had started and rainfall stood in their way. Consequently, the army of Hindustan could accomplish nothing in Warangal and the Sultan summoned it back. Towards the beginning of the winter, 1303, it succeeded in reaching Hindustan, thinned in numbers and with its baggage lost.'³³

For the campaign against Chitor we have to rely mainly upon Amir Khusrau, who was personally present.³⁴ The careers of the great

But this was never done. It is probable that Alauddin confined his punishment to cases of rape, for he does not refer to any punishment of the woman here; if so, the words—'and the woman I order to be killed'—in a previous paragraph must be put aside as the addition of some copyist. The death-penalty was prescribed for raping, but there was no punishment for the innocent and injured woman.

³² Ferishta, 14, says that the army was sent to Warangal through Bengal.

³³ Barani, 300.

³⁴ *Khazainul Futuh*, 60-63; *Dawal Rani*, 66-67.

ranas—Kumbh, Sanga and Pratap—have given to the dynasty of Chitor a grandeur and a dignity which no other Rajput medieval family can rival. Still, next to Ranthambhor, it was the most powerful of the Rajput states at the time of Alauddin's accession and its continued independence was a standing challenge to the Delhi empire. The fort, which has often been described, was formidable. The fortified hill of Chitor is an isolated mass of rock rising steeply from the plain, three miles and a quarter long and some twelve hundred yards wide in the centre. The circumference at the base is more than eight miles and the height nowhere exceeds four or five hundred feet.³⁵ But a man who climbs these 400 or 500 feet, not a difficult task in peace-time, will find himself face to face with a vertical escarp and stone-wall some forty feet high. The fort is said to have had some eighty-four reservoirs, the greatest of them being a lake in front of the Rai's palace-fort. 'The fort', says Khusrau, 'was the paradise of the Hindus, with springs and lawns on every side. It had a Rai with an organized army, heavily armoured but light-footed; compared with the thrones of other Hindus, his throne was higher than the seventh heaven (*haft kursi*).'³⁶ To the east of the hill and at some distance from it, there is a confluence of two streams, the Gambheri and the Berach, which form a small *doab*. To the north of the fort there is a hillock, which Khusrau calls Chatrvari, but which is generally referred to as Chitori.

The imperial army beat its drums for the march with the black canopy of the Sultan on Monday, 28 January 1303 (8 Jamadi II A.H. 702). We are not told when it arrived at Chitor, but the royal camp was pitched in the *doab* between the Gambheri and the Berach and the army invested the fort on all sides. Alauddin preferred to direct operations from his residential pavilion on the Chitori hillock. 'During the two months of the rainy season', Khusrau tells us, 'the deluge of the besieger's swords reached up to the "waist" of the hill but could not proceed any further. Strange the fort that could not be hit on the head even by hailstones.' The Sultan ordered the fort to be pelted with *munjaniq*-stones, while the soldiers in their armours attacked it from all sides. Khusrau makes no reference to the construction of a *pasheb*, but implies that a frontal attack had twice failed. Epidemic or famine may have paralysed the garrison. The words that follow seem to imply that the Rai surrendered on his own initiative. On Monday, 25 August 1303 (8 Jamadi II A.H. 702) the Sultan entered the fort and Khusrau claims to have entered the fort

³⁵ V. A. Smith, *Akbar*, 82-83.

³⁶ Khusrau, *Dawal Rani*, 66-67.

with him. Rai Ratan Sen, who had been on his throne only for a year or two and had received no substantial help from his fellow-rai, 'came out of his stone-gate, like a spark out of stone, crossed the river and ran towards the royal tent and thus obtained security from the flashing sword. . . . Though he was a rebel, still the morning wind of royal virtues would not allow any hot wind to blow over him.' Khusrau could not have been incorrect about a matter like this; we have to conclude, therefore, that the *jauhar*-rite of Chitor is a fabrication of later days. Khusrau has referred to the *jauhar* at Ranthambhor and he would have certainly referred to one at Chitor, had there been any.

The protection of the Rai was extended to his family but apparently not to his *muqaddams*. Khusrau says that the Sultan in his wrath ordered three thousand *muqaddams*³⁷ to be put to death 'so that the humble *ra'iyat*, which had been unable to raise its head, may prosper'. Chitor was renamed Khizrabad and assigned to the heir-apparent, Khizr Khan, aged seven or eight years, along with a red canopy, a *khilat* of gold brocade, two yellow and black banners and a two-coloured baton (*durbash*). The administration, according to Isami, was put in charge of Malik Shahin, the *naib-i barbek*, a slave of Alauddin whom he used to call his son.³⁸ This done the Sultan hurried back to Delhi, for he must by now have heard of the Mongol advance on his capital.

TARGHI INVESTS DELHI

Alauddin had denuded both Delhi and Hindustan of their troops for two distant campaigns and he may have taken soldiers from the frontier forts also. The Mongols in Trans-Oxiana heard of this and Targhi was sent post-haste to capture Delhi with thirty or forty thousand horsemen.³⁹ The enterprise could only have succeeded if Targhi

³⁷ The printed text says 'thirty thousand *muqaddams*', but this is obviously an error. In Persian three and thirty (*st'h* and *st*) can be written in much the same way. The *muqaddams* were not mere soldiers but *rawats* with cultivators subordinate to them. The primary cause of their destruction was that 'the *ra'iyat* may prosper'. It is inconceivable that there could have been thirty thousand such *muqaddams* in the Chitor fort. The reason given by Khusrau would not justify the killing of ordinary soldiers. Confirmation of this is also found in Tod's statement. 'Mention has already been made of the adjuration, "by the sin of the sack of Chitor"; of these sacks they enumerate *three* and a half. This is the half, for though the city was not stormed, the best and bravest were cut off' (*Rajasthan*, Vol. I, 309).

³⁸ Isami, 272. Khizr Khan was of about the same age as Mubarak Shah, who ascended the throne at the age of nineteen in 1316.

³⁹ Barani, 300. Some manuscripts say that Targhi had only 'twenty or thirty thousand horsemen'.

reached Delhi *before* the Sultan's return. But this he failed to do. Still the situation was critical, perhaps amusing. There were not at Multan, Dipalpur and Samana forces strong enough to stop the Mongol advance or even to retreat to help the Sultan at Delhi. Alauddin had been at Delhi for a month when the Mongols invested it; the weapons of his army had been ruined during the siege of Chitor in the rainy season and he had no time to hold a review of the army and to reequip it with horses and weapons. Malik Jauna (senior) had returned with his frustrated army to the Doab, but since the Mongols had captured all the fords of the Jumna, the army of Hindustan had to stay in Koil (Aligarh) and Badaun and could not come to Delhi in spite of the royal summons.

Under these circumstances the Sultan came out of the city with the few horsemen he had and pitched his camp at Siri. He ordered a ditch to be dug round his camp and outside the ditch he constructed a wooden rampart with doors from the houses of the city. He gave up the idea of a battle but was very careful about the protection of his camp and his armed foot-soldiers kept watch day and night. Five fully armed elephants were stationed before every contingent. There were two or three conflicts between the advance-guards of the armies but neither side won a decisive victory and the Mongols were unable to break into the royal camp, which was their main objective. Barani, who was in Delhi at the time, says that such fear of the Mongols had not been witnessed in the city on any previous occasion, and that if Targhi had stayed by the bank of the Jumna for another month 'the danger was that a tumult would have arisen in the city and it would have gone out of hand'. The movement of *carawans* had stopped and, consequently, there was a scarcity of water, wood and fodder. But as Alauddin was unable to protect the whole of the city, 'the Mongol horsemen came up to the *Chautra-i Subhani*, Mori, Hudhudi and the bank of the *Hauz-i Sultani* (Royal Tank) and they sold the Sultan's corn and other commodities (to the citizens) at a cheap rate; consequently, there was no great scarcity of corn⁴⁰. . . . Targhi could find no way of attacking and overthrowing the Sultan's army; and owing to the prayers of the helpless, the accursed Targhi returned with his

40 Barani, 130-32. It is impossible to identify Mori and Hudhudi. The raised platform, called *Chautra-i Subhani*, is sometimes referred to by our histories. Khusrau tells us that, since the *Hauz-i Shamsi* (Sultan Shamsuddin's Tank) had been filled up with mud, Alauddin had it dug up again so that water began to come out of the ground and rain-water also collected in the tank (*Khazainul Futuh*, 30-33). Though Khusrau is silent about it, Alauddin seems to have constructed another tank also for his expanding Delhi, probably after 1311. *Hauz-i Sultani* here seems to refer to the *Hauz-i Shamsi*.

spoils to his country after besieging Delhi for two months.⁴¹ Barani says that wise men were surprised at Delhi escaping unscathed, but Targhi had really lost the game when he found that the Sultan had already returned to Delhi and was in a position to direct operations over the whole country. Further stay in a hostile country would have meant the destruction of his whole army.

THE PADMINI LEGEND; CHITOR DURING ALAUDDIN'S REIGN

A historian, who studies the originals, is unable to find any place for the Padmini legend in the year 1303. Khusrau, Barani, Isami and all near-contemporary writers are silent about it. Alauddin captured Chitor and hurried back to Delhi; he forgave Ratan Sen and we have no reasons for thinking that he bothered about the Rai's wives or women. But in 1540—i.e. 237 years after the fall of Chitor—Malik Muhammad of Jais, a small town near Rae Bareilly in Awadh, wrote a Hindi poem, *Padmawat*, which has deservedly taken a very prominent place in classical Hindi literature. Though Malik Muhammad Jaisi may have written Hindi in the Persian script, Awadh tradition says that he tried to avoid Persian words so far as possible. We need not be surprised that in his great allegory (as he himself confesses) "Chitor" stands for the "body", the "Raja" for the "mind", "Ceylon" for the "heart", "Padmini" for "wisdom" . . . and "Alauddin" for "lust". Planning a romance, the author was under no obligation to respect the facts of history, the limitations of geography or even the principles of the prevailing Hindu castes and customs. According to him Alauddin could not conquer Chitor even after a siege of eight years. But he captured the Rai by a trick, took him to Delhi and refused to restore him unless the Rai's wife, Padmini, a Ceylonese princess whom the Rai had obtained after twelve years of wooing in that distant island, was surrendered to him. But the Rai was brought back safely to Chitor according to the well-known trick of Hindu warriors going in female litters to Delhi and only jumping out of them when they had reached the Rai's prison.

Dr. K. S. Lal correctly remarks that no authority available to us before the *Padmawat* has referred to this legend. Persian writers like Ferishta, who only knew of the *Padmawat* story by hearsay, have twisted it to conform it in some way to the known facts of history. Rajput bards, who could understand it but knew nothing of Delhi history, welcomed it and elaborated its contents, with no regard for

⁴¹ The story that Targhi retreated because he had been overcome by fear owing to the prayers of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya is a fabrication of later days.

historical facts. A great scholar of Rajasthan history, the late Dr. Gauri Shankar Ojha, has explained at length the factual improbabilities of the legend and his opinion is conclusive.

No contemporary historian tells us clearly how Chitor was governed during Alauddin's reign. Khizr Khan was, of course, only a nominal governor and did not live at Chitor, and Malik Shahin, according to Isami, fled away from fear of the Sultan to Rai Karan of Gujarat. Alauddin seems to have given up the idea of governing Chitor directly, though he kept a garrison there.⁴² 'The Sultan', Ferishta tells us, 'in accordance with the demands of prudence transferred Chitor from Khizr Khan to a son of the Rai's sister, Maldeo, who had been in his service and showed every sign of loyalty. This prince in a short time established his power in the region and all Rajputs were pleased with his government and supported it. He was loyal to the end of the Sultan's reign. He came to the court every year with the presents of his country and returned after receiving a horse and a special robe of honour. He took part in every campaign to which he was ordered with 5,000 horse and 10,000 foot and evinced great valour.'⁴³ The fact that an inscription of Alauddin, dated May 1310 (month of Zil Hijjah A.H. 709), is found in Chitor is not inconsistent with the fact that the principality accepted Alauddin as its overlord and had a garrison of his in the fort. But when Alauddin was on his death-bed, Ferishta tells us, 'the Rai of Chitor rebelled, tied up the hands and necks of the Sultan's officers and men, who were in the fort, and threw them down from the ramparts'.⁴⁴ Chitor thus regained its freedom. About 1321, after the death of Maldeo, Hamir, Rana of Sisoda, established his rule over Mewar and his descendants continued to rule the place till Indian independence.

42 Barani (323) gives us a list of Alauddin's governors and Malik Abu Mohammad is given as governor of Chitor.

43 Ferishta, 115. Tod, on the other hand, says, 'Maldeo remained with the royal garrison at Chitor, but Hamir desolated the plains and left to his enemies only the fortified towns which could be safely inhabited.' The inscription of Zil Hij, 709 (May 1310) quoted by Dr. K. S. Lal (*Khaljis*, 131n) does not militate against the fact that Alauddin governed Chitor through a Hindu prince. Dr. K. S. Lal erroneously attributes the throwing of the Muslims from the ramparts to the year 1311-12; Ferishta definitely states that this happened when Alauddin was on his death-bed in 1316, and there had also been a rebellion in Gujarat. According to Dr. K. S. Lal, Maldeo was the brother of Kanhar Deva Chauhan, the Songra chief of Jalor (*Khaljis*, 130). The transfer of Chitor to Maldeo must have taken place immediately after the flight of Malik Shahin. So far as we can see, Shahin's administration was shortlived.

44 Ferishta, 123.

IV. ALAUDDIN KHALJI: THE ECONOMIC REGULATIONS

THE OBJECT OF THE REGULATIONS

'The invasion of Targhi', Barani tells us, 'was a misfortune of considerable importance; it awoke Alauddin from his senseless dreams and he gave up the idea of leading campaigns and besieging forts. He built his palace in Siri and resided there; Siri, consequently, became his capital and its buildings and population increased. The old fort-wall of Delhi was repaired. Under his orders the old forts on the route of the Mongols were also repaired and new forts were built where necessary. He ordered well-known and efficient kotwals to be put in charge of these forts and plenty of *munjaniqs* and *iradas* to be constructed. Clever artisans were to be employed and weapons of all types were to be kept ready. Stores of grain and fodder were also to be collected. At Samana and Dipalpur a large force of efficient soldiers was to be enlisted and kept ready. The *iqtas* on the Mongol frontier were strengthened by the appointment of efficient and experienced amirs, *walis* and army officers.'¹

These arrangements proved quite sufficient for the Mongol hordes that were to come. But Alauddin applied himself for some years in settling the prices of commodities and Barani gives us a detailed account of what was done. A student of Barani need have no hesitation in accepting the following judgement of Mr. Moreland: 'Ziya Barani had no motive for inventing such a story, and, what is more significant, he did not possess the power of economic analysis which would have been needed for the invention. . . It is quite inconceivable that a writer like Ziya Barani could have invented these essential features (of Alauddin's economic regulations) out of his head; but it is quite conceivable that, in the economic condition of the time, a king like Alauddin aided, as he certainly was, by competent ministers, should by degrees have arrived at the essentials of the policy he was determined to enforce. He was, it must be remembered, strong where modern systems are weak, for he could rely on an elaborate system of spies and there was no sentimental objection in the way of effective punishment.'² Barani is not our only authority, but what other contemporary writers give us is only confirmatory evidence. Barani alone supplies the details.

1 Barani, 302-3.

2 *Agrarian System*, 36-37.

In his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* Barani writes as if the object of Alauddin's economic regulations was merely the maintenance of a strong and efficient army against the Mongols. This army had to be paid out of the normal revenues of the state. On this basis Alauddin suggested a yearly salary of 234 *tankas* for a trained and well-equipped man with one horse and 78 *tankas* extra for a man with two horses.³ If he paid more, his hoard of treasure would be exhausted in five or six years. The ministers said that the horsemen could live on these wages if the prices of commodities were reduced. Alauddin agreed on condition that this was done without his having to resort 'to killing, death-penalties and a Pharoah-like terrorism'. State-force was not to be used except against persons guilty of crimes; (the object was not to overthrow but to maintain and strengthen the normal conditions of business.) But Barani, after first declaring that the economic regulations were primarily a military measure, explains in some detail how Alauddin regulated the price of commodities that had no importance for the military; also the regulations were maintained long after the military need for them had vanished. In his 'Advice on Price-control' in the *Fatawa-i Jahandari*, which is meant for the average king, who cannot combat famines, Barani advocates price-control as a measure of public welfare necessary at all times. 'The policies and the enterprises of the state are interdependent. For example, just as the army cannot be stable without payment from the treasury, similarly it cannot be stabilized without the low price of commodities, and just as the cheapness of commodities is necessary for the proper organization of the army, in the same way without the cheap price of the means of livelihood there can be no prosperity, splendour and stability among the people.' A ruler is helpless during a famine, which is due to the complete failure of rain. 'But

3 The grammar of Barani's sentence here (as it has survived to us) leaves much to be desired. But 234 *tankas* + 78 *tankas* for the second horse is the generally accepted interpretation. Ferishta, however, writes as follows: 'After the prices of the means of livelihood and of the weapons of war had been reduced, the king fixed the yearly salary of soldiers according to the following grades: first, 234 *tankas*; second, 156 *tankas*; third, 78 *tankas*. When the officers acted according to this order, four lakhs and seventy-five thousand horsemen were put on the register (114).' There is an obvious error here; 78 *tankas* a year could not have maintained a horseman. It may have been the yearly salary of a foot-soldier, though Barani is silent on the point. 475,000 may have been the total number of Alauddin's troops, central and local, foot and horse. But here again no contemporary authority gives us the total of Alauddin's troops, or even of his horsemen. We only get occasional references to the number of troops employed on a particular campaign. The Mongols came on horseback, and foot-soldiers would have been useless against their mobile columns. But there was plenty of other military work, which foot-soldiers could do.

during the period of plentiful vegetation, when rainfall comes as a blessing, and crops, fruits, cultivated fields and gardens grow in luxurious abundance, the transport-merchants (*saudagar-i karawani*) and market-merchants (*saudagar-i bazari*), nevertheless, adopt the practice of selling at high prices; and owing to the great profits which result from high prices, all men of wealth take to business and regrating (*ihhtikar*).⁴ Regrating—i.e. purchasing at a low price and selling at a high price—was only possible for the rich; and since the Hindus had a monopoly of banking and big business, regrating (for Barani) meant that money went from the houses of the Musalmans to the houses of the Hindus.⁴

In the early years of Firuz Shah's reign, Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh, the senior *khalifa* (successor) of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, recalled a conversation about Alauddin, which has been summarized by Hamid Qalandar. Qazi Hamiduddin, the *Malikut Tujjar* (Prince of Merchants) came to Awadh and gave a banquet. When the other guests had departed, the Qazi narrated the following incident to the Shaikh. 'I once entered Sultan Alauddin's chamber and found him sitting bare-headed on a low-stool (*tangi*), with his feet on the ground, unconscious and absorbed in some deep thought. I went near, but since the Sultan took no notice of me, I came out and informed Malik Qara Beg, who was my companion in the Sultan's *Majlis*, of what I had seen. Qara Beg approached the Sultan and engaged him in a conversation. I then came near the Sultan and said, "King of the Musalmans, I have a request." "Speak out", he replied. "I came into the chamber and found the Sultan bare-headed and absorbed in some thought. What was the Sultan thinking about?" "Hear me", the Sultan replied, "For some time this idea has been coming to my mind. God Almighty has so many creatures, but he has placed me at their head. Now I, too, should do something the benefit of which may accrue to all the people. I said to myself, what can I do? If I give away all the treasures I possess—and a hundred such treasures more—they will not reach all the people. If I give away all my villages and territories (*wilayatha*), they too will not suffice. So I was thinking over the problem—what should I do so that my work may benefit all the people? Just now an idea has come to me and I will explain it to you. I said to myself that if I reduce the price of grain, the benefit of it will accrue to all the people. But how is the price of grain to be reduced? I will order all the (Hindu) Nayaks of the empire, who bring grain to Delhi, to be summoned. Some of them have ten thousand transport animals while others have

⁴ *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 34-38.

twenty thousand. I will summon them, give them robes and money from the treasury (for their business) and for the expenses of their families, so that they may bring grain and sell it at the rate I fix." So the Sultan ordered, and grain began to come from all sides. In a few days its price fell to seven *jitals* a *man*. Butter (*rughan, ghi*), sugar and other commodities also became cheap and all the people began to benefit from the Sultan's work.' After quoting Qazi Hamid, the Shaikh added, 'What a king was Alauddin, God's mercy on him!' A person, who was present, remarked, 'People make pilgrimages to his tomb, tie threads (round its railings) and their prayers are fulfilled.'⁵

The *Khazainul Futuh* of Amir Khusrau, our earliest authority, was written in 1311⁶ for presentation to the Sultan and also for publication. Though the achievements of the army by then had been phenomenal, Khusrau praises the administrative and economic measures of Alauddin not with reference to the army but to the public welfare. Some of his paragraphs deserve quotation in simplified English.

'Every one, who has a brain capable of thinking, will realize that the status of the good administrator (*jahandar*) is higher than that of the conqueror (*jahangir*)... Precedence has been given in this book to administrative over military affairs... The fortunate star of the mass of the people arose on the day when it was revealed to the heart of the Sultan that God had made him a ruler over them. The Sultan's fostering care for the sons of Adam is greater than that of the sun for the moon and the stars... *First*, from east to west and north to south, he has several times remitted the *khiraj* of the *ra'iiyyat*; (*secondly*), he has by the blows of his sword brought to the imperial exchequer the treasures of the *rais* of Hind, which they had collected star by star from the time of Mahraj and Bikramajit.'⁷

'Next, in order to make cheap the livelihood of the mass of the people, he has lessened the tax-burden of the artisans, who used to

5 *Khairul Majalis*, 231, Persian text edited by Prof. Khaliq Nizami. Shaikh Nasiruddin, according to Professor Nizami, was born in Awadh about 1276-77 and died at Delhi in 1356. He first met Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya at the age of forty-three, i.e. about the year 1310. But he came to settle in the great Shaikh's *khanqah* later. The principles of the Chistic *Silsilah* in those days did not permit a Shaikh to call on a Sultan or his nobles, and in the authentic surviving Chishti *Malfuzat* (Conversations) references to the ruling king are avoided. But it was permitted to speak of dead kings, whose dynasties had vanished. The conversations of Shaikh Nasiruddin seem to indicate that Alauddin was respected (within limits) in the *khanqah* of Shaikh Nizamuddin.

6 A supplementary chapter on the Ma'abar campaign was added after 1313.

7 *Khazainul Futuh*, 12-14.

sell their commodities at a high price. He has appointed an honest *ra'is* (controller) over them, so that he may talk to the glib-tongued shopkeepers with the whip of justice and give the power of speech to those who had none. Wise investigators were appointed to inquire into the stone-weights (kept by the shopkeepers). Every dark-hearted shopkeeper, who transacted business with his heart of stone, was deprived by them of his stones (weights) by the blows of the whip. Their sternness and severity was so great that all the weights (stones) became (so to say) of iron and their correct weight was inscribed upon them. So that anyone who gave less weight, would find that this iron became a chain round his neck, and, if he misbehaved still further, the chain would become a sword and the extreme penalty would be meted out to him. When the artisans witnessed this severity, they did not vary the iron-regulations (*mizan-i ahan*), but considered them an iron fort round themselves and the inscriptions (on the weights) as a protection for their souls. You may say, in general, that the inscriptions were not on iron (measures) but on their hearts of iron.⁸

'Further, to ensure peace for the mass of his subjects, he has wielded his sword in such a way that from the bank of the river of the Sind to the (eastern) Ocean no one has heard the name of thief, robber or pick-pocket. Night-prowlers, who used to set fire to villages, now look after the roads with a lighted lamp. If a piece of rope disappears, it has either to be found or compensation for it given.'⁹

'Further, since this Rain of Mercy has such a great regard for general prosperity and abundance, and for the happiness and comfort of the select as well as the commons, *he has maintained the low price of grain, which is beneficial both to the residents of the cities and the villages, in days when not a drop of water has fallen from the stingy clouds.* Whenever there was no water left in the white clouds and men were faced with disaster, he has created amplitude for the mass of the people by supplies from the royal granaries.'¹⁰

'Further, he has established the *Darul Adl* (Palace of Justice), broader than the forehead of honest workers, for all manufactured goods (*zarb*) on which the public is dependent. He has ordered all cloth and other commodities, brought from outside, to be unpacked here and nowhere else, and once unpacked, they are not to be packed up again.' Khusrau enumerates several varieties of high grade cloth,

⁸ *Ibid.*, 16. It is not safe to conclude from Khusrau's figures of speech that the shopkeepers were compelled to keep certified iron-weights instead of stone-weights.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 18-19.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 23-24.

most of which have no meaning for us—*kirpas, harir, Bihari, guli baqli, shir, galim, juz, khuz, Devagiri* and *mahadevanagri*. 'All varieties of dry fruits (*tafakkuh*), which grow out of the soil, but the list of which would be too long, and all necessities of life for the select and the commons have been provided here by royal justice, so that every one, without noise or tumult, may justly buy what he considers to be best and most suitable—and may also do justice to the generosity of the king.'¹¹

These remarks of Khusrau may certainly be taken as confirming what his friend, Barani, was to record over forty-five years later. But it will be necessary to distinguish Barani's facts from his conclusions. We have also to realize that he can only tell us what he saw personally at Delhi and that he leaves us to conclude what happened in the rest of the empire.

Naturally the first question that arises is the principle on which the Economic Regulations were based. Unfortunately, all medieval and modern historians have missed this point, because Barani has put this principle in the middle of his discussion of the 'general markets' in his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*. 'Alauddin', he tells us, 'laboured day and night to settle the production-cost (*bar-award*) of everything before himself—even of such paltry things as needles, combs, slippers, shoes, bowls, pots and caps.'¹² But when writing the *Fatawa-i Jahandari* he did not get confused in details and stated Alauddin's principle more clearly: 'The king should settle before his own throne the prices of all things according to the principle of production-cost (*bar-award*).'¹³ Barani (or rather Alauddin) came very near to the Marxian principle that 'prices depend upon the socially necessary labour-time'. But Marx was dealing with a 'free-market' which had grown up as the result of capitalism, industrial competition and modern transport; Alauddin had to impose the calculated price according to production-cost on an eastern and medieval society. The great difficulty was in fixing the price of grain; after that had been done, the prices of other commodities could be fixed after giving the merchants the profits of their investments, and the skilled and unskilled workers the wages of their labour. Alauddin's administration had made the roads safe; there was no lack of capital, but transport was disorganized, and the merchants were accused of regrating. Alauddin, as we shall see, made regulations (*mizan*) for some merchants, whom the state subsidized and controlled, and this indirectly brought the whole system into a

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 21-23.

¹² *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 316.

¹³ *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 35.

line. He did not—and could not—reduce prices by state-force; so we need not be surprised if in the time of some later rulers, who paid little attention to this matter, prices were quite as cheap. This only proves that Alauddin's calculations were correct and that *he was striving for a normal market*.

Alauddin seems to have left the Hindu bankers (*sahas*) untouched. He did not need their assistance, but their opportunities of investments and lending must have increased with the volume of guaranteed profits under the regulations (*zawabit*, singular *zabita*). There were two Hindu mercantile communities, however, who had a near-monopoly over two necessities of life—the Nayaks¹⁴ who traded in grain and the Multani merchants who traded in cloth. Alauddin converted their monopolies (based on tradition or competition) into state-controlled monopolies. His regulations must have caused them personal discomforts, but this was compensated by the fact that their business increased and their profits were guaranteed.

Before we attempt to explain Barani's account of the regulations, the currency and weights of the day have to be examined. 'The *tanka* of that time', Ferishta tells us, 'was one *tola* of minted gold or silver; and a silver *tanka* was equal to fifty *jitals* or copper coins.¹⁵ The weight of this *jital* is not known; some say it was one *tola* but others think that, like the copper coin of these days, a *jital* was two *tolas* minus one-quarter of a *tola* in weight. The *man* of those days consisted of forty *sirs* and a *sir* was 24 *tolas* in weight.' Since later rulers insisted on debasing the currency, the silver *tanka* of Alauddin, with its high silver content, remained the standard of reference for

14 The word, Nayak, seems to have become restricted in its meaning in later days. Alauddin uses it to mean merchants who transported grain and some of whom could place 10,000 or 20,000 beasts of burden at his disposal. *Nayak* is definitely the Hindi name for a Hindu mercantile community. The most prominent Nayak of the day, Malik Nayak *Akhur-bek Maisara*, governor of Samana and Sunam, is referred to by Amir Khusrau as a 'Hindu officer of the sublime court' (*Dawal Rani*, 61). The Musalmans were paralysed in the sphere of business because both law and public opinion objected to their taking interest. This meant, in practice, that Muslim merchants or industrialists would have to depend upon their own cash and could expect no credit facilities. Barani is correct about the 'sinfulness of regrating'; it was difficult to avoid regrating, or the charge of it; so the Muslim *mullahs* advised their flock not to deal in grain at all.

The Hindu Multani merchants were well-situated both for trade with southern India and export and import trade with foreign countries. They alone were in a position to get the Sultan the high-class silk fabrics of the Deccan and the South. Very naturally they had a big representation of their group at Delhi.

15 Ferishta, 114. Mr. Nelson Wright is inclined to think that it would be more correct to say that a *tanka* was equal to 48 *jitals*. But in a system of bi-metallic currency, slight variations were inevitable (Nelson Wright, 72).

two centuries and a half till the appearance of Sher Shah's rupee. The weight of the *tola* has changed through the centuries, but if we take a *tola* as equal to 180 grains (troy),¹⁶ then (according to Dr. Irfan Habib's calculations) a *man* of Alauddin would be equal to 25.44 lbs (avoirdupois) and 12.35 present-day *sirs*.

Alauddin organized the following markets in Delhi for various commodities—(a) the Central Grain Market or *Mundi* with subsidiary controlled grocers' shops in every quarter (*mohalla*) of the city; (b) the *Sera-i Adl* which was the exclusive market for cloth, sugar, herbs (*nabat*), dry fruits (*mewa*), butter and lamp-oil (*rughan-i chiragh*); (c) the markets for horses, slaves and cattle; and (d) the general markets for all other commodities.

THE 'MANDI' OR GRAIN MARKET

The First and most difficult Regulation (*Zabita*) concerned the fixation of price for all varieties of grain. We are not told by what calculations this price-list was arrived at, but we are assured by Khusrau, and repeatedly by Barani, that no rise of prices was permitted. The price per *man* prescribed by the government was as follows: wheat, $7\frac{1}{2}$ *jitals*; barley, 4 *jitals*; rice (*shali*), 5 *jitals*; *mash* (pulses), 5 *jitals*; gram (*nakhud*), 5 *jitals*; *moth*, 3 *jitals*. 'So long as Alauddin lived, monsoon or no monsoon, there was not the slightest rise in these prices. The permanence of prices in the grain market was a wonder of the age.'

Calculating in terms of present-day *sir*, we may conclude roughly that for an *Alai tanka* (which was equal in weight but higher in silver content than the rupee of the British Indian empire) a citizen of Delhi could purchase 88 *sirs* of wheat, 98 *sirs* of gram, rice or *mash* and over 205 *sirs* of *moth*. Owing to difficulties of calculation, there is probably a marginal error of 15 per cent to 20 per cent in these figures. But they give a rough impression of the grain-value of the *Alai tanka*, and that is all that can be attempted.

The Second Regulation appertained to the appointment of Malik Qabul Ulugh Khani as controller (*shuhna*) of the Grain Market.¹⁷ 'He was a wise and experienced malik, who had access to the throne. He was given extensive territories (*iqta-i buzurg*) and a large number

¹⁶ This was the official rate of the British government.

¹⁷ The term 'Ulugh Khani' indicates that he had been in the service of Ulugh Khan. As will be seen from the succeeding paragraphs, Maliks Qabul was in charge not only of the Delhi Grain Market but of the whole grain supply system. His real function was that of a Grain Controller. An officer subordinate to him must have been in immediate charge of the Delhi Grain Market, and it is safer to assume that it is this officer who was twice bastinadoed for recommending a rise in prices.

of horse and foot added to his dignity and power.' He was given an assistant controller from among his friends; at the same time Alauddin appointed as *barid* (intelligence officer) of the Grain Market a responsible person who knew the Sultan's mind.

The Third Regulation¹⁸ appertained to the collection of grain in the royal (*sultani*) stores. 'The Sultan ordered the whole of the *khiraj* of the *Khalisa* towns in the Doab to be demanded in kind and taken to the royal stores in the city.' In Jhain (or *Shahr-i Nau*) and its towns, half the Sultan's share was demanded in kind. The grain was first stored in Jhain and then sent to Delhi. 'In consequence there was no *mohalla* in Delhi in which two or three houses were not fully stocked with the Sultan's grain.'

● The Fourth Regulation assigned the grain-transport merchants to Malik Qabul. 'The Sultan ordered that all grain-transport merchants of the empire were to be made subjects of the controller of the Grain Market, and their leaders (*muqaddams*) with collars and chains round their necks were handed over to him. The Sultan ordered Malik Qabul to keep them before himself in the market and not to remove their collars and chains till they fulfilled the conditions imposed upon them. They were to become one body (corporation, *yak wujud*) by giving sureties for each other. They were to settle with their wives, children, goods and cattle in the villages on the bank of the Jumna and a *shuhna* was to be appointed by Malik Qabul to supervise their operations.' In normal times these transport merchants brought so much grain to Delhi that it was unnecessary to touch the royal stores.

The Fifth Regulation was a general and stern prohibition of regrating (*ihlikar*). The central ministry took a written deed from all its agents and officers in the Doab that they would not permit any one to regrade; and in case regrating was discovered, the officers concerned would have to answer before the throne. The regrated grain was confiscated and the regrater was severely punished. It was impossible for a merchant, a village-assignee, a grocer or any one else to regrade a *man* of grain or to sell a *man* or half a *man* of grain in his own house above the official rates.

The Sixth Regulation required a deed to be taken from the administrative and revenue officers of the country to the effect that

18 These regulations are not in the form framed by Alauddin. Barani is recollecting the steps taken and putting them in logical sequence. With reference to grain he has first given us a list of 8 regulations and explained each in a separate paragraphs. By an unfortunate oversight, Regulation 3 of the list becomes Regulation 2 of the explanatory paragraph and 2 becomes 3. I have followed the number given in the explanatory paragraphs by Barani himself.

they would have the grain delivered by the cultivators to the grain merchants at a cash price from their fields (without taking it to their houses). 'With reference to the Doab, which is nearer to the city, the central ministry, at the Sultan's instruction, took deeds from its *shuhnas* and *mutasarrifs* (revenue officers) that they would demand *khiraj* from the cultivators with such severity that it would be impossible for them to take the grain from the fields to their houses for the purpose of regrating, and they would have to sell it to the transport merchants at a low price... But the villagers had the option of taking as much of their grain as they could to the market and selling it there for their own profit at the official rates.'¹⁹

According to the Seventh Regulation the Sultan received daily reports about the Grain Market from three independent sources—first, from the controller of the market (*shuhna-i mandi*), second, from the *barids* (intelligence officers) and, lastly, from the secret spies (*munhis*), who had been appointed. Nothing was overlooked. Alauddin at the beginning of his reign was not quite illiterate. Ferishta says that owing to the mass of the reports of spies he had to wade through, he acquired the capacity of reading hastily scribbled Persian with the greatest ease.²⁰ When the market controller once or twice recommended an increase of half a *jital* in the price of grain, he got twenty blows of the rod. People behaved honestly because they knew that the Sultan was being informed of everything by his spies.

There was no famine in Delhi during Alauddin's reign and no rise in prices. But the following Regulation for rationing was fixed for times when the rains failed. 'To the grocers (*baqqals*) of every *mohalla*, in accordance with its population, a daily allowance of grain was given from the central market. Further, the central market allowed any member of the general public to purchase half a *man* of grain at one time, and it also, in proportion to their dependants, supplied grain direct to nobles and men of distinction, who had no villages or lands of their own.'²¹ Good order had to be maintained in the market, specially during times of drought; if a weak or helpless man was trampled underfoot, the *shuhna* in charge was sure to be punished.

¹⁹ Barani, 307-308. This option, left to the cultivator, would act as a check on the local revenue officers, if they insisted on reducing the price of the cultivator's grain beyond a certain point. According to Ferishta, the cultivator could sell his grain at the official rates at the nearest town (*qasbah*), going to Delhi was not necessary.

²⁰ Ferishta, Vol. I, 110.

²¹ Barani, 308.

THE SERA-I ADL

The *Sera-i Adl* (Palace of Justice) was the exclusive, and to a large extent a subsidized, market for manufactured commodities and merchandise brought from a long distance, from territories outside the Sultan's dominion and even from foreign countries. These specified commodities were cloth, sugar, herbs,²² dry fruits, butter (*rughan-i sutur, ghi*) and lamp-oil (*rughan-i chiragh*). They can be kept for a considerable time without being spoilt. The First Regulation dealt with the establishment of the *Sera-i Adl*. On the inner side of the Badaun Gate near the *Koshak-i Sabz* (Green Palace), an extensive piece of land had been lying useless for a long time. The *Sera-i Adl* was built here. Since the commodities stocked were of considerable value, the more important shops must have been strongly built. 'The Sultan ordered that every commodity brought by the merchants, either with their own money or with government money, was to be brought to the *Sera-i Adl* and not taken to a private house or to another market.' If this order was disobeyed, or if any commodity was sold even a *jital* above the official rates, the commodity was to be confiscated and the seller was to be severely punished.²³ 'Owing to this order all commodities valued from one *tanka* to ten thousand *tankas* were only brought to the *Sera-i Adl*.' The market remained open from the morning till the afternoon prayer (*namaz-i digar*), which would mean till about an hour after midday.

With reference to the Second Regulation, Barani gives us some items of the official price-list. But so far as silk fabrics are concerned, the list suffers from the fact that he gives us the prices without specifying the size; perhaps there was a standard size which he thought his readers would keep in mind. In any case, these fabrics have disappeared, and it is only worthwhile quoting their prices to assure the reader that the finest weavers were well-paid. (a) Silk fabrics—*khuzz-i Delhi*, 16 *tankas*; *khuzz-i konla*, 6 *tankas*; *mashru*²⁴ *shi'ri* (fine), 3 *tankas*; *shirin* (fine), 5 *tankas*; *shirin* (medium), 3 *tankas*; *shirin* (coarse), 2 *tankas*; *salahati* (coarse), 2 *tankas*. (b) The size of the following cotton cloths are not given, but they seem to have been of the size of an ordinary bed-spread—*burd* (fine) with red lining, 6 *jitals*;²⁵ *burd* (coarse), 36 *jitals*; *astar-i Nagauri* (red), 24 *jitals*; *astar* (coarse),

22 Our Yunani physicians throughout the middle ages kept prescribing many herbs, which grow in Persia and Central Asia; they just followed Avicenna in the matter.

23 Or, as Khusrāu points it poetically, 'If anyone opened his packages elsewhere, his joints were to be "opened" with the sword.' (*Khazatnūl Futūh* 23).

24 *Mashru* means a fabric of mixed silk and cotton, which the *Shar'at* permits a Musalman to wear.

25 '6 *jitals*' is obviously a copyist's mistake.

12 *jitals*; a *chadar*, 10 *jitals*. Further for one *tanka* a man could buy 40 yards of coarse, or 20 yards of fine-woven cotton cloth. (c) Other commodities—one *sir* of crystalline sugar (*misri*), 2½ *jitals*; one *sir* of coarse sugar, 1½ *jitals*; 3 *sirs* of brown sugar, 1 *jital*;²⁶ 1½ *sir* of *ghi*, 1 *jital*; 3 *sirs* of sesame oil, 1 *jital*; five *sirs* of salt, 1 *jital*.²⁷ 'The price of other commodities, whether coarse or fine', Barani says, 'can be estimated from the list I have given.'

The Third Regulation concerned the registration of merchants. 'The Sultan ordered all merchants of Delhi, whether Hindus or Muslims, and all merchants of the empire, whether Hindus or Muslims, to be registered with the ministry of commerce (*diwan-i riyasat*); and their business was to be regulated. In accordance with the royal orders, regulations (*mizan*) were made for all merchants. So far as Delhi was concerned, a deed was taken from merchants, who had been importing commodities into the city, that they would bring the same commodities and the same quantities of them every year and sell them at the official rates in the *Sera-i Adl*. The "regulated merchants" (*saudagaran-i mizani*) brought so much merchandise from the provinces and adjoining territories that it accumulated in the *Sera-i Adl* and could not be sold.'

The Fourth Regulation appertained to the Multani merchants. The commodities of the *Sera-i Adl* were brought by 'the regulated merchants' from long distances and they would need a subsidy in case of more costly goods. The prices had been fixed in the interest of the consumers, but they could only be maintained if they were sold direct to the consumers, and merchants were not allowed to take them out for resale at higher prices. With reference to this question Barani states: 'Both the merchants of Delhi and of the provinces tried to purchase fine, high grade and costly cloth, such as could not be found in the neighbourhood, in the *Sera-i Adl* at the official rates and take it outside and sell it at a high rate.' Alauddin had a bureaucracy, which knew how to administer and fight. But business was not its line. So the requisite power and responsibility had to be given to a leading group of the mercantile community. 'Sultan Alauddin ordered 20 lakhs (20,00,000) of *tankas* to be given from the treasury to rich Multani merchants and they were made *officers* of the *Sera-i Adl*. The Multanis were asked to bring commodities from all directions of the empire and sell them at the official rates in the *Sera-i Adl* in such a way that they may not fall into the hands of the (ordinary) merchants.'

²⁶ *Gur*, apparently, was not brought here.

²⁷ This is the price of salt given by Ferishta (114). Barani's text here is quite illegible in all manuscripts.

their business within the margin permitted. So we need only notice Barani's price-list.

Slaves:

'The price of a female slave for domestic work was fixed between 5 and 12 *tankas*, and of a female slave who was needed as a concubine (*kanizak-i kinari*) between 20 and 30 or 40 *tankas*. Very few slaves were sold for 100 or 200 *tankas*. If a slave, who cannot now be purchased for 1,000 or 2,000 *tankas*, appeared in the market, no one would have had the courage to purchase him from fear of the reports of the spies. The price of a handsome young male slave was between 20 and 30 *tankas*. The price of a slave experienced in his work was from 10 to 15 *tankas*, but young slaves inexperienced in any work only fetched 7 or 8 *tankas*.'

Cattle:

'The best beasts of burden, which now cost 30 to 40 *tankas*, were priced at 4 or, at the most, 5 *tankas*. (Further prices were as follows.) Male cattle for breeding purposes (*sutur-i jufti*), 3 *tankas*; cows for meat, 1½ to 2 *tankas*; cows giving milk, 3 to 4 *tankas*; female buffalo for milk, 10 to 12 *tankas*; buffalo for meat, 5 to 6 *tankas*; a fat goat or sheep, from 10 to 12 or 14 *jitals*.'

THE GENERAL MARKETS

Malik Qabul had been specially appointed as Grain Controller and the Grain Market was put in his charge. The *Sera-i Adl* was put under the immediate control of the rich Multani merchants. But the general markets, scattered throughout the city, were under the control of the ministry of commerce (*diwan-i riyasat*). Alauddin did not disturb this arrangement. But according to Barani, Alauddin with a staff working under him settled the price according to production-cost (*hukm-i bar-award*) for everything, however insignificant—hats, socks, combs, needles, sugar-cane, vegetables, pottage, soup, *hilwa*, *rewri*,³⁰ varieties of bread, fish, betel-leaves, colours, areca-nuts, roses and green plants; in fact, of all things sold in the general markets. 'The price-list sanctioned by the throne was given to the ministry of commerce.'

'The shopkeepers', says Barani, 'consider themselves the sole authority for deciding the price of the commodities they sell; they are a shameless, bold, deceitful, knavish, insolent, desperate, lying and insolent group... Great kings and wazirs have failed in controlling their sales and purchases.' Alauddin gave careful thought to the

³⁰ *Hilwa* and *rewri* are well-known Indian sweets.

selection of a proper minister of commerce and selected Yaqub Nazir for the post, and to increase his dignity he also appointed him *muhtasib*³¹ (censor) and *nazir* (superintendent of weights and measures) of the empire. Yaqub, according to Barani, was well-acquainted with the temperament of the people and the complexities of business. While 'reliable and honest' on the one hand, he was also 'hard-hearted, severe, rude and cruel'. 'Such an officer brought dignity and grandeur to the commerce ministry.' Yaqub appointed a *shuhna* or superintendent for every market, and brought dishonest shopkeepers to book by a regime of kicks, blows, chains and other degrading punishments. The *shuhnas* were directed to see to the enforcement of the price-list and to the maintenance of proper prices from day to day of commodities which could not be included in the list. 'All persons, old and young, agreed that a person so severe as Yaqub Nazir had never been in charge of the commerce ministry.' He would check the rates of a market ten or even twenty times and thrash the shopkeepers ruthlessly for charging above the price-list. These severities compelled the shopkeepers to reduce their prices, but they did not give up all their tricks, such as using false weights, keeping aside their best commodities and telling lies to young and ignorant purchasers. As a last measure Alauddin repeatedly resorted to the trick of sending children employed in the royal pigeon-house to make purchases in the market. Yaqub Nazir inquired into these purchases, and if a shopkeeper had not given full weight, he then and there ordered double the amount (of the weight due) to be carved out of the flesh of the shopkeeper. 'These repeated punishments at last put the market right.'

✓ REVIEW OF BARANI'S ACCOUNT

In writing his account of the regulations mostly from memory in the *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, Barani has given an almost exclusive importance to the city of Delhi. He has overlooked the provincial capitals, the *qasbas* (towns) and even the rural areas. The Delhi sultans, whatever their other misfortunes, did not, like the Roman emperors, live in fear of the mob of the capital or the revolt of the army. There was no reason why Alauddin should have plundered the Doab

31 It is not possible to find an English equivalent for the term, *muhtasib*. Broadly speaking, the *muhtasib* was assigned the duty of maintaining the public moral life of the city in his charge, but he could not try a legal case or enter a house. The duties of a *muhtasib* in India were often combined with other duties, particularly of the *kotwal*. As *muhtasib* of the empire, Yaqub Nazir would be able to control all local *muhtasibs*. According to Mawardi (*Ahkamus Sultaniyah*), the superintendence of weights and measures came within the normal duties of the *muhtasib*.

peasants for the sake of the Delhi citizens only and incurred a needless and prolonged headache. Reviewing the question of price-control in the *Fatawa-i Jahandari*, Barani remarks: 'The king should also know that every arrangement (*naqsh*) in the matter of buying and selling and price-fixation, which he makes for his capital, will also appear in all his provinces. The officers and the *ra'yyat* of his country will accept it and follow it.'³² Mr. Moreland, in order to give a meaning to Barani's half-told story, thinks that Delhi was isolated from the rest of the country. 'No attempt', he says, 'was made to keep down prices throughout the country; effort was limited to Delhi, where the standing army was concentrated; and the regulations extended to a region sufficiently large to ensure the isolation of the Delhi market.'³³ (This argument overlooks the fact that low-prices in Delhi only would not help the army, which was drawn from the whole of the country; the needs of the families of the soldiers (and horsemen) could not be overlooked; they had claims to at least half, if not more, of the wages of their bread-winners, and since they lived in all parts of the empire, in rural areas as well as in cities and small towns, the mere reduction of prices in Delhi would hardly bring any relief to them, or help the state in reducing the salaries of the horsemen. The basic fact, however, is that Alauddin did not want or desire an isolated Delhi market.) The Sultan was keen that the commodities of the *Sera-i Adl* should not go out of it; but in case this was done, he had no means of preventing anything from being taken from Delhi to the provinces. Secondly, if the Multani merchants were to bring commodities from distant provinces, how could they do so without exporting north Indian products to distant regions? The cash given to them would just suffice as a subsidy for bringing costly silk fabrics for the nobles and other rich persons in Delhi.

Ferishta must, therefore, be considered correct in concluding that the regulations were meant for the greater part of Alauddin's dominions; if enforced in Delhi alone, they would be meaningless, even as a means of lowering the salary of horsemen. Thus before giving the price-list of grain at Delhi, Ferishta remarks: 'The prices at Delhi were as follows; the prices in the rest of the empire can be estimated from them.' Similarly with reference to the price of cloth and commodities of the *Sera-i Adl* he says, 'The prices at Delhi have been noted to give an idea of prices in other territories.' Also, horsemen were enlisted at all important towns and the government would

³² *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 36.

³³ *Agrarian System*, 37. Neither Moreland nor Dr. K. S. Lal pays attention to Alauddin's basic principle that the prices of commodities should be determined by production-cost (*nirakh-i bar-award*).

have to pay for the price of horses at local rates; lowering the price of horses at Delhi by government order would only prevent horses reared in the provinces from being brought to the Delhi market. 'Since Delhi was the great place for the concourse of people,' Ferishta says, 'I am giving *as an example* the price of horses fixed there.'

Barani seems to assume that the object of Alauddin was to save not the whole of his dominions but only Delhi from famine. This has led him draft his Third Regulation in a way that insults the intelligence of the reader; for we are told that the whole of the state-revenue of the *khalisa-villages* of the Doab, which meant one-half of the total *khalisa-produce*, and half the total revenue of the *khalisa-villages* of Jhain, which meant one-fourth of the total *khalisa-produce*, was to be levied in kind and taken to Delhi. This would result in Delhi being over-stocked with grain while other cities and towns (*qasbas*) were left to starve. Similarly, the Sixth Regulation seems to imply that after the cultivators in the *khalisa-villages* had paid one-half of their produce as *khiraj*, they were also compelled to part with the rest at a price, so that they had no grain left for their own families. This would have left them to starve, and cultivation would have come to an end. Barani is using his own language and not quoting an official document; so Ferishta found himself justified in rewriting the two regulations:

'*Second Regulation*—The share of the revenue ministry in the royal *khalisa* was to be levied in the form of grain and collected and stored in the towns (*qasabat*); if there was insufficient grain in the market, grain from the official stores was to be sold at the official rates, . . .

'*Fifth Regulation*—The *ra'iyyat*, apart from the grain needed for their own consumption, were to sell their produce at their fields; they were not to take a single grain to their houses in addition to the quantity agreed upon. The revenue-officers were to collect the required produce in an appropriate manner, so that the *ra'iyyat* may be paid the cash price of their grain at the fields, and may not take to their houses more than their own share; they were to have no grain for regrating.'³⁴

Thus rewritten, the regulations give us a clearer idea of what happened. The state-share of the *khalisa-produce* was levied in kind and stocked in all towns and cities—and not in Delhi only; and the cultivators were then asked either to sell to the grain-merchants what was over and above their needs on their fields *or* to take their produce

³⁴ Ferishta, 112-13. The second and fifth regulations of Ferishta are the third and sixth regulations of Barani.

to the nearest town and sell it there at the official rates. The amount of grain per head required by a peasant-family could be easily calculated; in times of famine, as Khusrau tells us, the land-tax of the *khalisa-villages* was remitted. The price of grain and other commodities would, of course, be higher in Delhi than in the town and cities of the empire. The only exceptions were the subsidized high-grade silk fabrics.

The economic regulations of Alauddin are the greatest administrative achievement of the sultanat period. Ferishta writing in the reign of Jahangir (1606-7) remarks: 'To the end of Alauddin's reign these prices remained steady and there was no change in them owing to lack of rain or other causes that bring famine. It was a unique and remarkable achievement. Nothing like this had been accomplished before and no one can say whether it will be possible again.'³⁵ In the early days of Firuz Shah's reign, Hamid Qalandar summarized a statement of Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh.³⁶ 'In those days entertainments were common. During the days of the pilgrimages and on the last Wednesday of the month of Safar,³⁷ it was difficult to find (sitting) accommodation in the public enclosures, in the public gardens or by the side of the tanks. There was music and dancing on every side. These feasts would cost a *tanka* or more.' Then he recollected the plenitude of Alauddin's time and said,

'How cheap were things then. *During those days there was no beggar without his cotton-stuffed garment.* And how much did this cotton-stuffed garment (*libaicha*) cost? One *tanka* if of coarse cotton cloth and 2 *tankas* and 20 *jitals*, if of striped cotton cloth. The outer cloth (*jamgi kaminah*) would cost 30 *jitals* and the inner cotton cloth (*astar*) 12 *jitals*. The cost of cotton can be estimated from this. The wages of the tailor and the cotton-carder would be from four to six *jitals*. In these days they will not sew a stuffed-cotton garment for less than a *tanka*. (Malik) Kafur Muhrdar used to have many stuffed-cotton garments prepared and distributed among the poor.'

Barani is only partially right in his analysis of the causes of Alauddin's success.³⁸ Much was due to the personal attention and

³⁵ Ferishta, 112.

³⁶ *Khatrul Majalis*, 430.

³⁷ This is a day for rejoicing for the Musalmans in gratitude for the Prophet's recovery from a very serious illness.

³⁸ Barani (312) states that 'the wise men of that time' said that this stabilization of grain and commodities at low prices was due to four causes—(i) Sternness of the Sultan's orders; (ii) High taxation; (iii) Lack of money in the hands of the people;

the genius of the emperor and the honesty and severity of his officers. But *first*, Alauddin did not, and could not, reduce prices by state-force; Barani, in contemplating Alauddin's punishments, forgets his own repeated statements that Alauddin settled prices according to production-cost (*nirkh-i bar-award*). He punished defaulters and cheats severely, but that is all he did. *Secondly*, his practical insight told him that in economic affairs as in administration, his supervision may extend to great lengths but his direct control had to be limited. His control of the grain produce, in particular, was limited to that *marginal portion* the manipulation of which could keep the markets steady in the cities and towns of the empire; and the state-share of the *khalisa-produce* gave him that marginal portion. Had he tried to go beyond that he would have failed. Apart from the subsidized and controlled commodities of the *Sera-i Adl* and the punishments of the guilty, he allowed every one to work for his own welfare, provided he worked honestly. The fall of prices would give a temporary advantage to wage-earners, because wages would not fall as rapidly as prices. One has to assume that Alauddin knew this. The great advantage of his system was its *security*; a man would know what wages he would get and what commodities he could purchase. The tragedy lay in the fact that everything depended upon the life and health of one man. It was beyond Alauddin's power to give to 'the people of God' a security which God had denied to him.



(iv) Honest and harsh-minded officers, who neither took bribes, nor had a personal regard for anyone. These 'wise men' apparently did not know the ABC of economics. High taxation and lack of precious metals in the hands of the people would cause a rise of prices, which no effort of the Sultan and his officers could prevent. Barani is quoting others. But did he himself understand the principle of 'production-cost', to which he refers as the basic principle? If you keep compelling merchants to sell below their purchase-price and do not leave the peasant enough of grain and cash to live on from year to year, both will perish, and the result will be a phenomenal rise in prices, which no state-force can prevent.

V. ALAUDDIN KHALJI: THE LAST MONGOL INVASIONS—MALWA AND RAJASTHAN

INVASION OF ALI BEG, TARTAQ AND TARGHI¹

‘AFTER PRICES HAD BEEN REDUCED’, Barani tells us, ‘a well-equipped horseman (*nurattab*) could be enlisted for 234 *tankas* and a soldier with two horses for 78 *tankas* (more). The soldiers were examined at the review or *arz* with reference to their archery and equipment, and the army was placed on a permanent footing.’ The Mongols only tried their luck in India in two more winter campaigns, 1305-6 and 1306-7, but Barani’s memory did not fail him when he wrote: ‘Many thousand Mongols were brought to Delhi with ropes round their necks and thrown under the feet of elephants; their heads were used in the construction of platforms and towers. Both in the battle-fields and in the city there was a stench due to decomposing Mongol corpses.’

In 1305 ‘Ali Beg, Tartaq and Targhi marched with their drawn swords from Turkistan to the Indus and crossed the Jhelum like an arrow.’ But Targhi, who had been in this country twice before, was afraid that his head would be displayed on a spear, and seems to have retreated.² But the supreme commander was Ali Beg, a descendant of Chengiz Khan, and he and Tartaq decided to march ahead with their fifty thousand horsemen. It is difficult to see the wisdom that inspired their strategy. They plundered the Siwaliks, ‘the territory at the foot of the hills’; the distressed inhabitants fled across the fords of the Ganges but the Mongols followed in pursuit and ‘caused smoke to rise from the towns of Hindustan’. Malik Nayak *Akhur-bek Maisara*, governor of Samana and Sunam, whom Khusrau describes as ‘a Hindu officer of the court’,³ had probably retreated to Delhi along with the other frontier officers, who must have been surprised

1 Barani, 319-20; *Khazainul Futuh*, 37-41; Ferishta, 114; Isami, 394-98. Isami makes the mistake of putting the battle of Hansi-Sirsawa while Khusrau clearly indicates that it took place in Hindustan and Barani says that it was fought in the Amroha district.

2 The complex figures of speech in the *Khazainul Futuh* leave one perplexed but in the *Dawal Rani* (61) Khusrau states: ‘As he wanted to injure the Faith through the infidels, Time decreed that he should meet his death at the hands of infidels.’ Khusrau’s two statements seem to imply that Targhi, after his return to Turkistan, was killed by unconverted Mongols.

3 *Dawal Rani*, 61: ‘These two Turkish Khans were suddenly captured by a Hindu officer of the court.’ Nayak is also written as Manik in some manuscripts.

at the Mongols by-passing the frontier forts as well as Delhi and moving into the Doab. Alauddin saw clearly that, after inflicting much hardship on his subjects, they had played into his hands. He sent Malik Nayak with 30,000 horsemen with the order that the destruction of the Mongols was to be complete. According to the traditions collected by Isami, Bahram Aibah, Mahmud Sartiah, Takli, Tughluq, Qarmshi, Tulak and Qutta were among the officers subordinate to Nayak. The Hindu commander discharged his duty with remarkable efficiency. 'Across a distance which is as long as the day of idlers,' Khusrau assures us, 'the army passed as swiftly as the day of the busy.' It met the Mongols somewhere in Amroha district on 20 December 1305 (Thursday, 10 Jamadi II A.H. 705), and the Mongols, 'like an army of mosquitoes which tries to move against a strong wind', made one or two weak attacks. Then the sharp sword started its work and 'fire-coloured faces' began to fall to the ground. Ali Beg and Tartaq surrendered and were probably treated with the regard due to their rank. Barani says that 20,000 horses belonging to the dead Mongols were brought to the court. Alauddin organized a great *darbar* to receive Malik Nayak along with his officers and his captives. The throne was placed on the *Chautra-i Subhani* and the royal army stood in a double row from there to Indraprastha; the crowd was so great that the price of a cup of water rose to 20 *jitals* and half a *tanka*. Ali Beg, Tartaq and the Mongol captives were then brought before the royal throne. 'About these captives of two colours, red and white,' according to Khusrau, 'the order was that some were to be put to death and others were to be imprisoned. The lives of the two leaders were spared. But one of them died without any harm being done to him and the other was left alone.'⁴

INVASION OF KABK, IQBAL MUDBIR AND MUDABIR TAI BU⁵

In the succeeding year the Mongols sought to revenge the defeat of Ali Beg and Tartaq. But this time, instead of one combined army,

⁴ *Khazainul Futuh*, 41. But according to the traditions collected by Isami, Alauddin gave to the two captured generals the status of *amirs* with all necessary provisions, including an Indian-born slave-girl for each. But after two months, Tartaq, while in a drunken fit, began to demand what had happened to his army, his horse, his arrow-quiver and his hat. Alauddin, on hearing this, ordered him to be put to death. Ali Beg also met a similar fate owing to the evil in his heart (298).

According to Barani (321) Alauddin ordered all captives to be killed immediately by being thrown under the feet of elephants. Ferishta (114-15) says that the heads of 8,000 Mongols were used in building the Siri towers.

⁵ Barani writing after over four decades puts these campaigns very confusedly in different years. The traditions collected by Isami only refer to the victory over Kabk,

they sent three contingents under three commanders. The first was led by Kabk, and Iqbal and Tai Bu followed behind him. 'In the Persian month of *De* (December), they raised dust in the desert of Sind and the inhabitants of that region fled, leaving their belongings behind them. But as this wicked wind was unable to raise any dust in Samana and Kuhram, it turned towards the wilderness of Nagaur and overpowered the inhabitants of that desert. Alauddin refused to divide his army but placed the whole of it under the command of his favourite slave-officer, Malik Izzuddin Kafur Sultani, supported by officers like Tughluq, the Maratha-born Kafur and Ainul Mulk.'⁶ His order was that the army should march swiftly and crush the three Mongol contingents in succession. The Delhi army did move as rapidly as possible 'without distinguishing the morning from the evening twilight'. Near a place called Ab-i Ali, which may have been a river or a tank, 'a weak wave from the Muslim army' came across Kabk. He was surrounded and taken captive, and his followers were either killed or put in chains. But some of them succeeded in flying to the other two Mongol officers and were pursued by the Delhi army. 'Both Iqbal and Tai Bu decided to fly towards the river; they had come to collect spoils but now they considered it a good fortune to be able to save their own heads.'⁷ The Delhi army pursued them to the frontier, killing and capturing as many as it could.

Kabk and the captive Mongols were brought to Delhi. 'Order was given that the blood and bones of some of them were to be used in the construction of the fort-towers. . . . The necks of the remaining Qarunas⁸ and Mongols were to be cut off and their heads piled up in a high tower that reached the sky.'⁹ Kabk was imprisoned for some time and then put to death. The Mongol terror was at an end. 'The fear of the Mongols vanished from Delhi and its provinces and

but this battle was not as serious as he thought; he does not refer to Iqbal and Tai Bu, probably as they had escaped. The *Khazainul Futuh* written some six years after the event is our most reliable authority. Khusrau returns to the matter in the *Dawal Rani* and states: 'After this three generals, marching more rapidly than the wind, came to Multan and crossed the Ravi. One was Tai Bu, the other was Iqbal and the third was Kabk. . . . Their soldiers were innumerable as sand-grains and they sought revenge for Tartaq and Ali Beg' (61-62).

⁶ Isami, 311.

⁷ *Dawal Rani*, 62.

⁸ The term *Qaruna* is often used for a group distinct from, but allied to, the Mongols in the histories of Central Asia during this period. They were probably the descendants of the Mongols and the Muslim women they had captured.

⁹ It is about this tower that Barani's remark (321) should be interpreted: 'They constructed a tower of Mongol heads outside the Badaun Gate; it still stands and reminds people of Alauddin.'

perfect peace prevailed. The *ra'iiyat* on the (former) route of the Mongols could devote themselves to agriculture with peace of mind.¹⁰ Ghazi Malik, the governor of Dipalpur and Lahore, used to go with his army every winter to the frontier and search for the Mongols with a lighted lamp. 'Nobody cared to think or talk about the Mongols.' According to the letter of an officer, Badr, to Khizr Khan, which has been preserved in the *Ijaz-i Khusravi*, the *Khutba* of Sultan Alauddin was read even in the Jama mosque of Ghazni.

CONQUEST OF MALWA¹¹

A remark of Khusrau has already been quoted to the effect that the 'great rais' of northern India had by the year 1305 seen the wisdom of submitting to Alauddin. Alauddin's revenue and economic affairs had by now been put in order and his army had been reorganized. He was, consequently, in a position to attack Malwa, Siwana and Jalor.

The territory of Malwa, says Khusrau, was so extensive that even wise geographers were unable to delimit its frontiers. The wazir, Koka Pradhan, was more powerful than the Rai, Mahlak Deva. He had thirty or forty thousand horsemen and foot-soldiers beyond computation. Still a Delhi army of 10,000 horse succeeded in defeating him. His horse was caught in a mire; he was killed by numerous arrow-shots and his head was sent to the court. Our authorities do not tell us who commanded this Delhi army. But after the fall of Koka, Alauddin appointed one of his officers, Ainul Mulk, to govern the territory and to reduce the fort of Mandu, where Rai Mahlak Deva was still living. Ainul Mulk was an administrator and 'a man of letters' but Khusrau assures us that he had a military reputation also. He brought Ujjain, Dhar and Chanderi under his control and 'the peace he established was so effective that the sword refused to do its work and went back into its scabbard.'

'The fort of Mandu has a circumference of four *farsangs*;¹² still with the open country in the hands of the enemy, the position of Mahlak Deva was precarious. He sent forward an army under his son, but the army was defeated and his son was killed. Ainul Mulk then invested the fort. Fortunately for him, one of the Rai's watch-guards deserted to him, and led his army into the fort by a secret path at night in such a way that the Rai only came to know of the fact when the enemy's arrows began to fall on him. He fled to

¹⁰ Barani, 322-23.

¹¹ *Khazainul Futuh*, 55-59; *Ferishta*, 115; *Dawal Rani*, 69.

¹² *Dawal Rani*, 68. A Persian *farsang* varies from 3½ miles to 4 miles.

the *Chashma-i Sar* (Sar Spring) and was slain there. The fort was captured on 24 December 1305 (Thursday, 5 Jamadi II A.H. 705).

CONQUEST OF SIWANA¹³

In the *Khazainul Futuh*, which is meant to record and exaggerate Alauddin's victories, Amir Khusrau states that no independent rai had been left within five hundred *farsangs* of Delhi. But in his *Dawal Rani* he confesses that 'the (imperial) army had been besieging Siwana for five or six years without being able to injure even half a brick.' Rai Sital Deva of Siwana¹⁴ had a powerful fort and 'all rawats and all Meos were obedient to him'. Siwana, according to Khusrau's calculation, was only about 100 *farsangs* from Delhi; so it became necessary for the Sultan to march against it in person. The imperial army started from Delhi on 3 July 1309 (Wednesday, 13 Moharram A.H. 708). The Sultan stationed himself east of the fort; the right wing of the army was encamped to the south of the fort and the left wing to the north. Malik Kamaluddin Gurg was put in charge of the *munjaniqs*. But the fort was captured by the construction of a *pasheb* and this work must have started long before the Sultan's arrival. When the *pasheb* was completed, the Sultan ordered an attack and the battle raged from morning till night. Flight, it seems, was impossible for the garrison; some of the soldiers jumped down from the ramparts and tried to fly to Jalor, but the Sultan's army got news of this and pursued them till darkness supervened. On 9 September 1309 (Monday, 22 Rabi I A.H. 708) the body of Sital Deva, riddled with arrows, was brought before the Sultan and every one was surprised at his enormous stature. Kamaluddin Gurg was put in charge of the conquered fort and territory.

CONQUEST OF JALOR

Jalor was, for certain, conquered by Alauddin's army, but no contemporary account of it has survived. According to Khusrau, Alauddin ordered Kamaluddin to 'subdue the insolent rulers of the territory', and the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* is probably correct in stating that Jalor was conquered by Kamaluddin Gurg and its Rai slain in the same (lunar) year as Sital Deva.¹⁵ The Rajput accounts, apart from the error of a few years, substantially say the same thing with the

¹³ *Khazainul Futuh*, 68-72; *Dawal Rani*, 69; Isami, 307-9. Ferishta (118) mixes up the conquest of Siwana with that of Warangal (as described in the *Dawal Rani*) and is not reliable.

¹⁴ 'Siwana is a town situated 50 miles to the south-west of Jodhpur.' (K. S. Lal, *Khaljis*, 134).

¹⁵ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 78.

addition of some facts about the family of Kanhar Deva, the Rai of Jalor.¹⁶

'With the capitulation of Jalor', says Dr. K. S. Lal, 'about all the leading states of Rajputana, had been subdued one after another. Jaisalmer, Ranthambhor, Chitor, Siwana and Jalor, and the kingdoms adjoining them—Bundi, Mandore and Tonk—had all been invaded. Jodhpur (Marwar) also appears to have been under the sultanat. Although there is no specific reference to its capture by Alauddin, yet in an inscription at Pandua (in Jodhpur), dated Sam. 1358 (A.D. 1301) Alavadi (Alauddin) of Joginipura (Delhi) is mentioned as the ruling king.'¹⁷ Contemporary historians only refer to Ranthambhor, Chitor and Siwana, the conquest of which was due to the Sultan's personal efforts. The reduction of minor forts and territories was left to his officers, and their correct history can only be based on such inscriptions as have survived and on a critical analysis of the stories of Rajasthan bards.

NO RAJASTHAN POLICY

Alauddin Khalji, as we have seen, had a very definite policy, administrative and economic, for the home provinces of the empire. If Hindu custom required that the offices of rais, ranas and rawats should be hereditary, he would not quarrel with it. But he could win over the Hindu mercantile communities, and his government could get into touch with the *balahars*, the lowest caste of cultivators in the land of his birth, and see that he was taxed on an equitable basis. He had also a very clear policy with reference to the four kingdoms of Deccan and the Far South; they were to be deprived of their hereditary treasures and compelled to promise a yearly tribute, but there was to be no interference with their administration and not a *biswa* of their territory was to be annexed. But neither the actions of Alauddin nor the commentaries of his historians give us any clear idea of a Rajasthan policy. He was not prepared to tolerate a rai who questioned the supremacy of Delhi, and he certainly insisted on the security of roads. But beyond this we can only say that the plan of annexing Rajasthan was attempted in part and then given up as impracticable. The territory of Ranthambhor or Jhain was annexed and brought within the sphere of the economic regulations. But the slaughter of 3,000 rawats at Chitor proved futile, and no attempt was made to bring other parts of Rajasthan within the sphere of the imperial laws or *zawabit*. The reduction of the three great Rajasthan

¹⁶ *Vide* Dr. K. S. Lal, *Khaljis*, 135-39.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 139.

forts had entailed a terrible loss of life and no treasure worth mentioning had been obtained.

If a *rai* of distinction came to his court and, for the time-being, behaved like one of his high officers, Alauddin was content with his formal presents. If the Sultan had to appoint one of his own officers to the territory of a *rai* he had overthrown, the social order of Rajasthan was left undisturbed. The basic position was that of the *rawats* or local chiefs and, subject to such tribute as his officers may succeed in collecting, Alauddin left the *rawats* undisturbed. Nothing else was possible under the circumstances. It must be remembered, lastly, that Rajasthan was not so important in the days of Alauddin as it became later. No conception of a close-knit Rajput brotherhood seems to have existed; the constant wars between the Rajasthan *rais* had made any alliance against Alauddin, and also any joint cooperation with him, impossible. Rajasthan, divided into the territories of small rulers, was quite eclipsed by the rich kingdoms of the South.

Ziauddin Barani, on the whole a hostile critic, gives the following account of Alauddin's empire after the conquests in Rajasthan.¹⁸ 'The provinces of the empire on all the four sides had been brought under the control of reliable *maliks* and loyal officers; rebels and opponents had been suppressed. The hearts of the *ra'iyyat* had reconciled themselves to paying the Sultan's tribute on the basis of land-measurement along with *karhi* (*ghari*) and *charai*. The stupid ideas of rebellion and false ambitions had disappeared from the minds of the people; and the nobles and the commons applied themselves to their work or to their agriculture with peace of mind. Ranthambhor, Chitor, Mandalgarh, Dhar, Ujjain, Mandu, Alaipur, Chanderi, Iraj, Siwana and Jalor, where the government had been weak, were brought within control by (strong) governors (*wali wa muqti*). The following provinces were strengthened by the appointment of efficient governors:

1. Gujarat—Alp Khan.
2. Multan and Siwistan—Tajul Mulk Kafuri.
3. Dipalpur and Lahore—Ghazi Malik Tughluq.
4. Samana and Sunam—Malik Nayak *Akhur-bek-i Maisara*.
5. Dhar and Ujjain—Ainul Mulk Multani.
6. Jhain—Fakhrul Mulk of Meerut.
7. Chitor—Malik Abu Muhammad.¹⁹
8. Chanderi and Iraj—Malik Tamar.
9. Badaun, Koil and Kark—Malik Dinar *Shuhna-i Pil*.

¹⁸ Barani, 323-24.

¹⁹ Barani was writing several decades after the event; Malik Abu Muhammad may only have been the Sultan's 'resident' at Chitor.

10. Awadh—Malik Tigin.
11. Kara—Malik Nasiruddin Sutlia.'

'Further, Koil (Aligarh), Baran (Bulandshahr), Meerut, Amroha, Afghanpur, Kabar and (in fact) the whole Doab²⁰ was reduced to obedience like a single village; it was brought into the *khalisa* and (its income) was appropriated for the cash salary of the soldiers. All the cash income (of the empire) was brought to the treasury and used for making cash payments for the salaries of the army and the expenses of the *karkhanas*.'

PUNISHMENT OF THE ISMAILI BORAHS

As has been explained elsewhere, one of the most unpleasant features of Islamic orthodoxy was its persecution of the Ismaili minority, whom it very falsely accused of permitting incest in its secret assemblies. Barani²¹ calls them 'the people of incest' (*ibahiyatan*), but Isami tells us plainly that 'this group is known as BoraHS in the Hindi language'.²² Some time before 1311 the Sultan ordered investigations about them to be made. We need not be surprised that since the matter was investigated by their accusers—the orthodox *ulama*—the charge of incest was proved, and Alauddin ordered those who were guilty to be sawn into two.²³

20 The 'Doab' here must not be taken to mean the whole of the land between the Jumna and the Ganges, but only what Mr. Moreland calls the 'River Country': 'It lay between the Ganges and the Jumna, and on the north it extended to the submontane forest, but on the south it did not reach much further than Aligarh. During the thirteenth century, the region was divided into three provinces—Meerut, Baran and Koil, but Alauddin brought it directly under the revenue ministry on the same footing as the Delhi country' (*Agrarian System*, 231). It will be seen that all the cities named by Barani belong to Doab in this restricted sense.

21 Barani (336) calls them *ibahiyatan* and *bodhkan*; the latter is probably *boragan* mis-spelt.

22 Isami, 293.

23 *Khazainul Futuh*, 20. It is painful to find Khusrau making the charge and delighting in the punishment. But he was writing a book to justify the policy of the government and had no choice in the matter. He also tells us how magicians were buried up to their necks and stoned.

VI. ALAUDDIN KHALJI: THE DECCAN AND THE FAR SOUTH

CONQUEST OF BAGLANA; SECOND INVASION OF DEVAGIRI¹

ACCORDING TO THE ORAL tradition collected by Isami, Alp Khan was first appointed governor of Multan, probably after its conquest in 1297. He also says that Malik Qara Beg (whose personal name was Ahmad Jhitam) was sent to drive away Rai Karan from Anhilwara 'a second time', presumably because Karan had recaptured Anhilwara, after the retreat of Ulugh Khan and Nusrat Khan, in 1299. When Qara Beg was four *farsangs* from Anhilwara, he marched all night and attacked the city in the morning. Karan withdrew to Baglana once more. Qara Beg was then recalled to Delhi and the governorship of Gujarat was bestowed on Alp Khan. The regime of Alp Khan was popular, at least among the governing classes. 'If a chief behaved submissively', Isami states, 'Alp Khan favoured him beyond expectations. If a chief ignored him, Alp Khan attacked his principality immediately. All the warriors were like wax in his hands, for he displayed the glory of Islam in that land as the spring displays the glory of the garden.' The Mongols tried to advance to Gujarat through the Thar desert, but they were defeated by Alp Khan with the assistance of Ghazi Malik, who had come at the Sultan's order. In this campaign the Mongols had brought their women and children, possibly with the idea of settling in the land. But the Indian army succeeded in intercepting the route of the invaders and they suffered a severe defeat. The Indian captives were set free and 'eighteen thousand Mongol horsemen and three thousand horse-riding ladies (*khatuns*) were captured and sent to Delhi'.

For the year, 1306-7, Alauddin planned two southern campaigns. Alp Khan was directed to drive away Rai Karan from the Baglana hills. The Rai defended his land stoutly for two months. Then Alp Khan convened a meeting of his officers and they decided to win or die. Rai Karan was defeated and fled. Alp Khan pursued him to within a day's march of Devagiri and then the Rai vanished 'like a thought which you cannot recapture'. It was discovered later that he had sought refuge at Warangal.

The second campaign was against Rai Rama Chandra Deva of Devagiri, who had not sent his tribute for three or four years. A

¹ *Khazainul Futuh*, 64-68; Barani, 156-57; *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 116-18; Isami, 273-81.

rational comprehension of this campaign is not possible unless we admit that there is a core of truth in Isami's statement that Rama Deva sent a secret messenger to Alauddin to inform him that he was helpless in the matter 'because his son, Bhillama, and all the (leading) people of the territory had ceased to be loyal to the Sultan'. Rama Deva's own attitude had suffered no change: 'Even when time scatters my ashes to the wind, my soul will remember the oaths it has sworn.' The suggestion was that an army should be sent from Delhi.

Alauddin was anxious to have an officer—preferably a 'slave-officer'—from whom he would not be separated by the isolation that is inevitable in a monarchy. He had selected Malik Shahin, but when Shahin fled away from Chitor, Alauddin gave his place to Malik Kafur. It was necessary that Alauddin's favourite officer should be a person whose capacity and talents could not be challenged. Kafur had done well in the campaign against Kabk. Alauddin now decided to place him in charge of the thirty thousand horsemen, who had been collected for the Devagiri campaign. According to Ferishta, the Sultan took very definite steps to place Kafur above all other officers. The royal canopy and the royal pavilion were sent with him; the officers were directed to pay respects to him every day and to take their orders from him. Sirajuddin Khwaja Haji, the minister of war, a man of industry and talents but accustomed to take orders, was given immediate charge of the army. Directions were sent to Ainul Mulk Multani and Alp Khan that they were to give all possible assistance to Kafur and give him no cause of complaint.²

The *Khazainul Futuh* tells us that the Sultan had ordered that the Rai and his family were not to be injured in any way and this order was, of course, obeyed. Kafur assembled his men at Tilpat, the usual first stage, and then marched to Devagiri through Dhar and reached it by the pass known as Ghati Sagun. According to Khusrau, the Devagiri army offered a weak resistance and then split into two parts; Rama Deva surrendered but his son fled away with a part of the army, and the baggage of the fugitives was divided between the government and the victorious soldiers. But Ferishta says that 'when Kafur entered the Deccan, he took the inhabitants under his affectionate protection and would not allow even an ant to be injured'.³

² Ferishta quotes two lost works—the *Mulhīqat of Atmuddin Bijāpurī* and the *Nuskha-i Jahan Ara* of Qazi Ahmad Ghaffari. It is impossible to check his account, but it has only been accepted so far as it is consistent with contemporary authorities.

³ Isami cannot be correct in stating that the city of Devagiri was plundered for a second time. It was a part of Alauddin's policy to win over both the Rai and his people.

Rama Deva, he further tells us, considered fighting futile; so he left his eldest son, Singhana, at Devagiri and came out to meet Kafur. Kafur took him to Delhi and on the way 'he completely won over Kafur's heart'. Alauddin had pearls and precious stones showered on Rama Deva's head when he entered the court and kept him as his guest at Delhi for six months. 'Every day', says Khusrau, 'his status and honour increased till, like the crescent moon, in the course of time he attained to the full circle of light.' Ferishta says that 'the honour accorded to Rama Deva was such that the people of the court could make no distinction between him and the Sultan'. He also suggests that it was not all due to policy; 'Alauddin realized that his kingship had been due to the treasure of Devagiri'. Ultimately, Rama Deva was presented with one lakh⁴ of gold *tankas*, given the title of *Rai Rayan* with the privilege of 'a dawn-coloured (*shafaq-rang*) canopy' and allowed to depart. The Gujarat district of Nausari was transferred to him as a gift. It was probably during this visit that he gave his daughter, Jhatyapali, in marriage to Alauddin.

Dawal Rani

In writing this famous poem, Khusrau has not done any violence to historical facts, but he is not responsible for the errors of later writers. During the first invasion of Gujarat, the officers of Alauddin had captured a part of Rai Karan's *haram*. Among the captives was one of the Rai's wives, Rani Kamla Devi. The lady's anxiety was partly diminished when she found that she would be put in the royal *haram*. Accommodating herself to her changed circumstances, she won the Sultan's affection by her great beauty and her devoted services. Sometime in 1306-7, finding the Sultan in a good mood, she made a request. She had two daughters by Rai Karan; the first was dead, but the second, who was six months old when she started for Delhi, had survived. Would the Sultan's kindness get her this daughter, Dawal Rani? Alauddin sent an order to Rai Karan asking him that this girl of seven or eight be sent immediately.

It is difficult to believe with Amir Khusrau that Karan was elated by the order, but he was prepared to obey it, because it meant peace with Delhi and the security of his diminished kingdom. But before Dawal Rani could start, Alauddin's policy changed; he ordered Baglana to be annexed and Dawal Rani to be seized by force. Singhana, the elder son of Rama Deva, wanted to marry Dawal Rani, but as the Baghelas considered themselves higher in caste-status than the Yadavas, Karan was reluctant to agree to the match. But when

4. Isami says 2 lakhs of gold *tankas*.

Karan was a fugitive in Maharashtra, Singhana renewed his suit and sent his younger brother, Bhillama, with a small number of soldiers to bring the girl. Karan, who was being pursued by Alp Khan, was not in a position to refuse and handed over his daughter. But just a *farsang* from Devagiri, Bhillama met a contingent of Alp Khan's force led by Dilawar Panchami, and in the struggle that ensued Dawal Rani's horse was wounded by an arrow and could proceed no further. Dilawar caught hold of its bridle and took her to Alp Khan, 'who kept her as his own child' and then sent her to Delhi. Obviously, all this happened before Malik Kafur's invasion. Alp Khan retired to Gujarat; he had no orders concerning Devagiri affairs.⁵

THE WARANGAL CAMPAIGN⁶

Our most authoritative account of Malik Kafur's campaigns in the Far South is the *Khazainul Futuh* of Amir Khusrau. But though this work has survived as a literary gem through the centuries, its historical value was only brought to light by Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Sir Henry Elliot. Most Persian medieval historians did not know of it and have been content to copy Barani. Barani wrote long after the events; he had a very erroneous knowledge of Deccan geography and on two important matters his memory deceived him and his errors have been repeated by all historians who have depended upon him. Malik Kafur did not go to Devagiri on his way to Warangal; it was not necessary. Secondly, Rama Deva was not dead when Kafur went there on his way to Ma'abar; he was alive and gave Kafur and his troops a warm welcome.

However, there are two statements of Barani which deserve careful consideration. Malik Kafur had by now established his reputation and Alauddin put him in charge of the army that was to march to Warangal after giving him careful instructions, which may be summarized as follows :

5 Ferishta, who had studied the *Dawal Rani* and recommends it to his readers, adds the following. Singhana had sent Bhillama *without his father's permission*. When Alp Khan was unable to find Karan, he retired to the bank of a river to rest for two days. Some three or four hundred of his men obtained his permission to visit the famous Ellora Caves; in the course of their journey they saw a Maratha army, and presuming that it was hostile, they began to fight. But it was really Bhillama escorting Dawal Rani. When her horse was wounded, one of her female attendants shouted: 'This is Dawal Rani; have regard for her honour.' She was immediately taken to Alp Khan.

6 *Khazainul Futuh*, 73-116; Isami, 281-83; Barani, 157-63; the late Professor Krishnaswami Aiyangar's Introduction to Professor Habib's translation of *Khazainul Futuh* (*Campaigns of Alauddin Khalji*), XXI-XXVIII, in which he tries to interpret the route taken by Malik Kafur; Ferishta, 151-63; Dr. K. S. Lal, *Khaljis*, 193-200; Hodivala, 251-55.

'You are going to a far off land; do not remain there long. You must put in all your efforts to capture Warangal and overthrow Rai Rudra Deva, but if the Rai gives up his treasures, elephants and horses, and promises a tribute for the future, accept this arrangement and do not insist, for the sake of your reputation, that the Rai should present himself before you or that you should bring him to Delhi. Behave in a proper way towards the maliks and amirs and pay due regard to the dignity of the great commanders. Do not undertake any enterprise without consulting Khwaja Haji and the great maliks. Treat the soldiers with affection; there must be no unnecessary harshness or cruelty. Do not be guilty of any act or deed that may lead to trouble. Overlook small faults and peculations in the army. Keep yourself aware of all that is good and bad in the officers. Order the amirs not to hold meetings or go to each other's camps. Further, in your treatment of the amirs, do not be so gentle that they become bold and disobedient or so severe that they become your enemies and begin to hate you. Apart from gold and silver, do not be severe in exacting the fifth of the spoils.⁷ If an amir wants to keep a few slaves or horses he has captured, leave them to him. If a malik or amir wants a loan for himself or his soldiers, take a receipt from him and advance him the money. If a horse, whether belonging to an officer or a trooper, is stolen by a thief or killed in battle or perishes from some other cause, give him a better horse from the state-stables, but ask Khwaja Haji to keep a record in his office of the loss of all such horses, for this is necessary for the purpose of government.'⁸

Barani also gives us an idea of the arrangements made by Alauddin for the rapid communication of official news. 'When Alauddin sent an army on an expedition, it was his practice to establish post-stations (*thanas*) from Tilpat, which was the first stage, to the place where the army was operating or till such place as the post-stations could be established. Fast-running horses were stabled at every stage, and through the whole route runners on foot (*dhawas*) used to sit at a distance of half a *karoh* or one-sixth of a *karoh* (*dang-i karoh*) from one another (to carry the mail to the next man). At every town on the way and at places where the horses were stabled, news-writers

⁷ According to the Quranic law, 'Allah and his Messenger' were entitled to a fifth of the spoils and four-fifths went to the soldiers. But this law was meant for volunteers and not for enlisted soldiers, who were entitled to their salary both in peace and war. According to the tradition of the Delhi sultanat all things of value—precious stones, gold, silver, elephants, horses, etc.—were the exclusive monopoly of the state; one-fifth of the rest, slaves, corn, cattle and the like, went to the soldiers.

⁸ Barani, 327-28.

were also stationed. Thus every day, or every second or third day, information of what the army was doing was conveyed to Sultan and the army was informed of the Sultan's welfare. Owing to this arrangement no false rumours could be spread either in the city or the army.⁹

The army started with the red canopy and the red pavilion on 31 October 1309 (25 Jamadi I A.H. 709). Some indications of the line of march are given by Khusrau, but it is difficult to interpret them. Some of the cities mentioned by him are no more; also several other factors entered into the choice of the route of which we can form no idea now—the availability of provisions, the attitude of the local inhabitants and their chiefs, and the condition of the roads. It will be best to follow Khusrau and leave unsettled questions for future investigations.

After nine days the army reached Masudpur, which is named after king Mas'ud.¹⁰ The army started to march again on 13 November 1309 (Monday, 6 Jamadi II A.H. 709). The road was now very uneven, the rush of rain-water had caused fissures in the hill-sides, and there were hard rocks and thorny bushes. In the course of six days' march the army crossed five rivers by fords—Jun, Chambal, Kunwari (Kuwari), Binas and Bhoji¹¹ and reached Sultanpur, also

9 Barani, 330-31. Since Qara Beg was with the army at Warangal, we cannot accept Barani's story that he (Qara Beg) and Qazi Mughiruddin of Bayana were sent by the Sultan to Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya to find out what had happened as no news had arrived from the army for some forty days.

10 The word *pur* in Persian means 'son' and in Hindi it means a 'city or town'. There could have been no 'confusion' in Khusrau's mind about the matter as Professor Hodivala (251) seems to think. But there is a clerical error, and the sentence is put right if we read the Persian text as follows: *Wa dar an muqam, kt az Masud, pur-i badshah (Shamsuddin Iltutmish), nami gashta ast*—'At this place which has become famous after Mas'ud, son of king (Shamsuddin Iltutmish).' Khusrau wished to indicate the particular Mas'ud after whom the place was named and also his knowledge of the two meanings of the word *pur*. The city has not till now been traced. Dr. Aiyangar says we will have to locate it near Bharatpur.

11 These rivers have been written by Elliot as 'Jun, Chambal, Kunwari, Niyas and Bahuji'. 'Jun', writes Professor Aiyangar, 'seems to be the small river that passes through Bayana to fall into the Jumna (XXIII)'. Chambal is too well-known to need discussion. Kunwari is now known as Kuwari. Elliot identified the Niyas and the Bahuji with the Sind and the Betwa, and Dr. Aiyangar follows him in this identification. It should suffice to quote Prof. Hodivala's constructive arguments on the matter (251-52); 'When everything is considered, it seems that Khusrau's "Niyas" (or Binas) is meant for the "Niwaj" and his "Bahuji" (or "Bhoji") is intended for the "Pahuj"... Thornton tells us that the *Niwaj* is one of the tributaries of the Kali Sind, the two streams meeting 35 miles below the Makundra Pass. (*Gaz.* 479, 524). The Chambal is a tributary of the Jumna. The Kunwari, Niwaj and Pabuj are all branches of the Sind, which itself is an affluent of, and falls into, the Chambal. The Pahuj rises in a lake about 25 miles south-west of Jhansi and falls into the Sind.'

known as Irajpur.¹² Here there was a halt of four days. On 25 November 1309 (Sunday, 19 Jamadi II A.H. 709) the army began to move again across a stony road. After a journey of eleven days Khandar¹³ was reached on 5 December 1309 (1 Rajab 709). Here there was a halt of fourteen days so that a review of the army might be held. 'The leaders, maliks and distinguished men of the army used to assemble before the red canopy.' When the army started again, it had to cross heights and depths and to wade through streams, large and small. The greatest river it had to cross was the Narbada, 'which looked like a survival of (Noah's) Deluge'. 'Eight days after crossing the Narbada, they reached Nilkanth',¹⁴ and as Nilkanth was within the frontiers of Devagiri, order was given that no harm was to be done to the houses and fields of the farmers. There was again a halt of two days for making inquiries about the road ahead. On 30 December 1309 (Tuesday, 26 Rajab 709) the marching-drums beat again; 'the road rose and fell like the beats of a palpitating heart' and after great difficulties, for which there was no remedy, the road to Telingana was reached.

'The road now was thinner than a guitar-string and darker than the hair of a beauty's locks.' Khusrau tries to give the impression of roaring torrents and of men and animals slipping down the hill-side; and then, to try the army further, clouds appeared to rain down their 'imperfect pearls'. Ultimately, after crossing the hills, the army reached 'the precincts of Bijagarh';¹⁵ 'it was a *doab* between two rivers, the Bihar and the Baragi, and they also found a land in which there

12 'This Irajpur', Prof. Hodivala remarks, 'is an unsolved puzzle. I suggest that it is Irich. It is a place of considerable antiquity and its geographical situation is such as to give it a considerable importance. Irich lies 65 miles south-east and Chanderi 105 miles south of Gwalior (253).' Barani says that the *amirs* of Hindustan met Kafur at Chanderi, but Khusrau does not refer anywhere to Chanderi. These *amirs* must have met Kafur at Irich. We have to ignore the places referred to by Barani and Ferishta because they assume, very incorrectly, that Kafur went to Warangal *via* Devagiri.

13 It has been hitherto impossible to identify this place (Hodivala, 253 and Dr. Aiyangar, XXV). Dr. Aiyangar identified it with the railway junction, Khanda, across the Narbada. But the difficulty, as Prof. Hodivala points out, is that the Narbada was crossed after, and not before, Khanda.

14 Dr. Aiyangar suggests that Nilkanth was somewhere near the Tapti (XXV).

15 'Professor Habib on the basis of the British Museum manuscript (which was copied from an original written eleven years after Khusrau's death) writes Basiragarh; Elliot writes Bijanagar. "Basiragarh" is a misreading of "Bavagarh", i.e. Wairagarh. It is now in Garh-Chiroli tahsil of Chanda district, CP and is situated very close to the left bank of the Wain Ganga on a tributary of that river, called the Kabragarhi, about 80 miles south-east of Nagpur. . . . The names of the rivers which formed the *doab* or *interamnia* are manifestly corrupt. The diamond mine of Wairagarh is mentioned by Ferishta (I, 323) and Abul Fazl (*Ain*, tr. II, 230).' (Hodivala, 254.)

were signs of a diamond mine'. That very day, Malik Kafur, marching forward with some chosen horsemen, reached the fort of Sarbar,¹⁶ which is counted among the territories of Telingana. Without allowing the horses any rest, investment of the fort was ordered. The besiegers shot arrows and rawats inside the fort shouted 'Mar! Mar!' (Shoot! Shoot!). It appears from Khusrau's account that the rawats in the fort were taken unawares. 'Some of them lighted a *jauhar-fire* and threw themselves into it with their wives and children.' The besiegers burst into the fort and the sword began to slay those whom the fire had spared. The remaining *muqaddams* were prepared to die fighting, but then Khwaja Haji intervened. Ananir, a brother of the *muqaddam* of the fort, who had disappeared, was found hiding in a field. He was brought and put in charge of the fort; 'they gave life to this dead lamp of the Hindus so that he may put an end to the fire of disturbances'. Refugees from the fort found their way to Warangal.

The proper course for the rawats of Telingana, in case they had the support of the masses, would have been to wage a guerilla war throughout the land; even if popular support was not forthcoming, they should have organized resistance in separate areas by rapidly moving columns. Either plan would have succeeded, for the invading army had a limited time at its disposal and would have perished in an attempt to subdue the whole of Telingana. But the rawats made Kafur's work easy for him by flying to Rai Radra Deva at Warangal; the task of the invader, by this unwise move, was greatly simplified; he would get all he wanted by reducing a single fort.

On 14 January 1310 (Saturday, 10 Sha'ban 709) the army marched from Sarbar and reached the cultivated fields of Kunarbal¹⁷ on 18 January (14 Sha'ban). While the camp was being pitched, Kafur despatched a thousand selected horsemen to the suburbs of Warangal to find interpreters. From among them two officers and forty horsemen mounted the Anam Konda¹⁸ Hill from which the houses and

16 'Sarbar must be Sirpur—Tandur, now in Adilabad district, Haidarabad State... Sirpur was the capital of the southern Gond kingdom before Ballalpur. Ballalpur itself was superseded by Chanda, after which place the kingdom itself came to be called and it is always mentioned under that name in the Mughal histories. Warangal is due south of Sirpur.' (Hodivala, 254-55).

Ferishta and CHI (III, 112) are incorrect in bringing Kafur to Indur (modern Nizamabad), which is south-west of Warangal.

17 Dr. Aiyangar says that Kunarbal may possibly be a village, Kunar, not far from Warangal, but a little to the south of it by south-west. This is unlikely as Kafur was north of Warangal. Prof. Hodivala is inclined to identify Kunarbal with Gurapalli in the district of Elgandol or Karimnagar. 'Elgandol is less than 30 miles due north of Hannan Konda.'

18 According to Prof. Hodivala 'the Anam Konda (or An Makinda) of Khusrau is Hannam Konda, which was the capital of the Kakitya rulers before Warangal' (255).

gardens of Warangal were clearly visible. They came across three Hindu horsemen, killed one of them with a four-feathered arrow, and sent his body to the commander. Malik Kafur himself went round to inspect the fort in the heat of the sun. 'On this day Khwaja Haji also carefully observed some strong positions of defence.'

The fort of Warangal had two ramparts or fort-walls, each surrounded by a ditch. Pratap Rudra Deva resided in the inner fort, that had a rampart of stone. The rawats took their posts in the outer fort, which was much more extensive and was protected by a mud-wall. 'But this wall was so hard that no steel instrument could pierce it and a *munjaniq*-stone rebounded from it like a nut thrown by a boy.' The banners of the garrison were fluttering in the breeze and the rawats were busy in preparing stones for the *munjaniqs* and *iradas* and slings for shooting bricks.

Next day (15 Sha'ban, 19 January) the tent of Malik Kafur was pitched on the Anam Konda Hill and the royal pavilion before the gate of the fort. During the succeeding night Nasirul Mulk Sirajud-daulah Khwaja Haji with a lighted lamp personally assigned the sections of the army to their positions, so that the fort was completely surrounded. 'Every *tuman* (10,000 soldiers) was assigned 1,200 yards and the circumference of the tents surrounding the fort was 12,546 yards.' A strong wooden wall (*kath-garh*) was constructed round the tents to secure them against attacks from the open country. Manik Deva, a *muqaddam* of the territory, made a midnight attack during the full moon with a thousand horsemen but it failed disastrously. Some captives revealed that three elephants were kept at Dhamdum, a town among the hills six *farsangs* from Warangal. Malik Qara Beg *Maisara* was sent to seize them, but though they had been removed to another place, he nevertheless succeeded in bringing them.

The *sabat* and *gargaj* were raised higher than the level of the fort, and the ditch in front of them was filled up. The fort-wall, which was about a hundred cubits (*dast*) in breadth, was so broken on one side with the blows of hard stones that it was now lower than the arm-pits of the Hindus while on the other side many doors were opened in it with the *munjaniq*-stones. The plan was to build a *pasheb* 'from the middle of the ditch to the waist of the fort-wall so wide that a hundred men may be able to march on it abreast'. But this would take a lot of time. So a council of maliks summoned by Malik Kafur decided on immediate assault. Malik Kafur ordered every contingent (*khail*) to prepare its tall ladders and other equipment during the moon-lit night of 13 February (11 Ramazan) and to be ready for the attack next morning. When the sun was a spear high

on 14 February the war-drums gave the order for assault. Some soldiers tried to climb up the fort-wall and others tried to dig up its foundation with their pick-axes, while *munjaniqs* shot stones from both sides. Khusrau's statement that 'half the fort-wall or rampart flew up to the sky as dust while the other half fell to the ground like ordinary earth' is an exaggeration, for it is contradicted by his statement that 'by sunset the besiegers had seized a wing of the ramparts'. After hard struggles on 15 and 16 February the invaders succeeded in capturing the outer fort and planted their banners on its ramparts. Before them now was the second ditch and beyond the ditch the stone-fort, 'with its walls so smooth that an ant could not climb them, its stones so artistically joined together that the point of a pick-axe would not dare to harm them and so beautifully constructed that no *munjaniq* would have the heart to do them any injury'. The invaders were thinking of how to negotiate the ditch without any boats, when the war came to an end because Rai Rudra Deva, who had been guarding his treasure like the traditional Indian snake, decided to surrender.

No historical importance attaches to the speeches Amir Khusrau has composed for the two parties. The conversation was carried on in 'the Hindi tongue, which is sharper than the Hindi sword (*mohannad*)', but figures of speech, terms of Aristotelian logic and Persian words of double meaning (in which Khusrau delights) could not have been used. The Rai sent a golden image of himself with a chain round its neck in token of submission.¹⁹ He was prepared to part with his treasures and promise a yearly tribute. He could give 20,000 horses, both Indian and from overseas (*bahri wa kahi*), and one hundred young and powerful elephants; 'they were the mad elephants of Ma'abar and not the vegetarian elephants of Bengal'. He had enough gold to gild all the hills of India and an enormous stock of precious stones of all varieties. After the Rai's *basiths* or messengers had prostrated their foreheads before the red canopy, they overcame Malik Kafur's hesitation by reminding him of the Sultan's order and swore by the head of Khizr Khan (that they would keep their promise) if the war was stopped. Kafur put back his sword in its scabbard, extended his right hand and struck the backs of the messengers with the palm of his hand in token of his favours.

During the night the Rai's officers collected his treasures and brought them next morning before Kafur, 'who was sitting on the

¹⁹ According to the *Khazainul Futuh* and Barani, Rai Rudra Deva did not come to Kafur personally. This seems to be correct and in consonance with the Sultan's directives. But in the *Dawal Rani* (70) Khusrau says that Kafur insisted on the Rai's coming and that he did come.

high place allotted to him by the Sultan, while the other officers took their customary seats and the nobles and commons collected together like stars'. In reply to Kafur's question as to whether the Rai had sent all his jewels, his messengers replied: 'Among these treasures is a *jauhar* (precious stone) unrivalled in the world, though according to wise philosophers such a *jauhar* (substance) cannot even exist.'²⁰ The work could not have been finished in one day, for Khusrau proceeds to tell us:

'When everything that the Rai had received in inheritance from his paternal and maternal ancestors was sent by him through messengers perfect in logic, the total was more than the minds of the wise could apprehend. Nevertheless, the minister of war (*arz-i mamalik*) stood before the jewels, divided them grade by grade and had every stone written down at its proper place.'

The future tribute, Khusrau tells us jokingly, was to be 'the Hīndi figure one followed by ten zeros, each zero indicating a treasure, to be paid yearly to the agents of the Sultan. May God keep him alive till the Day of Judgement!'

A review (*arz*) of the army was held; it started its return journey on 20 March 1310 (16 Shawwal 709) and reached Delhi on 9 June 1310 (10 Muharram 710). On 23 June 1310 (24 Muharram 710) the Sultan's black pavilion was pitched on the Chautra-i Subhani, near the Badaun Gate, and treasures carried on a thousand camels were reviewed. Arrangements were made so that the general public could also see the treasures.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF DWARA SAMUDRA AND MA'ABAR²¹

By now, as Khusrau remarks, the Mongols had been driven back to Ghazni and even their forward contingents had not the courage to cross the Indus. The empire of Alauddin extended from sea to sea.

²⁰ Khafi Khan, who had no access to the *Khazainul Futuh*, declares on the basis of tradition that the *Kuh-i Nur* was brought from Warangal by Malik Kafur. It is difficult to say when it got this name. *Jauhar* in Persian may mean either a precious stone or 'substance' as distinct from 'attributes'. God is the Unique Substance (*jauhar*) or 'Necessary Existence', but this stone (*jauhar*) is also unrivalled as a stone.

²¹ The most, in fact the only, reliable authority about this campaign is the *Khazainul Futuh* of Amir Khusrau, 112-72. Barani, 332-34, Isami, 285-90, and Ferishta, Vol. I, 119-20, give some correct facts with a lot of inaccuracies. For modern works, see Dr. Aiyangar, Introduction to Prof. Habib's translation of the *Khazainul Futuh*, XXIX-XXXIX; Hodivala, 256-58; Dr. K. S. Lal, *Khaljis*, 201-21.

It is not possible to point out the inaccuracies of all writers. But the following errors of medieval Persian writers should be noted. Dwara Samudra is written as

So he decided to send another expedition to the Far South under Malik Kafur, who among other things expected to capture over 500 elephants. The journey from Delhi to Ma'abar and back took a whole year.

On 17 November 1310 (Wednesday, 24 Jamadi II 710) the royal canopy was moved from Delhi. But it was first taken to the plain of Tankal on the bank of the Jumna, where the minister of war, Khwaja Haji, held a review for fourteen days. On 2 December 1310 (9 Rajab 710) the drum beat for march in the morning and after twenty-one long stages the army reached Katihun.²² For seventeen days more (beyond Katihun) the army crossed high hills and deep valleys and three rivers, the greatest of which was the Narbada, till it reached Khargaon.²³ Here there was a stop of twenty days for a second review. All persons, present or absent, were counted. Twenty-three elephants sent by the Rai of Telingana as tribute joined the army here. On 29 January 1311 (Friday, 7 Ramazan A.H. 710) the army started from Khargaon, and after crossing the Tapti and other rivers, it reached Devagiri on 3 February 1311 (Thursday, 13 Ramazan A.H. 710). Rama Deva had made every possible preparation to welcome the army.²⁴

Dhur Samandar; *Samandar* in Hindi means 'the sea'; in Persian it also means the mythical salamander. We need not be surprised if Persian writers (including Khusrau and Ferishta) make the mistake of thinking that Dwara Samudra was near the sea. The name of Parsu Ram Deva, the Dalavai, (chief of Pandarpur), is written as Paras Dev Dalvi, and *dalv* in Persian means 'a bucket'. The Sanskrit *vira*, meaning a warrior or hero, is written in Persian as *bir*, which means 'a well'. Unfortunately, the names of two southern princes began with the word *vira*—Vira Ballala and Vira Pandya—and our writers are not sure whether by *bir* they are referring to a person or to a place. Bilal was also the name of a famous African Companion of the Prophet, who used to give the call to prayer. Lastly, *deva* in Sanskrit means 'a god', while its Persian equivalent, *deo*, means 'a demon or a giant'. With so many words with a double meaning, it is not always easy to interpret Khusrau's allusions and figures of speech. Khusrau almost always refers to the army of Delhi as the Turkish army, though the commander-in-chief was a Gujarati and the soldiers were drawn from all sections of the Indian people.

22 'There is no place that is identified with anything like Katihun that Khusrau speaks of; at any rate there is nothing satisfactory so far. But having regard to the length of the march and the summary description, we may possibly take it that the stage Katihun was somewhere near the region of Nagda.' (Dr. Aiyangar).

23 'I venture to say that "Ghargaon" is "Khargaon", now in Nimar district. It lies on the Kundi river, a tributary of the Narbada. Thornton describes it as a decayed town with a wall and a fort in Nimar zilla, lying 60 miles south of Indore. Khargaon lies about 25 miles east of the strong fortress of Bijagarh and Khafi Khan says that Bijagarh was also called Khargaon.' (Hodivala).

24 Khusrau is very definite about Rama Deva being alive at the time and of his welcoming the imperial army. It is unfortunate that so many writers, including Dr.

'He had ordered the city to be adorned like paradise and everything needed by the army to be brought to the *bazars*. . . Every *bazar* was planned on a different pattern. Money-changers (*sarrafs*) sat with large and small bags containing gold and silver *tankas*. The cloth-merchants (*bazzaz*) could provide every fabric from *bahar-i Hind* to *baward-i Khurasan*. . . Fruits lay in heaps. . . Everyone could buy commodities at a just price. The Turks did not oppress the Hindus and the will of the Hindus was not opposed to the Turks. But the army was unable to stay for more than three or four days in Devagiri in order to arrange itself into formations of one thousand and ten thousands and to replenish its stocks. Rama Deva had instructed his frontier-chief, Parasuram Deva, the Dalavai,²⁵ to help the imperial army. The Dalavai (*Dalvi*) sat waiting for it with his mouth open, like a bucket (*dalv*) which wishes to swallow the sea (*samandar*); also as *Dalvi* was a bucket raised up by the imperial officers, he desired to draw the two *birs* (wells)—Vira Ballala and Vira Pandya—along with the surrounding seas into a single cup.'

Leaving Devagiri on 7 February 1311 (Wednesday, 17 Ramazan A.H. 710) the army reached Bandri (Pandarpur)²⁶ in the territory of Parasuram in five days after crossing three rivers, Sini, Godavari and Binhur.²⁷ Parasuram helped Kafur in getting correct information and the following facts were revealed. The two rais of Ma'abar used to be of one mind (*yak rai*). But then Sundar Pandya, the younger brother, 'for political reasons coloured his palm with the blood of his murdered father', and Vira Pandya, the elder brother, leaving his two cities unguarded, marched with several thousand Hindus to slay alive the parricide. Hearing that the two cities were no longer protected by their *Maha-rai*, Ballala Deva, the Rai of Dwara Samudra, marched forward with the intention of plundering the bankers (*mahajans*) of the two cities. But then he heard of the imperial force and turned back to his capital.

'The responsibility, in such matters,' says Khusrau, 'lies with the great maliks.' They decided that it was necessary to attack Ballala Deva before he could prepare his defences; so 10,000 soldiers were

Aiyangar, who had the translation of the *Khazainul Futuh* in his hands, follow Barani, whose memory had clearly failed him, and refer to Rama Deva as dead.

²⁵ This was his correct name according to Dr. Aiyangar (XXIX).

²⁶ Dr. Aiyangar gives Pandarpur as the correct name of the town. 'Pandarpur was probably the frontier station, and that was within the government of Parasuram Deva Dalavai. We have reference to an inscription of the Hoysala Vira Somesvara discovered here. It is, therefore, clear that Pandarpur was the frontier station between the two kingdoms of Ballala and Yadava.' (XXX).

²⁷ Pahnur in the original; Dr. Aiyangar calls it Binhur, and Professor Hodivala calls it Bhima.

selected and led by Kafur to Dwara Samudra. They reached there after a journey of twelve days and surrounded it on 26 February 1311 (Thursday, 5 Shawwal A.H. 710). 'You see a strong fort surrounded by water and its name is *Bir* (well); there is water within a well (*bir*) but here is a well (*bir*) within water.'²⁸ Next morning Kafur went round the fort and took his position before the main gate along with the leading maliks.

On the night of Friday, after the night-prayer, the Rai sent an officer, named Gesu Mal, to inquire about the besieging force. Gesu reported that 'the attack would be delivered next morning and the fort flattened like a prayer-carpet'. Khusrau has tried to guess the discussions within the fort but he had no means of knowing them. However on the morning of Friday, Balak Deva Nayak with other messengers appeared before the royal canopy to plead for Ballala Deva's life on the same terms as Rama Deva and Rudra Deva; he would give up all his treasures, horses and elephants in return for peace. At this place—and quite inconsistently with the plan of his whole book—Khusrau makes Kafur talk like a missionary as well as a plunderer. The Rai's messengers were told: 'My order from the Sultan for Ballala Deva and all other rais is this. *First*, I am to offer them the two negatives of the (Muslim) Oath of Affirmation—"There is *no* God *but* Allah." If they do not accept it, I am to put the yoke of tribute (*zimmah*) on their necks; if they do not agree to this even, then I will put no burden on their necks, but free their necks even from the burden of their heads.' Kafur had no authority to make the acceptance of Islam an alternative to plunder and tribute; and in any case it is Khusrau, and not Kafur, who is speaking.

To prevent misunderstanding, the Rai's messengers requested that two imperial agents be sent with them; this seemed a reasonable proposal and Kafur directed two Hindu Pramar *hajibs* (messengers) to go with them. Ballala Deva told them that he would keep nothing with himself except his sacred thread, 'which is bound up with Hinduism and with which Hinduism is bound'. He also undertook to pay a yearly tribute in future. When this was reported to Kafur, 'he removed the notch of anger from his brow and put his bow on its rack'. Kafur had succeeded in his attempt of attacking Dwara Samudra before it could prepare to resist, and there was no bloodshed worth mentioning.

²⁸ It seems that Khusrau applies the term, *Bir*, to the fort, and Dwara Samudra to the city or to the whole territory of the Hoysalas. But this conclusion is contradicted by his remark: 'After all this fort is known as *Bir* and Dwara Samudra' (129-30). He never uses the word Hoysala and has no name for the whole territory of Ballala Deva.

On the same morning²⁹ Balak Deva Nayak, Main Deva and Jitmal with a handful of other messengers of the Rai came out of the fort, prostrated themselves before the royal canopy and offered thirty-six elephants. On Tuesday morning the Rai sent his horses. On Sunday morning after sunrise the Rai himself came out of the fort and was allowed to depart after he had prostrated himself before the royal canopy so that he may send his treasures. The whole night was spent in collecting the Rai's valuables and they were handed over to the officers of the imperial treasury. 'In this capital, the four cities of which are four months' march (from Delhi), there had to be a stop of twelve days so that the main army may catch up.³⁰ The elephants of Dwara Samudra were sent to Delhi.' Some later writers have said that Ballala Deva guided the Delhi army in plundering Ma'abar and then came to Delhi. There is no authority for either statement. Khusrau is silent on the point and his silence is significant. The officers of Ballala Deva would have been helpful guides in Ma'abar, but they were just not available.

On 10 March 1311 (Thursday, 18 Shawwal A.H. 710) the warriors started for Ma'abar. They had to negotiate a difficult route and 'every night they slept on ground more uneven than a camel's back'. After a march of five days, when the frontier of Ma'abar was reached, they found a high mountain trying to protect the territory, but there was a pass on each side of it, one Tarmali, the other Tabar.³¹ They pierced through the passes like an arrow and encamped on the sand-bank by the side of a river³² (Kaveri). Then they reached a fort, called Mardi,³³ which they took with the beat of drums. On a Thursday in Ziqad³⁴ (March) the army started from the bank of Kanvari (Kaveri) in the direction of Bir-Dhol³⁵ (Vira-Chola) in search of Vira Pandya.

29 Khusrau does not say that it was the same morning, but says it was Friday, 6 Shawwal (27 February 1311).

30 Malik Kafur reached Dwara Samudra on the 5th of Shawwal and left it on the 17th of the same month.

31 Dr. Aiyangar is inclined to identify Tabar with Toppur, 'a village where there is a little stream, which is called Toppur river'. 'Tarmali is probably the Tarmangalan river, or a pass a little to the west of Tarmangalan.'

32 'The river where they came for the night must have been the Kaveri.' (Dr. Aiyangar).

33 *Mardi* (courage) is used by Khusrau so that he may contrast it with *Na-mardi* (cowardice), which characterized its inhabitants.

34 There is a clerical error here; the copyist has forgotten to write the date given by Khusrau.

35 The city of 'Bir-Dhol' is too important in this campaign to be ignored. *Bir* may mean 'well' or Vira Pandya. Here it probably means the latter. *Dhol* may have been used by Khusrau to mean 'drum' in Hindi. 'Bir-Dhol' may thus be equated with the 'drum (or capital) of Vira Pandya'. Dr. K. S. Aiyangar writes: 'Unfortunately for

Owing to the civil war between the two brothers, no resistance was possible; both could only think in terms of flight. Khusrau's account completely disproves the statement of some writers that one of the brothers sought the help of the Delhi army. Kafur, as we shall see, struck against both brothers.

When the imperial army neared Vira-Chola, Vira Pandya wished to fly to an island in the Arabian sea,³⁶ but for some reason this was not possible. So while the hostile army was in the suburbs of Vira-Chola, Vira Pandya and his rais prepared to escape. After sunset he fled to the city of Kabam³⁷ and, after taking some men and money from there, he proceeded to the city of Kandur (Kannanur). But as he was unable to establish himself here also, he fled to the jungle of elephants and tigers.

At Vira-Chola the army found a body of Musalmans, who were in the service of the Rai. But as the Rai had disappeared, they had to surrender; they deserved to be put to death as apostates, but it was decided to forgive them.

When the imperial army, like a flood, entered Vira-Chola, it found that 'the *Bir* (well) had fled and the *Dhol* (drum) was empty'. Then the Hindu-minded black cloud intervened with its Hindu rainbow, and Khusrau sums up the result: 'You may say that the cloud was a curtain of destiny, which appeared before the victorious army, so that the fugitives may escape.' There was a struggle between the rawats and the imperial army during the rain. 'Then you saw bones on the earth.'

The main army remained encamped at Vira-Chola, but in spite of the fact that the countryside was so flooded that 'it was impossible

us, Amir Khusrau uses the name *Bir-Dhol* once for the capital, another time for the ruler, and contributes to make confusion worse confounded. We have to take "*Bir-Dhol*" to be the equivalent of Vira-Chola. That would be all right if it is applied to the capital.'

It is to be suspected that *Bir-Dhol* is a name invented by Khusrau, for his relevant remarks in the *Dawal Rani* are as follows: 'Here also there was a great Rai, a pearl among Hindu crowned-heads. His rule extended over land and sea; he was a Brahman, named Sundar Pandya. He had made Patan (Masaulipatam) his residence, while his idol and temple were at Barmatpuri. He had a large army and many ships, both Hindus and Musalmans were in his service. When the Sultan's army captured Patan, the misguided Rai lost his way.' Here Patan is the capital of Sundar Pandya and, therefore, *Bir-Dhol*, or 'Drum of Vira Pandya' must be considered as a mere figure of speech invented by Khusrau for the occasion. He had no use for it in the *Dawal Rani*. 'Patan', however, is very indefinite for in Sanskrit it merely means 'a city'.

³⁶ Khusrau frames a long conversation between Vira Pandya and the sea, but it has no historical value.

³⁷ Kabam (k-b-m) has not yet been identified.

to distinguish a road from a well', a contingent was sent in search of Vira Pandya. They saw a village where the Hindus had pitched their tents, like bubbles on the surface of water, but they vanished at the approach of the army. At midnight news was brought that the Rai was at Kandur³⁸ (Kannanur) and the army started for that place in the rain. But the Rai was not there. 'The Hindus were searching for their lost "head" and in the search they lost the "heads" they had.' Some of the rawats may have fought with the courage of despair. 'When the clouds cleared, one hundred and eight elephants loaded with treasures—pearls and precious stones—were discovered and handed over to the officers of the imperial treasury.' It was suspected that Vira Pandya may have gone to Jal-Kota³⁹ (Water-fort), 'the ancient city of his ancestors'. They started in haste for the place but persons coming from Jal-Kota said that the Rai was not there. He had taken refuge in the forest with a few followers and thus saved his life. It was necessary to find Vira Pandya for he alone could make a treaty binding on the territory, but the council of maliks decided that this was a hopeless task and returned to Kannanur (Kandur).

Next morning information was brought that there was a golden temple at Barmatpuri⁴⁰ and that the elephants of the Rai were wandering round it like clouds round the sun. The army started for the place and reached it at midnight. Next morning they captured two hundred and fifty elephants. Kafur then turned to the golden temple, the roof and walls of which were studded with rubies and diamonds. The destruction and plunder was thorough. 'The sword flashed where jewels had once been sparkling; where mire used to be created by rose-water and musk, there was now a mud of blood and dirt; and the stench of blood was emitted by ground once fragrant with musk.' The golden idols, called Ling-i Mahadeva, were broken into pieces and the image of Narayana fell to the ground. Every attempt was made to discover buried treasures. The contingent then marched for the main camp at Vira-Chola and reached it on 3 April

38 'Kandur is undoubted Kannanur on the northern bank of the Coleroon about six miles from Srirangum across the comparatively big river; Kannanur must have been a place of importance at the time, as that happened to be the Hoysala capital down to the time of Vira Ballala.' (Dr. K. S. Aiyangar).

39 'This must have been a strong fortress, which, in the centuries following, played an important part, and which in the days of the British used to be called Devakotta, really Tivukotta, the fortress on the island, popularly spoken of as Tikotai, which is at the mouth of the Coleroon, but in those days extending perhaps northwards to a considerable distance into the island which the river has formed there.' (Dr. K. S. Aiyangar).

40 Dr. Aiyangar identifies it with Brahmapuri-Chidamburam, because it had a golden ceiling.

1311 (Monday, 13 Ziqad A.H. 710). The temple of Vira-Chola was dug up to its foundations.

After ten (? four) days the red canopy began to move. On 7 April 1311 (Thursday, 17 Ziqad 710) it reached the city of Kanum,⁴¹ and from there after five days it reached Mathura (Madura), the capital of the brother, Sundar Pandya. 'The Rai had fled with the *ranis*, leaving two or three elephants in the temple of Jagnar' (Sokkanatha).⁴² Kafur was so angry that he set fire to this temple. The story of Malik Kafur building a mosque at 'Sit Band Ramisar', and the Hindu rais having had the tolerance not to destroy it, is a later-day fabrication. It will be found in Ferishta. But had Kafur built a mosque, Malik Khusrau would have certainly referred to it. If there was a mosque at Rameshvaram in Ferishta's time, it must have been a construction of the succeeding generations.

The work of the army was over. According to Khusrau it had seized 512 elephants, 5,000 horses and 500 *mans* of precious stones. On 25 April 1311 (Sunday, 4 Zil Hij 710) the army started on its return journey. On 19 October 1311 (Monday, 4 Jamadi II 711) Alauddin held a public court (*bar*) to welcome Kafur and the officers of the army. The great maliks and *tikadar rais* stood in rows and the proclamations of *Bismillah* (In the name of God!) and *Hadakallah* (May God lead thee aright!) resounded among the audience. 'The commander-in-chief', says Khusrau, 'had rendered a service which it is difficult to express in words and the amirs and great men with him had risked their lives in reviving the traditions of holy war.' If we equate 'holy war' with 'plunder', then Ferishta is probably correct in saying that the treasures obtained by Alauddin exceeded those of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni. Except in Ma'abar, where the rais could not be found, no temples were plundered. There can be no apology for aggressive force under any circumstances; still the strategy of the two campaigns of the Far South leaves us spell-bound. Alauddin got the two things he wanted—an acknowledgment of his over-lordship and the maximum of treasures with the minimum loss of life; while his wise and farsighted policy of non-annexation enabled Kafur to lead the most successful campaigns into the Deccan and the Far South during the middle ages.

41 The main army must have started at least four days after it had been joined by the contingent; 'ten' seems a clerical error. Professor Aiyangar identifies Kanum with Kadambavanum.

42 'Elliot's suggestion that the temple was dedicated to Jagannath, i.e. Vishnu, is discountenanced by Dr. Aiyangar, who assures us that "Jagnar" is a corruption of "Chokkanath" which is one of the alternative Tamil names of Siva or Sundraresha, the patron deity of the town of Madura.' (Hodivala, 257).

VII. ALAUDDIN KHALJI — THE LAST YEARS; KAFUR

MASSACRE OF THE NEW MUSLIMS¹

BEFORE THE GREAT ASSEMBLY met on 19 October 1311, the Sultan had terrified the country by a planned and wholesale massacre. The Sultan had appointed five officers with Kafur, whose duty it was to go forward and collect news in Ma'abar. One of these, a converted Mongol or New Muslim, Abaji Mughal, decided to join the Hindus and asked his interpreter to inform the Hindus of this fact. But the Hindu attack was unexpected and sudden and the interpreter was killed by an arrow. When after three days Abaji returned to the main camp, Kafur imprisoned him. When the army reached Delhi, the Sultan ordered Abaji to be beheaded. This led to a conspiracy.

'There were more than ten thousand New Muslims or Mongols in Delhi at the time.' According to Barani some New Muslim amirs had been unemployed for years and their salaries and *in'ams*, according to the rules of the treasury, had been greatly reduced. Since the Sultan came out to fly his hawks wearing only a cloak of one cloth² and the persons with him were not armed, the conspirators hoped that two or three hundred Mongol horsemen would be able to kill the Sultan and his *entourage* and establish a government of New Muslims and their Indian followers. 'When the welfare of the state was concerned,' Barani remarks, 'Alauddin had no regard for any restraint—either of religion or blood-relationship or the rights of others.' The conspiracy was discovered by the Sultan's agents and he issued a confidential order to his officers that all New Muslims in the empire, 'who held *jagirs*'³ (*jagir darand*), were to be put to death on a specified day. Some twenty or thirty thousand New Muslims, most of whom were completely ignorant of the conspiracy, were put to death under this ruthless order and their women and children were reduced to destitution.

¹ Isami, 289-91; Barani, 331-32.

² Apparently because it was summer time or rainy season. No date is given by Isami or Barani, but the conspiracy must have taken place soon after the return of the army from Ma'abar.

³ Barani, 331. This qualification (a copyist's addition) is meaningless. All New Muslims were put to death. Also the term, *jagir*, belongs to the Mughal period and was not used in Barani's days.

KHIZR KHAN'S MARRIAGES⁴

When Dawal Rani was brought to the imperial palace at the age of eight in 1307, Khizr Khan, who was ten years then, was told by his mother, at the Sultan's instruction, that she would be his future bride. Khizr Khan was able to understand what this meant, but Dawal Rani was too young to understand anything. Still since the young prince was somewhat like her brother, and Dawal Rani felt at home with him, a deep love developed between them in consequence. But then the royal policy changed, possibly on account of the wishes of Khizr Khan's mother, and it was decided to marry Khizr to the daughter of his mother's brother, Alp Khan. Three years were spent in preparation for this marriage, which was celebrated with great pomp on 2 February 1312 (Wednesday, 23 Ramazan 711). All senior officers were required to attend, and Rai Rama Deva took the trouble of coming from Devagiri. The *Rukhsati* (departure of the bride for the bridegroom's house) took place on 9 April 1312 (1 Zil Hij 711). But since the marriage did not 'cure' Khizr Khan of his love for Dawal Rani, his parents allowed him to be married to her at a private ceremony, probably in the summer of 1315. Some time after this, Khizr Khan asked the poet, Amir Khusrau, to write a *masnavi* on his love and gave the poet a draft he had made. The poet undertook the work and promised to do his best. Thus the famous *masnavi*, *Dawal Rani Khizr Khan* (also known as *Ashiqah*) saw the light. Khusrau says that he was engaged on the work for four months and some days, and that he finished it on 1 February 1316. The book was planned for presentation to Khizr Khan, the heir-apparent, and the bulk of the book assumes that Khizr Khan would be the next ruler.⁵ But while the work was proceeding, misfortunes overtook Khizr Khan, and Khusrau also became somewhat critical of his behaviour. Alauddin Khalji had died on 4 January 1316, and when the poet brought his work to an end, Khizr Khan was a blinded prisoner in the Gwalior fort. Later, probably after the death of Mubarak Shah, he added 319 verses on the murder of the three princes at Mubarak's order. So the *masnavi*, which had been planned as a romance, ended as a tragedy. On the basis of the internal evidence of the *Dawal Rani* we can safely say that Alauddin was able to continue his normal work till September or October 1315. The acute stage of his illness does not seem to have lasted long.

⁴ *Dawal Rani*, 91-323; Isami, 314-24.

⁵ See in particular *Dawal Rani* (74).

MALIK KAFUR IN DEVAGIRI

Some time after returning from Delhi, Rama Deva died and his son, Bhillama, rebelled against Delhi. Kafur, who seems to have been given the title of *malik naib* (regent or personal representative) some time after the Ma'abar campaign, was sent to suppress the rebellion and take temporary charge of the land.⁶ When Malik Kafur had crossed the pass, known as Ghat-i Sagun, Bhillama fled away and Kafur occupied Devagiri without bloodshed. Isami,⁷ who may have met some persons who remembered Kafur's regime, has the greatest praise for it. Kafur's great problem was to win over the Maratha chiefs and in this he succeeded. 'He did not kill or imprison anyone, the people of the city found freedom under his protection. . . He sent letters guaranteeing peace to those who had been alienated and all the Maratha people came over to his side. . . . The justice of the ruler over a territory is like the monsoon shower over a garden.' Apart from a week at Kampila, Kafur resided at Devagiri. Then he got urgent summons from Delhi to attend the marriage of the Sultan's son, Shadi Khan, to another daughter of Alp Khan, and he reached Delhi in a week.

THREE SUCCESSIVE GROUPS OF ALAUDDIN'S OFFICERS

Ruminating over the matter decades afterwards, Ziauddin Barani divided Alauddin's officers into three successive groups.⁸ The *first group*, among whom he enumerates Ulugh Khan, Nusrat Khan, Zafar Khan, Alp Khan, Malik Alaul Mulk, the (senior) Malik Fakhruddin Jauna *Dad-bek*, Malik Asghari *Sardawat-dar*, and Malik Tajuddin Kafuri, helped Alauddin to lay the foundations of his empire. Their competence could not be questioned. 'By a shake of the bridle they could conquer a kingdom; conversely, by a wise and discerning measure, they could suppress a wide-spread disturbance.' But according to the external judgement of men, they were responsible for the murder of Sultan Jalaluddin and they did not survive for more than three or four years under the new regime. Barani forgets to note that Alp Khan was an exception.

The *second group* of Alauddin's officers also consisted of competent men, such as Malik Hamiduddin and Malik A'izzuddin (sons

⁶ The *Khazainul Futuh* never refers to Kafur as the *malik naib*. *Malik naib* or *naib-i mulk* may be considered as equivalent to the term regent. Its Mughal equivalent is *vakil*, the title taken by Bairam Khan.

⁷ Isami, 325-27.

⁸ Barani, 331-38.

of Ala Dabir), Malik Ainul Mulk Multani, Nizamuddin Ulugh Khan (governor of Jalor and brother of Alp Khan), Malik Sharaf Qaani and Khwaja Haji. 'Malik Hamiduddin was *naib-i vakildar*,⁹ Malik A'izzuddin was *dabir-i mamalik*, Malik Sharaf Qaani was *naib wazir* and Khwaja Haji was *naib-i arz*; owing to these dignified officers the four ministries (commerce, secretariat, revenue and war), on which all the general and detailed affairs of the government depend, were so efficient that the like of it has not been reported during any other age or generation.'

During the last four or five years of his reign, Alauddin was infatuated with Malik Naib and made him the senior officer of the empire. Hamiduddin and A'izzuddin were dismissed and Sharaf Qaani was put to death; so out of the four ministries no dignity remained except with the ministry of war. Bahauddin *Dabir*, who was given the title of Umdatul Mulk, was a stupid minister. 'Alauddin kept experienced ministers and officers at a distance from himself and entirely gave up the habit of discussion and consultation. He desired that the authority of the state should be concentrated in the hands of his family and its servants, and that all matters of general policy as well as details should depend upon his own individual will. So he began to commit errors in the affairs of the government.'¹⁰

After making his habitual statement that the administration was being ruined by the appointment of the low-born, Barani adds: 'Though in the last years of Alauddin's reign Malik Qiran *amir-i shikar* and Malik Qara Beg had great honour and dignity before the throne, still they held no assignments or offices; they were elevated, lonely figures.' So far as the last group of Alauddin's officers is concerned, Barani's statement suffers both from mis-statement and over-exaggeration. There was no element of homosexuality in Alauddin's character; and though Kafur was a eunuch, there was nothing wrong in Alauddin's relations with Kafur, apart from the fact that since Kafur, unlike all other officers, had no family or followers, the Sultan had a greater trust in him. Alauddin, most unwisely, thought he could trust Kafur when his own family seemed to fail him. Alauddin had plenty of

9 The copyists often make the mistake of writing *diwan-i risalat*, which means the ministry of correspondence and is the same thing as the *diwan-i insha* (secretariat), for the *diwan-i riyasat* or ministry of industry and commerce. The term *dabir* means secretary. Now A'izzuddin was appointed to help his father, who was *naib-i diwan-i insha* (or *dabir-i mamalik*) and would naturally succeed him. But the ministry of commerce, according to Barani, had been assigned to Yaqub Nazir. Malik Hamiduddin must have succeeded him as commerce minister, though Barani still calls him by his old title, *naib-i vakildar* (officer in charge of matters to be placed before the court).

10 Barani, 331.

genuinely loyal officers in the last years of his life. As we shall see, they and their successors succeeded in maintaining the sultanat for three generations more; and even after the central government had completely collapsed, Alauddin's traditions were visible in the administrations of the provincial dynasties of the fifteenth century. But during the twenty years of his rule, Alauddin had taught his officers to understand their proper place and had effectually prevented the growth of a corporate spirit. His great officers, in their turn, played for security. They would obey the occupant of the throne, but they would take no initiative in king-making or in palace revolutions. The Sultan they loved and respected may be dying, but none of them would take the responsibility for his treatment from fear of being accused of his death.

So in his last days, when periods of unbearable pain alternated with fits of unconsciousness, the Sultan was left with Malik Naib Kafur as his sole adviser; and Kafur, whose career as an administrator and the successful commander of five great campaigns had hitherto been irreproachable, ineffectually sought to avoid the destruction that awaited him by trying to obtain complete control of the state by unpardonable intrigues and crimes. Since the highest officers of the state were neutral in matters which they considered to be the Sultan's personal affairs, two parties inevitably grew up in the palace. On the one hand was Alp Khan, governor of Gujarat, and his sister, Malka-i Jahan; their position had been strengthened by the fact that both the heir-apparent, Khizr Khan, and his younger brother, Shadi Khan, had been married to Alp Khan's daughters. Between Alp Khan and Malik Naib Kafur, Barani tells us, there was a bitter life and death struggle. We are not told of the causes of this 'hatred', but it increased daily. It was clear that if Alp Khan's party came to control the throne, it would give short shrift to Kafur.

ALAUDDIN'S LAST DAYS; MURDER OF ALP KHAN; KHIZR DISINHERITED AND IMPRISONED

It is difficult to say what Alauddin's complaint really was; Barani calls it *istisqa* (dropsy), Amir Khusrau suggests that it was a disease of the liver, and Isami, confining himself to external symptoms, says that the Sultan had grown lean and weak and that excessive pain began to affect his judgement and to bring on recurring fits of unconsciousness. 'Excess of pain', says the poet, 'drives a man mad; inevitably he becomes negligent and careless.' Ferishta, on the basis of the originals, has briefly depicted the situation. 'As Khizr Khan and Malka-i Jahan were devoting themselves to interminable feasts and celebrations and did not care about his nursing and treatment, the

Sultan attributed his illness to their negligence and his heart was deeply alienated from them.' Khizr Khan had his amusements—feasts, drinking parties, polo, elephant-fights. A lot of undesirable companions had collected round him, and Amir Khusrau has no hesitation in telling us that the character of the hero of his poem had greatly degenerated. His mother also spent her time in arranging functions so dear to uneducated *pardah*-women—marriage ceremonies, circumcision ceremonies and the like. 'The one thing that never drew their attention was Sultan Alauddin and his illness, and every day they were guilty of some act that increased his resentment and suspicion.' So the Sultan summoned Malik Naib from the Deccan and Alp Khan from Gujarat and was pleased by their rapid arrival.

After the conquest of Chitor, Alauddin had appointed Khizr Khan his heir at an age when his capacities could not have been tested, and he had a deed to this effect signed by his senior officers. So every one felt sure that Khizr Khan would succeed his father. But Khizr Khan's character was ruined by his environment and upbringing, and it was obvious that a young man so devoted to pleasures at the age of eighteen or nineteen would be incapable of shouldering the burden of the empire. When the young prince ignored his father during his illness, Alauddin began to have second thoughts. Alp Khan and Kafur, on reaching Delhi, must have realized that the Sultan would not last long. In the struggle that followed Kafur had two clear advantages. As *malik naib* he had the legal authority of governing the empire on behalf of the Sultan; in this context it has to be remembered that many great imperial officers had been his subordinates. Secondly, while Alp Khan came to pay his formal respects to the Sultan as a great officer of the realm, Kafur as a devoted slave lived on the ground floor of the palace and took charge of the Sultan's sick-room and his treatment. But he proceeded cautiously. His first advice to the Sultan was to order Alp Khan to go back to his province, and since Alp avoided or disobeyed the order, Kafur was able to put all sorts of suspicions into the Sultan's mind. At this stage Khizr Khan, who had sworn to go on foot to pray at the graves of the saints of Hastinapur for his father's recovery, decided to fulfil his vow. But he went on horseback and disgusted every one by taking with him a party of musicians and dancing girls. 'The locks of beautiful girls were constantly in his hands', says Khusrau, 'as rosaries are in the hands of the pious.'¹¹

During his absence Alp Khan was killed. Barani says that Kafur got an order of the Sultan for putting Alp Khan to death. Isami says that

¹¹ *Dawal Rani*, 236.

the Sultan refused to give such an order, but left the decision to Kafur in responsibility to God and his own conscience. Thereupon Kafur, who was much the stronger of the two, killed Alp Khan in a personal struggle not far from the Sultan's bedroom and ordered his corpse to be wrapped in a carpet and buried. Stern orders were then sent to Khizr Khan, who was at Meerut. He was required to return all the 'sultani symbols' (*alamatha-i sultani*), which had been given to him as heir-apparent, without delay—the *chattr* (canopy), the *durbash* (baton), the elephant and the banner. The territory between the Ganges and the Himalayas was assigned to him so that he may forget the death of Alp Khan in hunting and other amusements. He was to fix his headquarters at Amroha and remain there for two months and not to come to Delhi unless called. Khizr Khan sent back the 'sultani symbols' with Malik Husamuddin and proceeded to Amroha. But after staying for two or three days there, he decided to return to Delhi without permission. Alauddin first embraced him affectionately, but as he was not prepared to see his orders slighted, he directed Khizr Khan to be taken as a prisoner to Gwalior after extracting all sorts of fearful oaths from Kafur—'by God, by the Prophet, by the *shari'at*, by the Faith, by the Sultan's salt and by the sword'—that he would not injure the prince's eyes or take his life. The prince and a number of women, including Dawal Rani, were put into litters (*dolas*) and taken in two days to Gwalior. The punishment of Khizr Khan, according to Khusrau, worsened Alauddin's condition.¹²

Kamaluddin Gurg, governor of Siwana, was directed to put Nizamuddin Ulugh Khan, the governor of Jalor and brother of Alp Khan, to death. After he had performed this task, he was asked to proceed to Gujarat, where the army, which was loyal to Alp Khan, had rebelled under Haider and Zirak. The rebels captured Kamaluddin Gurg and killed him with excruciating tortures. The Rana of Chitor rebelled about the same time, and in the Deccan Hirpal Deva, son-in-law of Rama Deva, collected his soldiers and captured several *thanas*. Malik Dinar *Shuhna-i Pil* was then sent to Gujarat. The rebels tore up the Sultan's letter and killed his messenger; and Malik Dinar returned from the frontier of Gujarat on hearing of the Sultan's death.

Isami's account leaves upon one the impression that Alauddin left the decision of all matters to Malik Kafur and prepared himself quietly for his coming end. But Khusrau and Barani tell us that his mind was

12 Both Amir Khusrau (*Dawal Rani*, 233-54) and Isami (329-35) give an account of the struggle round the sick-bed of the dying Sultan. Khusrau is more reliable as he must have heard in the court-circles of all that happened from day to day. But he is primarily concerned with the fate of Khizr Khan. Isami, on the other hand, gives us the most rational account of what happened.

greatly disturbed. 'Three elements of great force', the former states, 'were struggling within him—love for his son, disease and ill-temper. All these elements took possession of his liver, and death ended the conflict.'¹³

One day, according to Isami, Kafur convened a meeting of the great civil and military officers by the Sultan's bedside. It was decided that Shihabuddin Umar, a son of Alauddin by Jathyapali, daughter of Rama Deva, who was about six years and some months, should succeed the Sultan and that Kafur should have the post of *naib* or regent. 'While the discussions were going on the emperor had physically collapsed and his tongue had become red owing to his illness. He could not say a word during the meeting owing to his unconsciousness and weakness. Nevertheless, all those present decided that silence gives consent.'¹⁴

Alauddin died late at night on 4 January 1316 (6 Shawwal 715). Malik Naib took the royal ring from the dead Sultan's finger and gave it to Sumbul with orders to proceed immediately to Gwalior. He was to use the ring as his authority for taking charge of the fort and directing the governor to come to Delhi. As soon as his control of the fort was complete, he was to blind Khizr Khan and return. The high post of *amir-i hajib* was to be Sumbul's reward for this nefarious deed, which was duly executed.¹⁵ After despatching Sumbul, Kafur shed some showy tears, brought the body of the Sultan towards the end of the night out of the Siri Palace and buried it in his mausoleum, outside the Jama Mosque, which had already been constructed.¹⁶

SULTAN SHIHABUDDIN UMAR; REGIME OF MALIK KAFUR¹⁷

On the day after Alauddin's death, Malik Naib convened a meeting of the maliks and amirs and placed Shihabuddin Umar on the throne. He read before them a deed according to which Alauddin had disinherited Khizr Khan and appointed Shihabuddin as his successor. All the sons of the late Sultan—Mubarak Khan (the eldest), Shadi Khan, Farid Khan, Usman Khan, Muhammad Khan, Abu Bakr Khan—were ordered to kiss the feet of the new king. Malik Naib ordered all the four ministries—revenue, secretariat, war and com-

¹³ *Dawal Rani*, 259.

¹⁴ Isami, 335-36.

¹⁵ *Dawal Rani*, 260-64. The correct date of Alauddin's death is given in the *Dawal Rani*, 259.

¹⁶ Barani, 369. Neither the Jama Mosque nor Alauddin's mausoleum can be found. Their foundations are probably covered by one of the mounds in Siri.

¹⁷ Barani, 272-77; Isami, 337-44; Ferishta, 123-24.

merce—to maintain all the laws and regulations of Sultan Alauddin; further the officers of all the ministries were to take orders from him on all matters of policy and details in the same way as from the late Sultan. During the thirty-five days of power that were granted to him, Kafur used to hold every morning a short court-ceremony on the roof of the *Hazar Sutun* Palace; then he sent the boy-king to his mother, dismissed the courtiers and came to his chambers on the ground floor, where the officers met him to take his orders. The transition of power into Kafur's hands had been fairly smooth, and in the only big enterprise he took in hand, he was obeyed. On leaving Devagiri he had handed over charge to Ainul Mulk Multani. He now sent an order to Ainul Mulk asking him to return with all his soldiers to Delhi. This would enable a prince of the old dynasty to seize the realm. But that was not Ainul Mulk's concern; he obeyed Kafur's order. While he was marching north he got another message informing him that he had been appointed governor of Gujarat and asking him to suppress the Gujarat rebels. Ainul Mulk turned in that direction. But when he was near Chitor, he heard that Malik Kafur had been killed and he and his officers decided to stay where they were.

Firuz Shah in his *Futuhāt* refers with respect to Kafur, whose mausoleum he had repaired. It is significant that Malik Kafur met with no resistance and had he adhered to the two great principles that were expected of him—respect for his master's family and government of the country in consultation with the great maliks—he had a fair chance of survival. But by the side of Alauddin's death-bed, the great commander of the campaigns of the Far South had degenerated into a very cheap type of intriguer. He began to strike against his master's family, and it was feared that at some great assembly (*bar*) he would capture all the Alai nobles and put them to death. But what he actually accomplished was atrocious enough. On the first day of his power he ordered his barber to carve out the eyes of Shadi Khan, the uterine brother of Khizr Khan. Malka-i Jahan, Alauddin's senior wife, was deprived of all her property and jewels and thrown into a corner.¹⁸ Kafur feared a revolution from the supporters of Khizr Khan and was planning their overthrow. It was for this reason, perhaps, that he only imprisoned Mubarak Khan, who was of about the same age as Khizr Khan, and did not immediately blind him. Ferishta says that in spite of being a eunuch, Kafur married the daughter of Rai Rama Deva, Jhatyapali, probably because being the Sultan's step-father would give him a status.

The members of the late Sultan's bodyguard, called *paiks*, who

¹⁸ We later find her in the Gwalior fort.

had the status of commanders of fifty and hundred, saw Kafur confabulating with his fellow-conspirators after the gates of the palace were closed, and led by four of their leaders—Mubashshir, Bashir, Saleh and Munir—they decided that, regardless of the consequences to themselves, it was their duty to prevent the further destruction of their deceased master's family by putting Kafur to death. Kafur got suspicious of the conspiracy and summoned Mubashshir to his room. Mubashshir insisted on going in armed—this was his special privilege before Sultan Alauddin—and struck Kafur with his sword. His companions then entered and cut off Kafur's head. They also killed two or three gate-keepers, who tried to protect Kafur, and then proceeded to Mubarak Khan's prison and cut off his bonds. When the great officers of the state came next morning, they found Malik Kafur dead and Mubarak Khan available. 'Kafur', the poet Khusrau remarks, 'had sworn by the sword and the salt; so the salt became a sword and cut off his head.' Nobody regretted what had happened.

VIII. QUTBUDDIN MUBARAK SHAH KHALJI

REGENCY, ACCESSION AND EARLY POLICY¹

WHEN THE NOBLES ASSEMBLED in the court next morning,² they offered the vacant post of regent or *naib-i mulk* to Mubarak Khan. The latter wished to be excused; his position as regent would be impossible and his life would be unsafe; they should allow him to go with his mother to another country. Nevertheless, the argument of the nobles was convincing and he allowed himself to be persuaded. The late Sultan had appointed a boy of six to be his successor; it was a great error but they had all accepted him, and the error could not be rectified immediately. Mubarak should work as regent for some time and then they would do the needful. Mubarak, after working as regent for some weeks, complained that Jhatyapali, the mother of boy-Sultan and daughter of Rama Deva, had tried to poison him. Shihabuddin Umar was sent as a prisoner to Gwalior and blinded, but no step seems to have been taken against Jhatvapali. Mubarak ascended the throne with full pomp on 18 April 1316 (Sunday, 24 Muharram 716).³ Malik Kafur had insisted on enforcing all the laws and regulations of Alauddin; we are not told of Mubarak's policy as regent but he seems to have inaugurated no policy of his own till after his accession.

Barani says that Mubarak at the time of his accession gave the impression of being 'a virtuous prince', and we can hardly blame him for the first harsh measure of the reign. The guardsmen or *paiks*, who had slain Kafur, completely forgot their position. They claimed to have put Mubarak on the throne; they took precedence over the great nobles in coming tumultuously and offering their *salaam* to the throne first; they wanted seats and robes of honour of the same grade as the greatest officers. Mubarak, who was under no personal obligation to them, 'ordered them to be separated from each other, taken to the neighbouring towns and beheaded'.⁴

1 Isami, 344-47; Barani, 379-89.

2 None of our authorities give the exact date of the murder of Malik Kafur, who remained regent for a month (Isami) or for thirty-five days (Barani). When the poet Khusrau brought the main part of his *Duwal Rani* to an end on 1 February 1316, Kafur was alive, for his murder is only mentioned in the 319 verses the poet added to the book after Mubarak Shah's death.

3 *Nuh Sipahr*, 51.

4 The stories about Mubarak appealing to the *paiks* and of his mother appealing

One of the first efforts of the new Sultan was to win popularity for the new regime, though this could only be done by overthrowing the immense structure of Alauddin's economic laws and regulations, every one of which (to quote Ferishta) had 'a wise and beneficent object in view'. On the day of his accession he ordered all those whom Alauddin had imprisoned—some 17,000 or 18,000 in number—to be set free, whether they had been guilty of political offences or corruption. Some of them had been in prison for so long as twenty years and none of them had any hope of becoming free again. Naturally they were very grateful to the new king. In the later days of Alauddin petitions from the needy had been forbidden; Mubarak ordered them to be received again, and his orders very often were according to the wishes of the petitioners. 'During the four years and four months of his reign, the grants of the Saiyyids and the *ulama* were increased; the salaries of the soldiers were also increased; many people got back the villages and lands which in the reign of Alauddin had been taken back into the *khalisa*; new salaries and livelihood-grants were also given. Owing to his innate good nature, the Sultan removed all severe taxes and harsh demands, along with kicks, blows, bonds and chains, from the ministry of revenue.'⁵ The economic regulations of Alauddin vanished into thin air. The price of handsome young boys, beautiful eunuchs and ravishing slave-girls rose to five hundred, one thousand and even to two thousand *tankas*. The price of grain and commodities rose and the regulations of the *Sera-i Adl* completely collapsed. Wages increased fourfold. The pay of a servant, which used to be ten or twelve *tankas*, now rose to seventy, eighty and even one hundred *tankas* (a year). The Multani merchants began to devote themselves to their private business. Merchants and shop-keepers could now transact their business as they liked. Though Alauddin's prohibition of intoxicants was continued by the Sultan, the order was evaded in many ways and liquor was brought into the city. Naturally people who had gained by the change cursed Alauddin and blessed the new ruler.

'Sultan Qutbuddin', says Barani, 'enforced none of the rules and regulations of Alauddin Khalji, but as the officers of the late Sultan remained at their posts, and extensive territories were in their charge, the governments of the provinces became firm in the first year of the reign. No trouble or disturbance arose on any side and the hearts of the people were reconciled to his government.' There were, of course,

for the prayers of the mystic, Shaikhzada Jam, are later-day fabrications. According to Barani and Isami, the *paiks* murdered Kafur on their own initiative and out of regard for loyalty to Sultan Alauddin's salt.

⁵ Barani, 382-83 *et seq.*

some new appointments and titles. Malik Dinar, the *shuhna-i pil* of the late Sultan, was given the title of Zafar Khan; later on the Sultan married his daughter. The Sultan's mother's brother (*nayai*), Muhammad Maulana, was given the title of Sher Khan, but we are not told of his being appointed to any office. Maulana Ziauddin, son of Maulana Bahauddin, the calligraphist, who had taught calligraphy to the Sultan, was appointed *sadr-i jahan* with the title of Qazi Khan and the privilege having his spears tied with golden banners (*band-i zar*). Malik Qara Beg, one of the most senior officers of the late Sultan, was given about fourteen offices, and some of his sons were also appointed to high posts.

THE PROBLEM OF HASAN BARADU AND THE DEGENERATION OF THE SULTAN

Qutbuddin had just missed being blinded and killed, and when he ascended the throne he had a genuine regard for human suffering. But as his position became stable, he attributed his selection to Divine choice and took the title of *Khalifatullah*—'Representative of God'—which we find inscribed on his coins. Since the Pious Caliphs of Islam had only claimed to be Khalifas (Successors or Representatives) of the Prophet, Mubarak's claim was puerile and stupid. But it explains to us how his mind moved. He is said to have asked his courtiers: 'Did any of you expect me to succeed to the throne?' And when they replied in the negative, he asserted that God had placed him on the throne and He alone could remove him. Apart from the economic regulations, the maintenance of which was beyond his power, Mubarak adhered to the policy of his father. But he would not, perhaps he could not, control his passions.

It is impossible to understand the character of Mubarak unless we start from the thesis that he was a born sexual pervert—both an active homosexual and an active heterosexual. He could easily satisfy his heterosexual desires, for there was no lack of women in the Sultan's *haram*. Isami tells us that whenever the Sultan went on a campaign, the choicest young women of the *haram* rode by his side. Even his homosexual desires would not have brought his ruin had he chosen passive homosexual perverts of the proper type. He had the whole of India to choose from and his officers could have done the needful. Unfortunately, he fell in love with two uterine brothers,⁶ Hasan and Husamuddin, who were normal young men, but who had to act as passive homosexuals, because it was only by submitting to the Sultan's

⁶ Barani again and again calls Hasan 'illegitimate', but this with our great historian was only a term of abuse.

sexual demands that they could maintain their status and position. Mubarak's choice was Hasan, but when Hasan was not available, Husamuddin took his place. There was nothing secret about the affair, for Mubarak used to hug and kiss Hasan in public. Barani imagines scenes of coition for which there is no evidence, but which are proved by their consequences. It was inevitable that the Sultan's sex-desire should increase because it was only partially satisfied by the two brothers; while they, on their part, were put in such a shameful position that they considered killing him to be justified.

Here an error has to be removed. *Tughluq Nama*, the last work of the poet Amir Khusrau, is devoted to the history of the two months of struggle which enabled Ghiyasuddin Tughluq to ascend the throne. This work has now been published, but since it was not known till our generation, we need not investigate the errors of medieval historians who have been misled by the clerical errors of Barani. According to the poet, Khusrau, the two brothers belonged to a military caste or group called Baradu. 'The Baradu is a (warrior-group) of Hindus, whose virtue (*sifat*) is that they know how to sell their own heads as well as to sever the heads of their enemies. This group is always with the (Hindu) rais, for they are prepared to sacrifice their lives for their rulers.'⁷

The Baradu, whether Rajput or not, were probably an all-India caste-group who specialized in acting as body-guards and protectors of the Hindu chiefs. We have no ground for treating them as a menial class or confining them to Gujarat.⁸

When Ainul Mulk Multani conquered Malwa in 1305, the two uterine Baradu brothers, Hasan and Husamuddin, came to Delhi as slaves and were brought up by Malik Shadi, the *naib-i khas-i hajib* of Alauddin Khalji. 'Mubarak fell in love with Hasan. Even in the first year of his reign the Sultan promoted him to full honours with the title of Khusrau Khan. In the reckless ignorance of youth, the Sultan gave the *iqtas* and the army of the late Malik Naib to this Baradu boy, and incited by his passion (*hawa*) he also assigned the

⁷ *Tughluq Nama*, lines 337-38.

⁸ Barani does not explain who they were, but Husamuddin, when governor of Gujarat, collected his Baradu relations there along with 'all the famous Baradus of Gujarat'. A careless reading of this sentence has given the impression that the Baradus were Gujaratis, and the author of the *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, misled probably by a similarity of sound, declared them to be a 'servant-class' (*khidmatia*) caste of Gujarat. Sir Syed's text of Barani calls them Parwars or Barwars; Professor Rashid's text calls them Bara'u. In the *Tughluq Nama* the word Baradu is very clear, but the word Bara'u would also satisfy the demands of rhyme and metre. Hasan Baradu, it has to be observed, was not born in Gujarat and never went there.

wizarat to him.⁹ As to the relation of the two, Barani, whose tendency to use abusive language needs no comment and who in his desire to clarify matters leaves little to the imagination of his readers, goes on to state: 'Owing to the intoxication of youth and his overpowering sex-desire, he was so enamoured and madly in love with Hasan, the Baradu boy, that he was unable to live without him for a single moment¹⁰. . . This low-born Baradu boy, owing to the wickedness of his nature, often desired to strike and kill the Sultan with his dagger when the Sultan cohabited with him or kissed him in public. Always this mean product of adultery was designing the Sultan's death. Outwardly, like a shameless whore, he surrendered his body to the Sultan, but inwardly owing to the (sexual) supremacy of the Sultan, he harboured a deep and bloody resentment.'¹¹ Still in the first year of the reign the public was happy because Mubarak's accession had ended the insecurity that had prevailed since Alauddin's death. Khusrau Khan was not thrust before the public gaze at this stage.

SETTLEMENT OF GUJARAT¹²

Ainul Mulk with the army of Devagiri had halted at Chitor on his way to Gujarat on hearing that Kafur had been murdered. The Sultan now sent Malik Tughluq to ask him to continue the campaign. Ainul Mulk was willing, but when he convened a meeting of his leading officers in the presence of Tughluq, there were dissenting voices. They had never seen the new king; they did not know what his policy would be; and their suggestion was that they should wait there for a month or two till the political horizon was clearer. Tughluq understood that they wanted a guarantee of their posts. He started back for Delhi on the same day and advised the Sultan to send a separate *farman* with a robe of honour or *khiṭat* to every important officer. On returning to Chitor with these gifts, Tughluq found the officers ready to march. Ainul Mulk was informed that he would be the supreme commander while Tughluq led the van.

The army of Gujarat, under Haidar and Zirak, had rebelled because Alp Khan had been killed by Kafur. Since Kafur had met his deserts, the rebellion had now become meaningless. Nevertheless, Haidar and Zirak decided to persist in the rebellion and came out of the city of Anhilwara. Ainul Mulk wrote a separate letter to every rebel noble drawing his attention to the futility of their struggle,

⁹ Barani, 381.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 381-82.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 391.

¹² *Ibid.*, 388-89, 395, 396, 398; Isami, 347-52.

promising him security of service if he joined Ainul Mulk on the day of battle, and hinting at the invincibility of the Delhi army. The nobles, who had no intention of rebelling against the sultanat, joined the Delhi army on the day of battle, while Haidar, Zirak and their followers fled for security to distant rais. 'Owing to the judgement and wise, policy of Ainul Mulk and the supremacy of the Delhi army, Anhilwara and the whole of Gujarat was brought into subjection again and its army was stabilized.' The Sultan married the daughter of Malik Dinar Zafar Khan, an old and experienced officer of Alauddin, and appointed him governor of Gujarat. Zafar Khan governed Gujarat so well that after three or four months every one forgot the regime of Alp Khan. The main point was to find a compromise with the Hindu chiefs, and Barani assures us that all the rais, ranas and muqaddams joined Zafar Khan.

On returning from Devagiri in the second year of his reign, the Sultan put Zafar Khan to death for no visible fault, and appointed Husamuddin, brother of Khusrau Khan, governor of Gujarat. Husamuddin is said to have apostatized from Islam and the term 'apostate', rightly or wrongly, is applied to him hereafter. Both brothers were anxious to get out of the power of the Sultan. Husamuddin called together his relations and the notable Baradus, who could be found in Gujarat, with the intention of rebelling. But his authority had no roots; the amirs of Gujarat seized him and sent him in bonds to the Sultan. But the Sultan merely slapped him and appointed him to a high office at the court. If this behaviour annoyed the amirs, the next step of the Sultan was a pleasant surprise. 'Wahiduddin Quraishi, who by birth and personal qualifications, was worthy of high command and leadership, was given the title of Sadrul Mulk and sent as governor to Gujarat. He was the rarest of wazirs and the finest of maliks; in fact, God had collected all good qualities in him.' He soon rectified all the errors of Husamuddin and won laurels for his administration. After Ainul Mulk had been appointed governor of Devagiri, Wahiduddin was called to Delhi and appointed wazir with the title of Tajul Mulk. People wondered how Mubarak, whose character had greatly degenerated by then, could make such excellent appointments.

MUBARAK'S CONQUEST OF DEVAGIRI¹³

It was Alauddin's policy not to annex any part of the Deccan as it was impossible to administer such territory properly from distant

¹³ Khusrau's *Nuh Sipahr*, 49-146, 195-210; Barani, 389-93; Isami, 352-62. Amir Khusrau's poem was written at Mubarak's order and prepared for presentation to the

Delhi. Bhillama's rebellion had left him no alternative but to send Kafur to take temporary charge, and Kafur sent letters to all chiefs who had submitted confirming them in their authority. Kafur handed over charge to Ainul Mulk when the Sultan summoned him all of a sudden to Delhi, and Ainul Mulk, in his turn, was asked by Kafur to return with the whole army of Delhi. The proper thing would have been to assign the territory to a prince of the old Yadava family, who would be accepted by his people and be loyal to Delhi. But it seems that no such prince was available. Mubarak gave to Hirpal Deva, a son-in-law of Rama Deva, some territory in Devagiri which he could govern without being subordinate to any Delhi amir. Apart from this, one Raghu, whom Khusrau calls *naib* and wazir of Rama Deva, the former ruler, tried to maintain some semblance of central authority at Devagiri. Delhi seems to have had some claims on Raghu's allegiance, for 'he had stood obediently before the throne'.

Mubarak wanted to march to Devagiri immediately after his accession, but the nobles were of the opinion that such an enterprise would be unsafe.¹⁴ They should be given time to establish his authority first. In the second year of the reign (beginning April 1317) Mubarak started on the campaign. When the army assembled at Tilpat, its camp was about three *farsangs* (ten to twelve miles) in length. The march was uneventful. Devagiri offered no resistance, and the Maratha chiefs offered their submission to Mubarak either in the course of his march or at Devagiri. The two conspicuous absences were Raghu and Hirpal Deva; they had fled away and Khusrau Khan with Malik Qutlugh, the *amir-i shikar*, was sent against them. Amir Khusrau's geographical references are vague. Raghu fled to the hills with about ten thousand horsemen; then there is reference to a fort by the side of a river, but when the Delhi army wanted to surround it, Raghu fled away with his horsemen. It was impossible to pursue Raghu further, and the attempt was given up. But while the army was returning news was brought that Rai Hirpal Deva was

court and immediate publication in the second year of the reign. According to Amir Khusrau, Khusrau Khan was sent to besiege Warangal a second time, and after seizing what he could from Rudra Deva, he joined Mubarak on the return journey to Delhi. Barani is obviously wrong in saying that Mubarak ordered Khusrau Khan to go to Ma'abar while he himself returned to Delhi. Isami, on the other hand, makes no reference to Khusrau Khan during Mubarak's conquest of Devagiri, but explains in detail how Khusrau Khan was sent to subdue Yak Lakkhi and to proceed to Ma'abar after this had been done. Barani has made a mistake, but this can be corrected by a reference to the *Nuh Sipahr* and Isami. Khusrau Khan went to the Deccan not once but twice.

¹⁴ The *Nuh Sipahr*, our best authority for the campaign, gives the minimum of facts with the maximum of words; it also gives no dates.

hiding in those hills. Khusrau Khan assigned the duty of capturing him to Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Talbagha (the *amir-i koh*), son of Yaghda.¹⁵ After two or three skirmishes Rai Hirpal was wounded and captured. He was brought to the Sultan with a rope round his neck and Mubarak ordered him to be beheaded.¹⁶

SECOND SIEGE OF WARANGAL¹⁷

It seems that Pratap Rudra Deva of Warangal had not sent his tribute for several years; and when Khusrau Khan returned from the pursuit of Raghu, the Sultan sent him against Warangal with his best officers. Khwaja Hajj, Alauddin's famous minister of war, was again in charge. Next to him in importance came Malik Qutlugh, the *amir-i shikar*. The second siege of Warangal had a family likeness with the first. Khusrau Khan surveyed Warangal from the Anam Konda Hill.¹⁸ The garrison was driven into the fort after a skirmish before the gate. The besiegers tried to set fire to the gate but probably without success, for their next step was to pitch their tents round the fort. A night attack by Diwar Mehta was foiled by two amirs—Ghazi Kamil, governor of Awadh, and Tamar, governor of Chanderi. The besiegers managed to climb up to a tower of the outer fort-wall, and Anil Mehta, a minister of Pratap Rudra Deva, was captured in the skirmish and taken to Khusrau Khan, who spared his life. After a stern struggle, which started a little after sunrise and lasted till midday, the besiegers captured the whole of the mud-fort and were contemplating the construction of a *pasheb* of one hundred and five yards in width under the supervision of two officers, Malik Ambar and Shihab Arb, when the Rai sent his messengers to seek terms of peace.

Khusrau's poetical reconstruction of the negotiations need not be detailed. The Rai sent over one hundred elephants and twelve thousand horses and such treasure as he could now afford. Khusrau demanded the handing over of five districts—Badarkot, Kailas, Basudan, Elor and Kobar—and 60 gold bricks as an yearly tribute for the future; but after some discussion he was content with the secession of the fort-district of Badarkot and the yearly tribute of 40

15 He is often referred to as Talbagha Yaghda to distinguish him from Talbagha Nagauri.

16 *Nuh Sipahr*, 195-202. The account of the capture of Hirpal Deva, for some reason, is given after the account of the Deccan campaign has been finished.

17 Khusrau's *Nuh Sipahr* (81-132) is the only account of the siege we have. But it is a contemporary work and reliable, though it lacks the accuracy of the *Khazainul Futuh*.

18 *Nuh Sipahr* writes it as Arankonda.

gold bricks (*a'jur-i zar*). The Rai signed a deed promising the tribute and paid obeisance to the royal canopy from the top of his fort-ramparts on three successive mornings. The canopy (*chatr*), baton (*durbash*) and banner, which had been granted to the Rai by Sultan Alauddin, were taken out as a sign of surrender, and then brought back as a gift from the new emperor. The Sultan had been staying for a month at Ellora and Khusrau Khan joined him there. The army with the elephants of Warangal seems to have joined the Sultan on the bank of the Narbada.

CONSPIRACY OF ASADUDDIN; MUBARAK'S PUNISHMENTS

While Mubarak was still at Devagiri, Malik Asaduddin, son of Yaghrash Khan, the younger brother of Sultan Jalaluddin, who was an inveterate intriguer and a warrior of some note, had planned his assassination while passing through a pass, which is generally referred to as Ghati Sagun. Mubarak was so careless when dallying with the girls of his *haram* that the conspirators expected that some twelve swordsmen would be able to kill him, and then Asaduddin would be proclaimed. But one of the conspirators, Aram Shah, whose father, Khurram Kahjuri, had been *vakildar* of Sultan Jalaluddin, revealed the plot to Mubarak. The Sultan halted the march. Asaduddin, Malik Kahjuri, Malik Misri¹⁹ and other conspirators were arrested during the night; they were forced to confess their guilt and were beheaded next morning before the royal pavilion. But Mubarak Shah decided to seek revenge from the whole family of Yaghrash Khan. Twenty-nine children descended from Yaghrash Khan, who were not old enough to come out of their houses, were arrested in Delhi at the Sultan's order and slaughtered like sheep; the property collected by Yaghrash was confiscated and the women of his family were left to beg in the streets.

On reaching Jhain, Mubarak decided to put to death his three blinded brothers—Khizr Khan, Shadi Khan and Shihabuddin Umar—who were being given food and clothing as prisoners in Gwalior. Shadi Khattari, the head of the Sultan's bodyguard, was sent to carry out the order and to bring the women of their family to Delhi. The murders have been described by Khusrau in the lines added to his *Dawal Rani*.²⁰ The women wept when the object of Shadi's coming

¹⁹ These two names, Kahjuri and Misri, are only given to us by the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, a later authority.

²⁰ Amir Khusrau refers to a message from Mubarak to Khizr Khan in which the Sultan offered the blind prince a governorship, if he would hand over Dawal Rani to

was known. The blind princes came courageously out of their prisons, but 'there was no strength in their arms or energy in their bodies'. Shadi Khan attacked the kotwal and knocked him down, but he had no arms and it was a useless effort. In any case, there were ten men to keep down every blind prince. Still when Shadi Khattari gave the order for beheading the princes and looked round, no one was inclined to undertake the deed. Ultimately, a low-born Hindu from the ranks of the guardsmen tucked up his sleeves, took his sword from Shadi Khattari and severed the head of Khizr Khan at one blow. The other two princes were killed in the same manner. 'The princes were buried in Vijay Mandir, which is a tower of the Gwalior fort.'

When starting for the Deccan the Sultan should have appointed an experienced Alai officer to act as regent during his absence. But instead of doing so, he selected for the post a slave-boy, who used to be called Yar Yalda in the time of Alauddin but whose real name was Shahin, gave him the title of Wafa Malik and recklessly left Delhi and all its treasures in his inexperienced and unreliable hands. After returning to Delhi, the Sultan first put Zafar Khan, the governor of Gujarat, to death, and some time after that he ordered Wafa Malik to be beheaded. He had in some way been guilty of conspiring against the Sultan, but the details are not known.

The conspiracy of Asaduddin, instead of warning the Sultan of his dangerous position, had the opposite effect; it made him reckless and blood-thirsty. On returning to Delhi he found both the amirs of his father and officers of his own creation obedient to him. He had the credit for the conquest of two provinces, Gujarat and Devagiri, and there was peace and quiet in the whole realm.

'This removed all fear of the decline of the kingdom, and of the danger of rebellion and disturbance, from his mind. His intoxications due to youth, power, wealth, possession of elephants and horses, ambition, success, conquest, stability, security and the obedience of the old and new nobles, increased and led to recklessness, terrorism and cruelty. The virtues of his character vanished. He became wrathful, shameless in his speech, vindictive and cruel. He began to shed innocent blood and became obscene and abusive in talking to those near him. . . Specially after his return

him. Khizr refused to part with her. However, the murder of the princes has nothing to do with Dawal Rani as Khusrau himself explains: 'When the heartless Mubarak Shah in his bitterness became resentful at his own relations, and considered that the security of his kingdom depended upon shedding their blood with the sharp sword, he determined in his enmity to liquidate all rivals to the throne' (273-74). It appears from Khusrau's account that Khizr Khan's mother was in the fort. We may speculate on the fate of Dawal Rani, but nothing is known for certain.

from Devagiri, no inhabitant of the palace or outsider had the courage to speak to him openly about affairs of state.²¹

The decencies of palace life disappeared. The Sultan gave up the habit of praying and ate in public during the month of Ramazan; two maliks of great dignity, Ainul Mulk Multani and Qara Beg, were so loudly abused by some shameless female jesters from the roof of the *Hazar Sutun* Palace that every one on the ground floor of the Palace heard them. A Gujarati *bhand* (joker), named Tauba, was given such liberties by the Sultan that he abused the wives and mothers of the maliks, dirtied their clothes and sometimes came stark naked to the Sultan's *majlis* and talked obscenities. The Sultan himself went so far as to appear in public wearing the ornaments and dress of women. We need not be surprised that under these conditions, no great officer of Alauddin was on such intimate terms with the self-willed Sultan as to offer him any advice. They bore with patience the insults offered to them in the palace and left him to his fate.

REBELLION OF MALIK YAK LAKKHI;
KHUSRAU KHAN IN MA'ABAR²²

Before leaving Devagiri the Sultan had assigned the governorship of the province to Malik Yak Lakkhi, a Hindu-born slave-officer of Alauddin Khalji, who had been *barid-i mamalik* (central intelligence officer) for several years. Yak Lakkhi rebelled, took the title of 'Shamsuddin' and struck his own coins.²³ He constructed a wooden fort (*kath-garh*) outside Devagiri, but instead of preparing for a struggle, he devoted himself to wine and music. On hearing this news, Mubarak 'curled upon himself like a dragon' for two days; on the third day he ordered Khusrau Khan to suppress the Devagiri revolt and then proceed against Ma'abar. Five of the highest officers were ordered to accompany him—Talbagha, son of Yaghda, Shadi Satila, Qutlugh *amir-i shikar*, Tajul Mulk, and last, but not least, Khwaja Haji, the minister of war. Khusrau had no difficulty at Devagiri. When he reached Ghati Sagun, three of the highest officers at Devagiri, Talbagha of Nagaur, Nasiruddin and Shams Malik, wrote to him that 'though captives in the hands of a fool, they were loyal to the Sultan and would join him in due course'. Finally, one Imran drew up his forces two *farsangs* from Devagiri, captured Yak Lakkhi and

²¹ Barani, 294-95.

²² Isami, 355-62; Barani, 397-401.

²³ Dr. K. S. Lal, *Khaljis* (331-32) refers to 'a couple of billon coins struck in A.H. 718 in the name of one Shamsuddin Mahmud Shah.' They are probably the coins of Yak Lakkhi.

handed him over to the imperial army. When Yak Lakkhi reached Delhi, the Sultan ordered his ears and nose to be cut off while all his chief supporters were put to death. Nevertheless, Yak Lakkhi was later on appointed governor of Samana. The governorship of Devagiri was assigned to Ainul Mulk Multani, the office of *ishraf* (revenue and accounts) of Devagiri was assigned to Tajul Mulk, one of the sons of Ala Dabir, and Mujiruddin Abu Raja was appointed deputy governor. People were surprised that Mubarak could make such excellent appointments. These experienced officers soon put the province in order.

Khusrau Khan could achieve nothing in Ma'abar. According to Barani, the two rais of Ma'abar fled from their two cities, leaving only a few elephants for Khusrau Khan to capture. The *Mubarak Shahi*²⁴ says that Khusrau Khan captured Mutli (Motupilla) where he got twenty-six elephants and a diamond weighing six *dirhams*. Isami says that when Khusrau Khan attacked Patan,²⁵ a town to which the poet Khusrau has also referred, every one fled away except a very rich Muslim merchant, Siraj Taqi. Khusrau appropriated Taqi's wealth and decided to marry his daughter; the unfortunate merchant took poison and died to avoid seeing his daughter disgraced. All our authorities are agreed that the movements of the imperial army were paralyzed by the monsoon. But they were even more paralyzed by the tension between Khusrau, on the one hand, and the officers who had the real command of the army, on the other. Khusrau's attempt seems to have been to escape from Mubarak's clutches somehow—by flying across to an island or capturing a fort.

In retrospect it is easy to say that in view of Mubarak's incurable obsession for Khusrau, the great officers should have connived at Khusrau's escaping out of the imperial dominions on his own responsibility. But they took a different, and fatal, view of their responsibilities. They kept a close watch on Khusrau Khan and ultimately ordered him to return to Delhi. Their hope was that the Sultan would punish Khusrau and reward them for their loyalty. But Mubarak was only too anxious to see Khusrau again. From Devagiri Khusrau, at the Sultan's order, was carried to Delhi in seven or eight days by relays of carriers, and this gave him two or three months for poisoning the mind of the Sultan against the great officers. Decades later Ziyauddin Barani had no hesitation in recording the following conjecture, for which he could have had no evidence: "This rebel-

²⁴ *Mubarak Shahi*, 85.

²⁵ Dr. K. S. Lal (*Khaljis*) identifies the 'Patan of the Muslim historians', lying near Motupilla on the mouth of the Krishna, with Masaulipatam.

lious wretch at the time of coition, which is a wonderful condition, complained to the Sultan against the maliks.²⁶ The Sultan had despatched him as their commander and they had sent him back as a prisoner.

When the army returned to Delhi, Malik Tamar and Malik Talbagha Yaghda, who had taken the lead in the affair, brought charges against Khusrau Khan and produced witnesses to prove their charges. But the Sultan's mind was made up and he was not prepared to hear anything against Khusrau Khan. Malik Tamar was dismissed and prohibited from coming to the court while his *iqtu* of Chanderi was transferred to Khusrau Khan. Malik Talbagha Yaghda, who had been more bold in accusing Khusrau Khan, was beaten on the mouth, deprived of his office, *iqtas* and army and put in prison. Persons who had given evidence against Khusrau were severely reprimanded and sent as prisoners to various cities. We are not told of the punishment meted out to the other officers; but this was a sufficient warning to all concerned.²⁷ 'Wise men in the palace and the whole city clearly foresaw that the death of the Sultan was approaching.' All notables and officers of the empire, who had any business with the court, sought the protection of Khusrau Khan, whether they liked it or not. 'The influence of Khusrau Khan was unchallenged and the negligence, ignorance and ill-temper of the Sultan had reached such a pitch that no well-wisher of his had the courage to say a word. From time to time they saw the Sultan's passion for Khusrau Khan increasing while Khusrau's moves for rebelling against the Sultan became more obvious. But owing to the Sultan's violence, injustice and insolence, they were all reduced to impotence.'²⁸

THE SULTAN AND SHAIKH NIZAMUDDIN AULIYA²⁹

A little digression is necessary here. Among men then living no one was more respected both by the Hindus and the Musalmans, by the masses as well as the classes, than the mystic, Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya. The great Chishti *Silsilah* (Order) to which he belonged insisted that mystics should keep aloof from the kings and the rulers of the day, and he had sternly followed that principle. His life was

²⁶ Barani, 400.

²⁷ Both Talbagha Yaghda and Tamar were somehow won over by Khusrau Khan, for they fought for him against Malik Tughluq. Khwaja Haji, a pure military administrator, who never embroiled himself in 'high politics' is not referred to by our authorities after this time.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 401.

²⁹ *Siyyarul Auliya*, 14th *Nukta* at the end of First *Bab*, on the Shaikh's mother; Barani, 396.

simple; the great gifts that poured into his *khanqah* were immediately distributed among the poor. He was a stranger to all religious prejudices, and one of his senior disciples used to compose Hindi verses in praise of Lord Krishna, which soon came to be sung in the streets of Delhi. His chief characteristic, as he once said with reference to another mystic, was the *nafs-i gira*—the sympathetic and understanding mind that could immediately comprehend the problems of his visitor and give him the advice he needed. His great mission was to lead people to the path of virtue—worship of God and service of fellow-men.

Alauddin Khalji respected the saint and saw no reason for quarrelling with him; after all the Sultan was also respected for qualities which no saint possesses and for services which no saint can render. But Mubarak's attitude was different. Khizr Khan had only been a formal disciple of the Shaikh, and Amir Khusrau frankly tells us that the prince was so given to pleasures that he totally forgot his spiritual master. But after Mubarak had put Khizr Khan to death, he thought it his duty to quarrel with the Shaikh. But how to quarrel with a man who was a perfect pacifist, who taught and practised the duty of forgiving enemies. Mubarak patronized one Shaikhzada Jam, who had put himself up as a rival to Shaikh Nizamuddin, but it cut no ice. The Sultan then sent for Shaikh Ruknuddin from Multan and gave him a unique privilege. If a petition was put in Shaikh Ruknuddin's litter, it would be read and considered by the Sultan personally. Still the plan misfired, for the two Shaikhs would not quarrel.

The Sultan and the Shaikh came across each other on the *siyyum*³⁰ of Shaikh Ziyauddin Rumi; Shaikh Nizamuddin saluted the Sultan, but Mubarak was too proud to acknowledge the salutation. The Sultan ordered his courtiers not to go to the Shaikh's *khanqah* at Ghiyaspur. He also declared repeatedly that he would give a thousand *tankas* to any one who brought him the Shaikh's head; but nobody was tempted and the Shaikh was not frightened. When the Jama Mosque, called Masjid-i Miri, constructed by the Sultan, had been completed, he sent a general order requiring all *ulama* and mystics to come there for their Friday prayers. 'The mosque nearest to my house has the greatest claims on me', Shaikh Nizamuddin replied. Matters came to a head in the last month (Jamadi I 720; 9 June-8 July 1320) of Mubarak's life. It was a custom in those days for all notables of Delhi, whether in government service or not, to go to the Sultan and congratulate him on the beginning of the new

30 The ceremony of reading the Quran on the third day after the burial.

lunar month. Shaikh Nizamuddin never went personally but used to send his servant-disciple, Iqbal, on his behalf. Mubarak declared that if the Shaikh did not come personally next month, he would compel the Shaikh to come by an executive order. The Shaikh went and prayed at his mother's grave, but did nothing more. When the sun rose on the first day of the next lunar month, Mubarak had been murdered.

MURDER OF THE SULTAN ³¹

Khusrau Khan represented to the Sultan that while other maliks had their groups and followers, he had none. So the Sultan allowed him to enlist Baradus at Bahilwal³² (near Mount Abu) and in the province of Gujarat. 'Many Hindus, called Baradu', the poet Khusrau says, 'joined him in order to take part in his rebellion.'³³ According to the *Tughluq Nama* about ten thousand Baradu horsemen, commanded by their own rais and ranas, were enlisted. Khusrau Khan's next step was to find allies among the officers. The Sultan had quarrelled with Bahauddin *Dabir* about a woman and intended to kill him; so Bahauddin joined the conspiracy. Yusuf Sufi, Shaista son of Muhammad Qirrat Qimar, and some officers of the same type were also won over. The Sultan went hunting to Sirsawah and the Baradu leaders wanted to kill him on the hunting-field, but Yusuf Sufi and his colleagues dissuaded them. In the open field they would all be slain by the army. Their wisest policy would be to kill the Sultan in the palace, to use the palace as a fort and to capture the nobles at Delhi. But this would only be possible if Khusrau obtained the keys of the gate-doors (*darha-i chak*) and the Sultan's permission to bring in the Baradus. Khusrau explained to the Sultan that as he was with him till late at night, he could not see his people; but if the keys (with the necessary permission) were given to his men, he could attend to the Sultan with ease of mind and see his people also. The Sultan ordered the keys of the small gates to be given to Khusrau's men. Thereafter three or four hundred Baradus began to assemble every night in the chambers of Malik Kafur on the ground floor, which had been assigned to Khusrau Khan.

The great maliks were so afraid of Mubarak's temper that none of them had the courage to suggest that he should arrest some of the Baradus, who used to assemble in the palace at night, and find out what they were planning. On 7 May 1320 (29 Jamadi I A.H. 720),

³¹ Barani, 481-508; *Tughluq Nama*, lines 297-384.

³² Barani, 131.

³³ *Tughluq Nama*, line 337.

however, Qazi Ziyauddin, who had been a teacher of the Sultan and was in charge of the palace at night, took courage in both hands and suggested an investigation. The Sultan flared up in anger and dismissed him with harsh replies. Just then Khusrau Khan happened to come in. The Sultan told him all that the Qazi had said. Barani has no hesitation in telling us that Khusrau won over the Sultan's confidence by yielding once more to his passion.

The remnants of Sultan Alauddin's famous *Hazar Sutun* Palace—'Palace of a Thousand Columns'—lie buried under two mounds of earth at Siri. It was a structure of three floors; and since the engineers of those days could only build a large flat roof by supporting a roof of flat stones on stone columns, the number of such columns must have been very large. The ground floor (the '*Hazar Sutun*' of Barani) consisted of offices of the various ministries and departments for the transaction of business which needed the Sultan's personal supervision; there was probably a large courtyard and living rooms for the guards and the palace working staff at a good distance from the offices. Every arrangement had been made for security; the palace was not surrounded by a ditch, but the gates were strong. However, in every large gate there was a small door, to which Barani refers as *dar-i chak*, which could be opened after the large gate had been closed at sunset. The first floor (Barani's '*Bam-i Hazar Sutun*') consisted of the throne-room, the state rooms and the emperor's living apartments. The second floor (Barani's '*Bala-i Bam-i Hazar Sutun*')³⁴ was meant for the Sultan's *haram*. It is impossible to give more details on the basis of surviving literature.

When they struck the palace gong on the night of 1 Jamadi II 720 (9 July 1320)³⁵ to declare that the first quarter of the night had ended, the maliks and amirs, who were not on night-duty, departed from the palace, and Qazi Ziyauddin left the Sultan with Khusrau Khan on the first floor and came down to the ground floor to supervise the palace-guard at night. At the same time Randhol, the maternal

34 *Bam-i Hazar Sutun* means the roof of the *Hazar Sutun*, *Bala-i Bam-i Hazar Sutun* means above the roof (or the second floor) of the *Hazar Sutun*. There were, obviously, no buildings on some roofs; the stone palace must have been hot; and it is impossible to sleep indoors during the Delhi summer.

35 The dates of the murder of Mubarak Shah and the accession of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq have been given by Amir Khusrau in his *Tughluq Nama*. He could have hardly erred in a matter like this and would have been corrected by his friends had there been an error. The matter has been carefully discussed by the late Saiyyid Hashmi Faridabadi in his Urdu Introduction to the *Tughluq Nama*. I have followed Khusrau's dates. It appears that the monsoon had not reached Delhi by 9 July that year. The Sultan and Khusrau seem to have been on an open roof, but could have looked over a wall at the courtyard below.

uncle of Khusrau Khan, entered the palace with a number of Baradus, hiding their daggers under the *chadars*; among them was one Jaharya, who had undertaken to kill the Sultan. Randhol extended his hand to offer a *pan* (betel) to the Qazi, but at the same time Jaharya struck him such a dagger-blow that he fell dead on the spot. There was inevitably some tumult and noise at the Qazi's death; more Baradus entered the palace and Jaharya with some determined Baradus ran towards the staircase. The Sultan heard the tumult on the open roof of the first floor and asked Khusrau to see what it was; the latter pretended to look over the wall and said that the Sultan's horses had broken loose and they were trying to catch them in the courtyard. While this conversation was going on, Jaharya entered the first floor of the palace with his fellow Baradus, and killed Ibrahim and Ishaq, the two special guards of the Sultan, with their daggers.

The Sultan now realized that a rebellion had started; he put his feet in his slippers and ran towards the staircase leading to the *haram* on the second floor. But Khusrau also saw that if the Sultan reached the *haram*, the situation would become complicated; so he ran after the Sultan, caught hold of his long locks and wound them firmly round his hands. Unable to proceed further, the Sultan turned round on Khusrau Khan, knocked him down and sat on his breast. But try as he might, Khusrau Khan would not let go his locks. At that moment Jaharya arrived. 'Take care of me!' Khusrau cried. Jaharya struck a blow of his axe (*patta*) at the Sultan's chest, lifted him up by his locks and then, after throwing him on the ground, cut off his head. Many people were killed that night on all the three floors of the Hazar Sutun. The second floor, in particular, was so crowded with Baradus that the guards fled and hid themselves in various corners. The Baradus lighted oil-vessels with wicks (*diwats*) in every corner. The headless trunk of Sultan Qutbuddin Mubarak was thrown from the first floor to the courtyard below. It was easily recognized, and every one tried to fly away and save his life. But the palace-gates were in the hands of the Baradus.

The Baradu palace revolution and its failure reveal the political forces at work in the Delhi sultanat. The next two months, therefore, deserve a careful objective study.

IX. NASIRUDDIN KHUSRAU KHAN

ACCESSION OF KHUSRAU KHAN¹

THE CONSPIRATORS HAD NOT decided what they would do after murdering the Sultan. Khusrau Khan was probably correct in telling Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, in the short trial that was granted to him, that his original intention had been to put one of the royal princes on the throne, but that he was overridden by his advisers, who were sure that any prince of the royal family, who ascended the throne, would put him to death. The Baradus, though good at fighting, were uneducated and uncultured; since during the two months of Khusrau's power not even one of them was appointed to any government post, we have to conclude that they were illiterate. It was not possible for such a group to lay down the policy of the Delhi empire. At the time of Mubarak's murder, no Muslim seems to have been present. But Khusrau Khan's well-wishers among the Muslim officers must have been brought to the palace as soon as possible. Among those who were privy to the conspiracy Barani mentions Bahauddin *Dabir*, Shaista Khan son of Qirrat Qimar, Yusuf Şufi and others. Still we cannot definitely name the Muslim advisers of Khusrau Khan, who

¹ Barani, 405-25, Isami, 362-81; *Tughluq Nama* of Amir Khusrau, 1-121; N. Wright, 103-4.

Of all the literature surviving to us for the two lunar months of Khusrau Khan's reign, the *Tughluq Nama* is the most important. It was written at the order of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq Shah and was meant for presentation to him and to the literary world. But it has the faults of such works. The Hindus—Khokars, Meos and other Hindus in the army of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq—are noted, but not given credit for the services they rendered. Similarly, there is no account of Khusrau Khan's accession, or of the officers who accepted him as their Sultan on the day following the murder. The names of many of Khusrau's officers are, however, given in the course of the narrative and the *Tughluq Nama* gives us many details for which we should be grateful. Unfortunately, this poem was never properly published during the middle ages and was beyond the reach of scholars till its publication by Saiyyid Hashmi Faridabadi on the basis of a text prepared by the late Maulana Rashid Ahmad of Aligarh in 1933. No medieval historian has used it.

Isami made independent inquiries and could do justice to the Khokars; his accounts of battles are also clearer than Khusrau's.

Barani's prejudices, unfortunately, make him most unreliable for these two months. He made no investigations and wrote from memory, and his one desire was to get his conclusions accepted by his readers. His work is more abusive here than anywhere else.

were responsible for deciding that he should ascend the throne.² But to secure Khusrau Khan's accession two things were necessary—all princes of the royal house had to be killed or blinded, and all the high officers of the government then residing at Delhi had to be brought immediately to the first floor of the *Hazar Sutun* and induced by threats and promises to accept Khusrau as their Sultan.

The Baradus burst into the royal *haram* on the second floor. Four sons of Alauddin Khalji had been killed by now but five were still alive—Farid Khan (15 years), Abu Bakr Khan (14 years), Bahauddin Khan (8 years), Ali Khan (8 years) and Usman Khan (5 years). The Baradus did not know their way about the *haram* and they shouted that they wanted the princes so that they may place one of them on the throne and appoint others as governors of provinces. No one was deceived; still the mothers of the princes had to surrender their children. Farid and Abu Bakr were allowed two genuflection of prayer before they were beheaded; the other three princes were blinded and sent to the Red Palace (*Qasr-i Lal*). The poet has given a detailed description of the tragic scene. The two princes seem to have met their end bravely. Among the princesses who were killed that night was Jhatyapali, daughter of Rama Deva, and the mother of Mubarak Shah. What havoc the Baradus wrought in the royal *haram* is better left to the imagination. According to Ferishta, Malik Nusrat, a son of Alauddin's sister, who had withdrawn from the world and had been living as a *durwesh* for years, was also put to death.³

The second plan of the conspirators, which had to be carried out simultaneously, was to bring the great nobles, who were then in Delhi, to the state-rooms on the first floor during the night and to get them to accept Khusrau Khan as their next ruler. The gates were thrown open; the whole palace was lighted with oil-lamps (*diwats*) and torches, and one by one the great nobles were persuaded, or compelled, to come.⁴ The discussions during the night are not recorded, but by sunrise Khusrau Khan was accepted by all present and ascended the throne with the title of 'Sultan Nasiruddin'. During

2 The *Tughluq Nama* (line 356) lays the responsibility on 'Sufi and some Baradus'. But the Baradus had not the brains required and Yusuf Sufi would not have taken the risk of going it alone.

3 Ferishta, 128.

4 Barani refers to the following, *among others*, as having been brought to the first floor of the palace at midnight—Ainul Mulk Multani, Wahiduddin Quraishi, Bahauddin *Dabir* and the sons of Malik Qara Beg. He says that they were kept as 'hostages'. Barani is not correct in stating that Ainul Mulk had nothing to do with Khusrau Khan; they had worked together on many occasions. When Khusrau Khan marched to Devagiri against Malik Yak Lakkhi, Ainul Mulk had gone with him.

the next two lunar months⁵ his *Khutba* was read in all the mosques of the empire and coins were minted in his name. The desire of his supporters was that he should be considered a normal Muslim king. The audiences in the mosques raised no objection.

A careful examination of the originals shows that the following officers, most of whom had worked under the great Alauddin, consented to join Khusrau Khan's government—(1) Tajul Mulk Malik Wahiduddin Quraishi was reappointed wazir;⁶ (2) Malik Ainul Mulk Multani was given the title of Alimul Mulk, apparently in recognition of his scholarship; (3-5) the offices of the late Malik Qara Beg were given to his sons; in his list of the officers of Sultan Qutbuddin, Barani refers to three sons of Qara Beg—Malik Hasan, the eldest, Malik Husain, the second, and Malik Badruddin Abu Bakr, the youngest; (6) Malik Fakhruddin Jauna (son of Malik Tughluq) was appointed *akhur-bek*; (7) Shaista Khan, son of Muhammad Qirrat Qimar, was appointed minister of war;⁷ (8) Yusuf Sufi was given the title of Sufi Khan; he was a counsellor but his post is not mentioned; (9) Malik Tamar, governor of Chanderi; (10) Kamaluddin Sufi; (11) Kafur *Muhrdar*, *amir-i hajib*; (12) Shihab, *naib-i amir-i hajib*; (13) Tigin, governor of Awadh; (14) Bahauddin *Dabir* was reappointed to the post of minister of the secretariat, which he had obtained from Alauddin with the title of Azamul Mulk; (15) Sumbul Hatim Khan; (16) Malik Yak Lakkhi Qadr Khan (different from the Yak Lakkhi, who had rebelled as governor of Devagiri and was now governor of Samana); (17) Ambar Bughra Khan; (18) Talbagha, son of Yaghda; (19) Talbagha Nagauri; (20) Saif Chaush; (21) Malik Qabul, who had been appointed *shuhna-i manda* by Sultan Alauddin; (22-23) Ahmad Ayaz, kotwal of Siri and his son, Muhammad Ayaz. Two or three other Muslim names are given by Isami in passing

5 Isami says that Khusrau Khan reigned for 'two or three months'. Barani says that Malik Fakhruddin Jauna fled from Delhi after Khusrau Khan had reigned for two months and a half. Amir Khusrau, who could not have been incorrect on a matter like this, says that Mubarak Shah was murdered on the first night of Jamadi II 720 (9 July 1320). He also gives Saturday, Sha'ban I 720 (6 September 1320) as the date of Tughluq Shah's accession. (*Tughluq Nama*, lines 345-46, and 2565-3599). The matter is clarified by the late Mr. Hashmi in his Introduction to the *Tughluq Nama* (18-19). It is not possible to find out the exact date of Jauna's flight from Delhi.

6 Wahiduddin Quraishi, about whom Barani thought so highly, is not referred to by our authorities again. He either died or resigned, for we find Ainul Mulk acting as wazir later.

7 The ministry of war had for long been held by Sirajuddin Khwaja Haji, often referred to as *Shah Nawis* (Writer during the Night). He was *probably* dead. Khwaja Haji, on principle, never meddled with 'high politics' and had worked as a loyal subordinate of Malik Kafur as well as Khusrau Khan.

without any reference to their antecedents or their posts.⁸

No Baradu—and probably no Hindu—was appointed to any regular government post. Khusrau Khan's younger brother, Husamuddin, the 'apostate', was given the title of Khan-i Khanan. The Baradus could only be rewarded with titles, cash grants and commands over the Baradu horse and foot with the titles of rais and ranas. Amir Khusrau says that Khusrau Khan had three or four uncles. One of them, Randhol, was given the title of Rai Rayan. The other two—probably Nag and Kajb Brahma—had to be content with the highest commands in the Baradu contingent. Jaharya, the murderer of the late Sultan, was dressed in pearls and diamonds.

The Baradu insurrection is important because it brought about a crisis in the empire of Delhi during the period of its greatest strength. But it was a crisis in the role of the monarchy; it was not a crisis in the role of Islam or of Hinduism or in Hindu-Muslim relations. The primary question was: Would conspirators who had succeeded in bringing about a palace revolution succeed in dominating the empire? The great and small officers of the empire were so accustomed to obeying the central authority, on which their own salaries and status depended, that their first instinct was to reconcile themselves to all that had happened and to accept the new Sultan.

Since Ziyauddin Barani's interpretation of the Baradu revolution as a Hindu-Muslim conflict has been the only view before the students of history till the publication of Isami and the *Tughluq Nama*, it is necessary at first to remove the errors Barani has created through his overheated imagination. His statements may be put in two paragraphs.

'At the time of his accession, Khusrau Khan ordered some slaves of Sultan Qutbuddin, who were closely allied to the late Sultan and had become great amirs, to be arrested and put to death. In the course of the day some of them were killed in their houses while others were brought to the palace, taken to a corner and beheaded. The wife and child of Qazi Ziyauddin had fled away in the early part of the night, but his house with all that it contained was given to Randhol. . . Khusrau Khan married the wife of Sultan Qutbuddin.⁹

⁸ This list has been prepared from references in Barani, Isami and the *Tughluq Nama*.

⁹ Since a Muslim widow cannot marry till four menses have passed after her husband's death, this marriage was declared invalid and those who had taken part in it were punished by Tughluq Shah.

According to Ferishta (128), Khusrau Khan gave a daughter of Sultan Alaaddin in marriage to his brother, Husamuddin Khan-i Khanan,

...The Baradus with their stinking breaths and stinking armpits had a free run of the royal *haram*.' Such misfortunes were inevitable in a palace revolution. But what Barani goes on to state further has to be rejected, because it contradicts both reason and evidence.

'Five or six days after the accession, the worship of idols began in the palace... The Baradus having become supreme obtained the houses of the great Alai and Qutbi amirs with all that they contained, and possessed themselves of their Muslim women and slave-girls. The flames of oppression went up to the sky. Further, since the Baradus and the Hindus were supreme, they used the Quran as their seats and placed idols in the arches and worshipped them. Owing to the accession of Khusrau Khan and the supremacy of the Baradus and the Hindus, the ways of infidelity became stronger day by day. Khusrau Khan's desire was that Baradus and Hindus should become powerful and collect round him in great numbers... The Hindus of the whole empire rejoiced and hoped that Delhi would become Hindu again and that the Musalmans would be suppressed and grow weak.'¹⁰

We are here face to face with three pure figments of Barani's imagination. *First*, apart from the house of Qazi Ziyauddin, the house of no Qutbi or Alai noble was plundered; Barani gives no instance and he could have given none, for they were all appointed to government posts under the new regime. *Secondly*, since Khusrau's desire was to be accepted as a normal Muslim monarch of Delhi, with the coins and the *Khutba* in his name, he could hardly have made his palace a centre of idol-worship where the Quran was insulted. His Baradus could give him no advice on matters of state and he had to depend entirely on his chosen Muslim advisers. *Thirdly*, here as elsewhere, Barani confuses a very small group of Hindus, the Baradus, with the whole Hindu community. The great Hindu community remained neutral. Hindus who were in military service fought under the officers they were accustomed to obey; the *Tughluq Nama* states that they formed about half of the total army.

Khusrau Khan is not said to have appealed to any Hindu group except the Baradus, and his appeal, if made, would not have been heard. He did not order the enlistment of new Hindu soldiers as this was not necessary. As for 'Delhi becoming Hindu again', Khusrau had made this quite impossible by entrusting the highest posts of the empire to men of the old regime. The great rais of Rajputana, and even

¹⁰ Barani, 410-12. The abuses Barani showers on Khusrau Khan have not been translated as they are merely repetitions,

the minor Hindu chiefs within the empire, saw no reason for taking any notice of Khusrau Khan and the Baradus; it was not their affair.

Since Tughluq Shah at the time of his accession decided to forgive all the nobles who had fought against him, like the Prophet after the conquest of Mecca,¹¹ Amir Khusrau does not give us an account of them, unless necessary; but he does not hesitate to give a correct description of the attitude of the officers of the empire after the government of Khusrau Khan had been formed. 'All the military commanders in the east and the west (of the empire) decided to obey instead of fighting. The Turks did not raise their Turkish spears; the Hindu officers did not attack the Hindus. All the nobles of the battle-fields were lazy and without energy; and they remained quiet like the goat before the butcher. In the provinces of the empire also the amirs girded up their loins in obedience.'¹²

The enterprise failed primarily because Khusrau Khan was not equal to his task. He seems to have lost the capacity of thinking for himself and just followed the advice of his counsellors. He was young with no real experience of war or administration. His advisers also were not chosen properly from among the high officers available. They had not the brains that could be depended upon for guiding an empire; and they crumbled before what would not have been even a minor shock to Alauddin Khalji.

The only officer who refused to acknowledge the new regime was Ghazi Malik Tughluq, governor of Dipalpur. But the poet describes him as reflecting: 'There are two hundred thousand swordsmen, compact as the clouds, in army-registers at Delhi. How can one district, Dipalpur, and the army of one amir accomplish this enterprise, even if you yourself are a Rustam? How can my force attack the army of Delhi? How can the wind take its dust to the sky? I have but little strength and my burden is great. How will I be able to carry it?'¹³ Weighed down by these reflections, Tughluq took no positive steps.

BEGINNING OF THE STRUGGLE

The ice was, however, broken by Tughluq's brilliant son, Fakhruddin Jauna, who had been closely observing the regime as one of its highest officers and who did not like the shape of things at Delhi. He called a confidential meeting of his friends at night; they advised him to contact his father as the regime at Delhi was too strong to be challenged. Ali Yaghdi, the messenger, came back with the reply

¹¹ *Tughluq Nama*, 136, line 2621.

¹² *Ibid.*, 37, lines 687-90.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 71, lines 1335-38.

that Tughluq wanted him to come to Dipalpur with the son of Bahram Aiba, the governor of Uchch, as soon as possible. So early one afternoon (according to Barani) he and Aiba's son with some horses, slaves and servants took the road to Dipalpur. The news was not brought to Khusrau Khan till sunset, and Shaista Khan, the minister of war, who was sent in pursuit was not able to catch them.¹⁴ Dipalpur is some two hundred miles from Delhi; the river Sirsati (Saraswati) divides the two districts and by the side of the river is the town and fort of Sirsa (also written as Sarsati). Tughluq had sent one of his officers, Muhammad Sartiah, to take possession of Sirsa and to protect Jauna. This route, Saraswati to Delhi, was the scene of the future struggle. The rest of the empire remained undisturbed.

Father and son consulted together and decided to fight. But the first problem was to find allies. Five identical letters in identical terms were sent to five neighbouring officers; their reactions showed how deep was the fear and respect of the central authority which Alauddin's regime had inculcated. (1) Bahram, son of Aiba, came with his army as soon as he could and joined Tughluq for whatever the future may have in store. But he was the only neighbouring officer who fought along with Tughluq. (2) Mughlati, governor of Multan, was furious at Tughluq's letter. Dipalpur, he claimed, was only a dependency of Multan. 'It is not my business to challenge the higher authorities, specially since my army is not with me.' Bahram Siraj, a friend of Tughluq, incited the army against Mughlati, who fled for his life, but fell into a canal which Tughluq had built when he was governor of Multan, and his head was cut off by a son of Bahram Siraj. Tughluq seems to have received no aid from Multan, but had now no fear of an attack from that quarter. (3) Malik Yak Lakkhi, governor of Samana, a Hindu slave who had been favoured and promoted by Alauddin, may have owed his rehabilitation after rebelling at Devagiri to Khusrau Khan's influence. He sent Tughluq's letter to Khusrau Khan and immediately marched with his army against Dipalpur. But he was defeated and fled back to Samana. He was planning to join Khusrau Khan at Delhi, but was killed by the irate citizens before he could start. (4) Muhammad Shah Lur, the governor of Sind, was being besieged by his officers at Siwistan when Tughluq's letter reached him. He was able to make peace with his officers so that he may join forces with Tughluq. But either the distance was too great or his movements were too slow, for he only reached Delhi after Tughluq Shah had ascended the throne. True to

14 The *Tughluq Nama* (lines 803 and 804) says that no one from the great army of Delhi had the courage to pursue Jauna. But Barani seems to be more reliable here.

his publicly declared policy, the new Sultan expressed no anger and appointed Muhammad Shah governor of Ajmer. (5) Hushang, son of Kamaluddin Gurg, was governor of Jalor. He promised to come but took care to reach after the decisive battle. He was sent back to Jalor.

A special letter, carefully drafted, was sent to Ainul Mulk Multani, who was now the chief wazir. He showed the letter to Khusrau Khan in order to win his confidence. Tughluq had probably expected this, for his next move was to send a verbal message. Ainul Mulk's confidential reply was this time clear. He was a highly educated man and would brook no theological or communalistic nonsense. 'My ancestors', he said, 'have been Musalmans for ten generations', probably hinting at the fact that Tughluq, whom he knew intimately, could not produce an equally long Muslim paternity. He would not take sides, but when Tughluq's banners appeared near Delhi, he would withdraw. If Tughluq won the battle, he would be equally prepared to serve the new Sultan or to be put to death, as the new Sultan may decide.

Tughluq's claim was that he wanted to fight for the glory of Islam, loyalty to the family of Alauddin Khalji and the punishment of the criminals at Delhi. So far as his fellow-officers were concerned, these slogans fell on deaf ears. But help came from a different quarter. In four curious lines¹⁵ Amir Khusrau asserts that the army of Tughluq, though small, consisted of warriors from races of the northern climes, who had often fought with him against the Tatars, and he proceeds to enumerate them as follows: 'Ghizz, Turks, Mongols, Rumis (Greeks), Russians (Rusi), Tajiks and Khurasanis, people of pure birth and not racial mixtures.' But in the two battles that followed, he mentions only one Mongol officer. These races are an official disguise for the two Hindu groups that really joined Tughluq in the enterprise—the Khokars led by their prince, the 'pious-footed' Sahij Rai, and their chiefs, Gul Chandra and Niju, and the Mewatis or Meos. Since Tughluq was fighting for the glory of Islam, he had no hesitation in enrolling Hindus; also by now his name, for the warrior-races of the Punjab, had become synonymous with victory. He had an intimate knowledge of their chiefs and they gave him the assistance which the officers of the empire had denied. Apart from these chiefs and Bahram Aiba, Tughluq had no alternative but to entrust most of his highest commands to members of his own family. Just then a *carawan* carrying the tribute of Sind to Delhi along with a number of horses was captured by Tughluq's officers, and he

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, line 1095-99. The achievements of the Khokar chiefs are related by Isami.

carefully distributed the treasure among his soldiers to equip them for the coming struggle.

BATTLE OF SARASWATI

When Fakhruddin Jauna deserted him, Khusrau Khan felt that one of the four pillars of his throne was broken and that the whole structure was threatened. As usual, he consulted his advisers, and in consonance with their opinion he put to death the three blinded sons of Sultan Alauddin—Bahauddin, Ali and Usman—who had been kept as prisoners in the Red Palace. He then despatched an army of forty thousand horsemen under Khan-i Khanan, but the real military charge was given to Malik Qutlugh *amir-i shikar*. It is difficult to find the spot where the battle of Saraswati, as Isami calls it, was fought.

The army of Delhi by-passed the fort of Sirsa, which was held by Muhammad Sartiah on behalf of Tughluq. The Dipalpur army with Jauna and the Fish-banner in the van passed the village of Alapur and the tank of Bhat. Then, if the *Tughluq Nama* is to be believed, the army of Delhi, owing to some stupid miscalculation, was made to march ten *karohs* through the wilderness during the night, and the soldiers, thirsty, tired and covered with dust, came face to face with the enemy next morning and had no alternative but to fight.¹⁶ The two armies rapidly arranged themselves in the formal medieval order. In the Delhi army Khan-i Khanan, with the canopy, stationed himself in the centre; Qutlugh led the van, Talbagha Yaghda commanded the left wing and Kajib Brahma and Nag with their Baradu followers formed the right wing. 'The Hindu and Muslim columns were separated; the Hindu horsemen were led by Hindu *rawats*.'¹⁷ In the Dipalpur army Tughluq took his place in the centre; Jauna was stationed in front of him, and the Khokars, who formed the van were led by their chiefs, Gul Chandra, Niju and their followers. The left wing was commanded by Bahram Aiba and the right wing by Asaduddin and Bahauddin, two nephews of Tughluq.

According to Isami, the Khokar attack on the Delhi front ranks was so severe that they were broken and fled to the centre. Qutlugh's horse was shot under him; he fell down and shouted to the Khokars, who had surrounded him, that he was a great officer and must be taken to Tughluq. But they paid no heed to what he said and cut off his head. When the ranks in front of Khan-i Khanan fled towards the centre, Khan-i Khanan, who had rarely led an army, decided on flight. The Khokars were surprised at their easy victory. Gul

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, lines 1756-62.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, line 1777.

Chandra drove his charger straight at the Khan-i Khanan's *chatr-bearer*, slew him, and brought the *chatr* and placed it on Tughluq's head, thereby anticipating and forestalling the decision of the great nobles at Delhi. Tughluq thus received his first symbol of royalty from the hands of a Khokar chief.¹⁸ The Baradus seem to have done no fighting. Khan-i Khanan left everything on the battle-field to the enemy and fled away with three other khans—Yusuf Khan, Shaista Khan and Qadr Khan. Tughluq felt sorry for the end of Qutlugh, but when Malik Tamar was brought to him from among the wounded, he looked to his proper treatment. The Muslim captives from the defeated army were insulted by Tughluq's soldiers but he forgave them when they were brought before him.

After seeing to the collection of the spoils and rearranging his army, Tughluq moved from the battle-field to Delhi. The *Tughluq Nama* notes the following stages of his march: Hansi, Madina (a village north of Rohtak), Rohtak, Mandoti, Palam (the present international air-port), the hillock of Kosambar and the plain of Lahrawat. Here, with the Jumna behind him and Delhi in front of him, he encamped for battle. Tughluq, we are told, saw sternly to the maintenance of order in the territory that came under his control, and he refused the sum of six lakhs of *tankas*, which his officers had extracted from a *carawan* of innocent corn-merchants. But there was growing disorder in the territories of Khusrau Khan.

BATTLE OF LAHRAWAT

When the defeated army returned to Delhi, Khusrau Khan after some hesitation asked his officers for their advice. The suggestion that peace should be sought with Malik Tughluq by surrendering to him all territory east of Palam was dropped, as it would not be acceptable to the victorious general, and Khusrau Khan was advised to behave like a king and fight; they also suggested that the enormous treasure at Delhi should be distributed to win over the loyalty of the men and their officers. 'It is not possible to describe the way in which the whole treasury was plundered. The khans, maliks and other officers took away not lakhs but crores of *tankas*. . . Though the Musalmans got a lot, yet the Hindus got twice as much. . . Still to distribute treasures from fear of the enemy is ruinous to one's prestige; he who gives does not gain any reputation, and he who gets feels himself

¹⁸ Isami, 370-73. Amir Khusrau says that 'the army of Delhi was routed in one attack', but he was unfortunately not in a position to acknowledge frankly (as Isami does) that it was the Khokars who won the battle of Saraswati for Malik Tughluq and 'the glory of Islam'.

under no obligation.'¹⁹ Barani says that, apart from special *in'ams*, every soldier got two and a half years' salary; all records of demand and expenditure were burnt.

Khusrau Khan with his army came out of the Siri Palace and encamped before the Hauz-i Khas, which some authorities have referred to as the Hauz-i Alai. The *Tughluq Nama* thus describes this mixed army. 'It was half-Muslim and half-Hindu, mixed together like black and white clouds. The Musalmans in the service of the Hindus were as friendly to them as their own shadows; they were as closely bound to the Hindus as the charity of the Musalmans is bound up with their sins.'²⁰ The army was so full of Hindus and Musalmans that both Hindus and Musalmans were surprised.'²¹ Unfortunately, both military capacity and statesmanship were wanting to unify these two groups into a proper army and a proper state.

Khusrau Khan spent the night before Friday in preparing for the battle. A small ditch had been dug in front of his camp and a mud-wall constructed behind it. His soldiers were cramped for space. Ainul Mulk fled to Ujjain and Dhar in the course of the night but Khusrau Khan did not come to know of this till the next morning.

On Friday, when the sun was a spear high, Khusrau Khan launched his attack on Tughluq's camp.

The *Tughluq Nama* gives the position of Khusrau's officers, which is worth considering. *Right wing*—Yusuf Sufi Khan; Kamaluddin Sufi; Shaista Khan, son of Qirrat Qimar; Kafur *Muhrdar*; Shihab *naib-i barbek*; Qaisar *khas hajib*; Ambar Bughra Khan; Tigin, governor of Awadh; Bahauddin *Dabir*. *Left wing*—All the Baradus led by Randhol Rai Rayan, Nag, Kajb Brahma and Maldeva; Sumbul Hatim Khan *amir-i hajib*; officers of all the *diwans*, including the ministry of war; Talbagha Yaghda. 'It is impossible to enumerate the amirs who had been recently created... The ten thousand Baradu horsemen, with their ranas and rais, were stationed round the elephants.'²² The Hindu contingents had adopted for their standards the tails of cows with hog's teeth tied to them. Tughluq, as usual, had ordered peacock feathers to be tied to the Fish-standards of the empire. The pass-word for Tughluq's army was 'Qula'. The Musalmans on both sides seem to have cried 'Allah-o Akbar!' while the Hindus on both sides cried 'Narayan!'

19 *Tughluq Nama*, lines 2190-93, 2196, 2167-68.

20 Referring, apparently, to the fact that Muslim theology in some cases prescribes charity as a means for washing off sins.

21 *Ibid.*, lines 2289, 2146-49.

22 *Ibid.*, lines 2267-69, 2272.

Tughluq did not wish to fight that morning, but Khusrau Khan's attack left him no alternative. According to Isami, Tughluq stationed himself in the centre. Ali Haidar and Sahij Rai (a Khokar chief) stood behind Tughluq. Gul Chandra with all the Khokars led the van. The right wing was commanded by Fakhruddin Jauna, Shaghuri Shihab and Shadi Dawar. The left wing was assigned to Bahauddin (son of Tughluq's sister), Bahram Aiba, Yusuf *shuhna-i pil*, Nurmand (an Afghan), Kari (a Mongol New Muslim) and Asaduddin (son of Tughluq's brother, Sipahdar Dawar).

Barani's account of the battle is not worth considering. Amir Khusrau and Isami both agree in stating that Khusrau Khan's attack was so fierce that not more than three hundred men were left with Tughluq. The Baradu chiefs, Randhol and Kajb Brahma, attacked Malik Jauna's contingent in front of them so fiercely that he moved towards Shaghuri Shihab, and the Baradus rushed forward through the space thus opened for them. Asaduddin moved from Tughluq's left to the centre of the conflict, but Bughra Khan and Talbagha also moved forward to oppose him, and it seemed that the army of Tughluq was being defeated. Seeing the enemy columns dispersing and only a few men left who still kept their position, Khusrau ordered Shaista Khan to attack the enemy's baggage. Shaista cut the ropes of Tughluq's pavilion and shouted that Tughluq had run back to his own territory. At the same time Khusrau's victorious soldiers took to plundering the baggage of the enemy. It was a fatal error, for one of the canons of medieval warfare was to insist on the stern maintenance of discipline when the hour of victory was near.

In that terrible crisis Tughluq's nerves did not fail him. He called his highest officers together; still the men round him did not exceed five hundred. His advantage was that the enemy soldiers were in utter disorder, every one plundering what he could. Tughluq decided that the critical point was the position of Khusrau Khan; if that was gained, the battle, which had been nearly lost, could yet be won. So he sent the Khokar chief, Gul Chandra, to attack Khusrau Khan from the rear while he attacked him from the front. This double attack made it clear to Khusrau Khan that his own life was in danger, whatever may happen to the rest of the army; and being quite inexperienced in the handling of large bodies of fighting men, he decided to fly for dear life. This settled the fate of the battle; seeing their chief no more in his place, Khusrau's soldiers also took to flight. Gul Chandra slew Khusrau's *chatr-bearer* and put the *chatr* over the head of Tughluq once more. When Tughluq thought he had won the battle, a hostile army with elephants, half visible and half invisible, was seen in a depression. Isami says that it was a part of Khusrau's

left wing, led by Sumbul Hatim Khan, which had still remained in its position, but according to the *Tughluq Nama* Sufi Khan and Kafur Muhrdar were also there. Like all sections of the Delhi army, it had both Muslim and Hindu soldiers, but the latter predominated. Tughluq at first overestimated its strength but had no difficulty in defeating it.

Isami and Khusrau give us some idea of what befell the defeated soldiers. According to Isami, all Baradus, who had not fallen on the field of battle, were, according to the new Sultan's orders, killed next day in the streets and lanes of Delhi. Whether the Baradus were a caste or a profession, this wholesale massacre seems to have extinguished them. Khusrau says that the Musalmans of the victorious army seldom wielded their swords against the defeated Muslim soldiers, but the Khokars, Afghans, Mongols and Mcos observed no restraint. Even if the lives of the defeated Musalmans were to be considered as guaranteed, they could still be deprived of all they possessed. 'The real misfortune was for the (defeated, non-Baradu) Hindu soldiers, who whether dead, wounded or alive, had no protection.'²³ Their money, horses and jewelry were seized, and the ranas and rawats, who had come to the battle wearing all their ornaments, were the special object of plunder. Khusrau, however, adds that the officers of Tughluq seldom took to plundering.²⁴

Tughluq returned to his camp after the battle, and all the leading officers of Delhi came to pay him their homage. Among them was Muhammad Ayaz, who brought the keys of Siri on behalf of his father, Malik Ahmad Ayaz. Next morning (Saturday, 1 Sha'ban 720) 6 September 1320, with soldiers lining both sides of the streets, Tughluq started in full military procession for the *Hazar Sutun* Palace. He alighted at the gate and, promising forgiveness for the past, made the maliks and amirs sit by his side. The throne was not occupied.

The *Tughluq Nama* has given us a summary of the discussion that followed and there are some sentences of it which the poet could not have composed on his own responsibility. Instead of claiming anything for his ancestors, which would not have deceived those present, Tughluq began with the blunt sentence. 'I was a man of no consequence (*awara mard*), subject to the heat and the cold of the sun and the moon. The late Sultan Jalaluddin Khalji raised me from a humble post to a position near to himself and I guarded him sleeplessly with my sword, sharp as a diamond.' He then proceeded to give

²³ *Ibid.*, line 2522.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 128-32; Isami, 379-80.

a short account of his career. After Jalaluddin's death, he was greatly depressed. But then the star of Alauddin's good fortune arose; he entered the service of Ulugh Khan and, after his death, he girded his loins in the service of Sultan Alauddin. 'Whatever promotions I have received since then have been due to that great monarch.'

Here the nobles intervened. Tughluq was ignoring his own merits, which had brought him promotions. When Hamira Deva of Ranthambhor had sent out his garrison to fight, Ulugh Khan had put Tughluq in charge of the army and he had put two-thirds of the enemy to the sword. 'That day was the morning of your good fortune.' After recounting his other victories, they referred to his success on the sea-coast over a *tuman* commanded by his name-sake, the Mongol Tughluq, and an equally large army of Rai Bombal; he had seized money from the Rai and imposed a tariff on sea-born merchandise. He had won eighteen victories before Mubarak's death and two more since then. 'God has protected you for a great work; otherwise who could have survived so much bloodshed and slaughter.' He deserved the throne.

Tughluq was still unwilling. 'My crown and throne are my bow and arrow.' He had been distressed at the way in which the Alai princes had been murdered. 'The rebels had broken into the *haram*, taken some of the princesses for themselves, openly or secretly, and distributed others among the Hindus. Khan-i Khanan, the apostate, had raped many.' He had three objects in view—*first*, to revive Islam again; *second*, to seize the empire from this Hindu-born wretch and to give it to a surviving prince of the royal house; and *third*, to mete out condign punishments to the ungrateful wretches who had murdered the princes. 'If there is any survivor from the royal family, let him be proclaimed; if no survivor has been left, there are many capable maliks here. I love my Dipalpur. . . For me, my sword and the heads of the Mongols. You look after the crown and its wearer.'

The nobles placed their foreheads on the ground. Tughluq's acceptance would be unanimous, but his non-acceptance might entail a civil war. So after some more discussion, they brought forward their final and conclusive argument. 'The work your hands have wrought has raised your prestige to the skies. If another man ascends the throne, we are sure he will keep a careful watch on you, and your courage being what it is, how will he be able to sleep in peace without fearing your spear? Under these conditions, whether he likes it or not, he will have (to remove you) like a thorn from his pillow.' They drew his attention to the fate of Abu Muslim Khurasani, who had overthrown the Umayyads, placed the Abbasids on the throne and behaved like a loyal officer; nevertheless the Caliph

Abu Ja'far Mansur ordered him to be killed, for he was too great to be a subject. The argument was unanswerable. Tughluq thought for some time and then acceded to the wishes of the nobles. They took him by the hand, seated him on the throne and proclaimed him Sultan with the title of 'Ghiyasuddin'.

It remains to note the fate of the two leading adventurers who had lost the game. They were deserted by their closest friends, who realized that being found in their company meant certain death. Khan-i Khanan sought refuge in an old woman's hut but he was discovered and Malik Jauna, who was sent to fetch him on the night following the battle, carelessly used some words about his father's merciful and forgiving temper. But there could be no question of mercy for he had been guilty of both rapes and murders. Tughluq ordered him to be paraded through all the streets of Delhi; he was then killed and his dead body was hung upside down from a tower.²⁵

Khusrau Khan was also deserted by his Baradus. He seems to have gone to Tilpat and then returned to Delhi, where he tried to hide in a desolate garden—probably the garden of the mausoleum of his former master, Malik Shadi. He was discovered on the third day after the battle, and Malik Jauna (now Ulugh Khan), seeing his distressing condition, again talked of mercy.²⁶ On being brought before Tughluq Shah's *masnad* (pillow), Khusrau kissed the ground. Why had he murdered Mubarak Shah? Khusrau Khan's answer is thus summarized by the *Tughluq Nama*: 'The facts are known to every one. If that which should not be done, had not been done to me, then I too would not have done what I ought not to have done.' He put the blame of everything else on his advisers; his own desire had been to place one of the royal princes on the throne; and later on, he wished to make peace with Tughluq Shah by ceding to him all territory east of Palam. He went on to suggest his own punishment; he should be blinded and given a village to live in. But the Sultan said that he was bound by the principle of *qisas*—'a life for a life'²⁷—and asked him to prepare his neck for the sharp sword. Then the executioner, at the Sultan's order, beheaded Khusrau Khan where Mubarak Shah had been beheaded, and threw his dead body to the courtyard below in the same manner.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, lines 2820-21.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, lines 2874-76.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, line 2882.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE TUGHLUQS

I. SULTAN GHIYASUDDIN TUGHLUQ (1320-25)

NAME AND ETHNIC ORIGIN

REFERRING TO SULTAN GHIYASUDDIN, Amir Khusrau observes in his *Tughluq Nama*:

*'Thy name was Tughluq Ghazi, the revered one,
The Mongol chief too at that time had the same name, Tughluq.'*¹

It is unmistakably clear from this verse that *Tughluq* was the personal name of the Sultan and not a tribal cognomen, as Sir Wolseley Haig has suggested. Afif confirms this when he says that Sultan Tughluq was the name of the first ruler of the dynasty and Sultan Muhammad that of the second.² Numismatic and epigraphic evidence also corroborates Amir Khusrau. Sultan Muhammad used to call himself son of Tughluq Shah; but Firuz Shah and his successors never used Tughluq as a surname. *It is, nevertheless, convenient, though quite incorrect, to give the name of Tughluq to the whole dynasty.*

Considerable difference of opinion has existed among historians regarding the descent of Sultan Tughluq. Ibn-i Battuta writes on the authority of the famous Suhrawardi saint of Multan, Shaikh Ruknuddin Abul Fath, that Tughluq belonged to the Qarauna tribe of the Turks, who inhabited the hilly regions between Turkistan and Sind.³ Apart from the fact that Ibn-i Battuta's testimony is not confirmed by other writers of the period, the ethnic and etymological origin of the word *Qarauna* remains obscure and later writers, who have put different interpretations on it, have not been able to clarify the position. Marco Polo considered them people of mixed parentage, whose

¹ *Tughluq Nama*, 138.

² Afif, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 27.

It is needless to speculate about the meaning of the word *Tughluq* because no earlier authority throws any light on it and Ferishta's view that the word is an Indian corruption of the Turkish term '*Qutlugh*' is far from convincing.

³ *Rehla*, II, 31.

fathers were Tatars and mothers were Indians.⁴ Mzik holds that *Qarauna* is connected with the Sanskrit *Karana*, which means mixed caste, and is used for one whose father is a Kshattriya but whose mother is a Sudra.⁵ Ferishta, who made inquiries at Lahore about the origin of the Tughluqs, was told that Ghiyasuddin's father, Malik Tughluq, was one of the Turkish slaves of Balban and that his mother was a woman of a local Jat family.⁶ But this statement lacks confirmation by contemporary authorities.

The *Rauzatus Safa* refers to the Qaraunas as a tribe forming a special division in the Mongol army.⁷ Sultan Ghiyasuddin's being a Qarauna is, however, highly doubtful. In his speech before his accession, as reported by the contemporary authority of the *Tughluq Nama* of Amir Khusrau, Ghiyasuddin frankly admits, what all his audience knew, that he was a man of no importance (*awara mard*) in his early career. Unless the king had said something to this effect, the poet could not have ventured to make this fact the basis of his speech. Efforts like those of Badr-i Chach to find a royal genealogy for the dynasty must, therefore, be dismissed as prompted by flattery. Keeping these diverse opinions in view, it may be concluded that both in India, Central Asia and Persia the term 'Qarauna' was used for a mixed race—the descendants of Mongol or Turkish fathers and non-Turkish mothers.

EARLY CAREER

There is no unanimity of opinion among the historians with regard to the time of Tughluq's arrival in India. Afif⁸ and Ibn-i Battuta⁹ place it during the reign of Alauddin Khalji, but Amir Khusrau clearly remarks in his *Tughluq Nama* that after searching for livelihood (in Delhi) for a considerable time, Tughluq was taken into the service of the imperial guard by Jalaluddin Khalji. The *Tughluq Nama* is silent about his coming from abroad, and this seems to imply that he was born in India. He won his first distinction during the siege of Ranthambhor under Ulugh Khan.¹⁰ It was, however, during the reign of Sultan Alauddin Khalji that Malik Tughluq rose

4 Yule's *Marco Polo*, 98-99.

5 *Die Reise des Arabers Ibn Battuta durch Indian and China*, 97.

6 Ferishta, I, 130.

7 *Rauzatus Safa*, Vol. V, 96.

8 *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 36. Afif says that the three brothers—Tughluq, Rajab and Abu Bakr—came to Delhi from Khurasan during the reign of Sultan Alauddin. The Khalji Sultan admitted them all in his service. But this error is clearly disproved by the *Tughluq Nama*.

9 *Rehla*, II.

10 *Tughluq Nama*, 136.

in position and prestige. He must have impressed the Sultan very early by his spirit of dedication and his martial talents, because the wardenship of the marches, which was assigned to him, was one of the most difficult posts in the empire. Tughluq rendered meritorious services to the sultanat as governor of Multan and later on of Dipalpur. He checked successfully the Mongol inroads into the country and effectively garrisoned the frontier towns. Ibn-i Battuta refers to an inscription which he saw in the Jama Masjid of Multan, in which twenty-nine of his victories against the Tatars were recorded.¹¹ Perhaps Ibn-i Battuta's memory deceived him about the number of campaigns, because Amir Khusrau mentions only eighteen such victories.¹² No historian has given a list of these campaigns, but obviously some of them must have been mere skirmishes between the Mongols and the Indian troops posted to defend the western frontier.

According to Amir Khusrau there was a brief interval of obscurity in the career of Malik Tughluq after the death of Jalaluddin Khalji. Perhaps he did not change his loyalty as abruptly as the other Jalali nobles had done after the assassination of their master. He entered the service of Ulugh Khan, brother of Alauddin Khalji, and became his personal attendant. When Ulugh Khan died, he joined the service of Alauddin Khalji. 'It is by his (Alauddin's) favour that I have attained to the position you see me in', he remarked at the time of his accession.¹³ His name is for the first time mentioned by Barani in connection with the invasion of Ali Beg and Khwaja Tartaq. According to Isami and Khusrau, on this occasion the supreme command was entrusted to a Hindu officer, Malik Nayak, and Tughluq was one of his chief subordinates. Subsequently when Iqbalmanda made his appearance, Ghazi Malik marched against him and inflicted a crushing defeat on the invader. Perhaps it was after this success that he was appointed warden of the western marches and the *iqta* of Dipalpur was assigned to him.

Though Tughluq had risen to an eminent position during the reign of Alauddin, it appears strange that he did not lift even his little finger to protest against the high-handedness of Malik Kafur, who had gathered all power in his hands and had started playing the role of a king-maker. Mubarak Khalji, however, recognized his services and confirmed him in his assignment.

Incidentally, mention may be made of a mission which Qutbuddin

¹¹ *Rehla*, II, 29.

¹² *Tughluq Nama*, 138. Barani, however says that he won twenty battles against the Mongols. *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 416.

¹³ *Tughluq Nama*, 137.

Mubarak assigned to Malik Tughluq. According to Isami, after the accession of Shihabuddin Umar, his regent, Malik Kafur, sent for Ainul Mulk Multani from Devagiri and deputed him to crush the rebellion of Haidar and Zirak in Gujarat. He marched from Devagiri, but while he was encamping at Chitor, he heard of the assassination of Kafur. He stopped where he was and carefully watched the rapid developments that were taking place in the politics of Delhi. Qutbuddin, on attaining to power, deputed Malik Tughluq to go and persuade Ainul Mulk to resume his march. But though he was welcomed by Ainul Mulk at Chitor, the latter's officers were reluctant about undertaking any enterprise. 'We have not seen the Sultan yet'; they wanted to wait for a month or so. Sensing the cause of their reluctance, Malik Tughluq immediately returned to Delhi and suggested that *farmans* and *khilats* be sent to every officer of Ainul Mulk confirming him in his post. This advice was accepted and Malik Tughluq succeeded in bringing round the leaders to resume their march to Gujarat. Malik Tughluq accompanied the army; but Ainul Mulk Multani remained in supreme command. Nevertheless, Ghazi Tughluq had rendered a commendable diplomatic service.

RISE TO POWER

In the preceding chapter Ghazi Malik's role in organizing a movement against Khusrau Khan has been described in detail. The nobles acted wisely in placing the crown on the head of Ghazi Malik, who had proved his worth as a leader of mature experience and dauntless courage. According to Ibn-i Battuta, Ghazi Malik was at first reluctant to wear the crown and asked Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan to accept it. But when the latter, after refusing the offer added: 'If you do not accept, we will make your son our king', Tughluq immediately accepted the crown. The version of the Moorish traveller seems highly improbable. The correct account of the reason advanced by the nobles and recorded by the *Tughluq Nama* has already been given. It had become impossible for Tughluq to remain a subordinate officer.

Ghazi Malik assumed the style of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq. Though not young in years, he was gifted with boundless enthusiasm, an unerring judgement, firm determination and the desire to be methodical in all matters of administration. In accordance with the time-honoured practice, he reconstituted the administrative machinery, including in it his friends, relatives and supporters. He gave the office of *naib barbek* to his nephew, Malik Asaduddin. Another nephew, Malik Bahauddin, was appointed *arz-i mamalik*. Malik Jafar was made *naib-i arz*. Malik Shadi, the son-in-law of the Sultan, was made supervisor of the revenue ministry (*diwan-i wizarat*). Qazi

Kamaluddin, the *qaziul quzzat*, was honoured with the title of *sadr-i jahan*, and Qazi Shamsuddin was appointed qazi of Delhi.

Rising as he did from the position of a plebeian, the new Sultan, on the one hand, distributed honours and posts to his relatives and friends, and on the other, emulating the example of Balban, ennobled his own sons with high sounding titles. The eldest son, Malik Fakhruddin, was given the title of Ulugh Khan; and the remaining four sons were entitled Bahram Khan, Zafar Khan, Mahmud Khan and Nusrat Khan. Curiously enough, the names of Abu Bakr and Rajab, the two brothers of the Sultan, and of his nephew, Kamaluddin Firuz, who at this time must have been a stripling of fourteen, do not find a mention in this list. Perhaps the two brothers were dead by this time, and the nephew was too young to be invested with any distinction. We do not also come across the names of the fathers of his other nephews.

Bahram Aiba was given the title of Kishlu Khan and was accorded the unprecedented honour of being addressed by the Sultan as his 'brother'. To his *iqta* of Uchch was added that of Multan. Tatar Khan, an adopted son of the Sultan, became Tatar Malik and the *iqta* of Zafarabad was assigned to him. Qutlugh Khan, son of Burhanuddin, was raised to the position of naib wazir of Devagir. It was with this reconstituted machinery of the empire that Ghiyasuddin initiated his policy of administrative reforms and the restoration of the royal authority.

THE PROBLEMS BEFORE THE SULTAN

The empire which Ghiyasuddin was called upon to administer was seething with innumerable thorny problems. Its vastness militated against any uniform control of the outlying and distant areas. There were frequent convulsions in the provinces. Sind was only nominally under Delhi; taking advantage of the troubles at the centre, its chief, Amar, had seized Thatta and Lower Sind and had virtually become independent. Similarly, Gujarat had been plunged into a state of turmoil after the recall of Ainul Mulk Multani. The efforts of Malik Dinar, Zafar Khan, Husamuddin and Wajihuddin Quraishi to restore order had completely failed. In Rajputana, Chitor, Nagaur and Jalor were some of the important imperial strongholds, but they were subject to unexpected attacks by the adventurous Rajput chiefs.

In the east the loyalty of Bengal, the 'problem province' of the empire, was of a fitful character. Its ruler, Shamsuddin Firuz, a descendant of Balban, had died in 1322. His two sons, Shihabuddin Bughra Shah and Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah, had revolted against

him during his life-time. Bahadur Shah had established himself at Sonargaon; on the death of his father he also seized Lakhnauti, and expelled his two brothers, Shihabuddin and Nasiruddin. This development impelled the intervention of the Sultan of Delhi. Tirhut and Jajnagar were still in the hands of powerful Hindu rais and zamindars.

Nor was condition in the Deccan assuring in any way. It had been merely overrun by Alauddin Khalji, who was content with the acknowledgement of his overlordship by the rulers of the south. But the loyalty which they professed was skin-deep and expeditions had to be sent to reinforce royal authority in Devagiri and Telingana. To improve the situation, Qutbuddin Mubarak Khalji had changed the policy of his father and taken the forward step of appointing his own officers in the erstwhile Yadava kingdom, which thus became a part of the Delhi empire. When political convulsions occurred at Delhi, Rai Pratap Singh Rudra Deva of Telingana threw off even the mask of outward allegiance to Delhi. In utter disregard of the agreement, which he had concluded with Khusrau Khan in 1318, he marched against the fort of Bhadrakot, on the frontiers of the Maratha country, ejected the imperial garrison and occupied it. Also after improving his resources, he repelled the attacks of the ruler of Orissa and extended his domination as far as the Western Ghats, and from the Godavari to the Jalar river. The imperial authority in Ma'abar had also been overthrown; though Vira Ballala of the Hoysala land did not show a mailed fist, he too had become virtually independent.

Apart from these unsatisfactory political conditions, which demanded the immediate attention of the new Sultan, the administrative machinery was completely out of gear. The officers and their men had been bribed to ensure their support; both Qutbuddin Mubarak and Khusrau Khan had spent lavishly in order to strengthen their position by satisfying the soldiers. Reckless distribution of money by Khusrau Khan is said to have completely depleted the treasury. The revenue system of Alauddin Khalji had completely broken down, and as a result the financial stability of the state had received a serious setback.

Thus the problems which confronted Ghiyasuddin Tughluq were not only vast in their magnitude, but also complicated in their nature. Though primarily a military leader, Ghiyasuddin was quick to size up the situation, and through a series of bold but well-calculated measures, he brought the machinery of the sultanat to an even keel. Barani very significantly observes that he achieved in days what others would have taken years to accomplish.¹⁴ His firm and vigorous

14 *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 426.

administration gave people peace and prosperity and, in the words of Barani, 'they felt as if Alauddin had come to life again'.¹⁵

ECONOMIC MEASURES

Soon after his accession, Ghiyasuddin addressed himself to the task of rehabilitating the depleted exchequer and organizing the finances of the empire. For this purpose he chalked out a practical scheme of revenue reforms, which was in essence a compromise between the rigour of Alauddin Khalji's methods and the extravagant leniency of his successors. Barani says that moderation (*tariqa-i ʿitidal wa rasm-i miyana ravi*) was the keynote of his policy in all administrative affairs.¹⁶

Although the crabbed words of Barani render it difficult for us to understand the details of his agrarian policy, it is possible to form some idea of the Sultan's objectives. He tried to tackle the problem at three levels: Of the *maqtas* (i.e. provincial governors), of the *muqaddams* (i.e. village headmen) and of the peasants. The consideration of the welfare of the peasant was uppermost in his mind. His orders were to treat the peasants in such a way that wealth did not tempt them to raise the standard of rebellion; nor were they to be made paupers, because in that case they would give up cultivation.¹⁷ The steam-roller reforms of Alauddin Khalji had paralysed the economic life of the agriculturists. The burden of taxation had been so heavy that all the incentives to work had dried up, and they were no longer interested in improving or expanding cultivation. The advantages they had been enjoying for centuries had disappeared, leaving them in the grip of penury and poverty. The *maqtas* were also faced with difficulties. Decreasing cultivation and the unwillingness of the *muqaddams* to serve as links between them and the peasants, because their perquisites had been abolished, must have adversely touched their pockets. Such a dismal state of affairs cried for a change. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq rose equal to the occasion and made a serious attempt to regulate revenue affairs with firmness and sympathy.

To lighten the burden of the peasants, he rescinded Alauddin's rule of measurement (*hukm-i masahat*) and the yield per *biswa*, and substituted for it crop-sharing (*hukm-i hasil*). It was advantageous in two ways: First, it ensured to the producer the benefit accruing from improved cultivation; and secondly, it made allowances for a complete

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 425.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 427.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 431.

or partial failure of crops. Barani, while praising this method, says that it was no longer necessary to take into account calamities, or differentiate between the areas which had produced a harvest and those which had not. But Barani is ambiguous with regard to the proportion of the state demand. He says: *'The Sultan ordered the revenue officials not to assess more than one in ten or eleven upon "iqta" and other lands either by guess or computation or on the reports of informers or on the statements of enhancement-mongers.'*¹⁸ This cryptic sentence may mean either that the state demand was not to exceed a tenth of the total produce, or it may be (more rationally) interpreted to suggest that the extra-enhancement in the revenue was not to exceed one-tenth or one-eleventh. Considering the fact that in inaugurating the revenue reforms the two-fold objective of the Sultan was to afford relief to the peasants and also to rehabilitate the finances, it is highly unlikely that he would have reduced his demand to one-tenth of the produce. The traditional rate was one-fifth of the produce, which had been increased to one-half during the reign of Alauddin Khalji. But Alauddin's system had also guaranteed against famine, and under the succeeding systems this was not possible. Though it may be argued that this exorbitant rate could not have been applied in the post-Alauddin period, it must be conceded that, in the midst of confusion, variations must have occurred. Barani tells us that Qutbuddin Mubarak Khalji 'removed from among the people the heavy revenues and severe demands'.¹⁹ This, however, does not mean that he abolished the revenue altogether. In all probability he reduced its incidence to some figure lower than that fixed by Alauddin. And it may safely be presumed that this rate must have been the traditional one-fifth of the produce. Ghiyasuddin gave to it a legal sanction with the proviso that, wherever possible, it may be enhanced by one-tenth or one-eleventh. The following remark of Barani clearly shows that this enhancement was in the nature of surcharge over the existing rates. 'Land revenue was to be increased', he says, 'by degrees and gradually, because the weight of a sudden enhancement would ruin the country and bar the way to prosperity.'²⁰

Instructions were issued to the officers to see that cultivation increased from year to year, and that the government revenue was also proportionately enhanced. Increase in the incidence of taxation was to be gradual, and such that it did not affect the prosperity of the peasantry and did not reduce its interest in its holdings. The Sultan repeatedly warned the revenue officials against increase in taxation,

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 429.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 383.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 430.

which rendered it difficult for the peasant to cultivate his holdings or bring virgin lands under the plough. He laid down rules of conduct for the *maqtas* and governors regarding the realization of the land revenue, and took all possible precautions to save the peasant from their high-handedness and oppression.

Ghiyasuddin Tughluq did not believe in Alauddin Khalji's principle of levelling down the village headman to the rank of the ordinary peasant. He realized fully the utility of their services in the process of collecting the government demand. They had been performing this duty for generations and had acquired experience and traditional dignity. He is said to have remarked: 'It cannot be denied that abundant responsibility rests on the shoulders of chiefs and headmen.' So he ordered the restoration of their perquisites and exempted their cultivation and pasturage from assessment. But at the same time he insisted that 'the chief or headman (Hindu) be kept in such a condition that he may not become oblivious (of the authority of the government) and rebellious and refractory from excessive affluence'. Thus, he accorded a lenient but firm treatment to the village headman. His services were utilized, his status was restored, but he was prevented from becoming mischievous or defiant.

In this new set-up the practice of farming of the land revenue was discouraged. But it could not be avoided at the highest level, because the governors held their posts on farming terms; the surplus revenue (*fawazil*) to be remitted by them to the treasury was a stated sum, and not a matter to be settled annually on the basis of actual receipts and sanctioned expenditures. Piecing together all the relevant but stray references in Barani's *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, it is possible to form a fairly vivid picture of the rules framed for the guidance of *maqtas* and governors. The Sultan was agreeable to allowing the maliks and amirs 'a half-tenth or half-eleventh, and one-tenth or one-fifteenth of the revenue of their own territory'. Similarly, if the agents and deputies appropriated half-a-per cent in addition to their salary, they were not to be disgraced, nor was the amount to be recovered from them by torture. But if they deviated from this norm and appropriated considerable sums, they were to be subjected to humiliations and the disgrace of flogging and fetters, and the money was to be recovered from them in full. They were required to make only slender demands on their *iqtas*, and to reserve out of this demand something for their agents. This modification of the farming system cast a heavier responsibility on the shoulders of governors and *maqtas*. They were to see that revenue was realized without oppression and high-handedness, that excessive demands were not made from the peasants and that the village headmen did not pass on their liabilities to the

peasants. And they, in their turn, were enjoined to be scrupulously fair and honest on pain of being treated with rudeness and severity by the ministry of revenue.

Even this hazy picture of land revenue reforms brings into bold relief the sound and wholesome features of the Sultan's fiscal administration. While conceding that the rule of measurement did not altogether disappear, and that it gave place only slowly to assessment on the basis of crop-sharing, it cannot be denied that due regard was paid to safeguarding the interest of the producing class, and that steps were taken to protect it from rack-renting and oppression, and to guarantee to it the benefits accruing from extended and improved cultivation. Rules for the guidance of officers at the various levels were laid down, and every effort was made by the soldier-sovereign to enforce them effectively. We need not wonder that the income of the royal exchequer improved considerably and the Sultan was enabled to undertake schemes of political consolidation.

REORGANISATION OF THE ARMY

Next to finances, the Sultan's attention was absorbed by the affairs of the army. Alauddin Khalji had created an effective war-machine, which had fallen to pieces under his weak successors. Ghiyasuddin, a veteran military leader, strove hard to reorganize the army as efficiently as possible. The key-note of his military policy was to keep the soldiers satisfied, economically and otherwise. Barani very significantly remarks that he was more affectionate towards his soldiers than their own parents. He saw to it that there was no misappropriation of their salaries and allowances. Barani's erroneous remark that Sirajul Mulk Khwaja Haji was reappointed minister of war was probably due to his failing memory, that famous war-veteran had vanished from the scene and we do not find him playing any part in the campaigns of the reign. Much of the effectiveness of the army depended on the way the horses were maintained. Ghiyasuddin rigorously enforced the regulations of Alauddin Khalji with regard to descriptive rolls (*huliyah*) and branding (*dagh*). Within two years of his accession, Ghiyasuddin had so effectively organized his army that he could think of sending a campaign to the distant south.

THE WARANGAL CAMPAIGN

Having set the administrative machinery in order, the Sultan turned his attention to the task of restoring his prestige and authority in the outlying parts of the empire. Telingana claimed his immediate attention as Rai Pratap Rudra Deva had reasserted his independence

and refused to pay any tribute. The Sultan appointed his son, Ulugh Khan, to deal with the recalcitrant Rai. In 721/1321 the prince left Delhi at the head of a large army, and a number of seasoned and experienced officers of the Alai period accompanied him.²¹ He traversed the distance to the Maratha country in much less time than had been taken previously by any army. He stopped for a while at Devagiri to rest and recruit, and then resumed his march to Warangal, the capital of Telingana. He did not meet any opposition on the way. On reaching Warangal he laid siege to the fort, which was famous in the Deccan for its massiveness and strength. It had seventy bastions, each of which was guarded by a *naik*. Amir Khusrau has described the fort in connection with Malik Kafur's Deccan campaigns.

According to Isami,²² the siege dragged on for about six months without any prospects of success. The Sultan grew suspicious of the loyalty of Ulugh Khan and sent weekly letters to him expressing his dissatisfaction at the delay. The reasons for such a misunderstanding have not been explained by Isami, but he exonerates Ulugh Khan of all treasonable designs. The garrison defended the fort resolutely, but with the passage of time scarcity of provisions threatened to break its back. The besiegers, on their part, adopted the two-fold strategy of a scorched earth policy and of closing all sources of supply to the garrison. Rudra Deva, hard-pressed as he was, opened negotiations for peace and offered to pay a tribute provided the prince raised the siege and retired from his territory. He thought that, like Malik Kafur before him, Ulugh Khan would be satisfied with acceptance of the overlordship of the Sultan of Delhi. But Ulugh Khan's intention was to annex the territory and he did not discuss terms of peace.

Two important facts emerge from the statements of Isami and Barani: First, that for a month despatches did not reach the army from Delhi as the line of communication was broken; and second, that there prevailed some unrest among the imperial officers, who were probably tired of campaigning in a distant and hostile land. Ibn-i Battuta's statement that the prince meditated rebellion is not worthy of credence; it is not supported by Barani or Isami, neither of whom were favourably inclined towards Ulugh Khan. The former blames Shaikhzada Damishqi and Ubaid for the mischief; the latter holds only Ubaid responsible. Isami tells us²³ that Ubaid, who was also an astrologer, was commissioned by Ulugh Khan to forecast the

²¹ *Ibid.*, 446. See also *Futuh-us Salatin*, Madras ed. 392.

²² *Futuh-us Salatin*, Madras ed. 392.

²³ *Ibid.*, 395.

date of the fall of the fort. After a week's calculation, he predicted a date and offered to be executed if his prophesy did not come true. The date turned out to be wrong, and Ubaid had to do something to save his life. So he spread among the officers the rumour of the Sultan's death and said that the prince was concealing it from them because he intended to make a short shrift of them all. But this statement cannot be accepted in full. Ubaid did spread the rumour; but how could he have convinced the great officers of the evil intentions of the prince?

There is, however, no doubt that this rumour led to great consternation and commotion in the imperial camp and that the officers became restless owing to their desire to leave for Delhi. What worsened the position of Ulugh Khan further was the rumour that some one had been already raised to the Delhi throne. This incorrect rumour completely paralysed Ulugh Khan. Some of the great officers of the Delhi army came to an understanding with Rai Rudra Deva, who promised by a sacred oath on the Ganges and Somnath²⁴ that he would refrain from attacking them during their retreat. They broke up their camp, set fire to their entrenchments and left the place in great haste.

This treacherous betrayal by a section of his officers, at a time when victory was not very far off, came as a great shock to Ulugh Khan. He had, however, no alternative but to follow the retreating army. On the way he made an attempt to bring round the disaffected officers, but was disappointed at their pretexts and vague apologies. When he arrived at Katgir, he was joined by Mujir Abu Raja, who sent letters to the neighbouring zamindars asking them to apprehend the rebels and destroy them. Many of the soldiers of Tamar and Tigin were put to the sword at Kalyan.²⁵

Ulugh Khan proceeded to Devagiri where he was welcomed by his younger brother, Mahmud Khan, the *maqta* of the province. Mahmud took the conspirators and their accomplices to Delhi, where condign punishments were meted out to them. Some were beheaded and others were trampled under the feet of elephants. Another army was recruited at the capital and sent to Ulugh Khan with instructions to invest Warangal again and complete the conquest of Telingana. This despatch of the second army proves that the Sultan was not in any way suspicious of the loyalty of Ulugh Khan, who marched with the fresh reinforcements against Warangal. On this occasion Ulugh Khan was more cautious and took effective steps to guard his line

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 395.

²⁵ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 398-99.

of communications. He seized Bidar and several other forts along his route and posted strong garrisons to protect them.

Rai Rudra Deva was taken by surprise when he found the imperial troops besieging him again. Though not well-equipped at the time, he decided to face the invader and tire him out by patiently prolonging the siege. In spite of his past experience, Ulugh Khan could not hasten the pace of operations, and the siege dragged on for about five months. In the end when disease and hunger began to stare the garrison in the face, the Rai decided to surrender. He sent messengers to the prince begging for quarter and offering to give up the fort. The imperial army occupied the fort, plundered the houses and demolished some public buildings. The Rai with all his relations and dependants was escorted to Delhi by Qadr Khan. He was not, however, destined to bear the humiliations of captivity. He died before he could be presented before the Sultan; he may have committed suicide.

The conquests of Gutti, Kunt and Ma'abar were perhaps a continuation of the Warangal campaign. It appears that Gutti at this time was in the hands of a Telugu chief, called Jaglapi Gangydeva. He surrendered it to Ulugh Khan. Rajamundry (Rajamahendri) was occupied by another imperial officer, Salar Alavi. A Pandyan chronicler places the conquest of Madura by the Turks in 1323, which lends support to the presumption that the conquest must have been made by Ulugh Khan or one of his officers.

Telingana now became a part of the Delhi empire and Ulugh Khan made provisional arrangements for its administration. He changed the name of Warangal to Sultanpur,²⁶ and divided the kingdom of Telingana into several administrative units. For the sake of convenience as much as from considerations of policy, he did not ignore local talent and utilized it as far as he could. He retained the old Hindu officers at their posts and accorded a generous treatment to some of the former ministers. Nor did he antagonize the population by acts of vandalism or the demolition of temples. Despite all this, the hold of the Delhi government on the region remained uncertain and shaky. The achievement of Ulugh Khan was acclaimed at the court with festive rejoicings.

THE JAJNAGAR EXPEDITION

Another offshoot of the Telingana campaign was the expedition to Jajnagar²⁷ (Orissa) undertaken to chastize Bhanudeva II (1306-

²⁶ *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 450.

²⁷ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 402-3.

28), who had given support to Rudra Deva²⁸ and had entered into alliances with the chiefs of Gondwana. Ulugh Khan left Warangal about the middle of 1324 and, skirting along the eastern coast, subdued the petty *naiks* and seized Rajamahendri. When he reached the frontier of Jajnagar, he was opposed by the Rai, who had a large army at his beck and call. A sanguinary conflict ensued at the end of which the forces of Delhi plundered the camp of the enemy, took much booty in addition to a whole train of war-elephants, which was taken to Telingana and from there despatched to Delhi. According to Isami, the Sultan conferred a robe of honour on Ulugh Khan for his brilliant exploits and celebrated the victory for two or three weeks with great pomp and eclat.²⁹ An inscription at Rajamahendri dated Ramazan 724/September 1324 refers to Ulugh Khan's victories in Orissa and calls him 'Khan of the world'.³⁰

A MONGOL INVASION

Operations in the Deccan had hardly been completed when a sudden tumult on the western frontier became a source of anxiety to the Sultan. Gurshasp, the governor of Samana, sent a message to inform the court that two Mongol armies, led by Shir Mughul, had crossed the Indus and were pressing forward.³¹ An army was immediately sent under the command of Malik Shadi, the naib wazir, and other officers; instructions were given to them to march to Samana and reinforce Gurshasp, who gave battle to the invaders at two places, inflicted crushing defeats on them and took a large number of prisoners. The triumphant army then returned to the capital where the officers were duly rewarded.

THE GUJARAT CAMPAIGN

Shortly afterwards there was a rebellion in Gujarat. Isami neither gives the names of its leaders nor indicates the place of the rebellion. He simply says that the rebels collected together inside a lofty fort.³² In fact, ever since the death of Alauddin Khalji this province had only nominally formed a part of the empire. The Sultan sent Malik Shadi to Gujarat to suppress the rebels. Shadi soon reached the trouble-spot and besieged the fort. Skirmishes continued for some time, but in the end the garrison resorted to a trick. Some of them obtained the permission of Malik Shadi to enter his camp in order to

28 *Hajrud Dabir*, III, 860.

29 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 403.

30 *Archaeological Survey of India*, 1925-26, 150.

31 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 404.

32 *Ibid.*, 409 *et seq.*

entertain him with their music and dancing. But the persons wearing female attire were soldiers in disguise, and had concealed arms and weapons under their dress. They took the Malik by surprise and stabbed him to death. This sudden development demoralized the imperial army, which broke up and fled pell-mell to Delhi. Ghiyasuddin was very deeply hurt and pained at the tragic end of Malik Shadi, his trusted naib wazir. Isami does not tell us his authority, but stories of this type have been often related by both Hindu and Muslim medieval historians and have to be regarded with suspicion.

THE BENGAL CAMPAIGN

The Gujarat campaign and its disastrous end did not affect the Sultan's programme in other parts of the country. Fratricidal quarrels and internecine struggles in Bengal had attracted his attention, and he organized an expedition to the eastern region. The circumstances which favoured him in Bengal were as follows. An independent kingdom had been established in Bengal under Bughra Khan, the second son of Sultan Balban, who held sway over that region. Shamsuddin Firuz Shah, a descendant of Bughra Khan, died in 1322, leaving four sons—Shihabuddin Bughra Shah, Nasiruddin, Ghiyasuddin Bahadur and Qutlu Khan. There was a fratricidal conflict between the sons of Firuz, and Ghiyasuddin Bahadur's ambition created chaos everywhere. He expelled Shihabuddin, who had succeeded his father at Lakhnauti, murdered Qutlu Khan, and subjected Nasiruddin to pin-pricks. According to the *Riyazus Salatin*, Nasiruddin and Shihabuddin took refuge with Ghiyasuddin Tughluq and implored his help in overthrowing their unscrupulous brother. But Isami says that when Ghiyasuddin Tughluq had crossed the river Gomti on his way to Bengal, he was joined by Nasiruddin, who told the Sultan about his efforts to persuade his brother Ghiyasuddin Bahadur, called Bura, to recognize the suzerainty of Delhi. Barani says that some nobles came from Lakhnauti and complained to the Sultan of the high-handedness of the ruler of Bengal. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq responded to their appeal and decided to march in person to Bengal.

Before embarking upon his eastern campaign, the Sultan made adequate arrangements for the governance of the empire during his absence. The unexpected Mongol invasion and the tragedy in Gujarat had been a sufficient warning. He sent for Ulugh Khan from the Deccan and appointed a council of regency consisting of Ulugh Khan, Shahin (the *akhur bek*) and Ahmad Ayaz. He then left Delhi for the east. When he arrived near Tirhut, Nasiruddin and some rais and zamindars of that region paid homage to him. Though Barani, Yahya,

Nizamuddin, Badauni and others designate Nasiruddin as the ruler of Lakhnauti, the fact is that he had only claims on Lakhnauti and was a fugitive from that place. He certainly did not come to Delhi but he might have sent some of his supporters to solicit the assistance of Tughluq Shah; when the latter actually arrived on the borders of Tirhut, Nasiruddin explained to him the recalcitrant attitude of his brother.

The Sultan appointed Bahram Khan with a host of other officers, including Zulchi and Nasiruddin, and ordered them to march on Lakhnauti. The rival forces confronted each other near Lakhnauti and the battle opened with an attack led by Bahadur on Zulchi, who commanded the centre. But he was easily pushed back and his army was thrown into confusion. The imperial forces pursued the retreating Bengali soldiers for some distance. During his flight Bahadur was reminded of a beautiful slave-girl, who had been left behind in the abandoned camp. He returned post-haste, recovered her, and took to flight again. Having crossed two or three hills, he suddenly arrived near a river where he got stuck up in the quagmire. He was taken prisoner and produced before Bahram Khan.

The victorious army returned to the imperial camp, where the prisoners of war were led before the Sultan who, on seeing Bahadur, offered thanks to God for the success achieved by his men. Isami remarks that at that time, besides the Sultan, there were two other kings in the camp—one who had come to make peace and the other who had resorted to war and had been defeated. Bahadur was put in chains; Nasiruddin was confirmed as the tributary ruler of Lakhnauti. Satgaon and Sonargaon were placed in charge of Tatar Khan. Letters of victory (*fath namas*) were read in the mosques of Delhi and the success of the imperial armies was celebrated with pomp.³³ A coin bearing the names of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq and Nasiruddin Ibrahim Shah points to the existence of their joint sovereignty.

THE ATTACK ON TIRHUT

On his way back from Bengal the Sultan led an attack on Tirhut. Isami says that the Rai fled to the jungles, but was hotly pursued by the imperial army, which lost its way and had to cut down a large number of trees. After considerable difficulties the invaders reached a fort, but it was very strong and could not be taken. The lands adjacent to it were laid waste and a large number of men were killed. Ghiyasuddin placed Tirhut under the charge of Ahmad Khan, son of Yal Talbagha,³⁴ and started on his journey back to the capital.

³³ *Tarikh-i Firud Shahi*, 452.

³⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 418.

THE AFGHANPUR TRAGEDY

After his successful campaigns in Bengal and Tirhut, the Sultan proceeded by forced marches towards Tughluqabad which, according to Isami, had been founded on the eve of the eastern expedition. A temporary wooden pavilion was hastily erected at Afghanpur, a small village at a distance of three or four *karohs* from the new town. Here the Sultan was welcomed, and he was to rest till an auspicious time for his entry into the capital. The formalities being over, food was served. The Sultan partook of it along with some of the courtiers. 'When the maliks and amirs', writes Barani, 'came out to wash their hands, a *thunderbolt of calamity from the sky descended upon the people of the earth*, and the roof of the pavilion, under which the Sultan was seated, fell all of a sudden, crushing him and five or six others to death.'³⁵

This tragic event has been the subject of considerable controversy.³⁶ While Barani's tantalizing brevity does not help us in examining the problem in all its aspects, Isami and Ibn-i Battuta supply some interesting information which needs critical examination before it can be accepted. Ibn-i Battuta, who arrived in India almost eight years after the event, built up a chain of circumstances to sustain his theory of evil motives on the part of his benefactor, Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq. Its starting point is a remark of Bahram Aiba addressed to Ghazi Malik that if the latter was reluctant to wear the crown, his son would be elected. This is how the ungrateful Moorish traveller has imparted the first touch to the picture of misunder-

35 *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 452. Elliot's translation of the underlined portion as 'a thunder-bolt from the sky descended upon the earth' (Vol. III, 235) is misleading.

36 The problem has been discussed in all its details by Sir Wolseley Haig (JRAS, July 1922, 330-31), Dr. Ishwari Prasad (*A History of Qarauna Turks in India*, 46 *et seq.*), Dr. A. Mahdi Husain (*The Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq*, 86 *et seq.*) and Dr. Moinul Haq (*Muslim University Journal*, 1939: 'Was Muhammad bin Tughluq a Parricide?'). Sir W. Haig and Dr. Ishwari Prasad suspect Jauna Khan, while the last two exonerate him completely of all such charges. Dr. Ishwari Prasad has quoted a large number of authorities to bring home the charge of parricide against him. To support his contention he draws upon the explicit and implicit statements of Yahya Sirhindi, Abul Fazl, Nizamuddin Ahmad, Badauni and others who confirm the views of Isami and Ibn-i Battuta. On the other hand, Agha Mahdi Husain, placing his reliance on Ferishta, Haji Muhammad Qandhari, Rai Bindraban (*Lubbut Tawarikh-i Hind*, IO, Ms, f. 38) and Muhammad Bulaq (*Matlubut Talibin*), has come to just the opposite conclusion—namely that the fall of the pavilion was only an accident and not the result of any conspiracy. But this impressive array of authorities on either side leaves out the common sense point of view. With the exception of Isami and Ibn-i Battuta, the other authors, cited by the critics or admirers of Ulugh Khan, belong to a much later period, and each of them draws his cue from earlier works according to his own preferences.

standing between the father and the son. The second touch is furnished in ascribing treasonable designs to Ulugh Khan on the occasion of the first campaign to Telingana. The picture is completed by Ibn-i Battuta when he refers to the grant of sovereignty to Ulugh Khan by Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya in a state of ecstasy, and the prince's lending his shoulders to the hearse of the Shaikh which, according to him, annoyed the Sultan. It is also reported that the unbounded generosity of Ulugh Khan and the purchase of a large number of slaves by him, had alienated the Sultan's mind from him. Finally, the prophesy of an astrologer that the Sultan would not return from the campaign alive is cited to create an atmosphere in which the prince's complicity in some heinous conspiracy against his father may not appear incredible. But curiously enough, Ibn-i Battuta has definitely stated that the pavilion was constructed in accordance with the instructions of the Sultan himself.

Isami, who finished his work in 1350, describes the episode as follows: When the Sultan arrived near the Jumna, the prince hastened to wait upon him and crossing the river, appeared in full view of the imperial army. On seeing the Sultan, he immediately dismounted from his horse, kissed the feet of his father, offered prayers for his long life and apologized for his shortcomings. Isami, unlike Ibn-i Battuta, has ascribed the construction of the pavilion to the initiative of Ulugh Khan, who entrusted the work to Ahmad Ayaz. He goes on to say that the Sultan did not embrace the prince open-heartedly, because of the adverse reports which had been conveyed to him about his behaviour during his absence. The Sultan entered the pavilion, which had been lavishly decorated. Having taken his seat in it, he ordered the huge elephants to race in the yard in front of him. This caused vibrations in the ground and brought down the newly constructed pavilion. The Sultan was crushed to death under it. The narrator concludes with the condemnation of the prince, who is alleged to have conspired with Ahmad Ayaz to bring about the death of his father by making tempting promises to him. The fact that Ahmad Ayaz was subsequently appointed wazir by Ulugh Khan is cited in support of the allegation.

Sultan Muhammad's complicity in the death of his father cannot be proved or disproved merely on the basis of positive or ambiguous statements of contemporary or later historians. We should try to understand the totality of circumstances in which the tragedy occurred. If we piece together the various events, beginning with the Tughluq revolution and ending with the accession of Muhammad bin Tughluq, we can form a fair estimate of the problem and arrive at a satisfactory conclusion. As the *akhur bek* of Nasiruddin Khusrau

Khan, Sultan Muhammad could not reconcile himself to the new set-up. He fled from the court and joined his father at Dipalpur. He did not lag behind in the struggle which ensued, and it was in recognition of his services that the title of Ulugh Khan was conferred on him. He was deputed to the supreme command of the army in its two campaigns against Telingana. Had his father suspected his loyalty, he would have withdrawn him from the Deccan. Isami's hint to this effect is only an indication of his hatred for Ulugh Khan. Finally, while leaving for Bengal, the Sultan included Ulugh Khan in the council of regency, which would have been impossible unless he had enjoyed the full confidence of his father. Moreover, he had already been declared heir-apparent, and as such he could not have been assailed by any anxiety about the succession.

The charge of being a parricide is based on the hypothesis of strained relations between Ulugh Khan and his father, and a curious argument is put forward in this connection. It is stressed that much bitterness had arisen between Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya and Sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughluq because of the inquisitorial proceedings instituted by the Sultan to recover money which Khusrau Khan had sent to the Shaikh, and which the Shaikh was unable to reimburse as he had distributed the money amongst the poor. It is further argued that since the Shaikh and Ulugh Khan were on friendly terms, relations between the Sultan and his son must have been unhappy. But the stage at which this strain arose has not been pointed out. It could not have been coeval with the accession of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq to the throne, because such a supposition militates against the chain of events cited above. Nor can it be believed that intimacy between Ulugh Khan and the Shaikh had developed during the Sultan's absence in Bengal. Over and above everything else, no historian has associated politics with the name of the Shaikh. Following the traditions of the Chishti *silsilah*, he even abstained from visiting the courts of kings, not to speak of dabbling in politics which was entirely against his nature. In short, even presuming that the Sultan did not entertain a friendly regard for the Shaikh, to conclude that it affected his relations with his own son is straining the argument too far. It is also not warranted by facts.

Ibn-i Battuta's version is based on hearsay, and the same applies to the statements of Isami, who clearly admits that he had heard the story from old men, though he is not reluctant to admit that the building, having been newly constructed, collapsed because of the vibrations caused by the running of elephants. He could have stopped his narrative and retained its logic, but in his frenzy to denounce Ulugh Khan, he added the story of a conspiracy unmindful of the

fact that he was contradicting himself. He does not even hint that the elephants were made to race at the instance of Ulugh Khan; this, according to Isami, was done at the order of the Sultan who was destined to die on account of an accident, and not owing to any conspiracy. Isami has prefaced his remarks about the part of Ulugh Khan by saying that a discreet man can interpret the event like this, which shows that he himself was not certain of its veracity. Ibn-i Battuta, who wrote even later than Isami, refers only to one elephant which Ulugh Khan had presented to the Sultan. The moment it entered the pavilion, the structure collapsed, killing the Sultan and his young son, Mahmud. The story as recorded by him appears to be unworthy of credence, though he has narrated it on the authority of a pious man like Shaikh Ruknuddin. Incidentally, it appears amazing that Shaikh Ruknuddin, who was on the best of terms with Muhammad bin Tughluq, should have taken a foreigner into confidence about this matter regarding the reigning monarch. Perhaps Ibn-i Battuta's memory failed him or he deliberately and maliciously associated a saint's name to lend an air of authenticity to his otherwise incredible statement.

Having thus disposed of the evidence of Ibn-i Battuta and Isami, it appears to be appropriate to adduce some circumstantial evidence to controvert the charge of parricide preferred by modern and medieval writers. In the first place, after the assumption of roval authority, reciprocal affection continued between Muhammad bin Tughluq and his mother. Secondly, his claim to the throne was challenged neither by any of his surviving brothers nor by any group of nobles, and there is no mention of their loyalty having been purchased by promises of rewards and promotions. Finally, Ulugh Khan's nature belies such an allegation against him. He was normally kind-hearted and affectionate towards the members of his family.

The view advanced by some scholars that the pavilion was destroyed by lightning must be examined with reference to the time of the death of the Sultan. Dr. Ishwari Prasad places it in Rabiul Awwal A.H. 725 (or February-March 1325) which, according to him, is not the time when lightning is generally expected. On the other hand, Dr. Mahdi Husain, on the authority of Ali Ahmad Hasan, the author of *Basatinul Uns* and a courtier of Sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, whom he had accompanied in the Lakhnauti expedition, places the event in May 1325, when hot winds were blowing and the temperature was very high. But Ali Ahmad does not refer to lightning.

It is difficult to understand as to why the cryptic and euphemistic expression of Barani has been subjected to so much scrutiny and why he has been accused of the charge of *suppressio veri*. Perhaps he never intended to mean that the building was struck by lightning. He

only wanted to convey the impression that a calamitous event had occurred, which in its suddenness and intensity was like the fall of lightning. In these circumstances it would be quite fair to accept the versions of Ibn-i Battuta and Isami that the pavilion collapsed because it had been hurriedly constructed and its foundations were not strong. In fact, it was a temporary structure for a temporary purpose. But the motive attributed to Ulugh Khan by these historians cannot be accepted. They are unnatural and militate against circumstantial evidence.

THE SULTAN AND SHAIKH NIZAMUDDIN AULIYA

It is said that Sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughluq's relations with Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, the greatest sufi-saint of the period, were far from cordial. The reasons for this estrangement are given as follows. Khusrau Khan, on his accession, sent a gift of five lakh *tankas* to the Shaikh, who accepted them but, as was the practice of his *khanqah*, distributed the entire amount amongst the needy and the poor. When Ghiyasuddin Tughluq came to the throne, he demanded back money from all recipients of Khusrau Khan's favours. To this royal demand the Shaikh replied that since the money belonged to the public treasury (*baitul mal*) he had distributed it among the people. This reply, it is said, offended the Sultan and he became hostile towards the Shaikh. This seems to be a very exaggerated view of the situation. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq had been a prominent officer of the state since the days of Jalaluddin Khalji and, as such, he must have known the Shaikh and his pious and dedicated ways of life. According to Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh of Delhi, gifts and presents flowed into his *khanqah* continuously like the water of the Jumna.³⁷ But the Shaikh, Nasiruddin Chiragh continues, never kept anything for the morrow. He accepted gifts with one hand and distributed them with the other. Apart from this, the Shaikh had throughout maintained an attitude of superb indifference towards mundane affairs. He never visited the rulers and never dabbled in politics. 'While monarchs came and went', writes Dr. Wahid Mirza, 'and dynasties rose and fell, while ambitious princes fought and contested, conspired and planned, and while courtiers flattered and betrayed, the saint stuck to the duty which he had imposed upon himself and carried on his work of spiritual salvation calmly and quietly in his sequestered monastery at Ghiyaspur.'³⁸ Ghiyasuddin Tughluq could not possibly have been ignorant of all this, and knowing all this, he could not have resented the Shaikh's remarks.

³⁷ *Khairul Majalis*, 257.

³⁸ *Life and Works of Amir Khusrau*, 135.

Another reason for this alleged estrangement is said to have been the Shaikh's fondness of audition parties (*sama*). Amir Khurd, the author of *Siyarul Auliya*, has given us details of the incident, which should be seen in its proper perspective. From the earliest years of the foundation of the sultanat of Delhi, the *ulama* had been critical of the mystic practice of holding audition parties, and they had even prevailed upon Iltutmish to hold a *mahzar* on this issue against Qazi Hamiduddin Nagauri.³⁹ Similarly, during the time of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq some *ulama*, who were jealous of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya's tremendous influence over the people, raised a great hue and cry against the Shaikh's practice of holding frequent *sama* parties and presented the matter before the Sultan in such religious colours that he could not but convene a meeting of scholars to consider the religious and legal aspects of the problem. Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya was also invited to attend the meeting and to explain his attitude to the *ulama* and convince them. Since there were certain *ulama*, who had personal grudges against the Shaikh and wanted to discredit him, they misbehaved at the meeting. The Sultan's attitude was that of a neutral observer. The Shaikh was, however, distressed at the arrogance and narrow-mindedness of the *ulama*. When the Shaikh cited a *hadis* (saying of the Prophet) in support of his action, the *ulama* cried out that they did not want a *hadis*, but a verdict of Imam Abu Hanifa on the matter. The Shaikh was pained at this attitude of disrespect towards the traditions of the Prophet and, according to Amir Khurd,⁴⁰ predicted a miserable future for the insolent *ulama*. In the whole episode there is little or nothing to suggest that Ghiyasuddin Tughluq himself was, in the least, disrespectful to the Shaikh. The uproar of the *ulama* in the presence of the Sultan, however, may have created the impression that perhaps these scholars enjoyed his tacit support; but there is no evidence to substantiate this view and, in fact, the Sultan made several attempts to make them behave coolly. Apart from this, he was so thoroughly convinced of the point of view of the Shaikh that he rejected the proposal of the Qazi to declare *sama* illegal.

The story that the Sultan had sent a message to the Shaikh asking him to vacate Delhi before he entered the capital after his successful Bengal campaign, and that the Shaikh had remarked in reply 'Delhi is still far off' (*Ilanuz Delhi dur ast*) is a later fabrication and lacks contemporary confirmation. The Shaikh was seriously ill at this time and had given up eating for some forty days before his death.⁴¹ He

39 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 117-20

40 *Siyarul Auliya*, 531.

41 Ibn-i Battuta's statement that the Shaikh had died before the accident of the

was more busy with God at this time than with the Sultan's return or the prince's future. Credulous writers of later years have given the entire episode of the Shaikh's relationship with Ghiyasuddin a complexion which has no historical authenticity.

ESTIMATE

Sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughluq was a sovereign of uncommon abilities, clear-headed, firm and methodical. Like many other rulers, he rose to the top from small beginnings and laid no claim to blue blood. Unlike Balban he had no fictitious royal genealogy fabricated for himself. He depended for his position on his own merits. His rise was not meteoric. He gradually moved up from rank to rank, gathering experience and gaining insight into men and their affairs. By temperament he was cool and calculating. In moments of crisis he stood firm like a rock. Though trained in the methods of Alauddin Khalji, he refrained from ruthlessness. He possessed a kind and generous heart, and was devout and God-fearing. According to Barani, his personal life was chaste and pure, and he was free from all those blemishes which tarnished the character of many medieval monarchs.

In remodelling his administrative system, he followed a middle path which combined firmness with fairness. He enacted a code of laws for the guidance of his officers and for securing uniformity in their decisions. Like Balban, he was keen on surrounding himself with able men, but unlike Balban he had no fads concerning purity of blood. In his eyes only merit counted, and not wealth or birth. He firmly put down corruption and embezzlement. In order to save his officers from petty temptations, he paid them well. He was fair and just towards his people. His revenue reforms must have immensely benefited the Hindu intermediaries, because he restored their privileges and perquisites. In his army also there was a fair percentage of Hindu officers and soldiers. Though faced with the necessity of placating his co-religionists, he was not prepared to go beyond certain limits. He did not hesitate in compelling the *ulama* to disgorge their ill-gotten gains from Khusrau Khan, and in this respect he treated them on a par with the soldiers and other persons. He reorganized the departments of police and justice, which inspired wholesome fear and respect in the hearts of the people. The highways became safe from robbers and thieves, and peace and security prevailed in the empire. His military system

Sultan is absurd. The Shaikh died on 18 Rabi II and the Sultan died in Rabi I of the same year

The Shaikh's long and painful illness seems to have been stoppage of urination owing to the growth of the prostate gland, a disease of old age for which the physicians of those days had no remedy.

was efficient. A seasoned soldier and a successful general, he had almost a paternal affection for his soldiers.

In short, the founder of the Tughluq dynasty was a sovereign of wide sympathies, of firm determination and sound judgement. He was keen to resuscitate the healthy traditions of the Delhi sultanat. He gave a new meaning to the methods and ideals of Alauddin Khalji and, by removing the sharp edge of cruelty from them, he rendered them more acceptable and workable. He could not be an innovator, but he did play successfully the role of a preserver and consolidator. His achievements mark the growth of liberal tendencies in the administrative system of the Delhi sultanat.

II. SULTAN MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ (1324-51)

PERHAPS NO OTHER SULTAN of medieval India has excited so much curiosity about himself and provoked so much criticism of his policies as Muhammad bin Tughluq. His reign of twenty-six years is a fascinating but tragic story of schemes and projects correctly conceived, badly executed and disastrously abandoned. His ingenious mind was as quick in formulating new plans as it was slow in understanding the psychology of the people. He could never establish that rapport and mutual understanding with his subjects, which was so necessary for the successful implementation of his schemes. He doubted the intentions of the people, and the people suspected his motives. A yawning gulf appeared between him and his subjects and it went on widening with the passage of time. Each project left its ominous trail on the other till at last the whole atmosphere became surcharged with bitterness and hostility.

Notwithstanding all this, Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign forms a watershed in the history of the Delhi sultanat because it was under him that it reached its highest watermark; but then a reaction also set in and one rebellion after another sapped the foundations of his power. The Sultan strove ceaselessly throughout his reign to push ahead his concept of the political and administrative unity of India, but when he closed his eyes in death a number of independent kingdoms had raised their heads and the sultanat had retreated to its old frontiers. An inevitable consequence of this tragic denouement of his life was that all sorts of prejudices, consciously or unconsciously, entered in all assessments of his thoughts and projects. He was either painted as an 'ill-starred idealist' or condemned as a blood-thirsty tyrant (*khuni*). Those who found an excuse or an explanation for his failure in his scholarly make-up ignored the fact that, despite all his academic interests, Muhammad bin Tughluq was essentially and basically a soldier and a man of action, who spent more time on the battlefield than even Balban or Alauddin Khalji, and that his policies should, therefore, be judged as such. Here an attempt has been made to examine Muhammad bin Tughluq's thought and behaviour in its historical milieu and in all its lights and shades.

ACCESSION

Since Ghiyasuddin Tughluq had already designated Ulugh Khan as his heir-apparent,¹ his elevation to the throne was smooth and without any opposition. After a state-mourning of forty days for the death of his father, he decided to celebrate his coronation at Delhi. So long he had lived at Tughluqabad, but now he entered the old city and, as a happy and auspicious omen, seated himself on the throne in the Daulat Khana, which had witnessed the coronations of many previous sultans of Delhi.² The city of Delhi was beautifully and lavishly decorated for the festival; cupolas were erected; and richly embroidered and artistically decorated sheets of cloth were hung all along the streets, bazars and lanes of the capital. When the royal procession entered the city, gold and silver coins were scattered right and left and were even thrown on to the balconies and into the laps (*damans*) of the spectators. As the Sultan proceeded to the Daulat Khana through the Badaun Gate, there was a profuse 'rain of gold and silver'. 'All people', writes Barani, 'men and women, young and old, children and grown-ups, free-born and slaves, Muslims and Hindus, shouted praises and blessed Sultan Muhammad and filled their handkerchiefs (*dastarchas*), purses, and pockets with coins of gold and silver. Delhi looked like a garden profusely blooming with white and yellow flowers.'³ Barring Alauddin Khalji, such pedantic display of generosity at the very outset of a reign had not been seen during the time of any other sultan of Delhi.⁴

Both Isami and Barani have used this happy beginning of his reign as a contrast-background to the delineation of the subsequent atmosphere of horror and hatred that prevailed during his regime. Soon after his accession, he adopted the name Muhammad (formerly he was known by his Hindi⁵ name, Jauna) and announced *Abul Mujahid* as his epithet.⁶ According to Isami, he assured the people of his determination

1 The author of *Tarikh-i Ma'sumi* (64) says that his father had conferred upon him the title 'Sultan Muhammad Shah' but this is not confirmed by any early authority.

2 *Firuz Shahi*, 456.

3 *Ibid.*, 457.

4 Though based on hearsay, the following account of Makhduma-i Jahan, mother of the Sultan, as given by Ibn-i Battuta (*Rehla*, Eng. tr., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, 118), gives some idea of the eclat and splendour with which the occasion was celebrated: 'But she has lost her eyesight, which came about in this way. When her son ascended the throne, all the ladies and the daughters of maliks and amirs, dressed in their best clothes, came to pay their respects. She was seated on a gold throne studded with jewels. All of them bowed to her. Then all of a sudden she lost her eyesight.'

5 *Futuh-us Salatin*, Madras edition, 421.

6 *Ibid.*, 421; *Rehla*, 56.

to follow in the footsteps of his deceased father, and declared: 'Every old man in my territory is like a father to me and every young man is like (my brother), Balram Khan, in my affection.'⁷

A well-established tradition of the Delhi sultanat was the appointment of many high officials at the time of the coronation and the conferment of titles and honours on persons chosen to constitute the main core of the governing class of the new regime. Curiously enough, Barani has omitted this list of appointments, but Yahya Sirhindi supplies the necessary details.⁸ According to him the Sultan conferred the following posts and titles at this time:

'Malik Firuz—*naib-i barbek*; Malik Ayaz—*Khwaja-i Jahan*; Malik Qabul—*Malik Kabir*; Malik Sartezi—*Imadul Mulk*; Malik Khurram Mubiz—*Zahirul Juyush*; Hamid Kumli—*Raziul Mulk*; Malik Pindar Khalji—*Qadr Khan*, and the *iqta* of Lakhnauti; Malik Husamuddin Abu Raja—*Nizamul Mulk* and the wizarat of Lakhnauti; Malik Izzuddin Yahya Bandat—*A'zamul Mulk* and the *iqta* of Satgaon; Maulana Qawamuddin—*Qutlugh Khan* and the office of *vakildar*; Muhammad, eldest son of Maulana Qawamuddin—*Alp Khan* and the *iqta* of Gujarat; Maulana Kamaluddin, brother of Qawamuddin—*sadr-i jahan*; Maulana Nizamuddin, another brother of Qawamuddin—*Alimul Mulk*; Nizamuddin Kamal Surkh—*Mukhlisul Mulk*; Shihab Sultani—*Tajul Mulk*; Maulana Yusuf—*Dawarul Mulk*; Malik Qiran—*Safdarul Mulk*; Malik Begi—*sardawatdar*; Malik Shihabuddin Abu Raja—*Malikut Tujjar* and the *iqta* of Nausari.'

For a proper assessment of the role of Muhammad bin Tughluq in the history of the Delhi sultanat, it is necessary to construct, with as much accuracy as possible, the chronology of his reign and to analyse his basic political and religious concepts. With the help of one we can follow the *sequence* of events, and with the other the *logic* of these events during the period of his hectic rule.

CHRONOLOGY

Chronology presents a very complicated problem for one trying to analyse the various measures of the Sultan and their reactions in terms of causal connections. Barani was guided by the character and intensity of the impact that the Sultan's various projects had on his own mind rather than their historical sequence.⁹ Ibn-i Battuta is

⁷ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 422.

⁸ *Mubarak Shahi*, 98.

⁹ He frankly admits this, see *Firuz Shahi*, 478.

reliable for incidents that occurred during his stay in India, but is not helpful about events that took place before his arrival. The two versified accounts of Muhammad bin Tughluq—that of Isami and Badr-i Chach—are more helpful in constructing a chronological framework of his reign. The following sequence of events emerges from a study of all the available sources of his reign—political chronicles, poetical works, numismatic and epigraphic evidence, mystic records and accounts of foreign travellers.

According to Barani, Muhammad bin Tughluq ascended the throne at Tughluqabad in A.H. 725/1325.¹⁰ Isami gives A.H. 724/1324¹¹ as the date of his accession and he is supported by evidence available from other sources. (a) Ibn-i Battuta says that Ghiyasuddin Tughluq ruled for four years.¹² It is clear from Khusrau's *Tughluq Nama*¹³ that he had ascended the throne on 2 Sha'ban 720/7 September 1320. This would make A.H. 724/1324 the year of his death, and naturally the year of Muhammad bin Tughluq's accession. (b) A *farman*¹⁴ of Muhammad bin Tughluq granted to the descendants of Shaikh Hamiduddin Sufi Nagauri is dated 14 Zil Hij 724/21 November 1324. (c) It is possible to reconcile the statements of Barani and Isami if we place Muhammad bin Tughluq's accession in Zil Hij 724/November-December 1324 and his coronation forty days later, i.e. in A.H. 725/1325.

One of the earliest events of Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign was the invasion of Tarmashirin Khan. Yahya Sirhindi gives 729/1328 as the date of this invasion.¹⁵ Ferishta,¹⁶ however, says that it took place in 727/1326-27 and his date is supported by circumstantial evidence. Isami refers to the conquest of Kalanaur and Farashur (Peshawar) by the Sultan very soon after his accession.¹⁷ Perhaps the campaign which led to the conquest of Kalanaur and Peshawar was undertaken after this invasion in order to consolidate the position in the frontier areas and to create an effective bulwark against Mongol incursions.

10 *Ibid.*, 456.

11 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 421.

12 *Rehla*, 50.

13 *Tughluq Nama*, 132 *et seq.*

14 See *Saroorus Sadur* (Ms. in Habibganj collection of the Aligarh Muslim University Library). It is a collection of the conversations of Shaikh Hamiduddin Sufi of Nagaur; and since it was compiled during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq, it gives very interesting information about the Sultan. The Habibganj Ms. has some other valuable documents, like the *farman* referred to above, appended to it.

15 *Mubarak Shahi*, 101.

16 *Ferishta*, I, 134.

17 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 423-24.

The first rebellion of Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign was organized by his cousin, Bahauddin Gurshasp. According to Isami¹⁸ it took place two years after the Sultan's accession, i.e. in 727/1326-27. A few months after the execution of Gurshasp, the conquest of Kondhana was undertaken.¹⁹ The campaign against Gurshasp took several months, because he held out for two months at Kumta and for one month at Mahendrag. He was arrested when he crossed over to Dwara Samudra. All this must have taken at least five to six months. Isami says that the siege of the Kondhana fort lasted eight months.²⁰ Calculated on this basis, the conquest must have been completed sometime in the middle of 728/1328.

Isami says that the Sultan received the news of the revolt of Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan when he was resting at Devagiri after his campaign against Kondhana.²¹ It may, therefore, be placed sometime in 728/1327-28. Barani gives no date but considers it the first rebellion of the reign.²²

It appears from Isami's account that the rebellion of Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah took place almost simultaneously with the campaign against Bahram Aiba, but the Sultan received the report about its successful suppression when he had completed his operations against Aiba.²³ Thus, it may be presumed that it took place some time late in 728/1328 or early in 729/1328-29. Numismatic evidence supports this inference. The available joint currency of Ghiyasuddin Bahadur and Muhammad bin Tughluq does not go beyond 728/1328.

It appears from Isami that the Sultan issued orders for the exodus to Devagiri after his return to Delhi from Multan²⁴ and prior to the introduction of the token currency.²⁵ Isami's account implies that the token currency was introduced as a measure of punishment for the refractory attitude of the people, who had been sent to Daulatabad.²⁶ Numismatic evidence shows that the token currency was introduced in 730/1329-30.²⁷ The exodus to Devagiri may, therefore, be placed in 729/1328-29.

According to Isami the token currency was withdrawn three years

18 *Ibid.*, 424.

19 *Ibid.*, 432. Ferishta gives 739/1338 which is obviously incorrect.

20 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 432 *et seq.*

21 *Ibid.*, 433.

22 *Firuz Shahi*, 478.

23 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 444-45.

24 *Ibid.*, 445-46.

25 *Ibid.*, 459-60.

26 *Ibid.*, 459-60.

27 *JASB*, XVII, 1921, No. 1, 147-52.

after its introduction.²⁸ Numismatic evidence corroborates this. All the available token coins belong to 730/1329-30, 731/1330-31 and 732/1331-32 only.²⁹

Ziyyauddin Barani says³⁰ that the Sultan enlisted 370,000 horsemen for the conquest of Khurasan, but they were disbanded after a year because the treasury was unable to pay their salaries any longer. Then 10,000 soldiers were sent to Qarachil. No contemporary or near-contemporary work gives us the exact year in which the army for Khurasan was enlisted. Still it is possible to fix the approximate period. The failure of the monsoon in 1333 left the Sultan no alternative but to seize the grain of the Doab peasants, and when Ibn-i Battuta reached Delhi in March 1334, he found the citizens being given rations for the next six months.³¹ The Sultan left for the South in mid-winter 1334-35, to suppress the rebellion of Ma'abar, and when he returned after two and a half years, the 'bulk'—or 'two-thirds'—of his army had perished in the bubonic plague, while the famine continued. For the next ten years the central authority was paralysed; so neither the Khurasan plan nor the Qarachil campaign can be put after 1333. Now Mir Khurd, who was born about 1310, tells us³² in a passage (quoted later) that the Sultan had begun his propaganda for the Khurasan campaign in the year of the exodus (1329). Next year he issued his token currency. Its success would have given him the silver he needed, but its failure left him no alternative but to redeem his bronze coins and to disband the army. The Khurasan army must have, therefore, been enlisted in 1330-31 and disbanded in the following year. The Sultan's relief measures, foundation of Saragdwari, etc. followed the outbreak of famine. According to Barani the Sultan removed his name from the coins and substituted that of the Khalifa after his return from Saragdwari.³³ The coins without the Sultan's name belong to 741/1340-41.³⁴ According to Ibn-i Battuta the Sultan had stayed at Saragdwari for two and a half years.³⁵ This would mean that he returned from Saragdwari before 741/1340 and that the town of Saragdwari had been founded late in 738/1338 or early in 739/1338.

During the decade beginning in 729/1328 and ending in 739/1338, that is from the exodus to Devagiri to the foundation of the city

²⁸ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 460.

²⁹ *JASB*, XVII, 1921, No. 1, 147-52.

³⁰ *Firuz Shahi*, 477.

³¹ *Rehla*, 117.

³² *Siyarul Auliya*, 271.

³³ *Firuz Shahi*, 492.

³⁴ Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 259-60.

³⁵ *Rehla*, 87, III.

of Saragdwari, the Sultan had to deal with a number of rebellions, the two most conspicuous being the rebellions of Ma'abar and Bengal, which broke out in 735/1334 and 739/1338 respectively. The independent coins of Jalaluddin Shah of Ma'abar date back to 735/1334,³⁶ and it may be presumed on that account that his rebellion took place about that time. The rebellion of Fakhruddin Shah in Bengal took place sometime in 739/1338. This date can be fixed on the basis of the following calculation. According to Isami this rebellion took place after the return of Muhammad bin Tughluq from Daulatabad.³⁷ Ibn-i Battuta informs us that the Sultan returned from Daulatabad after two and a half years. Since he started for Ma'abar in Jamadi I 735/December 1334-January 1335, his return would be in 737/1336-37. A coin³⁸ of Fakhruddin Shah, which is dated 737/1336-37, supports the above date.

According to Isami, Delhi was repopulated after fourteen years of wilderness.³⁹ This means that the permission to go to Delhi was given to the people in 743/1342, but Barani definitely states that the Sultan, probably on account of the plague, gave a general permission to the people to go to Delhi when he was on his way from Telingana. 'Two or three *carawans*, which had stayed on there, were sent to Delhi; others who were happy in the Maharashtra territory continued to live there with their wives and children', remarks Barani.⁴⁰ It means that during the years 735-737/1335-37 all those emigres of Delhi, who wanted to do so, had returned to the north.

In 741/1340-1, according to Ibn-i Battuta, 'the Sultan ordered the remission of duties in his empire adding that no tax should be realized from the people except the *zakat* (import duties) and *ushr* (land tax).'

36 JRAS, 1922, 344; 1902, 673.

37 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 471.

38 Thomas, *Chronicles*, 263.

39 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 262.

40 *Firuz Shahi*, 481.

41 *Rehla*, 84. This passage needs elucidation. It does not refer, as is sometimes thought, to the general taxation policy of the Sultan. It deals with *non-shari'at* taxes levied on imports and should be read with the following statement made earlier by Ibn-i Battuta on pages 12-13: 'At the time of our arrival it was the custom at Multan that one-fourth of the commodities brought by the merchants was appropriated by the state and on every horse was levied a tax of seven dinars. Two years after our arrival in India the Sultan remitted these taxes. And he ordered that nothing should be realized from the merchants (*an-nas*) except the *zakat* and *ushr*, when he took the oath of allegiance to Abul Abbas, the Abbasid Caliph.' In this passage Ibn-i Battuta's memory erred in indicating the period as 'two years after his arrival in India' which would mean 735/1335. The date given on page 84 is correct and also corresponds to the latter part of his statement that it was after his oath of allegiance to the Caliph.

Three rebellions broke out when the Sultan was staying at Saragdwari—(i) the rebellion of Ainul Mulk Multani; (ii) the rebellion of Shihabuddin Nusrat Khan; and (iii) the rebellion of Ali Shah Nathu.

The dates of the remaining events of the Sultan's reign are known and will be given as we proceed. But this chronology of the first sixteen years of the reign, though only approximate, will help us in putting events in their chronological and causal sequence. Barani definitely says that he has not followed the time-sequence, and curiously enough, no modern historian has attempted to put the most important events of the reign in their historical order.

THE POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS CONCEPTS AND ATTITUDES OF THE SULTAN

The Sultan's religious and political ideas deserve careful consideration as many of his attitudes were conditioned by them and had a bearing on many of his projects and administrative policies.

1) Muhammad bin Tughluq possessed an unusual originality of mind. He was never satisfied with stereotyped solutions of problems. He hated traditional and conventional approach in all matters. Barani has referred to this quality of the Sultan's mind in different contexts, using different words—*ikhtira'ah*,⁴² when he deals with his political activities, and *tahkimat-i mujaddid*,⁴³ when referring to his quaint attitude in religious and other matters.

2) Politically the keynote of the Sultan's thought was his desire to achieve the political and administrative unity of India. He was anxious to liquidate the barriers—political as well as intellectual—which separated the North from the South. Perhaps no ruler after Asoka had visualized India as a political and administrative unit in the same way as Muhammad bin Tughluq. His Deccan experiment led to the rapid cultural transformation of the South. From Delhi to Daulatabad it was now one world. While his armies were moving from Daulatabad to Multan and from Bengal to Gujarat, mystics, scholars, merchants, poets and administrators annihilated the distance which, for centuries, had narrowed down the vision of the Indian people.

3) When Muhammad bin Tughluq ascended the throne of Delhi, the Central Asian scene was in a state of constant flux. The power of the Il Khans had declined and Timur had not yet been born. There was a vacuum in the political life of Central Asia. Could he fill in

⁴² *Firuz Shahi*, 462-63.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 467, 470.

Also 471 where Barani refers to *ahkamul mujaddida wa awamirul mukhtari'ah* as causes of rebellions.

that vacuum? Muhammad bin Tughluq's restless political spirit asked him that question, and got an answer in the affirmative. He initiated what may very appropriately be called 'an era of higher imperialism', whose spirit one finds articulate in his Khurasan project, apart from his other measures. Barani has very neatly expressed this aspect of the Sultan's thought and ambition in the following words: 'On account of the high ambition, which was ingrained in the peerless personality of Sultan Muhammad, if the whole fourth of the inhabited globe (*rubi maskun*)⁴⁴ was brought under the control of his slaves, and the entire world from east to west, and from north to south, became the tax-payer to his exchequer, and the people of the world became subservient to his orders, and the currency in his name circulated in the whole of the inhabited world (*rubi maskun*); yet if some one said that some land in some island or a piece of territory equal to the size of a room in some country had not been brought under his control, his river-like heart and his world-conquering spirit would not have found peace till that island or that little room-space had been brought under subjection to him. Owing to the high ambitions, exalted aspirations, great love of honour and extraordinary sense of prestige that was rooted in his mind, he desired to stalk in the world like Kaimurs and Faridun, and to behave towards the people like Jamshed and Kaikhusrau. In fact, he would not have been content merely with the status of Alexander (of Macedonia) but tried to attain to the position of Solomon so that ruling both over men and *jins*,⁴⁵ he could combine prophethood (*nubuwat*) with *sultanat*, and counting the king of every country as his slave, issue his commands from his capital both as a prophet and a sultan.'

4) The idea of the political and cultural isolation of India was gall and wormwood to Muhammad bin Tughluq. He believed in close diplomatic, cultural and economic contacts with the outside world. The remission of many taxes on imports in 741/1340-41 may be read in this context. His political vision extended far beyond India and embraced countries up to Egypt on one side and China and Khurasan on the other. In fact, with the rise of Muhammad bin Tughluq to power a new phase began in the history of India's diplomatic relations with the world outside. One hears of embassies pour-

44 Medieval geographers believed the earth to be a globe, but thought that only one-fourth of it—Eurasia and northern Africa—to be inhabited. The sea, they believed, covered the remaining three-fourths of the globe. The inhabited one-fourth (*rubi maskun*) they again divided into seven climes (*haft aqlim*).

45 *Jins* are invisible beings referred to in the Quran. Solomon, son of David, combined the offices of the prophet and the king and both men and *jins* were under his control. In this respect he surpassed all other rulers.

ing in at his court from different parts of Asia. The Iraq embassy sent by Musa; the Chinese embassy sent by Toghan Timur; the Khwarazmian embassy sent by the Princess Turabak, wife of Qutlu Damur, ruler of Khwarazm; the arrival of Amir Saifuddin, son of the chief of the Arabs of Syria—all these show the extent to which foreign governments were anxious to establish relations with him. The Chinese mission consisted of fifteen men with a retinue of one hundred servants. It was headed by Tursi. The emperor of China sent enormous gifts to the Sultan, who reciprocated the gesture by sending a bigger party with larger gifts. Sultan Abu Sa'id Khan of Iran (1316-35) sent Azd bin Yezd as his envoy to the Delhi court.

Muhammad bin Tughluq sent Bighdan, one of his private secretaries, to Sultan Abu Sa'id with one crore *tankas* to be distributed in the sacred towns of Iraq.⁴⁶ These international contacts also brought with them international involvements and tensions; and it is not proper, therefore, to study the developments of Muhammad bin Tughluq's political and religious ideas in isolation. In fact, some of his measures—the Khurasan project, the Qarachil expedition, the token currency and even the execution of certain persons⁴⁷—will remain unintelligible unless considered in the broader framework of developments in the eastern world.

5) The Sultan was a very careful student of religion and philosophy. He had experienced all forms of religious attitudes, including agnosticism and atheism. Ultimately, rationalism became the sheet-anchor of his thoughts, and every religious postulate was subjected by him to deep and searching inquiry. To orthodox theologians, like Ziyauddin Barani, this rationalistic approach was tantamount to a denial of religion. Barani⁴⁸ makes a broad observation to the effect that he had lost implicit faith in 'the revealed word' and the traditions of the Prophet, but later writers say that he had even questioned the *ulama* about their arguments in support of the dogma of the finality of prophethood.⁴⁹ But this does not mean that he had lost faith in Islam. Ibn-i Battuta informs us that he constantly urged people about the performance of obligatory prayers. 'His standing orders', he

46 For details, see Nizami, *Studies in Medieval Indian History and Culture*, Allahabad 1966, 5-6.

47 When the Sultan executed Shaikh Hud, a Suhrawardi saint of Multan, he told him: 'Certainly you intended to flee to the Turks and tell them that you were the son of Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariya and that the Sultan had done such and such a thing to you and to bring them to fight me.' *Rehla*, 91.

48 *Firuz Shahi*, 465.

49 Shaikh Abdul Haq Muhaddis Dihlavi, *Akhbarul Akhyar*, 129; Muhammad Ghausi Shattari, *Gulzar-i Abrar* (Ms.); Saiyyid Muhammad Husaini, *Jawamaul Kalim*, 175-76.

writes, 'were to the effect that prayers must be recited in congregation and severe punishment was meted out to defaulters.'⁵⁰ The discussions, which caused this misunderstanding among certain orthodox sections, were conducted in an entirely different spirit and with an entirely different objective. Al-Umari writes: 'The *ulama* are present in his *majlis* and have *iftar* with him in the month of Ramadan. The Sadr-i Jahan invites every evening one of those who are present to raise a point for discussion; then all of them discuss the different aspects of the question in the presence of the Sultan, and he, like one of them, discusses with them and refutes them.'⁵¹ It appears that his mornings were also devoted to philosophic discussions. 'I have seen', says Ibn-i Battuta, '...philosophical matters alone being discussed every day after the morning prayers.'⁵² These discussions were not confined to Muslims alone.

Non-Muslim scholars also participated in the discussions at his court. Both Isami and Ibn-i Battuta say that he used to have private discussions with the *jogis*.⁵³ Recent discovery of Jain records has shown that he had close contact with Jain scholars.⁵⁴ Once Jinaprabha Suri conversed with him till midnight.⁵⁵ The Sultan gave him one thousand cows, besides a large number of other gifts. Jain scholars like Raja Sekhara and Jinaprabha Suri enjoyed his patronage. It is, however, surprising that he remained absolutely uninfluenced by the Jain ideal of *ahimsa*.

6) While extremely punctilious in the performance of prayers and other religious rites enjoined by Islam, the Sultan was, at the same time, equally tolerant of other creeds and could participate in their religious ceremonies and festivals. He is perhaps the first sultan of Delhi about whose participation in the Hindu festival of Holi there is clear contemporary evidence.⁵⁶ Innumerable *jogis* roamed about in his territory with their Muslim followers, and he never objected to it. A very large number of heterodox religious groups and individuals, to whom reference is made by Firuz Shah in his *Futuhāt*, could only have flourished in the atmosphere of intellectual freedom created by Muhammad bin Tughluq. He is reported to have visited the Satrunjaya temples at Palatina and the idol-houses of Girnar. In the Satrun-

⁵⁰ *Rehla*, 83.

⁵¹ *Masalikul Absar*, Eng. tr. Otto Spies, 38.

⁵² *Rehla*, 266.

⁵³ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 515; *Rehla*, 199.

⁵⁴ For detailed reference see Kalipada Mitra's article 'Historical References in Jain Poems', in the *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, Hyderabad Session, 1941, 295-302.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 299.

⁵⁶ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 515.

jaya temples he performed some acts of devotion appropriate to a leader of the Jain *sangha*. He is also reported to have issued a *farman* under royal seal for the construction of a new *basati upasraya* (rest house for monks).⁵⁷ The Batihagarh⁵⁸ inscription announces the construction of a *gow math* (cow-temple) under the orders of the Sultan. This religious cosmopolitanism of the Sultan provided a pretext for men like Isami to bring charges of heresy and innovation against him.

7) The Mongol destruction of Muslim lands in the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries had evoked two diametrically opposed reactions in Muslim minds.

(a) The mystics, with a nonchalant attitude towards political power, had organized the mystic *silsilahs* and initiated a brisk movement for resuscitating Muslim society through the moral and spiritual regeneration of the people.

(b) A fundamentalist section led by Imam Ibn-i Taimiya (1263-1328) adopted an entirely different attitude. It condemned the mystic approach as one of pacificism, inertia and submission to an unfavourable situation, and advocated a movement for the revitalization of Muslim society by bringing together its various constituents—peoples, rulers, mystics, *ulama*, etc.—and the revival of political power. According to Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Ibn-i Taimiya occupies a unique place in the history of Islam on account of the fact that, after the Mongol cataclysm, it was he who indicated the lines on which political power could be regained and Muslim society resuscitated. It appears that Muhammad bin Tughluq was attracted towards some aspects of the thought of Ibn-i Taimiya. His criticism of the mystic attitude of isolation from the state and of some customs and practices of the mystics is in line with the attitude of the great Syrian scholar. Ibn-i Battuta informs us that one of the disciples of Ibn-i Taimiya, Maulana Abdul Aziz Ardbili, had visited the court of Muhammad bin Tughluq and the Sultan was so deeply impressed by him that he had kissed his feet in the *darbar*.⁵⁹

His attitude, which developed under these influences, found expression in his declaration that 'religion and state are twins'⁶⁰—a remark intended primarily against the mystics who had developed a tradition of isolation from the state under the excuse that the state

⁵⁷ *Proceedings of the Indian History Congress*, 1941, 296.

⁵⁸ See, Hira Lal, *Descriptive Lists of Inscriptions in Central Provinces and Berar*, Nagpur, 1916, 50.

⁵⁹ *Rehla*, 70.

⁶⁰ *Siyarul Auliya*, 196. Barani puts the same idea differently when he says that he wanted to combine prophethood with kingship (*badshahi ra ba paygham-bari jamai kunad*), *Firuz Shahi*, 459.

did not represent religion. In a coin issued by him as early as 727/1326-27 he calls himself *Muhi-i Sunnan-i Khatim un Nabi'in*⁶¹ (Reviver of the Traditions of the Last of the Prophets).

It would, however, be incorrect to think that he completely subscribed to the thought of Ibn-i Taimiya or identified himself with it. He seems to have asked Shaikh Sharafuddin Yahya Maneri to write a book on mysticism specifically for him.⁶² He was himself the disciple⁶³ of Shaikh Alauddin, a grandson of Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-i Shakar. Shaikh Alauddin was known for his aversion towards worldly power and materialistic pursuits. Obviously, the Sultan and his *pir* (religious guide) stood on antipodes, but the mere fact that he turned to him for spiritual solace shows that he had, in spite of all that he did against the mystics, a deep and genuine respect for the mystics and their piety. He is even reported to have kissed the feet of Shaikh Ruknuddin Multani,⁶⁴ and accepted his intercession for forgiving the people of Multan after crushing the rebellion of Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan.⁶⁵ Muhammad bin Tughluq was the first sultan of Delhi to visit the grave of Shaikh Mu'inuddin Chishti at Ajmer,⁶⁶ and the grave of Salar Mas'ud Ghazi at Bahraich. He distributed enormous gifts to the guardians of the mausoleum of Salar Mas'ud.⁶⁷ Besides, he constructed mausoleums over the graves of Miran Mulhim at Badaun, Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya at Delhi, Shaikh Ruknuddin Abul Fath at Multan, Shaikh Alauddin at Ajudhan,⁶⁸ and many other contemporary and earlier saints.

Taking all aspects of the Sultan's thought and behaviour into consideration, it may be stated that he was not against *mysticism* as such, but did not approve of the mystic attitude of isolation from the state and wanted the *sufis* to make their talent available to the state in its various plans and projects. He was anxious to absorb as many

61 Thomas, *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 211. The assumption of this title by the Sultan assumes added significance when it is recalled that at one time he had exercised his mind over the arguments one could advance in support of the Muslim doctrine about the finality of the Prophet. Unfortunately, the *ulama* did not attempt to satisfy the curiosity of his mind by cogent reasoning; they challenged his motives and condemned him. See *Gulzar-i Abrar* (Ms.).

62 *Maktubat* (Ms.).

63 *Siyarul Auliya*, 196; *Rehla*, 20 (but Ibn-i Battuta's memory errs when he gives his name as Fariduddin). The Sultan's attachment with the mystic house of Ajudhan is mentioned in *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* (f. 10) also. For Shaikh Alauddin's piety and popularity, see Barani, *Firuz Shahi*, 347.

64 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 439.

65 *Ibid.*, 443; *Firuz Shahi*, 479.

66 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 466.

67 Barani, *Firuz Shahi*, 491.

68 Nizami, *Salatin-i Delhi kay Mazhabi Rujhanat*, 375-76.

mystic families in his administration as possible, and if his policy, according to which he gave his sisters and daughters⁶⁹ in marriage to religious families, had succeeded, a new and very incongruous element would have appeared in the governing class.

8) The Sultan believed in offices being open to talent. He dispensed with whatever considerations of birth had persisted in the administration and appointed low-born persons to the highest offices in the administration. Barani, in whom hatred for persons he considered to be low-born amounted to an incurable disease, writes: 'The Sultan talked as if he hated low-born people more than he hated idols. Nevertheless, I have seen him promoting Najba, the low-born son of a musician, to such an extent that he rose higher in status than many maliks, for Gujarat, Multan and Badaun were put in his charge. Similarly, he raised Aziz *Khummar* (the vintner), and his brother, Firuz *Hajjam* (the barber), Manka *Tabbakh* (the cook), Mas'ud *Khummar* (the vintner), Laddha *Baghban* (the gardener) and many other jems of low-birth (*jawahir-i latrah*) to a high status and gave them offices and territories. He gave Shaikh Babu, the son of a Nayak weaver, a position near to himself and elevated the rank and position of such a low-born man among mankind. He assigned the ministry of revenue (*diwan-i wizarat*) to Pera *Mali* (the gardener), the lowest of the low-born and mean-born men of Hind and Sind, and placed him over the heads of maliks, amirs, *walis* and governors (*maqtas*). He assigned to Kishen (Krishna) Bazrañ Indri, who was the meanest of the mean-born, the territory of Awadh. To Muqbil, the slave of Ahmad Ayaz, who in appearance and character was a shame for all slaves, he gave the governorship (*wizarat*) of Gujarat, which had been a post for great khans and wazirs. It was strange how he gave high offices and governments of extensive territories and great provinces to men of low and mean birth."⁷⁰

The professions indicated in the above surnames are the ancestral professions of the officers mentioned; the officers themselves, it has to be assumed, were highly educated and efficient men. The matter is clarified by Barani himself when in his *Fatawa-i Jahandari* (Advice XI) he advocates that 'low-born people are not to be taught reading and writing, for plenty of disorders arise owing to the skill of the low-born in knowledge. The disorders into which the affairs of the state are thrown are due to the acts and words of the low-born, who have become skilled. For, on account of their skill, they become

⁶⁹ The Sultan gave one of his daughters in marriage to a grandson of Shaikh Hamiduddin Sufi of Nagaur (*Saroorus Sadur*, Ms.), and another daughter to Maulana Yusuf (*Mubarak Shahi*, 98).

⁷⁰ *Firuz Shahi*, 505.

governors (*wali*), revenue-collectors (*amils*), auditors (*mutasarrif*), officers (*farman-deh*) and rulers (*farman-rawa*).⁷¹ This policy of the Sultan was bound to cut across the interests of certain families, which had looked upon all offices as their sole monopoly.

9) The Sultan believed that only by giving a broad base to his administration could he consolidate the foundations of his power. A government to be stable should be conterminous with its subjects—if all sections of the Muslims had to be taken into the administration, it was equally necessary to admit Hindus to the highest offices of the government. With some such notion he appointed Hindus to some of the highest offices, as will be pointed out as we proceed.⁷² Besides, he patronized Hindu scholars and poets. According to Shihabuddin al-Umari there were one thousand poets of Arabic, Persian and Hindi at his court.⁷³

It is with reference to these basic concepts of the Sultan that some of the prejudices and antipathies of the historians of the period, as well as some of the important sections of medieval society, can be explained and analysed. Our chief authority for Muhammad bin Tughluq, Ziyauddin Barani, who was a reactionary in politics and a traditionalist in religious matters, could hardly appreciate the objectives of a ruler, who belonged to an entirely different category, being a progressive in religion and an innovator in politics. It is only in the interplay and interaction of these trends of Muhammad bin Tughluq's thought that an assessment of his policies can be attempted.

INVASION OF TARMASHIRIN

Isami gives a graphic account of the invasion of Alauddin Tarmashirin Khan but it is disfigured by poetic exaggerations and his personal vendetta against Muhammad bin Tughluq. One day, he says, a messenger came rushing from Multan and reported that a Mongol storm had burst in Sind and was spreading thick and fast. The Sultan started making immediate preparations to repulse the attack and summoned contingents from different parts of the empire. From Siri to the hills of Jud (Salt Range) the entire area looked like a military camp. The army had not yet come into motion when reports began to pour in saying that the Mongols had reached Meerut and were plundering the area. The Sultan despatched Yusuf Bughra to Meerut with ten thousand mounted soldiers and instructed him to make a surprise attack on the enemy; and if the enemy advanced further, he

⁷¹ Professor M. Habib and Mrs. Afsar Salim Khan: *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 49.

⁷² *Firuz Shahi*, 501.

⁷³ *Masalikul Absar*, Eng. tr., 32.

was to attack it from the rear while the Sultan attacked it from the front. When the actual combat began, the Indian soldiers were struck with giddiness on account of the terrible roar made by the Mongol bugles. Despite this serious affliction, however, the forces of Delhi achieved a victory over Tarmashirin and repulsed his attack.⁷⁴ This was the first and the last foreign invasion that Muhammad bin Tughluq had to face during his reign. Unlike Balban and Alauddin Khalji, he had to deal with no recurring Mongol problem. His energies were consumed in dealing with internal rebellions.

Yahya Sirhindi says that the Sultan went in pursuit of Tarmashirin up to Kalanaur and garrisoned that frontier post and placed it under Malik Mujiruddin Abu Raja.⁷⁵

Ibn-i Battuta gives a detailed account⁷⁶ of Tarmashirin, which is entirely different from all Indian accounts, and the only way to reconcile it with the accounts of Isami, Yahya Sirhindi and other Indian chroniclers is to assume that the second Tarmashirin was a pretender.

Ibn-i Battuta says that while coming to India he had stayed at Bukhara for two months as a guest of Tarmashirin. At that time Tarmashirin was at the height of his power; he ruled over an extensive dominion and large armies were at his beck and call. Two years after his arrival in India, Ibn-i Battuta came to know that as a punishment for violating the *yasas* of Chengiz, people swore allegiance to a cousin of Tarmashirin, Bazan Aghul, and deposed him. Tarmashirin came to India and started living in Sind without disclosing his identity. Imadul Mulk Sartezi, the governor of Multan, succeeded in discovering him and reported the matter to the Sultan. The Sultan's physician, who had formerly served Tarmashirin, was sent to confirm his identity. He recognized him by the scar of an abscess which he had treated. Ahmad Ayaz and Qutluq Khan warned the Sultan of the political dangers involved in the presence of such a dignitary in the country. Muhammad bin Tughluq was also alarmed. He summoned the pretender to his court and when he arrived, the Sultan angrily addressed him: 'O son of a prostitute! How could you lie and say that you are Tarmashirin, whereas Tarmashirin has been killed and here is with us the guardian of his grave.'⁷⁷ According to Central Asian historians, Tarmashirin tried to fly to Ghazni but was captured and sent to Bazan, who put him to death in 1332. Muhammad bin Tughluq must have been informed of the correct facts. The

⁷⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 462-63.

⁷⁵ *Mubarak Shahi*, 101.

⁷⁶ *Rehla*, 254-56.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 258.

words attributed to him by Ibn-i Battuta clearly show that the Sultan knew that he was dealing with a Mongol pretender, who found it profitable to hint that he was Tarmashirin Khan. The pretender was expelled from India.

CONQUEST OF KALANAUR AND FARASHUR (PESHAWAR)

Soon after his accession,⁷⁸ Muhammad bin Tughluq led a campaign to Kalanaur and Peshawar. In all probability it was undertaken after the invasion of Tarmashirin. He paid his soldiers one year's salary in advance and ordered them to equip themselves with all necessary weapons, horses, etc. He then marched towards Lahore and reached there after two months. He stayed at Lahore but ordered the army to continue its march to Peshawar. His aim was to garrison the frontier region against the Mongols, who were entrenched all along the area and used to plunder Indian territory. 'In that year', remarks Isami, 'contrary to what had happened in earlier years, Indian soldiers pillaged Mongol territory.'⁷⁹ Kalanaur and Peshawar were conquered and the *Khutba* was read in the name of the Sultan. Since no cereals were available there, and the soldiers had to live on the animals they hunted, they soon got disgusted with the place. The army rejoined Muhammad bin Tughluq at Lahore. For two or three months the Sultan stayed at Lahore and set the affairs of the frontier region in order and brought to book many recalcitrant elements. He then returned to Delhi. According to Isami, for two years he was extremely kind and affectionate towards the people but later on his attitude began to change.⁸⁰

REBELLION OF BAHAUDDIN GURSHASP

Yahya Sirhindi says that it was the first rebellion during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq.⁸¹

Gurshasp was a cousin of the Sultan.⁸² According to Ibn-i Battuta he refused to swear allegiance to Muhammad bin Tughluq after the death of Ghiyasuddin,⁸³ but Isami says that Muhammad bin Tughluq had conferred on him the title of Gurshasp and sent him to Sagar,

⁷⁸ Isami definitely says '*dar aghaz-i mulk*', *Futuh-us Salatin*, 423.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 423.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 424.

⁸¹ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 99.

⁸² Ibn-i Battuta says that he was the son of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq's sister (*Rehla*, 95); Ferishta mentions him as the son of Muhammad bin Tughluq's uncle (I, 135). Ibn-i Battuta is, no doubt, correct.

⁸³ *Rehla*, 95.

where he attained to great fame.⁸⁴ He rebelled when he realized that a change had taken place in the character and temperament of the Sultan.⁸⁵ Barani, perhaps owing to his failing memory, says nothing of this rebellion.

Khwaja-i Jahan Ahmad Ayaz was directed to proceed against Gurshasp from Gujarat and take with him senior maliks, like Qawamuddin, Qutbul Mulk, Tatar Ashraful Mulk and others.⁸⁶ 'The Sultan sent against him', Ibn-i Battuta states, 'troops which contained great amirs like Malik Mujir (Mujiruddin Abu Raja); and the wazir, Khwaja-i Jahan, was the commander-in-chief.'⁸⁷

When Gurshasp heard about the approach of the imperial army, he immediately crossed the Godavari and moved westwards from Devagiri. Here the encounter took place. Gurshasp attacked the centre led by Ahmad Ayaz and crippled it, but before he could take advantage of this, one of his comrades, Khizr Bahram, deserted him and joined the troops of Abu Raja. This desertion proved disastrous and turned Gurshasp's initial victory into a defeat. He, however, saved himself and his family by crossing the river and flying to Sagar, from where he left with his family to seek refuge with the Rai of Kampila. The Rai, brave and chivalrous as he was, readily agreed to give him asylum. 'You have done well', he told Gurshasp, 'in coming to me and I am prepared to lay down my own life to save yours. So long as a single artery functions in my body, I won't allow any one to touch you.'⁸⁸ These were brave words, sincerely uttered and scrupulously carried out.

Hotly pursuing Gurshasp, the forces of Delhi reached Kampila. Muhammad bin Tughluq himself marched to Daulatabad and sent reinforcement to Kumta (the fortress of Kummata). Gurshasp and the Rai of Kampila came out twice to give battle, but eventually decided to shut themselves up in the fortress. For about two months the fighting went on, but then the position of the garrison became untenable, and the royal army succeeded in forcing its way into the fortress. Gurshasp and his host, the Rai of Kampila, then left for Husdarg (Anegundi). The forces of Delhi pursued them and besieged that fortress also. For about a month they bravely defended themselves, but ultimately the royal army made a violent attack and captured the fortress.

The accounts of Ibn-i Battuta and Isami vary in certain details at

⁸⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 424. See also Ferishta, I, 135.

⁸⁵ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 424.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 425-26.

⁸⁷ *Rehla*, 95.

⁸⁸ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 427-28.

this point, but there is no real contradiction in their statements and taken together they complete the picture. According to Ibn-i Battuta, the Rai told Gurshasp: 'You see how things have developed. In these circumstances I have resolved to perish with my family and followers. You had better go to such and such a ruler and stay with him. He will defend you.' The Rai sent some one with Gurshasp to conduct him to the territory of the other Rai.⁸⁹ According to Isami, Gurshasp had kept four horses in readiness for his escape. He seated his family on them and very skilfully came out of the fortress and killed everybody who chased him.⁹⁰

The Rai of Kampila, on his part, was determined to fight to the finish. He performed the rite of *jauhar*—burnt all his property, wives and daughters,⁹¹ and then fought the last and the most desperate battle with the royal forces and died fighting on the battle-field. When Ahmad Ayaz occupied Anegundi, he directed one of its leading inhabitants to identify the persons who had been killed and whose bodies lay on the battle-field. When the man looked at a 'head dotted like a flower with shafts', he shrieked as if in deep agony. 'This is the head of our Rai', he told the anxious inquirers. Ahmad Ayaz ordered the head be placed in a tray of gold and the skin to be severed from the body and filled with straw.⁹² Eleven sons of the fallen Rai were captured and taken to the Sultan, who treated them exceedingly well 'in consideration of their good descent and the noble conduct of their father'. All of them embraced Islam. Ibn-i Battuta met three of them, Nasr, Bakhtiyar and Abu Muslim, and developed a friendship with Abu Muslim, who was known as *muhrdar*, because it was his duty to seal the water which the Sultan used to drink.⁹³ That Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq selected him for such a delicate and responsible duty shows the high appreciation he had for the fallen Rai's steadfastness, chivalry and loyalty to a guest.

Gurshasp was not destined to succeed. Ibn-i Battuta does not mention the name of the Rai with whom he sought shelter after the fall of Anegundi, but informs us that the Rai told him that he could not repeat the mistake of the Rai of Kampila and made him over to the imperial army.⁹⁴ Isami says that the Rai was Ballala⁹⁵ (i.e. Vira Ballala III, also called Bilal Deva, the Hoysala Rai of Dwara Samudra).

⁸⁹ *Rehla*, 97.

⁹⁰ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 429.

⁹¹ *Rehla*, 97.

⁹² *Futuh-us Salatin*, 430.

⁹³ *Rehla*, 96.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁹⁵ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 431.

Gurshasp was put in heavy chains and sent to the Sultan, who ordered that he be flayed alive and his skin be stuffed with chaff and straw and paraded throughout the country.⁹⁶ According to Ibn-i Battuta, 'The sultan ordered him to be taken to his female relations, who abused him and spat on his face; and then he had him flayed alive. A part of his flesh was cooked with rice and sent to his wife and children; the rest, put together in a tray, was placed before a female elephant, who refused to eat it.'⁹⁷ Ibn-i Battuta further says that when the stuffed skin reached Sind, its governor, Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan, ordered it to be buried⁹⁸ and this was disapproved by the Sultan.

This inhuman treatment of Gurshasp's dead body created horror and hatred against the Sultan in the public mind. What the Sultan wanted to act as a deterrent to future rebellions in fact provided an incentive for them. Kishlu's rebellion is perfectly understandable in this context.

The only silver lining to the cloud in the operation against Gurshasp is the spirit of religious tolerance and broad-mindedness displayed by the Sultan's officers. During this time some soldiers damaged the *Siva-linga* and the temple of Madhukeshwar at Kalyan.⁹⁹ Thakkura Mala, a trustee of the temple, waited upon Ahmad Ayaz and requested him to reinstate the idol. Ahmad Ayaz issued an order, saying: 'Since worship in the temple is the religious duty of the petitioners, they should follow it.' The Kalyan inscription brings to light the Sultan's policy of religious freedom¹⁰⁰ to his non-Muslim subjects.

CONQUEST OF KONDHANA

Kondhana or Singarh stood in the vicinity of Devagiri and was held by Nag Nayak. Muhammad bin Tughluq marched against the fortress from Devagiri. The Rana stood the siege for eight months but could not hold out further and submitted. The Sultan appreciated his surrender and honoured the Rana by bestowing a *qaba* and a *kulah*¹⁰¹ on him.

⁹⁶ *Rehla*, 96; *Futuh-us Salatin*, 431.

⁹⁷ *Rehla*, 96.

⁹⁸ Ibn-i Battuta says that the skin of Bahadur Bura was also paraded with it, but this cannot be correct because the rebellion of Bura took place after the rebellion of Kishlu Khan.

⁹⁹ In the Bidar district of Mysore.

¹⁰⁰ *Epi. Ind.*, Vol. XXXII, Part IV, October 1957, 165 *et seq.*

¹⁰¹ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 423-33.

REBELLION OF BAHRAM AIBA

Isami says that the Sultan was resting in Devagiri¹⁰² after his successful Kondhana campaign when he was informed about the insurrection of Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan in Multan. He immediately set off for Delhi and by forced marches reached there within a short time. He did not march to Multan immediately but relaxed for about a month in Delhi and made the necessary preparations. Here he gave orders for the construction of a huge tent (*bargah*). A pulpit was placed in it for him and a feast was arranged to which all sorts of people were invited. The Sultan first asked Jalal Husam to deliver a speech and then himself ascended the pulpit and addressed the audience. Later some musicians entertained the people. The Sultan also distributed trays full of gold to the invitees. Isami gives all these details but says nothing about the main theme of the Sultan's exhortations. He makes a cryptic and evasive remark with reference to his speech and says that the Sultan did hypocritical talking to his people. Perhaps it was on this occasion that the Sultan began to think in terms of a second administrative centre in the South. Thus alone he could meet effectively the situations arising in the far-flung parts of the empire.

Aiba's rebellion was, in fact, the first serious protest against the policy of draconian punishments initiated so early in his reign by Muhammad bin Tughluq. Ibn-i Battuta says that the Sultan was displeased with him because he had ordered the burial of the corpse of Bahauddin Gurhasp, which was being paraded throughout the empire. The Sultan summoned Kishlu Khan, but he declined to come and rose in rebellion.¹⁰³ Yahya Sirhindi says that Ali Khattati was sent by the Sultan to bring Aiba's family to Devagiri. Ali Khattati was harsh and uncouth in his dealings with Bahram Aiba, a veteran noble and military leader of great reputation and standing and a close friend of Tughluq Shah. He made Aiba sit in his court and reproached him in strong words. He even rebuked Laula, a son-in-law of Bahram, in these words: 'Why do you not despatch your dependants? You desire that they should not go. You are acting villainously.' Laula's patience was exhausted. He pulled Ali Khattati down (from his horse) and killed him. Matters now took a serious turn and Bahram had no alternative but to rebel.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, 433.

Isami is supported by Barani, who says that the Sultan rushed from Devagiri to quell the rebellion of Bahram. (*Ftruz Shahi*, 479.)

¹⁰³ *Rehla*, 97.

¹⁰⁴ *Mubarak Shahi*, 100.

The Sultan marched from Delhi against Bahram Aiba. The battle was fought near Abuhar. The Sultan placed Shaikh Imaduddin, brother of Shaikh Ruknuddin Multani, under the royal canopy in order to deceive the enemy. The trick worked. Bahram mistook Imaduddin for the emperor, and having killed him, dispersed and relaxed. Thereupon the Sultan, who was hiding in an ambush, came out and completely crushed the army of Bahram. Bahram was decapitated and his head was brought before the Sultan. The Sultan then thought of punishing the people of Multan by ordering a mass-massacre. When Shaikh Ruknuddin came to know of the Sultan's intention, he went to him with bare head and bare feet¹⁰⁵ and sought his forgiveness. The Sultan's wrath cooled down and he granted mercy to the people.

KAMALPUR INSURRECTION

According to Ibn-i Battuta the other insurrection that broke out at this time was of the inhabitants of Kamalpur in Sind. The Sultan sent Khwaja-i Jahan to crush the rebellion. 'I was informed by a jurist', writes Ibn-i Battuta, 'that the *qazi* and the *khatib* of Kamalpur were brought before the wazir and the latter ordered them to be flayed alive. "Kill us", they said, "in any other fashion". "Why" the wazir inquired, "are you to be killed at all?" "On account of our disobedience", they replied, "to the Sultan's order." "How, then," the wazir remarked, "can I myself act contrary to his orders? Verily, he has ordered me to kill you in this very fashion."' ¹⁰⁶

REBELLION OF GHIYASUDDIN BAHADUR

Almost simultaneously with the campaign against Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan the rebellion of Ghiyasuddin Bahadur, known as Bura, took place.¹⁰⁷ According to Ibn-i Battuta, Bura had been detained in Delhi as a prisoner by Ghiyasuddin Tughluq. Muhammad bin Tughluq set him free after his accession, and conferred upon him and his own step-brother, Bahram Khan, the governments of Lakhnauti and Sonargaon respectively. The *Khutba* at Lakhnauti was to be read and the coins were to be struck in the names of both Bura and the Sultan. It was also decided that Bura would send his son, Muhammad, known as Barbat, as a hostage to Delhi. Bura carried out all the instructions of Delhi but politely declined to send his son, under the pretext that his son was not prepared to obey his orders. The Sultan

¹⁰⁵ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 427.

¹⁰⁶ *Rehla*, 97.

¹⁰⁷ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 444.

sent an army under Duljiut Tatarī and instructed his brother, Bahram Khan, also to deal with Bura.¹⁰⁸

According to Isami, the Sultan was on his way back from Multan and had reached Dipalpur when a courier came from his brother, Bahram, governor of Sonargaon, and informed him that Bura had revolted at Lakhnauti and caused much bloodshed and confusion. He was challenged and defeated. He fled towards a river but his horse got stuck in the mud. He was captured and flayed alive. His stuffed skin was sent with the *fath nama* (message of victory). The Sultan ordered celebrations of this victory for forty days in Dipalpur, and the skins of Bura and Aiba Kishlu Khan 'were displayed from a height like two kernels in one shell'.¹⁰⁹ This rebellion took place in 730/1330-1.

EXODUS TO DEVAGIRI

One of the most grossly misunderstood measures of the Sultan was his attempt at creating an effective administrative centre in the Deccan. The nature of the experiment, the extent of the exodus it necessitated and its reactions and after-effects—all these topics deserve unbiased appraisal, since much of the misunderstanding has been due to the subjective statements made by contemporary chroniclers.

I. *Motives*:

Different motives have been ascribed by various historians to Muhammad bin Tughluq for his Deccan experiment.

(a) Barani says that the Sultan made Devagiri his *darul mulk* (or capital) because he thought that it was more centrally situated and was equidistant from Delhi, Gujarat, Lakhnauti, Satgaon, Sonargaon, Tilang, Ma'abar, Dwara Samudra and Kampila.¹¹⁰ Apart from the geographical inaccuracy of this statement, the point cannot be ignored that if Devagiri could not be controlled from Delhi, neither could Delhi be controlled from Devagiri. Nevertheless, Barani's observation, as usual, is helpful in understanding the basic motive of the Sultan—*effective administrative control of the South*.

(b) Ibn-i Battuta, who came to India nearly five years after the Deccan experiment of the Sultan, writes: 'One of the most serious reprehensions against the Sultan is that he forced the inhabitants of Delhi into exile. The cause of it was this. They used to write letters

¹⁰⁸ *Rehla*, 95.

¹⁰⁹ For numismatic evidence, see Lane Poole, *The Coins of the Muhammadan States of India in British Museum*, 11.

¹¹⁰ *Firuz Shahi*, 473-74.

containing abuses and scandals, and they would seal the letters, writing on the cover—"By the head of His Majesty none except His Majesty should read this letter." These letters they used to throw into the council-hall in the course of the night. When he tore them open, the Sultan found abuses and scandals in the contents. So he resolved to lay Delhi waste.¹¹¹ But the very next sentence that the African traveller writes after this contradicts him: 'He (the Sultan) bought the houses and dwellings from all the inhabitants of Delhi and paid the price for them.'¹¹² A punitive action could not possibly be accompanied by such fair bargaining. The incident of throwing letters, if at all true, must have been the *effect and not the cause* of the exodus of the people to Devagiri.

(c) Isami says that since the Sultan was suspicious (*badguman*) of the people (*khalq*) of Delhi, he thought of driving them out in the direction of Maharashtra in order to break their power.¹¹³ Isami's narrative leaves the impression that he is often at pains to prove and develop his theory that a deep animosity existed between the Sultan and the people, and that the Sultan was guided by his animus against the people in all his projects. Such an approach can only blur a correct historical perspective.

(d) It was in all probability during, or immediately after, his campaign against Bahauddin Gurshasp in the Deccan that Muhammad bin Tughluq realized the urgent need* of having a strong administrative centre in the South to cope effectively and instantaneously with all situations that arose in that region. His councillors suggested Ujjain¹¹⁴ for that purpose but his decision went in favour of Devagiri. To the beauties of Devagiri and its claim to a pride of place in the cities of the world, the attention of Muhammad bin Tughluq had already been drawn by the poet, Amir Khusrau, in his *masnavi*, *Sahifatul Ausaf*,¹¹⁵ when the poet came with him in 721/1321.

When the Sultan embarked upon his Deccan project, he had already given considerable thought and attention to all aspects of the problem. It was neither a haphazard plunge in administrative experimentation nor an eccentric craze for novelty, but a well-thought-out

¹¹¹ *Rehla*, 94.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 94.

¹¹³ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 446.

¹¹⁴ *Ferishta*, I, 136.

¹¹⁵ This short *masnavi* supplies 'background atmosphere' to the decision of the Sultan to make Devagiri 'the second administrative city of the empire'. This *masnavi* is included in the poet's *Diwan*, the *Nihatul Kamal*, and has been separately edited by the writer of these lines.

solution of a problem by one who, of all the sultans of Delhi, had the most intimate experience of the difficulties in the administrative control and the military operations in the South. Among modern historians two very significant explanations for this measure of the Sultan have been given by Professor Muhammad Habib and Gardner Brown.

Professor Habib says: 'Muhammad bin Tughluq knew the Deccan better than any of his contemporaries. Malik Kafur, in the course of four successful campaigns, had plundered the richest temples of the South and compelled most of the rais to accept the overlordship of Delhi; but Alauddin, acting on the sane and sensible advice of Alaul Mulk, the fat and wise kotwal of Delhi, had refused to annex even a bigha of land. The southern rais were deprived of all the jewels they had collected 'star by star' from the time of Vikramaditya, but their territories were returned to them with the diplomatic suggestion that they were welcome to make up for their loss by plundering their neighbours. It was not the habit of the Khalji autocrat to undertake more than he could very safely perform.

'Mubarak Shah after his accession entirely changed the Deccan policy. He not only overthrew the Yadavas of Devagiri but established his administration over their territory, which was distributed among a large number of petty officers, known as the *sadah* amirs (*amiran-i sadah*) or commanders of one hundred, who were expected to collect the revenue and keep the population quiet. It was a brittle and rickety administration. There was only a thin sprinkling of Muslim populations in Gujarat, Rajputana and Malwa. In Devagiri there was no Muslim population whatsoever, except the officers and their men. To the south, east and west of Devagiri there were powerful Hindu chiefs, who had lost their prestige but not their power; a union of their forces could have any day driven the weak forces of the empire pell-mell beyond the Vindhya, and the hold of Delhi over Gujarat and Malwa, conquered so lately by Sultan Alauddin, would have also been endangered. But the fateful dice had been cast.

'Muhammad bin Tughluq was driven to the conclusion that the position of Devagiri would never be secure so long as the kingdom of Warangal was allowed to exist. He led an expedition against Warangal during his father's reign and tasted the bitterness of failure. His second attempt, however, was successful and Warangal, like Devagiri, was entrusted to the *sadah* amirs. Still the situation was anything but satisfactory. Foreign government—a government of the South by the North—was as intolerable to the *sadah* amirs of the empire as to the Hindu population whom they were expected to control. Every one saw that it could not last beyond a decade; the

forces of opposition were too strong. The success of Islam in India, moreover, depended on its becoming thoroughly indigenous.

'Mu'izzuddin and the early Turkish sultans had succeeded in Hindustan owing to two great movements: The Mongol invasions of Central Asia and Persia had driven a large number of refugees to India, who had settled in the country for good. At the same time the Chishti and Suhrawardi mystic orders (*silsilahs*) with their super-military discipline had carried on an extensive religious propaganda in every village and town of Hindustan, and their efforts had brought a considerable minority of pure Indians within the fold of Islam. This minority of gardeners, cooks, barbers, and other "gems of worthlessness", which Barani detested, naturally stood for that social democracy which is the finest contribution of Islam to India, and gave to the empire of Delhi the strength it needed. Unless something like this happened in the Deccan also—unless by deportation or conversion an indigenous Muslim population was created there—the breeze of the first Hindu reaction would sweep everything aside.

'Muhammad bin Tughluq, who combined the bull-dog tenacity of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri with the far-sighted tolerance of Shaikh Fariduddin, to whose school he belonged, grimly made up his mind to accomplish the task. The population of Delhi was there, living comfortably beneath his nose; *it was a fine social and economic unit for a southern capital and he would take it there*. But, this was not enough. Unless an extensive propaganda was undertaken and centres of Muslim social and religious culture were established in the Deccan, his scheme would fail. So the mystics also had to be transported for the purpose of preaching and propaganda.'¹¹⁶

According to Gardner Brown, with the accession of Muhammad bin Tughluq the centre of gravity of the empire had shifted from the North to the South. The Punjab had lost its importance on account of the Mongol devastations to which it was subjected for about a hundred years.¹¹⁷ Thus, to put it differently, when Muhammad bin Tughluq embarked upon his Deccan experiment, he simply acted as an agent of certain economic forces, which were actively operating in the life of the country and demanded the transfer of the capital to a region economically more prosperous to sustain the structure of an all-India government. When all contemporary and modern interpretations are taken into consideration, it appears that the Deccan experiment was basically dictated by political exigencies. In an empire in which simultaneous insurrections were appearing in areas so far off

¹¹⁶ *Aligarh Magazine*, July 1930, 1-11. The *Siyyarul Auliya* refers to a lot of mystics, who were compelled to leave for the Deccan.

¹¹⁷ *Journal of UP Historical Society*, Vol. I, pt. ii, 13.

as Ma'abar and Bengal, there was no other alternative to deal with the situation except what the Sultan attempted.

II. *Implementation:*

The Deccan scheme was implemented in stages and with due consideration for the convenience of the people. (a) It appears that the idea was conceived at least two years before it was actually executed. Yahya Sirhindi records in the developments of 727/1326-27: 'At a distance of every two miles (*karohs*) along the road from Delhi to Daulatabad, the Sultan constructed halting stations and transformed the whole uninhabited area into a habitation. To the people in these regions he gave lands to dwell in, and the income of these lands was to be accounted for in their salaries. He also planted trees on both sides of the road.'¹¹⁸ (b) First of all the Sultan's mother, Makhduma-i Jahan, and the entire royal household, with amirs, maliks, slaves, horses, elephants and treasures, shifted to Devagiri. Afterwards, the Sultan summoned all the *Saiyyids*, shaikhs (mystics), *ulama* and grandees of Delhi.¹¹⁹ (c) According to Isami, six *carawans* were formed of the people who were forced to migrate to Daulatabad.¹²⁰ According to Yahya Sirhindi the order for the exodus was issued in 729/1328-29.¹²¹ (d) The Sultan, as already stated, purchased the houses and dwellings of the people of Delhi and paid the price for them.¹²² (e) Facilities of travel and conveyance were provided for the migrants. (f) In Daulatabad itself, free board and lodging were provided for new arrivals. 'The Sultan', writes Barani, 'made liberal gifts to the people both at the time of their departure for, and on their arrival at, Daulatabad.'¹²³ (g) The Sultan had bestowed considerable thought and attention to the planning of Daulatabad. The following account of the city given to Shihabuddin al-Umari by Shaikh Mubarak deserves to be quoted in this context:

'And the city of Delhi is the capital of the country. Then *after it* (comes) Qubbatul Islam and this is the city of Devagiri, which this Sultan built anew and named Qubbatul Islam... When I left it six years ago it was not yet completed. And I do not think it is yet complete on account of the vast extent of the area of the city and hugeness of its buildings. The Sultan had divided it in such

¹¹⁸ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 98.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 98.

¹²⁰ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 449.

¹²¹ *Mubarak Shahi*, 102.

¹²² *Rehla*, 94; *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 102. Isami says that the emperor had announced that he who obeyed the royal order would receive much gold.

¹²³ *Firuz Shahi*, 474.

a way that separate quarters were built for every class of people; a quarter for the troops, a quarter for the wazirs, a quarter for the secretaries, a quarter for the judges and the learned men, a quarter for the shaikhs and faqirs, and a quarter for merchants and handicraftsmen. In every quarter there were found, according to the needs of every class, mosques, minarets, bazars, public baths, ovens for (baking) flour; so that the people of that quarter did not depend upon the other quarters for selling and buying and exchanging things, and each quarter was in the position of a separate self-contained city, not dependent on others for anything.¹²⁴

III. *Not a Mass Exodus:*

The impression of a mass exodus given by contemporary historians is not correct. In fact only the upper classes, consisting of nobles, *ulama*, shaikhs and the elite of the city, were shifted to Daulatabad.¹²⁵ The general Hindu public also was not affected by this project. Two Sanskrit inscriptions¹²⁶—dated 1327 and 1328—show that the Hindus of Delhi lived in peace all this time. Barani's narrative makes it abundantly clear that the measure had proved a calamity for the upper classes. Both Barani and Isami magnified this limited exodus of the elite of the city into a wholesale transportation to Daulatabad. The elite of Delhi constituted a fine social and economic unit for a southern capital, and the Sultan forced it alone to change its habitat and settle in a new region and amidst new surroundings.

IV. *Reactions of the People:*

An exodus under duress is bound to provoke strong reactions. So did the Deccan project of the Sultan. During the preceding one hundred and sixty years or so Delhi had been the capital of the sultanat, and it had developed its urban and cultural life in its own distinctive manner. Its bazars, *khanqahs*, madrasas, tanks, orchards, minars, buildings, mausoleums had their own fascination for the people who had been brought up among them. Even as early as the days of Kaiqubad—when hardly a century had passed since the foundation of 'Hazrat-i Delhi'—a poet like Amir Khusrau felt home-sick in Awadh and longed to be back in India's cultural centre.¹²⁷ To be weaned away completely from Delhi could be nothing short of torture for the people affected. Apart from this, during the last century and a half Delhi had become a strong centre for the mystics. There

124 *Masalikul Absar*, Eng. tr. by Otto Spies, 18-19.

125 For a detailed discussion, see Mahdi Husain, *Tughluq Dynasty*, 145 *et seq.*

126 *Catalogue of the Delhi Museum of Archaeology*, 29; *Tughluq Dynasty*, 146-47.

127 See Amir Khusrau's versified letter, written from Awadh to his friend, Tajuddin Zahid, quoted in *Ghurratul Kamal*.

were thousands of *khanqahs*, hospices and *zawiyahs* (religious houses)¹²⁸ in Delhi, and huge crowds of people used to gather there.¹²⁹ Muhammad bin Tughluq's project hit hard at the *khanqah*-life of Delhi. Saiyyid Muhammad Gisu Daraz is reported to have remarked that with the exception of the mausoleums of Shaikh Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki, Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya and a few others, no other mausoleum of Delhi had even a candle-stick left on account of the destruction wrought by Muhammad bin Tughluq.¹³⁰ This general eclipse of the cultural centres of Delhi is responsible for the extremely exaggerated accounts of the destruction of Delhi that one finds in the pages of *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* and *Futuh-us Salatin*. For Barani Delhi was nothing but the dwellings of its aristocracy and the hospices of its saints. When these disappeared, the whole Delhi seemed depopulated to him. Isami's very aged grandfather had died at Tilpat while on his way to Daulatabad, and his bitterness against the Sultan and his project is understandable. Ibn-i Battuta talks of the depopulation of Delhi on the basis of rumours, but when he actually describes Delhi on his arrival in 734, barely four or five years after the exodus, he talks of its splendour, prosperity and population as if no disaster had overtaken it.

The mystic reaction to the demand of Muhammad bin Tughluq had some ideological complications also. The mystics believed in the concept of *walayah*¹³¹, (spiritual dominion over a territory) being the linch-pin of their organization. Their areas of work were determined by their spiritual masters, who assigned 'spiritual territories' to them to carry on their work of moral and spiritual education of the people and face the blows and buffets of fortune. When the Sultan sought to move them from one place to another, they interpreted it as a serious interference in their *khanqah*-life. They hesitated in obeying the Sultan's orders; the Sultan interpreted this hesitation as rebellion, and armed by a counter-ideology of the 'state and religion as twins', forced them to migrate to the distant South. It was difficult for many to defy a sultan like Muhammad bin Tughluq, but Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh held fast to the traditions of his *silsilah* and patiently bore all the tortures and punishments inflicted on him by the Sultan.¹³²

128 The author of *Subhul Asha* refers to two thousand *ribats* (inns) and *khanqahs*. *An Arab Account of India in the 14th century*, 29.

129 See Barani's account of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya's *khanqah* at Ghiyaspur, *Firuz Shahi*, 341-44.

130 *Jawamaul Kalim*, 143.

131 For a detailed discussion of the concept, see Nizami, *Religion and Politics in India during the Thirteenth Century*, 175-76.

132 For details, see *Khairul Majalis*, Introduction, 49-58.

It was easy for the Sultan to use all the terrible powers of a medieval monarchical government to drive the mystics from Delhi to Daulatabad, but it was not easy to escape the consequences in terms of loss of public popularity. Perhaps no other measure brought so much unpopularity to the Sultan as the forced migration of the mystics to Daulatabad.

Muhammad bin Tughluq was an autocrat to his finger-tips. He was never prepared to tolerate disobedience to his orders. He simply became mad when he found anybody disobeying him. Ibn-i Battuta says that one night the Sultan went up to the roof of his palace and looked around. When neither a lamp nor even smoke or light came within his sight, he remarked: 'Now my heart is pleased and my soul is at rest'¹³³—as if he was a Nero playing on the fiddle while Rome was burning.

The accounts of his punishments of all people who disobeyed his orders, as given by Barani, Ibn-i Battuta and Isami, may be highly exaggerated, but it will be improper to dismiss them as baseless. They represent the general disgust against the Sultan and are in line with the general policy of the Sultan himself. Isami says that the mystics and all other persons, who did not start for Daulatabad at the Sultan's order, were dragged out of their houses. The police pulled them by their hair and inflicted draconian punishments upon them.¹³⁴ Isami gives an idea of the atmosphere in which the *caravans* marched towards Daulatabad when he says: 'They walked with loud lamentations, like persons who were going to be buried alive.'¹³⁵

It appears from Isami that the exodus took place during the hot summer months and this considerably aggravated the miseries of the people. 'The people had to tread', writes Isami, 'over the soil which the burning sun had made hot like iron.'¹³⁶ Making due allowance for Isami's poetic exaggerations, it can hardly be denied that the journey from Delhi to Daulatabad was bound to be a prolonged torture, despite all the facilities provided by the state. This was inevitable in view of the medieval limitations concerning transport and conveyance. The inclemencies of the season, nostalgic memories of the past, presence of women, children and old persons in the *caravans*, uncertainties of life in the South, and a dread of the Sultan's unpredictable temper—all these combined to make the journey an extremely tormenting experience. Still Isami, a bitter critic of Sultan Muhammad and the exodus, writing in the reign of the first Bahmani king

¹³³ *Rehla*, 94.

¹³⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 447.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 447.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, 449.

sums up the situation in two lines: 'A tenth of the population of the people of Delhi that succeeded in reaching (their destination) brought glory to this region; groups that had been distressed in Delhi were well-provided in this land.'¹³⁷

V. Capital or Second Administrative City:

The general impression about the Deccan experiment of the Sultan that he transferred the capital to Daulatabad is not correct. In fact, he made Daulatabad the second administrative city of the empire. This is borne out by Al-Qalqashandi who says that the empire of Delhi had two capitals: Delhi and Devagiri or Qubbatul Islam.¹³⁸ It may be noted that in a coin minted in A.H. 730, Delhi is indicated as *Takhtgah-i Delhi*¹³⁹ and another coin of A.H. 731 refers to Daulatabad as *Takhtgah-i Daulatabad*.¹⁴⁰

A word has to be added here about the historic past of Devagiri (Deogir), 'the hill of the gods'. It was the capital of the Yadavas. Sultan Qutbuddin Mubarak Khalji gave it the name Qutbabad¹⁴¹ and established a mint there.¹⁴² The words, *Qubbatul Islam*,¹⁴³ appear on the coins as early as 727/1326-27 but no significance need be attached to this fact. It was in 728/1327-28 that the place was named Daulatabad.¹⁴⁴ Thus, it was not Devagiri that was renamed Daulatabad; it was Qutbabad which received a new title.

VI. Aftermath:

The after-effects of this Deccan experiment may be assessed from two angles—immediate and remote. Its immediate effect was widespread resentment against the Sultan, who forfeited once and for all the confidence of his people, and the bitterness against him due to their sufferings continued to rankle in their hearts for decades. In its remote consequences the Deccan experiment of Muhammad bin Tughluq was a remarkable success. The barriers which had separated

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, 458.

¹³⁸ *An Arab Account of India in the 14th century*, 30. See also *Masalikul Absar* (Eng. tr.), 18.

¹³⁹ *Indian Museum Catalogue* II, 59. *Takhtgah* means Capital.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 60, Coin no. 385.

¹⁴¹ *Masnavi Sahifatul Ausaf (Ms)*; also Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 109.

¹⁴² Three gold coins minted there in A.H. 718, 719 and 720 have come to light. *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 179-80. Edward Thomas's view that these coins belong to Delhi has been refuted by H. R. Nevill (JASB, NS, 35 art. 219) and Nelson Wright (*The Coinage*, 109).

¹⁴³ Nelson Wright, 119, Specimen No. 484.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 157.

the North from the South broke down, and though the extension of the administrative power of the Delhi sultanat into the Deccan did not prove successful, the extension of its cultural institutions did in fact succeed. 'On all the four sides of Daulatabad there appeared graveyards of Musalmans',¹⁴⁵ Barani remarks, referring to the impact of the exodus forced by the Sultan. But these 'graveyards' connected the hearts of the people of the North with the soil of the South. The rise of the Bahmani kingdom was only made possible by this influx of population.

Isami tells us that when the people of Delhi left for Daulatabad, the Sultan brought 'peasants' (*rustai*)¹⁴⁶ from the countryside and settled them in Delhi. But this is obviously a poetic way of saying that all those who filled the vacuum created by the transportation of its original inhabitants were like uncouth countrymen compared to them. Barani clearly says that the elite of other parts of the country was invited to Delhi and settled there.¹⁴⁷ It is a significant fact that when Ibn-i Battuta reached Delhi in 1334, he found it full of scholars, literati and mystics and no after-effects of the exodus were visible to him. This fact becomes even more significant when it is remembered that the Sultan permitted the people to return to Delhi in 1335-37.¹⁴⁸

THE TOKEN CURRENCY

Next to the Deccan experiment comes the token currency of the Sultan. Briefly put the measure was as follows. A silver coin, in those days, was known as a *tanka*; a copper coin was known as a *jital*. The Sultan issued a bronze coin, in place of the silver coin, and demanded its acceptance as a token coin equivalent to the silver *tanka*.¹⁴⁹ To put it in a different way—here was a *jital* calling itself a *tanka*.

The token coin was distinguished from the ordinary currency in the following respects: (a) The metal used for the token coins was copper (*mis*) according to Barani, but Ferishta says it was brass or bronze (*biranj*) and he is supported by numismatic

145 *Firuz Shahi*, 343.

146 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 450.

147 *Firuz Shahi*, 474.

148 *Ibid.*, 481. Moreland, however, puts a wrong interpretation on the words of Barani when he regards this permission as 'the restoration of Delhi as the capital'. (*Agrarian System*, 49.)

149 'In no instance', remarks Edward Thomas, 'were these representations of real money issued to pass for the more valuable current gold pieces; the highest coin he desired credit for in virtue of the regal stamp was a *tanka* of 140 grains of silver and the minor subdivisions were elaborately provided for in detail.' *Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, 245.

evidence.¹⁵⁰ (b) While other coins had only Arabic superinscriptions, the token coin had its legends in Persian also. (c) While most medieval coins of the baser metals are difficult to decipher, special care was taken to make the legend on the token coins clear and legible. (d) The inscription in Persian ran: *Muhr shud tanka, ra'ij dar ruzgar-i banda-i ummidwar Muhammad Tughluq* (Minted tanka, current during the days of Muhammad (bin) Tughluq, who hopes for Divine favour). The word 'current' in this inscription makes it clear that the coin owed its value to the credit of the Sultan and not to its metallic value. (e) The token coins contained the following Arabic inscriptions also: 'He who obeys the Sultan, obeys God'; 'Obey God, obey the Prophet and those in authority amongst you.' This was an appeal to the religious sentiments of the people to honour the token currency.

The principles of a token currency, whether of paper or base metal, are too well-known to the modern world to need a detailed discussion, and some of them must have been foreseen by Muhammad bin Tughluq. The basic condition of success is that the token currency must be accepted by the government in taxes and other payments by the people; unless this is done, the token currency will have no value whatsoever. Secondly, the token currency has to be manufactured by some process the secret of which is known to the government alone. Thirdly, very harsh punishments have to be meted out to unauthorized persons, who manufacture or 'utter' the token currency and an extensive police organization is needed for the purpose. *If these necessary measures are taken, the success of the token currency will mean that a very large part of the silver in circulation as coin comes into the hands of the state as an interest-free loan for an indefinite period.* But since the token currency has no value in foreign countries, a certain amount of silver currency is needed by merchants, who bring foreign merchandise into the country. If the state can give a guarantee that a silver coin will be given *on demand* in return for a token coin, the permanent value of the token coin is assured. Conversely, if the state and the forger — or both — keep on manufacturing the token coin beyond a particular limit, its value will fall in proportion to the increase in its quantity.

This experiment in token currency was not new in Asia. Under Qublai Khan (1260-94) of China and Kaikhatu Khan of Iran (1293) attempts at introducing a token currency had been made. The Iranian experiment had failed; the Chinese venture had succeeded. The *chao* (paper currency of Qublai Khan) had succeeded because (a) the Khan had made due allowance for the people, if they desired to use

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 244, 249.

gold and silver, and (b) the manufacture of the paper and inks of the state could not be forged.

Why did the Sultan at all think of introducing a token currency? Barani says that the Sultan's projects to conquer foreign lands and his boundless generosity and munificence had depleted the treasury;¹⁵¹ and it was a device to face the crisis of bankruptcy. This is only partially true. It cannot be disputed that the experiment was connected with the economic strain put on his resources by the contemplated Khurasan expedition and the subsequent Qarachil disaster, but he was not bankrupt even at this time, for we know that when the experiment failed, he promptly redeemed in silver and gold the token base metal coins his own mint had manufactured. Was it then a fad for novelty which prompted him to introduce it? It must be remembered that Sultan Muhammad was never satisfied with temporary solutions of basic problems. Whenever any difficulty or problem came to his knowledge, he attempted some basic and fundamental solution. Perhaps the experiment was dictated by the phenomenon of the shortage of silver not only in India but all the world over. The relative value of silver and gold during this period is given as follows by three authorities:

Edward Thomas	8:1
Col. Yule	7:1
Nelson Wright and Nevill	10:1

This is why we find a gradual decrease in the weight of the silver *tanka* and a corresponding increase in the weight of the gold coin during this period. Regarding the scarcity of silver, Nelson Wright remarks: 'But apart from Bengal the sources of silver supply in India were scanty. The riches of Southern India were exhausted or at any rate closed to the Delhi sultans. The extension therefore of the use of billon, which Muhammad was the first to introduce for the higher-value coins, in a more and more debased form became almost inevitable'.¹⁵² The problem of the shortage of silver was aggravated during the time of Muhammad bin Tughluq on account of the establishment of new mints in the extensive empire and the enormous expenditure incurred on military expeditions and the Deccan experiment.

The effect of the token currency was felt in different spheres and in different ways.

(a) People began to mint the token coins and (in the words of Ziyauddin Barani) the house of every 'Hindu'¹⁵³ became a mint. Why

¹⁵¹ Firuz Shahi, 475.

¹⁵² Nelson Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 160.

¹⁵³ It may be pointed out that by the word 'Hindu' in this context Barani obviously means the goldsmiths. Since the goldsmiths were mostly Hindus, he uses the

did it happen? Edward Thomas finds the following reasons for this: 'His Majesty's officers of the mint worked with precisely the same tools as the ordinary workman, and operated upon a metal, so to say, universally available. There was no special machinery to mark the difference of the fabric of the royal mint and the handiwork of the moderately-skilled artisan. Unlike the precautions taken to prevent the imitation of the Chinese paper notes, there was positively no check upon the authenticity of the copper token, and no limit on the power of production by the masses at large.'¹⁵⁴

But Professor Mohd. Habib gives a different and more plausible explanation when he says: 'The mint had a special type of bronze alloy for the coins, which could be easily distinguished on the touchstone; but the secret of the proportion of the metals in the bronze coins could not be discovered by the goldsmiths. When people took gold and silver coins in those days, they had the coins weighed (to make allowance for clipping) and also tested on the touchstone for purity of metal. The Sultan expected the public to follow the same practice in regard to his token coins. But in this matter the public failed him. Consequently, many forged coins got mixed with the treasury coins; and as the forged coins became current and the government was unable to prevent this, more and more coins were forged. A bronze coin would be at least worth its weight in bronze—i.e. about 50 bronze coins would be normally equal to one silver *tanka*. But forging the bronze coins was an offence. So a forged bronze coin may meet any fate, for a new element—fear of punishment—also entered into the determination of its value. In the distant provinces it circulated at one-half of its official value in terms of the silver *tanka*; in the capital people would be afraid of being found in possession of forged bronze coins; they would throw them away or keep them in order to melt them into bronze vessels later on. The whole operation got beyond the control of the government. Too many forged coins got into circulation and the failure of the experiment caused a havoc in the market. It was not possible to punish those in actual possession of the forged bronze coins, because they were innocent. In fact, strange to say, nobody was punished. . . It was understood from the very beginning that the treasury would redeem every bronze coin it had issued. The Sultan now ordered this to be

term *Hindu* for them—a favourite practice with Barani to use a 'generic' term where a 'specific' term is required. His use of the word 'Turk' for Ilbarites in the context of the rise of the Khaljis, and his use of the word 'Hindu' here and in connection with the regulations of Alauddin Khalji concerning *khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis* are examples of this presentation, which has caused considerable confusion.

done. People brought to the treasury the bronze coins they had. *The treasury redeemed the bronze coins it had issued as a matter of treasury-conscience; it rejected the false coins but did not punish their owners because they were "bonafide" possessors.* Heaps of these rejected bronze coins, which were probably melted later on, could be seen at Tughlaqabad. But forged bronze coins not brought to the treasury continued to circulate at their metallic value, specially in the provinces, and have survived to our days.¹⁵⁵

(b) People started hoarding silver and made all purchases in the token currency. Thus considerable silver was kept out of circulation.

(c) Payment of land revenue came to be made in the spurious token currency. The *khuts*, *muqaddams* and *chaudharis* became powerful and defiant.

(d) Contumacious elements purchased weapons and war-material with the spurious token currency.¹⁵⁶

(e) Foreign merchants stopped bringing their wares to India, and imports received a serious setback. When the Sultan realized that his token currency had created a chaos, he withdrew it and offered to exchange all copper coins *by genuine gold and silver coins*.¹⁵⁷ Though the Sultan had vindicated the pledge that was implicit in the token currency, he was deeply annoyed at the failure of his project.

THE KHURASAN EXPEDITION

Barani informs us that Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq had raised an army of 370,000 soldiers for the conquest of Khurasan and Iraq. This project he counts among the Sultan's misdeeds and remarks that, deceived by the people of other lands, he lavishly squandered his resources. He could not conquer those lands while he weakened his control over his own territory.¹⁵⁸ The following features of the recruitment of this army are evident from Barani's narrative: (a) The total number of recruits reported by the *diwan-i arz* was 370,000 mounted soldiers. (b) The salaries were paid both in cash and in the form of *iqtas*. (c) An enormous amount was given for the careless purchase of equipment — arrows, horses, etc. (d) This army was paid

¹⁵⁵ *The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 129.

¹⁵⁶ *Firuz Shahi*, 475.

¹⁵⁷ Barani says that in exchange of that *muhr* (token coin), the Sultan gave gold and silver *tankas* and *sahganis* and *duganis* (*Firuz Shahi*, 476). This shows that the Sultan was, in fact, short of silver; otherwise he would not have given gold in exchange.

¹⁵⁸ *Firuz Shahi*, 476. Barani had no clear idea of the relative position of various Islamic countries. This is proved by the surprising errors he makes in Advice XVI of his *Fatawa-i Jahandari* (*Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 75-81.)

for one year, and it was thought that the 'booty' obtained would meet its expenditure in the following years; but the campaign could not be undertaken and there were no resources for maintaining it for the second year. And what was more, this army could not be kept busy in any military operation.

Barani does not mention the motives of the Sultan in planning this military venture, but it is difficult to believe that, despite his close contact with the Sultan, he was unaware of the circumstances in which the military preparations were undertaken. The following account of Amir Khurd gives a good idea of the way in which the Sultan tried to mobilize public opinion in favour of his project and also throws light on the mystic reactions to his plans:

'In those days when Sultan Muhammad (bin) Tughluq sent the people to Devagiri and was (also) anxious to conquer Turkistan and Khurasan and to overthrow the descendants of Chengiz Khan, he summoned all the elite and grandees of Delhi and the neighbourhood. A big tent (*bargah*) was pitched and a pulpit placed on which the Sultan was to sit in order to exhort the people to undertake a *jihad* against the *kuffar* (Mongols). So on that day he summoned Maulana Fakhruddin (Zarradi), Maulana Shamsuddin Yahya and Shaikh Nasiruddin Mahmud. Shaikh Qutbuddin Dabir, who was one of the sincere and devoted disciples of the Sultanul Mashaikh (Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya) and was a pupil of Maulana Fakhruddin Zarradi, wanted to conduct him (to the presence of the Sultan) before the others entered. But the Maulana, who was reluctant in meeting the Sultan, said several times: "I see my head rolling (in dust) before the palace (*serai*) of this fellow (the Sultan). I will not treat him gently and he will not spare my life."

However, when the Maulana approached the Sultan, Shaikh Qutbuddin Dabir carried his shoes behind him and, keeping them in his armpit, stood there (in the court) like a servant. The Sultan saw all this but did not say anything at the time. He began talking with Maulana Fakhruddin and said, "I want to overthrow the descendants of Chengiz Khan. You should cooperate with me in this work." The Maulana replied: "*Insha Allah* (God willing)!" The Sultan said: "This term indicates indecision." "This term is used for work to be done in future", replied the Maulana. The Sultan writhed in fury on hearing this reply of the Maulana and said: "Give me some advice so that I may act upon it." The Maulana replied: "Get rid of this anger." "Which anger?" asked the Sultan, "The anger of the beasts", the Maulana replied. The Sultan got infuriated at this reply and signs of resentment and anger became visible on his face. But he said nothing and ordered the midday meal to be served. The Maulana and

the Sultan began to partake of the food from the same dish. Maulana Fakhruddin Zarradi was so deeply annoyed at this that the Sultan also realized that he did not like taking food with him; and in order to add to his feelings of resentment, the Sultan kept on severing the meat from the bones and passing it on to the Maulana who (on his part) ate very little and very reluctantly. The meal being over, Maulana Shamsuddin Yahya and Shaikh Nasiruddin Mahmud were brought before the Sultan.¹⁵⁹

While the methods adopted by Muhammad bin Tughluq for the realization of his various projects were often offensive and hasty, their *raison d'être* was invariably sound. A few facts may, however, be noted in this connection. The word 'Khurasan' is often very loosely used and it is very difficult, therefore, to determine exactly the geographical area which Muhammad bin Tughluq had in mind.¹⁶⁰ Barani, however, tags the word Iraq also to Khurasan.¹⁶¹ Ferishta says that large number of princes and maliks, who had arrived in his court from Iraq and Khurasan, convinced him that the conquest of Iran and Turan would be an easy walk-over.¹⁶² There was a political vacuum in Central Asia and Persia in the period between the vanishing of the power of the Il Khans and the establishment of Timur's authority. Muhammad bin Tughluq wanted to take advantage of this situation in order to extend the area of his influence. His unbounded generosity to foreigners and his gifts to people resident in foreign lands were all intended to create a favourable climate for the execution of his plans. He entered into some alliances also for this purpose. A serious break in these alliances, however, made him change his mind. A large army such as he had recruited could not but raise the expectations of the people. The abandonment of the project and the consequent disbandment of the army created frustration, unemployment and disgust.

REBELLION OF SEHWAN

Since on his arrival at Sehwan in 734/1333, Ibn-i Battuta saw the bodies of the rebels nailed to the ramparts of the city, this rebellion must have taken place sometime during that year. Ratan, the Hindu governor of Sehwan, was put to death by Wunar and Qaisar-i Rumi, and all government property amounting to twelve lakhs was seized by them. Wunar became known as Malik Firuz and a large army was recruited by him, but he did not consider himself safe and fled

159 *Siyarul Auliya*, 271-73.

160 Ibn-i Battuta says: 'All foreigners in India are called Khurasanis.' *Rehla*, 60-61.

161 *Firuz Shahi*, 476.

162 *Ferishta*, I, 134.

away. The army then raised Qaisar-i Rumi as its leader. Imadul Mulk Sartez, the governor of Multan, crushed the rebellion and gibbeted the rebels.

THE QARACHIL EXPEDITION

The Qarachil region may safely be identified with the mid-Himalyan tract of Kulu in the Kangra district in the Kumaon-Garhwal area. Ibn-i Battuta says that the region was at a distance of 'ten days' journey from Delhi'.¹⁶³ Securing this region was part of a broader policy of the Sultan 'to complete the chain of fortifications in the North'. It appears from Ibn-i Battuta that Chinese encroachments on the independent Rajput kingdoms in the Himalayas had caused some concern to Muhammad bin Tughluq. They had built an idol temple at a strategic place and were planning extension of their authority in that area.

Barani's statement that the expedition was connected with the conquest of Khurasan cannot be accepted. 'The Sultan', he writes, 'thought that as the preliminaries to the conquest of Khurasan and Trans-Oxiana had been undertaken, and as the Qarachil mountain intervened and obstructed the shorter route from the countries of Hind and Sind, it should be brought under the control of the banner of Islam.'¹⁶⁴ Since the Himalayas did not obstruct the way to Khurasan, the statement is obviously meaningless. Ferishta, in his attempt to rectify Barani's error, made China the ultimate objective of Muhammad bin Tughluq's Qarachil expedition, but no earlier authority supports Ferishta's view.¹⁶⁵ Hajiud Dabir's suggestion that the Sultan wanted the Qarachil women for his *haram* is contradicted by all estimates of the Sultan's character. In fact, the motive of the Sultan was simply to secure frontier areas and to consolidate his position in a region of strategic importance by compelling the chiefs of the hilly area to recognize his overlordship. For this purpose he sent an army comprising of 10,000¹⁶⁶ soldiers under the command of his nephew (sister's son), Khusrau Malik.¹⁶⁷ He gave elaborate instructions as to how far the operations were to be extended and where the army had to stop. According to his instructions, military posts had to be established all along the route to ensure regular supply of provisions and to serve as places of refuge in case of retreat or mishap.

¹⁶³ *Rehla*, 98.

¹⁶⁴ *Firuz Shahi*, 477.

¹⁶⁵ *Ferishta*, I, 135.

¹⁶⁶ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 467; *Rehla*, 98.

¹⁶⁷ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 467.

Ibn-i Battuta gives the name of the commander as Malik Nukbia, *Rehla*, 98.

The army succeeded in occupying Jidya, and the Sultan sent a qazi and *khatib* as symbols of his decision to integrate the area with his territory. The Sultan warned the commander not to proceed beyond Jidya; but elated with his success, Khusrau Malik ignored the Sultan's instructions and marched ahead towards Tibet, unconsciously repeating the mistake committed earlier in the thirteenth century by Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khalji. Soon afterwards the rains set in and the army was overtaken by disease and panic. The hill people hurled huge blocks of stones and completely routed the forces of Delhi. According to Barani only ten persons survived;¹⁶⁸ according to Ibn-i Battuta only three soldiers¹⁶⁹ returned to tell the tale of their misfortune.

Though the Sultan cannot be blamed for the catastrophe that came in the wake of Khusrau Malik's misguided enthusiasm, he had to face the consequences. It led to tremendous waste of resources and to immeasurable discontent among the people. It would, however, be unfair to Muhammad bin Tughluq to think that the Qarachil expedition did not yield any positive political results. Ibn-i Battuta remarks: 'After this, the Sultan made peace with the inhabitants of the hills on condition that they should pay him a certain amount; since these people held possession of the territory lying at the foot of the hills, they were unable to use it without his permission.'¹⁷⁰ This is an aspect which has been ignored by both Barani and Isami. Ibn-i Battuta is corroborated by the author of *Masalikul Absar* who received the following information in Damascus: 'The people of the country of Qarachil are subject to this Sultan. They have from him protection and security on account of taxes, which are brought to him from them and are a source of wealth.'¹⁷¹

FAMINE, PLAGUE AND THE SUCCESSFUL REBELLION OF MA'ABAR

The first decade of Sultan Muhammad's reign was pre-eminently successful; his direct administration extended over an area more extensive than that of Alauddin Khalji and he succeeded in crushing all rebellions.

But then he had to face two forces quite beyond his power—famine and the bubonic plague.

¹⁶⁸ *Firuz Shahi*, 478.

¹⁶⁹ *Rehla*, 98. Ibn-i Battuta gives the names of two survivors—Nukbia and Badruddin Malik Daulat Shah. He had forgotten the name of the third person.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 98-99.

¹⁷¹ *Masalikul Absar*, Eng. tr., 13.

In examining Barani's account of the matter, we have to remember that though his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* is 'a remarkable feat of memory', the author had no books or records within his reach and, as Professor Habib has pointed out, 'he had nothing but his memory and his pen, ink and paper'.¹⁷² Also we have Barani's frank confession that he is not describing the events of Sultan Muhammad's reign in their historical sequence.¹⁷³

Barani's first paragraph on the famine is very incorrect and unfortunate. He writes: 'The first design that led to the destruction of the territory and the overthrow of the *ra'iiyyat* was this. It came to the Sultan's mind that the land tax of the Doab peasantry should be raised from one to ten and from one to twenty.'¹⁷⁴ He made stern regulations for enforcing this measure; the money realized broke the backs of the *ra'iiyyat*; the demands were so severe that weak and helpless peasants were completely crushed, while the richer *ra'iiyyat*, who had money and goods, became rebellious. The territory was ruined and cultivation was given up completely. Further, the *ra'iiyyat* of distant territories, fearing that they would be treated in the same way as the Doab peasantry, began to disobey and hid themselves in the forests. And on account of the dearth of cultivation in the Doab and the ruin of the Doab peasantry, the decline of *carawans* and the non-arrival of grain, there was a fatal famine in Delhi and its suburbs and the whole of the Doab. The price of grain rose. *The monsoon also failed.* There was total famine, which remained for some years. Many thousands and thousands of men died. Society was distressed. Most people lost all they had. *The country as well as the government of Sultan Muhammad became insipid and without glory from that time.*¹⁷⁵

Our historian's memory is obviously deceiving him. In order to bring a charge against his deceased patron, he tries to confuse the effect with the cause. The increase in the land tax of the Doab could not have led to failure of monsoon for several years; on the other hand, it is very likely that the famine left the Sultan no alternative but to demand that the peasant pay the state-share in grain or (in the alternative) its money equivalent in cash according to the market price of grain.

¹⁷² Professor Habib, *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 120.

¹⁷³ *Firuz Shahi*, 476.

¹⁷⁴ Since we are dealing with famine prices, it is useless discussing whether Barani's figures should be taken literally; even taken literally they are correct. *But the point is that the enhanced taxation was not the cause of famine, but its consequence.*

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 472-78.

After describing the defeat of Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan, Barani returns to his charge again, but his memory fails him when he writes as if the famine came immediately after Kishlu Khan's rebellion. The measures we have been discussing—the exodus to Daulatabad, the recruitment of an enormous army for the Khurasan expedition, the Qarachil campaign—could not have been undertaken during a famine. 'During the two¹⁷⁶ years (? six years, 1328-34)', he tells us, 'when the Sultan was at Delhi with his amirs, maliks and soldiers, while their women and children were at Devagiri, the territory of the Doab was ruined on account of severe demands and innumerable cesses. The Hindus set fire to their grain and burnt it; they also turned out their cattle from their houses. The Sultan ordered the *shiqdars* and *faujders* to extend their hands in plunder. Some *muqaddams* and *chaudharis* were killed, while others were blinded. Those who succeeded in escaping collected together and took refuge in the forests. Thus the territory was desolated. During these days the Sultan happened to go for hunting to Baran; he ordered the whole territory of Baran to be plundered and the heads of the Hindus to be brought and hanged from the towers of the Baran fort. . . The Sultan during these days took his army to plunder the Hindustanis and he plundered the territory from Kanauj to Dalmau; those who fell into the hands of the soldiers were killed, but most inhabitants fled away and hid themselves in the forests; the forests, however, were surrounded and those found in them were killed. In this way during this year¹⁷⁷ the land between Kanauj and Dalmau was desolated.'

Barani quite ignores the Sultan's objective in raising the land tax and waging a war with the Doab peasants for the possession of their grain. The matter is, however, clarified by Ibn-i Battuta, who seems to have reached Delhi in March 1334, probably the first year of severe famine in the Doab. 'When the famine became unbearable, the Sultan ordered provisions for six months to be distributed to all the people of Delhi. Accordingly the qazis, clerks and amirs used to go round the streets and shops. They would make a note of the inhabitants, and give to each provisions sufficient to last for six months at the rate of the daily allowance of one and half *maghrabi ratl* (i.e. 12 chataks of modern Indian weight) per day.¹⁷⁸ All this while I used to feed the people with victuals, which I caused to be prepared in Sultan Qutbuddin's sepulchre, as

176 'Two' seems to be a clerical error for 'six'.

177 It seems probable that the monsoon failed to reach the Doab in 1333.

178 Dr. Mehdi Hasan's calculation, *Rehla*, 85.

will be mentioned. The people were being thus relieved.¹⁷⁹ Ibn-i Battuta only tells us about the capital, but the Sultan's government must have organized some rough system of rationing for all cities till the cutting of the next kharif crop, and it had to get from the peasants the minimum of grain necessary for the purpose.

Barani and Ibn-i Battuta agree in stating that the Sultan was at Kanauj when he heard that Saiyyid Ahsan Shah, governor of Ma'abar, had rebelled, and that he had put seven or eight loyal amirs to the sword and had been joined by the army, which had conquered Ma'abar. The Sultan's hand had fallen very heavily on the earlier rebels, but Saiyyid Ahsan Shah, whose capital, according to Ibn-i Battuta, was six months' march from Delhi, calculated that the long distance and the weakening of the central government owing to a severe famine, which seems to have covered the Doab, Malwa and East Punjab, gave him a chance. His son, Ibrahim *Kharetadar*, was in the imperial service and was sure to be punished, but he preferred to take the risk. The Sultan returned from Kanauj to Delhi, equipped his army in about eight days and started for Ma'abar. Saiyyid Ibrahim *Kharetadar*, who was then governor of Hansi and Sarsati, was arrested immediately with his relations, and when the Sultan returned from the South, he was put to death on the charge of treason.¹⁸⁰ Meanwhile the wazir, Khwaja-i Jahan Ahmad Ayaz, had reached Dhar, but here he discovered that his nephew along with two or three amirs had conspired to kill him and to fly with his property to Ma'abar. Ahmad Ayaz discovered the conspiracy through one of their confidants, Malik Nusrat Hajib, seized the conspirators and sent them to Delhi. The Sultan ordered the amirs to be killed by elephants. But he sent Ahmad Ayaz's nephew to be put to death by Ayaz himself and this was done.¹⁸¹ Ahmad Ayaz was then ordered to return to Delhi and take charge of the central government.

The Sultan reached Daulatabad and stayed there for a month or two. He then proceeded to Bidar in Telingana. According to Barani the Sultan appointed harsh agents and officers to collect whatever they could from the land of the Marathas. *But a severe outbreak of plague while the Sultan was at Bidar frustrated all his future plans.* 'At that time', says Ibn-i Battuta, *the plague broke out in his army, the bulk of which perished.* The slaves and soldiers (*abd wa mamluk*) and the

179 Mehdi Hasan, *Rehla*, 117. Ibn-i Battuta is obviously incorrect in stating that the famine broke out after the Sultan had left for Ma'abar; Barani says that the famine became more severe after the Sultan had marched four stages. Isami is silent about the famine.

180 *Ibid.*, 103-4.

181 *Ibid.*, 99.

principal amirs, such as Daulat Shah whom the Sultan used to address as "uncle" and Amir Abdullah of Herat, died.¹⁸² Ibn-i Battuta was not present with the Sultan's army, but he has described this well-known epidemic—the oriental or bubonic plague—elsewhere. 'When I reached Madura, I found that an epidemic was raging there and that the people afflicted with it died in no time. Whoever caught the infection died on the morrow or the day after, and if not on the third day then on the fourth... Wherever I went I saw people either diseased or dead.'¹⁸³ Isami, who talks poetically in terms of a poisonous wind (*simum*), due to the evil acts of the Sultan, declares that '*out of the army-officers of Delhi one half died, more or less, and that the army which the Sultan brought back to Delhi had been reduced by the plague ("waba") to less than a third.*'¹⁸⁴

The Sultan himself fell a victim to the plague. As is well-known for all early victims the plague used to be fatal, but with the passage of time the poison of the bacteria became less effective and people began to recover. The Sultan was probably among these fortunate later victims. He got into a litter and, though expecting the pangs of death (*naza*), started for Daulatabad. In the way a messenger from Qutlugh Khan informed him that Hoshang, son of Kamaluddin Gurg, had rebelled and found refuge with a Hindu chief of Konkan. But neither the Sultan nor Hoshang were prepared to drag matters to extremes, though Hoshang's Hindu host was prepared to die for him.

The Sultan, when leaving Warangal, put Malik Maqbul in charge of that territory. On reaching Devagiri, he assigned Bidar and the territories subject to it to Shihab-i Sultani Nusrat Khan on a farm or contract of one hundred lakhs of *tankas* (a year). The government of Devagiri and Maharashtra was assigned to Qutlugh Khan, who was authorized to convey the Sultan's pardon to Hoshang, and the Sultan was pleased when Hoshang came to see him at Delhi. A general permission was given to the former citizens of Delhi to return to the capital and two or three *carawans* started for Delhi, but people who had accommodated themselves to Maharashtra were allowed to remain there.¹⁸⁵

'When the Sultan saw the misfortune that had befallen the army,' Ibn-i Battuta observes, 'he returned to Daulatabad, since rebellion had been ripe in the provinces and anarchy reigned in different parts, and *the sceptre would have fallen from his hands had it had not been*

182 *Ibid.*, 101.

183 *Ibid.*, 230.

184 Isami (Madras edition), 469-71.

185 *Rehla*, 101-2; Barani, 480-81; Isami, 449-52.

decreed by Destiny that his power would continue. On his way back to Daulatabad the Sultan fell ill; the people spread rumours of his death far and wide and this gave rise to widespread disturbances.¹⁸⁶

Ibn-i Battuta's impression that the Sultan's government was no longer based on real military strength is correct. The invincible central army of the empire, which the Tughluqs had inherited from the Khaljis, was so weakened by the loss of lives in the plague that it became ineffective as an instrument of the central authority for several years, and in spite of Muhammad bin Tughluq's efforts, it never reached its former standard of efficiency and invincibility. The Sultan undertook no distant campaign for a decade, and the army that marched with him to Gujarat in 1345 was but the ghost of its former self.

The fact that the Sultan had not under his personal and immediate command an army that could control the empire and knock down enemies on the frontier created a curious situation with respect to rebels. If a district officer rebelled, the regional or provincial officer could suppress him. But if a provincial officer rebelled during this decade (1334-45), the Sultan was just helpless. He could not take up the challenge and the rebel, whether a Hindu chief or a Muslim officer, became an independent ruler. The larger number of rebellions after 1334 were no doubt inspired by the known weakness of the central army. The idea of an all-India administration had to be given up altogether, and the Sultan correctly calculated that his army was too weak to challenge Alauddin Bahman Shah after his accession in 1347. It was probably after the plague of 1334 and his known military weakness that two existing features were greatly accentuated: The Sultan began to punish both the guilty and the innocent on mere suspicion in the hope that bloodshed on a large scale would terrorize his officers and make them obedient; on the other hand, his officers, knowing his military weakness, preferred rebellion to punishment without trial. This is the main military theme of the seventeen later years of the reign.

While the Sultan was dealing with the situation in Maharashtra, a crisis developed in Lahore. Hulajun, one of those Mongol chiefs who had been taken into the imperial service by Muhammad bin Tughluq, killed the governor of Lahore, Malik Tatar, and assumed independence. Khwaja-i Jahan marched from Delhi and defeated the rebel, who fled from Lahore.

The Sultan though still ill (according to Barani) proceeded from Devagiri to Delhi but stopped for a few days at Dhar. There was an acute famine in Malwa also; in Delhi the price of grain rose to 16 and

¹⁸⁶ *Rehla*, 101.

17 *jitals* a *sir*. But Barani's statement that this year also there could be no cultivation owing to lack of rain is not quite correct. Ibn-i Battuta, who to start with had been treated as a very distinguished guest, could get no proper interview with the Sultan till after his return from Devagiri after an absence of two and a half years. 'It was in these days', Ibn-i Battuta tells us, 'that I reached the Sultan's camp. The territories on the western (? southern) bank of the Ganges, where the Sultan was encamped were severely affected by the famine while those lying on the eastern (? northern) bank were prosperous.' Obviously, it had rained fairly well in Awadh but not in the Doab. 'The governor of the territories of the eastern (? northern) bank was Ainul Mulk bin Mahru, and these territories included Awadh, Zafraabad, Lucknow and others. Ainul Mulk used to send every day fifty thousand *mans* of wheat, rice and grain and also fodder for the animals.'

Barani, in effect, accepts the accuracy of Ibn-i Battuta's statement when he says that the Sultan allowed the citizens to migrate with their families to Hindustan (? Awadh) to escape the famine. 'Sultan Muhammad also came out of the capital and passing Patiali and Kampila encamped with his troops before the town of Khud by the side of the Ganges. The men built their thatched houses facing the cultivated lands. This encampment was named Sargdwari (Gate of Heaven); grain could come here from Kara and Awadh and was cheaper than in Delhi. While the Sultan was encamped at Sargdwari, Malik Ainul Mulk Mahru held the *iqtas* of Awadh and Zafraabad. Ainul Mulk and his brothers sent to the Sultan at Delhi and Sargdwari cash, commodities, cloth and grain to the value of seventy or eighty lakhs of *tankas*; the Sultan's trust in Ainul Mulk increased and he was convinced of Ainul Mulk's efficiency.'¹⁸⁷

According to Ibn-i Battuta, the Sultan had to stay at Sargdwari for about two and a half years and he had spent an equal time in the futile attempt to reach Ma'abar. It is necessary to examine what the Sultan had suffered in power and prestige during these five terrible years. There had been plague but not famine in the Deccan, but the home provinces of the empire—Doab, East Punjab, Malwa, but probably not Awadh—had been hit severely by the continued drought and it would take a wise minister, if the Sultan could find one, seven or eight years to restore agriculture to normal conditions. The 'bulk' of the invincible army of Delhi—one-half of the officers and two-thirds of the men—had perished in the plague. It has to be borne in mind that the army which almost perished in the plague was the

army of the central government; the civil and military officers stationed in the provinces—often referred to as the *sadah* amirs—do not seem to have suffered.

REVOLUTIONS IN BENGAL

'Bahram Khan (the King's step-brother) died in Sonargaon (Dacca); and in 739/1338-39 Malik Fakhruddin, the *silahdar* (weapon-keeper) of Bahram Khan, rebelled and declared that he was an independent ruler and took the title of Sultan Fakhruddin. Malik Pindar Khalji Qadr Khan, governor of Lakhnauti, along with Malik Husamuddin Abu Raja, the *mustaufi-i mamalik* (auditor-general), Azam Malik Izzuddin Yahya, the *muqta* of Satgaon (Chittagong), and Firuz Khan, son of Nusrat Khan, the *amir-i koh*, marched to Sonargaon to suppress Fakhruddin's rebellion. Fakhruddin came out with his army to fight them; there was a battle, Fakhruddin was defeated and fled and his elephants and horses fell into the hands of the imperialists.

'The other amirs returned to their *iqtas* but Qadr Khan remained in Sonargaon. When the monsoon set in, most horses of the army of Qadr Khan died. But he had collected a lot of money in the form of silver *tankas*. After every two or three months he would come to the palace (*serai*) and collect them in a heap and say, "In this way I will place them before the royal court (*dakhul*); the more I collect the better will be my service." Malik Husamuddin warned him against the danger of collecting large sums of cash in a distant province: "People will be tempted; short-sighted persons will want to know the reason why this money is not sent to the capital; all revenue collected is safest in the treasury of the king." But Qadr Khan would not hear; he neither paid their salary to the soldiers nor sent the revenue to the royal treasury. Then Fakhruddin attacked and Qadr Khan's unpaid army joined him. Qadr Khan was killed; Fakhruddin established himself in Sonargaon and put Lakhnauti in charge of his slave, Mukhlis.

'Ali Mubarak, the *ariz* of the army of Qadr Khan, seized Lakhnauti and put Mukhlis to death. But he adopted none of the insignia of royalty and petitioned to the court: "I have captured Lakhnauti; if an officer from the capital is appointed to take charge of it, I will return to the capital." Sultan Muhammad agreed; he gave the title of khan to Yusuf, the *shahna* of Delhi, and decided to send him there. But Yusuf died; the Sultan could not attend to the matter and sent no one to Lakhnauti.

'Owing to the opposition of Fakhruddin, Ali Mubarak had no alternative but to declare that he was a king and assume the title

of Sultan Alauddin. After some days Malik Haji Ilyas, who had an army and plenty of followers, conspired with some maliks, amirs and the people of Lakhnauti; he put Alauddin to death and mounted the throne with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin. In 741/1340-41 Haji Ilyas marched against Sonargaon; he succeeded in capturing Fakhr-uddin, brought him to Lakhnauti and put him to death. Thereafter for a long time Lakhnauti remained in the hands of Shamsuddin and his descendants; it did not come within the control of the Delhi sultans again.¹⁸⁸

It is impossible to believe that Sultan Muhammad failed to attend to the Bengal problem owing to an oversight. Qadr Khan may have been harbouring treasonable designs, but Ali Mubarak was certainly loyal. But the Sultan lacked both the men and the resources which an officer of his would need for establishing himself in the province; consequently, in view of troubles nearer home, he could do nothing about the matter and Bengal slipped out of his grasp.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT HINDU PRINCIPALITIES IN SOUTHERN INDIA

We can form some idea of the military and financial weakness to which the sultanat had been reduced by the famine and the plague from the fact that the Sultan made no effort to maintain his power over two principalities which he had annexed after a terrible cost of money and blood.

(a) *Vijayanagar*:

When the Sultan retreated with his plague-stricken army to the famine-stricken North, it was obvious that he would be unable to control the Far South. In 1336 Hari Har and his brother, Bukka, founded a Hindu principality south of the river Krishna, which gradually expanded into the Vijayanagar empire.

(b) *Warangal*:

The Sultan had decided to annex Warangal after the second invasion. Now (*circa* 1335) Warangal was lost and he could do nothing about it. 'While the Sultan was at Delhi (and before he went to Sargdwari),' Barani tells us, 'the rebellion of the Hindus at Warangal took place; Kanhya Naik attained to power in the region; Malik Maqbul, the governor of Warangal, took the road to Delhi and reached

¹⁸⁸ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 104-6. Yahya Sirhindi does not quote his authority, but he gives us the best account of the revolutions in Bengal, which we can at present find.

there safely; the power of Hindus was established at Warangal and the region was totally lost.'

KAMPILA

'About the same time a relation of Kanhya (who had been converted to Islam) was sent by the Sultan to Kampila. This wretch apostatized from Islam, went back to Hinduism and raised the banner of revolt. Kampila was also lost and came into the hands of the Hindus.'¹⁸⁹

And this was the end of Sultan Muhammad's dream of an all-India administrative system. Apart from the homelands of the empire, as Barani points out, 'only Gujarat and Devagiri remained in his hands'.

THE NAGARKOT CAMPAIGN

No detailed account of Muhammad bin Tughluq's Nagarkot campaign in the Kangra district is found in any early authority, but that the Sultan personally undertook this campaign is clear from certain stray remarks and references found in the works of Barani¹⁹⁰ and Afif.¹⁹¹ Badr-i Chach gives some verses under the caption of *Fath-i Qila-i Nagarkot* and mentions 738/1337 as the date of conquest. The campaign cannot be identified with the Qarachil expedition, as Sir Wolseley Haig has done for the simple reason that, unlike the Qarachil expedition, this campaign was led by the Sultan in person. But it certainly formed part of the Sultan's larger programme of securing frontier outposts. Perhaps it was the Qarachil disaster that induced him to assume the command in person. He displayed great religious tolerance on this occasion and, according to the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*, spared the temple of Jwalamukhi.¹⁹²

REBELLIONS

In spite of the famine, the Sultan had to face a number of rebellions.

Rebellion of Mas'ud Khan:

Mas'ud Khan was the Sultan's step-brother; his mother was a daughter of Sultan Alauddin Khalji. 'He was the most handsome of all the men that I have seen in the world',¹⁹³ Ibn-i Battuta remarks.

¹⁸⁹ *Firuz Shahi*, 484.

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, (Barani), 483.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*, (Afif), 185-89.

¹⁹² *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*, f. 40.

¹⁹³ *Rehla*, 85.

The Sultan had stoned his mother to death on the charge of adultery and this naturally created a deep resentment in the heart of Mas'ud. Two years after this Mas'ud was charged with contemplating rebellion. He was so afraid of the torture inflicted in order to extort confessions that he accepted the charge outright and was executed in the centre of the market. His body remained there for three days.¹⁹⁴

Rebellion at Sunam and Samana :

This was in the nature of a peasant revolt. The cultivators refused to pay the land tax and shut themselves up in their *mandals*. The Sultan marched against the rebels in person, captured their leaders and brought them to Delhi.

Rebellion of Nizam Ma'in at Kara :

In 739/1338 Nizam Ma'in rebelled at Kara. He had undertaken to farm the revenue of Kara for several lakhs of *tankas*, but could not pay even one-tenth of the amount he had promised. He assumed the title of Sultan Alauddin and declared his independence. Ainul Mulk, the governor of Awadh and Zafrabad, and his brother Shahrullah, marched against him. Ma'in was flayed alive and his stuffed skin was sent to Delhi.¹⁹⁵ The *iqta* of Kara was assigned to the husband of the Sultan's sister, Shaikhzada Bustami.¹⁹⁶

Rebellion of Shihab Sultani at Bidar :

In 740/1338-9 Tajul Mulk Nusrat Khan, also known as Shihab Sultani, rebelled at Bidar. He had been assigned Bidar about 1334 and had to pay a crore of *tankas* to the centre. He failed to pay the fixed amount of revenue and also could not promote agriculture as he had promised. He rose in rebellion as he thought that his failure would lead to his condign punishment by the Sultan. Qutlugh Khan marched against him and captured him.

Rebellion of Ali Shah Nathu at Gulbarga

This rebellion took place some time after the rebellion of Shihab Sultani. Ali Adil Shah Nathu was a nephew of Zafar Khan, the famous general of Alauddin Khalji. Having been appointed to collect the taxes, he killed Bhiran, the Hindu *maqta* of Gulbarga, and established his hold over Gulbarga and Bidar. Qutlugh Khan marched against him, defeated him and sent him to Delhi. The Sultan exiled

¹⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 86.

¹⁹⁵ *Firuz Shahi*, 487. Yabya Sirhindi gives the name of his brother.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 487-88.

him and his brothers to Ghazni, but when they returned without his permission, he ordered them to be executed.

Rebellion of Ainul Mulk Mahru :

Ainul Mulk, son of Amir Mahru, was a close friend and associate¹⁹⁷ of Muhammad bin Tughluq, who appointed him governor of Awadh and Zafrabad.¹⁹⁸ During the days of the Doab famine he did excellent work in his *iqta*. With the help of his brothers, he dealt with the recalcitrant elements and established peaceful and prosperous conditions in his *iqtas*. In 1338 he suppressed the rebellion of Nizam Ma'in at Kara. When the Sultan was at Sargdwari, Ainul Mulk and his brothers worked hard to help the Sultan in his relief programmes. He used to send 50,000 *mans* of wheat and rice every day to the imperial camp.¹⁹⁹ Besides, he sent 70 to 80 lakhs of *tankas* in cash and commodities to the Sultan at Delhi and Sargdwari, as already mentioned.²⁰⁰

These achievements of Ainul Mulk and his hold over the people made the Sultan suspicious of him. This suspicion was further confirmed by the fact that during the famine, when the Sultan had forbidden emigration, many nobles, officers and others, particularly the secretariat staff (*nawisandas*), went to Awadh and Zafrabad and found shelter with Ainul Mulk. Some of these persons were involved in cases of embezzlement. Ainul Mulk and his brothers treated them with kindness and even assigned villages to them.²⁰¹

The Sultan thought of transferring Ainul Mulk to Daulatabad, which needed a statesman and administrator of Ainul Mulk's stature and insight. Qutlugh Khan had proved himself unequal to the task. Ainul Mulk, however, interpreted this transfer as a device for reducing his influence and his ultimate destruction. The emigrant nobles and *nawisandas* convinced Ainul Mulk that the Sultan was not sincere in sending him to the Deccan and that he was playing a treacherous game.²⁰²

One day Muhammad bin Tughluq sent a message to Ainul Mulk, which explained to him the inexpediency of sheltering these men and ordered their immediate despatch in chains to Delhi. Ainul Mulk's

¹⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 489.

¹⁹⁸ Zafrabad is mentioned in the *A'in-i Akbari* as a pargana in the sarkar of Jaunpur. It was probably founded by Zafar Khan during the reign of Alauddin Khalji.

¹⁹⁹ *Rehla*, 105.

²⁰⁰ *Firuz Shahi*, 486.

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 486.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 486.

suspicious were further confirmed, and he began to plan his escape with his brothers. One night he left the Sargdwari camp and proceeded to join his brother, who had seized the entire baggage of the Sultan, which was in his charge.²⁰³ The news of this escape was reported to Muhammad bin Tughluq by a slave, Ibn-i Malik Shah, who used to live with Ainul Mulk.²⁰⁴

The Sultan, who was in the Doab at that time, found himself in a very critical position. He could not concentrate his forces to suppress the rebellion at such a distance from the capital. So he thought of going back to the capital and then coming again with sufficient men and material. But the foreign amirs, who were bitterly hostile to Ainul Mulk, the leader of the Indian amirs, advised the Sultan to take prompt action. Nasiruddin Auhari suggested that an immediate attack would prevent Ainul Mulk from organizing his forces. His advice disappointed the native amirs who, in their heart of hearts, were sympathetically inclined towards Ainul Mulk.²⁰⁵ Muhammad bin Tughluq called his troops from Samana, Amroha, Baran, Koil and other towns, and resorted to a strange stratagem to overawe the enemy. If one hundred men came to the royal camp from outside, one thousand men went out to receive them and thus they created the impression that large imperial reinforcements were pouring in from all sides. The Sultan hurriedly proceeded towards Kanauj and entrenched himself in the fort, thus securing a strategic position.

Ainul Mulk and his brothers crossed the Ganges below Bangarmau;²⁰⁶ they wanted to raid the camp of the Sultan, but by mistake they reached the camp of the wazir. The wazir's force consisted of elements deadly opposed to the Indian amirs. The Persians, Turks and Khurasanis, who constituted the wazir's troops, fought well and Ainul Mulk's forces fled away from the field.²⁰⁷ One of Ainul Mulk's principal associates, Malik Ibrahim Banji, betrayed him; and pulling him down from his horse by catching hold of his locks of hair, took him to the wazir. Ainul Mulk's brothers were either drowned while attempting to cross the river or were killed in the battle.²⁰⁸

²⁰³ *Ibid.*, 489.

²⁰⁴ *Rehla*, 105. Ibn-i Battuta further informs us: 'It is the habit of the emperor of India to keep with every amir, be he great or small, one of his slaves who acts as a spy on the amir and informs the emperor about everything concerning him.'

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 105-6.

²⁰⁶ Bangarmau lies in the centre of the pargana of the same name at a distance of 31 miles N.W. of Unao on the road leading from that place to Hardoi.

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 107.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 108-9.

Ainul Mulk was subjected to many indignities. He was asked to ride on an ox.²⁰⁹ His body was naked, except for a small cloth hiding his private parts. The sons of maliks and amirs spat on his face and scolded and abused him.²¹⁰ When he was brought before Muhammad bin Tughluq in that condition, the Sultan was deeply moved and ordered him to be given ordinary clothes. Ainul Mulk's hands were tied to his neck and chains were put on his legs. Some sixty-two of his companions were ruthlessly trampled by elephants and their flesh was thrown at Ainul Mulk. After crushing his rebellion, the Sultan went on a pilgrimage to the shrine of Salar Mas'ud Ghazi and from there he returned to Delhi.

Ainul Mulk was pardoned on the fourth day after his defeat and was appointed superintendent of a royal garden. He was given a *khilat* (robe of honour) and a horse. His ration was supplied from the royal godown. Afif's account about the rehabilitation of Ainul Mulk is as follows :

'The Sultan held a public court, and a small carpet was placed next to the throne. He summoned to this court all qazis, *ulama*, shaikhs, khans, maliks, nobles and the general public from all directions. When after a short time the well-wishers of the court had assembled, rubbed their foreheads on the ground in humble submission and stood up with all reverence in their respective positions, Sultan Muhammad commanded the courtiers to come nearer. When they had done so, he said, "I put to you a question : If a man should lose a priceless gem and after some time find it lying in dirt, should he pick it up or leave it there?" The nobles and officers of the empire replied : "It should be picked up. It would not be wise to leave it there." On hearing this answer the Sultan pointed towards Ainul Mulk and remarked, "That gem of mine is Ainul Mulk, who had the misfortune to be found among his slovenly brothers. I picked him up and have found in him my gem." It was commanded that Ainul Mulk be seated on the carpet referred to above.'²¹¹

Ainul Mulk is not heard of during the remaining years of Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign, but when the Sultan breathed his last at Thatta, we find him in Multan. Shihab-i Sultani had also been put in charge of a garden.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 108. Yahya Sirhindi says: 'Bereft of head dress, he was placed on an ass by Ibrahim Bangi and taken to the Sultan.'

²¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 108.

²¹¹ Afif, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 408.

Rebellion of Shahu Afghan:

In 742/1341 Shahu Afghan killed Bahzad, the governor of Multan, and declared his independence. Muhammad bin Tughluq set off from Delhi to deal with him. On the way he heard about the death of his mother, Makhduma-i Jahan, but despite his grief and bereavement, he continued his march. Near Dipalpur he came to know that Shahu had fled to the 'home of the Afghans'—explained by Ibn-i Battuta as Cambay, Gujarat and Nahrwala where the Afghans lived. It was not the Sultan's policy to tolerate rebels. He issued orders for the wholesale arrest of Afghans in his territory.

THE KHILAFAT AS A PROTECTING GLACIS

In the later years of the famine (*circa* 1339) Muhammad bin Tughluq evinced a keen and excessive interest in the institution of the khilafat. According to Barani,²¹² he made persistent enquiries about the Khalifa and the position of the khilafat after the fall of Baghdad; and when he came to know about the Egyptian Khalifa, he was so delighted that he would have sent his whole wealth to the Khalifa but for the danger of bandits and pirates on the way. Was this respect for the khilafat genuine or was it simply a subterfuge to disarm the hostility of the Muslim masses, particularly of the religious sections, through the immense moral prestige of the khilafat on the Muslim mind? *And was there such a prestige?* It seems highly improbable, if not impossible, that despite his close diplomatic and cultural contacts with the outside world, the Sultan did not know for decades that there was an Abbasid Khalifa in Egypt. Perhaps this alleged discovery of the Khalifa was just an explanation for the delayed expression of his faith in the khilafat. However, it is significant that the period of the Sultan's pedantic display of faith in the khilafat as the only source of moral and legal authority synchronizes with the period of great stress and strain in his empire and the problems created by the opposition of the religious classes. From 741/1340-41 to 752/1351 his time and energy were spent in dealing with rebellions that grew like dragon's teeth in every direction. He thought that perhaps by the use of the Khalifa's name, he could rehabilitate himself in the confidence of the people.

The anonymous author of the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*²¹³ says that his extensive study of books had led him to believe that the sanction of the Khalifa was absolutely necessary for the rightful exercise of political power. The *Tarikh-i Alfi*, however, informs us that it was the

212 *Ibid.*, 491 *et seq.*

213 *Sirat*, Ms., f. 139.

Sultan's teacher, Qutlugh Khan, who had impressed this fact on his mind. But that the absolute necessity of the Khalifa's sanction for the legal exercise of his political authority should dawn on him at a particular time—this could not have been a mere coincidence. It was the last weapon in his armoury which he could use against the rebel-crowd and Badr-i Chach very significantly remarks that the receipt of the *manshur* from the Khalifa unnerved his enemies.²¹⁴

Muhammad bin Tughluq removed his own name from the coins²¹⁵ in 741/1340-41 as 'he was tormented by doubts regarding the legality of his sovereignty, which had never been recognized by a khalifa.' On the coins issued in A.H. 742, 743 and 744 the name of Mustakfi Billah appears.²¹⁶ This was nothing more than a mere affirmation of loyalty to a symbol, for Mustakfi Billah had expired in 740/1339-40. Subsequently, he stopped the Friday and the Id prayers, and did not start them again until the Khalifa had granted an investiture to him. . . This *manshur* was received in 744/1343 from Al-Hakim II and the event was celebrated with great pomp and eclat. Barani,²¹⁷ Ibn-i Battuta²¹⁸ and Badr-i Chach²¹⁹ are all unanimous in stating that the Sultan showed great respect to the emissaries of the Khalifa. According to *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* the *manshurs* were received thereafter by the Sultan every year. Maybe, the mysterious coins of the Sultan containing numerals (like 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8) on the reverse indicate the length of his association with the khilafat—the period of the legal existence of his sultanat—or the receipt of yearly *manshurs*.

THE SULTAN'S ATTEMPT AT REHABILITATING AGRICULTURE

We have still to consider one of the most far-sighted programmes of the Sultan, which unfortunately collapsed. He gave considerable thought to the problem of agrarian distress and the short-fall in agriculture after the famine years. Barani tells us that during the four years (1340-43) when the Sultan was at Delhi, his main attempt was to restore agriculture to normal conditions. But in his attempt to find fault with the Sultan's work, Barani makes some errors and does not describe the real conditions. Medieval peasants were aware that barren

²¹⁴ *Qasa'id-i Badr Chach*, 14.

²¹⁵ Nelson Wright, *The Coinage*, 122, coin no. 491A.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 148-49, coins no. 617B, 620A, 621, 622, 622A, 623F.

²¹⁷ *Firuz Shahi*, 492. According to Barani he kissed the feet of Sa'id Sarsari, who had brought the *manshur* and the robe of honour for him.

²¹⁸ *Rehla*, 72 *et seq.*

²¹⁹ *Qasa'id-i Badr Chach*, 14.

or *usar* land cannot be brought under the plough; they were also aware that *banjar* or semi-barren land will not grow crops except after enormous labour and cost. Barani is, therefore, wrong in attributing to the Sultan the desire that 'not even a hand-breadth of land should remain uncultivated'. Secondly, there was no scarcity of cultivable land; we may also assume that the peasants who survived were enough for the purpose. But what they needed was seed, cattle, ploughs—in fact, all things necessary for medieval agriculture. The Sultan provided these things to the cultivators at the beginning.

Ibn-i Battuta informs us: 'During the years of famine the Sultan had ordered the digging of wells outside the capital city and the cultivation of crops there. For this purpose *he had provided the people with seeds as well as the requisite sum of money*. And he made them undertake this cultivation with the object of enriching the granary.'²²⁰ This was a sort of experiment in *state-farming*. It appears that the Sultan did not succeed in it and resorted to the other alternative of *contract-cultivation*. Whether the Sultan was well-advised in entrusting this work to contractors, instead of persons in his permanent service, may be doubted; but in directing the peasant to sow his crops according to state-orders in preference to his personal choice, the Sultan had probably the general needs of the country in view.

With these warnings in mind, we can proceed to quote Barani's partially correct passage:

'The first object to which the Sultan applied himself during the years he did not go from Delhi to any place was the improvement of agriculture and the growth of cultivation. The Sultan made regulations (*asalib*) for the improvement of agriculture; whatever came to the Sultan's mind for this object was written down and called a "regulation". If these imaginary regulations could have been implemented, and they had not appeared impossible to the people, the world would have been full of good things owing to agricultural production; enormous treasures would have been collected and an army strong enough to conquer the inhabited world could have been enlisted.

'A department, called *diwan-i amir-i koh*, was organized to promote agriculture and officers to it were appointed. The country was divided into imaginary rectangles (*daira*) of thirty *karohs* by thirty *karohs* on two conditions—not a handful of land in all these *karohs* was to be left uncultivated and every crop was to be changed; thus wheat was to be grown instead of barley, sugar-cane instead of

wheat, and grapes and dates instead of sugar-cane. About a hundred *shiqdars* were to be appointed (to these imaginary rectangles). Greedy men, men in distress and reckless adventurers came and undertook within three years to bring under cultivation three hundred thousand *bighas* of barren land (*zamin-i akhal*) and to provide three thousand horses (?) from the barren land. They gave written deeds to this effect. To this reckless group, which undertook to cultivate barren land, various awards were given—caparisoned horses, cloaks of brocade and cash. Out of a loan (*sondhar*) of three lakhs of *tankas* promised to each of them, every one got fifty thousand *tankas* in immediate cash. The money they got seemed the price of their blood. Since the barren land could not be cultivated, they spent the money for their own needs and then waited for punishment. In the course of two years over seventy lakhs of *tankas* were advanced as loans by the treasury to people who had undertaken to cultivate barren land. In the course of three years they could not bring under cultivation a hundredth or even a thousandth part of the barren land assigned to them. Had the Sultan returned alive from Thatta, not one of these contractors and loan-mongers would have been spared.²²¹

REVOLT OF THE 'SADAH' AMIRS AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE BAHMANI KINGDOM

The energies of the Sultan in the closing years of his reign were directed towards dealing with the revolts of the *sadah* amirs (*amiran-i sadah*), who had charged the entire atmosphere from Cambay to Daulatabad with sedition and rebellion. These rebellions ultimately paved the way for the emergence of the independent Bahmani kingdom.

A word about the position of the *sadah* amirs is necessary in order to bring out clearly their role in the history of the period. The term was originally related to the army structure of the Turks and the Mongols, which was planned on the decimal system.²²² Barani quotes Bughra Khan's advice to Kaiqubad in which a reference is made to the decimal system as the basis of the army organization.²²³ All references to the *sadah* amirs during the early Turkish period concern the Mongols. Kaiqubad and Jalaluddin Khalji are reported to

²²¹ *Firuz Shahi*, 497-99.

²²² Al-Qalqashandi writes about Muhammad bin Tughluq, 'The officers of his army are the khans, maliks, amirs, sipah-salars and then the ranks... The khan has ten thousand horsemen, the malik one thousand, the amir one hundred, and the sipah-salar less than that.' *Subhul A'sha (An Arab Account of India in the 14th Century)*, 66-67).

²²³ *Firuz Shahi*, 145.

have executed some Mongol *sadah* amirs.²²⁴ Perhaps the institution had a Mongol origin, but it developed its own features in India; its exclusive military connotation was extended to embrace civil and administrative functions also. 'The question arises', writes Dr. Ishwari Prasad, 'whether these *amirs* were captains of 100 men as is frequently suggested or officers placed in charge of 100 villages. From the word *sadi* it appears probable that each *amir* was placed in charge of 100 villages, though a careful examination of Barani's text as a whole leads to the conclusion that these men were officers who combined civil and military functions and each had one hundred men under his command.'²²⁵ While no specific evidence about the number of soldiers placed under a *sadah* amir is available, the view that these officers exercised civil functions also is confirmed very clearly by Hajiud Dabir. According to him the *sadah* amirs were appointed in the Doab 'over the tax-collectors (*ummāl*)'.²²⁶

The hostility of the *sadah* amirs was deepened by the Sultan's new plan for administering the Deccan. The bright idea was to divide the Deccan into four units in charge of Malik Sardawatdar, Malik Mukhlisul Mulk, Yusuf Bughra and Aziz Khammar. These four officers were to work under a wazir established at Daulatabad. Imadul Mulk Sartez was to be the wazir and a Hindu, Dhara, was to be the naib wazir for the Deccan. But only two items of the new programme could be put into operation.

(a) *Recall of Qutlugh Khan from Daulatabad.* Some historians, like the author of the *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, give a very good certificate to Qutlugh Khan for his work in the Deccan, but Barani very explicitly says that under him the resources of the Deccan had considerably fallen and that he was unequal to the problems of that region. The Sultan recalled him and, probably because Imadul Mulk Sartez was not immediately available, he sent Qutlugh's brother, Nizamuddin, also known as Alimul Mulk,²²⁷ in his place. Since Qutlugh Khan had the reputation of protecting persons against the Sultan's wrath, the *sadah* amirs resented this change and interpreted it as a prelude to punitive action against them. But it is doubtful whether the transfer of a high officer alone would have led to their rebellion, if the Sultan's determination to punish them had not become a stark and visible reality.

(b) *Appointment of Aziz Khammar.* The Sultan sent Aziz Khammar as governor to Malwa and bestowed several lakhs of *tankas* on

²²⁴ *Qir'anus Sa'datn*, Aligarh ed., Introduction, 18; *Firuz Shahi*, 219.

²²⁵ *History of the Qaruna Turks*, 209.

²²⁶ *History of Gujarat*, III, 873, *et seq.*

²²⁷ He is called Alim Malik by Isami and Yahya Sirhindi.

him so that he may live there with power and dignity. 'O Aziz!', the Sultan told him, 'You see how rebellions are raising their heads in every direction. I hear that whoever rebels, does so on the strength of the *sadah* amirs, and that these *sadah* amirs become supporters of these rebels for the sake of loot and plunder. Thus only does it become possible for anyone to rebel. Look here! Whomsoever amongst the *sadah* amirs of Dhar you find to be a mischief-monger, crush him in any way you can.'²²⁸ The grant of such plenary powers to a callous person could not but be abused. Aziz Khammar, on reaching Dhar, started a veritable reign of terror. He arrested some eighty-nine²²⁹ *sadah* amirs and had them executed. The news of these executions sent a wave of horror and disgust through Daulatabad and Gujarat; 'wherever there was a *sadah* amir, he became suspicious and watchful'.²³⁰ When the Sultan learnt about these executions, he admired Aziz's performance. He sent a special robe of honour to Aziz Khammar and asked every one of the dignitaries of his court to write letters to Aziz, praising his action. The nobles were also asked to send gifts of robes and horses to Aziz Khammar.²³¹ This was a public declaration of the Sultan's determination to deal ruthlessly with the *sadah* amirs, and it naturally made them more determined in their struggle, which had now become a struggle for survival. Their petty acts of insubordination and misbehaviour were now replaced by organized rebellions and pitched battles.

Revolt in Gujarat:

Barani, Isami and Ibn-i Battuta have given different accounts of the circumstances which led to the flare-up at Dabhoi and Baroda. But there is nothing contradictory in their statements, which may be taken as inter-related though it is difficult to determine their sequence. (i) Ibn-i Battuta says that the Sultan had written to Muqbil,²³² the naib wazir of Gujarat, to capture Qazi Jalal and a group of Afghans. Malikul Hukama, a relation of the Sultan and a companion of Muqbil, divulged this secret to the Afghans, who immediately rose in rebellion. Three hundred Afghans, whom Muqbil had intended to kill, raided Cambay and plundered the treasury.²³³ (ii) Isami says that after Muqbil had killed many people at the order of the Sultan, Juranbal, Qazi Jalal, Jalal ibn-i Lala and Jhallu assembled at a place

²²⁸ *Firuz Shahi*, 503.

²²⁹ On page 507 of *Firuz Shahi* the number is given.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*, 504.

²³¹ *Ibid.*, 504.

²³² He was a slave of Ahmad Ayaz.

²³³ *Rehla*, 113-14.

and took solemn oaths to rise against the Sultan.²³⁴ The government officers, who came to confiscate their property and to take them into custody, were themselves captured. Thereupon Muqbil marched against them. (iii) According to Barani, Muqbil was taking the revenues and horses to Delhi, when the *sadah* amirs of Baroda and Dabhoi seized the treasures and even plundered the wares of some merchants,²³⁵ who were travelling with him. This completely stripped off of all treasures, Muqbil returned to Anhilwara.²³⁶

The treasure thus acquired by the rebels provided them with the necessary resources for organizing a movement against the Sultan of Delhi. 'The rebellion of the *sadah* amirs of Dabhoi and Baroda', remarks Barani, 'created a sensation in the whole of Gujarat.'²³⁷ It was through a trick that Muqbil succeeded in saving his skin.²³⁸

The Rebels March to Cambay:

The four rebel leaders then marched to Cambay and occupied it. The city was entrusted to one Akhi by name.²³⁹ Here Taghi, the former *shahna-i bargah*, was living as an exile in chains and fetters. The rebels set him free and gave him a *kulah* (hat) and a *qaba* (cloak), and selected him as the fifth leader of the rebel group. Taghi, however, escaped from them on the third day and reached Pattan (Anhilwara) and joined Muqbil.

The report of these reverses reached Aziz Khammar, the governor of Malwa and, without waiting for instructions from the Sultan, he started to help Muqbil.²⁴⁰ The four rebel leaders also made their preparations and put their soldiers in order. According to Isami, the imperial army comprised of six thousand soldiers, while the rebel army did not exceed seven hundred cavalry. The imperial army was thoughtlessly arranged. Taghi led the advance-guard, Aziz Khammar commanded the centre, and Muqbil controlled the right wing. The rebels could not attempt to arrange their army in the traditional manner on account of their limited numbers. Aziz Khammar made a rash thrust into the centre of the enemy ranks, and got entangled in

²³⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 504.

²³⁵ Ibn-i Battuta gives the name of one merchant, Ibnul Kaulami, who had constructed a 'handsome school at Alexandria'. *Rehla*, 114. See also page 69 where he mentions some other names also.

²³⁶ *Firuz Shahi*, 504.

²³⁷ *Ibid.*, 504.

²³⁸ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 504.

²³⁹ *Ibid.*, 505.

²⁴⁰ According to Ibn-i Battuta, Malik Jahan Bambal at the head of seven thousand horsemen had come to the help of Malik Aziz Khammar, but all of them were defeated. *Rehla*, 114.

a whirlpool from which he could not come out. Qazi Jalal rushed on him from an ambush and all the leaders of the rebels made a concerted attack from different directions. Aziz Khammar was caught and killed. Muqbil's defeat was complete. The rebels collected the booty under a tent and distributed it among the four leaders.²⁴¹ It was the first very significant defeat of the imperial forces by the rebels and it emboldened them considerably.

The Sultan's March from Delhi:

Isami says that the Sultan left Delhi for Gujarat when he heard about the killing of Aziz,²⁴² but Barani definitely states that the Sultan had left Delhi late during the month of Ramazan 744/January 1344, when he heard about the rebellions of Dabhoi and Baroda, and was at Sultanpur when he had heard about Aziz Khammar's march to Gujarat. Barani's details about the movements of the Sultan and of the Delhi-side are more reliable than those of Isami, who is more detailed in his account of the other side of the struggle.

When Muhammad bin Tughluq decided to march in person against the rebels, Qutlugh Khan sent a message through Barani, submitting that it was below the dignity of the Sultan to march in person against the *sadah* amirs of Dabhoi and Baroda; and since they had been antagonized by the cruel and impolitic executions of Aziz Khammar, the likelihood was that on hearing about the arrival of the Sultan, they would immediately take to flight. Qutlugh Khan offered to lead the campaign and to bring the rebels to the Sultan as he had done in the case of Shihab-i Sultani and Ali Shah. But the Sultan ignored his request and ordered preparations to be made for the royal march to Gujarat. So far the Sultan had only marched in person against rebels who belonged to the highest category of the governing class; this was his first campaign against the lowest cadre of his bureaucracy. The Sultan had successfully dealt with and withstood the attacks of the higher nobility, but his whole administration got paralysed when the lower class of administrators, like the *sadah* amirs, challenged his authority. The Sultan could crush men like Gurshasp and Aiba, but he became helpless before this riff-raff drawn from different and incongruous backgrounds. The changed circumstances were largely due to the weakness of the central army, which in spite of a whole decade had not been able to recover from the effects of the plague. The Sultan in person alone could lead it with some hope of success. The *sadah* amirs, despite all the prestige and influence they came to exercise

²⁴¹ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 508-9.

²⁴² *Ibid.*, 509.

subsequently, were not high in the grades of the imperial hierarchy, and it is not without significance that Isami refrains from referring to this background of the founder of the Bahmani kingdom.

Before the outbreak of the rebellion in Gujarat, the Sultan had assigned the governorship of that province to Shaikh Mu'izzuddin, son of Shaikh Alauddin of Ajudhan. When the Sultan decided to march in person, he issued an order for the payment of three lakhs of *tankas* to Shaikh Mu'izzuddin so that he may recruit and get ready a contingent of one thousand horsemen within two to three days.²⁴³ Isami gives a very graphic account of the weakness of the royal forces at this time.²⁴⁴ He says that the number of mounted soldiers was so small that it did not exceed four thousand. The army was in an utterly frustrated state—the horses were lifeless and the soldiers were indifferent.²⁴⁵

Before the Sultan set out on this campaign, he nominated a council of regency consisting of Malik Kabir, Malik Firuz and Khwaja-i Jahan Ahmad Ayaz to look after the affairs of the empire during his absence.²⁴⁶ According to both Barani and Afif, the head of this council, who also acted on behalf of the Sultan, was Malik Kabir, also called Qabula. He had started his life as a slave and obtained the highest possible position. At the order of the Sultan, Kabir had written to the Khalifa offering his services; so he was constructively an officer of the Khalifa also. He was held in great respect; nevertheless the Sultan could depend upon him for the execution of his policies.

The Sultan stayed at Sultanpur for a time as three or four days of the month of Ramazan were still left. During his stay there a message was received from Aziz Khammar that, on hearing of the rebellion of Dabhoi and Baroda, he had decided to march out to crush the rebels. The Sultan was extremely displeased at this report and said: 'Aziz does not know the art of war. He might be killed by the rebels.'²⁴⁷ Soon afterwards reports arrived to the effect that Aziz had been caught and killed on the battle-field. The Sultan was deeply disturbed at these reports and one night he even discussed with Barani about the causes of disturbances in the empire.²⁴⁸

It appears from the accounts of Isami and Barani that the Sultan's strategy was to stop at convenient places, probably to mobilize fresh

²⁴³ *Firuz Shahi*, 508.

²⁴⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 510-12.

²⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 511.

²⁴⁶ *Firuz Shahi*, 509.

²⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 509. It is interesting to note that Isami also says that Aziz was utterly ignorant of the tactics of war. *Futuh-us Salatin*, 507.

²⁴⁸ This conversation is discussed later.

resources and to send armies from different places to different destinations. The activities of the *sadah* amirs were widespread and had to be controlled and dealt with in different directions. Isami says that the Sultan had to stay for months at Nagaur, where he had to face a severe shortage of fodder.²⁴⁹ From Nagaur he sent Azam Malik to Broach;²⁵⁰ from Mount Abu he sent Shaikh Mu'izzuddin to Anhilwara;²⁵¹ and from Broach he sent Malik Muqbil towards Daulatabad.²⁵²

The Sultan sent an advance contingent to Dabhoi and Baroda to challenge the rebels. Many of the insurgents were killed but some of them managed to escape to Daulatabad along with their families.²⁵³

The Sultan sent Azam Malik to Broach with one hundred mounted soldiers and with very specific instructions for Qamar, who was in charge of the fort. Qamar was to stick to the fort, 'no matter what streams of blood flowed outside it'. He was also to keep a watch over the soldiers from Daulatabad. He was not to come out if the rebels attacked the fort. On receiving this *farman* of the Sultan, Qamar put his soldiers all along inside the fort-ramparts and shut himself up.²⁵⁴ When the insurgents heard about the arrival of an army at Broach, they left Cambay, where they had been controlling the situation for three or four months and where Taghi had also joined them,²⁵⁵ and rushed to Broach. They were under the impression that a strong imperial force had reached there. They besieged the Broach fort and expected the imperial forces to come out in the open to challenge them. The army inside the fort numbered three to four thousand soldiers; the rebels had at their disposal a force of seven thousands. When there was no response from the fort to the attempts of the rebels to provoke fighting, Jhallu Afghan attacked a gate. Some of the soldiers from Daulatabad and one Shaikhzada Hamid²⁵⁶ came out of the fort and, in utter disregard of the definite instructions of the Sultan, gave battle to the insurgents. Jhallu's horse stumbled and fell in the field; he was immediately surrounded and his head was cut off. When Jhallu fell, other soldiers also rushed out from the fort. Juranbal and Qazi Jalal were disheartened and fled to Man Deva, the ruler of

249 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 511.

250 *Ibid.*, 512.

251 *Firuz Shahi*, 512.

252 *Ibid.*, 512.

253 *Ibid.*, 512.

254 *Futuh-us Salatin*, 512.

255 *Ibid.*, 509-10.

256 *Ibid.*, 513.

Baglana, who received them with warmth but later deprived them of their belongings.²⁵⁷

Barani informs us that from Broach the Sultan sent Muqbil with some forces of Delhi along with the *sadah* amirs of Broach in pursuit of the fugitives. Malik Muqbil overtook them on the bank of the Narbada and destroyed them. He seized all their property and took all their families into custody.²⁵⁸ Muqbil stayed there for some days, and, acting on the royal directive, he put to death many of the *sadah* amirs of Broach. Some of them, who escaped the sword of Muqbil, reached Daulatabad, while others sought shelter with the *muqaddams* of Gujarat.

The Sultan stayed at Broach for some time and tried to set its affairs in order. He appointed harsh tax collectors to realize the arrears of revenue with a strong and firm hand. He was extremely irritated by all those people who had supported the rebels.

Rebellion at Daulatabad:

According to Barani, the Sultan had appointed Zain Banda Majdul Mulk and the second son of Rukn-i Thanesari, two very cruel and intensely hated officers, to inquire about the rebels at Daulatabad. The son of Thanesari reached his destination and began his investigations, while Zain Banda had only reached Dhar. This raised a tumult in the minds of the Musalmans of Devagiri. By an unfortunate coincidence the Sultan at this very time sent three well-known officers with a confidential *farman* addressed to Alimul Mulk directing him to send the leading *sadah* amirs of Devagiri under an escort of fifteen hundred horsemen to Broach.²⁵⁹ According to Isami, Alimul Mulk did not like the contents of the *farman*, still he had no alternative but

²⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 514.

²⁵⁸ Barani says that some of the rebels defeated at the Narbada fled to Man Deva, the *muqaddam* of Kol Sahir, but Man Deva arrested them and deprived them of all their property (*Firuz Shahi*, 512). But from Isami's account (*Futuh-us Salatin*, 514) it appears that it was after the defeat at Broach that the rebels sought shelter with Man Deva. From the names of the two great forts attributed to him, Man Deva was obviously the ruler of Baglana.

²⁵⁹ Barani, 513.

It is significant that only when Isami discusses the rebellion of Daulatabad, he prepares a whole charge-sheet against Muhammad bin Tughluq. (a) He is a friend of the low-born; (b) he wishes ill to religion; (c) he has gone astray from the path of religion; (d) everyone, young and old, is aggrieved against him; (e) rebellion is justified against him; (f) the *sharif* has permitted the shedding of his blood; (g) the qazis have declared legal his execution; (h) he has become rebellious towards Islam; (i) he has started mixing with *Kafirs*; (j) he has stopped the call to prayers; (k) he has stopped the Friday prayers; (l) he celebrates the festival of Holi; and (m) he consorts with the jogis in private. *Futuh-us Salatin*, 515.

to obey the imperial order. The *sadah* amirs had hardly marched five *farsangs* towards Broach when they began to brood over their fate. Nuruddin and Ismail Makh Afghan decided upon rebellion and mobilized opinion in favour of their plan. They argued: 'Why should we lay down our lives like this? We should first cut off the heads of Ahmad Lachin, Qultash and Husam and send them to Jagnag and Man Deva. Then we should march back to Daulatabad and arrest Alimul Mulk.'

Next day at sunrise they went to the tent of Ahmad Lachin and cut off his head. The noise awakened Qultash from his sleep; he rushed out on a horse but was chased, caught and killed. Husam was killed in his tent without any resistance. Their heads were sent to Devahar, capital of Man Deva. Nuruddin and Ismail rushed to Daulatabad and reached there a little after midday. News of the rebellion was brought by Nasir Tughalchi and a *hajib* to Alimul Mulk, who had gone to his afternoon sleep after working in the *diwan*. Awakened from his sleep, he ordered the gates to be closed and prepared to fight the rebels. That day's battle was indecisive. At night Alimul Mulk retired to the inner *kushak* of Daulatabad while Nasir and the *hajib* took charge of the outer fort, and the rebels seized the *khatti* of Devagiri. Next day the battle was again undecided, but on the morning of the third day Alimul Mulk was captured alive and the rebels seized Daulatabad. The great treasure in Devagiri, which had not been sent to Delhi as the routes were not safe, fell into the hands of the rebels. The *karkuns* (employees) of the Delhi sultanat were killed, but Alimul Mulk was set free as they considered him innocent. The rebels then decided to elect a king. When the name of Ismail was mentioned, he showed his preference for Hasan.²⁶⁰ The people agreed with him, but since Hasan was not available at the time and delay was dangerous, they raised Ismail to the throne. An orange coloured *chatr* was raised over his head and he became known as Sultan Nasiruddin. Nuruddin was appointed wazir with the title of Khwaja-i Jahan. Ismail distributed money among the soldiers and gave every man fifteen months' salary.²⁶¹ Thus the first independent kingdom of the Deccan came into being. It foreshadowed the eventual emergence of the great Bahmani kingdom.

When the Sultan came to know of this rebellion, he could not sleep for three days and three nights. 'He writhed in pain like a serpent at the loss of its treasure.' On the fourth day he repented of his

²⁶⁰ This is Isami's version (*Futuh-us Salatin*, 512) and may be merely an attempt to prove the superiority of Hasan (the future Bahmani ruler) over all others.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 521. According to Barani the *wilayat* of Maharashtra was distributed amongst the *sadah* amirs.

killings and took a vow not to shed human blood.²⁶² He raised a huge army in six months²⁶³ and then marched towards Daulatabad. He made elaborate preparations and planned the disposition of his army very carefully. The rebels also made elaborate preparations and a large number of talented *sadah* amirs threw themselves into the struggle. But it was difficult for them to outpace the manoeuvre and planning of a sultan, who had spent a quarter of a century in fighting against heavy odds. The rebels were defeated and many of their supporters were killed on the battle-field. Ismail Makh Afghan fled with his family to Dharagir or Dharagarh, the highest part of the Devagiri fort. He was entirely surrounded by the enemy; Ibn-i Battuta, writing on the basis of reports, says that the Sultan would not grant him an amnesty, but provided him with food and water. Hasan Kangu (the future founder of the Bahmani kingdom) fled to Miraj,²⁶⁴ where he started recruiting an army for another encounter, and was later joined by his comrades like Sikandar Khan, Qir Khan Husain Hatiyah and others.

Gulbarga had also come under the control of the rebels. The Sultan sent Imadul Mulk Sartez with some amirs to arrest the fugitives, crush the rebels and retrieve the fort. The Sultan himself stayed at Daulatabad for some time and turned his attention to the reorganization of its affairs. He assigned *iqtas* to nobles and tried to establish peaceful conditions. It was at this time that he heard about the rebellion of Taghi in Gujarat and decided to go there.

Birth of the Bahmani Kingdom:

Before leaving Daulatabad, the Sultan put Khudawandzada Qawamuddin, Malik Jauhar and Shaikh Burhan Balarami *Zahirul Juyush* in charge of the fort and stationed a big army there. The affairs of the Deccan were, however, in the melting pot and the situation was far from satisfactory. The inhabitants of Broach, who had stayed on in Daulatabad, were sent to Broach along with the army. The price of corn went up at the time and the soldiers experienced great hardships. As the Sultan proceeded towards Broach, the historian Barani came to offer felicitations for his success at the battle of Daulatabad on behalf of the council of regency. The battle of Daulatabad must have been a big victory—at least from the point of view of imperial prestige—for in that case alone could the council have decided to send its felicitations to the Sultan, of course not knowing

²⁶² *Ibid.*, 530.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 530.

²⁶⁴ In the Satara district of Maharashtra.

that within a few months the Deccan was destined to be lost to Delhi for all time. The Sultan received Barani with great affection.

Later, when the Sultan was busy settling the affairs of Sahsiling and wanted to proceed to Anhilwara, he received reports from Daulatabad that Hasan Kangu and other rebels, who had fled from the battle-field, had fallen on Imadul Mulk Sartezi, killed him and scattered his forces. Khudawandzada Qawamuddin, Malik Jauhar and the *Zahirul Juyush* had fled from Daulatabad to Dhar. Hasan Kangu came to Daulatabad, ascended the throne on 24 Rabi II 748/3 August 1347 and laid the foundation of the Bahmani kingdom, which for the next century and a half was to dominate the political scene of the South. Ismail Makh acknowledged the new king. This news upset the Sultan completely. He could now see clearly that the empire was fast crumbling and it was beyond his resources and power to check the process. Barani says that during this time the Sultan did not indulge in executions. This fact is confirmed by Isami also, who says that a 'pain' suddenly overtook the heart of the Sultan at the time of the *isha* prayer and he proclaimed a general amnesty to the people. Isami adds, however, that next day, when the pain had subsided, the Sultan returned to his old ways.²⁶⁵ However the Sultan, who had been planning to send an army against the rebels, realized that the power of the Bahmanis was too great to be challenged and reconciled himself to the loss of the Deccan.

FRUSTRATIONS OF A DESPOT

Muhammad bin Tughluq's life during the closing years of his reign was one of deep frustrations, gloom and peevishness. All his projects had failed and an incurable spirit of rebellion had permeated the rank and file of the people. His dogged tenacity of purpose refused to give way, but his frustrations found expression in different ways. During his stay at Sultanpur, while on his way to crush the Gujarat rebels, he summoned his courtier or *nadim*, Ziyauddin Barani. It was towards the end of the night and the Sultan may have spent sleepless hours brooding over the impossible situation. 'You see', he told the historian, 'how many rebellions are raising their heads. I am not afraid of these rebellions. But people say that these rebellions are due to the excessive capital punishments of the Sultan. Well, I am not going to give up my punishments owing to what people say. You have read many histories. Have you read anywhere about the crimes for which kings have inflicted capital punishments?' Barani gave the details of the Sassanid penal law as well as the Muslim *shari'at* but

²⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 536.

tried to approximate his answers, so far as possible, to the wishes of the Sultan. He said:

'I have read in the *Tarikh-i Kisravi* that it is not possible for a ruler to govern without inflicting capital punishments. If a king does not do that, God alone knows what mischief and turmoil will be created by the activities of refractory people; even the obedient will be involved in thousands of sins. When a confidant asked the Persian emperor, Jamshed, about the cases in which capital punishment could be inflicted, Jamshed replied: "The infliction of capital punishment by the king is justified in the case of seven offences; if the king goes beyond these limits, troubles for the kingdom will arise. (i) Apostasy—leaving the true creed and persisting in religious error; (ii) murder—intentionally killing a law-abiding person; (iii) adultery—cohabitation of a married man with the wife of another; (iv) conspiracy—planning rebellion against the king in which the fact of the conspiracy is proved; (v) rebellion—leading a rebellion against the king or helping rebel leaders; (vi) helping the king's enemies, opponents or rivals by giving them information, arms, or assisting them in other ways, and the facts are proved; (vii) disobedience—disobedience to the king in a way that endangers the state but not disobedience of other kinds."

The Sultan then asked Barani as to how many of these seven categories of capital punishments were permitted by the Prophet. Barani replied: 'Only for apostasy, murder and adultery. Capital punishment for the other four offences are the responsibility of the king for the welfare of the state. Jamshed has said: "Kings have selected wazirs, raised them to a high status and put the affairs of the kingdom in their charge. In consequence of this, wazirs have been able to make laws (*zawabit*) for the state and to enforce them permanently; and owing to the enforcement of these laws, it has not been necessary for the king to sully his own hands with the blood of any creature."' The Sultan then stated his position in the following words:

"The punishments prescribed by Jamshed related to ancient times. In these days a large number of wicked and mischievous persons have been born. *I inflict capital punishments on the basis of suspicion and presumption of rebellion, disorder and conspiracy.* I put people to death for every slight disobedience that I see in them, and *I will keep inflicting capital punishments in this way till either I perish or the people are set right and give up rebellion and disobedience.* I have no wazir who can frame such laws for

my kingdom that it may become unnecessary for me to smear my hands with blood. Also I inflict capital punishments because people have become my enemies all of a sudden. I have distributed so much treasure among the people, but no one has become my sincere well-wisher. The temper of the people has been clearly revealed to me; they are my enemies and opponents.'²⁶⁶

Feelings of bitterness and frustration run throughout this conversation of the Sultan and show how deeply his mind had been affected by them.

Some time later the anguish of his soul again gushed out before Barani. Taghi was at large and the Sultan was trying to pacify Gujarat. News had come at this time about the second insurrection of the *sadah* amirs at Daulatabad. What to do and where to go? The Sultan had not yet decided about his future course of action. He summoned Barani and said: 'My kingdom is diseased and its illness cannot be cured by any medicine. If the physician treats it for lumbago, the fever increases; if he treats it for fever, there is an obstruction of the arteries. Different diseases have appeared in my kingdom simultaneously. If I put things right at one place, disorders appear at another place; if I put them right at the second place, disorders appear at a third place. What have kings of the past said about these diseases of the kingdom?'

To this pathetic note of the Sultan, Barani's reply was boldly indiscreet, but it stirred the Sultan to the very depths of his soul and drew him out. Barani said: 'Books of history have described the remedies prescribed by kings for the diseases of the kingdom in a variety of ways. Some sultans, on seeing that the people have ceased to trust them and that a general resentment against them has appeared, have abdicated from the kingdom and assigned it to one of their sons, whom they have considered deserving, in their own life-time. They have then retired to a corner of the kingdom, devoted themselves to engagements that keep away weariness and contented themselves with the cheerful company of a few courtiers. They have not (after their abdication) meddled with the affairs of the kingdom. Other sultans, owing to that disease of the kingdom which is due to the hatred of the people (towards their ruler), have given themselves up suddenly to hunting, music and wine, and have assigned all affairs of the state—both principles and details and the solution of every problem—to their wazirs, high officers and the supporters of the kingdom. One of the most dangerous and fatal diseases of the kingdom is the detestation of (the ruler) among the select and the

commons and the lack of confidence among the generality of the *ra'iyat*.'

There was an implied suggestion in this speech that abdication was the only alternative left for the Sultan. But the suggestion went against the very grain of the Sultan and he told the historian:

'If the affairs of the kingdom were settled according to my wishes, my desire was to go to the sacred Ka'ba and assign the affairs of the Delhi empire to these three persons—Firuz, Malik Kabir and Ahmad Ayaz. *But in these days I am angry with the people and the people are angry with me.* The people have discovered my mind and I have discovered the evil and rebellious designs of the people. Every remedy I try fails. My remedy for rebels, opponents, disobedient persons and evil-wishers is the sword. *I will continue punishing and striking with my sword till it either cuts or misses. The more the people oppose me, the greater will be my punishments.*'

It was now a desperate man struggling with a desperate situation.

What may have deepened the frustration of his life considerably and made him peevish and relentless was the unfortunate effect of an operation which, according to Ibn-i Hajar Asqalani, had made him impotent.²⁶⁷ He had two daughters born earlier, but he had no children later. Very contemptuously Isami remarks: 'Verily the king has no son; he wishes the entire world to be like himself.'²⁶⁸

It was perhaps in these moments of frustrations that he turned to some saints for spiritual help and blessings. Shaikh Sharafuddin Yahya Maneri wrote to him in a letter:²⁶⁹ 'As requested by you, dear brother, I have prayed to God to set right all your worldly and religious affairs.'

REBELLION OF TAGHI; DEATH OF SULTAN MUHAMMAD

Taghi was a Turkish slave brought to Ghiyasuddin Tughluq by some merchants from Turkistan. He was appointed superintendent of the *darbar* (*shahna-i bargah*) by Muhammad bin Tughluq and was later made an officer in the army of the wazir. As a punishment for some dereliction of duty, the Sultan issued orders for his banishment to Yaman. While he was at Cambay, Qazi Jalal's rebellion broke out in Gujarat, and he rendered some service to the Sultan by persuading

²⁶⁷ *Al-Durar al-Kamina*, Hyderabad ed., III, 460.

²⁶⁸ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 450.

²⁶⁹ *Maktubat-i Shaikh Sharafuddin Yahya Maneri* (Ms.).

the people to disperse the rebels. The Sultan appreciated this loyal behaviour and reappointed him as *shahna-i bargah*. Taghi remained in Gujarat for some time, while the Sultan proceeded to the Deccan in order to deal with the Daulatabad rebellion. But during the Sultan's absence Taghi joined hands with the *muqaddams* and the *sadah* amirs of Gujarat and raised the standard of revolt. He killed Shaikh Mu'izzuddin, the governor of Anhilwara, and besieged Broach with a large army.

According to Barani, the Sultan spent three rainy seasons in Gujarat—the first at Mandal Batari and the second near the fort of Karnal. His main object was the pacification of the province and in this he succeeded; Taghi was a nuisance but not a power. The ruler of Karnal wished to capture Taghi alive and hand him over to the Sultan, and Taghi on discovering his intention fled to the Jam of Thattah. The Sultan, after the end of the rainy season, captured Karnal; and the coast and the islands came within his power. The ranas and *muqaddams* came to the Sultan and submitted; they were given robes and *inams* in return. In Karnal a *mehta* (Hindu officer) was appointed by the Sultan; Khankhar, the rana of Karnal, was brought a captive before the Sultan. The whole of the province was pacified. The Sultan passed the third monsoon at Kondal on the way to Thatta.²⁷⁰ Here he received the painful news that Malik Kabir had died. The Sultan sent Ahmad Ayaz and Malik Maqbul, the naib wazir, to Delhi and summoned a large number of shaikhs, *ulama*, maliks and amirs with their families, horse and foot. Boats full of fighting men came to him from Dipalpur, Multan, Uchch and Siwistan. Altun Bahadur with four or five thousand Mongol horsemen was sent by Amir Qazghan, the ruler of Mavaraun Nahr. Thus the Sultan marched towards Thatta with an enormous army.

The imperial forces were alerted against Taghi, who fled from one place to another, eluding the Sultan's officers and subsequently the Sultan also. From Broach he fled to Cambay; and from there he went to Asawal. When the Sultan turned to Asawal, Taghi started for Patan. At Kadi the Sultan overtook him and defeated him in an encounter at Takalpur near Patan, but he fled towards Patan. He then escaped to Girnar and ultimately sought shelter with the Sumeras of Thatta, who defended him with an army 'numerous as ants and locusts'.

It was the last campaign of Muhammad bin Tughluq's life—tragic but remarkable in its relentless pursuit of the enemy and determination to bring him to book.

Pursuing Taghi from place to place, Muhammad bin Tughluq reached Gondal in Kathiawar. Here he had to break his journey on account of his illness and the rains. He then reached the Indus and moved towards Thatta. He suffered a relapse and again developed temperature. He fasted on the 10th of Muharram and broke his fast with fish. This aggravated his illness for fish did not agree with him; but he ignored it and continued his journey on the river for two continuous days. His illness increased and his strong frame began to crack. He landed at a village, Sonda, and after a week breathed his last on 21 Muharram 752/ 20 March 1351. Thus came to an end a stormy career which, despite all its concern for the welfare of the people, had kept the whole country in a state of suspense, anxiety and terror for more than a quarter of a century. 'At last the people got rid of him and he got rid of the people', says Badauni. It was not without significance that soon after his accession, Firuz Shah obtained letters of forgiveness by money payment from those who had been mutilated by him and from the heirs of those whom he had killed, and put them in a box at the head of the Sultan's cenotaph. It was a subtle comment on the deceased Sultan's policies and nothing more insinuating could have been done to malign him.

THE SULTAN'S 'SIYASAT' (DEATH-PENALTIES)

One would have expected a highly educated ruler, like Muhammad bin Tughluq, to have been a humanist of great standing. But the reverse was the case. 'Of all the people', says Ibn-i Battuta, 'this king loves most to make presents and also to shed blood.²⁷¹ ... His gate was hardly free from the corpse of a man who had been executed. ... The Sultan would punish all wrongs whether big or small and he would spare neither men of learning (*ahlul ilm*) and of probity (*salah*) nor those of high descent (*sharaf*). Every day hundreds of people in chains with their hands fastened to their necks and their feet bound were brought into the council-hall. Those who were to be killed were killed, and those who were to be tortured were tortured, and those who were to be beaten were beaten. The Sultan used to summon all the prisoners to the council-hall every day except Friday.'²⁷² Ibn-i Battuta relates a number of hideous punishments of which he happened to be an eye-witness.

Barani, who could have been contradicted by his contemporaries, has no hesitation in recording: 'The killing of Musalmans and of believers in one God had become a part of his temperament and

²⁷¹ *Rehla*, 56.

²⁷² *Ibid.*, 85.

nature. He put many *ulama*, shaikhs, Saiyyids, mystics, qalandars, clerks and army-men to death. No day or week passed in which the blood of many Musalmans was not shed, and a stream of blood was made to flow before the royal palaces.²⁷³

The Sultan's punishments sent a wave of disgust and horror through the people, and whenever circumstances permitted, they rebelled against the authority of the 'tyrant'. We are told that the Sultan never punished anybody unless he had obtained a verdict for his execution from the four *muftis*, who were constantly in attendance. Obviously, it was hardly possible for any *mufti* to express an opinion against the wishes of the Sultan, and if he ever did so, there was hardly any chance of his carrying his point before a philosopher well acquainted with the technique of casuistry and debate.²⁷⁴ This tribunal was nothing short of a big farce staged to satisfy his conscience and to give an air of legality and fair-play to his otherwise callous massacres. Two or three incidents of the Sultan's presence in the court as a defendant summoned by the aggrieved parties, as mentioned by Ibn-i Battuta,²⁷⁵ should be considered sham pretences intended to deceive the people as well as his own conscience. The brutal punishments meted out to Gurhasp, Ghiyasuddin, Shaikh Shihabuddin and others and the inhuman treatment of their dead bodies could not possibly leave the people undisturbed. Barani says that there were certain nobles and officers, who encouraged the Sultan in pursuing his policy of ruthless executions. He has particularly named Zain Banda Mukhtasul Mulk, Yusuf Bughra, Khalil son of Sardawatdar, Muhammad Najib, Shahzada Nihawandi, Qaranfal Sayyaf, Aiba, Mujir Abu Raja, the son of a qazi of Gujarat and the three sons of Thanesari. The historian has succeeded in giving an idea of the horrible blood-thirstiness of these people when he remarks that they could have killed twenty prophets without compunction.

PERSONAL CHARACTER; EXPANSION AND CONTRACTION OF THE SULTANAT

Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq was one of the most striking personalities of medieval India. His intellectual attainments elicited praise from friend and foe alike, and raised him head and shoulders above his contemporaries. His personal life was absolutely chaste²⁷⁶

²⁷³ *Firuz Shahi*, 459-60.

²⁷⁴ *Mubarak Shahi*, 115.

²⁷⁵ *Rehla*, 83.

²⁷⁶ *Firuz Shahi*, 460.

While he was insistent that people should perform congregational prayers punctually, he allowed *tarababads* (pleasure resorts where people could enjoy music, etc.)

and free from many of the vices which tarnished the character of medieval monarchs. There was hardly any branch of medieval learning in which he had not achieved something—literature, history, philosophy, rhetoric, poetry, logic, mathematics, medicine, astronomy and calligraphy. His knowledge of Arabic was limited; he understood the language but could not speak it. His memory was, however, prodigious and he knew the Quran as well as a part of the *Hidaya* by heart.²⁷⁷ His intelligence was sharp and penetrating and his power of conversation unrivalled. His eloquence was magical, says Barani. In the use of similes and metaphors he was an adept.²⁷⁸ Notwithstanding all his scholarly interests and intellectual attainments, he was essentially a man of action, who never allowed his intellectual pursuits to affect his administrative responsibilities. He had the gait and bearing of a soldier—a well-built body, with broad and tough hands which made the hands of people tremble when he took them in his own.²⁷⁹ He looked smart (*zaiib-i jama*) in whatever dress he put on.

To this physical equipment was added a dauntless spirit of courage and chivalry, which became known in other lands also. Most of his life, both before and after his accession, was spent on the battle-field. He began his career as the *amir-i akhur* of Mubarak Khalji and ended his life in the pursuit of a rebel in distant Sind. Perhaps no other Delhi sultan undertook so many campaigns in person and dealt with so many well-organized rebellions as he did. Apart from this incessant military activity, he remains unrivalled in the history of the Delhi sultanat on account of his administrative measures and cultural contacts with the world outside. He initiated a new era of cultural contacts with Asian and African countries. People from Khurasan, Iraq, Sistan, Herat, Egypt, Trans-Oxiana, Tangiers, etc. visited his court and he acquired first-hand knowledge about the literary and cultural developments in those lands.²⁸⁰ His political

to function undisturbed in his empire, as Ibn-i Battuta has pointed out. He was himself fond of music and had a jealously guarded contingent of musicians in his service (*Masalikul Absar*, 32).

277 The *Hidaya* is a voluminous law book and it seems highly improbable for an individual to commit it to memory, but several independent authorities mention this fact about the Sultan. Ibn-i Hajar Asqalani, *Al-Durar al Kamina*, III, 460; *Masalikul Absar*, Eng. tr., 37.

278 *Firuz Shahi*, 463-64.

279 *Siyyarul Auliya*, 254-55. Amir Khurd gives a graphic account of Shaikh Qutb-uddin Munawar's meeting with the Sultan.

280 Two incidents may be quoted in this context. A scholar from Persia brought for him philosophical books, including the works of Ibn-i Sina (*Masalikul Absar*, 41). The Sultan sent Maulana Mu'inuddin Imrani to Qazi Azd to persuade him to come

vision was broad and dynamic, and he had a dogged tenacity of purpose which made him pursue his objectives under the most unfavourable circumstances.

Nevertheless, he failed in his main attempt, which was to establish an all-India administration.

Muhammad bin Tughluq inherited a vast empire from his father and, during the first decade of his reign, he made it vaster still by his own exertions. From the foot-hills of the Himalayas to Dwara Samudra and from Thatta to Lakhnauti the entire country was brought under his umbrella. The whole of the Deccan—including its distant parts like Ma'abar and Warangal—obeyed his orders. The independent states of the Western Ghats—Sandabur, Hinaur, Manjarur, Jura-fattan, Dahfattan, Budfattan, Fandarayra and Calicut—acknowledged his paramountcy. Never before in the history of the Delhi sultanat had the authority and prestige of the sultan touched such a high watermark and, according to Barani,²⁸¹ so much revenue had never flowed into the Delhi treasury from every direction as under Muhammad bin Tughluq. The author of the *Masalikul Absar* writes: 'It is a big country having ninety ports on the sea-coast, the revenue of which is derived from perfumes, muslin (*lanis*), various kinds of cloth and other beautiful things. The learned *faqih*, Sirajuddin Abu Safa Umar bin Ishaq bin Ahmad as-Shibli al-Awadhi, . . . one of the great jurists, who is at present at the court of the Sultan in Delhi, has related to me that the chief provinces in the territory of this king are twenty-three in number: Delhi, Devagiri, Multan, Kahran (Kuhram), Samana, Sabastan (Siwistan), Wajja (Uchch), Hasi (Hansi), Sasuti (Sirsa), Ma'abar, Tilang (Telingana), Gujarat, Badaun, Awadh, Kanauj, Lakhnauti, Bihar, Kara, Malwa, Lahawar (Lahore), Kalanaur, Jainagar and Dwara Samudra.'²⁸²

To maintain effective control over this extensive empire was an extremely difficult task in the fourteenth century, specially in view of the geographical barriers and the limited means of communications, both of which were exploited by local interests to weaken the control of the centre. The Sultan, however, applied his organizing

to India and dedicate his book *Matn-i Muwafiq* to him. (Abdul Haq, *Akhbarul Akhyar*, 142.)

²⁸¹ *Firuz Shahi*, 467-70.

²⁸² *Masalikul Absar*, Eng. tr., 16.

In this list Shihabuddin has, by mistake, mentioned Tilang twice. No other historian of the period has given a list of the provinces of the empire. Barani incidentally mentions some provinces (*Firuz Shahi*, 467-73), but gives no exhaustive list.

Jainagar and Dwara Samudra were not provinces of the empire, but their Hindu rulers acknowledged the suzerainty of Delhi.

capacity and resourcefulness to bring every part of the extensive empire under his personal control. Barani informs us that whenever a new territory was added to the empire, it was forthwith furnished with a hierarchy of officials and arrangements were made for the direct realization of revenues.²⁸³ When the Sultan strove to create an effective administrative centre at Daulatabad, he had in mind the stupendous difficulties that lay in controlling the South from Delhi. However, this measure could not possibly override the barriers set by geography; and the process of disintegration, though delayed, could not be averted.

But after ten years the experiment failed; and though the Sultan persisted in his attempt to the end, it was impossible, under medieval conditions of transport and communications, to maintain such a stupendous edifice. The centrifugal tendencies, which began to assert themselves, were helped by one of the most serious famines in the history of India, by the bubonic plague that seems to have paralysed the central army for a whole decade, and by the severe death penalties by which the Sultan hoped to make the people obedient but which only led to more rebellions.

But we must not exaggerate the extent of Muhammad bin Tughluq's failure. He left the frontiers of the directly administered territories of the Delhi sultanat just where they had been at Alauddin Khalji's death. The Sultan and his policies may have been highly unpopular, and the ordinary citizen may have raised his hands in horror when he heard the stories, correct or exaggerated, of the Sultan's punishments. Still there is no doubt that he was personally respected. If the *Futuh-us Salatin* can be an index to the mind and activities of the rebels, it may be safely concluded that they left no stone unturned in inciting the people against him. 'If all people combine against him', the *Futuh-us Salatin* says, 'he can be overthrown. . . Rebellion against him is legal. . . The *shari'at* has permitted the shedding of his blood. . . The qazis have given a *fatwa* (judgement) permitting his execution.'²⁸⁴

In attempting a correct estimate of the Sultan's position, three facts have to be borne in mind. Firstly, no sultan of Delhi has had to face so many and so well-organized rebellions as Muhammad bin Tughluq; the fact that he survived them all proves that he must have had a corps of very loyal officers. Further, the success of the rebels was confined to the areas annexed after the death of Alauddin Khalji, which only proves that the great Khalji Sultan was right in stopping where he did.

²⁸³ *Firuz Shahi*, 468.

²⁸⁴ *Futuh-us Salatin*, 451.

Secondly, Muhammad bin Tughluq is one of the very few rulers of the Delhi sultanat concerning whom no attempted assassination has been recorded, though if his three main historians (Isami, Barani and Ibn-i Battuta) are correct, there must have been thousands and thousands of persons in India who had deep personal reasons for revenging themselves on the Sultan. Also it is not reported that the Sultan took any but the traditional measures of his predecessors for his personal protection. He was too much of a soldier to be afraid of the assassin's dagger or a palace revolt. *That his own officers should depose him never crossed his mind, whatever he may have thought of rebels and the generality of his subjects.*

Lastly, Muhammad bin Tughluq died without nominating a successor. For two days his army by the side of the Indus had no king. Firuz Shah, after his election, had to march all the way from the precincts of Thatta to Delhi.²⁸⁵ Had the mass of the officers in the army been disloyal, they could have displaced the Tughluq dynasty; even a truculent minority could have made Firuz Shah's position difficult. The governors of the great provinces could have rebelled on hearing of Sultan Muhammad's death, which implied a temporary weakening of the central authority, but all of them hastened to offer their allegiance to Firuz Shah. Bengal, the Deccan and the Far South were lost, but all rebellions in northern India were suppressed.

Different assessments have been made of the Sultan's character by his contemporaries and by posterity. He has been called 'a mass of inconsistencies', 'a wonder of creation', 'a freak of nature', 'an ill-starred idealist', and above all a 'nightmare' and a 'mad man'. But these are more in the nature of verdicts based on partial estimates of his complex nature than objective assessments of his total impact on, and contributions to, the history of the Delhi sultanat.

Foreign scholars, like Shihabuddin al-Umari, Al-Qalqashandi, Ibn-i Hajar Asqalani and Salahuddin Safadi have unqualified praise for him on account of his learning, generosity and cordial treatment of foreign scholars. Ibn-i Battuta praises the Sultan's open-handed generosity and religious interests but condemns his executions. To Isami the Sultan was a second Yezid,²⁸⁶ a tyrant²⁸⁷ and a heretic²⁸⁸ who deserved an all-round condemnation. He paints the Sultan in lurid colours all through and finds no redeeming feature in his personality. He justifies every rebellion against him. Barani is also critical of the Sultan, but

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 515.

²⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, 606.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 607.

²⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 515.

unlike Isami, in almost every rebellion that he has discussed, his sympathies were with Muhammad bin Tughluq.

To Barani, a companion of seventeen years, Muhammad bin Tughluq appeared 'a mixture of opposites'. Nevertheless, a careful analysis of the mind of the historian leads one to the conclusion that it was not the Sultan who was 'a mass of inconsistencies' or a 'mixture of opposites', but that the historian himself was a miserably torn personality. He projected his own psychological states in his assessment of the Sultan's character. It was due to his policy of throwing offices open to talent, his many novel orders,²⁸⁹ his recruitments from the promiscuous mass of the people to the 'charmed' circle of the nobles, his philosophic interests which led to the development of a sceptic attitude in him towards the 'revealed books and the traditions of the prophets' (*kutub-i samavi wa ahadis ambia*), which created confusion all around and made the position of the old and respectable families, like Barani's own, absolutely untenable. He, therefore, deserved (in Barani's opinion) condemnation in the severest terms. So Barani starts disparaging the Sultan. But this mood does not last long. As soon as the historian returns from his mental excursion into the age of Muhammad bin Tughluq and suddenly becomes conscious of his present miserable plight, the direction of his emotions begins to change. 'I enjoyed status and position during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq.²⁹⁰ A patron and benefactor like him deserves to be praised.' Then the historian starts extolling the Sultan to the skies. When Barani is in the present, he has love for Muhammad bin Tughluq; when he is in the past, he has nothing but hatred for him. Love and hatred thus alternate with fluctuations in the moods of the historian. The moment one succeeds in catching this subtle psychological phase of the historian, the entire data supplied by him neatly fit into a proper perspective.

BUREAUCRACY OF MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ

Under Muhammad bin Tughluq the governing class of the sultanat period underwent a complete change of character and composition. If on the one side he pushed ahead the Khalji concept of a governing class based on loyalty and efficiency rather than racial affinity, he also introduced new elements into it. Barani does not give a list of offices conferred by the Sultan at the time of his accession but this lacuna has been filled up by Yahya Sirhindi; still Barani makes some disconnected references to the later officers of the reign. A study of

²⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 467.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

these two lists along with the names of other officials found in contemporary records reveals the basic character of his bureaucracy. It appears that Muhammad bin Tughluq's governing class comprised of seven distinct elements :

- (1) Families of officers who had been in the service of the sultanat since the time of Alauddin Khalji; (2) Families of converts to Islam, recently promoted to positions of authority; (3) Foreigners; (4) Members of religious, mainly mystic, families appointed by the Sultan; (5) the Afghans; (6) the *sadah* amirs; and (7) the Hindus.

Never before, or even after him, was the governing class of the Delhi sultanat recruited from such diverse backgrounds. This was at once the source of the strength and the weakness of the bureaucracy of Muhammad bin Tughluq. It broadened the base of the empire but weakened the position of the Sultan.

(1) *Old families:*

Amongst the old nobles the Sultan's wazir, Khwaja-i Jahan Ahmad Ayaz, son of Muhammad Ayaz, Alauddin's kotwal of Siri, Qutlugh Khan and Ainul Mulk, son of Amir Mahru, deserve special mention. Ahmad Ayaz was closely associated with the whole policy of Muhammad bin Tughluq and, as we shall see, he had to suffer for this after the Sultan's death. Qutlugh Khan was a tutor of the Sultan and was held in deep respect by him. His two brothers, Kamaluddin and Nizamuddin, also enjoyed posts of distinction in the administration. Qutlugh Khan was appointed wazir of Daulatabad in 1335, when illness obliged the Sultan to abandon his Ma'abar campaign and return to Delhi. Qutlugh could not deal with the rebellions and, in fact, he could not rise to the occasion in dealing with the problems of the South. His over-cautious or vacillating policy led to the loss of the South and facilitated the emergence of the independent kingdoms of Madura, Warangal, Kampila and Vijayanagar. The Sultan had ultimately to withdraw him from the Deccan. Ainul Mulk Mahru, though not a military man, was a very honest administrative officer, who combined executive efficiency with deep learning and the capacity for writing excellent Persian. Ibn-i Battuta says that he was looked upon as the leader of the Hindustani group among the governing class and, therefore, was a *persona non-grata* with the foreign amirs, who were always anxious to get him involved in some trouble. We have seen the excellent work he did as governor of Awadh, when the Sultan was paralysed by famine. He was destined to have a brilliant career during the reign of Firuz Shah.

As new elements entered the official hierarchy of Muhammad bin

Tughluq, this section of the old nobility gradually lost its exclusive control of the administration.

(2) *Converts:*

Another important element in the governing class of Muhammad bin Tughluq consisted of converts from Hinduism. Azizuddin *Khammar* (the distiller) and Qawamul Mulk Maqbul belong to this category. Azizuddin was probably connected with some vintner family and was, on this account, called *Khammar*. Barani is very critical of his low family status. Ibn-i Battuta saw him as a tax-collector at Amroha but subsequently he was appointed governor of Malwa. No convert from Hinduism had a better career in the service of the Delhi sultanat than Qawamul Mulk Maqbul. He belonged to the Hindu nobility of Warangal; the Sultan converted him to Islam, found him efficient in spite of his illiteracy, and saw to his promotion. He held various posts, including in succession the governorships of Multan, Badaun and Gujarat. When the Sultan died, Maqbul was working at Delhi as the naib wazir of the whole empire. Some members from the ruling Hindu families were also included in this category. The sons of the Rai of Kampila, who embraced Islam or were brought up as Musalmans, belonged to this group. The Sultan had great confidence in them and had, as we have seen, put one of them in charge of the supply of his drinking water. This element of the nobility continued to enjoy the confidence of the Sultan throughout his reign.

(3) *Foreigners:*

Muhammad bin Tughluq showed extraordinary consideration for foreigners and admitted them to the highest ranks in his administration. 'One of the habits of the emperor of India, Sultan Abul Mujahid Muhammad Shah,' remarks Ibn-i Battuta, 'is to love foreigners and to honour them by specially appointing them as governors and high officers. Most of his special officers, chamberlains, ministers, judges and brothers-in-law are foreigners. He has issued orders that in his dominions foreigners should be addressed as *a'izza*. And *a'izza* (excellent) has consequently become a proper name for them.'²⁹¹ This group of foreign officers could not be employed indiscriminately in every part of the country, because its knowledge of local problems was limited; but on judicial posts or posts in charity departments it could function better. Ibn-i Battuta's hostile criticism of the Sultan and his policies shows that this element did not remain uninfluenced by local pressures and

²⁹¹ *Rehla*, 4. Ibn-i Battuta is supported by Shihabuddin al Umari and Ziyauddin Barani.

prejudices, but by and large it was cooperative and loyal to the Sultan.

(4) *Members of Religious Families:*

One of the experiments of Muhammad bin Tughluq was to enlist some members of religious families in his administration. As discussed elsewhere,²⁹² his argument was that during the time of the Pious Caliphs the learned and the pious had rendered similar services to the state. The analogy was wrong because circumstances had completely changed; and the training required for religion and the administration was so radically different that any attempt to appoint to executive offices people who had been trained for theology or mysticism, but were ignorant of war and administration, was bound to lead to disaster. Shaikh Mu'izzuddin, son of Shaikh Alauddin of Ajudhan, who was appointed governor of Gujarat at a very critical juncture, was killed by the insurgents.²⁹³ Shaikh Imaduddin, a brother of Shaikh Ruknuddin Abul Fath of Multan, fought against Bahram Aiba and was killed.²⁹⁴ Saiyyid Kamaluddin Amir Kirmani was taken in the army.²⁹⁵ Shaikh Shihabuddin, a well-known saint of Delhi, was appointed head of the *diwanul-mustakhraj*—the department for the realization of arrears from revenue officials. These arrears used to be extorted by 'means of bastinado and tortures'²⁹⁶ and none could be more unsuitable for the office than the scion of a mystic family. Obviously, this element could not make its mark in the administration and slowly drifted out of the political forum.

(5) *Afghans:*

Some Afghan families also succeeded in securing high posts in the administration of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Malik Makh and Malik Shahu Lodi Afghan were eminent maliks and Barani specifically mentions their names in the list of Muhammad bin Tughluq's officers.²⁹⁷ It appears that these Afghans did not cooperate with him and their rebellions created a serious problem.

(6) *The Sadah amirs:*

The character and position of these amirs has already been discussed.

292 See Nizami, *Salatin-i Delhi Kay Mazhabi Rujuhanat*, 366.

293 Barani, *Ftuz Shahi*, 518.

294 *Rehla*, 97.

295 *Shjarul Auliya*, 215.

296 *Rehla*, 87.

297 *Ftuz Shahi*, 454-55

(7) *Hindu Officers:*

Under Muhammad bin Tughluq a large number of Hindus were appointed to important posts in the administration. The Chunar²⁹⁸ inscription refers to a Hindu wazir of the Sultan, Sai Raj. The naib wazir of the Deccan was also a Hindu, Dhara by name.²⁹⁹ The governorship of Sehwan was entrusted to Ratan. Bhiran Rai was appointed governor of Gulbarga and the *iqta* of Kohir was assigned to him. The introduction of this Hindu element in the charmed circle of the bureaucracy was resented by the old families, who had vested interests and disliked any encroachment on their privileges. The Sehwan rebellion and the rebellion of Ali Shah Nathu were inspired by this discontent. It is significant that while Muhammad bin Tughluq had to face a number of rebellions organized by his Muslim officers, there was no insurrection of the Hindu officers in his services.

Taken as a whole these seven elements, whatever their individual utility and significance, could not pull on together, and the governing class of Muhammad bin Tughluq lacked that homogeneity of spirit and outlook which was so necessary for the successful implementation of his policies and projects.

²⁹⁸ JASB 1836, V, 342

²⁹⁹ *Firuz Shahi*, 501.

III. FIRUZ SHAH TUGHLUQ

ELECTION; MARCH TO DELHI¹

WHEN SULTAN MUHAMMAD BIN TUGHLUQ died on 20 March 1351 (21 Muharram A.H. 752) on the east bank of the Indus some eighteen *karohs* from Thatta after an illness of some ten days, the men and women in his camp, about two hundred thousands, according to Barani, knew two things for certain—the deceased Sultan had left no son and he had appointed no successor.²

For educated persons in the camp, whether civil or military, the situation was extremely delicate, which if not properly handled could lead to a war of succession. Under the general conventions of Muslim monarchies, the new sultan had to be elected by the high officers and other leading men from among the members of the royal family. But only a part of these 'notables' were in the camp. The officers of the central government at Delhi could not be ignored. Then there were the governors of the provinces, whose active assent was also necessary, if the peaceful accession of the new ruler was to be assured. What saved the situation was the general conviction, to which Barani refers, that the only member of Tughluq Shah's family who deserved to be considered was Kamaluddin Firuz, son of Tughluq's younger brother, Malik Rajab, who had also been the third highest officer of the late Sultan.

Immediately after the Sultan's death, his high officers arranged with Altun Bahadur, the commander of the Mongols whom Amir Qazghan, the ruler of Trans-Oxiana, had sent to help the late Sultan, by such payment as they could manage, that his men would remain at a distance from the royal camp. 21 March was spent in mourning.

¹ Barani, 531-48; Aff, 36-88, *Mubarak Shahi*, 118-22; Dr. Riyazul Islam, Professor of History, Karachi, typed Ph.D. thesis on *Firuz Shah*.

² Isami's statement, made during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq, to the effect that he lacked all human feelings because he had no son, must be considered conclusive on the issue (433).

Barani, trying to please Firuz Shah, declares that he had a claim on the basis of all the three counts that mattered—nomination by his predecessor, unchallengeable personal qualifications and election by the 'notables'. But if Firuz had been nominated, the nobles would have asked him to ascend the throne and take charge before the leaderless march of two harassing days, to which Barani refers in detail; also if Sultan Muhammad had nominated a successor, there would be no sense in Khudawandzada's claim for her son.

After performing the rites of *siyyum*³ on the morning of 22 March the leaderless army started in utter confusion for Siwistan, marching on the east side of the river. On that day, Nauroz Kargan, a son-in-law of Tarmshirin Khan, who had been promoted by the late Sultan in the service of the Delhi empire, decided to rejoin his own people and invited the Mongols to attack the leaderless army. The Mongol attacks on 24 and 25 March were very severe, and on one occasion it was with difficulty that the ladies of the royal *haram* and the imperial treasures were saved from falling into their hands. Meanwhile the Thattians were attacking the marching army from the south.

Two days' experience of anarchic marching convinced all concerned that they could not proceed further without an *imam* or leader. There was a consensus of opinion in favour of Kamaluddin Firuz, but Khudawandzada, the sister of the late Sultan, wanted her son, Dawar Malik, to be elected. Malik Saifuddin Khuja was sent to give her a scolding, but he went beyond his commission and promised the office of *amir-i hajib* to Dawar Malik, and this promise was not kept. Firuz Shah, on his part, showed real reluctance in accepting the most dangerous post then available, but Tatar Khan, the captured child of a Mongol prince whom Tughluq Shah had adopted and educated, closed the argument by catching hold of Firuz's arm and threatening to enthrone him by force. Firuz Shah asked for time to say two *rakats* (genuflections) of prayer and then ascended the throne with the royal robes over his mourning dress. He then mounted an elephant and proceeded to his cousin, Khudawandzada, who as a sign of her acceptance of his accession, embraced him and placed the royal *kulah* (hat), valued at one lakh of *tankas*, over his head (24 March).

Afif, whose ancestors had been connected with the Tughluq family since the days of Alauddin Khalji, gives us an account of the marriage of Firuz's father and the early life of Firuz. When Malik Tughluq was governor of Dipalpur, Afif's great-grandfather, Malik Shihab Afif, was his subordinate in charge of Abohar district. Tughluq had two younger brothers, Sipah Salar Rajab and Abu Bakr. Whether Ghiyasuddin Tughluq was the son of a Jat woman has not been proved or disproved. But he wanted a Hindu lady of status for Rajab, and was told that Bibi Nala (or Naila), the daughter of Rai Ranmal Bhatti, was the best match he could find. But when the proposal was sent to the Rai, he refused it with indignation. Shihab Afif advised Tughluq to proceed to the Rai's territory and demand arrears

³ The *siyyum*, performed on the third day after the burial, consists in reading the Quran for the sake of the dead and praying for his salvation. The time after the morning prayer is generally preferred.

of tribute from the Rai and his *muqaddams*. This threw the Rai's family into distress, but after two or three days the young lady, much to the Rai's relief, decided to accept the offer. 'Send me to them', she said, 'think that one of your daughters has been seized by the Mongols.' Kamaluddin Firuz was born in A.H. 709 (1309-10) but he was only seven years old when Malik Rajab died, and Tughluq promised the weeping young widow that he would treat Firuz as his own son. This promise was nobly kept.

Rajab left two other sons, Qutbuddin and Ibrahim, by other wives, but Firuz took precedence on account of his mother. When Sultan Muhammad ascended the throne, Firuz had reached the age of eighteen. Sultan Muhammad kept his father's promise and gave Firuz a thorough training in all the civil departments of the government—state policy, administration, account-keeping, appointments, etc. Firuz held the office of *amir-i hajib* or *barbek*, but the Sultan assigned to him many duties unconnected with his office. The Sultan was a faddist for efficiency and Firuz was certainly overworked. 'Amir-i Hajib! Tomorrow is Id', the Sultan would remark, and Firuz had to make all necessary arrangements in the short time at his disposal. Afif would have us believe that the Sultan's real object was to give Firuz a thorough training. But though Muhammad bin Tughluq was a professional soldier, he put Firuz to no military duties and even complained of his being too fond of hunting. Firuz obeyed his Sultan-cousin loyally and faithfully, and retained the greatest possible affection for him after his death. Afif, who saw him frequently, states that Firuz Shah had a white complexion with a prominent nose and a broad beard, and was medium in height and weight.

Persons who saw Firuz Shah ascend the throne at the mature age of forty-five lunar years could hardly have predicted that he would give India thirty-eight years of peace, the chief features of which would be—(a) cheap prices and high wages, (b) no famines and no epidemics, (c) no serious foreign invasion, (d) no rebellions or serious internal tensions, (e) one attempt to assassinate the Sultan and some attempts to poison him, but no serious intrigues and no danger of a palace revolution at any time. Concerning the other side of the picture, the chief feature of Firuz's administration was that it gave security to all depending upon the government—to the members of the royal family, who for the first and last time in medieval Indian history stood in no danger from the occupant of the throne, and to all the employees of the state, high and low, who were guaranteed that their offices would go to their sons and who, in practice, found that the government would only exercise a formal supervision over their accounts.

If the *Insha* of Ain-i Mahru is any guide to the professions of the age, all government officers prided themselves on the fact that they injured no human beings; they only plundered the state and the reign of Firuz Shah is perhaps the greatest age of corruption in the whole history of medieval India. Firuz Shah was a man of average intelligence but of great and varied experience. He was not a weak man but neither was he of the stuff of which despots are made. The reasons for his failure and success can be put in one simple sentence: *He injected into the hideous, but necessary, institutions of the despotic Muslim monarchy the principles of the Quran, of the Prophet's teachings and of the humanity common to all peoples and all religions, which were quite incompatible with the basic principles of that monarchy.* He prided himself on the fact that the prestige of his government was not only maintained but increased without the use of 'fear and terror'. It could do so during his reign, but after him everything would collapse. Firuz was not ignorant of what was happening; he saw but overlooked as a matter of policy. It was not in his nature to be cruel and despotic; and for a man of his *character and capacity* no other policy was possible.

On the day after his accession the army marched in proper order. Three days later he was in a position to send a contingent, which defeated and drove away the Mongols and set free the Indians they had captured. The Thattians also retired. At Siwistan, where the army stopped for a week or more, the Friday *Khutba* was read in Firuz Shah's name for the first time. The most important state function was to inform the country of Firuz Shah's accession. For this purpose, first, a general proclamation was issued for circulation in the whole country; secondly, special messengers with robes of honour were sent to important officers. In particular, Saiyyid Alaud-din Rasuldar and Malik Saifuddin *shahna-i pil* were sent to Khwaja-i Jahan at Delhi. Foreigners from Muslim countries, whom the late Sultan had collected together, were given such presents as was possible and requested to leave for their homelands. Firuz appointed his step-brother, Ibrahim, as *amir-i hajib* or *barbek*, and his slave, Bashir, as *ariz-i mamalik* with the title of Imadul Mulk. 'The body of the late Sultan had been put in a coffin which, with the royal *chatr* mounted on it, was placed on the back of an elephant and taken to Delhi with the army.' Barani is probably right in stating that at Siwistan and throughout his march, Firuz won over religious people by calling on mystics of distinction, praying at the tombs of saints and restoring the land-grants of the learned and the pious.

The army proceeded to Bhakkar and thence to Uchch. Soon after starting from Uchch Firuz received information of the 'rebellion' of

Khwaja-i Jahan, the wazir, at Delhi. He had on 1 April 1351 (8 Safar A.H. 752) placed a boy of six on the throne with the title of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud, declared him to be the son of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq and sent messages to all important officers asking them to accept the boy-king. Firuz kept the information secret till he had reached Multan, where the matter could be properly discussed and the army kept pacified. But when the facts were revealed, all officers present asked with one voice: 'Sultan Muhammad had only a daughter, who was born in the reign of Tughluq Shah; he had no son; how, then, has Ahmad Ayaz found a son for him?'

REBELLION OF KHWAJA-I JAHAN AHMAD AYAZ

'Ahmad Ayaz, the wazir, had reached the age of eighty-four; he was a mere civilian and had never shot an arrow or mounted a troublesome horse.' Why should such a man embark on a hopeless rebellion when the amirs and the army had accepted Firuz Shah? Afif admits that people in general believed that Ahmad Ayaz had rebelled after hearing of the election of Firuz Shah, but affirms that this opinion was not correct. On the basis of his own investigations and of what he had heard from Kishwar Khan, son of Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan, Afif gives the following account of what happened. Khwaja-i Jahan had a confidential slave, Malih Tutun, whom he had sent to Sultan Muhammad. Tutun left the army-camp when it was being plundered by the Mongols and gave the following report to Khwaja-i Jahan at Delhi: 'Sultan Muhammad is dead; the Mongols have attacked the main market and plundered it; the whereabouts of Firuz and Tatar Khan are not known; and it is not certain whether they have fallen into the hands of the Mongols or have been killed.' Khwaja-i Jahan wept both for Sultan Muhammad and Firuz. 'There was', Afif assures us, 'a great affection between Khwaja-i Jahan and Firuz Shah—such affection that no third person could come in between them; the wife of Khwaja-i Jahan used to call Firuz Shah her son and did not observe *purdah* from him.' So believing that Firuz Shah was dead, 'Khwaja-i Jahan took an initiative (*ijtihad*) and placed the boy on the throne.' This initiative proved to be an error, but most of the officers at Delhi seem to have agreed with him at the time.⁴

Now the plan of putting a minor on the throne as a temporary measure and removing him afterwards was a well-known trick of the middle ages; with a minor on the throne, a regent (*naib-i mamlakat*) elected by the nobles could act with full or absolute powers and the machine of the state kept working. Still Khwaja-i Jahan had acted

⁴ Habib & Afsar, *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 159-60.

too hastily; without waiting for further and more reliable evidence, he had taken upon himself the very grave responsibility of putting a boy of unknown paternity on the throne barely ten days after Sultan Muhammad's death. Secondly, when messengers conveying the news of Firuz Shah's accession reached Delhi, the majority of the high officers, led by the naib wazir, Malik Maqbul Qawamul Mulk, vowed allegiance to the new Sultan and informed him of the fact in their confidential letters.⁵ Khwaja-i Jahan should also have vowed allegiance to the new Sultan and sent 'the boy' to him as a token of his loyalty. Whether this would have saved him from destruction may be doubted, but his action would have been technically correct. But instead of confessing his error, Khwaja-i Jahan pursued three contradictory policies. Firstly, he prepared for war. There was little money in the treasury; so he had to sell the gold and silver plate and the precious jems of the state. But all he could collect was 20,000 unreliable and inexperienced horsemen. Secondly, (according to the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*) he also attempted fruitless negotiations. Firuz's reply was flat—If Khwaja-i Jahan submitted, he would be forgiven. 'If the late Sultan had a son', Firuz declared, 'it could not have been kept a secret from me and no one could have nurtured him with more affection and family feeling.' Lastly, he was always thinking of submission and expected Firuz Shah to forgive him for the sake of old days; even if the worst was to happen, he was a disciple of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya and would know how to die.

On Thursday 23 August 1351 (29 Jamadi II A.H. 751) the naib wazir, Qawamul Mulk, along with Amir-i Azam Qatbugha fled from Delhi and joined the Sultan at Agroha, a place near which the city of Fathabad was constructed later. It was a fortunate day for Firuz; his son, Fath Khan, was born on that day; also on the same day (according to the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*) news was brought to him that three of his officers—Malik Neki Sardawatdar, Malik Bahram Ghazni and Malik Nawa—had at last succeeded in putting the rebel, Taghi, to

5 The rift among the nobles at Delhi could only have occurred after the accession of Firuz Shah was known. According to the *Mubarak Shahi* (120) the following officers preferred to follow the Khwaja-i Jahan—Malik Nathu, who was appointed *hajib-i khas*, Azam Malik Husamuddin, Shaikhzada Bustami, Malik Hasan Multani and Malik Husamuddin Adhak.

The officers who, in addition to Qawamul Mulk, sent confidential letters of loyalty to Firuz Shah are listed as follows—Sharful Mulk, Malik Dilan, Amir Qatbugha, Malik Khaljin, Malik Hasan *amir-i miran*, Qazi-i Misr, Khwaja Bahauddin Thekara, Malik Muntakhab Balkhi and Malik Badruddin Butahari.

Some names in the first list are given by Barani; *Mubarak Shahi* does not quote any authority for the second list, but some officers in this list are found holding offices under Firuz.

death. Firuz's position had been getting stronger since he had left Multan. The population at large, including the Hindu rais, accepted him. Mahmud Bek, governor of Sunam, Khudawandzada Qawamuddin and Ainul Mulk Mahru from Multan reached his camp at various places, and at Dipalpur he was joined by thirty-six rais. At Ajudhan he prayed at the tomb of Shaikh Fariduddin Ganj-i Shakar, and at Sarsati (the modern Sirsa), which Afif puts as 90 *karohs* from Delhi, the grocers and bankers presented him with several lakhs of *tankas*. Firuz badly needed the money for his soldiers, but he would only accept it as a loan and ordered Bashir to see to its repayment after reaching Delhi. At Hansi he made the mistake of calling on the famous mystic, Shaikh Qutbuddin Munawwar, at the wrong time—that is, just when the Shaikh had come out of his house and was going to the Friday prayer—and got a well-deserved reprimand.

Khwaja-i Jahan decided to submit; starting after the Friday prayer next day (14 August), he reached the royal camp at Dhanswa, the next stage after Agroha. Here, after the manner of criminals who are offering themselves to justice, Khwaja-i Jahan, with a skull cap instead of a *pagree* or turban on his head and with a sword tied to his neck, took his stand among the *hajibs* (attendants) at Firuz Shah's afternoon court.

Firuz desired to forgive Khwaja-i Jahan and to appoint him to the post of wazir again. But his design was definitely vetoed by his officers. It is a safe surmise that one of the chief topics discussed by the high officers during their long march must have been the policy of the late Sultan and the relation of the officers and the crown. Firuz Shah had till now only made two high appointments; all other officers were men of Sultan Muhammad's regime, whom Firuz had confirmed. They had served the late Sultan loyally, but one and all they were determined that his despotic ways should not be continued, and that the high officers must regain their privilege of advising the Sultan. There had been too many tensions, too many rebellions, too much bloodshed. They were united in demanding that Khwaja-i Jahan as the greatest representative of the old regime must be destroyed. Coming to Firuz's court, they requested for an audience through Bashir, the minister of war. Since Bashir had been brought up as a slave by Firuz, he could act as their mouthpiece without any misunderstanding. When Firuz Shah admitted them, they showed excessive reverence: 'The *Haj* was binding on every Muslim; they wanted his permission to go on the sacred pilgrimage. Small faults, like revenue offences, may be pardoned, but not treason.' The term *Haj* meant everything but the real pilgrimage; officers could paralyse the government by simultaneous resignations or by refusal to obey orders; it also implied possibility of rebellion.

'Firuz Shah', says Afif, 'was intelligent enough to understand that unanimously and with one voice they were demanding the destruction of Khwaja-i Jahan. *He became pale with excessive thought and caution.*' The meeting probably ended with the formula 'that the king would take thought of it'. Firuz reflected on the matter for several days. During the reigns of Iltutmish, Balban, Alauddin or Sultan Muhammad, the nobles would not have ventured to behave like this. And if they did, the leaders would have been publicly executed and the rest terrorized into abject submission. But Firuz may also have reflected that many rulers of Delhi, like Aram Shah and the successors of Iltutmish, had been elected and destroyed by the nobles. For the present he had no alternative but to yield; but as soon as possible, he had to frame a policy that would prevent the conflict of the officers and the crown. Firuz summoned Bashir and asked him to inform the officers confidentially that they could deal with Khwaja-i Jahan as they liked. The officers informed Khwaja-i Jahan on behalf of the Sultan that the *iqta* of Samana had been assigned to him. But they also sent behind him Mahmud Bek Sher Khan. 'He has been sent to destroy me', Khwaja-i Jahan said, and decided to anticipate the event. He put on the *kulah* (cap) and *dastar* (turban) he had received from Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, recited two *rakats* of prayer and then, after he had put his forehead on the ground and was reciting the 'Oath of Affirmation', a kindly friend, whom he had requested to do so, took a sharp sword and cut off his head.

The road to Delhi was now clear. Firuz established himself in the royal palace in Rajab (August-September 1351). Barani assures us that the death penalty was only inflicted on four or five persons—Malik Nathu Sondhar, Hasan (Multani), Husam Adhak, and two slaves of Ahmad Ayaz—but the innocent members of their families were not injured. Shaikhzada Bustami, who was a brother-in-law of the late Sultan, was asked to leave the country.

FIRST ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS AND REFORMS

Firuz's entry into Delhi was celebrated for twenty-one days and this period was observed during all future celebrations. But the Sultan had to attend to urgent work immediately. The 'reforms' or administrative and legislative measures of the reign are not dated, but in some cases the sequence is clear and in other cases it will be convenient to follow the order of our authorities.

(i) *Washing of the Loan-Registers:*

Khwaja Fakhr Shadi, the *majmu'adar* of accounts in the wizarat (or finance department), had kept his papers in order. His registers

and lists, according to Afif, gave the names of all persons to whom the late Sultan had advanced loans (*sondhar*) amounting to two crores of *tankas*, and also the names of persons to whom Khwaja-i Jahan had given the cash, gold and silver plate and the precious jems of the state. As in duty bound, Fakhr Shadi placed the lists in the hands of Firuz Shah. Firuz Shah was perplexed and consulted Qawamul Mulk. 'There is widespread distress and want', Qawamul Mulk remarked, 'it is, therefore, inadvisable to attempt the recovery of the loans; not a copper coin will be really recovered and the only result of the attempt to recover will be *badnami*.' He suggested, further, that all these registers should be washed away before the royal *darbar* in the presence of the old and the young'. The Sultan accepted the advice and the registers were duly washed in water to assure all concerned that the claims of the state had been cancelled. Many dishonest persons at Delhi, who had spent away the money loaned to them for rehabilitating agriculture, were satisfied.

(ii) *Appointment of Malik Maqbul Qawamul Mulk as Wazir:*

On the same day Malik Maqbul was appointed wazir. The *farman* of appointment is general in character; it asks all officers to obey him but does not declare the post to be hereditary.⁶ His full titles and name as given by the *farman* were—'Masnad-i A'ali Ulugh Qutlugh Azam-i Humayun Khan-i Jahan Maqbul'.

Afif gives the following account of his early career. 'The Khan-i Jahan was from Telang and his name before his conversion to Islam was Kannu (flower). He was a man of the greatest honour in his own community and had a position of distinction before the Rai of Telang. Muhammad bin Tughluq captured the Rai and sent him to Delhi, but the Rai died on the way. Khan-i Jahan came obediently to Muhammad bin Tughluq and recited the 'Oath of Affirmation' (*kalima*). The Sultan gave him the name of Maqbul (Accepted) and treated him with favour. Later on, when the Sultan saw all signs of intelligence and wisdom in Khan-i Jahan, he appointed him naib wazir for the city of Delhi and opened the door of promotion to him. When Khan-i Jahan sealed a document, his name was inscribed as follows—'Maqbul, the slave of Muhammad Tughluq'. Though the distinguished wazir did not know how to read and write, still he was the wisest of men and through his wisdom he adorned the capital of the empire. The title of Qawamul Mulk was given to him during his early career. The governorship of

⁶ *Insha-i Mahru*, 8-11 (No. 2). The only reason for incorporating a few *farmans* in this collection and a few forms, with the names left blank, seems to have been that they were drafted by Ain-i Mahru.

Multan was assigned to him and later on he was appointed naib wazir of the empire; Khwaja-i Jahan was the wazir of Sultan Muhammad.

'Khan-i Jahan, as naib wazir, made laws and regulations and put the department of revenue in perfect order. The governors of the provinces had not much fear of Khwaja-i Jahan but they stood in mortal dread of Khan-i Jahan. If Khwaja-i Jahan wanted the governor of a territory to be severely treated, he handed him over to Khan-i Jahan; and the latter treated him with excessive sternness in accordance with the regulations. Also when Khwaja-i Jahan, a religious man, retired from the *diwan* (for his devotions), Khan-i Jahan sat in his place; he dealt severely with the governors and collected plenty of cash and commodities for the royal treasury. Khwaja-i Jahan had nothing but the title of wazir; all the work of the *diwan-i wizarat* (revenue ministry) was carried on through the experience and intelligence of Khan-i Jahan.'⁷

Concerning his work as wazir, Afif writes: 'In accordance with the traditions of the great wazirs, Khan-i Jahan sat before the pillow of his office every day; he carefully investigated the accounts of the governors and other officers and realized the share of the treasury. The income and expenditure of the treasury were placed daily before him. He insisted and reinsisted that money beyond reckoning should be daily put into the treasury. If on any day the money received by the treasury was not sufficient, he would be extremely harsh towards all his officers and would go without food owing to his thoughtfulness and anxiety. "The stability of the government", he would say on such occasions, "depends upon the treasury. If there is not enough money in the treasury, or if the money is improperly spent, the foundations of the government will be shaken. If, God forbid, the treasury of a far-sighted king becomes empty owing to any cause, the maintenance of the government becomes impossible." For this reason the wazir was bent on collecting treasures night and day.'⁸ Khan-i Jahan, as wazir, collected a *haram* of two thousand slave-girls and had plenty of children. Firuz made him an annual grant of eleven thousand *tankas* for every son and five *thousand tankas* for every daughter.

Khan-i Jahan seems to have taken no part in the demand for the destruction of his predecessor. Firuz Shah, who must have known him intimately during the late reign, decided to appoint him wazir soon after. Till Khan-i Jahan's death in 1368-69 (A.H. 770), the Sultan and the wazir acted in the closest cooperation with each other. Khan-i Jahan carried on the day-to-day administration of the country

⁷ Afif, 394-96; translated in Habib and Afsar, *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanat*, 168.

⁸ Afif, 397-98; translated in *Political Theory*, 166-67.

and acted as a buffer between the king and the bureaucracy. He worked hard, bore many insults of the nobles with patience and saw to it that the Sultan's dignity and honour were maintained. Firuz, on his part, allowed the wazir to enjoy many privileges which had been royal monopolies in the past. Both showed the greatest possible regard for the other in public. 'The real king of Delhi', Firuz Shah used to say, 'is Azam-i Humayun Khan-i Jahan.' But Khan-i Jahan never forgot his position. The Sultan's favour had made him rich and he could afford to be personally incorruptible, but he knew that his power had no foundation except in the Sultan's favour. He was sternly loyal and there was no question of his not referring any important matter to the Sultan or evading his orders. The policy of the state was a matter for the Sultan but he would give due weight to the wazir's advice.

(iii) *Prohibition of Bloodshed and Torture:*

Ziyauddin Barani says that the first great factor which contributed to the stability of Firuz Shah's government was the prohibition of *siyasat*. In his *Fatawa-i Jahandari* Barani explains that *siyasat* originally meant 'putting things right' but was used in his time generally for the infliction of the death penalty. The matter is clarified in a small booklet, the *Futuhat* of Firuz Shah, which, according to the *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, was an inscription put up by Firuz Shah on an octagonal tower inside the Jama Mosque of Firuzabad; the internal evidence of the work clearly reveals that it was meant for a purely Sunni Muslim audience with the artisans forming a majority.⁹

'First, in past times much Muslim blood has been shed, and varieties of tortures have been used, such as cutting hands, feet, ears and noses, plucking the eyes, pouring molten lead down the throats of men, breaking the bones of hands, feet and chests by strokes of iron nails, burning (living) men in fire, flaying alive, thrashing by whips with iron nails, cutting a man into two with a saw and other kinds of mutilations. God strengthened my heart and I resolved in gratitude for His favours that no Muslim blood shall be shed without just cause or excuse, *that there shall be no tortures, and that no human beings shall be mutilated.*'¹⁰

⁹ Hodivala, *Studies*, 339-40. Afif (20) says that this inscription was in the Kushak-i Nuzul before the *darbar* of the city of Firuzabad, but this is probably an error. Firuz Shah put up many inscriptions about his hunting feats, etc. possibly (as Afif guesses) because he could not find a proper historian for his reign after Barani's death. The Hindus would not care much about what was said against them in Persian inside a mosque, but the Shias and other non-Sunnis would certainly be interested in destroying the Sultan's inscription of which the *Futuhat* is a copy.

¹⁰ Persian text, edited by Professor S. A. Rashid, Aligarh, 1954.

The punishment of crimes had for centuries been a function of state law. Since the *shari'at* did not recognize monarchy, it prescribed no punishment for treason or crimes against the king. These barbarous measures were taken mostly against rebels and persons from whom state dues had to be realized. The reference to Musalmans is relevant insofar as they were almost the only offenders with reference to these two crimes. 'All these harsh things were done', Firuz continues, 'so that the affairs of the government may be put right by injecting fear and terror into the hearts of the people. Owing to Divine kindness in the reign of this weak person, these terroristic severities have been replaced by mildness, kindness and affection. The fear and prestige of the government has increased in the hearts of the people without resorting to the death-penalty, flogging and the infliction of pain through tortures.'¹¹

With reference to their non-political crimes the Musalmans were to be punished in accordance with the judgements of the qazis, and Afif assures us that Firuz was relentless in the punishment of thefts and murders. Firuz Shah's abolition of torture is to be approved, but unfortunately he put nothing in its place for political offences. So embezzlers of public revenue went unpunished. *Imprisonment as a universal form of punishment would have been the proper remedy, but a national system of state-prisons is not contemplated by the Muslim scriptures and had not been evolved by state law.* It has come to us from the West and is the result of Benthamite reforms during the nineteenth century.

(iv) *Deeds of Forgiveness for Sultan Muhammad:*

Both Firuz and Khan-i Jahan had been favoured and promoted by the late Sultan. They wanted to manifest their great respect for him and also to make it clear that their policy would be different. The following lines of the *Futuhat*, therefore, require no comment. 'Further, God in His kindness has enabled this sinful creature by payment of money on behalf of the late Sultan to get deeds of satisfaction concerning the receipt of compensations (*istirza*), duly witnessed, from the heirs of all persons who, according to Divine destiny, had been put to death during the reign of the late king, Sultan Muhammad, my master, leader and patron, and also from those persons who had been deprived of their eyes, noses, hands and feet. These letters of good-will (*khushnudi*), placed in a box, were put at the head of the cenotaph of the late Sultan (May God hallow his grave!) in the Darul Aman; so that the grace of God may draw my

¹¹ For a contemporary discussion of punishment for political offences, see Habib and Afsar, *Political Theory*, 55-63, (Advice XIII of Barani's *Fatawa-i Jahandari*).

master and patron in His mercy and with His favours reconcile these people to my patron.'¹² When the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* was written in 1370-71 (A.H. 772) this box was still there.

(v) *Taxation according to Production:*

According to Barani, the second factor that contributed to the stability of Firuz Shah's government was the order that *khiraj* (land-tax) and *jizya* (other taxes) be levied according to produce (*bar hukm-i hasil*).

It must be clearly understood that according to the *shari'at* books of the middle ages *the jizya meant a personal tax on a non-Muslim for remaining a non-Muslim*. But by Barani, Amir Khusrau, Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya and others, *the term jizya is used to mean any tax, which is not a land-tax*. In a story related by Shaikh Nizamuddin and recorded by Amir Hasan, a tax-collector asks a Muslim mystic, who had brought virgin land under his plough: 'Either show me a miracle or pay the *jizya*'. *Jizya in the sense of the medieval shari'at has not been levied in India except by Aurangzeb*. When a medieval writer talks of the *jizya* as being levied on non-Muslims, he is confusing the *shari'at*-sense of the term with *its actual meaning during the middle ages in India as a tax, which is not a land-tax*.

'The income (*mahsul*) of the kingdom', says Afif, 'was considered afresh (*az sar bastah*)'. The duty of fixing this income was assigned to the late Khwaja Husamuddin Junaid. He travelled through the kingdom for six years and according to *the rule of inspection (bar hukm-i mushahida)* he fixed the income of the whole realm at six crore and seventy-five lakhs of *tankas*. During the forty years¹³ of Firuz Shah's reign this was the total income of the Delhi sultanat.'¹⁴

Mr. Moreland says that he has not come across the term, 'rule of inspection' (*hukm-i mushahida*), anywhere else in the literature of the period. Junaid must have had a large staff with him and his figures were obviously based on a rough estimate. Afif must not be understood to mean that the income of the country did not increase. There was an increase in agricultural production and in the income of some of the assignees. Junaid had obviously calculated the share of the state in terms of *tankas* and *jitals*. The governors may have had to revise this owing to change in the price of grain. Thus we find Ain-i Mahru, governor of Multan, stating at one place that he had ordered the assignments of the soldiers to be paid half in silver and half in kind. Later on, while keeping this rule for the 'old peasants', he

¹² *Futuhāt*, Prof. Rashid's edition, 16.

¹³ Only 32 years of the reign would be left after Junaid's work.

¹⁴ Afif, 94.

ordered 'new peasants' to pay the whole of the state share in the grain they produced. But, as Moreland points out, the share of the produce taken by the state is not recorded by our authorities anywhere, and this was probably due to the fact that there was no uniform rule with reference to the state share of the produce for the whole country.

(vi) *Assignment of Land Revenue :*

Afif claims that Firuz Shah was generous in assignments of land revenue for livelihood (*nan*); that he made assignments of 10,000, 5,000 and 2,000 *tankas*; and that the whole army was paid by assignments of land revenue (*wajh*). This was a peculiar procedure of Firuz Shah. The earlier kings of Delhi had not permitted this. 'Sultan Alauddin', he says, 'declared that a village should not be assigned in salary (*wajh*); there may be 200 or 300 men living in a village and they would be under one assignee (*wajhdar*); and if a few assignees combined, they could create trouble. For this reason Alauddin never assigned a village to anyone but paid his whole army in cash.' Afif goes on to declare that Firuz assigned 'all villages, *khatats* (districts) and towns of the kingdom to the army' and then attributes the financial survival of kingdom to the fact that Firuz Shah was a saint.¹⁵ All this is sheer exaggeration and nonsense. *It must be clearly understood that the convention, or rather the law, of Firuz Shah's reign was that when land revenue was given on paper to an assignee, the government officers in charge of revenue collection would only give him one-half of the amount assigned. The collection of land revenue continued to be a function of the state. Further, these assignments must have been made in 'tankas' and 'jitals'; so with the increase of agricultural production, the state-half of the land revenue would keep on increasing.* A large number of soldiers were paid in cash, as Afif himself admits elsewhere.¹⁶

Soldiers and military officers to whom assignments were made could either go to the villages with their assignment-orders (*itlaqs*) and there the officers-in-charge would give to them *half the amount (of cash) specified in the assignment-order*, or, in the alternative, they could sell the assignment-orders to brokers in the city and get *one-third* of this amount from them. Many brokers became rich by purchasing assignment-orders 'or *itlaqs*'.¹⁷ The army officers were not

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 94-96.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 220.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 296-97. Mr. Moreland was needlessly hesitant about the meaning of this passage. Ain-i Mahru in his *Insha* makes it clear that it was he, who as governor, saw to the payment of the soldiers, half in silver and half in kind (75-76).

given administrative charge of the villages. Ain-i Mahru, however, gives us one case in which the assignees had illegally taken charge of a village on behalf of one Ziyauddin, who was absent owing to military service in Lakhnauti. Ain-i Mahru records his serious complaints against them. They even levied the *jizya* on the Hindus without state authority.¹⁸

Concerning non-military assignments, a clear distinction must be made between assignments of land revenue to government officers from the villages and territories under their jurisdiction, and assignments to other persons—mystics, *ulama*, pensioners, etc.

There was no provision in Firuz Shah's system to prevent his officers from making enormous fortunes by overtaking the peasants in lands assigned to them and withholding money due to the state. A few of these great fortunes, based on corruption, are recorded by Afif with great regret.

But it was different with other assignees. Ain-i Mahru tells us that three lakhs of *tankas* (a year) were assigned to various persons from the revenues of Multan. He told the assignees that he could put to their credit inhabited villages with cultivated and uncultivated lands; the assignments from the cultivated lands would suffice for their livelihood, and the uncultivated lands would serve to maintain their claims. 'This is possible, but if they demand everything in cash, that is quite impossible.'

The assignment system of Firuz Shah and the official corruption, which it shielded, were the two greatest causes of the fall of the sultanat. The third greatest cause was the declaring of all offices to be hereditary.

(vii) *Hereditary Assignments:*

Afif continues: 'After Firuz Shah had given the income of the whole realm (?) in assignments (*wajh*) to the army,¹⁹ he made another rule: "If an army man died, his office (*istiqamat*) would go permanently to his son; if he had no son, then to his son-in-law; if he had no son-in-law, then permanently to his slave; if he had no slave, then permanently to his women." This rule was maintained throughout the forty years of Firuz Shah's reign.'²⁰ Many years later Firuz issued an additional *farman* to the effect that a soldier who was 'too old to ride' would be kept in service, but he was to send as his 'agent' his

¹⁸ *Insha-i Mahru*, No. 28, 62-63.

¹⁹ This, as has been shown, was absolutely impossible. It is probably a slip of the pen.

²⁰ Afif, 96. Afif admits that Firuz reigned for thirty-eight (lunar) years only, but nevertheless repeatedly refers to his reign as covering forty years.

son to serve in his place; if he had no son, then his son-in-law; and if he had no son-in-law, then his slave.²¹

Further, while Afif only refers to posts in the army being made hereditary, Firuz in his *Futuhāt* claims that he applied this principle to all his officers. 'When a person holding an office (*ashab-i shughl*) died, I transferred his office and its dignities to his son, and the status, perquisites and dignities of the office were not reduced in any way.'²²

Lastly, if a government employee left more than one son, his private property would be divided among his heirs after his death, but it was for the state to decide, in the case of higher offices at least, as to which of his sons would be assigned his office. After these and other 'reforms' to which reference will be made had been implemented, all employees of the state had good reasons for praying for Firuz's long life and good health. He had given them great guarantees but they were sure to lapse after him.

(viii) *Names of Past Kings in the Friday 'Khutba':*

Hitherto only the name of the reigning Sultan was referred to in the Friday *Khutba* (sermon). Firuz directed after his arrival in Delhi that reference to the following sultans should be made before his name in the Friday sermon—Shihabuddin bin Sam, Shamsuddin Iltutmish, Nasiruddin Mahmud, Ghiyasuddin Balban, Jalaluddin Firuz, Alauddin Khalji, Qutbuddin Mubarak, Ghiyasuddin Tughluq Shah and Muhammad bin Tughluq. The non-inclusion of Qutbuddin Aibek is surprising. At the time when Afif composed his work, the names of two successors of Firuz—(Nasiruddin) Muhammad bin Firuz Shah and Alauddin Sikandar Shah—had been added to this list in the Friday sermon.

It was Firuz Shah's custom to go to see Khudawandzada, sister of Muhammad bin Tughluq, after every Friday prayer. Some time before Firuz started on his first Bengal campaign, she and her son took advantage of this privilege to attempt his assassination by placing armed men in the neighbouring rooms and at the gate. But Firuz Shah was warned, probably by a sign from Khusrau Malik, the lady's second son; he left her room in haste, took his sword from his maternal uncle, Rai Bhirhu Bhatti, marched bravely to his own palace and ordered Khudawandzada's residence to be searched. The armed men were caught and they confessed. Khudawandzada's enormous

²¹ Afif, 302-3.

²² *Futuhāt*, Prof. Rashid's edition, 18 (para 25). It has to be added that in all cases referred to by Afif, the high offices, to which he generally confines himself, went to the sons of the deceased officers.

properties, owing to which she had hoped to put her son on the throne, were confiscated and she was directed to lead a secluded life; her son, Dawar Malik, was exiled, and her second son, Khusrau Malik, was directed to pay his respects to the king like other persons on the first of every month.²³

FIRST BENGAL CAMPAIGN²⁴

Not much space can be given to the campaigns of Firuz Shah in a general history of India. He was not the stuff conquerors are made of; he did not delight in leading his people to martyrdom; killing enemy soldiers, who had only enlisted for wages, was for him just 'multitudinous murder'. Still Sultan Muhammad had lost Ma'abar, the Deccan and Bengal, and Firuz was determined to prove that no part of the remaining empire of Delhi could be seized by a neighbouring power. Under the circumstances of the time he could only do so by taking the offensive. He led two campaigns to distant Ikdala in Bengal and on both occasions he made peace without attempting annexation. He attacked the Hindu rulers of Orissa (Jajnagar) and Kangra, but concluded treaties honourable to both sides on the principle of *status quo ante bellum*. His longest campaign led him to Thatta and thence to Gujarat; he bitterly regretted the sufferings of his soldiers and determined not to go on a campaign again. But his purpose had been served; after 1367 he could reign in peace with no fear of attacks by neighbouring rulers. He neither gained nor lost any territory and he never tried to develop 'a taste for conquests'.

When Firuz ascended the throne, Lakhnauti and Sonargaon had been brought under the power of Haji Ilyas Sultan Shamsuddin,

²³ I have tried to follow Afif so far as possible, but the matter is not without difficulties owing to the errors of the copyists of Afif, and the errors of Afif himself, who confuses Dawar Malik with Khusrau Malik. Barani (351) says that Sadruddin Arif, the head qazi of Delhi in the reign of Alauddin Khalji, was the father of Dawar Malik and the son of a daughter of Minhaj Jurjani. The *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi* (98) says that Muhammad bin Tughluq gave a daughter of his in marriage to Maulana Yusuf and gave the Maulana the title of Dawar Malik. Sultan Muhammad had only one daughter, who was born in the reign of Tughluq Shah. Dr. Riyazul Islam, after considering all authorities, sums up as follows: 'Dawar Malik was the son of Khudawandzada (sister of Sultan Muhammad) by Qazi Sadruddin Arif. Dawar's personal name was Maulana Yusuf, but when Sultan Muhammad married Yusuf to his daughter, Yusuf was given the title of Dawar Malik. Khusrau Malik was in all probability the son of Khudawandzada by another husband; it is very unlikely that he was her husband.' Dr. Riyazul Islam claims that he agrees with Professor Hodivala, who writes: 'Yusuf must have been chosen as the Sultan's son-in-law because he was the Sultan's sister's son' (*Studies*, 309).

²⁴ Afif, 109-24; Barani, 586-97; *Strat-i Firuz Shahi*, f. 15(a)-17(b); *Insha-i Mahru*, 15-17; *Mubarak Shahi*, 124-25.

who was given to eating *bhang* and was suffering from leprosy (*pars*). The capital had been removed from Lakhnauti to Pandua. In the past revolutions had taken place in Bengal without any reference to Delhi, and Haji Ilyas thought he could extend his power in the west. He attacked Tirhut and then marched *via* Banaras to Bahraich on the pretence that he had to pray for his recovery at the famous tomb of Salar Mas'ud Ghazi. It was feared that, on the same pretext, he might also come to Delhi to pray at the more sacred tomb of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya.²⁵

After appointing Khan-i Jahan as *naib-i ghibat* (regent in absence), Firuz Shah started on his march against Bengal on 8 November 1353 (10 Shawwal A.H. 754). The rais of eastern UP joined his army with their soldiers; the most important of these chiefs was Udai Singh, the Rai of Gorakhpur and Champaran, who paid 20 lakhs of tribute that were due from him and got Firuz's favours in return. The Rai of Tirhut welcomed Firuz and consented to become a tributary as before, but he and his subordinate rais and ranas did not join the march. Firuz when starting had issued a proclamation, drafted by Ain-i Mahru, which seems to indicate a firm purpose that the country would be annexed. 'Firuz declared that he would not demand any land-tax or tribute during the current year; next year only the customary taxes would be demanded. The land assignments of Bengal government officers and of Hindu chiefs, who brought all their followers to him, would be doubled; but if they could bring half of their followers only, their assignments would be increased by 50 per cent. Firuz claimed right of inheritance (*irs*) over the land; so all inhabitants were deemed his subjects, and they need have no fear unless they took up arms against him.'²⁶

Haji Ilyas tried to prevent Firuz's eastward march by opposing him at a ford of the river Kosi, but Firuz got the better of him by marching about a hundred *karohs* north and crossing the stream at Jiam, with the help of the friendly rai of the place to whom he gave the privilege of a *chatr*. Firuz's road to the heart of West Bengal was now clear. Ilyas had no alternative but to fly back to his capital, Pandua, and to take at least its leading inhabitants with him to Ikhdala.

Afif refers to Ikhdala as an island, on which there was a large mud fort and also a city, and he says there was a river seven *karohs* from it. According to the modern authorities, quoted by Professor Hodi-vala, the village of Ikhdala is in the Dhanjar pargana of Dinajpur

²⁵ *Strat-i Firuz Shahi*, 15(a)-17(b).

²⁶ *Insha-i Mahru*, 15-17, No. 6. (Summarised).

district; it is 23 miles north of Pandua in Malda district, 42 miles north of Lakhnauti or Gaur and 15 miles west of Ghoraghat on the Malda side of the river Tangan. 'Ikdala occupied an area of about 25 miles; it was enclosed within a broad moat, which was formed by linking up the Chiramati and the Buliya rivers by canals.'²⁷ Firuz Shah pitched his camp south of Ikdala about the end of April 1354, and directed his soldiers to construct a wooden stockade (*kath-garh*) round it. To understand Firuz's changed mental attitude we have to remember that the soldiers *on both sides* now consisted of three categories—Muslims, 'tax-paying' Hindus in the service of the Delhi or the Bengal government, and 'protected' Hindus who were in the service of their rais, and that the last category had definitely increased owing to the number of rais who had joined Firuz. A battle between soldiers was the utmost Firuz was prepared for; he would not permit his soldiers to plunder enemy civilians or to capture, rape and enslave Muslim women.

Ilyas had calculated that the rains would flood Firuz's camp and compel him to retreat. But Firuz's officers managed to deceive Ilyas by suddenly marching back seven *karohs* to the river-bank; to prove that they were in real flight, they burnt part of their baggage, left a few tents standing and bribed some *qalandars* to tell Ilyas that the army of Delhi was flying back in distress. Ilyas decided to pursue the retreating enemy and came out of Ikdala with 10,000 horsemen, 50 elephants and plenty of footmen. The Delhi army consisted of 90,000 horsemen, who were divided into three equal units commanded by Malik Wilan, the *amir-i shikar*, Malik Husam Nawa and Tatar Khan. Heavily out-numbered, the Bengal horsemen were defeated and fled back to Ikdala; the Delhi army captured the city of Ikdala but not the fort. Afif's statement that the footmen of Ilyas amounted to two lakhs and that 180,000 'good men of Bengal' were slain is an obvious exaggeration.

But Firuz had enough of killing. 'These poor men are dead today', he remarked with tear-filled eyes, 'because they wanted to find a means of livelihood for themselves and their families.' The *pardah*-keeping Muslim women appealed to him with their bared heads from the top of the Ikdala mud-ramparts, and he decided to end the war. 'If I allow my soldiers to capture these helpless women', he asked Tatar Khan, 'what difference will there be between me and the Mongols?' And he added, more pertinently, that the attempts of all previous sultans of Delhi to keep Bengal within their control had failed. He gave the name of *Azadpur* (Free-city) to Ikdala and

²⁷ Hodivala, *Studies*, 311-12.

marched back to Pandua, which he named *Firuzabad*. Before leaving the frontiers of Bengal, he ordered his soldiers to set free any Bengalis they may have captured; the Hindu chiefs were allowed to depart when their territories were reached; and Firuz entered Delhi in triumph on 1 September 1354 (12 Sha'ban A.H. 755). As symbols of victory he could show forty-seven out of the fifty elephants captured from Haji Ilyas along with some horses as well as the officers of Ilyas. Some treaty with Ilyas must have been made, for we find the two rulers exchanging presents till Ilyas's death. It is also a fair guess that the officers of Bengal were allowed to go home.

ACHIEVEMENTS IN CIVIL ENGINEERING 28

The real sphere of Firuz's genius—for he had a genius—was his capacity for construction, the putting up of buildings and the digging of canals. The subject of medieval architecture belongs to Vol. VI of the present series. Here Firuz's achievements, which in mass and in cost, exceeded that of all other sultans of Delhi will only be described or listed and no attempt will be made to assess their aesthetic or architectural value.

(i) *Early Repair Works:*

'One of God's favours to me', Firuz says in his *Futuhāt*, 'has been the fact that I have been able to repair and renew the buildings of past kings and great amirs, and I have given this repair-work precedence over my own constructions.' He gives the following list of the buildings he had repaired. (i) *The Jama Mosque of old Delhi*. (ii) *The Minar of Delhi*. 'It had been struck by lightning. It was made better than it had been before and also raised higher.' (iii) *The Shamsi Tank*. Dishonest people had filled up the channels that brought water to it; Firuz ordered these channels to be reopened. (iv) *The Ala-i Tank* (or *Hauz-i Khas*). It had been filled up with earth and become dry. People carried on agriculture within it; they had also dug wells in it and sold the water. Firuz ordered the tank to be dug up afresh. (v) *The Madrasa of Sultan Shamsuddin Iltutmish*. (vi) *The Jahan Panah*. 'The foundation of it had been laid by the late Sultan Muhammad Shah, my master and patron, by whom I was brought up and promoted. I completed it.'

Afif says that Firuz Shah never left Delhi for any considerable time without prostrating himself—that is, putting his forehead on the ground—before the tombs of the great shaikhs and great sultans of the past. In the *Futuhāt* Firuz claims that he repaired the mauso-

28 Afif, 124-37; Barani, 561-65; *Mubarak Shahi*, 125-26; *Futuhāt-i Firuz Shahi*, 12-15 (Professor Rashid's edition).

leums of the following: (a) *Shamsuddin Iltutmish*.²⁹ 'I had it repaired where necessary. Doors of sandalwood were put in. The pillars supporting the dome (of the mausoleum) had fallen down; I put better pillars than before. The *sahn* (floor) of the mausoleum had been left *kacha* at the time of construction; I had it made *pucca* (*gach-karda*). A staircase of carved stone leading to the dome was constructed and pillars of mortar supporting the four towers were built.' (b) *Sultan Mu'izzuddin (Bahram)*, son of Sultan Shamsuddin, at Malikpur. (c) *Sultan Ruknuddin (Firuz)*, son of Sultan Shamsuddin, at Malikpur. (d) *Sultan Jalaluddin*. (e) *Sultan Alauddin*. This was a large building, with a *madrasa* (college) attached, for the *Futuhāt* says: 'Doors of sandalwood were put in; and the wall of the *abdar-khana* (room for keeping water) and the western wall of the mosque, which is within the *madrasa*, down to the foundations were repaired as well as the floor.' (f) *Tajuddin Kafuri*. It is significant that Firuz says: 'He commanded fifty-two thousand horsemen and was a loyal servant.' (g) '*Darul Aman*, the mausoleum of my masters. I had sandalwood doors put in. An awning of cloth, which had covered the Holy Ka'aba, was put over their graves. The old endowments for the maintenance and repair of the mausoleum were confirmed and I made new assignments for carpets, lighting and other expenses of those who frequented the place.' (h) *Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya*. The Shaikh, according to his own wishes, was buried in an open plain, but Sultan Muhammad, according to the *Siyarul Auliya*, built a high dome over it. The *Futuhāt* says: 'I had doors and lattice-works (*ja'fariha*) of sandalwood put in. Golden chandeliers with golden chains were hung from the four corners of the dome. I constructed a new *Jama'at Khana* such as had not existed there before.' According to the *Siyarul Auliya* this *Jama'at Khana* was in the form of a quadrangle round the mausoleum in the rooms of which the Shaikh's disciples could live. Lastly, with reference to the 'madrasas, graves and *mazars* (mausoleums) of the great kings and great *shaikhs* of the past', Firuz confirmed the old grants and made new grants where necessary.³⁰

29 A line or two are missing here in Professor Rashid's printed text. We are not told here of the work done on the Madrasa of Iltutmish, and the heading, *Maqbrat-i Sultan Shamsuddunya waddin Iltutmish*, is also not given. It is difficult to identify Firuz's description with the grave and the room with a fallen dome, which are at present attributed to Iltutmish.

30 *Futuhāt-i Firuz Shahi*, 12-15. I have ignored what are obviously copyist errors—(i) Reference to the grave of Mu'izzuddin Sam at Delhi, (ii) attributing the construction of the Delhi Minar to Mu'izzuddin Sam, (iii) references to the graves of the sons and grandsons of Alauddin Khalji.

I have slightly changed the order in which the buildings have been listed in the *Futuhāt* so as to bring all mausoleums in one list.

(ii) *Early Buildings and Fathabad:*

Barani, who finished his work in the sixth year of Firuz's reign, refers to three constructions of the Sultan in Delhi. He does not tell us where the Jama Mosque built by Firuz was situated, but assures us that it was overcrowded in spite of competing mosques. The Madrasa-i Firuz Shahi was built by the side of the Hauz-i Ala-i and put in charge of Maulana Jalaluddin Rumi. The third structure above the Siri Dam, Barani says, may be called a palace (*qasr*) or a *khanqah* (house for mystics), but it would be most appropriate to call it a *madrassa*; it was put in charge of Maulana Saiyyid Najmuddin Samarqandi. Barani also says that the *hisar* (fort) of Fathabad between Hansi and Sarsati was completed while the foundations of the fort of Firuzabad by the side of the Jumna were laid. The *Mubarak Shahi* says that the Jama Mosque and the madrasa above the Hauz-i Khas (or Alauddin's Tank) were built in 1352 (A.H. 752).

(iii) *Construction of Hisar-Firuzah and the Canals:*

Some ten *karohs* from Hansi there were two villages: Laras-i Buzurg with 50 pastures and Laras-i Khurd with 40 pastures (*khark*).³¹ There was scarcity of water in the region; during the summer foreigners coming to India had to pay four *jitals* for a pot of water. Owing to paucity of rainfall only the coarse grains of the *kharif* season could be grown in the area; the wheat of the *rabi* crop requires more water than was available.

Firuz Shah spent two and a half years in constructing the fortified city of Hisar-Firuzah on the site of Laras-i Buzurg and irrigating the whole region by his canals. During this period he only paid short visits to Delhi.

Though Afif's father worked as a *shab-navis* (writer at night) during this period, a more detailed account of Firuz Shah's canal system is given by the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*. 'In A.H. 756 (1355) Firuz Shah went to Dipalpur and dug a canal from the Sutlej to Jahbaz (?), a distance of forty-eight *karohs*. Next year he dug a canal from the Jumna in the precincts of Mandal and Sirmur, and after causing the water of seven more canals to fall into it, he took it (i.e. the main canal) to Hansi and thence to Arasin (or Baralisan) and further on to the place where he built a strong fort, to which he gave the name of Hisar-Firuzah; he constructed a large tank near the royal palace (*kushak*) and filled it with water from this canal. He dug another canal from Kahkhar and took it, passing by the side of Sarsati (Sirsa) fort, to Harni Khera, and here he constructed a fort which he called

31 For the meaning of *khark* see Hodivala, *Studies*, 313-14.

Firuzabad. Another canal was dug from the Jumna at Budhai (or Budhni) to Hisar-Firuzah; it flowed into the tank there but was also taken further.'

A principle enunciated by Ain-i Mahru, as governor of Multan, was probably applied to the whole canal system. Building the main canals was the function of the state; the minors, feeders, etc., that took the water to the fields, would be constructed and maintained by state officers, but the cost of their construction and maintenance would have to be borne by the assignees or the cultivators. They had to pay for this or go without water.

The city of Hisar-Firuzah, as described by Afif, consisted of a rampart surrounded by a ditch; within the rampart Firuz constructed a royal palace (*kushak*) and a tank (*hauz*); the officers also built their houses there and Hisar-Firuzah became 'a large, populous and flourishing city'. It was made the capital of a province (*shiq*), which included the territories of Hansi, Agroha, Fathabad, Sarsati (Sirsa) up to Salura, Khizrabad and other areas. The charge of the province was given to Malik Wilan.

When the system had been put into working order, both the *kharif* and the *rabi* crops could be grown. The level of the subsoil water also rose and a well could be made by digging four *gaz* deep. An assembly of religious scholars declared that owing to the labour and capital he had put in, Firuz Shah had personal claims to *haqq-i shurb* (water-right) as distinct from the claims of the public treasury. This was interpreted to mean that he could claim about one-tenth of the gross produce of lands, which had been under some sort of cultivation before, and the whole revenue of villages the establishment of which had been made possible by his canals. Firuz's personal income from the canals was about two lakhs of *tankas* a year. But this was only a part of the king's personal income. 'No king of Delhi', says Afif, 'had so much personal property as Firuz Shah; ultimately a separate department with its own officers had to be established to take charge of his personal properties.'

(iv) *The City of Firuzabad on the Jumna:*

The canal-system apart, the greatest achievement of Firuz, his officers and his people in the sphere of construction was the city of Firuzabad (now extinct) in the Delhi area. The king first selected the village of Kawin on the Jumna as the proper site for his palace. Then his officers, great and small, began to build their houses in the city, and the rich members of the public also contributed to the growth of the city by building *pucca* houses. Twelve out of the eighteen areas (*mawazi*) that were included in the city of Firuzabad have been

enumerated by Afif—the town of Indpat, Serai of Malik Yar Parran, Serai of Shaikh Abu Bakr Tusi, the areas of Kawin, Kathiwara, Lahrawat, Andheoli, Serai Malika, mausoleum of Sultan Razia, Bihari, Mahrauli and Sultanpur. The city, when completed, extended for five *karohs* from Indpat to Firuz Shah's Kushak-i Shikar on the Ridge. *Karoh* after *karoh* the city was full of people. Afif enumerates eight jama mosques, each of which could accommodate a Friday congregation of about 10,000. There was a brisk movement of people over the five *karohs* that separated Firuzabad from old Delhi, and Afif gives us the following 'fixed charges' for transport—one seat in a cart, 4 *jitals*; hire of a buffalo or a bullock (*sutur*), 6 *jitals*; hire of a horse, 12 *jitals*; hire of a litter (*dula*), half a *tanka*. But Afif lived to see the almost total destruction of Firuzabad. 'God be praised!' he remarks, 'A city so great, so populous and so prosperous has, in accordance with Divine destiny, been ruined in a number of ways. Most of the inhabitants were destroyed by the (Timurid) Mongols and the survivors fled in various directions. All this is God's wisdom; complaining is not permitted. An order of Destiny cannot be deflected by any human foresight.' Today the *kotla* of Firuz Shah in New Delhi and his *kushak* on the Ridge are the sole remnants of Firuz Shah's great capital.

THE SECOND BENGAL CAMPAIGN³².

On the day of Id, Zil Hij A.H. 756 (17 December 1355) Firuz received the robes of honour and a *manshur* (order) assigning India to him from the Caliph Al-Hakim bi-Amrillah Abul Fath Abi Bakr bin Abi Rabi Sulaiman from the capital of Egypt. In 1357 Zafar Khan, a Persian by birth and a son-in-law of Sultan Fakhruddin of Sunargaon, came to Firuz Shah at Hisar-Firuzah with two elephants.³³ He complained that Haji Ilyas had attacked Sonargaon suddenly, put Fakhruddin to death and crushed all his followers. Zafar Khan could only reach Delhi by the sea-route; after going round the whole of the Indian peninsula, he had come to Delhi by way of Thatta.

³² Afif, 137-63; *Mubarak Shahi*, 126-28.

³³ So in the *Mubarak Shahi*; Afif says that he had one thousand (Bengali) horse-men and a large number of foot-soldiers. This seems improbable. Dr. Riyazul Islam rejects the detailed account of Zafar Khan's coming *via* Thatta and his audiences in Firuz's court, which Afif gives us, on the ground that it is 'chronologically absurd'. Fakhruddin was overthrown in 1340-41. What was Zafar Khan doing all these years? Zafar Khan's character and qualifications must have been well known in Delhi; otherwise he would not have been placed among the highest officers so soon after his arrival. His history during the preceding years remains to be discovered, but the Delhi government was obviously prepared to receive him on the basis of his known personal merits. He had no following and no influence to back him.

Zafar Khan, as the future was to show, was a man of ability and character. Firuz at the first interview gave him 30,000 *tankas* for 'washing his clothes'; later on he gave Zafar four lakhs of *tankas* for himself and his followers, confirmed him in the title of Zafar Khan and appointed him naib wazir. But as to Zafar Khan's request that justice should be done to him by the punishment of Haji Ilyas, Firuz said that the matter would require consideration. When Zafar Khan went to meet Khan-i Jahan at Delhi, he found him equally friendly. In 1358 (A.H. 759) the Mongols came up to Dipalpur, but were driven off by an army sent under Malik Qabul, the *sar-pardahdar*. In November 1358 (end of A.H. 759), Firuz's officers, who were carrying presents to Haji Ilyas, learnt on reaching Bihar that Ilyas had died and had been succeeded by his son, Sultan Sikandar. They asked Sultan Firuz for his instructions; he directed them to return the presents to Delhi, to hand over the horses to the imperial army in Bihar and to keep the Bengal envoys at Kara.

In 1359 (A.H. 760) Firuz Shah once more appointed Khan-i Jahan as *naib-i ghibat* and started for Bengal with 80,000 horsemen and 470 elephants. He had marched a few stages when Tatar Khan came to see him after the morning prayers, discovered the wine-vessels the Sultan had tried to hide, and extracted from him the promise that 'he would not touch any liquor while Tatar Khan was in the camp'. Firuz considered that Tatar's attitude had been too presumptuous and he also wished to regain his freedom; consequently, he sent Tatar Khan as governor of Hisar-Firuzah after a few days. Marching by way of Awadh and Kanauj, Firuz spent six months (including the monsoon season) in building the town of Jaunpur, named after his cousin, Sultan Muhammad, who had held the title of Malik Jauna at one time.³⁴ Sultan Sikandar's envoys failed to satisfy him and so he decided to march eastwards. Sikandar, like his father, took refuge in the fort of Ikdale. During this march Firuz nominated his son, Fath Khan, aged about eight years, as his successor and ordered his name also to be superscribed on the coins.

It is hard to discover the real reason for the second Bengal campaign. The *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* says that Firuz was annoyed at Sikandar's insolence, but Sikandar did all he could to maintain good relations. Afif writes on the assumption that Firuz wanted to establish Zafar Khan at Sonargaon, but that, as the sequel was to show, was clearly impossible so long as Sikandar held West Bengal. Dr. Riyazul Islam suggests that Firuz expected that Sikandar was so

³⁴ It is also said that Jaunpur was named after a Hindu *rishi*.

weak that he could conquer without bloodshed; if so, he made a serious miscalculation.

It seems that the Delhi army was able to cross the water-barrier and surround the Ikdala mud-fort. One day a bastion of the fort fell down and Firuz's soldiers wanted to break into the fort. But Firuz ordered them to wait for a day. 'Husamuddin Nawa!' he told his commanding officer, 'I want this place to come into my hands without my soldiers having to go into it.' He referred to the havoc they would cause and to the sufferings of Muslim women who fell into their hands. During the night the Bengalis rebuilt the bastion and the siege dragged on.

Sikandar asked his ministers to find some means of inducing the 'dragon' (*azhdaha*) to withdraw as the sufferings of his people were very great. His ministers by a letter and a messenger got into touch with the ministers of Firuz, and Firuz assented to terms of peace, provided Sonargaon was handed over to Zafar Khan. Haibat Khan, a Bengali officer in Firuz's service, who had two sons in the service of Sikandar, was sent to make matters clear. If Afif is to be trusted, Sikandar said to Haibat Khan: 'Sultan Firuz is my master, my patron and my uncle. I could not dream of fighting him. If my uncle wants Sonargaon for Zafar Khan, I hereby give it to him. Also, it was not necessary to march here with an army; I would have obeyed my uncle's written *farman* to this effect.' As a final proof of the 'uncle-nephew relationship', Firuz sent Malik Qabul Torabund³⁵ with a royal robe, a hat (*kulah*) or crown worth 80,000 *tankas* and other presents. Malik Qabul dressed Sikandar in this royal robe, and after walking seven times round his throne, he put the crown on Sikandar's head. But Zafar Khan, after consulting his friends, decided not to leave the secure safety of Firuz's service for the doubtful throne of Sonargaon; the party of the late Sultan Fakhruddin had been completely uprooted in 1341 and could not be revived. Even Firuz's offer to stay on in the area for such time as may be necessary could not induce Zafar Khan to change his mind.

THE JAJNAGAR CAMPAIGN³⁶

Since the time when Ulugh Khan attacked it during the reign of Tughluq Shah, Jajnagar or Orissa had acknowledged the supremacy

³⁵ For an attempt to find the meaning of this Hindi word, see Hodivala, *Studies*, 317.

³⁶ Aff, 163-74; *Mubarak Shahi*, 129-30; *Insha-i Mahru*, 27-35, No. 14. Mahru's *arzdasht* is a petition sent to Firuz Shah after the receipt of his *Fathnama* (Message of Victory). It is a contemporary work, but the facts in it were probably culled from the *Fathnama*.

or suzerainty of Delhi and sent a regular supply of elephants. But when Firuz started on his second Bengal campaign, the Gajpati of Jainagar, Viranbhanudeva III (Saka 1274-1300, A.D. 1351-78) was won over to the Bengal side and in this act of insubordination or 'declaration of independence' he was supported by his wazirs or *mehtas*, who in Orissa were called *paturs*. They assured him that Delhi was far off. So Firuz Shah left his baggage at Kara in charge of his brother, Qutbuddin, and marched with some 40,000 horsemen by way of Bihar to Jainagar. Afif, whose father was with the army, assures us that the country was remarkably prosperous. The houses were large with good orchards and there was plenty of cultivated land. The invading army lacked nothing. Slaves could be purchased for two copper coins; no one cared to buy cattle, for they could be had for the asking. At every stage the invading army found enough goats for its food. *There was no Musalman in the land*. Firuz would fight and forgive; he would desecrate some ancient temples to gain the applause of Muslim fanatics, though he knew that the *shari'at* prohibited this; and, above all, he would enjoy hunting elephants. If Afif's father told him about the route of Firuz's march, our author forgot it, and we have to depend on other authorities.

The first fort attacked by Firuz was Sekhar or Sekhan, which Dr. Riyazul Islam identifies with the modern Panchet hill and the old Panchkot fortress. The name of the rai is given as Salmin by Mahru and as Sadhan by the *Mubarak Shahi*. The Rai of Sekhar, according to the *Sirat*, had thirty subordinate rais and offered a stiff resistance, but he was compelled to fly and his daughter fell into the hands of the invaders and was adopted by Firuz Shah. The next important place was Tinianagar, to which Mahru refers as 'Aztasaran, whose *wilayat* (territory) is Tinia'; according to Mahru the inhabitants had never paid taxes to any authority. Konianagar, which may be identified with Jaipur, was the next stage, according to the *Sirat*; here the inhabitants were peaceful Brahmans and Firuz ordered his soldiers not to molest them. The next stages given are—Kalkalghati (or Kalkalla), 15 miles north of Cuttack; Sarangarh (referred to by Mahru), a fort now in ruins, 5 miles south-west of Cuttack; Chattra-garh (referred to by the *Sirat*); and Ahramin (referred to by Mahru).

Our authorities (Mahru, *Mubarak Shahi* and Afif) agree in stating that Firuz captured Cuttack-Banarsi and that he destroyed the idol of Jagannath at Puri. After that, if Afif is to be believed, Firuz built a wall of earth and wood (*kath-garh*) round a forest of about ten or eleven miles in which eight elephants used to live and captured the brutes after they had become helpless owing to hunger and thirst.

The Gajpati had wisely preferred flight to fighting. He sent

Ahmad Khan, a Bengali Muslim officer in his service, along with one of his own *pateurs*, named Baki, with twenty-eight elephants to Firuz Shah. But they failed to cut any ice. Rana Sahasmal, the superintendent of the Gajpati's elephant-stables, was also captured. Ultimately Rai Dahir, the Gajpati's father-in-law, intervened, and Raghu Jita Pandit was sent to assure the Gajpati. The Gajpati (according to Mahru) 'prostrated himself in the Hindu way, declared that he and his father had 'been obedient servants of the (Delhi) court and promised to hand over to Firuz's officers all elephants that were captured and brought to Cuttack-Banarsi'. Firuz assured the Gajpati that he had only come to hunt elephants, and that the Gajpati's flight had been unnecessary.

Both Mahru and *Mubarak Shahi* state that Firuz returned directly to Kara. He reached Delhi in May or June 1361 after an absence of two and a half years. It is impossible to believe in Afif's account of Firuz Shah losing his way for six months.

FOUR YEARS OF PEACE³⁷

Firuz Shah's return to Delhi was duly celebrated; *qubbas* were built and the seventy-three elephants he brought were properly displayed.³⁸ The city of Firuzabad had been built; Firuz Shah now proceeded to construct the royal palace (*kushak*) and the ramparts. He also built a *kushak* at Mahendwari (or Chandwari). Among the good acts of this period (according to Afif) Firuz Shah made a grant of 36 lakhs of *tankas* to scholars, *shaikhs* and other religious people, while 100 lakhs of *tankas* were granted to 'poor persons without capital' so that they may bring cultivable land (*zamin-i akhal*) under the plough. 'The non-Muslims', Afif tells us, 'whether "tax-paying" (subjects of the empire) or "protected persons" (i.e. subjects of the *rais*) passed their days in prosperity under the shadow of the royal canopy of Firuz Shah.'

The *Mubarak Shahi* gives us some idea of Firuz's canal digging activity during this period. 'The river Sarsati (Saraswati) comes from the great mountains and falls into the Sutlej. An earthen hillock near a place called Barwar, Firuz was informed, separated the river Saraswati from the Salima canal (of Firuz Shah). If this hillock was dug up, the water of the Saraswati would flow into the canal, which could then be taken to Sahrind (or Sirhind), Mansurpura and further on to

³⁷ Afif, 175-85; *Mubarak Shahi*, 130-1.

³⁸ It is impossible to correct the figures about elephants given by our authorities. They give us a total of 101 at least, but the question is of no particular importance to the history of India.

Sunam. Firuz went to the place and began digging up the hillock. 'He took ten *karohs* of land out of the province of Samana and assigned it to Ziyaul Mulk Shamsuddin Abu Raja, so that he may bring it under cultivation. He also built a fort there, which he named Firuzpur.' Firuz Shah found it impossible to dig up the hillock, but plenty of fossils, the nature of which was not then understood, were discovered during the process of excavation. 'The records of the reign', says Sir Wolseley Haig, 'have led to the discovery of the fossil bones of sixty-four *genera* of mammals which lived at the foot of the Himalayas in Pliocene (Siwalik) times, of which only thirty-nine *genera* have species now living. Of eleven species of the elephant only one now survives in India, and of six species of *bos* but two remain.'³⁹

THE KANGRA CAMPAIGN⁴⁰

Nagarkot-Kangra was one of the strongest forts of medieval India. 'Nagarkot', says the *Ain-i Akbari*, 'is a city situated on a hill; its fort is called Kangra.'⁴¹ Towards the end of the winter, 1365, Firuz ordered an advance of 10 per cent to be given to those of his soldiers who were employed on a salary-basis and started towards the Deccan.⁴² But on reaching Bayana, he stayed there for a short while, returned to Delhi and then started for Nagarkot. The reason for this expedition is hard to discover. Perhaps a new rai had ascended the *gaddi*, who was not as loyal as his predecessor. Firuz on his way is said to have visited the temple of Jwalamukhi. The Rai withdrew to his fort; the countryside, as usual, fell into the hands of the Delhi army, who plundered the neighbouring temples and collected a stock of Sanskrit works.

After the siege had dragged on for six months, a fortunate incident led to peace, for which apparently both sides were prepared. While Firuz was going round to inspect the siege-operations, his eyes fell on the Rai; the Rai folded his hands and bowed; the Sultan waved his handkerchief and motioned to the Rai to come down. The

³⁹ *Cambridge History of India*, 179.

⁴⁰ Afif, 185-90; *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*, ff. 177-82.

⁴¹ Jarret, Vol. II, 312.

⁴² On the basis of Afif's assertion that after reaching Delhi in May-June 1361, Firuz did not go on any campaign for full four years, Professor Hodivala (*Studies*, 822) makes the following suggestions about dates. '(a) Firuz could not have left Delhi for Nagarkot before Rajab A.H. 766 (March-April 1365). (b) As that stronghold held out for six months, he could not have reached Thatta before the middle of A.H. 767 (April 1366). The rainy season of that year was passed in Gujarat. (c) The conquest of the town (of Thatta) could not possibly have taken place before the middle of A.H. 768 (March 1367).'

Rai's *mehtas* advised him to trust the Sultan. When the Rai appeared before the Sultan and prostrated himself according to the court-customs of the day, the Sultan placed his hands on the Rai's back and bestowed on him a robe of honour and a *chatr*. The Rai returned to his fort and sent such presents as he could. Nagarkot was not conquered, for neither the Sultan nor his army entered the fort. The suzerainty of Delhi was recognized and the Rai retained the authority his ancestors had exercised.

Aff is concerned to insist, on the basis of what his father told him, that it is wrong to say that either Firuz Shah, or Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq before him, placed a *chatr* over the idol of Jwalamukhi. Various historians have accepted or rejected the statement. But, as Dr. Riyazul Islam correctly points out, Aff was confused and has confused others. 'The interior of the temple consists of a square pit, about three feet deep. In the middle the rock is slightly hollowed out about the principal fissure, and on applying a light the gas bursts into a flame. There is no idol of any kind, the flaming fissure being considered as the fiery mouth of the goddess, whose headless body is said to be in the temple of Bhawan.'⁴³ There could be no question of putting a *chatr* on the flame. The *Sirat* says that fifty temples were spared in accordance with the rules of the *shari'at*.

THE THATTA CAMPAIGN (1365-67)⁴⁴

The rulers of lower Sind and Thatta at the time were Jam Alauddin Juna, brother of the late Jam Unnar, and Sadruddin Banhbina, son of Jam Unnar. Ain-i Mahru, as governor of Multan, had complained bitterly of the behaviour of Banhbina, who had repeatedly tried to induce the Mongols to invade the country. The Jam, in Mahru's opinion, was not so bad, but he was incapable of controlling his nephew and the men around him. Firuz, remembering how Sultan Muhammad had died before Thatta, decided to invade the territory. It was to be the most mismanaged military campaign in the whole history of the Delhi sultanat.⁴⁵

After appointing Khan-i Jahan as his *naib-i ghibat*, Firuz started with 90,000 horsemen and 480 elephants. Two of his great officers, Tatar Khan and Ain-i Mahru, were no more. After praying at the grave of Shaikh Farid at Ajudhan, Firuz reached Siwistan and Bhakkar. Since the Thatta of those days consisted of two cities on both banks of the Indus and both cities were protected by strong

43 Archaeological Survey Report, Vol. V, p. 171, cited by Dr. Riyazul Islam.

44. Aff, 194-254; *Mubarak Shahi*, 131.

45 Aff is our main authority for the details of this campaign, but there is no reason for distrusting him.

mud-ramparts, Firuz ordered 5,000 boats to be collected and taken down the stream, while he and the army marched by land. Afif says that the control of 1,000 boats was assigned to his father and uncle. While the siege of Thatta was prolonged, the besiegers had to face two misfortunes of which at least one could have been foreseen and provided for. More than three-fourths of the horses died of an epidemic, and there was such scarcity of grain that it was sold at two or three *tankas* a *man*. The majority of invading horsemen were starving and on foot. After a series of skirmishes, the Thattians decided to risk a battle. They came out with 20,000 horsemen and a large number of footmen. Firuz and his officers with their weakened forces were only saved from dire defeat by a timely dust-storm. But that evening Firuz explained to his officers: 'Thatta will not fall this time, but I am not going to return to Delhi without taking it. We will march to Gujarat and return when the *rabi* crop is ready.' So the march to Gujarat began. The pursuing Thattians were driven away, but they composed a Sindhi verse, which Professor Hodivala translates as follows: 'By the blessing of Shaikh Patha (Ibrahim Shah Alam)⁴⁶ one (Muhammad Tughluq) died and one (Firuz Tughluq) fled away.' The boats of Firuz Shah fell into the hands of the Thattians, and they began cultivating their fields in peace.

In the retreating army of Firuz Shah the price of grain rose to two or three *tankas* a *sir* and after that it could not be had at any price. Add to it, the Sindhi guides purposely misled the army into the Rann of Cutch, where there was nothing but salt water as far as the eye could see. Firuz directed his soldiers to take with them as much fresh water as was possible. But the sufferings of his men were terrible. They tried to live on carrion and boiled hide. All the horses perished and the highest officers had to walk on foot. 'At every stage a large number of people and horses died.' After the terrible Rann had been crossed, they came to a desert of sand which could sustain no form of life—no grass, no bushes, no birds and no trees. Finally, they were rescued by a shower of rain and the survivors managed to reach Gujarat.

At Delhi there had been no official news of Firuz Shah and his army for six months. It is to the credit of Khan-i Jahan that he kept the government going. He perambulated Delhi as if nothing had happened; he took all valuable commodities from the royal palace and stocked them for safety in his own house. Finally, he forged and circulated a *farman* declaring that the king was safe and victorious,

⁴⁶ Ibrahim Shah Alam was a disciple and successor (*khalifa*) of Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariya, the founder of the Suhrawardi Order of Indian mystics; Shah Alam's grave at Thatta has been revered through the ages.

and ordered a celebration of twenty-one days. Later, a real *farman* came to him describing the distress of the army.

The governor of Gujarat, Nizamul Mulk Amir Husain, son of Amir Miran, was the husband of Firuz Shah's sister. He had been doing his work well and it is to his credit that he had two crores of *tankas* in the Gujarat treasury. But he had taken absolutely no notice of Firuz and his misfortunes. Firuz was naturally angry. 'If you had come to the help of my army and kept sending me grain by instalments,' Firuz told him, 'my soldiers would not have perished.' Amir Husain was sent to Delhi to await appointment to the first high office that fell vacant and Firuz, for the time being, seems to have kept the government of Gujarat in his own hands. The two crores of *tankas* in the treasury were spent in re-equipping the army. Soldiers employed on a salary-basis were given an extra grant of 60 per cent; soldiers to whom land revenue had been assigned were given loans varying from 500 to 1,000 *tankas* from the royal treasury. Khan-i Jahan cooperated by sending Firuz such products of the royal *karkhanas* as could not be procured locally. Afif says that the price of one type of weapon sent amounted to 70 lakhs. But many soldiers of Firuz Shah, after being re-equipped, decided to return home. Firuz, out of regard for what they had suffered, would not establish military posts (*thanas*) to prevent them from leaving, but he sent orders to Delhi that soldiers and officers in the direct service of the state were to be subjected to 'moral punishments' (*tadaruk-i ma'navi*)—that is, put in stocks and displayed in the public markets for a day or two—but their salaries and assignments were to be left untouched.

The flight of the horsemen, whose number is not given, certainly weakened Firuz's army and he could not be sure of his success in a pitched battle in the next campaign. Zafar Khan was appointed governor of Gujarat, though he was required to serve with the army during the campaign. Bahram Khan, son-in-law of Alauddin Hasan Kangu, who had rebelled at Daulatabad, sent messengers appealing to Firuz for assistance, but Firuz replied that he could not attend to any other enterprise till Thatta had been conquered.

When Firuz with his army appeared again on the east bank of the Indus, the inhabitants were taken by surprise. The crops which they had sown were ready to be reaped, but in their great panic they left the east bank of the Indus, fled across the river to the west bank, and left their crops standing. There were plenty of villages on the east bank of the river; these villages were captured and probably the city of eastern Thatta also. The Delhi army reaped what the Sindhis had sown. The price of grain, which had been eight or ten

jitals for five *sirs* at first, fell further when the crop was cut. Some four thousand Sindhis, who had been unable to fly back, were collected together and put on rations—three *sirs* of coarse grain per head per day.

But how to reach the greater Thatta on the western bank? The Thattians, who had captured the boats of Firuz Shah, controlled all fords of the Indus for about eighty *karohs*. After much discussion Firuz directed Imadul Mulk Bashir and Zafar Khan to march 120 *karohs* north, cross the Indus at Bhakkar⁴⁷ and then march down the same distance on the west bank and attack western Thatta from the north. The two officers carried out their orders. But on the day of battle, Firuz Shah, who could only see the fort of Thatta and the dust raised by the armies across the broad expanse of the river, felt disturbed about the consequences of the conflict, for his army had been weakened by sufferings and reduced by desertions. At nightfall he sent a malik in a boat and ordered Imadul Mulk and Zafar to return by the route they had travelled. Obedient to their orders, the two generals returned to Firuz's camp after 480 *karohs* of quite useless marching.

Firuz felt brave and talked brave. What did the Thattians think of themselves? He would remain encamped till they surrendered; if necessary, he could even build a city there. More to the point, he sent Imadul Mulk Bashir to Khan-i Jahan for fresh troops; and Khan-i Jahan, in the shortest time possible, collected soldiers on the royal pay-roll from Lahore to Bihar and Tirhut and sent them to Firuz Shah under Bashir. There was at last a turn of affairs in favour of Firuz. Owing to famine in Thatta, the price of grain rose to one or two *tankas* a *sir*, and the Thattians in their distress began to cross the Indus in their boats and submit to Firuz Shah. The Jam and Banhbina realized that they could struggle no further and appealed to the famous mystic, Saiyyid Husain Bukhari of Uchch. The Saiyyid came to Firuz Shah's camp, was well received by the Sultan and the soldiers, and got the best possible terms for the Jam and Banhbina. It was obviously impossible for Firuz Shah to leave the country in their charge. But he treated them fair; after they had surrendered unconditionally in accordance with the accepted protocol of the day, he took them to Delhi, fixed a pension of two lakhs of *tankas* a year on each of them and settled them in the quarter of Delhi known as Serai Malika, the name of which the public changed to Serai Thatta. No service was required of Banhbina except attendance at the formal *darbar*; but

⁴⁷ 'Bhakkar is an island fortress in the Indus between Sakkar and Rohri.' (Dr. Riyazul Islam).

here, as a rare privilege, he was allowed to sit cross-legged on the second carpet on the right side of the royal throne. The government of lower Sind was assigned by Firuz Shah to a son of the Jam and to Tamachi, the brother of Banhbina; they paid four lakhs in gratitude and promised to send some lakhs as tribute in future years. After some time Tamachi rebelled, and the Jam, whom Firuz sent to Sind, captured Tamachi and sent him to Delhi. Banhbina remained in Delhi after the death of Firuz. Tughluq Shah II allowed him to go back to Sind but he died on the way.

Firuz Shah returned to Delhi after two and a half years. There was rejoicing in some houses and wailing in others. 'It would have been better', Firuz observed, 'if I had not gone to Thatta.' According to Afif he issued the following instructions concerning the soldiers who had gone on the campaign.

'The assignments of all persons, who have died in the Thatta campaign or in the Rann of Cutch, are to be continued—permanently and unconditionally—to their heirs; they are not to be harassed in any way and it is not necessary to put the matter before me again. As to those who have opposed me by taking 60 per cent in Gujarat and then flying back to Delhi, their salaries and assignments are also to be continued. I do not wish any person to have a grievance.'

THE TAS-GHARIYAL

According to Afif,⁴⁸ Firuz Shah with the help of astronomers invented the *tas-ghariyal*—a metal cup perforated at the bottom which when put in a tub of water would be filled up and sink after a *ghari* or twenty-four minutes. When this happened, the public was informed by the beating of a gong; after every four hours (*pass*) there was a *gajar* or double-beating of the gong. The errors of the metal-cup were corrected by reference to a sun-dial. The cup and its tub, the gong and the sun-dial were put on the top of the gate of the Firuzabad palace. This method of reckoning time seems to have become quite popular.

Messengers came from Ma'abar to ask for Firuz's help against Bukka, who had captured their city with its Muslim women, but Firuz Shah reminded them that at his accession they had decided to ally themselves with the Bahmani kingdom; and now his soldiers were too tired for a far-off campaign. The idea of attacking the Deccan had been haunting Firuz's mind, but Khan-i Jahan now

⁴⁸ Afif, 254-57.

succeeded in finally convincing him that a campaign against the Bahmanis would be inadvisable.

THE COLLECTION OF 'SLAVES'

With reference to the energy with which Firuz Shah collected slaves, Afif quotes the Quranic verse: 'It is possible that you consider a thing to be good and it is injurious to you.' At first he instructed his governors that whenever they attacked a place (for realizing the revenue), 'selected, handsome and well-born young boys' should be brought to him. The governors saw to it that they were also neat, presentable and well-dressed. In former days the governors used to make such presents to the king as they could, and the king was expected to remember this with reference to their transfers and promotions. Firuz now made a general rule that the price of the presents brought by the governors was to be estimated, and to that extent the demand made from them was to be reduced. But as the presents Firuz Shah preferred were slaves, the governors brought slaves to him till the number of royal slaves amounted to 180,000. Having made all offices hereditary, it is possible that Firuz wanted a body of men who would be loyal to him and his successors. But this is only a supposition. What we can be certain about is the desire of Firuz Shah to give to every one of his slaves the salary and status he deserved. Under these conditions many fathers would have been willing to give their sons to Firuz Shah to be brought up as his slaves, *for this slavery was not legal in any sense*. The most fortunate slaves were given to the nobles, who were ordered 'to bring them up as their own sons and to present them before the throne once a year'.⁴⁹ The next fortunate group was selected for education and some were even sent to the Haj pilgrimage.

A separate department—not directly under the wizarat—was organized for the slaves so that they had their own treasury, *majmu'adar* and officers. Some of the slaves were sent to the provincial capitals while others were kept at Delhi. The slaves were paid either by assignments on land revenue (like the soldiers) or in cash; their salaries ranged from 10 *tankas* to 100 *tankas*,⁵⁰ but no slave got less than 10 *tankas*. Their salaries were paid without fail by the treasury every third, fourth or sixth month. About twelve thousand slaves were trained for various crafts. The slaves were to be found in all ministries, departments and *karkhanas*, but the nucleus of the whole organization consisted of the forty thousand slaves, who mounted guard at the

⁴⁹ Afif, 267-73.

⁵⁰ The context shows that these salaries were annual.

royal palace; they developed a strong *esprit de corps* without any loyalty to the head of the state. 'God be praised!' says Afif, 'Since Destiny had ordered from the beginning of time that the Muslim factions of Delhi would declare war on each other a few years after Firuz's death, this misfortune afflicted the public through the slaves. . . Ultimately, the slaves became so bold that they unhesitatingly severed the heads of the princes of Firuz's family and hung them up at the *darbar* gate.'

LATER CONSTRUCTIONS; ASOKA'S PILLARS⁵¹

After returning to Delhi in 1367, Firuz Shah gave up the idea of marching beyond the frontiers and consoled himself with hunting campaigns on which his officers and slaves were expected to accompany him. These hunting campaigns cannot be described here, but we may note in passing, as a symbol of the corruption of the age, that no artisan was allowed to accompany the king unless he got a permit from the *rais-i shahr* (city-officer) on the payment of a bribe (*khidmati*).

Among the new cities built by Firuz Shah, Afif notes Firuzabad Harni Khera, Tughluqpur Sapdam and Tughluqpur Kasna.⁵² 'In 1385 (A.H. 787)', the *Mubarak Shahi* tells us, 'he built a fort at the village of Bewli, seven *karohs* from Badaun, and gave it the name of Firuzpur, but people have been calling it Akhirinpur (the Last City).'⁵³ Afif gives us a list of nine palaces or *kushaks* built by Firuz Shah, but it is difficult to say which of them was built after the Thatta campaign.⁵⁴ He also gives a list of seven dams (*bands*) built by the king and says that strong dams were also built at many necessary places.⁵⁵ Firuz also built *khanqahs* (mystic houses) and inns maintained at state cost. A traveller was by custom entitled to free board and lodging at an inn for three days, and the wits said that the king built 120 inns at Delhi and Firuzabad, so that a traveller by changing his residence could live in these inns all the year round free of cost. It is obvious

⁵¹ Afif, 329-31 and 305-21 for Asoka's pillars.

⁵² There seems to be a copyist error about the two Tughluqpurs.

⁵³ *Mubarak Shahi*, 135.

⁵⁴ 'Kushak-i Firuzabad, Kushak-i Nuzul, Kushak-i Mahendwari, Kushak of the city of Hisar-Firuzah, Kushak-i Fathabad, Kushak-i Jaunpur, Kushak-i Shikar, Kushak-i Band-i Fath Khan, and Kushak-i Salura.' The Kushak-i Nuzul seems to have been a small palace on the bank of the Jumna, opposite to Firuzabad; Firuz used to stay here for a short time on returning from his hunting trips while the royal palace at Firuzabad was being prepared for his residence.

⁵⁵ 'Band-i Fath Khan, Band-i Maldah, Band-i Mahpalpur, Band-i Shukr Khan, Band-i Salura, Band-i Sahepna, and Band-i Wazirabad.'

that Firuz's public works department must have been a huge enterprise. Artisans of all types had to be brought together and every group of artisans was put under a *shahna* (officer) of its own. The chief officers were Malik Ghazi, director of the department of public works, and Abdul Haqq *alias* Jahir Sondhar. Afif, who was destined to see everything crumble down, could not help remarking: '*Lakhs and lakhs of "tankas" were spent on the buildings; in fact, money beyond measure was wasted!*'

Firuz discovered two pillars of Asoka—the larger in the village of Nawira in the district (*shiq*) of Salura and Khizrabad at the foot of the hills about ninety *karohs* from Delhi and the smaller near Meerut city. He did not know what they were, but decided to bring them to Delhi. Afif gives us some idea of how the larger stone-pillar, which Firuz called the 'golden pillar', was brought and put up at Delhi. Thousands of men from mere labourers to artisans and engineers of the highest type were employed. Raw hides and reeds were wound round the pillar to prevent it from breaking. On digging up the foundation, they found that the pillar had been firmly fixed in a hole in a square stone. This stone was also dug up and brought with the pillar. Tree trunks were piled up by the side of the pillar and the top of the pile was covered with cotton wool. The pillar was made to lean gently on this tree-trunk pile; then one by one the tree-trunks were removed and the pillar placed on a cart with forty-two wheels; and two hundred men dragging each wheel by ropes brought the pillar to the bank of the Jumna. In those days the Jumna was a great means of traffic, and boats carrying 2,000 to 5,000 *mans* of grain were available. The larger boats were tied together and the pillar brought on them to Firuzabad. Here a new structure had to be constructed for the pillar. Wooden pulleys were used to make the pillar stand vertically and then to make it rise vertically at the rate of half a *gaz* per day by enormous human labour. The building was constructed as the pillar was raised, and ultimately the pillar was put at the top of the building. Afif, who was twelve years old at the time, states that the pillar was 32 *gaz* in length, of which eight *gaz* were under the building and 24 *gaz* above it. The open length of the pillar can be measured; it is 37 feet. The *gaz* of Firuz Shah must, therefore, have been 18.54 inches in length.

The second pillar was placed on the Kushak-i Shikar on the Ridge. The five pieces into which it was broken have been now put together. It is 32½ feet in length.⁵⁶

⁵⁶ Hodivala, *Studies*, 830-31.

THE 'KARKHANAS'; FRUIT GARDENS, MEASURES
OF RELIEF FOR MUSLIMS

(Firuz Shah had thirty-six *karkhanas* divided into *ratibi*, which provided daily food for men and animals, and *ghair ratibi*, which dealt with commodities produced by human labour.) Afif says that his father and uncle were in charge of the *alam-khana* (concerning the insignia of royalty, etc.), the *rakab-khana* (dealing with the equipment for horses) and the elephant-stables of the left wing, and that he worked with them. In the *ratibi karkhanas*, 160,000 *tankas* a month were spent on the provision of food alone; this amount did not include the salaries of officers and servants employed. The figures of expenditure given by Afif for other *karkhanas* are—*jamdar-khan*, 600,000 *tankas* for winter clothes alone; *alam-khana*, 18,000 *tankas* a year (exclusive of salaries); and *farrash-khana* (for carpets), 200,000 *tankas*.

(The formal charge of the *karkhanas* was given to khans and great maliks, but the actual control of every *karkhana* was vested in a *mutasarrif* (director) appointed by Firuz Shah personally.) Khwaja Abul Hasan was the chief *mutasarrif* or director-general of the *karkhanas* and all royal orders went to him in the first instance. (Afif quotes Firuz Shah as saying: 'Just as lakhs of revenue are collected in the provinces, similarly lakhs are collected in the *karkhanas*. The turn-over (*tasarruf*) of a *karkhana* of mine is not less than the turn-over of the city of Multan.') 3

The *karkhanas* had their separate *diwan*; the wizarat, to which their accounts were submitted, was as lax in controlling the accounts of the *karkhanas* as it was in controlling the accounts of the *iqtas*. There was plenty of *hashiya* (marginal corruption and mal-expenditure) in every *karkhana*. Never during the thirty-eight years of Firuz's reign, Afif asserts repeatedly, were the accounts of provinces or of *karkhanas* examined in accordance with the correct principles of accountancy. 'It is not that Firuz Shah was ignorant of the principles of accountancy,' Afif remarks, 'he knew them only too well. But he saw everything and preferred to close his eyes; so the auditors (*ahl muhasibah*) also overlooked the acts of the officers-in-charge (*ummal*).'

(Firuz Shah, according to Afif, was very fond of planting orchards or fruit-gardens.⁵⁷ In those days there were 1,200 fruit-gardens in the suburbs of Delhi alone, but Firuz Shah did not appropriate the property of others. He had his fruit-gardens throughout the empire and their total income, after deducting the share of the gardeners,

came to 180,000 *tankas*. It might be noted that grapes were then grown in the Delhi area, and the cultivation of grapes was so extensive that they sold at one *jital* a *sir*.)

Reference may here be made to some relief measures of Firuz. (1) *Unemployment*—Firuz asked the kotwal of Delhi, Malik Nek Amdi, to bring to him such persons as wanted employment. The kotwal passed on the order to the officers in charge of the *mohallas*. Attempts were made by Firuz—or rather by officers commissioned by him—to do something for those who applied. (2) *Shifa-khana*—Firuz organized a hospital in which a number of physicians were employed to give free treatment to the people. Medicines were free and in some cases food also. The king endowed some villages for the maintenance of the hospital. (3) *The Marriage Bureau*—This was meant for Muslims only. Fathers of marriageable girls, who could not afford their wedding expenses, would (if the officers-in-charge were satisfied) be given a lump grant of 50, 30 or 25 *tankas* according to their need or family status.

PRICES AND WAGES

Afif and the persons, whose conversations he has recorded, repeatedly assert that there was no real famine in the reign of Firuz Shah and, consequently, thanks to the labour of the peasants and the artisans, production had greatly increased and the income of some lucky assignees went up even ten times. 'In the Doab from the hills of Sakrodah (?) and Kahrola (?) to Koil there was no village desolated even nominally,' Afif states with commendable inaccuracy, 'and not a cubit of land remained uncultivated. In those days there were 52 prosperous parganas in the Doab. The same was the condition in territories outside the Doab. In every *iqta* or *shiq* (Samana for example) there were four villages in every *karoh* and happy people in every village.'⁵⁸

A comparison with the regime of Alauddin Khalji naturally suggests itself, for no Indian government, whatever its achievements in other directions, has succeeded in freezing wages and prices on a normal basis—the basis of *production-cost* (*nirakh-i baraward*)—to the same extent as the Khalji Sultan. Afif admits that there has not been the same prosperity during the reign of any other king. But the low prices of Alauddin were due to his great efforts; he gave capital to the merchants, fixed their salaries and supported them in every way. The low prices in the reign of Firuz Shah, however, were not due to

⁵⁸ Afif, 293-95. On page 383 Malik Abdullah confesses that the income (*khiraj* and *mahsul*) from the two parganas assigned to him had gone up ten times.

his efforts but to Divine favour, or, as we would now say, to the working of the law of supply and demand in a period of peace. Afif gives the price of some basic commodities—wheat, eight *jitals* a *man*; gram and barley, four *jitals* a *man*; *ghi* or *rughan-i sutur*, two and a half *jitals* per *sir*; sugar three and a half *jitals* per *sir*. The price of cloth and other commodities, Afif claims, were also low. He admits, however, that when rainfall was scarce, the prices of cereals rose to one *tankah* a *man*, but the prices came down again for there was no real famine in the reign.

At present we have only two contemporary accounts, both earlier than Afif, to compare with what he says—the *Insha-i Mahru* and the *Khairul Majalis* or the conversations of Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh, recorded by Hamid Qalandar in the first decade of Firuz Shah's reign.

In his Letter No. 20 *Ain-i Mahru*, the governor of Multan, admits that soldiers on duty were probably not so prosperous as in Alauddin's days, but he insists that the artisans had raised their wages eight or ten times higher than in Alauddin's reign on the ground that *the price of grain was unstable. Regrating by merchants and artisans had become common*, specially with reference to *ghi*, cloth, sugar and wood. *Ain-i Mahru* quotes the Arabic proverb: 'They buy for fifty and sell for hundred.' In Alauddin's time the maximum price of a good horse was 120 *tankas*; but in the account he submits to Delhi, *Ain-i Mahru* fixes the price of every horse at 500 *tankas*. The price of other commodities may have risen also.

Concerning the second of our contemporary authorities, Professor Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, the editor of the *Khairul Majalis*, writes:⁵⁹ 'The age of Firuz Shah Tughluq has generally been depicted as an age of peace and plenty for the masses. The *Khairul Majalis*, however, creates a different impression. It appears that economic distress was very acute during the early years of Firuz Shah's reign. The Shaikh often contrasts the conditions during the reign of Firuz Shah (who is not mentioned by name) with the conditions prevalent during the time of Alauddin Khalji. As one who had lived in Delhi during both these regimes and had looked at the economic structure from the point of view of the common man, his observations deserve careful consideration. He says that during the time of Alauddin Khalji there was an all-round cheapness. One *man* of wheat could be had for 7½ *jitals*; an equal quantity of (crystal) sugar for half a *tanka*; ordinary sugar was available at the rate of one *jital* (a *sir*). Cloth and other articles were also cheap. A quilt could be prepared for a few *tankas*. There were a number of *langars* (free kitchens) in

⁵⁹ K. A. Nizami: English Introduction to the Persian text of the *Khairul Majalis* (32), published by the History Department, Aligarh Muslim University.

Delhi, like the *langar* of Malik Yar Parran, where food was freely distributed. Then referring to his own time (the reign of Firuz Shah), the Shaikh said, "These days neither those *langardars* nor those people have survived; all have been ruined."

It would not be fair to forget the terrible famine of the time of Mohammad bin Tughluq in comparing the figures of the two reigns, and when Ain-i Mahru says that the prices of commodities have come down but not wages, he is probably referring to the famine figures of the previous reign. Both Afif and Ain-i Mahru admit that the price of grain was not stable, though they seem to differ about the frequency and degree of instability. Ain-i Mahru is very clear about his charge of regrating against the merchants; Afif, who tells us so much about the official corruption of the reign, forgets to refer to the regrating of merchants, probably by oversight. If we are to be guided by the price of horses, a matter which the government could not ignore, then the average price for the consumer was about five times higher in the middle of Firuz Shah's reign than in the last ten years of Alauddin Khalji.

VANISHING OF THE INVINCIBLE ARMY OF DELHI

The efforts of the Delhi sultans from Qutbuddin Aibek onwards had greatly strengthened the army of Delhi. Alauddin Khalji had broadened its base by discarding all irrelevant considerations and looking exclusively to military merit and discipline, and under him and his son, Mubarak Shah, it had become invincible. The sultans of Delhi had some forts on the north-western frontier, *but the sultans, unlike the rais, did not depend upon the strength of their forts but upon the striking power of their army as an offensive weapon for knocking down all opposition and controlling the open country.* Unlike the Hindu chiefs, the Delhi sultans have left us no great fort—except the fort of Tughluqabad, which was not completed.

The strength of the Delhi army rested upon the stern enforcement of the rules of the *arz* or the annual review of the horsemen. The government had no organization for training its horsemen; it would only employ them if they had been already properly trained. A man who wanted to enlist in the army, of which the horsemen were the effective core, had to provide himself with one or, if possible, two horses and all necessary weapons of which he had to learn the use. After he had been trained and equipped, he could appear at the *arz*, where his horse, equipment and his capacity of using his weapons would be carefully tested by the minister of war or an officer appointed by him; if the government needed his services and he was up to

the standard required, he would be paid the price of his horse and his weapons and also his salary for a year. The horse would be branded with a mark (*dagh*) to show that it was the property of the government, and a descriptive roll (*hulia, chehra*) of the horseman would be put in the records for identification. If a soldier lost his horse in government service, it would be replaced at government cost, but not otherwise. Now this *arz* was a stern annual affair on which the efficiency of the army—and, in fact, the effective government of the country—depended.

Alauddin had been very stern in the matter and condign punishments were meted out to horsemen, who having taken their salaries and the price of their horses, failed to turn up at the *arz*. He paid the soldiers in cash, thus concentrating the power of command and dismissal in the hands of the minister of war, who was expected normally to accept the recommendations of the officer in immediate charge. The standard of Alauddin's army was maintained by Mubarak Shah and Tughluq Shah. Sultan Muhammad lost the Deccan, but he was a professional soldier and would tolerate no relaxation of military discipline.

With the accession of Firuz Shah everything changed. We have only to compare the campaigns of Firuz Shah with those of Malik Kafur to realize the difference. An officer of Alauddin Khalji, who conducted his campaigns as inefficiently as Firuz Shah, would have been dismissed and severely punished. The laws of Firuz Shah, already referred to, would have led to the degeneration of any army. When *Firuz Shah made the posts of the horsemen and their officers hereditary, he gave up the basic right of the government to see to the efficiency of its military personnel.* The effect would not be felt immediately, but no considerations for the financial security of the military man and his descendants, which Afif advances, can justify a measure so patently stupid and idiotic. From a remark attributed by Afif to the minister of war, Imadul Mulk Bashir, it seems that 80 per cent of the horsemen were paid by assignments of land revenue.⁶⁰ On paper the whole land revenue of the country was assigned to the army; the repeated statements of Afif to this effect are 'fictionally correct'. But when the officer or horseman took the *itlaq-nama* (assignment-order) to the local officer in charge of collecting land revenue, he would get only 50 per cent of the cash assigned to him. The other half, we have to assume, was kept for the other expenses of the state. If the military men were on duty at Delhi or elsewhere, they could sell their *itlaq-namas* for immediate

60 Afif, 220. *Wa in taifa wajhdar hashtad bi hashtad dar in mulk rasida.*

cash for 30 per cent of their fictitious amount to brokers who, generally through their agents, got the 50 per cent to which the military men were entitled. It may be assumed, therefore, that the living wage of a horseman was one-third of the fictional amount assigned to him in his *itlaq-nama*. The system did not lead to feudalism of any sort; its evil effect lay in the fact that the descendants of military men ceased to be military men and became pensioners entitled to land revenue from specified villages.

The great feature of the period after Firuz Shah's death was the fact that this land revenue could no longer be collected by Delhi owing to rebellious governors, *muqaddams* and Hindu chiefs; for the army, fear of which had made them obedient in the payment of land revenue and tribute, had completely vanished. The *itlaqs* became pieces of waste paper in the hands of pensioners, who had lost all military qualities and to whom the penniless central government could pay nothing.

After the return of the army from Thatta, its visible disintegration began and twenty years of peace enabled this disintegration to pass almost unobserved. There may have been some 80,000 horsemen in the central imperial service, but the officers knew that no service outside the sultanat would be required of them. So worthless horses were brought to the review and passed as fit on payment of bribes. The same lax standards must have been applied to weapons. Another difficulty was that a whole year would pass and the men had no horses to bring to the *arz*. Firuz ordered an extension of about fifty-one days to be given to them, because the offices had not worked on Fridays. When this period did not suffice, Firuz gave a further extension of two months. When this period also passed, Malik Razi, the deputy minister of war, found a permanent excuse. The horsemen, he represented, had sent their *itlaqs* to the villages and they could not bring their horses to the *arz* till they had received the salary that was due to them. But, of course, they would bring their horses for the *arz* next year! After that the *arz* was only continued for the corruption it made possible.

In fact, the whole organization of the army was honeycombed with corruption. Firuz Shah was informed of the correct facts, but he preferred to close his eyes. Afif relates the case of a horseman to whom the king gave a *tanka* of gold so that he may bribe the clerk in charge and have his horse passed at the *arz*. It is usual for junior state employees to secure themselves against punishments by passing on a part of the bribes they have taken to their superiors; it is also the custom of dishonest superior officers not to demand bribes directly, except where the amount is very large, but to leave the

dirty work to their subordinates and to demand a fixed sum or percentage in the form of presents. Now we are told that the estimated yearly income of Firuz Shah's government was 6 crores and 75 lakhs of *tankas*, while the wealth collected by Imadul Mulk Bashir, the minister of war, who had started his career as an inherited slave of Firuz Shah, amounted to 13 crores—slightly less than the total income of the state for two years. The *iqta* of Rapri had been assigned to him, but out of regard for him the office of the wazir made no demand for revenue from his agents at Rapri. All recommendations of Bashir with reference to appointments and dismissals, assignments of land grants and their cancellations were accepted by Firuz, and, like other officers of Firuz, Bashir too may have accepted presents and bribes from petitioners. Still the thirteen crores of *tankas*, which Bashir stored in dry *pucca* wells in the same way as peasants store grain, could only have been collected together by plundering the military budget on such a stupendous scale that the great and historic army of the Delhi empire gradually ceased to exist.⁶¹

VISIT TO BAHRAICH; FANATICAL AND REACTIONARY MEASURES; ABOLITION OF 'NON-SHARI'AT' TAXES

In 1374-75 (A.H. 776) Firuz went to pray at the tomb of Salar Mas'ud Ghazi at Bahraich, saw the alleged martyr in a dream and became definitely cruel, communalistic and fanatical. He ordered all mural paintings in his palaces to be erased, and the gold and silver vessels to be melted; the use of pure silk fabrics and pure brocade was also prohibited. The Sultan's stupid 'conversion' led to an atrocious deed. A Brahman, who used to assemble Muslims and Hindus in his house and was alleged to have converted a Muslim woman, was brought before him. Firuz offered him two alternatives—acceptance of Islam or being burnt alive. The brave Brahman preferred the latter alternative. We can only affirm that Islam definitely prohibits the infliction of the death-penalty by burning, whatever the crime; and that Firuz was really guilty of a cruel and unpardonable murder. Afif also asserts that Firuz imposed the *jizya* on the Brahmans of Delhi, but on this point his memory was probably playing him false,

⁶¹ Neither the income of Rapri nor the presents of petitioners can explain Bashir's enormous fortune. We have no documentary evidence but the following is not perhaps a bad guess of what really happened. When a horseman died or became 'too old to ride', the war office kept on demanding his salary from the finance department as before, but nothing was paid to his son or heir, who was not called upon to serve. It is not possible to say how this dishonest money was distributed between the war minister and other high officers. But if Bashir got one-fifth of it, it would explain his enormous fortune. Afif states that Bashir's son, Ishaq, also knew how to become rich.

for he confuses the *shari'at*-sense of the *jizya* with its current use as a non-agricultural tax. The figures he gives for the three grades of *jizya*—10, 20 and 40 *tankas*—are also incorrect. And what sense could there be in realizing the *jizya* from the Brahmans of the cities of Delhi only? But in the last fifteen years of his reign Firuz was an incurable and degenerate fanatic.

To the new fanatical attitude of Firuz we may also attribute the following measures of persecution to which he refers with pride in his *Futuhāt*—(a) Destruction of three *new* Hindu temples, one at the pond (*hauz*) of Malwa, the second at Salihpur and the third in the town of Gohana; (b) Order that Muslim women were not to come out of their houses or go to visit tombs outside the city of Delhi; (c) Punishment of the Shias and the burning of their religious books; no details are given but it is incorrectly claimed that the sect was completely suppressed; (d) Infliction of the death-penalty on the leaders of the *mulhidan* and *ibahatiyan*, i.e. the Ismaili group of Shias; (e) Execution of Ahmad Bihari, whom his followers declared to be God, along with one of his disciples; (f) Execution of a man, named Rukn, who claimed to be the Mahdi along with his followers; the public joined in the good work and tore their bones and flesh to pieces;⁶² (g) Execution of a servant of Ain-i Mahru who used to declare, 'I am the Truth (*Haq*)', and had written a pamphlet to prove his claim; (h) Granting the soldiers of the army four-fifths of the spoils instead of one fifth, which had been the custom of previous kings. The Quran orders four-fifths of the spoils to be given to the fighting men, but this order was with reference to volunteers and not paid soldiers.

Firuz Shah in the *Futuhāt* claims that he ordered the remission of a number of octroi taxes on the ground that the *shari'at* had not permitted them. Repeated attempts to interpret these taxes have been made. Professor K. A. Nizami's interpretation of these taxes is given below:

(1) *Mandavi-barg* (Professor Hodivala and Professor S. A. Rashid interpret it as a tax on the produce of kitchen gardens. But the tax on vegetables and fruits, called *Khizrawat*, is referred to as a separate tax in the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* (f.61); Roy considers it as a tax on betel-leaves and Dr. I. H. Quraishi as tax 'on corn sold in the state market'. It would be safest to take it in the literal sense as a tax on leaves and grass (fodder) brought for sale in the market). (2) *Dalail-i*

⁶² The Shias believe that their twelfth Imam, Mahdi, who disappeared while a boy, will return one day to put the world right. Many persons claiming that they are 'Mahdis' have appeared in the history of Islam, but curiously enough all of them have been Sunnis.

bazarha (tax on brokerage in the markets). (3) *Jazari* (tax on butchers at the rate of twelve *jitals* for every cow or bullock slaughtered by them). (4) *Amir-i tarab* (amusement tax, probably paid to the *amir-i tarab*, an officer appointed by the state to regulate festivals and maintain order in places of public amusement). (5) *Gul faroshi* (tax on the sale of flowers). (6) *Jizya-i tambol* (tax on the sale of betel-leaves). (7) *Chungi-i ghalla* (tax on grain and cereals; *chungi* means a handful). (8) *Khayyali* (Dr. I. H. Quraishi and Prof. S. A. Rashid and others have read it as *kitabī* and interpreted it as a tax on scribes. But it has to be read as *khayyali* or a tax on those who weighed corn in the markets). (9) *Bilgari* (Roy reads it as *Bilgari*; Dr. Quraishi and Prof. S. A. Rashid read it *Nilgari*, a tax on the manufacture of indigo, which seems to be the safest interpretation. Dr. Chaghtai considers it a preparation of *bail*, used in buildings). (10) *Mahi faroshi* (a tax on the sale of fish). (11) *Naddafi* (a tax on carders of cotton). (12) *Sabun-gari* (a tax on soap-making). (13) *Ris-man-faroshi* (a tax on selling ropes). (14) *Rughan-gari* (a tax on oil-making). (15) *Nakhud-i biryan* (a tax on parched gram). (16) *Tah-bazari* (a tax levied from stall-keepers for the use of public lands). (17) *Chappa* (Some scholars, like Prof. Hodivala, have read it as *chappa*, meaning a tax on printed cloth; others have read it as *chatta* or a balcony that abets on a public road. The former appears to be more satisfactory). (18) *Dadbeki* (fee on law-suits; but only in excess of 10 per cent of the property involved, according to Prof. Hodivala). (19) *Qimar Khana* (tax on gambling houses). (20) *Kotwali* (Dr. I. H. Quraishi interprets it as 'police dues' but it may have included many taxes charged by the kotwali office). (21) *Ihtisabi* (charges made by the *muhtasibs* or officers in charge of public morals (*ihtisab*). The *muhtasib* was in the service of the government and not entitled to tax the public for his services).⁶³ (22) *Qassabi* (a professional tax on butchers, apart from *jazari*). (23) *Kuza wa khisht pazi* (a tax on brick-kilns and potteries). (24) *Ghari* (house-tax). (25) *Charai* (grazing-tax). (26) *Musadarat* (fines of various kinds). (27) *Kababi* (tax on minced meat). (28) *Khizrawat* (taxes on vegetables and fruits).⁶⁴

63 Mawardi tells us in his *Ahkam-us-Sultaniya* that under the later Abbasids the *muhtasibs* were officers in charge of public morals. They could not enter a house; also they could not try a case, for this was the function of the qazi or judge. But all the external aspects of city-life were in their charge. According to Mawardi, respect for the *muhtasibs* had decayed owing to their dishonesty and lack of character. In India we do not find a special body of officers, known as *muhtasibs*; it was found more convenient to assign the duties of the *muhtasibs* to officers with real executive authority, like the *maqta* or the kotwal.

64 The copyists through the ages have worked havoc both with the number of

Afif says that Qazi Nasrullah was directed by the king to announce the list of the prohibited taxes publicly from the back of an elephant in 1375-76 (A.H. 777). Afif was present at the time of the announcement. The total of the abolished (octroi) taxes amounted to thirty lakhs. They concerned Delhi and its suburbs only. It was not possible for Firuz Shah to change the tax-structure of the whole empire.

The *Shari'at* has not contemplated octroi duties, whether good or bad, for the simple reason that the Prophet did not have to manage the affairs of a really large city. The *Futuhāt*-inscription would guarantee the Delhi citizens against the reimposition of the abolished taxes; on the other hand, city-officers, who wanted to reimpose those or similar taxes, would see to the destruction of the inscription. Also octroi taxes could be imposed by the officers of other cities without the permission of the Sultan or even of his governors. *Ain-i Mahru*, in his Letter No. 20, expresses surprise at the fact that taxes at Uchch, which had been abolished by Sultan Muhammad, had been reimposed by some officers without his knowledge or permission as governor.⁶⁵ It is impossible to say in what other cities the same thing took place.

Firuz's action was probably based on the demand of the *ulama* throughout the middle ages that the state should only collect taxes prescribed by the *shari'at*, though he could not go beyond the abolition of the octroi duties of Delhi. The question was considered and dismissed in a few sentences by *Ain-i Mahru*.⁶⁶ 'If you confine your taxes to those prescribed by the *shari'at*—that is, taxes levied by the Prophet—then you must confine your expenditure also to items prescribed by the *shari'at*. If both these conditions are fulfilled, then your budget will balance. But if for various reasons, which are too obvious to be discussed, the *shari'at*-taxes do not suffice for the expenditure of the present-day state, then your course must be to follow not what the *shari'at* prescribes, but what it permits.'

taxes and their spellings. The *Tabaqat-i Akbari* adds two more taxes to the above—*nikahi* (a tax on marriages) and *daroghi* (a tax for the perquisites of the *darogha*).

Afif refers to three or more taxes—like *dangana*, *mustaghil*, and *dauri*—and explains their character. Two examples should suffice. If a merchant brought a beast of burden to old Delhi, the government officers compelled it to carry building-material without payment at least once from Delhi to Firuzabad. After a merchant's goods had paid the import-duty (called *zakat*) at the *Sera-i Adl*, it was taken to the *khazana* and kept there for a further charge of one *dang* (copper coin) per *tanka* for a long period. Though *dangana* is referred to in the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*, the other taxes were probably remitted after the *Futuhāt-i Firuz Shahi* had been inscribed.

⁶⁵ *Insha-i Mahru*, 48.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 69 (No. 30).

THE GREAT OFFICERS OF FIRUZ SHAH

When Firuz Shah held his public *darbar*, some ten or twelve great officers were allowed to sit but the rest, including members of the royal family, had to stand. The curious privilege of sitting during the *darbar*, but on the uncarpeted floor, was given to three Hindu rais—Rai Madar Deva, Rai Sabir and Rawat Adharan. The normal seat of the minister of war was on the left of the royal throne, but Bashir was not allowed to sit there because he was legally a slave of the Sultan. Convention required that Firuz should talk only to the wazir during the *darbar*; even when he wished to talk to others, it had to be through the wazir.

Space will only permit brief references to the leading officers of the reign.

(i) *Tatar Khan*:

Though Khan-i Jahan was appointed wazir, Tatar Khan was believed to be the senior-most officer and sat on the right of the royal throne while Khan-i Jahan sat on the left. He seems to have died soon after the second Bengal campaign. To posterity Tatar Khan is known by two encyclopaedic compilations—the *Tafsir-i Tatar Khani* and the *Fatawa-i Tatar Khani*. The former gave all the differences in the interpretations of the Quran (*tafsir*) within the orthodox (Sunni) creed and referred each opinion to the author who had propounded it. Similarly the *Fatawa-i Tatar Khani* collected all the differences in the Hanafi law as propounded by different juriconsults. Both must have been convenient works of reference, but they were too voluminous to last. The *Fatawa-i Tatar Khani* consisted of 30 volumes, according to Afif. Some parts of it have survived and references to it are found in the *Fatawa-i Alamgiri*.

(ii) *Khan-i Jahan Maqbul*:

According to Afif, Khan-i Jahan worked as wazir for eighteen years and died in 1368-69 (A.H. 770) after he had reached the age of eighty. He was succeeded as wazir by his son, who had been named Jauna by Sultan Muhammad and was also given the title of Khan-i Jahan by Firuz.

Apart from the grants to Khan-i Jahan's officers, soldiers and members of his family, Firuz seems to have assigned lands yielding about thirteen lakhs of *tankas* a year to Khan-i Jahan personally; and with the growth of agricultural production during the reign, this amount must have increased considerably. The great wazir took the customary presents from the *maqtas* (governors), but he made a

careful list of these presents, placed the list before the royal throne and deposited the total amount in the treasury of the royal *karkhanas*, which was not under his direct control. He also, like other good wazirs, presented four lakhs of *tankas* to the Sultan every year. Apart from this, he was incorruptible. 'Khan-i Jahan', Afif assures us, 'did not demand a copper coin from the *maqtas* or from any one else.' The king left all affairs of the state in the hands of the wazir, but the wazir never forgot his place. When Firuz was residing at Salura, Khan-i Jahan and his officers used to go to him every Saturday to place the official papers before him and to obtain his instructions. Though each trusted the other, occasional misunderstandings were inevitable. On one occasion when Khan-i Jahan thought that Firuz wished to appoint Zafar Khan in his place, he sent to the Sultan the original letter he had written with his own hand promising to make the post of wazir hereditary in Khan-i Jahan's family. When they met after a few days, Firuz succeeded in explaining that he had been misunderstood.

Two examples given by Afif show us how the Khan-i Jahan used to 'manage' the Sultan. It was reported to the king by two spies that the silver *shashganis* (one-sixth of a *tanka*) issued by the mint, of which one Kajar Shah was in charge, was less by one grain in weight. Khan-i Jahan insisted on an immediate inquiry in the presence of the Sultan. Since the charge was correct, Khan-i Jahan advised Kajar Shah to arrange with the goldsmiths that they would transfer into the crucible the necessary silver, which would be brought in a piece of charcoal, while he engaged the sultan in conversation. The weight of the *shashgani* was found correct and this fact was officially proclaimed. But Khan-i Jahan soon after dismissed Kajar Shah on another pretext. At another time Khan-i Jahan found Firuz Shah, while sitting on the throne, scolding a number of officers. A pair of socks ornamented with precious stones and valued at 80,000 *tankas* were missing; the officers had put them in the list of articles sent to Lakhnauti but had really divided the proceeds among themselves. Khan-i Jahan caught hold of the sleeves of the officers in great anger and dragged them out of the throne-room. Then by threatening them with the death-penalty, he realized the embezzled money immediately. When Firuz asked him about the matter next day, he could reply with a smile, 'Eighty thousand *tankas* have been deposited in the treasury; whether the socks were sent to Lakhnauti or not is a different question.'

These two instances, purposely selected by Afif, should not lead us to conclude that Khan-i Jahan continued the discipline and good work of the sultanat in its palmy days. It was easy to punish the

smaller fry, but when it came to the big guns, Khan-i Jahan had to be careful. Firuz used to embrace him and address him as 'brother', but other high officers also had a pull with the Sultan. Khan-i Jahan was on the best of terms with Bashir, the minister of war, and made no inquiries into his ill-gotten wealth. The same was true of Malik Shahin, the officer (*shahna*) in charge of the Sultan's private *majlis* (*majlis-i khas*), who left a legacy of 50 lakhs of *tankas* in cash along with a lot of jems and valuables. 'The khans and maliks of the reign grew rich and collected enormous quantities of gold and precious stones.' Afif is correct in stating that Khan-i Jahan controlled all officers of the regime, but it was unfortunately obtained by overlooking their corruption and their withholding of money, which should have been deposited in the public treasury. There was, however, one exception. Ain-i Mahru objected to this shielding of corruption.

(iii) *Ain-i Mahru*:⁶⁷

Ain-i Mahru had a brilliant career as an administrator during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Firuz Shah appointed him *mushrif-i mamalik* and as such he was in charge of collecting the taxes of the whole empire; the auditing of expenditure was in charge of another high officer, the *mustauf-i mamalik*; and both were subordinate to the wazir, who was in charge of the finance department. The surviving letters of Ain-i Mahru, which have been so carefully edited by Professor S. A. Rashid, prove that he was a highly educated man of remarkable politeness and great charm and a master of the mild answer that turns away wrath. But he could not pull on with Khan-i Jahan; the two used hard words for each other publicly in the wazir's office and also in the presence of the Sultan.⁶⁸ Ultimately Firuz allowed Khan-i Jahan to dismiss Ain-i Mahru from the office of *mushrif-i mamalik*. But three days later he appointed Ain-i Mahru governor of the three provinces of Multan,

67 He must be clearly distinguished from Ainul Mulk Multani to whom Barani refers first during the siege of Ranthambhor in 1301. Ain-i Mahru died some time after the second Bengal campaign of 1360. To identify them—as Prof. S. A. Rashid has done—would mean giving over 75 years of working life to one man. Secondly, while Ainul Mulk Multani was a general of great repute, Barani declares (389-390) that Ainul Mulk (Mahru) and his brothers 'knew nothing of warfare and had no military experience'. Ain-i Mahru gives his name as Abdullāh Muhammad Sharif; the title of Ainul Mulk was probably given to him after the death of Alauddin's great general. His father's name was Amir Mahru and in his *Insha-i Mahru* he refers to himself as 'Ain-i Mahru' to prevent being identified with the great general, whose title had been bestowed upon him.

68 Afif, whose sympathy seems to have been with Khan-i Jahan, describes these quarrels in detail. The quarrel began with Khan-i Jahan's refusal to let Ain-i Mahru see the audit papers to which he was by custom entitled.

Bhakkar and Siwistan with 'full powers' (*mutlaq*); since he was not prepared to work in subordination to Khan-i Jahan, these provinces were taken out of the control of the wizarat and put directly under the king. He was scrupulously honest. 'I am not one of those servants of the king,' he says in one of his letters, 'who can be turned from the path of duty by bribery or influence.'⁶⁹ Ain-i Mahru was appointed governor before the second Bengal campaign. In one of his letters he refers to the fact that he had been governor for three years.

(iv) *Imadul Mulk Bashir Sultani*:

Bashir's enormous wealth, and the means by which it was accumulated, must have been well known to Firuz Shah, but he refused to take any steps. 'Bashir's property is my property', he remarked. Bashir placed in his hands a list of his properties—the silver *tankas* alone amounting to thirteen crores. Firuz read through the list and returned it. Bashir then brought one crore of *tankas* in gunny bags and Firuz accepted the money as a reserve fund for state. When Bashir grew too old for any work, he handed over the office of the *diwan-i arz* to his son, Ishaq, and got a letter of manumission from Firuz Shah; he also set free four thousand slaves he had purchased and gave them some money to establish themselves. When Bashir died, Firuz Shah took nine out of the twelve crores he had left, and allowed the remaining three crores to be distributed among Bashir's heirs. Afif's remarks are significant. 'In no age has any khan or malik possessed so much wealth as Bashir... God be praised! They have to account (to God) for the wealth they have collected honestly and dishonestly (*wajh wa na wajh*)—and left behind them... The rebellion of the royal slaves against Sultan Muhammad Shah, son of Firuz, was for the possession of the money collected by Bashir.'

(v) *Ziyaul Mulk Shamsuddin Abu Raja*:

The meteoric career of Abu Raja, covering some three years (1381-83), gives us the only instance when Firuz Shah made an attempt to prevent the further deterioration of the financial system of the empire. After his appointment as *mustauf-i mamalik* (auditor-general), Abu Raja began to inform the Sultan secretly of the dishonesty and corruption that prevailed in the finance department and implanted in his mind the hope that he (Abu Raja) would put things right. Firuz ordered all papers to be put before Abu Raja; the wazir, Khan-i Jahan II, was paralysed and issued all orders according to Abu Raja's wishes. Unfortunately Abu Raja, though very able, had

⁶⁹ *Insha-i Mahru*, 213, No. 120.

been dishonest in the past, and now he began to make dishonest demands even from persons who had access to the king. Instigated by Khan-i Jahan II, the clerks of the revenue office brought charges of corruption against Abu Raja confidentially before Firuz Shah, and proved them conclusively on the basis of documents and witnesses. Firuz's confidence in his favourite gave place to dislike. Abu Raja's houses were searched; 80,000 silver *tankas* were found in one house and 3,000 gold *tankas* in another. For six months Abu Raja was brought daily before the wazir's office and beaten with a stick till the stick itself broke into pieces. This is the only case of a recorded torture in Firuz's reign. Finally, Firuz ordered him to be exiled to 'Marut and Tahluk'(?), some places in the waterless desert of western India. Muhammad Shah brought him back to Delhi, but he died soon after.

LAST YEARS OF THE REIGN 70

In 1371-72 (A.H. 773) Zafar Khan died in Gujarat and his governorship along with the title of Zafar Khan was granted to his son, Darya Khan. On 23 July 1374 (12 Safar A.H. 776) Fath Khan, the heir-designate, died at Kanthur; Firuz Shah was deeply affected by this misfortune but he did not nominate another heir. In 1376-77 (A.H. 778) Shamsuddin Damghani was appointed governor of Gujarat. His promise was that he would, in addition to the usual *mahsul* (payment to Delhi), give forty lakhs of *tankas* more along with 100 elephants, 200 horses and 400 slaves from among the sons of *muqaddams* and Abyssinians. He was unable to keep his promise and rebelled. But the *sadah* amirs of Gujarat cut off his head and sent it to Firuz Shah. This is the only rebellion of a governor in Firuz Shah's reign and no army was needed to suppress it. Gujarat was then assigned to Malik Muffarrih Sultani with the title of Farhatul Mulk.

In 1377-78 (A.H. 779) Rai Sabir, Rai Adharan and the *muqaddams* of Etawah rebelled but capitulated after a defeat. They were brought with their families and settled in Delhi. The duty of keeping the area in order was assigned to Malikzada Firuz, son of Tajuddin Turk, and Malik Bali Afghan.

Rai Kharko, chief of the Katehr Rajputs, invited Saiyyid Muhammad, governor of Badaun, and his brother, Saiyyid Alauddin, to a feast at his place and then put them to death. His action, as reported by the historians, was indefensible. But both the Quran and common sense are at one on this point—no one is responsible for the

crimes of another. Firuz Shah's actions, amounting almost to madness, indicate the incurable moral and theological degeneration his character had suffered. He marched to Katehr and desolated the whole territory. Rai Kharko fled to the chiefs of Kamaun at the foot-hill of the Himalayas; Firuz desolated that region also, but Kharko could not be found. Firuz then appointed two strong governors at Badaun and Sambhal, and under the pretext of hunting he desolated the area of Sambhal every year. 'Nothing was left there except the game.'

As the Sultan neared the age of ninety and became weak and infirm, he relied more and more on Khan-i Jahan II. The wazir put into the Sultan's mind the suspicion that his eldest surviving son, Shahzada Muhammad, was conspiring to rebel with the help of certain nobles, the chief of whom was Darya Khan, son of Zafar Khan. Firuz Shah, without giving a second thought to the matter, ordered Khan-i Jahan to arrest the nobles. The wazir succeeded in getting hold of Darya Khan on the pretext of settling the accounts of Mahoba, but the other nobles eluded him. Shahzada Muhammad succeeded in reaching his father in his *haram* in the litter of his wife, and explained the real situation to him. Firuz then ordered the Shahzada to suppress Khan-i Jahan. The great officers, the royal slaves, the amirs and the majority of the citizens were in favour of Shahzada Muhammad. In July-August 1387 (A.H. 789) the Shahzada and his followers attacked Khan-i Jahan's house in the late hours of the night, plundered it and executed his leading supporters. Khan-i Jahan, after killing Darya Khan, fled to Koka Pradhan at Mahari in Mewat for safety. Firuz first appointed Shahzada Muhammad as wazir, but later on transferred all the paraphernalia of royalty to him. The *Khutba* was read in the names of both kings.

In August-September 1387, Shahzada Muhammad ascended the throne in the Jahan Numa Palace with the title of Nasiruddin Muhammad Shah. He confirmed the old officers in their posts, but some new appointments were made. Malik Yaqub, who had been *akhur-bek*, was given the title of Sikandar Khan and appointed governor of Gujarat; but before he could take up his governorship, he was required to suppress Khan-i Jahan. The affairs of the *diwan* or wizarat were assigned to Malik Samauddin and Malik Kamaluddin. When Sikandar with his army reached Mahari, Koka Pradhan sent Khan-i Jahan as a prisoner to him. Sikandar cut off his head, brought it to Delhi and then proceeded to Gujarat. But provincial governors could not now be dismissed merely by a written *farman* from Delhi, and only a weak army could be sent with Sikandar. Farhatul Mulk and the *sadah* amirs of Gujarat and Khambayat defeated and killed

Sikandar, and the Delhi soldiers, who had gone with him, came back wounded and plundered. Sultan Nasiruddin, who had been hunting in the foothills of Sirmur for two months, returned to Delhi on hearing this news, but there was little he could accomplish for the great army of the Delhi sultanat had been reduced to his personal retinue.

Two months later the Firuzi slaves rebelled. There were a hundred thousand of them living in Delhi and Firuzabad, and their real object, as Afif suggests, was the great hoard of coins collected by Bashir. Firuz Shah, it seems, had left the main palace in Firuzabad and retired to the Kushak-i Nuzul, and it was in the plain before the Kushak-i Nuzul that the slaves collected together. Nasiruddin fought with them for two days with such soldiers as he could muster. On the third day the slaves brought out Firuz Shah, and on seeing their old master, all elephant-drivers and soldiers left the Shahzada and joined the Sultan. Nasiruddin fled to the Sirmur hills; the slaves plundered his house, and 'the scenes of the Day of Judgement were enacted in Delhi'. When the situation became calmer, Firuz Shah appointed Tughluq Shah II, son of Fath Khan, as his heir and left all matters under his control. Tughluq beheaded Amir Hasan Ahmad Iqbal; he also exiled Ghalib Khan, governor of Samana and a partisan of Nasiruddin, to Bihar, and gave the governorship of Samana to Malik Sultan Shah Khushdil. On 21 September 1388 (18 Ramazan A.H. 790) Firuz Shah breathed his last.

IV. SUCCESSORS OF FIRUZ SHAH TUGHLUQ

GHIYASUDDIN TUGHLUQ SHAH II, 1388-89

FIRUZ SHAH HAD LEFT two successors. Sultan Muhammad, his son, had been properly crowned, but the Firuzi slaves had driven him to Sirmur, and Firuz Shah had assigned all affairs of state to Tughluq Shah, son of Fath Khan. But Tughluq II had never been properly crowned, and the Firuzi slaves, who had put him on the throne, arranged for his coronation ceremony on the day of Firuz Shah's death (21 September 1388). The title of 'Ghiyasuddin' was found appropriate for him.¹

Tughluq II sent an army under his wazir, Malikzada Firuz, against his uncle in October 1388, but it completely failed in the enterprise. Sultan Muhammad moved from Sirmur *via* Baknari and Sikhab to Nagarkot, where he seems to have found a safe asylum.

'Tughluq Shah', says the *Mubarak Shahi*, 'was an inexperienced young man, who did not know how to govern. Unaware of the deceitfulness of the sky, he passed his time in drinking and dissipation and the affairs of state were totally neglected. The Firuzi slaves became bold and heedless to such an extent that the authority of the king completely vanished.' Tughluq II imprisoned his brother, Salar Shah, without any reason, and Abu Bakr Shah, son of Shadi Khan,² son of Firuz Shah, sought to escape from him.

Led by Ruknuddin Jundah, the naib wazir, the Firuzi slaves rebelled against Tughluq Shah. On 24 February 1389, they first killed a high officer in broad daylight, and when Tughluq and his wazir, Malikzada Firuz, tried to escape from the Firuzabad palace by a door leading to the Jumna, they captured and killed them and hung up their severed heads on the palace gate.

ABU BAKR SHAH, 1389-90

Abu Bakr Shah, a grandson of Firuz, was put on the throne with Ruknuddin Jundah as his wazir. Jundah, it was suspected, wanted

¹ It is convenient to use the term 'sultan' for Shahzada Muhammad and his successors and the term 'shah' for the other claimants. It is impossible to distinguish between the legitimate king and the pretender. Both were really claimants.

Our best authority for the period is the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*.

² Barani writing in the early years of Firuz's reign definitely says that Firuz had appointed his eldest son, Shahzada Shadi Khan, as *rakil-i dar*. Putting Abu Bakr as the son of Zafar Khan is probably a copyist's mistake (*Mubarak Shahi*, 133).

to kill Abu Bakr and mount the throne; so the well-wishers of Abu Bakr put Jundah and the slaves of his party to death. 'Abu Bakr Shah obtained control of Delhi and of the elephants and treasures of former kings.'³ But it was different with the provinces. On 27 February 1389, the *sadah* amirs of Samana slew Sultan Shah Khushdil, who had been appointed governor by Tughluq II, plundered his house and the houses of his supporters and sent his severed head to Sultan Muhammad at Nagarkot.

CONFLICT OF ABU BAKR AND SULTAN MUHAMMAD

Sultan Muhammad proceeded to Samana and had himself enthroned a second time (4 April 1389). 'He was joined by the *sadah* amirs of Samana and all the *muqaddams* of the hill-tract.' He proceeded to Delhi and established himself there for a time, but all the Firuzi slaves were against him and they drove him out. Muhammad then established himself at Jalesar on the bank of the Ganges and about 50,000 indifferent soldiers collected round him. In August 1389 he again marched against Delhi but was again defeated. It was now clear that the Firuzi slaves were definitely against Muhammad and he took a drastic step against such of them as were outside Delhi and within his reach. 'On 19 Ramazan A.H. 791 (11 September 1389) all Firuz Shahi slaves, who were living in districts and cities, such as Multan, Lahore, Samana, Hisar-Firuzah and Hansi, were, by the order of Sultan Muhammad, martyred without reason by the governors and the inhabitants of the cities.'⁴ An attack of Humayun Khan, the second son of the Sultan, on Delhi in January 1390, was again repulsed. There was a political stalemate; the city of Delhi acknowledged Abu Bakr, but such neighbouring district officers as still desired a central authority preferred Sultan Muhammad. Abu Bakr tried to solve the problem by marching against Jalesar; but Muhammad marched at the same time to Delhi and captured it, and Abu Bakr had to return to evict his rival from the city.

Ultimately, however, the majority of the Firuz Shahi slaves became dissatisfied with Abu Bakr, and led by Mubashir, the *hajib*, they offered their allegiance to Sultan Muhammad. The reasons for their dissatisfaction are not recorded but can be easily guessed; it was impossible for Abu Bakr with the resources of the cities of Delhi only to give to the slaves the standards of life which Firuz Shah had guaranteed them. But the Firuzi slaves forgot that they were handing

³ *Mubarak Shahi*, 145.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 147. If the inhabitants (*sakanah*) also took part in the killing, the Firuzi slaves must have made themselves quite unpopular.

themselves over to an implacable enemy. Abu Bakr fled to the Kotla (fortress) of Bahadur Nahir in Mewat. On 8 September 1390, the slaves informed Sultan Muhammad of Abu Bakr's flight and he reached Delhi within three days. Mubashir was appointed wazir with the title of Islam Khan. But one of the first acts of Sultan Muhammad was to take the royal elephants from the Firuzi slaves and hand them over to their old keepers. The slaves realized that the days of their supremacy were over. Many of them fled with their families during the night to the Kotla of Bahadur Nahir. 'Such of the Firuzi slaves as were still in the city were directed to leave within three days; and the city was cleared of these dirty people.'⁵ It is said that many helpless persons, who fell into the hands of Sultan Muhammad after the passage of these three days, claimed that they were free men. He said that every one who could correctly pronounce '*Kharha Kharhi Karajna*' would be considered a free man. Owing to this test, many Hindustanis were disgraced and the Firuzi slaves were put to the sword. 'This story' says the *Mubarak Shahi*, 'is well known through Hind and Sind.'

Many amirs came to the capital, and an army under Shahzada Humayun and Islam Khan was sent against Abu Bakr Shah, Bahadur Nahir and the fugitive Firuzi slaves. When the army reached the town of Mahendri in January 1391, the enemy came forward to fight but was defeated and pursued. The Delhi army encamped near the Kotla on the bank of the Dahind. The Sultan also came on hearing of the victory. Bahadur Nahir and Abu Bakr capitulated; the former was offered a robe of honour and allowed to return; Abu Bakr was sent to Amroha where he died in prison. He had reigned for a year and a half.

The next two years of the reign were spent in fighting the Hindu chiefs of the Doab—Bir Singh, Sabir, Adharan, Jit Singh Rathor, Bir Bhan, *muqaddam* of Bhanugaon, and Abhay Chand, *muqaddam* of Chandwar. It is not possible to go into details, but ultimately Malik Muqarrabul Mulk succeeded in getting all these chiefs, with the exception of Rai Sabir, under the pretext of a conference into the Kanauj fort and murdering them there.

In the summer of 1392 Islam Khan, the wazir, was unjustly executed. In 1393 the Sultan developed a mortal disease, but in spite of it he captured the Kotla of Bahadur Nahir and despatched his son, Shahzada Humayun Khan, against Shaikha Khokar, who had rebelled and captured the fort of Lahore. But the Sultan died at Jalesar, where he had built a fort, named Muhammadabad after

him, on 20 January 1394, and Shahzada Humayun had to return from Delhi. He had reigned for six years and seven months.

ALAUDDIN SIKANDAR SHAH

Shahzada Humayun, the second son of Sultan Muhammad, ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Alauddin Sikandar Shah on 22 January 1394, at Delhi. Khwaja-i Jahan was confirmed in the post of wazir, and other officers of his father were also reappointed to their posts. The coffin of the late Sultan was brought to Delhi and buried in the mausoleum of Badr (?) by the side of the Hauz-i Khas. But Sikandar was only destined to reign for one month and sixteen days; he died on 7 March 1394.

ACCESSION OF NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD

The circumstances of the accession of Nasiruddin Mahmud give us an idea of how the Delhi empire had shrunk during the last six or seven years. It was with considerable difficulty that Khwaja-i Jahan, the wazir, succeeded in inducing the officers to enthrone Nasiruddin Mahmud on 23 March 1394, before they left Delhi. Three high officers of the central government are mentioned—Muqarrabul Mulk was given the title of Muqarrab Khan and appointed heir to the throne; Abdur Rashid Sultani was given the title of Sa'adat Khan and appointed to the office of *barbek*; Malik Daulat Yar Dabir was given the title of Daulat Khan and appointed *ariz-i mamalik*. The great provinces had become independent and their rulers did not need even a formal confirmation from Delhi. The territories to the east and west of the capital were in disorder owing to the power of Hindu chiefs and disobedient Muslim amirs. In earlier days a serious attempt would have been made to bring them under the direct control of Delhi. But now a different programme was followed. The policy of the king and the unity of India did not matter. Khwaja-i Jahan, the wazir, got from his fellow-officers the title of *Sultanus Sharq* (Sultan of the East) and the privilege of governing all districts from Kanauj to Bihar. The excuse for this partition of the already shrunken kingdom was that the Hindu chiefs were too powerful to be controlled from Delhi. Khwaja-i Jahan succeeded in his enterprise and the Sharqi kingdom of Jaunpur was established.

CAREER OF SARANG KHAN

Sarang Khan, to whom Dipalpur was assigned by the Delhi authorities, may have expected a similar good fortune. He proceeded to Dipalpur and succeeded in bringing it under his control. Then at a battle at Samothala, twelve *karohs* from Lahore, he defeated

Shaikha Khokar and appointed Adil Khan, his younger brother, governor of Lahore. In A.H. 798 (1395-96) Sarang attacked Khizr Khan, governor of Multan, and succeeded in capturing the place. He next attacked Ghalib Khan, the amir of Samana; Ghalib fled to Tatar Khan, wazir of Nusrat Shah, one of the rival kings at Delhi, and Tatar, at the command of his master, defeated Sarang Khan on 8 October 1397, at the battle of Kotla (or Kohla) and drove him back to Multan. In November-December 1397, Pir Muhammad, grandson of Timur crossed the Indus and captured Uchch. He then proceeded to besiege Multan and Sarang Khan surrendered unconditionally after a siege of six months.

EVENTS AT DELHI, 1394-98

It is to the credit of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud that, in spite of aggressive officers who left him neither power nor territory, he managed to remain king of a sort for twenty lunar years and two months. In June 1394, he left Muqarrab Khan at Delhi, and taking Sa'adat Khan with him, he marched to Bayana. When they were near Gwalior, Sa'adat Khan discovered that Malik Alauddin Dharwal, Mubarak Khan, son of Raju, and Mallu, brother of Sarang Khan, were conspiring against him; he captured and executed Alauddin and Mubarak, but Mallu succeeded in flying for protection to Muqarrab Khan at Delhi. Sa'adat Khan decided to return to Delhi and brought Sultan Mahmud back with him. But Muqarrab preferred to stand a siege, which lasted for three months or more, and Sa'adat Khan could not enter Delhi. In October-November 1394, Sultan Mahmud's well-wishers succeeded in carrying him into Delhi but his elephants, baggage and all royal paraphernalia had to be left in the hands of Sa'adat Khan.

At the approach of the rainy season of 1395 Sa'adat seized Firuzabad, but to give legality to his independent power he had to find a king. So Nasiruddin Nusrat Shah, son of Fath Khan, son of Firuz Shah, was brought from Mewat and put in the royal palatium (*kushak*) at Firuzabad. 'He was only kept as a puppet (*namuna*) and all affairs of state were managed by Sa'adat Khan.' But after a few days there was a sudden revolution against Sa'adat Khan; taken unawares, he fled to Muqarrab Khan for protection and was put to death by him. The government of Nusrat Shah at Firuzabad was reconstituted, and Muhammad Muzaffar (son of the governor of Gujarat) was appointed wazir with the title of Tatar Khan.

'Thus there were two kings, Sultan Mahmud at Delhi and Nusrat Shah at Firuzabad.' Muqarrab Khan kept Bahadur Nahir and his men with him and assigned to him the old fort of Delhi. He gave Mallu th

title of Iqbal Khan and put Siri in his charge. There was fighting between the inhabitants of Delhi and Firuzabad every day; the Musalmans (of the two cities) killed each other, but neither faction could overpower the other. Parts of the Doab, Panipat, Sonpat, Rohtak and Jhajjar (till twenty *karohs* from Delhi) were under the control of Nasiruddin Nusrat Shah. Sultan Mahmud only controlled the two forts (old Delhi and Siri) mentioned above. The amirs and maliks of the great provinces of the empire had become kings and spent their income as they liked.⁶

This stalemate was ended by Mallu Iqbal Khan, one of the most unconscientious adventurers who have disgraced the Indian political scene. First, by a sacred oath on the grave of Shaikh Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki he brought Nusrat Shah to Jahan Panah; but on the third day he suddenly attacked his royal guest, who fled first to Firuzabad and then to his wazir, Tatar Khan, at Panipat. Iqbal captured Firuzabad, fought against Muqarrab for two months and then made peace with him. Nevertheless, he attacked Muqarrab's house suddenly and put him to death, regardless of all his past favours. It suited Mallu Iqbal's policy not to injure Sultan Mahmud in any way. 'But he kept all affairs of state under his personal control and the Sultan was only a puppet.' Iqbal's next move was to march against Tatar Khan at Panipat, and Tatar hearing of this marched on Delhi. But while Iqbal was able to reduce Panipat in two or three days, Tatar was unable to make any impression on Delhi and went in his disappointment to his father in Gujarat.

This was the condition of the government of Delhi at the time of Timur's invasion. That invasion has been described in a previous chapter and it is not necessary to give an account of it here.

Khizr Khan, whom Sarang had deprived of Multan and who for that reason may have been entitled to Timur's consideration, had fled to Mewat from fear of the invaders. Timur summoned him along with Bahadur Nahir, Mubarak Khan and Zirak Khan with a promise of safety, but apart from Khizr Khan, the rest were imprisoned. 'I assign to you Delhi and all I have conquered', he told Khizr Khan when setting him free in the Siwaliks. 'But plague and famine were rampant at Delhi and in the regions through which the Mongols had passed; Delhi, in particular, was quite uninhabitable for two months.'⁷ So Khizr established himself at Multan and Dipalpur and very unwisely left Delhi to others.

⁶ *Mubarak Shahi*, 160-1.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 166-67.

CAREER OF MALLU IQBAL KHAN, 1399-1405

Nusrat Shah, who had taken refuge from Timur somewhere in the Doab, came to Meerut and then proceeded to take possession of Delhi 'such as it was'. But he made the mistake of sending an expedition against Mallu Iqbal Khan to Baran; Shihab Khan, the commander of the expedition, was slain by some Hindu footmen, and Mallu Iqbal Khan, in his turn, marched on Delhi. Nusrat Shah fled to Mewat and died there. 'Delhi came under the control of Iqbal Khan and he took up his residence in the fort of Siri. Some Delhi citizens, who had escaped the Mongol massacres, came and settled in the city again. In a very short time Siri was full of people once more. Iqbal Khan was able (by his efforts) to bring a part of the Doab and some districts round Delhi within his power; but the great provinces of the Delhi empire remained under the control of their independent rulers.'⁸

In the winter of 1399-1400 Iqbal Khan marched against Shams Khan of Bayana and extracted two elephants from him; then proceeding to Katehr he got a tribute from Rai Har Singh. In 1400-1401 a number of Hindu chiefs, led by Rai Sabir, fought a battle against Iqbal near Patiali; he defeated them and pursued them till Etawah and then proceeded to Kanauj. Mubarak Shah of Jaunpur came out against him, but neither army was able to cross the Ganges and they returned after camping on the opposite sides of the river for two months. Iqbal had induced Shams Khan and Mubarak Khan to join him in this campaign, but with his usual faithlessness he now seized them and put them to death.

In A.H. 804 (1401-2) Sultan Mahmud, who had tasted the unwilling hospitality of the independent rulers of Gujarat and Dhar (Malwa), decided to return to Delhi. 'Iqbal Khan went out to welcome him and gave him the royal palace (*kushak-i humayun*) in the Jahan Panah for his residence; but he kept in his own hands all affairs appertaining to the government and there was, consequently, a conflict between him and the Sultan.' Nevertheless, the two marched against Jaunpur and Ibrahim Shah Sharqi came forward with his army to fight them. Under the pretext of hunting, Sultan Mahmud managed to get out of Iqbal Khan's camp; he had an interview with Ibrahim Shah with whom he could come to no terms; then he suddenly attacked and captured Kanauj from Malikzada Harwi, the Sharqi governor of the place. The Sharqi and Delhi armies returned home without fighting. So long as Mallu Iqbal

Khan was alive, Sultan Mahmud remained content with his city-kingdom of Kanauj.

During the disorder following Timur's invasion, the strong fort of Gwalior had been seized by Narsingh Deva, who had been succeeded by his son, Biram Deva. For a general with Iqbal's poor resources, the fort of Gwalior was quite impregnable; also the Rai of Gwalior could help other Hindu chiefs in their struggle against Delhi. Iqbal Khan spent the next two years in fruitless campaigns against Gwalior and its allied rais. His attempt to capture Kanauj also proved fruitless.

In Muharram A.H. 808 (June-July 1405) Iqbal Khan marched to Samana, where Bahram Khan Turk-bacha had rebelled against Iqbal's nephew, the son of Sarang Khan. But Shaikh Ilmuddin, grandson of Saiyyid Jalaluddin Bukhari, intervened, and relying on his promise, Bahram Khan came to see Iqbal. Further, on reaching Talaundi (fortress) of Kamal Ma'in, Iqbal also took Rai Daud, Kamal Ma'in and Rai Hemu, son of Khul Chain Bhatti, with him. But he broke his promise on the third day. He had Bahram Khan flayed alive, while the others with hands and feet bound and a yoke round their necks were carried along with him. The object of Iqbal's campaign was to crush the increasing power of Khizr Khan, who came forward to meet him. In a battle by the river Dhanda in Ajudhan district, Iqbal Khan was defeated and killed by Khizr's army on 14 October 1405, and his severed head was sent to Fathpur, the capital of Khizr Khan.

RESTORATION OF SULTAN MAHMUD, 1405-12

The amirs of Delhi, left leaderless, invited Sultan Mahmud from Kanauj and he came and took possession of the city with a small army. 'The family and followers of Mallu Iqbal Khan were sent to Koil, and the good-natured king did not injure them in any way.'⁹ Daulat Khan was appointed *faujdar* (army-commander) of the territories held by the king in the Doab, and Ikhtiyar Khan was put in charge of the Firuzabad palace.

Sultan Mahmud had two dangerous neighbours—the Sharqi king in the east and Khizr Khan in the west. In November 1406, Sultan Mahmud marched in the direction of Kanauj and sent Daulat Khan with an army against Samana. The Delhi and Sharqi armies encamped against each other on the opposite banks of the Ganges and then returned; Ibrahim Sharqi, however, kept his army intact and, after the Delhi soldiers had been allowed to go home, he attacked

Kanauj and took it after a siege of four months. In September 1407 Ibrahim Shah Sharqi marched against Delhi and was planning to cross the Jumna at the Kija ford; but on hearing a rumour that Zafar Khan, ruler of Gujarat, had conquered Dhar and was proceeding against Jaunpur, he decided to go back to his capital. Sultan Mahmud succeeded in recapturing Baran and Sambhal, where Ibrahim Shah had placed his officers.

Meanwhile in a battle fought near Samana in December 1406 (or January 1407), Daulat Khan succeeded in defeating Bairam Khan Turk-bacha, who had seized Samana after the death of Bahram Khan Turk-bacha. But as Bairam Khan had vowed allegiance to Khizr Khan as his overlord, the latter marched against Daulat Khan with a powerful force. Daulat Khan fled across the Jumna, but the maliks and amirs, who were with him, offered their allegiance to Khizr Khan. Khizr assigned the *shiq* of Hisar-Firuzah to Qawam Khan; Samana and Sunam were taken from Bairam Khan and assigned to Majlis-i A'ali Zirk Khan, but Sirhind and a few parganas were assigned to Bairam Khan. 'Nothing was left in the hands of Sultan Mahmud except his territories in the Doab and the district (*iqta*) of Rohtak.'

The great, if unfortunate, strategic advantage of the Delhi area, as the next few years were to show, lay in the fact that the Mongol massacres had been so thorough that even after a decade it could not produce the grain and fodder needed by an invading army. In December 1408 Sultan Mahmud marched to Hisar-Firuzah and Qawam Khan submitted to him. But Khizr, the overlord of Qawam Khan, was naturally annoyed. He sent Malik Tuhfa with an army to plunder the Doab, while he marched directly on Delhi and besieged Sultan Mahmud in Siri and Ikhtiyar Khan in Firuzabad. But lack of provisions prevented Khizr Khan from continuing the sieges and he returned to his capital, Fathpur (or Fathabad).

Sultan Mahmud undertook no campaigns in A.H. 812 (1409-1410). In 813 (1410-11) Khizr Khan conquered Rohtak after besieging it for three months. 'The affairs of Mahmud's kingdom had totally collapsed; he could think of no means for stabilizing his power and gave himself up to enjoyments and pleasures.' In 814 (1411-12) Khizr Khan desolated a great part of Mewat and then besieged Sultan Mahmud in Siri. Ikhtiyar, who held Firuzabad on behalf of Sultan Mahmud, submitted to Khizr Khan, and thus both the Doab and the precincts of Delhi came within Khizr Khan's control. Nevertheless, owing to lack of grain and fodder, Khizr had no alternative but to return to Fathpur *via* Panipat in April 1412.

Sultan Mahmud died in October 1412, and his amirs vowed

allegiance to Daulat Khan as their king. In November-December 1413, Khizr Khan marched towards Delhi and, after subduing various places, besieged Daulat Khan in Siri. After the siege had dragged on for four months Daulat Khan found himself helpless and capitulated. Khizr sent him as a prisoner to Hissar-Firuzah and obtained possession of Delhi in May 1414. The central government of India, after reaching the vanishing point, was destined to rise slowly once more.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SAIYYIDS (1414-1451)

I. KHIZR KHAN

OF ALL THE DYNASTIES of the sultanat period, the Saiyyids had, next to the Khaljis, the shortest span of life—37 years. But its life-story is characterized neither by the bold imperialistic achievements of the Khaljis, nor by the novel administrative experiments of the Tughluqs. It, however, forms a watershed in the history of medieval India, indicating a stage in the dismemberment of India, when owing to the strength of centrifugal tendencies the concept of a strong centralized monarchy gave place to regionalism or provincialism in administration. It, no doubt, saw much feverish political activity, but all at a very low level in which its energies were frittered away in dealing with the rebellions of petty chieftains and zamindars. The Saiyyid sultans were singularly devoid of any ideal of establishing an empire, even roughly embracing the boundaries set by their predecessors. The sultanat of Delhi shrank in dimensions and its rulers were satisfied in formulating their policies in a very limited context. Their political vision was confined to a radius of some two hundred miles round Delhi.

Innumerable half-hearted punitive campaigns were undertaken against refractory chiefs; but these campaigns did not, and as a matter of fact were not intended to, achieve any permanent political objective and came to an end abruptly when a recalcitrant chief paid some tribute, or made a dubious promise for its payment in future. Erring chiefs always had to be forgiven when they paid all outstanding arrears of revenue. Probably at no previous period in the history of the Delhi sultanat were so many punitive campaigns undertaken for such limited purposes and conducted so half-heartedly. Moreland rightly observes: 'It is a striking fact that in these expeditions governors and chiefs were treated very much on the same footing. The king marches towards Gwalior; the chiefs pay the customary revenue or do not pay it, as the case may be. He marches towards Badaun, and the governor either comes to meet him and settle his accounts, or else shuts himself up in the fort, and is

treated as a rebel. The position for the time being resembled that which we shall meet in eighteenth century, when all titles and jurisdictions became confounded in the *taluk* or "dependency", that is to say, the area over which an individual, whether governor or assignee, whether farmer or chief, exercised *de facto* authority.¹ This situation must have adversely affected the revenue administration and planning of the Saiyyid government. The amount of yearly revenue during this period depended upon the capacity of the state to chastize its defaulting chiefs.

Even regions, which owed allegiance to Delhi, were actually controlled by disgruntled and ambitious elements of the Tughluq nobility. It was as difficult to control them as it was dangerous to connive at their contumacious activities. The Saiyyids could gather together a few efficient and devoted officers but they did not succeed in creating a nobility, homogeneous in its composition and loyal in its disposition. This weakened their basic position and rendered almost inevitable a very large number of half-hearted campaigns. Apart from this, there was no administrative uniformity and there existed a variety of persons who exercised varying degrees of control over their respective areas—amirs, *maqtas*, *zabits* and zamindars; and the Sultan realized different types of revenues—*mahsul*, *mal*, *khidmati* and *kharaj*—from them. A further division of *iqta* into *shiqs* had become very popular during this period. This heterogeneity in the administration resulted in the total annihilation of any sense of political solidarity, and centrifugal tendencies became rife and rampant. The Saiyyid ruler—with his nebulous title of *rayat-i a'ala* (royal standard)—was nothing more than a glorified *iqtadar*.

The Saiyyid dynasty was an interesting experiment in the theory of Muslim kingship. Khizr Khan, the founder of the dynasty, found himself in a curious political situation; his enemies had reduced him to impotence; he owed his rise to the invading Tatars or Mughals and could not assume an independent position in all respects. As a mark of the recognition of the suzerainty of the Mughals, the name of the Mughal ruler (Shah Rukh) was recited in the *Khutba*, but as an interesting innovation, the name of Khizr Khan was also attached to it. But strangely enough the name of the Mughal ruler was not inscribed on the coins and the name of the Tughluq sultan continued on the currency. 'They preferred to maintain', observes Nelson Wright, 'types of coins that had become popular in the recent past, merely altering the dates on them.'²

¹ *The Agrarian System of Moslem India*, 66.

² *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi*, 239.

All this indicated a strange duality in the political thought and behaviour of the Saiyyids and was unprecedented in the history of medieval India. Perhaps the Saiyyids wanted to take advantage, in the consolidation of their power, of their association both with the Mughals and the Tughluqs. The Tughluqs enjoyed a traditional respect—however flimsy and weak it might have become in later days—while the Mughals were supposed to be a military power to be reckoned with. This duality was needed only so long as the Saiyyid power had not established its credentials; as soon as that was achieved, both fictions were thrown overboard. Khizr Khan's successor dropped the names of the Tughluqs from his coins and declared himself to be the *Naib-i Amirul Muminin*. In 832/1428 Mubarak Shah initiated a coinage of his own and the Saiyyids came to enjoy all the insignia of royalty.

RISE OF KHIZR KHAN

Khizr Khan was the son of Malik Sulaiman, an adopted son of Malik Nasirul Mulk Mardan Daulat, an eminent amir of Sultan Firuz Shah Tughluq. Mardan was, at the beginning, in charge of the *iqtas* of Kara and Mahoba as well as the district of Dalmau. Later, when the frontier province of Multan needed a more seasoned administrator to deal with the Mongol pressure, Firuz Shah recalled him from the eastern provinces and entrusted to him the administration of Multan. The *iqtas* of Kara and Mahoba were then assigned to Mardan's adopted son, Malik Sulaiman, as an expression of royal regard for Mardan Daulat. On Mardan's death, his son, Malik Shaikh, got the *iqta* of Multan and when the latter also died, Sulaiman became the *iqtadar* of Multan. But Sulaiman was not destined to live long, and after his death, the *iqta* of Multan was assigned to his son, Khizr Khan.

Yahya Sirhindi's account gives the impression of all these appointments being made during the reign of Firuz Shah Tughluq. But it was not so. According to Bihamid Khani the *wilayat* of Multan was entrusted to Mardan towards the close of Firuz Shah's reign³ and he continued to hold it till his death during the reign of Abu Bakr Shah. Subsequently, the government of Multan was entrusted to Sulaiman.⁴ After Sulaiman's death, Sultan Muhammad Shah (son of Firuz Shah) appointed Khizr Khan as the *maqta* of the *wilayat* of Multan.⁵

A very unhealthy development of Firuz Shah's reign was the

³ *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, f. 417a.

⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 420.

⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 426b.

principle of the hereditary *iqtas*, and it was this principle which helped the members of particular families to consolidate their position in certain regions and ultimately paved the way for the rise of independent dynasties. The forces of anarchy gathered momentum after the death of Firuz Shah Tughluq and the nobles started a mad race for political power. From the capital to the *shiqs* and the *iqtas*, the whole of northern India was enveloped in political tussles and manoeuvres.

In 1395-96 Khizr Khan quarrelled with Sarang Khan, brother of Mallu Iqbal Khan, who was governor of Lahore and Dipalpur; as a result he lost the governorship of Multan, which was then entrusted by Delhi to Sarang Khan. Khizr Khan found himself in extremely difficult circumstances and sought refuge with Bahadur Nahir, the *maqta* of Mewat. But with Timur's invasion of India better days dawned upon him and he got an opportunity of returning to power. When Timur occupied Delhi, Khizr Khan, Bahadur Nahir, Mubarak Khan and Zirak Khan were summoned from Mewat to pay their homage to the conqueror, whose cyclonic impact on Indian political life had provided an opening for political adventurers. Yahya Sirhindi says that Timur showed consideration for Khizr Khan and conferred upon him the government of Delhi. Subsequently, on the eve of his departure from India, Timur conferred Multan and Dipalpur on him. It is not clear whether the government of Multan and Dipalpur was in addition to Delhi or was granted as an alternative to it. But it considerably enhanced Khizr Khan's position in northern India and gave him a definite advantage over all other contenders for political supremacy. Still his political path was not smooth. There were a number of Tughluq maliks and amirs who could not reconcile themselves to the rise of Khizr Khan and were anxious to grind their own axes. Khizr Khan had to struggle hard to work his way to the throne of Delhi.

During Timur's invasion of India, Delhi and all the territories traversed by him were ravaged by famine and pestilence. Sultan Nusrat Shah occupied Delhi for a time but Mallu Iqbal Khan rushed from Baran and drove him away. Mallu occupied Siri and extended his hold to the neighbouring *iqtas*. He also tried to repopulate Delhi. Thus, while Khizr Khan was consolidating his position in the *wilayat* of Multan and the *shiq* of Dipalpur and the region of upper Sind, Mallu Iqbal sought to stabilize his hold over Delhi and the region of the Doab.⁶

In the year 808/1405-6, Mallu Iqbal, who wanted to break the

⁶ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 167-68.

power of hostile *maqtas*, marched against Khizr Khan. The latter challenged him near Ajudhan, and in a battle fought on the bank of the Dhandra, Iqbal suffered a severe defeat. His wounded horse got stuck in the mire, all his efforts to escape from the field proved abortive and he was quickly beheaded. Thus a very powerful rival was removed from the path of Khizr Khan.

On Mallu Iqbal's death the nobles of Delhi invited Sultan Mahmud Tughluq from Kanauj. Though weak and immersed in pleasures, Mahmud somehow managed to rule over Delhi and its neighbouring areas till his death in 1412. It was during the period, 1405-12, that Khizr Khan consolidated his position and extended his authority beyond Dipalpur. His ambition to occupy Delhi, however, took some time to materialize.

In 811/1408 Khizr Khan attacked Delhi and besieged Sultan Mahmud in the fort of Siri. He could not, however, capture the capital city; he raised the siege and returned to Fathpur. He further decided to consolidate his position in the Punjab first and then launch an attack on the capital. In 812/1409-10 Khizr Khan marched to Sirhind against Bairam Khan Turk-bacha. Bairam sent his family into the mountains and proceeded with his forces to join Daulat Khan, an officer of Mahmud Tughluq. Khizr Khan defeated Daulat and Bairam was forced to surrender. Next year (813/1410-11) Khizr Khan proceeded to Rohtak and besieged Malik Idris, who had ultimately to surrender and send his son as hostage to Khizr Khan. In 814/1411-12 Khizr Khan marched to Mewat, harried Tijarah, Sarhath, Kharol and many other places in the region, and when returning, he besieged Siri. Ikhtiyar Khan, who was in charge of Firuzabad on behalf of Sultan Mahmud, joined Khizr Khan. But Sultan Mahmud put up a determined resistance and Khizr Khan had to abandon the siege. He, however, occupied some areas near Delhi and in the Doab and continued his efforts to extend his power round Delhi.

On Sultan Mahmud's death (October 1412), the amirs and maliks paid homage to Daulat Khan. Some maliks, like Mubariz Khan and Malik Idris, deserted Khizr and joined Daulat Khan. For some time Khizr Khan watched the developments quietly, but in November-December 1413, he marched against Delhi and pitched his camp at the entrance gate. The siege continued for four months. Daulat Khan realized the hopelessness of his situation and begged for mercy and quarter. Khizr Khan did not hesitate to forgive him, but put him at Hisar-Firuzah under the charge of Qawam Khan. Delhi was now under the control of Khizr Khan.

KHIZR KHAN'S ENTRY INTO DELHI

On 17 Rabi I 817/6 June 1414, Khizr Khan entered Siri with his army and took up his residence in the palace of Sultan Mahmud. Efforts were made to win over the good will and the cooperation of the Delhi people, who had suffered immensely during the period of anarchy and confusion. Gifts and pensions were given to them on a large scale. This, according to Yahya Sirhindi, led to the prosperity and affluence of the people. The chief supporters and nobles got offices and titles. Malikus Sharq Malik Tuhtah, who received the title of Tajul Mulk, was appointed wazīr. Saiyyid Salim was given the *iqta* and *shiq* of Saharanpur. He became the chief adviser of the ruler and, according to Yahya, 'all acts began to be transacted according to his advice'.⁷ Malik Abdur Rahim, an adopted son of Malik Sulaiman, got the title of Alaul Mulk and the *iqta* and *shiq* of Multan and Fathpur. Malik Sarup⁸ (? Malik Sarwar) was appointed *shahna-i shahr* and *naib-i ghibat*; Malik Kalu became the *shahna-i pil*; Malik Khairuddin Khani became the *ariz-mamalik* and Malik Da'ud was appointed *dabir*. Ikhtiyar Khan got a *shiq* in the Doab. The slaves of the former Sultan, Mahmud Tughluq, were confirmed in their *iqtas* and villages.

It is difficult to say anything definite about the character and composition of the new governing class, which the Saiyyids sought to create, as the detailed antecedents of the individuals are not available; but obviously it was drawn from different political and cultural groups and lacked that homogeneity which alone could guarantee the stability of a government in the middle ages. Probably the Saiyyids sought to obviate this basic weakness of their political system with the help of a concocted genealogy, which ensured at least a religious superiority on account of association with the Prophet of Islam.

THE GENEALOGICAL MYTH

The author of the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, the only contemporary authority for the Saiyyid dynasty, says that it was reported that Khizr Khan was a Saiyyid.⁹ His statement is based on two considerations: first, Saiyyid Jalaluddin Bukhari Makhdam-i Jahanian¹⁰ had once referred to Malik Sulaiman as a Saiyyid and, secondly,

⁷ *Ibid.*, 183.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 183. In *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (I, 266) and in Elliot (IV, 47), it is given as Malik Sarwar. 'Malik Sarup' is probably the error of a copyist of the *Mubarak Shahi*.

⁹ *Mubarak Shahi*, 182.

¹⁰ He was a distinguished Suhrawardi saint of the Tughluq period and exercised great influence over Firuz Shah. See, Aff, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 514-16.

Khizr Khan possessed the moral qualities of a Saiyyid. It is amazing to find a contemporary and fairly critical historian basing his assertion on such meagre and inadequate data. If Yahya Sirhindi wanted us to believe him, he could have easily concocted a genealogical table connecting Khizr Khan with one of the accepted Imams. It was not a difficult task; Yahya's faked genealogy could not have deceived contemporaries but it may have cut some ice with posterity. But Yahya must have known the circumstances under which the preposterous official claim was made and he did not wish us to take him seriously.

It has to be remembered that Timur at the beginning of his career as a ruler claimed that the Saiyyids had the right of governing the Musalmans and that they had transferred this right to him. Khizr Khan may have tried to walk in his footsteps, but the claim to Saiyyidship in its Indian environment did not raise his status. No later historian has given us any information about the matter. The author of the *Tarikh-i Muhammadi* is significantly silent on the question of genealogy. Though Khizr Khan was certainly not a Saiyyid, the appellation of 'Saiyyid'—with the comment that the claim is unproved and unprovable—may be continued as a matter of convenience for his dynasty.

CAMPAIGNS OF KHIZR KHAN

The seven years of Khizr Khan's rule were spent in dealing with recalcitrant elements and in quelling rebellions, which raised their head like the famed dragon's teeth in almost every part of his realm. The most disturbed areas were Katehr,¹¹ Badaun, Etawah, Patiali, Gwalior, Bayana, Kampil, Chandwar, Nagaur and Mewat. A new class of semi-independent local chiefs—*iqtadars-cum-zamin-dars*—which had emerged in this area, took full advantage of its geographical situation and kept the central authority at bay by its contumacious activities. With Tajul Mulk in charge of operations in the east and Zirak Khan responsible for the western areas,¹² Khizr Khan tried to deal with the situation as best as he could.

In 817/1414-15, soon after his entry into Siri, Khizr Khan had to send an army to Katehr under his wazir, Malikus Sharq Tajul Mulk. Rai Har Singh fled to the ravines of Aonla,¹³ but when pressed

¹¹ Rohilkhand. See Elliot, IV, 49.

¹² Unlike his successor, Mubarak Shah, Khizr Khan refrained from changing the assignments of his maliks. It shows that his decisions were carefully made and strictly adhered to.

¹³ A town in Bareilly district.

hard he agreed to pay tribute, cash and presents¹⁴ (*mahsul wa mal wa khidmati*). The amir of Badaun, Mahabat Khan, also submitted to the wazir. Tajul Mulk then chastized the chiefs of Khor¹⁵ and Kampil,¹⁶ and proceeded to exact tribute (*mal wa mahsul*) from the chiefs of Gwalior, Seor¹⁷ and Chandwar. He wrested Jalesar¹⁸ from the control of the Rajput chiefs of Chandwar and appointed his own *gumashta* (agent) there. Then after chastizing the Hindu chiefs of Etawah, he returned to Delhi.

WESTERN PROVINCES PLACED UNDER
SHAHZADA MUBARAK

Next year in 818/1415-16 Khizr Khan put his son, Shahzada Mubarak, in command of all the western provinces, Firuzpur, Sirhind, etc., after the death of Bairam Khan. Malik Sadhu Nadira was made his deputy (*naib*). The Shahzada put in order the affairs of the frontier territories and returned to the capital with his deputy and some amirs and maliks, including the amir of Samana, Zirak Khan. Malik Sadhu Nadira was appointed agent of the Shahzada in Sirhind. In June 1416, some Turk-bachas of the family of Bairam Khan rose in rebellion. They killed Malik Sadhu Nadira and occupied Sirhind. Khizr Khan despatched Malik Da'ud and Zirak Khan to deal with the miscreants. The Turk-bachas avoided direct conflict with the Delhi army and sought refuge in the mountains. They were chased for two months but ultimately the Delhi army had to abandon the pursuit.¹⁹

In 819/1416-17 Khizr Khan sent Tajul Mulk to Bayana and Gwalior. Malik Karimuddin, brother of Shams Khan Auhadi, came to wait upon him at Bayana and expressed loyalty to Delhi. The wazir then proceeded to Gwalior, sacked the city and exacted money (*mal wa khidmati*) from the Rai and other chiefs. Later he turned to Kampil and Patiali and then proceeded to Katehr. Rai Har Singh of Katehr having promised fealty, he returned to Delhi.

In August-September 1416 (Rajab 819) Sultan Ahmad of Gujarat invested Nagaur. Khizr Khan immediately set out for Nagaur but Sultan Ahmad retreated towards Dhar. Khizr then turned his atten-

14 Yahya says: '*mahsul wa mal wa khidmati*' (p. 184). It is difficult to fix the exact connotation of these terms.

15 Badauni (I, 276) identifies it with modern Shamsabad in the Farrukhabad district. It is situated in 27° 33' N and 79° 33' E about 6 miles east of Shamsabad. *District Gaz. Farrukhabad*, 255; Hunter, *Gaz. of India*, XII, 375.

16 Kampil is a village 28 miles N.W. of Fatehgarh in Farrukhabad district.

17 *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (I, 266) has Rabri.

18 In Etawah district, 38 miles east of Mathura.

19 *Mubarak Shahi*, 186.

tion to Ilyas Khan, the amir of Jhain. Ilyas Khan having submitted, Khizr marched to Gwalior and laid siege to the fort. Though the fort proved impregnable, Khizr succeeded in realizing some revenue (*mal wa mahsul*) from Gwalior and then turned towards Bayana. Shams Khan Auhadi of Bayana offered tribute and taxes (*mal wa khidmati wa mahsul*) and Khizr Khan returned to Delhi.

The invasion of Nagaur by Sultan Ahmad of Gujarat had disturbed the operations against the Turk-bachas of Sirhind. In 820/1417-18 Tughan Ra'is and some Turk-bachas, who had killed Malik Sadhu, again rose in rebellion at Sirhind and besieged Malik Kamal Budhan, the representative of Shahzada Mubarak, in Sirhind. Zirak Khan, amir of Samana, was sent to suppress the Turk-bachas. When he reached there, they raised the siege and again sought refuge in the mountains. Zirak chased them up to Pail²⁰ and compelled Tughan to submit to three conditions—(a) to pay a fine, (b) to expel from his camp those Turk-bachas, who were responsible for the murder of Malik Sadhu Nadira, and (c) to send his son as a hostage to Delhi.

Now that temporarily the situation in the western region had been brought under control, affairs in Katehr assumed a serious aspect. Rai Har Singh of Katehr again rose in rebellion in 821/1418-19. Khizr Khan despatched Tajul Mulk to deal with him. Har Singh behaved in a desperate manner. He laid waste Katehr and then sulkily retired to the ravines of Aonla; but he was pursued and considerable damage was done to his army and equipment. He, however, sought shelter in the hills of Kumaon. An army consisting of 20,000 was sent in pursuit. Har Singh emerged from the hills on the fifth day. The Delhi army returned with considerable spoils, but without any substantial achievements against the Rai. Tajul Mulk then proceeded to Badaun and from there to Etawah.²¹ Rai Sabir of Etawah shut himself up in the fort but ultimately agreed to pay a tribute (*mal wa khidmati*). In May-June 1418, Tajul Mulk returned to Delhi and presented the revenues and tributes to Khizr Khan, who showered his royal favours on him.

Since the situation in Katehr was far from being under control, Khizr Khan decided to march in person against the Rai. He punished the rebellious chiefs of Koil, and of the jungles of the Rahib and Sambhal,²² and then proceeded to Badaun and invested it in November-December 1418. Mahabat Khan held out for about six

²⁰ Pail was a pargana in the sarkar of Sirhind during the reign of Akbar. It lies 25 miles north-west of Sirhind.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 187-88.

²² Sambhal is 22 miles west of Moradabad.

months. Victory was almost in sight when news of a conspiracy by some amirs forced Khizr Khan to raise the siege and return to Delhi.

The nobles who were involved in the conspiracy included Qawam Khan, Ikhtiyar Khan and some other slaves of Sultan Mahmud. Khizr Khan invited them to a function arranged on the banks of the Ganges on 20 Jamadi I 822/14 June 1419, and put all of them to death.

Reports then arrived from Bajwara,²³ that an imposter, who pretended to be Sarang Khan,²⁴ had risen in revolt. The Sultan assigned Sirhind to Malik Sultan Shah Lodi and directed him to deal with the rebel. Malik Sultan defeated the pretended Sarang Khan, who retired to Lahori, a dependency of Sirhind. When Malik Sultan marched in pursuit, he fled to Arubar (Rupar),²⁵ and subsequently found shelter in the hills. Malik Khairuddin Khani was sent to reinforce the army of Malik Sultan. But it was difficult to bring the hill region under control, and the forces of Delhi had to give up the campaign without achieving anything. Malik Khairuddin Khani returned to Delhi; Zirak Khan went to Samana; Malik Sultan Shah remained at Rupar. But what his forces could not achieve, an ephemeral alliance between the two enemies of Khizr Khan made possible. Early in 823/1420 this Sarang Khan joined Malik Tughan Ra'is in his struggle against the Sultan of Delhi, but the alliance could not last long. According to Ferishta, when Tughan found that Sarang Khan had a large quantity of jewels with him, he got him assassinated.²⁶ Thus one of the determined opponents of Khizr Khan was removed from the scene.

The situation in Etawah having deteriorated, Khizr Khan sent a contingent under Malik Tajul Mulk in 1420. Tajul Mulk chastized the chiefs of Baran and Koil and then reached Etawah and besieged Rai Sabir. The Rai submitted and offered to pay an annual tribute (*mal wa khidmati*). Tajul Mulk then proceeded to Chandwar and plundered it. At Katehr he realized the revenue and tribute from Rai Har Singh.

In July 1420, Tughan raised the standard of revolt. He besieged Sirhind and plundered the region between Mansurpur and Pail.

²³ Bajwara lies 1½ miles east of Hoshiarpur and 25 miles N.E. of Jalandhar. Hunter, *Imp. Gaz.* II, 439.

²⁴ Sarang Khan was the *muqta* of Multan and Dipalpur when Timur invaded India. He was very popular with the people. He was either killed or taken to Central Asia by Timur. Since there was no love lost between him and Khizr Khan, it was deliberately circulated amongst the people that Sarang had returned.

²⁵ *Mubarak Shahi*, 189. Rupar is 50 miles N.E. of Ludhiana.

²⁶ Ferishta, I, 163.

Khizr Khan despatched Malik Khairuddin to crush the rebellion and Zirak Khan also joined him in the operations. Tughan, however, escaped to the territory of Jasrath Khokar, and Zirak Khan occupied the *iqta* of Tughan.

In 824/1421 Khizr Khan marched towards Mewat. Persons in the fortress of Bahadur Nahir were besieged; those outside submitted and joined Khizr Khan. Khizr Khan razed the fortress of Kotla to the ground and then headed towards Gwalior, invested the fort and ravaged the country. The chief of Gwalior paid tribute. He then marched to Etawah. Rai Sabir, the chief of Etawah, was dead; his son, however, offered fealty and paid the tribute (*mal wa khidmati*).

On 13 January 1421, Tajul Mulk, the talented wazir of Khizr Khan, died. The Sultan appointed his eldest son, Malikus Sharq Malik Sikandar, as his wazir. Within a few months of Tajul Mulk's death, Khizr Khan also followed him to the grave on 17 Jamadi I 824/20 May 1421.

ESTIMATE OF KHIZR KHAN

Khizr Khan was a very capable and energetic ruler, who rose from a low position to the throne of Delhi by sheer dint of merit. The throne of Delhi was, however, in the midst of hostile elements. The Punjab and the regions of Katehr and Mewat presented difficult administrative problems. The rebels were considerably helped by the geographical features of the area and any decisive action against them was not possible. However with the help of his maliks, like Tajul Mulk, Zirak Khan, Khairuddin and a few others, he struggled hard to maintain the control of Delhi over these areas. But one cannot help feeling that Khizr Khan was struggling in vain. The situation was so unstable that as soon as the forces of Delhi returned, the chiefs again adopted a rebellious attitude. However, he made a determined effort to reunite under the sultanat the whole tract of the country from Multan in the west to Kanauj in the east, and from the foot of the Himalayas in the north to the borders of Malwa. His administration also was just and generous. 'People', writes Ferishta, 'were happy and contented under his rule and so the young and the old, the slave and the free, condoled his death by wearing black garments.'²⁷

²⁷ *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, I, 163.

II. MUBARAK SHAH (1421-33)

NOMINATION BY KHIZR KHAN

KHIZR KHAN HAD ASSIGNED the command of the western areas to his son, Malik Mubarak, in 1415, but it was only three days before his death that he nominated him as his heir-apparent and made him sit on the royal throne. His nomination had the approval of all the important amirs and maliks. When Khizr Khan died, the people vowed allegiance to him afresh and he formally ascended the throne on 19 Jamadi I 824/22 May 1421.

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE NORTH-WESTERN REGION

On ascending the throne Mubarak generally confirmed the amirs and maliks in their former *iqtas* and assignments, but he made some readjustment also. The districts of Hisar-Firuzah and Hansi were taken from Malik Rajab Nadir and assigned to Malikus Sharq Malik Buddh, a nephew of the Sultan.¹ Rajab was given an *iqta* in the *shiq* of Dipalpur. This adjustment was rendered necessary by the pressure of circumstances. The general situation of law and order in the north-western region and also in the Punjab was far from satisfactory and a strong hand was needed to deal with the recalcitrant elements.

REBELLION OF JASRATH

Soon after his accession Mubarak had to deal with the rebellions of Jasrath Khokar and Tughan Ra'is.

Jasrath was the son² of Shaikha, a chief of the Khokar tribe, who lived near Sialkot. When Timur was marching through southern Punjab, Jasrath cavalierly opposed him between Tulamba and Dipalpur, but soon repented of his foolhardy venture and escaped to Shaikha. After Timur's cyclonic invasion had paralysed the rickety political structure of northern India, Jasrath expanded his activities and occupied Lahore. His power was immensely increased when, in Jamadi I 823/May-June 1420, he participated in a civil war in Kashmir and his candidate, Sultan Zainul Abidin, emerged successful. He then began to think of occupying the throne of Delhi. Khizr

¹ *Mubarak Shahi*, 193; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 271.

² *Muntakhabut Tawarikh*, I, 289; Yezdi, *Zafar Nama*, II, 169. Ferishta (I, 163), however, calls him Shaikha's brother.

Khan's death provided the long-awaited opportunity to Jasrath. With help from Sultan Zainul Abidin, he rushed from Sialkot and, crossing the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej, appeared before Rai Kamaluddin Ma'in at Talaundi³ and ravaged the whole territory from Ludhiana to Rupar. A few days later he recrossed the Sutlej and marched towards Jalandhar and invested Zirak Khan. Though he was resisted and opposed wherever possible, but in keeping with the traditions of the Saiyyid rulers, no attempt was made to reduce Jasrath to a position of complete obedience. Instead, an agreement was arrived at and it was decided that—(1) the Jalandhar fort would be vacated and left under the care of Tughan, (2) Zirak Khan would take a son of Tughan to Delhi, and (3) Jasrath would send tribute (*khidmati*) to Delhi and would himself return home.

When the terms of the agreement had been finally agreed upon, Zirak Khan emerged from the fort of Jalandhar and encamped on the bank of Pisi, at a distance of about three *karohs* from the army of Jasrath. Jasrath went back upon his plighted word, and when Zirak Khan came out of the fort on 4 June 1421, he imprisoned him and took him to Ludhiana. He then marched towards Sirhind on 22 June 1421 and besieged Malik Sultan Shah Lodi, the amir of Sirhind. But Jasrath, despite all his efforts, could not capture the fort. When Mubarak came to know of these developments, he marched towards Sirhind in spite of the heavy rains. Avoiding an engagement with the Sultan of Delhi, Jasrath fell back on Ludhiana and released Zirak Khan.⁴ Zirak immediately joined Mubarak at Samana.

The Sultan now advanced towards Ludhiana, but Jasrath had already forded the Sataldar (Sutlej) and had safely reached the other side of the river. To make it impossible for the Sultan to cross the river, he secured all the boats. On 9 October (Shawwal 11) Mubarak ordered some amirs—Malik Sikandar Tuhfa, Zirak Khan, Mahmud Hasan, Malik Kalu and others—to cross the river higher up at Rupar. Keeping himself by the river bank, Jasrath made a parallel move. But when news that the imperial forces had crossed the river reached him, he did not risk an encounter and took to his heels. Mubarak's forces pursued the enemy. But Jasrath beat a hasty retreat towards Jalandhar and crossed the Beas. When Mubarak's army reached near the Beas, Jasrath ran towards the Ravi. Mubarak crossed the Beas at the base of the hills and reached the Ravi near

³ Talaundi lies 20 miles S.W. of Ludhiana.

⁴ *Mubarak Shahi*, 196. According to *Ferishta* (I, 164) Zirak had himself managed to escape from the custody of Jasrath.

Bhowa. Jasrath crossed the Janhao⁵ and entered Tilhar.⁶ With the help of Rai Bhim⁷ of Jammu, who acted as their guide, the forces of Delhi dashed further. The Sultan went across the Janhao and demolished Jasrath's stronghold, Tilhar. Jasrath had been hunted from place to place and one of his strongholds had been dismantled, but he was far from being crushed. However, this campaign against Jasrath had an apparently successful end, and Mubarak returned to Lahore in Muharram 825 (December 1421-January 1422).

ATTEMPTS TO REHABILITATE AND GARRISON LAHORE

On his return from the campaign against Jasrath, Mubarak Shah turned his attention to the restoration of the city of Lahore; it presented a deserted look at this time because after the holocaust of the Timurids, it had remained almost neglected. At the instance of Mubarak, the houses were reconstructed and repaired and the people were rehabilitated. It took nearly a month to repair the fort and the gates. The *iqta* of Lahore was then assigned to Malikus Sharq Mahmud Hasan, and, in view of the strategic importance of the place and the recurring insurrections of the Khokars and the Turkbachas, a contingent of two thousand horse was also stationed there. But Lahore was not destined to enjoy peace for long.

CONFLICT WITH JASRATH

In April-May 1422, Jasrath crossed the Janhao and the Ravi, appeared near Lahore with a large number of footmen and mounted soldiers, and encamped near the tomb of Shaikh Husain Zanjani.⁸ The Malikus Sharq challenged him and the two forces met on 2 June. Jasrath was defeated in battle and was driven out of his mud fortifications, but he reappeared the next day. This time the struggle, which took place outside the fort, lasted for a month and five days, and Jasrath could not be decisively beaten. He went

⁵ Mubarak Shahi, 197. Chintah is meant.

⁶ Ranking (*Muntakhabut Tawarikh*, I, 384) identifies it with the village Talwara on the right bank of the Chenab, just opposite to the town of Riasi. It lies in the hills about 50 miles north of Sialkot. See also K. S. Lal, *Twilight of the Sultanat*, 321-22.

⁷ Yahya Sirhindi (p. 197) gives the name as Bhilain and calls him *muquddam* of Jammu. Nizamuddin (*Tabaqat-i Akbari* I, 272) gives the correct name, Bhim, and refers to him as the Raja of Jammu.

⁸ One of the most venerated saints of Lahore. Shaikh Ali Hajwiri (author of *Kashful Mahjub*) and Shaikh Zanjani were disciples of the same *pir* and came to Lahore during the later Ghaznavid period. See *Fawa'idul Fu'ad*, (Lahore ed. 1966), 57.

towards Kalanaur⁹ where Rai Bhim, who had come to support the royal forces, checked and opposed him. But the encounter remained indecisive. Jusrath then turned to the banks of the Beas in order to recruit a new army from the Khokars. But while Jusrath was trying to muster his forces and strike again at Lahore, reinforcements arrived from Delhi under Sikandar Tuhfa. Jusrath was quick to appreciate the strength of the combined forces of Mahmud and Sikandar and fled to the hills of Tilhar.¹⁰ But the forces of Delhi did not give up pursuit.

Malik Rajab (amir of Dipalpur), Malik Sultan Shah Lodi (amir of Sirhind) and Rai Firuz Miyan joined Sikandar Tuhfa in his operations against Jusrath, who had now become a serious problem for the Saiyyid authority in the Punjab. When this army reached the frontiers of Jammu, Rai Bhim also joined it. This army of several amirs of the Punjab then turned to Lahore. Mubarak sent a *farman* to Malik Mahmud Hasan to go to Jalandhar to reinforce and recoup himself and then return to deal with Jusrath. The office of the wazir was assigned to Malikus Sharq Sarwarul Mulk, and the office of *shahna* to one of his sons.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST KATEHR AND KAMPIL

In December-January 1422-23 (Muharram 826), Mubarak turned towards Katehr, and exacted revenue and taxes (*mal wa mahsul*) from there. Mahabat Khan, amir of Badaun, who had become panicky during the time of Khizr Khan, came and offered homage to him. The Sultan then marched towards the territory of the Rathors and punished rebels and miscreants. He stayed on the bank of the Ganges for a few days. Mubarak, Zirkhan and Kamal Khan were left at Kampil¹¹ in order to deal with the Rathors.

The chief of Etawah, son of Rai Sabir, who had once moved about with Mubarak in his suite, fled away in alarm when he heard of these operations. Malik Khairuddin Khani was sent to pursue him with a large army, but failed to overtake him. Khairuddin, however, laid waste the territory of the Rai and descended upon Etawah where the rebel chief had shut himself up. Mubarak also hastened to reach Etawah. The Rai was forced to submit and promised to pay the revenue (*mal wa khidmati*) as usual. In April 1423, Sultan Mubarak returned to Delhi. The office of *ariz-i mamalik*

⁹ Kalanaur is 17 miles west of Gurdaspur town.

¹⁰ *Mubarak Shahi*, 199.

¹¹ In Farrukhabad district.

was taken from Malik Khairuddin Khani and entrusted to Malikus Sharq Mahmud Hasan.¹²

BATTLE AGAINST JASRATH

Almost at the same time when Mubarak was settling the affairs of Etawah, a battle was fought between Jasrath Khokar and Rai Bhim. The Rai was defeated and slain in the conflict and Jasrath got hold of an enormous booty, horses and equipment. Emboldened by this success, he increased the area of his activities in the Punjab, entered into an alliance with the Mughal princes of Kabul and sacked Dipalpur and Lahore. Malik Sikandar prepared to chase him, but he quickly returned, avoiding any encounter. At this time news arrived that Shaikh Ali¹³ was marching from Kabul in order to pillage the *iqtas* of Bhakkar and Siwistan. The situation in the Punjab and Sind demanded immediate action, and Sultan Mubarak placed the districts of Multan and Siwistan under the charge of Malikus Sharq Malik Mahmud Hasan, whom only a few months earlier he had appointed *ariz-i mamalik* in place of Malik Khairuddin Khani.

MALIK MAHMUD HASAN IN MULTAN

Malik Mahmud Hasan reached Multan with a large army and restored the confidence and morale of the people, who had suffered a lot during those days. His keen interest in the welfare of the people endeared him to all and sundry, while his lavish 'rewards, pensions and allowances' won over the leaders to the side of Mubarak Shah. He repaired the fortress of Multan and strengthened its defences. A large army was also recruited to meet any threat of invasion. Thus he established peace and order in that area and created conditions in which the people could flourish and prosper.¹⁴ The situation in the north-western frontier eased for the time being.

ALP KHAN'S ATTACK ON GWALIOR

While the affairs of the Punjab were absorbing the attention of the Sultan of Delhi, Alp Khan, ruler of Dhar, attacked Gwalior. The Sultan immediately marched to deal with him. He exacted tribute (*mublighi mal wa khidmati*) from the chief of Bayana on the way and then proceeded to meet Alp Khan. Alp Khan had secured the usual fords of the Chambal, but Mubarak managed to cross the river

¹² *Ibid.*, 201.

¹³ Shaikh Ali was the *naiib* of Kabul, first under Suyurgatmish Mirza, son of Shahrukh, and later under Suyurgatmish's son, Mas'ud Mirza Kabuli.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 202.

suddenly at an unguarded place. Malik Mahmud Hasan and Nusrat Khan also joined the Sultan. They plundered the baggage of Alp Khan. Some soldiers of Alp's army were caught and brought in fetters before the Sultan, but he set them free. Next day Alp Khan made overtures for peace and the Sultan agreed as he thought that Alp Khan had been thoroughly broken and could not rise again. Alp was to quit Gwalior forthwith and had to pay tribute (*khidmati*) to the Sultan of Delhi. The Sultan stayed for some time on the banks of the Chambal to set affairs in order. He extracted revenues (*mal wa mahsul*) from that area and returned to Delhi in Rajab 827/May 1424.

In Muharram 828/November-December 1424, Mubarak went to Katehr. When he reached the bank of the Ganges, Rai Har Singh joined him and was honoured on that account, but as he had not paid his tribute for three years, he was detained for a time, probably till he had cleared the outstanding dues. The Sultan crossed the Ganges and punished rebels and miscreants. He then proceeded to the foot of the Kumaon hills and remained there for some time, but as it was too cold there, he turned homewards along the banks of the Rahib. He then crossed the Ganges near Kampil and proceeded towards Kanauj. But on account of a severe famine he did not push ahead.

REVOLT IN MEWAT

The Mewatis having risen in rebellion, the Sultan marched against them and carried fire and sword through their country. The Mewatis devastated their own land and took refuge in Jahrah,¹⁵ which was an invulnerable retreat. The imperial forces fell short of provisions and retired to the capital without achieving anything.

A year later, in 1425, the Sultan again proceeded to Mewat, because the area was far from being settled. The Mewati chiefs—Jallu and Qaddu, grandsons of Bahadur Nahir—having destroyed their places sought refuge in the hills of Indur.¹⁶ After a siege of several days during which the forces of Mubarak pressed hard, the Mewati chiefs made off to the hills of Alwar. Mubarak razed to the ground the fort of Indur and proceeded to Alwar in pursuit of the rebel chiefs. Jallu and Qaddu shut themselves up in the Alwar fort. The imperial forces, however, pressed hard upon them and the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 204. In all probability the place meant is Tijara. See also Hodivala, 405.

¹⁶ According to Elliot, Indur lies on the western brow of the Mewat hills between Nuh and Kotla, 8 miles south of Nuh. (Elliot, *Races*, II, 88, 100). Its fort, which stood on the top of a hill, was a stronghold of the Mewatis. See also Powlett, *Gazetteer of Alwar*, 134-35.

Mewati chiefs were forced to surrender. But Qaddu again showed signs of rebellion by trying to escape to his hill-retreats; he was, consequently, thrown into prison and Mewat was ravaged. The scarcity of supplies, however, obliged the Sultan to return to the capital.

BAYANA AND GWALIOR

In the closing months of 1426 (Muharram 830) Mubarak Shah proceeded towards Bayana. Muhammad Khan (son of Auhadi Khan), the amir of Bayana, shut himself up in his fort built on the top of a hill. For sixteen days he stood a siege, but on 31 January 1427 (2 Rabi II 830) the Sultan ascended the hill by a pathway situated in its rear.¹⁷ When Muhammad Khan came to know of this, he got nervous, begged for mercy and submitted. The cash, valuables, arms, horses and equipment, which he had stored in the fort, were all surrendered as *na' l baha*.¹⁸ The family of Muhammad Khan was taken out of the fort and sent to Delhi to be lodged in the *kushak* of Jahan Panah. The *shiq* of Bayana was entrusted to Malik Muqbil, a slave of the Sultan. Malik Khairuddin Tuhfa was appointed as the Sultan's deputy and the pargana of Sikri¹⁹ was entrusted to his care.

Mubarak then proceeded towards Gwalior. The rais of Gwalior, Thankir and Chandwar submitted and paid the revenue and the tribute (*mal wa mahsul wa khidmati*) according to the old law (*qanun-i qadim*). The Sultan returned to Delhi in March 1427 and made certain readjustments in the administration of the frontier *iqtas*. Malikus Sharq Mahmud Hasan was assigned the *iqta* of Hisar-Firuzah and Malikus Sharq Rajab Nadira was given charge of the *iqta* of Multan.

Shortly afterwards Muhammad Khan escaped from Delhi and went to Mewat. His family and dependants, who were living at different places, joined him. While in Mewat he came to know about the departure of Malik Muqbil, along with his contingent, from Bayana to Mahr Mahawan. Malik Khairuddin Tuhfa was in charge of the fort; otherwise the region of Bayana was without any effective protection. Muhammad Khan took advantage of the situation and rushed to Bayana, where he was joined by his former supporters. Within a few days he occupied the fort.²⁰

Mubarak Shah took back Bayana from Malik Muqbil and entrusted

¹⁷ According to Ferishta (I, 165) some deserters had indicated this secret passage to the Sultan.

¹⁸ War-cost, literally a tribute which a king exacted from the ruler of a place in passing by, being the price of the shoes of the horse on which he was riding at the time.

¹⁹ 18 miles west of Agra.

²⁰ Mubarak Shahi, 206.

it to Malik Mubariz with instructions to deal with Muhammad Khan effectively. As soon as Muhammad Khan heard about the arrival of the imperialists, he shut himself in the fort and Malik Mubariz took possession of the entire territory of Bayana. Entrusting the defence of the place to some of his followers, Muhammad Khan ran away to join Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi.²¹ Sultan Mubarak had planned to visit Bayana and set its affairs in order, when he heard about the movements of Ibrahim Sharqi and changed his mind.

CONFLICT WITH IBRAHIM SHARQI

Qadir Khan, amir of Kalpi, reported to Delhi the details of the movements of Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi, who had laid waste Bhungaon²² and was proceeding towards Badaun. Mubarak Shah forded the Jumna at Nuh-Patal, sacked Chartoli and proceeded towards the *qasba* of Atrauli.²³ Meanwhile Mukhtas Khan, brother of Ibrahim Sharqi, reached the skirts (*hudud*) of Etawah with a big force. Mubarak at once detached a contingent of 10,000 from his army and despatched it against Mukhtas Khan under the leadership of Malikus Sharq Mahmud Hasan. Mukhtas Khan came to know of this, and before the Delhi forces could reach him, he rejoined the camp of Ibrahim. Mahmud made many efforts to attack the Sharqi camp at night, but did not succeed on account of the alertness of the enemy. Ibrahim Sharqi then advanced to Burhanabad in Etawah district. Mubarak pitched his camp in the *qasba* of Bain Kota, a short distance from the enemy camp. Ibrahim, however, decided to retire to Rapri²⁴ from where he proceeded towards Bayana and encamped at the bank of the Kanbhir. Mubarak Shah followed him, and crossing the Jumna at Chandwar, halted at a short distance from the enemy camp. After twenty-two days of minor skirmishes the two armies came into conflict on 24 March 1428 (7 Jamadi II 831). On 3 April Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi forded the river at Gudrang, and returned to his territory. Mubarak followed him up to Gudrang, but gave up further pursuit.

Having satisfied himself that the Sharqi menace had disappeared, at least for the time being, Mubarak proceeded towards Hathiyakant, and after realizing tribute and taxes (*mal wa mahsul wa khidmati*) from the Rai of Gwalior and other rais, he marched on to Bayana. Muhammad Khan Auhadi, who had sided with the Sharqi Sultan,

²¹ *Ibid.*, 206.

²² 9½ miles east of Mainpuri. *Mubarak Shahi* has Bhukanur (p. 207), *Muntakhabut Tawarikh* has Bhunaknun.

²³ It lies 16 miles N.E. of Aligarh. In Akbar's time it was a *mahal* in sarkar Koil (*A'in*, II, 186; *Imp. Gaz.*, I, 180).

²⁴ In Shikohabad tahsil of Mainpuri district.

shut himself up in his fortress situated on a hill-top.²⁵ Mubarak besieged the fortress for a week and created such a situation that Muhammad Khan had to seek his mercy. Sultan Mubarak agreed to forgive him and withdrew his forces from the siege of the fortress. Muhammad Khan Auhadi came out of the fortress and went to Mewat. The Sultan stayed on at Bayana for a few days and made arrangements for its defence. Malikus Sharq Malik Mahmud Hasan was appointed governor of Bayana and its adjoining territories. Mubarak returned to Delhi on 30 May 1428 (15 Sha'ban 831).

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE MEWATIS

In July-August 1428, Sultan Mubarak decided to take firm action against the Mewatis, who had sided with the Sharqi ruler and were persisting in their hostile attitude. He executed Malik Qaddu Mewati on the charge of having exchanged presents and envoys with the Sharqi ruler. Malik Sarwarul Mulk was ordered to lay waste their strongholds. This terrified the other chiefs of the area. Jalal Khan, brother of Malik Qaddu, and other chiefs, viz. Ahmad Khan, Malik Fakhruddin, Malik Ali and their kinsmen, shut themselves up in the Indur fort. When Sarwarul Mulk pressed hard, the besieged offered to pay tribute. Sarwarul Mulk then returned to the capital.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE KHOKARS

In August-September 1428 (Ziqad 831), Jasrath Khokar besieged Kalanaur. Malik Sikandar Tuhfa, amir of Lahore, marched towards Kalanaur to relieve the besieged. Jasrath gave up the siege and moved forward to meet Malik Sikandar Tuhfa. In the conflict that ensued, Malik Sikandar was defeated and fell back on Lahore. Jasrath sacked Jalandhar but failed to retain it and retired to Kalanaur. The news of this setback alarmed Sultan Mubarak. He issued immediate order to Majlis-i A'ali Zirak Khan, amir of Samana, and Islam Khan, amir of Sirhind, to proceed to the help of Malik Sikandar. In the meantime Malik Sikandar had left Lahore for Kalanaur. He challenged Jasrath near Kangra and defeated his army. All the booty that Jasrath had obtained from Jalandhar, was scattered, and he hastily retreated towards Tilhar. Malik Sikandar returned victorious to Lahore. But Jasrath was far from being annihilated. He was as potential and serious a danger for Mubarak as ever before.

MEWATIS AGAIN

The activities of the recalcitrant Mewatis again attracted the attention of Sultan Mubarak. He pitched his tent near the Hauz-i

Khas, where amirs and maliks from different parts joined him. From there he proceeded to the *kushak* of Mahendwari and established his headquarters there. Jalal Khan Mewati and others realized the gravity of the situation and paid the revenue, presents and tribute (*mal wa mahsul wa khidmati*) due from them. In July-August 1429 (Shawwal 832) the Sultan returned to Delhi, and during that year he did not go on any other campaign. During this time news arrived that Malik Rajab Nadira, amir of Multan, had expired. The Sultan assigned the *iqta* of Multan to Malikus Sharq Malik Mahmud Hasan and conferred upon him the title of Imadul Mulk.²⁶

THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN

In 1429-30 Sultan Mubarak proceeded to Gwalior, chastized the rebels there, and then pushed ahead towards Hathiyakant.²⁷ The Rai of Hathiyakant was defeated and fled to Jalbahar at the foot of the hills. The Sultan followed him and punished the people of Jalbahar for supporting the rebels. He then proceeded to Rapri. The *iqta* of Rapri was taken from the son of Hasan Khan and was made over to the son of Malik Hamza. The Sultan returned to the capital in March-April 1430 (Rajab 833). During the return journey Saiyyid Salim fell ill and expired.

REVOLT OF THE SONS OF SAIYYID SALIM

In June-July 1430 (Shawwal 833), the Sultan had to deal with a revolt in which the sons of an old servant of the state—Saiyyid Salim—were involved. Saiyyid Salim, who died in March 1430, had held *iqtas* in the Doab and Sirhind under Khizr Khan, and was assigned the *khitta* of Sarsuti²⁸ and the *iqta* of Amroha by Sultan Mubarak. The Saiyyid was an extremely avaricious man and had hoarded enormous quantities of cash, corn and other commodities in the fort of Tabarhinda.²⁹ On his death, Mubarak distributed his *iqtas* and parganas among his sons. The eldest son got the title of Saiyyid Khan and the youngest was given the title of Shujaul Mulk. But the ambitions of the descendants of Saiyyid Salim remained unsatisfied. In June 1430 (Shawwal 833), Paulad Turk-bacha (a slave of Saiyyid Salim) rebelled at Tabarhinda. Mubarak imprisoned the sons of the late Saiyyid and sent Malik Yusuf Sarwar and Rai Hinu Bhatti³⁰ to allure Paulad to their side and get hold of the Saiyyid's wealth.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 213-14.

²⁷ According to Abul Fazl, the chief town of Bhadawar, a district, S.E. of Agra.

²⁸ Sirsa, a district in Hisar division, between the rivers Sutlej and Ghaghar.

²⁹ *Mubarak Shahi*, 214.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 215.

Paulad, however, played a treacherous game, and lulling the Delhi officers into a false sense of security, made an unexpected attack. The imperial army was defeated; all its baggage and cash were looted by Paulad and it ignominiously retired to Sarsuti.

The news of this defeat upset Mubarak and he decided to march against Paulad in person. He started for Tabarhinda and by quick marches reached the region of Sarsuti. Paulad shut himself up in the fort of Tabarhinda. He had abundant resources at his disposal and could stand a long siege. Zirak Khan, Malik Kalu, Islam Khan and Kamal Khan besieged the fort of Tabarhinda. Malikus Sharq Imadul Mulk Mahmud Hasan, the amir of Multan, was summoned from Multan to help and advise on the question of dealing with Paulad. In the meantime Paulad made an overture, saying that he had faith in Imadul Mulk and that if the latter accompanied him, he would submit to the Sultan. Thereupon Mubarak Shah sent Imadul Mulk to the Tabarhinda fort.

Paulad came out of his shelter and met Imadul Mulk and Malik Kalu in front of the gate. It was agreed that on the following day Paulad would come out of the fort and pay his respects to the Sultan. But some people of his army told Paulad that there was danger for him in this arrangement. Consequently he made up his mind to hold out. The Sultan could not stay long as affairs in other parts of the kingdom needed his attention. He sent back Imadul Mulk to Multan and returned to Delhi. He, however, left specific orders for Khan-i Azam Islam Khan, Kamal Khan and Rai Firuz Miyan to continue the investment of Tabarhinda and bring Paulad to book. Malikus Sharq Imadul Mulk again came to Tabarhinda and made such detailed arrangements for the siege that not a soul could come out. After making these arrangements, he returned to Multan. Paulad persisted in his resistance for six months, and even secured the assistance of Shaikh Ali of Kabul by offering him cash and presents.

INCURSION OF SHAIKH ALI OF KABUL

Shaikh Ali reached India in February-March 1431 (Jamadi II 834) and the Khokars joined hands with him. Amir Muzaffar, a nephew of Shaikh Ali, and Khajeka, a nephew of Jasrath Khokar, collected a large force from Seor and Salwant³¹ in order to strengthen the army of Shaikh Ali. When he reached Tabarhinda, Islam Khan, Kamal Khan and other amirs raised the siege and retired to their own territories. Paulad came out of the fort and paid 2 lakhs of *tankas* to Shaikh Ali. Shaikh Ali left Tabarhinda, but carried away with him

the women and children of Paulad. He stayed in India for twenty days and during this period he plundered and devastated the territory of Rai Firuz and the *iqta* of Jalandhar, besides other towns and villages. Imadul Mulk proceeded to Tulamba and desired to challenge Shaikh Ali, but instructions were received from Mubarak advising him to return to Multan and avoid an encounter with Shaikh Ali. Emboldened by this lukewarm policy of Mubarak, Shaikh Ali proceeded to Multan and reached there on 7 May 1431 (24 Sha'ban 834).

Imadul Mulk sent Malik Sultan Shah Lodi to act as a piquet. In an encounter that took place on 15 May 1431, Lodi was killed, and Shaikh Ali occupied Khusrauabad and reached near the *Namazgah* of Multan. But Imadul Mulk rose equal to the occasion and inflicted a severe defeat on Shaikh Ali.

Mubarak realized the gravity of the situation and sent reinforcements to Imadul Mulk. Khan-i Azam Fath Khan, Zirak Khan, Malik Kalu, Islam Khan, Malik Yusuf Sarwar, Khan-i Azam Kamal Khan, Rai Henu Zulji Bhatti³² joined Imadul Mulk in his defence arrangements. They attacked the army of Shaikh Ali, who found himself in a very difficult situation. Imadul Mulk's soldiers killed and plundered many of his men, while some of them were drowned in the Jhelum. Shaikh Ali and Amir Muzaffar, however, managed to swim across the river and reached the *qasba* of Seor. Enormous booty in the form of horses, equipment, etc. fell into the hands of the forces of Delhi. Describing the result of the encounter, Yahya Sirhindi remarks: 'Such a dire calamity never befell any (invading) army on any previous occasion, or in any other reign. Those who ran to the river were drowned, and those who fought were killed; so neither fight nor flight proved of any avail.'³³ Imadul Mulk Malik Mahmud Hasan and other maliks pursued Shaikh Ali up to Seor, but he eluded their grasp and escaped to Kabul. Amir Muzaffar relied upon his resources and shut himself up in the fort of Seor. In the meantime orders were received from Mubarak Shah directing the forces to raise the siege of Seor.

Soon after Shaikh Ali's departure from India, Sultan Mubarak decided upon reorganizing the administration of Multan. So he took over the *iqta* of Multan from Imadul Mulk Mahmud Hasan and assigned it to Malik Khairuddin Khani. This transfer was, in the opinion of Yahya Sirhindi, imprudent and ill-advised as it led to rebellion in Multan.³⁴

³² *Ibid.*, 220.

³³ *Ibid.*, 221-22.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 223.

REVOLT OF JASRATH

In November-December 1431 (Rabi I 835) while Malik Sikandar Tuhfa was proceeding towards Jalandhar, Jasrath Khokar unexpectedly appeared before him with a large army. Sikandar fought against him with the small force he had and was defeated. Jasrath imprisoned him and marched towards Lahore and besieged the Lahore fort. Saiyyid Najmuddin, a lieutenant of Sikandar, and Malik Khushkhabar, his slave, put up a stout resistance and held the fort. In the meantime Shaikh Ali reappeared and began ravaging the environs of Multan. He perpetrated great atrocities on the inhabitants and levelled the fortress of Tulamba with the ground. Referring to the atrocities committed on the people of Tulamba by Shaikh Ali, Yahya Sirhindi observes: 'Though many of the inhabitants of the *qasha* belonged either to the families of *ulama*, qazis or Saiyyids, that accursed, heartless wretch did not show any consideration for the Musalmans and did not even fear Divine wrath. Young women and children were taken from their families and dragged to his house; of the males, some were put to the sword, others were let off.'³⁵

While the storm created by Jasrath and Shaikh Ali had not subsided, Paulad Turk-bacha marched out of Tabarhinda and started devastating the territory of Rai Firuz. Rai Firuz was killed while defending his place and Paulad took his head to Tabarhinda. When news of these reverses reached Sultan Mubarak, he started for Lahore and Multan in January-February 1432 (Jamadi I 835), and sent Malik Sarwarul Mulk³⁶ as an advance-guard to put down the rebellion. On hearing of the arrival of the imperial forces at Samana, Jasrath raised the siege of the Lahore fort and retreated to his hill-fort of Tilhar, carrying Malik Sikandar with him. Shaikh Ali also decided to avoid an encounter with the forces of Delhi and retired to Bartut.³⁷

It had become the practice of Sultan Mubarak to change the *iqtadars* of Multan and Lahore after every serious insurrection. He deprived Malikus Sharq Shamsul Mulk of the *iqta* of Lahore and assigned it to Khan-i Azam Nusrat Khan Gurgandaz. Sarwarul Mulk brought the family of Shamsul Mulk out of the fort of Lahore and sent it to the capital. The fort of Lahore and the *iqta* of Jalandhar came under Nusrat Khan.

In July-August 1432 (Zil Hij 835) Jasrath marched towards Lahore at the head of a huge army. Nusrat Khan challenged and defeated

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 224.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 225.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 225. Professor Hodivala suggests that the place meant is, perhaps, Marcot or Marwat, now a tahsil in Bannu district in Western Pakistan (409).

him. During this time the Sultan remained encamped at Panipat, ready to march to any disturbed area.

In May 1432 (Ramazan 835) the Sultan sent Malikus Sharq Imadul Mulk to Bayana and Gwalior in order to chastize the rebels.

In August-September 1432 (Muharram 836) the Sultan started for Samana in order to punish the contumacious people of that region. He, however, encamped at Panipat and sent Sarwarul Mulk against Tabarhinda, which was ably defended by Paulad Turk-bacha. Sarwarul Mulk placed Zirak Khan, Islam Khan and Malik Raja in command and then proceeded to Panipat in order to see the Sultan. The campaign did not make any progress. The Sultan gave up his idea of proceeding in that direction and for the time being was satisfied with making some changes in assignments. The *iqtas* of Lahore and Jalandhar were withdrawn from the control of Nusrat Khan and assigned to Malik Ilahdad Kaka Lodi. When Ilahdad reached Jalandhar, Jasrath crossed the Beas and reached Bajwara. In the battle that followed, Malik Ilahdad was defeated and retired to Kothi at the foot of the hills.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST MEWAT

In October-November 1432 (Rabi I 836) the Sultan proceeded towards the hills of Mewat, and reached Ta'oru.³⁸ Jalal Khan Mewati shut himself up in the almost impregnable fort of Indur. The Sultan thought of investing the fort but Jalal Khan set fire to it and set out for Kotla. The enormous quantities of corn and equipment which Jalal had accumulated fell into the hands of the Sultan. Mubarak, however, proceeded to Tijarah and devastated the area of Mewat. Jalal Khan decided to submit and paid tribute and taxes (*mal wa mahsul*).³⁹ At Tijarah Imadul Mulk also joined him and brought a strong force from Bayana. The Sultan then sent an expedition against Gwalior and Etawah under Malik Kamalul Mulk.⁴⁰

SHAIKH ALI AGAIN

Soon afterwards reports were received about Shaikh Ali's invasion of Tabarhinda. Mubarak became apprehensive, for he feared that the amirs might abandon the siege as they had done before. So Imadul Mulk was despatched to help them. Shaikh Ali marched rapidly from Seor and reached Lahore. Malik Yusuf Sarwar, Malik Ismail and Malik Raja, who were in charge of the defence of Lahore, shut themselves up in the fort, but when the people of Lahore showed slackness

³⁸ Mubarak Shahi, 227

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 227.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 227.

in keeping watch at night, Malik Yusuf Sarwar and Ismail left the city by night and fled. Shaikh Ali, who came to know of their escape, sent an army to chase them. Some soldiers were killed by the forces of Shaikh Ali. Malik Raja was taken prisoner. The next day 'all the Musalmans of the city' were made prisoners. Shaikh Ali stayed in Lahore for some time and renovated the fort. Then leaving behind a guard of 2,000 soldiers, he marched towards Dipalpur. Malik Yusuf Sarwar was about to abandon the fort of Dipalpur when Malikus Sharq Imadul Mulk sent his brother, Malik Ahmad, with a large army to his assistance. As Shaikh Ali was afraid of Malikus Sharq, he did not stay at Dipalpur.

In January-February 1433 (Jamadi II 836) Mubarak marched to Samana where he was joined by Malikus Sharq Kamalul Mulk. Then he proceeded by way of Sunam to the vicinity of Talaundi.⁴¹ Imadul Mulk and Ilam Khan Lodi, who had been sent to Tabarhinda, joined the Sultan. Other amirs were also directed to remain near the fort. The Sultan then started in pursuit of Shaikh Ali, who fled. Malikus Sharq was sent to chase him but Shaikh Ali abandoned his horses and equipment and escaped. A nephew of Shaikh Ali, Amir Muzaffar, defended the fort of Seor for a month, but at last started negotiations. In April-May 1433 (Shawwal 836) he gave his daughter in marriage to Mubarak's adopted son, paid a large tribute and made his peace with the Sultan of Delhi. The Mughals, who had been besieged in Lahore, capitulated to Malikus Sharq Shamsul Mulk, who occupied the fort.⁴² Shaikh Ali was not heard of afterwards. After the successful Seor campaign, the Sultan left his army, elephants and tents at Dipalpur and went to Multan to visit the tombs of eminent saints. Subsequently he made some administrative changes in order to strengthen the frontier defences, and returned to Delhi.

CURTAILMENT OF THE AUTHORITY OF SARWARUL MULK AND ITS REACTIONS

The Sultan withdrew the *iqtas* of Lahore and Jalandhar from Shamsul Mulk and entrusted them to Imadul Mulk. Bayana was taken from Imadul Mulk and given to Shamsul Mulk.

Since Sarwarul Mulk could not look after every aspect of the functions connected with the wizarat, the duties of *ishraf* (auditing) were taken from him and assigned to Kamalul Mulk. But this arrangement led to bitterness and conflict. When the officers and superintendents of the various departments started consulting Kamal, it

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 229.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 230.

excited feelings of revenge and retaliation in the heart of Sarwarul Mulk, who also had a previous grudge on account of the resumption of his *iqta* of Dipalpur. He started thinking in terms of a *coup* (*inqilab-i mulk*),⁴³ and created a circle of supporters, which comprised of 'some treacherous infidels, such as the sons of Kanku and Kajo Khattri, whose families since the days of their ancestors had received patronage and protection from the royal house, and each of whom possessed plenty of attendants, territory and power; and some treacherous Muslims also, like Miran Sadr, the *naib-i arz-i mamalik*, Qazi Abdus Samad, the *khas hajib* and others.'⁴⁴ All these elements were on the look out for an opportunity to carry through their designs.

While Sarwarul Mulk was busy hatching conspiracies against him, the Sultan himself was busy in founding a new city. On 1 November 1433 (17 Rabi I 837) he laid the foundations of Mubarakabad and made elaborate arrangements for the construction of buildings. In the same month news arrived of the reduction of the fort of Tabarhinda and the death of Paulad, whose head was sent to the Sultan. Mubarak snatched some time from his constructional preoccupations and proceeded to Tabarhinda to settle its affairs. But he soon returned to Mubarakabad and again devoted himself to watching the rise of the new city.

ASSASSINATION OF MUBARAK

Probably the Sultan's brief absence from the capital provided Sarwarul Mulk with an opportunity to complete his plans. On 19 February 1434 (9 Rajab 837) when the Sultan was preparing to go for his Friday prayers, Miran Sadr, in league with Sarwarul Mulk, craftily removed the royal guard and brought armed horsemen on pretence of leave-taking. The Sultan was caught unawares. Sidhipal, grandson of Kajo, came forward and killed the Sultan with his sword and javelin.⁴⁵ According to Yahya Sirhindi, Mubarak ruled for seventeen years, three months and sixteen days.⁴⁶

Mubarak Shah had to wield the sceptre under very trying circumstances. His reign of seventeen years was a period of ceaseless military operations in Katehr, in Mewat and in the north-eastern region. He tried his best but failed to achieve anything solid and substantial. The cause is not difficult to discern. Under Firuz Shah's system all services under the government had been declared permanent and hereditary. Firuz Shah could lay down the law, but its

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 232.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 234-35.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 235.

implementation was in the hands of others. So, first, owing to the corruption of Bashir Sultani, the minister of war, and his subordinates, who misappropriated the salaries of the soldiers, the invincible army of Delhi disappeared, and the central government had no physical means left for keeping control over the rulers of the great provinces. These rulers had been made hereditary, but very naturally if they allowed the offices of their subordinates also to become hereditary, their influence, power and income would vanish. Alauddin Bahmani of the Deccan had to answer the question before Firuz Shah had set his evil example at Delhi. As has been shown in the chapter on the Bahmani kingdom, Alauddin Bahmani claimed and exercised all the powers which the traditions of Muslim kingship, including the traditions of Delhi, had given to the sultan; he had to execute two of his highest officers to publish the fact that he possessed these powers, but in the case of junior officers, transfers, dismissals and minor punishments were enough.

The same problem had to be faced by the founders of the independent dynasties of Gujarat, Malwa, Jaunpur, Bengal, Khandesh and Ma'abar. When the rulers of these regions declared their independence by striking their coins and putting their names in the *Khutba*, it meant, among other things, a notice to all holders of *iqtas* and offices within their sovereign control that their *iqtas* and offices were now held at the sultan's pleasure and not by hereditary right. As the chapters devoted to the provincial histories will show, these provincial kings took good care to establish their power over the administrative machine—including the power of dismissing and executing the holders of the *iqtas*, if necessary—before laying claim to kingship. The matter had to be arranged carefully and cautiously; both public opinion and the opinion among the mass of the *iqtadars* had to be won over, and it had to be proved that the only alternative to the provincial sultanat was complete anarchy. There was no rush to declarations of independence among the provincial governors.

Nowhere was the position so bad as at Delhi. The governors of the great provinces apparently did not accept in its fullness the hereditary principle of Firuz Shah, for this would have made it impossible for them to carry on their government. But the Tughluq kings of Delhi had lost the power and dignity which the provincial governors still possessed. One of them had been beheaded and his severed head displayed in public; others had been driven away or else deprived of all power while still supposed to reign. Consequently, it was hardest to restore the royal prestige at Delhi.

Like the founders of other dynasties, Khizr Khan was reluctant to assume sovereignty; he was content with the curious title of

Rayat-i A'la (Royal Standards) and we have to assume that he pretended to rule on behalf of Mirza Shah Rukh of Herat, the youngest son of Timur. Such a policy was not calculated to win over the loyalty of a plundered people, but Khizr Khan's appointment by Timur was the only claim he could put forward. When Mubarak Shah struck his coins and had his name recited in the *Khutba*, he was only following the precedent already set by the provincial sultans. But would the higher officers obey? That was the crux of the question. Khizr Khan, himself the product of an era of disintegration in which loyalty to the Delhi sultanat had vanished owing to personal ambitions, had postponed the question. Mubarak Shah by transferring *iqtas* tried to prove that he was in full control of the administration. His attempt should have been—and it probably was—to create an aristocracy loyal to the king and the country. Perhaps his transfers were too rapid and made it impossible for an officer to show the good work he was capable of. Perhaps he was a bad judge of men and trusted the wrong people. Maybe, the wicked spirit of Mallu Iqbal Khan—the spirit of ambition-cum-ingratitude—still haunted the politicians of Delhi. There was no principle to which Mubarak or his father could appeal and neither had any astounding achievement to his credit. Even the provincial sultans, with a definite principle on which to work, had done much better. Still to be just to the martyred Sultan—martyred by wicked people who owed so much to him—we have to remember that (as Ferishta says) he was 'a cultured prince' and had many laudable qualities.

III. SUCCESSORS OF MUBARAK SHAH

MUHAMMAD SHAH (1434-43)

AFTER ACCOMPLISHING THE ASSASSINATION of Mubarak Shah, Miran Sadr reported his achievement to Sarwarul Mulk, who rejoiced at it but tried to create the impression of non-involvement in the crime by supporting Muhammad Shah, who had been adopted as a son by the martyred Sultan. On 19 February 1434 (9 Rajab 837) Muhammad Shah (son of Farid Shah, son of Khizr Khan)¹ ascended the throne 'with the assent of the amirs, maliks, *imams*, Saiyyids, grandees, people, *ulama* and the qazis.'² Sarwarul Mulk tendered fealty but displayed great arrogance and took possession of the treasury, the elephants and the armoury. He got the title of Khan-i Jahan from the new Sultan. Miran Sadr received the title of Mu'inul Mulk.

Kamalul Mulk was not prepared to allow the murder of Mubarak to go unavenged, but he found himself utterly helpless under the circumstances. Sarwarul Mulk, on his part, was anxious to get rid of all his quondam colleagues as well as officers associated with the late Sultan. On the day following the accession of Muhammad Shah, he called some of the high amirs and slaves (*bandagan*) of Mubarak Shah, who enjoyed the privilege of *mahi-maratib* (fish-banner) on the pretext of *bai'at* (allegiance); he killed some of them and put others in confinement.

Malik Sura, the *amir-i koh* (amir of agriculture), was killed; Malik Karam Chand, Malik Muqbil, Malik Futuh and Malik Bira were thrown into prison. Having got rid of these amirs, Sarwar sought to create a group of his own supporters by a redistribution of *iqtas*. Bayana, Amroha, Narnaul, Kuhram and some parganas in the Doab were conferred upon Sidhipal, Sadharan and their relatives. Ranu, a slave of Sidhipal, was sent to bring the *shiq* of Bayana under his control. Sarwarul Mulk sought to bring the entire administration under his control, but his plans miscarried one after another. When Ranu reached Bayana and tried to occupy the fort, Yusuf Khan Auhadi challenged him and killed him in an encounter. His head was displayed at the gate of the fort and his family was taken into custody. This was the first bold expression of that anger and anguish,

1 *Mubarak Shaht*, 236.

The author of the *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, however, says that he was the son of Budha, and grandson of Khizr Khan (f.428a).

2 *Mubarak Shaht*, 236.

which was rankling in the heart of those sections of the nobility, who were loyal to the house of Mubarak and wanted the regicides to be brought to book.

Sarwarul Mulk's treacherous conduct and his arrogant attitude towards the maliks also created widespread disgust and discontent. Several amirs and maliks of Khizr Khan, like Malik Ilah Dad Kaka Lodi, *maqta* of Sambhal and Ahar,³ Miyan Jiman,⁴ *maqta* of Badaun and grandson of the late Khan-i Jahan, Amir Ali Gujarati and Amir Kik Turk-bacha organized opposition against him and rose in rebellion in their respective administrative jurisdictions.

Sarwarul Mulk sent an army under Kamalul Mulk, whose fidelity he did not suspect at the time, together with Khan-i Azam Saiyyid Khan (son of Saiyyid Salin), Sadharan Kanku and his own son, Malik Yusuf, to deal with the rebels. At first Malik Ilah Dad thought of avoiding a conflict by crossing the Ganges and going to some other place, but when he came to know of the determination of Kamalul Mulk to wreak revenge upon Sarwarul Mulk, he encamped in the qasba of Ahar. Sarwarul Mulk sent his slave, Malik Hoshiyar, under the pretence of assisting Kamalul Mulk. Soon after this Miyan Jiman also came with his forces from Badaun and joined Malik Ilah Dad at Ahar. Malik Yusuf, Hoshiyar and Sadharan now found themselves placed in an extremely difficult situation and were afraid of Kamalul Mulk. Unable to prevent the junction of Malik Ilah Dad and Malik Jiman, Sarwar's army fell back on Delhi. When Kamal's ranks swelled and the number of his supporters increased, he marched on Delhi on 12 May 1434 (2 Shawwal 837), and besieged it. Sarwarul Mulk made preparations for standing a siege and held out for three months, while minor skirmishes went on.

According to the *Mubarak Shahi*, Muhammad Shah kept up a show of alliance with the besieged, but at heart he was deadly opposed to Sarwarul Mulk and was desirous of taking revenge for the murder of Mubarak Shah. Sarwarul Mulk and his group, in their turn, were apprehensive lest the Sultan should betray them. On 14 August 1434 (8 Muharram 838) Sarwarul Mulk and the sons of Miran Sadr broke into the royal apartments with the intention of killing the Sultan. But the Sultan had been anticipating such a move and was fully prepared for it. Sarwarul Mulk's *coup* failed and he was killed along with the sons of Miran Sadr in front of the *darbar*. The Sultan immediately sent a message to Kamalul Mulk, who entered the city with his followers through the Baghdad Gate. Sidhipal set fire to his house, burnt his family, and fought till he was killed. Sadharan Kanku and

³ 20 miles N.E. of Bulandshahr.

⁴ *Mubarak Shahi*, 239. *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (I, 288) has Miyan Chaman.

the other Khattris were taken to the tomb of Mubarak and executed there.⁵ Malik Hoshiyar and Mubarak, the kotwal, were taken into custody and decapitated. Malik Kamal and all other nobles expressed allegiance to Sultan Muhammad afresh.

It was after this second oath of allegiance that the real enthronement of Sultan Muhammad took place. Kamal was appointed wazir and the title of Kamal Khan was conferred on him. Malik Jiman became Ghaziul Mulk and got the *iqtas* of Amroha and Badaun. Malik Ilah Dad refused the title of Khan for himself but obtained the title of Darya Khan for his brother. Malik Khun Raj Mubarak Khani got the title of Iqbal Khan and the *iqta* of Hisar-Firuzah. The eldest son of Saiyyid Salim became Majlis-i A'ala Saiyyid Khan, and a younger son got the title of Shujaul Mulk. Other nobles also received titles and *iqtas*. Having set the administration in order, Sultan Muhammad proceeded to Multan, where the rise of Langas needed immediate attention. He posted Khan-i Khanan there and then returned to Delhi.

In 1436 the Sultan marched towards Samana and sent an army against Jasrath Khokar. This army ravaged the country of the rebel but could not achieve any substantial results.

Disturbing reports then began to pour in from different parts. In the north-west the Langas began to expand their power, in the eastern parts Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi occupied some parganas, while the Rai of Gwalior stopped paying tribute. Chaos now reigned supreme in the provinces and stern measures were required to check the rapid process of disintegration.

Invasion of Mahmud Khalji of Malwa

At a time when anarchical tendencies were getting out of control, some *ulama* and amirs thought fit to invite Mahmud Khalji of Malwa and he marched to Delhi and encamped near it in 1440. In his distress Muhammad Shah sent for Bahlul Lodi and his troops from Samana and sent his son, along with Bahlul, to fight the invader. The forces of Sultan Mahmud Khalji were also put under his sons—Ghiyasuddin and Qadr Khan. The battle raged throughout the day. Next morning Muhammad Shah sent proposals of peace and they were accepted by the Malwa sultan. Now Mahmud Khalji of Malwa was a ruler of vaulting ambitions; he had come to Delhi because Delhi alone could be the centre of a future all-India administration. Why did he promise to go back from Delhi after an inconclusive battle? According to the Mushtaqi, the king of Gujarat

⁵ Mubarak Shahi, 242.

decided that Mahmud Khalji would become too powerful if he conquered Delhi, and in order to paralyse the whole policy of the Malwa king, he marched against Mandu, thus compelling Mahmud Khalji to return to defend his capital.⁶

But a more plausible theory has also been advanced. Mahmud Khalji, it has been said, had been convinced by the *ulama* and amirs, who had gone to him at Mandu or joined him in the way, that he would be welcomed at Delhi with open arms and that the weakened Saiyyid authority could offer no resistance. The stern battle of the first day convinced Mahmud that he had been misled; so he decided to make peace and retired.⁷ While he was on his return journey, Bahlul Lodi pursued him and plundered some of his equipage, and Muhammad Shah was so pleased with Bahlul's achievement that he addressed him as his son.

In 845/1441 Muhammad Shah proceeded to Samana, handed over Dipalpur and Lahore to Malik Bahlul Lodi and commissioned him to chastize Jasrath Khokar. But Jasrath made peace with Bahlul and flattered him by foretelling a great future for him. Bahlul wavered in his loyalty and did not fulfil the expectations of Sultan Muhammad. On the contrary, he marched against the territories of Delhi, seized all land up to Panipat and even invested Delhi. He did not succeed in capturing the capital, but on his return he rebelled at Sirhind. These developments considerably undermined the position of the Sultan, and amirs 'even within twenty *karohs* of Delhi turned against him'. In 847/1443 Sultan Muhammad Shah breathed his last, after an inglorious reign of ten years.

SULTAN ALAUDDIN SHAH (1443-76)

On the death of Muhammad Shah, his son, Alauddin Alam Shah, was placed on the throne of Delhi, and Malik Bahlul and all others paid homage to him. But it was soon realized that he was even more inefficient than his father.

In 1445 Alauddin started for Samana,⁸ and while on his way he heard that the Sharqi ruler was marching against Delhi. Alauddin quickly returned to Delhi. Husam Khan, the wazir, who was also *naib-i ghibat*, did not like this hasty action of the Sultan, and represented that it was not proper for him to return to Delhi on hearing a false rumour. The Sultan was vexed at this remark. In 1447 he went to Badaun, where earlier he had lived as governor for some time, and expressed his desire to stay there permanently. Husam

⁶ *Waqiat-i Mushtaqi*, ff. 83a, 83b.

⁷ Dr. U. N. Day, *Malwa*; also the chapter on Malwa in this volume.

⁸ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Vol. I, 293.

Khan disagreed with him sincerely and advised against the abandonment of Delhi. The Sultan was again displeased and left for Badaun in utter disregard of the wazir's advice. He left two brothers of his wife as superintendents of the city (*shahna-i shahr*) and of agriculture (*amir koh*). He settled in Badaun in 1448. His wife's brothers at Delhi quarrelled and one of them was killed. The next day the people of the city killed the other brother also at the instigation of Husam Khan; they took possession of Delhi and summoned Bahlul to assume the reins of government. Malik Bahlul sent a message to Alauddin saying that he was only striving for the good of the Sultan. Alauddin wrote in reply: 'Since my father called you his son, and I have no anxiety for the provision of my few wants, I am content with the one pargana of Badaun and am giving up the empire to you.' Bahlul did not dislodge Alauddin from Badaun and he continued to rule over an area from Khairabad on the bank of the Ganges up to the Himalayan foothills⁹ till his death¹⁰ in 883/1476. Then the claims of his sons were passed over by his son-in-law, Sultan Husain Shah Sharqi, who lost no time in integrating Badaun with his kingdom of Jaunpur.

Thus ended the Saiyyid dynasty after an inconspicuous rule of 37 years. Emerging as the principality of Multan, it ended as the principality of Badaun. Neither politically nor culturally did it contribute anything worth while to the history of medieval India. It was, however, an inevitable stage in the process of the dissolution and reconstruction of the Delhi empire.

⁹ *Muntakhabut Tawarikh*, I, 305.

¹⁰ His dilapidated tomb lies in Mohalla Miran Sarai, in an enclosure by the side of his mother's grave. See Raziuddin, *Kanzut Tarikh* (History of Badaun), Badaun 1907, 54-55. For some inscriptions of the Saiyyids in Badaun, see *Epigraphia Indica*, ed. by Z. A. Desai, 1965, 11-18.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE LODIS

(1451-1526)

I. INTRODUCTORY

THE LODI DYNASTY WAS THE LAST of the ruling families of the sultanat period. It had a greater life-span than the Khaljis and had better achievements to its credit than the later Tughluqs and the Saiyyids. Its history of seventy-five years is, however, a story of conflicts—conflicts between the crown and the nobility, the petty zamindars and the powerful *hakims*, the centrifugal tendencies of the age and the centripetal aspirations of the rulers, the monarchical ideals of absolute power and the Afghan concept of partnership in government. In the whole of this struggle the nature of the Afghans, apart from the general trends of the period towards decentralization, played a very significant role. 'The Afghans', remarks Akhund Darweza,

had since ancient times never considered it proper to have a king as their pride and arrogance would not let them bow and prostrate before one of their own kith and kin. Further, if they agreed to call one a king, they feared that they would thereby reduce themselves to the level of servants. They would rather like all of them to be treated as equals and it was, therefore, that all Afghans were addressed as maliks.¹

The Afghan king had to struggle against the fissiparous tendencies of the age on one side and against the tribal traits of the Afghan character on the other. The hostile and disruptive powers in the country could be checked only with the help of Afghan soldiers; but these Afghans also, in their turn, were very difficult to deal with. Their vanity had to be pampered and their tribal instincts had to be respected at every stage. The Lodis could not survive without their help, but they had to guard themselves against being swayed by their tribal sentiments.

¹ Akhund Darweza, *Tazkiratul Abrar wal Ashrar*, (Ms. U. L. Cambridge), f: 73a, as cited by Dr. Hameeduddin in his article: 'The Fall of the First Afghan Empire in India', *Asiatische Studien, Etudes Asiatiques*, XIV, 126-27.

It is true that the Afghans had served under the Khaljis and the Tughluqs and were fully familiar with the monarchical traditions of the autocratic exercise of power; but the situation changed when fresh streams of Afghan emigres entered the country and sought to introduce in the Indian polity the principles characteristic of Afghan tribalism. The traditions of monarchy, as developed in India, had, therefore, to face a new challenge.

The democratic spirit of the Afghan tribes expressed itself in a variety of ways:

(a) In matters of succession, they kept an open mind and were guided by considerations of suitability rather than the principle of heredity or nomination by the deceased monarch. Sultan Shah Lodi, governor of Sirhind, nominated his nephew, Bahlul, ignoring the claims of his son, Qutb Khan. On the death of Sultan Sikandar, they partitioned the empire between Ibrahim and Jalal. Some influential nobles persuaded Bahlul during his last illness to nominate his grandson, Azam Humayun, as his successor. Again, disgusted with the overbearing attitude of Ibrahim, they invited his uncle, Alam Khan, from Gujarat. At times their ambition to maintain their personal freedom created a number of complications in the administration; they also created rifts and dissensions in order to enhance their bargaining value.

(b) The army of the Delhi sultanat changed its complexion from the 'king's army' to a tribal militia. Since it was not centrally recruited and was not centrally maintained or centrally administered, it lacked that homogeneity and effectiveness which had characterized the armies of the Delhi sultanat. The Afghan armies could overwhelm other Indian armies by sheer weight of numbers, but face to face with a well-organized foreign army—like that of Babur—they could hardly achieve anything. The use of artillery was, no doubt, one of the factors which led to Ibrahim's defeat at the battle of Panipat, but the Afghan army had certain basic organizational defects.

(c) Some of the privileges and prerogatives of the sultan came to be commonly used by high officers during this period. For instance, elephants were considered a part of the royal paraphernalia and the sultan alone had the privilege of keeping them. During this period, however, we find the nobles maintaining large numbers of elephants and bringing them to the battle-field in times of conflict. Azam Humayun Sarwani alone is reported to have possessed seven hundred elephants.

Notwithstanding all this, there was an inherent vitality—perhaps born of its democratic spirit—which kept the Lodi power intact for

nearly three quarters of a century. 'In spite of its defects', remarks Dr. R. P. Tripathi,

'the experiment of Bahlul Lodi is interesting. Its immediate usefulness was proved by the spirit of loyalty that it awakened among the Afghan tribal leaders who in fighting for him felt to be virtually fighting for their own cause. By toning down the autocratic conception of kingship, Bahlul Lodi had taken a substantial step towards making it amenable to the wishes of his peers. Responsibility to peers and nobles has been an important link between autocracy and constitutional kingship. Here again was a chance for Muslim monarchy to change for the better and take a constitutional form. But lack of appreciation, factions, jealousies, selfishness of the nobility, indifference and ignorance of the people let the opportunity pass away.'²

Keeping in view the general level of the Afghan government, it seems probable that had Babur not intruded, the Afghan power would have lasted some time more. The rise of Sher Shah soon after the establishment of Mughal power in India shows that the Afghans were not a spent-up force and could drive out the successor of Babur from India.

The keynote of political life during this period was the presence of a very large number of zamindars all over northern India, from Lahore to Manikpur. Their power and resources are hard to calculate; in fact, their direct contact with the peasantry placed them in a very advantageous position. They could raise large armies without any great effort. Perhaps only on a few occasions during the earlier period were such huge armies brought to the battle-field. An unrest, a search for something indefinite, a spirit of adventure and an insatiable ambition characterize all political activity during this period, but none of the adventurers in the field seems to have ever had the vision of a centralized empire, roughly embracing the frontiers of the Khalji or the Tughluq dominions. Their activities were limited by local, tribal or racial considerations and could not pave the way for the emergence of a centralized empire. The Lodis, in spite of all these limitations, gave a fairly good account of their political abilities and held intact and extended a political structure, all full of cracks and crevices.

During this period the centre of political gravity gradually shifted to Agra, from where the problems of the kingdom could be more effectively tackled. It was easier from there to control the zamindars

² *Some Aspects of Muslim Administration*, 84.

and maliks of Etawa, Koil and Badaun. The activities of the people of Mewat could be watched better from Agra and campaigns against the Sharqis could be more efficiently managed from there. Besides, an eye could be kept on Rajputana also from the new capital.

Another important and interesting political development of this period was 'the principle of truce', which suddenly brought all hostilities to an end when the combatants found it difficult to inflict a crushing defeat on each other. Twice Bahlul Lodi had to enter into truce with the Sharqi sultan, for four years in the beginning and for three years a second time. The period of truce was spent in making good the losses suffered during the previous engagements and in preparing for a more decisive struggle in the future. Conflicts thus lingered on for decades and the energies of different powers were always directed towards planning and preparing for battles.

THE AFGHANS IN INDIA

It is needless to speculate about the half-mythical and half-legendary accounts of the origin of the Afghans. The researches of Olaf Caroe, Morgenstierne, Bellew, Longworth Dames, Raverty and others have brought to light many interesting aspects of this problem. It is, however, more relevant from our point of view to trace the history of Afghan settlements in India and the ultimate emergence of the Afghans as a ruling dynasty of the sultanat period.

Though individual Afghan settlers must have come to India much earlier, it was during the reign of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud that they were enrolled in the army in large numbers. In 1260 when Ulugh Khan (future Balban) marched against the Mewatis, he employed three thousand Afghan soldiers.³ Later on Balban created Afghan military posts in the neighbourhood of Delhi and in Jalali, Kampil, Patiali, Bhojpur, etc.⁴ The importance which the Afghans gained during this period helped them considerably in the future extension of their influence and provided an effective base for the growth of their power. Amongst the nobles of Alauddin Khalji were Ikhtiyaruddin Yal Afghan⁵ and Malik Makh Afghan, who played an important role during the Khalji and the Tughluq periods. Under Muhammad bin Tughluq the Afghans constituted an important element of the governing class, and in the rebellions organized against him they played a conspicuous role. Malik Shahu Afghan, Qazi Jalal Afghan and Malik Makh Afghan rose in rebellions against him. Malik Makh

³ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 315.

⁴ Barani, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 57-59.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 240.

Afghan established his independent power in Daulatabad as Sultan Nasiruddin, but when Hasan Kangu emerged as a greater force in the Deccan, he voluntarily abdicated in his favour.

It appears that the Afghans constituted an important element of the *sadah* amirs, and it was this control of the administrative base of the sultanat which provided them with an opportunity to consolidate their power. The emergence of a very large number of Afghan zamindars during the latter part of the fourteenth century was, in fact, made possible by the position enjoyed by them as *sadah* amirs. Firuz Shah Tughluq encouraged the development of the hereditary principle when he made all appointments hereditary.⁶ On account of their courage and character, Afghan soldiers were recruited in large numbers in the frontier areas. A *muqta* of Multan employed a number of Afghans, including Malik Bahram, an ancestor of Bahlul Shah Lodi.⁷ During the later Tughluq period the Afghans got important appointments in different areas of UP. In 1405 Daulat Khan Lodi was appointed *faujdar* of Miyan-i Doab⁸ and Malik Asad Khan Lodi got the *shiq* of Sambhal as a *muqta*.⁹ Their power increased under the Saiyyid rulers. In 1417 Khizr Khan assigned Sirhind to Malik Shah Bahram Lodi.¹⁰ Malik Sulaiman Lodi stabilized his position in Multan. Rapri was under Husain Khan Afghan and his son, Qutb Khan Afghan.

RISE OF THE LODIS TO POWER

Many Lodi Afghans used to come to India with trade *carawans*. Once a merchant, Malik Bahram, came to this country and decided to settle here because he was not on good terms with his elder brother and did not want to go back to his homeland. He joined the service of Malik Mardan Daulat, governor of Multan. He had five sons—Malik Sultan Shah, Malik Kala, Malik Firuz, Malik Muhammad and Malik Khwaja; all of them continued to live in Multan even after the death of their father. When Khizr Khan became governor of Multan, Malik Sultan Shah entered his service. On the occasion of Khizr Khan's conflict with Mallu Iqbal, Malik Sultan Shah displayed great bravery on the battle-field and killed Mallu Iqbal. In recognition of

6 On the death of Malik Bir Afghan, the *muqta* of Bihar, his son, Da'ud Khan, was appointed in his place (*Mubarak Shahi*, 123). After the death of Muhammad Shah Afghan, his sons, Sirbali Khan and Mahmud Khan, got the *iqta* of their father (*Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, f. 412a):

7 Ferishta, I, 173.

8 *Ibid.*, 160.

9 *Mubarak Shahi*, 170.

10 *Ibid.*, 195-96.

his devoted services, he was given the title of Islam Khan and the governorship of Sirhind. His brothers, who lived with him, also got assignments and promotions. Malik Kala was assigned the governorship of Daurala. Malik Kala's wife died of an accident when she was pregnant, and her child was rescued through a Caesarian operation. This child was Bahlul, the future founder of the Lodi dynasty in India. He was brought up with great care and affection by his father, but when he died in a conflict with the Niyazi Afghans, Bahlul went to Sirhind to live with his uncle, Islam Khan. Islam Khan discerned talent in him and gave him his daughter in marriage.

Islam Khan himself was a very dynamic figure. Gradually he increased his military resources and power and twelve thousand Afghans, most of whom were his clansmen, joined his service. Ignoring the claims of his grown-up sons, he nominated Bahlul as his successor. It was a very bold decision but when he died, his servants were divided into three groups: one group supported Bahlul on the basis of Islam Khan's will, the second supported Malik Firuz, brother of Islam Khan, and the third group joined Qutb Khan, son of Islam Khan. Bahlul handled the situation with great tact and steered clear out of the initial difficulties. Qutb Khan, however, came to Delhi, approached Sultan Saiyyid Muhammad Shah through his officials, and reported that the Afghans were gathering in huge numbers at Sirhind and might create confusion in the kingdom. The Sultan despatched Malik Sikandar Tuhfa with a big force, along with Qutb Khan, with instructions to send the Afghans to the court; but if they defied him, he was to drive them out of Sirhind. A *farman* to the same effect was sent to Jasrath Khokar.

As soon as the Afghans came to know of this order, they left Sirhind and sought shelter in the foot-hills of the Siwaliks. Jasrath and Malik Tuhfa sought to remove their suspicions and sent a message to them saying that since they had committed no wrong, there was no reason for their fear or flight. The Afghans, however, demanded a guarantee of security from them; and when it was given, Malik Firuz Lodi left Shahin Khan, his eldest son, and Malik Bahlul, his nephew, with his family, and came to see Malik Sikandar and Jasrath Khokar. Qutb Khan instigated them to take Malik Firuz Lodi into custody and he was arrested; many Afghans were killed and an army was sent to bring their families also. Bahlul realized the gravity of the situation and escaped to the Siwalik hills. Jasrath entrusted Sirhind to Malik Sikandar Tuhfa and sent the prisoners to Delhi.

Bahlul was so deeply distressed at these developments that he started waylaying trade *caravans* and distributed the booty among his partners in order to prepare them for an encounter with Delhi. In

a short time the Afghans increased their strength and even the Mughals joined their ranks. Later on, when Malik Firuz escaped from Delhi and joined Bahlul, and Qutb Khan also repented of his misdeeds, Bahlul's position became much more secure and he re-established himself in Sirhind. Sultan Muhammad Shah sent a strong force under Husam Khan, the *wazir-i mamalik*, to crush him. A battle fought at Kadha (a pargana in Khizrabad and Shahpura) resulted in the defeat of Husam Khan. Bahlul's power and prestige further increased. Along with Malik Firuz and his other relatives, he occupied the entire area from Sirhind to Panipat. He, however, acted with great prudence in dealing with Sultan Muhammad. A very polite letter was sent to him expressing fealty and loyalty, but submitting at the same time that since Husam Khan had a personal grudge against him, he could not come to the court so long as Husam was there. If Husam Khan was put to death and the wizarat was entrusted to Hamid Khan, Bahlul would only be too ready to serve him. The Sultan, devoid of wisdom and foresight as he was, fell into the trap and killed Husam Khan. Malik Bahlul was confirmed in his possession of Sirhind, which along with other adjoining areas was given to him as his *jagir*.

The Lodis further consolidated their position in that region and increased their military resources. When Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa invaded Delhi, Sultan Muhammad asked for help from Malik Bahlul, who marched in response from Sirhind with a force comprising of twenty thousand Afghans and Mughals. His performance in the conflict won the approbation of the Sultan, who conferred upon him the title of Khan-i Khanan. After his return to Sirhind, Bahlul brought Lahore, Dipalpur, Sunam and a number of parganas under his jurisdiction without the permission of the Sultan. He was now fully confident of his strength and was anxious to extend his power to Delhi. Soon afterwards he marched against Delhi and besieged the city, but he could not conquer it and had to return to Sirhind disappointed. He, however, did not give up the hope of establishing himself at Delhi and started consolidating his resources with a view to striking again. He assumed the title of sultan at this time but deferred the announcement of his name in the *Khutba* and the coins till such time as Delhi was brought under control. Fortunately for Bahlul, Sultan Muhammad expired at this time and his son, Sultan Alauddin, succeeded him. Bahlul intensified his efforts for the occupation of Delhi.

The political situation of the country at this time, which considerably facilitated the realization of Bahlul's political ambitions, was as follows. The central region of northern India was divided into a

number of semi-independent ruling families and all the strategic areas were controlled by tribal chiefs. From Mehrauli to Ladu Sarai (near Delhi) the area was under Ahmad Khan Mewati; Sirhind, Lahore, Samana, Sunam, Hisar-Firuzah and the area up to Panipat were under the Lodis; the country from Sambhal to the ford of Khwaja Khizr (near Delhi) was held by Darya Khan Lodi; Koil was under Isa Khan Turk-bacha; Qutb Khan, son of Hasan Khan, controlled Rapri; Bhonggaon, Patiali and Kampil were under Rai Pratap, while Bayana was under Da'ud Khan Auhadi. With so many tribal chiefs spread around Delhi, the position of the Sultan of Delhi could be nothing more than that of a senior tribal chief. His authority was confined to Delhi and a few villages around it. Viewed in its proper perspective, Bahlul's real conflict was not with the Sultan of Delhi—though the occupation of Delhi was absolutely vital for the rise of his independent dynasty—but with the other chiefs, who exercised limited but effective authority in their respective areas.

Bahlul collected an army and marched on Delhi a second time. Again he failed to capture the fort and returned to Sirhind frustrated. Sultan Alauddin consulted Qutb Khan, Isa Khan and Rai Pratap and accepted their advice to dismiss and imprison Hamid Khan, who had been appointed at the suggestion of Bahlul, and transfer some forty parganas from his *iqta* to the *khalsa* land. Actuated by his animus against Hamid Khan, whose father had plundered his territory, Rai Pratap incited the Sultan to kill Hamid Khan. The Sultan accepted his advice, but before he could act upon it, some brothers of Hamid contrived his escape from his prison. Hamid Khan now made up his mind to retaliate. He forced his way into the Sultan's female apartments and turned out the ladies of the *haram* from the palace and seized their wealth and property. Sultan Alauddin found himself utterly helpless under the circumstances, and retired to Badaun where he bided his time.

Hamid Khan now started thinking in terms of inviting either Sultan Mahmud of Jaunpur or Sultan Mahmud of Malwa to come and occupy the throne of Delhi. When Malik Bahlul came to know of Hamid Khan's search of a ruler for Delhi, he started for Delhi in full strength. Hamid Khan shut himself in the fort and prevented Bahlul's entry into the city. Bahlul preferred diplomacy to a military engagement, and secured an interview with Hamid Khan after making many false promises and giving many deceptive assurances. Hamid's suspicions were lulled and Bahlul continued to live in Delhi more or less as a subordinate officer of Hamid Khan.

Once Hamid Khan invited some nobles to a convivial party and extended the invitation to Bahlul also. Bahlul thought that this was

a good opportunity to create upon the mind of Hamid Khan an impression that his Afghan followers were a group of simpletons and were incapable of causing any harm to him. At Bahlul's instance they started behaving in a strange and uncouth manner at the party—some of them tied their shoes to their waists, others put them on a shelf above the Khan's head. When asked about this queer behaviour, they replied that they were afraid of thieves. Some of them asked for pieces of carpets to make caps and fillets out of them for their children and send them as presents to Roh. Hamid Khan laughed with scorn and said: 'Yes, I will give you some fine fabrics which you can use as gifts.' When trays of betel-leaves were brought, some Afghans licked the lime and chewed the flowers. The trick worked well and Hamid Khan began to think that the followers of Malik Bahlul were 'country bumpkins' and that there was no danger from them. As soon as Bahlul succeeded in creating this impression, security and other arrangements at the residence of Hamid Khan were relaxed.

Whenever Malik Bahlul went to see Hamid Khan, he took a few men into the court while others remained standing outside the fort. Once Hamid Khan invited Bahlul to a banquet. His Afghan attendants quarrelled with the guards and forced an entry, saying: 'We are also servants of Hamid Khan. Why should we not be allowed to offer our respects to him?' When the matter was reported to Hamid Khan, he ordered them to be admitted to the court. They soon rushed into the hall and wherever they found a single guard of Hamid Khan, two Afghan followers of Bahlul sandwiched him between themselves. At the end of the banquet, when Hamid Khan's men had taken leave, Qutb Khan Lodi drew out a chain from under his armpit and placing it before Hamid Khan said: 'You must remain in custody for some time. I refrain from taking your life because of your past favours.' The *coup* was a complete success. The empire of Delhi passed into the hands of Malik Bahlul.

II. BAHLUL LODI (1451-89)

BAHLUL ASCENDED THE THRONE of Delhi on 17 Rabi I 855/19 April 1451¹ at a propitious hour selected by the astrologers. It appears from Ferishta that he had two coronations: one before and the other after his correspondence with Sultan Alauddin.² Bahlul retained the name of Alauddin in the *Khutba* till the latter had formally abdicated.

Sultan Bahlul had nine sons at this time — Khwaja Bayazid, Nizam Khan (future Sikandar Shah), Mubarak Khan (known as Barbek Shah), Alam Khan (later known as Sultan Alauddin), Jamal Khan, Mian Yaqub, Fath Khan, Miyan Musa and Jalal Khan.³ The author of the *Tabaqat-i Akbari* further gives a list of thirty-four nobles and relatives of Bahlul who constituted the core of his government. An analysis of their racial and religious background reveals that they included Lodis, Lohanis, Yusuf Khails, Sarwanis, Mewatis, Jilwanis, Turk-bachas, Farmulis and Hindus like Rai Pratap, Rai Kilan and Rai Karan.

Immediately after his occupation of Delhi, Bahlul wrote a letter to Sultan Alauddin saying: 'Your Majesty's father brought me up. I have been acting as your deputy... without expunging your name from the *Khutba*.' Alauddin replied: 'As my father used to address you as his son, I look upon you as my elder brother and resign the kingship to you. I shall live contented at Badaun.' How far this reply gave Bahlul the satisfaction he needed is not difficult to guess, but for the time being it reduced his worries and he could turn his attention to other pressing problems.

In fact the throne of Delhi to which Bahlul had been raised was no bed of roses. There were a number of baffling problems which had to be tackled with tact and determination. Keeping in view the background of the Lodis and the character and composition of the new governing class, every detail of the new polity had to be placed on firm and generally acceptable foundations. The way in which a *mulla*, Qadin, had ridiculed the cultural traditions of the Afghans before a Friday congregation in the presence of Bahlul was not a passing episode. It reflected the general reluctance of the people to

1 *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*, I, 140.

2 *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, Aligarh ed., 11-12; Ferishta, I, 174-75.

3 *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 12. Nizamuddin (*Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 298) and Ferishta (I, 174) have wrongly mentioned Barbek Shah and Mubarak Khan as two different individuals.

accept the Lodis as rulers of Delhi. In fact the situation was worse than what the Khaljis had to face at the beginning of their rule. A cautious and careful handling of the situation alone could remove these prejudices from the public mind. Besides, Bahlul could not possibly be sure of his position unless he had organized a strong and efficient governing class to shoulder the burden of the empire.

The democratic spirit of Afghan polity, sanctified by its tribal traditions, constituted a serious impediment to the evolution of a strong monarchy; and the linking-up of Afghan socio-political ideals with the monarchical traditions of absolutism, which had determined the tenor of political life in India during the preceding centuries, seemed impossible. Afghan political traditions leaned more towards a diffusion and decentralization of political authority, while the general political climate in the country made it utterly impossible to tolerate any centrifugal tendencies. Political exigency and Afghan traditions thus came into conflict, and Bahlul had to effect a healthy compromise between them so as to take full advantage of both in the consolidation of his power in India.

One of the most disturbing problems for Bahlul was the presence of a ruler of the Saiyyid family. Notwithstanding the fact that Sultan Alauddin had abdicated, Lodi power could not be stabilized so long as he lived at Badaun. There were nobles who still looked upon him as their legitimate sovereign and were not reconciled to the idea of Lodi ascendancy. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the Sharqi ruler of Jaunpur was a son-in-law of the Saiyyid Sultan of Delhi and, consequently, he looked upon the Delhi sultanat as legitimately belonging to him. In the background of the Sharqi-Lodi conflict, this fact assumed serious dimensions and posed a threat which could not be easily averted.

Then there was the party of Hamid Khan, which had to be dealt with. Thus hemmed in on all sides by problems posed by his enemies, both within and outside the kingdom, Bahlul had to proceed very cautiously.

The two immediate problems for him were the control of the treasury and the establishment of peace and order in the capital. He deputed Afghan officers to guard the treasury and manage the royal stores, stables, etc., and posted Afghan soldiers at all strategic places to guard the fort. Peaceful conditions were thus established in and around Delhi; and having made his position secure in Delhi, Bahlul turned his attention towards the Punjab. He marched towards Multan to set its affairs in order.⁴

⁴ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 501.

CONFLICT WITH THE SHARQI RULER

When Bahlul proceeded to the Punjab, he left the capital in charge of his eldest son, Khwaja Bayazid, Shah Sikandar Sarwani and Bibi Mattu, widow of Islam Khan. This was an ideal opportunity for Sultan Mahmud Sharqi to strike. Abdulla and Ni'matullah say that some of the nobles of Sultan Alauddin, who were at heart hostile to Bahlul Lodi, invited the Sharqi ruler.⁵ Another very important factor in this conflict was the wife of Sultan Mahmud Sharqi. She was the daughter of Sultan Alauddin and used to incite her husband to take vigorous action against Bahlul. 'If you do not march against him,' she used to say, 'I shall tie the quiver and ride against Bahlul.'⁶ Bahlul was not ignorant of the intentions of the Sharqi Sultan and had, therefore, pampered his vanity by expressing great humility. But all this failed to have any effect on him. He marched against Delhi in 854/1450 at the head of a huge army comprising of one hundred and seventy thousand soldiers,⁷ mounted and footmen, and fourteen hundred war elephants, and besieged the capital. Bahlul was at Sirhind at that time.⁸ On receipt of the report about this attack, he turned back to deal with the invader.

The Afghan forces stationed at Delhi tried to meet the situation as best as they could. Bibi Mattu⁹ dressed up many women in male attire and posted them as guards all along the ramparts of the fort in order to deceive the enemy about the numerical strength of the Afghan garrison. Sikandar Sarwani, son-in-law of Khan-i Jahan Lodi, who was an excellent archer, shot an arrow at an enemy water-bag. It went through the bag and the ox on which it was being carried and then pierced into the ground. This excellence in archery made the Sharqi forces rather hesitant in approaching the walls of the fort. Mahmud Sharqi, however, resorted to a new device. He threw ignited material into the fort, so that it became impossible for the people even to move in the courtyards of their houses. The garrison was thus forced to negotiate terms of peace and surrender. Saiyyid Shamsuddin came out to settle terms with Darya Khan Lodi, and in a secret interview appealed to Darya's Afghan sentiments and shrewdly won him over to his side. Darya diverted the attention of

⁵ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 12-13. *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*, I, 142. See also *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 301.

⁶ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 12-13.

⁷ Some writers give it as the number of his cavalry, but this was impossible. The author of *Tarikh-i Da'udi* is more credible when he puts it as the number of both the *sauwars* and *piadas*.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 13. Nizamuddin (*Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 301) says that he was at Dipalpur.

⁹ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 13.

the Sharqis from Delhi to the army of Bahlul, which was quickly returning to Delhi to relieve the pressure of the Sharqi attack.

Mahmud sent Fath Khan Harvi and Darya Khan Lodi at the head of an army consisting of thirty thousand soldiers and thirty elephants to intercept Bahlul west of Panipat. The two armies came face to face at Narela, some seventeen miles from Delhi. Bahlul's army was less than half the Sharqi army, as it comprised of fourteen thousand cavalry only. Here Qutb Khan Lodi employed the same tactics which Saiyyid Shamsuddin had earlier employed with great success. He appealed to the sentiments of Darya Khan in these words: 'Your mother and sisters are besieged in the fort and what sort of a man are you that you fight for the cause of a stranger, without any regard for your own honour?' This speech had the desired effect and it secured the defection of Darya Khan, who wheeled off the field when a promise was given that he would not be chased. Thus deserted, Fath Khan, who had to bear the brunt of the attack, was defeated and caught. Rai Karan, whose brother, Rai Pithaura, had been killed by Fath Khan, slew him.¹⁰

The news of this disaster disheartened Mahmud Sharqi and he left for Jaunpur. Bahlul chased the retreating army and captured an enormous booty. This victory enhanced Bahlul's prestige and overawed his enemies.

CHASTISEMENT OF THE NOBLES

Soon after his victory at Narela, Bahlul turned his attention to the recalcitrant elements in his nobility. Ahmad Khan of Mewat submitted and, as a guarantee for his future good conduct, offered the services of his uncle, Mubarak Khan, as a retainer of the Sultan. Bahlul accepted his apology but curtailed his power by reducing his *iqta* by seven parganas.

Darya Khan Lodi, the governor (*hakim*) of Sambhal, had initially transferred his loyalties to the Sharqi Sultan, and on that account deserved punishment; but on the battle-field he had deserted the Sharqi Sultan and had joined Bahlul, and this defection was instrumental in the victory at Narela. Bahlul reduced his *iqta* by seven parganas, but did not remove him from Sambhal.

The Sultan then proceeded towards Koil. Isa Khan, the governor of Koil, professed loyalty and was allowed to continue.

Bahlul's main concern at this time was a thorough scrutiny of the provincial and other local administrators, so that the basic units of his power may be secured. But as soon as these governors made their

¹⁰ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 302.

submission and accepted his authority, Bahlul did not hesitate in confirming them in their territories. He turned his attention towards Sakit,¹¹ Kampil,¹² Patiali,¹³ Bhongaon,¹⁴ Rapri and Etawah. All the governors except Qutb Khan of Rapri accepted his suzerainty. But after a brief resistance, Qutb Khan also submitted. Bahlul confirmed them in their areas.

CONFLICT WITH THE RULER OF JAUNPUR

Bahlul was busy consolidating his position in his kingdom when he was forced to turn all his resources and energy to dealing with the territorial ambitions of the Sharqis. In fact, throughout his long reign the Sharqi menace constituted one of the most difficult problems for him.

In 856/1452 the conflict went on for some time without any decisive result. Ultimately Raja Pratap and Qutb Khan negotiated a treaty with Sultan Mahmud Sharqi according to which (a) Bahlul was to retain the territories of Sultan Saiyyid Mubarak Shah while Sultan Mahmud Sharqi was confirmed in his possession of the territories of Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi; (b) Shamsabad was to be surrendered to a vassal of Sultan Bahlul; and (c) Bahlul was to return the seven elephants he had captured during the previous struggle. Difficulties, however, arose at the time of implementing the terms of the treaty. Bahlul sent Rai Karan to take possession of Shamsabad, which was under Jauna Khan, a vassal of Sultan Mahmud. Jauna Khan refused to deliver the fort. Thereupon Bahlul marched to Shamsabad, expelled Jauna Khan and installed Rai Karan there. Mahmud Sharqi set out to challenge the Lodi Sultan. The two armies met near Shamsabad. Qutb Khan Lodi and Darya Khan made a night attack and would have succeeded in it, but as bad luck would have it, Qutb Khan fell from his horse and was immediately taken prisoner by the Sharqi forces. He lived as a Sharqi prisoner for seven years.

On Sultan Mahmud's death (1459) hostilities between Delhi and Jaunpur were suspended for some time and a treaty was made on the basis of the status quo. Shamsabad was restored to Jauna Khan, a Sharqi vassal.

Since Qutb Khan Lodi, who had been taken into custody by the Sharqis, was a brother of Shams Khatun, the wife of Sultan Bahlul, she was not prepared to allow Bahlul to sit in peace unless her brother was released. When she heard about this treaty with the

11 It lies 12 miles S.E. of Etawah town.

12 A pargana village 28 miles N.W. of Fatehgarh.

13 A pargana village in Etah district.

14 A tahsili town in Mainpuri district. Bhongaon was under Rai Pratap whom Ni'matullah calls 'haktm' and zamindar of Bhongaon'.

Sharqi, she sent a message to Bahlul saying that it was not proper for him to have any rest or peace while Qutb Khan was in prison. Bahlul took the message to heart and turned back to accomplish his unfinished enterprise. He was encouraged in this course of action by the general atmosphere of Jaunpur at this time. The new Sharqi king, Muhammad Shah, had not been able to consolidate his position and there were nobles hostile to him. When the Sharqi Sultan heard about the movement of the Lodi forces, he advanced from Jaunpur in order to encounter them. He drove out Rai Karan from Shamsabad and placed Jauna Khan in charge of it. Rai Pratap was so overawed by the strength of Sultan Muhammad that he deserted Bahlul and joined him. The Sharqi Sultan reached Barsani.¹⁵

The two armies came face to face near Rapri.¹⁶ What had considerably enhanced the resources and strength of the Sharqi at this time was the fact that Raja Pratap, Mubariz Khan and Qutb Khan, governor of Rapri, had joined Muhammad Sharqi. But Muhammad failed to take full advantage of this situation; and by planning retaliatory action against his brothers, he so weakened his position that he was ultimately killed.¹⁷ An accident facilitated a temporary truce and the cessation of hostilities. Prince Jalal Khan, a younger brother of Sultan Husain Sharqi, who had succeeded Muhammad on the throne of Jaunpur, had hurriedly marched at night to join his brother and mistaken Bahlul's army for Husain's camp. He had been immediately arrested, and this arrest provided a basis for the exchange of prisoners, including Qutb Khan. A truce for four years, on the basis of the status quo, was agreed upon by the two sultans. The Sharqi retained their control over Shamsabad. Rai Pratap now joined Sultan Bahlul. Sultan Husain summoned Qutb Khan Lodi from Jaunpur and sent him to Bahlul with great honour; Sultan Bahlul returned Jalal Khan to the Sharqi Sultan.

The tussle between Bahlul and Husain Sharqi was a protracted one. It lasted during the whole life of Husain Sharqi, and for decades the politics of Delhi revolved round the problems posed by the ever-recurring invasions of the Sharqi ruler. Even when Husain was ousted from Jaunpur and the Sharqi kingdom was, to all intents and purposes, extinguished, Husain Shah remained a snake that had been scotched but not killed.¹⁸

¹⁵ According to Hodivala (*Studies*, 493), this was Sirsa, near Rapri, 27 miles south of Mainpuri.

¹⁶ According to *Tarikh-i Da'udi* the battle was fought at Chandawar, 3 miles from Firuzabad in Agra district.

¹⁷ For details, see the chapter of the Sharqi of Jaunpur.

¹⁸ See chapter on the Sharqi for details.

During these four years of truce, developments took place which precipitated a crisis. Bahlul had not reconciled himself to the loss of Shamsabad. He wrested it from Jauna Khan and placed it under Rai Karan. Besides, Bahlul in his anxiety to placate Hindu chieftains and zamindars, gave to Rai Bir Singh Deo¹⁹ (son of Rai Pratap) the standard and the kettle-drums which had been seized from Darya Khan. Darya Khan was naturally very deeply incensed at this action, which he interpreted as an insult to him; he reacted to it sharply and got Bir Singh murdered. Bahlul found the situation beyond his control and returned to Delhi.

THE MULTAN CAMPAIGN

The rise of the Langas in Multan is discussed in the chapter dealing with Multan. Shaikh Yusuf, a descendant of Shaikh Bahauddin Zakariyya, who was supplanted by them, left Multan and sought shelter with Bahlul Lodi, who gave all possible help and protection to him. Bahlul even entered into matrimonial relationship with his family and gave his daughter in marriage to Shaikh Abdulla, a son of Shaikh Yusuf. Anxious to retrieve his position, Shaikh Yusuf very often asked Bahlul to support his cause by attacking the Langas and overthrowing them, but Bahlul realized the limitation to his power and kept Shaikh Yusuf pleased with empty promises.²⁰ But when Qutbuddin Langa died in 873/1468-69, Bahlul marched towards Multan, leaving Qutb Khan Lodi and Khan-i Jahan as his deputies in Delhi.²¹ But in course of his march he heard about the movement of Sultan Husain Sharqi's forces towards Delhi and *immediately turned back to the capital.*²²

It was at this time that Bahlul thought of inviting the Afghans from Roh. The account of the Afghan migrants as given by Abbas Sarwani deserves to be quoted in full:

'Sultan Bahlul had reached the vicinity of Dipalpur when he heard the disturbing news of the siege of Delhi. He said to the amirs and the dignitaries of the realm: "The kingdom of India is vast and rich; all the kings are not *qaumdars* (with tribal following). I have a big clan in my homeland (*diyar-i khud*) which is known for bravery and courage. They are distinguished for their manliness and physical strength, but in their own land they are hard-pressed for livelihood. If they migrate to India, they will get rid of the ignominy of poverty

19 *Tabaqat-i Akbari* has Nar Singh.

20 *Ibid.*, III, 525.

21 *Ferishta*, II, 325.

22 *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*, I, 155.

and I shall gain ascendancy over my enemies and the kingdom of India will come under my control."

"The amirs and the dignitaries of the realm submitted: "All that has occurred to the luminous heart of the world-conquering king is in the interest of the state; it is inspired by considerations of generosity and the welfare of his *qaum* (people) and his tribe; otherwise the state as well as his prestige, and also the strength of his army, does not stand in need of other's assistance.... But expediency demands that his Majesty be pleased to send *farmans* to the leaders of tribes in Roh saying: God Almighty has bestowed the sovereignty of the empire of Delhi on the Afghans. Other rulers of India want to drive them out of India.... The territory of India is extensive and rich. It can accommodate all our relatives. If our relatives come to this land, the sultanat will nominally be in my name; but every territory and *wilayat*, which is under my control or will in future be occupied, they can distribute on a brotherly basis (*biradar-war*) and occupy it. These days Sultan Husain, the *hakim* of Jaunpur, has besieged Delhi with the help of a large army and numerous zamindars. The Afghan families are in that city (Delhi). If our fellow tribesmen come to our help in large numbers, this is really the proper time for their assistance. Immediately on the receipt of these *farmans*, they should come to India inspired by their self-respect and honour and should take the city out of the control of Sultan Husain. When they see with their own eyes the affluent circumstances of their Indian relatives and also benefit from their wealth, they will not, like ourselves, return to their homeland but will join the army of the Sultan and will bring most of the land of India under the control of the royal servants."

"Sultan Bahlul appreciated this advice and despatched *farmans* to the leaders of the Afghan tribes.

"On receipt of these *farmans*, the Afghans of Roh came like ants and locusts to join the service of Sultan Bahlul."²³

CONFLICT WITH HUSAIN SHARQI

Bahlul intercepted the Sharqi forces at Chandwar. After seven days of indecisive but sanguinary struggle, a three-year truce was arranged by the nobles of both sides. Both rulers then returned to their respective territories.

During this period, however, the power of Husain Sharqi increased. He organized his army and set his affairs in order. The vassals and nobles of Bahlul, like the governor of Etawah (Ahmad Khan Mewati),

²³ *Tarikh-i Sher Shahi*, ed. by Imamuddin, Dacca 1964, 4-6.

the governor of Koil (Rustam Khan) and the governor of Bayana (Ahmad Khan Jalwani) joined him one after another.

Before the expiry of the three-year truce, Husain Sharqi marched against Delhi at the head of an army consisting of a hundred thousand horsemen and a thousand elephants. It was a moment of grave concern for Bahlul. He sent Shaikh Muhammad Farmuli and Kapur Chand (son of the Rai of Gwalior) to appeal to Mahmud Khalji of Malwa for his help in the crisis, and agreed to offer 6,000 horses to him if he came to his support. Sultan Mahmud promised to help him, but before he could move the Sharqi Sultan had already marched forward. Bahlul left his capital and met him at Bhatwarah. But Bahlul was not in a position to fight. Khan-i Jahan mediated and Bahlul consented to submit to the most humiliating terms. Excepting the city of Delhi and an area within a radius of 18 *karohs* from it, all territory of the Delhi kingdom was to be the Sharqi dominion, and Bahlul was to remain at Delhi virtually as a vassal of Jaunpur. But Husain Sharqi spurned even this offer. Bahlul was desperate now and he made up his mind to defend himself with whatever resources he had at his disposal.

Husain's impolitic action in sending his troops to plunder the neighbouring regions provided Bahlul with the opportunity of making a surprise attack on his camp, which was on the other side of the Jumna.²⁴ Bahlul struck hard at the Sharqis and inflicted a crushing defeat on them. Husain Shah fled from the field and even his *haram* was captured by Bahlul.

Bahlul had won a great and unexpected victory against Husain Shah. He was, however, anxious to conciliate the Sharqi ruler. When Husain's mother, Bibi Raji, died at Etawah in 883/1478, Bahlul conveyed his condolences to him through Qutb Khan Lodi and Kalyan Mal (son of Rai Kirat Singh of Gwalior). In the same year Husain visited Badaun to offer condolences on the death of Sultan Alauddin. He, however, decided to seize the fort and later occupied Sambhal and then marched against Delhi in Zil Hijj A.H. 883/February-March 1479.

Bahlul was upset by this invasion. In extreme despair and distress he went to the tomb of Shaikh Qutbuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki and prayed there throughout the whole night, standing on foot. In the small hours of the morning he felt as if somebody was giving him a staff and asking him to drive away the cattle which had strayed there. It was a happy omen and Bahlul was convinced that he would emerge victorious from the conflict.

Next morning Bahlul directed an attack against the Sharqi forces

²⁴ See details in chapter on the Sharqis.

with great confidence. Sultan Husain's attempt to storm the fort having failed, an atmosphere was created for negotiations of peace. Qutb Khan Lodi mediated and sent a message to Sultan Husain, saying, 'I am a favourite servant of Bibi Raji, who treated me with great kindness during my imprisonment at Jaunpur, and because of that I advise you to go back to your capital after concluding peace with Sultan Bahlul. The territory east of the Ganges should be under your control; that on the west should belong to Sultan Bahlul.' This message formed the basis of a treaty and hostilities were suspended. Putting his trust in the treaty, Sultan Husain returned to Jaunpur and left considerable equipment and stores to follow him. Bahlul went back on his plighted word; and as soon as Husain was away, he started plundering his baggage. He even pursued the Sharqi army and captured the Malika-i Jahan along with a number of important nobles, including the wazir, Qutlugh Khan (Qazi Samauddin), and Buddhu, the *naib-i arz*. Shamsabad, Kampil, Patiali, Koil, Sakit and Jalali were annexed to the sultanat of Delhi. Husain turned back and challenged the Delhi forces at a place²⁵ near Rapri, but was defeated. Under the circumstances he had no alternative but to recognize Bahlul's authority over the parganas he had occupied after the treaty.

Husain could not reconcile himself to the loss of these parganas, and he marched again in 884/1479. In a battle fought near Sonhar,²⁶ Bahlul defeated him again. Sultan Husain retreated to Rapri, but he was chased by Bahlul and another defeat was inflicted upon him. While crossing the Jumna, he suffered great losses.

Bahlul then turned his attention towards Etawah and expelled Ibrahim Khan, brother of Husain Sharqi, from there. He assigned Etawah to a son of Mubarak Khan Nuhani. Later on, the Lodi Sultan marched to Kalpi. Since the Jumna prevented the two armies from coming into direct conflict, skirmishes went on for a long time. The help of Rai Tilokchand of Baksar²⁷ facilitated Bahlul's task. He showed him a ford by which Bahlul's army crossed the river, and made a surprise attack on the Sharqi forces. Sultan Husain was defeated and his army was scattered. Bahlul pursued him up to Jaunpur, from where he fled to Kanauj. On being chased by Bahlul, he left Kanauj and reached the banks of the river Ramganga. Here Bahlul inflicted another defeat upon him.

Bahlul's victories emboldened him and he made up his mind to annex Jaunpur and liquidate the Sharqi kingdom. Husain had to seek

²⁵ *Tabaqat-i Akbari* gives this place as Arammahjor.

²⁶ A village in Etah district, see *District Gaz.* UP, XII, 222-23.

²⁷ It stands on the left bank of the river Ganges and is 34 miles south-east of Unao.

shelter in Bihar. Bahlul put Barbek Shah in charge of Jaunpur and allowed him the use of the canopy and *durbash*.²⁸

Sultan Husain refused to accept any defeat as final. He marched at the head of an army against the Lodi governor of Jaunpur. The nobles failed to put up a defence against him, and on assurance of safe conduct Barbek retreated to Mijhanli.²⁹ Bahlul marched again to Jaunpur and recaptured it and reinstated Barbek Shah. To consolidate the position of Barbek, Bahlul fully garrisoned and fortified Jaunpur.

Bahlul then turned his attention to annexing and garrisoning the areas of Sharqi influence. He captured Kalpi and assigned it to his grandson, Azam Humayun. Next he marched to Dholpur. The Rai submitted and presented a few *mans* of gold. The governor of Bari,³⁰ Iqbal Khan, also submitted.

ATTACK ON MALWA

These victories came in such quick succession that Bahlul's ambition of extending his authority further became sharper and he turned to Malwa, where Ghiyasuddin Khalji (873-906/1469-1501) was sunk in debauchery and pleasures. Bahlul ravaged Allhanpur³¹ in the territory of Malwa. The Khalji Sultan ordered the governor of Chanderi to march against Bahlul with the armies of Bhilsa and Saranpur. Bahlul found himself outnumbered and beat a hasty retreat to Delhi. The army of Malwa chased him and obliged him to purchase peace by sending gifts, etc. Sher Khan, the governor of Chanderi, rebuilt the city of Allhanpur.³²

DIVISION OF KINGDOM

Some time after the overthrow of Tatar Khan in 1485, Bahlul divided his kingdom among his sons and his Afghan kinsmen. Barbek Shah got Jaunpur; Kara and Manikpur were assigned to Mubarak Khan Nuhani. Shaikh Muhammad Qurban Farmuli (Kala Pahar) got Bahraich; Azam Humayun got Lucknow and Kalpi, while Khan-i Jahan Lodi was given Badaun. Nizam Khan got the Punjab and portions of the Doab. It is difficult to determine whether this division

²⁸ Yadgar, 16.

²⁹ It lies on the left bank of the Little Gandak in district Gorakhpur. *District Gaz.* UP, XXXI, 297.

³⁰ Headquarters of the district of the same name, 19 miles west of Dholpur, and 45 miles south-west of Agra.

³¹ Headquarters of a pargana of the same name in Ranthambhor sarkar. See *A'in-i Akbari*.

³² *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 352.

was inspired by respect for Afghan tribal traditions or was the outcome of his political experience, which pointed to consolidation of power in small units.

CONFLICT WITH KASHMIR

In the struggle for succession between Sultan Hasan (1472-84) of Kashmir and his uncle, Bahram Khan, Bahlul had probably instructed the governor of the Punjab to help the latter.³³ Bahram was, however, defeated at Dulipura and was soon afterwards blinded and killed. Sultan Hasan then sent an army under Malik Tazi Bhatt to invade the Punjab. Tatar Khan Lodi, the governor of the Punjab, inflicted a defeat on him and recaptured Sialkot also.

On Hasan Shah's death, his son, Muhammad Shah, who was a minor, was raised to the throne. During his minority some nobles assassinated the regent, Saiyyid Hasan. A son of Saiyyid Hasan, Saiyyid Muhammad, prepared himself for retaliatory action but circumstances did not favour him. He sought the help of Tatar Khan Lodi, who sent a big army to attack Srinagar in 1484. This army was defeated and dispersed by Rai Hans, the chief of Bhimbar.

NIZAM KHAN SENT AGAINST TATAR KHAN

Sometime in 1485 Bahlul sent Nizam Khan (future Sultan Sikandar Lodi) against Tatar Khan Yusuf Khail, the *muqta* of all the sarkars to the west of Delhi—Sirhind, Hisar-Firuzah, Samana, Lahore and Dipalpur. Tatar's military strength was considerable; he had fifteen thousand mounted soldiers in his army. Military strength and financial resources bred a seditious attitude in him and he not only occupied some parganas of the *khalsa* land but also dismissed the officers appointed by Bahlul. Bahlul sent Nizam Khan along with Umar Khan Sarwani, Mian Sa'id Farmuli, Nasir Khan Nuhani, Darya Khan Nuhani and other distinguished nobles of the period to chastise Tatar Khan. In a battle fought near Ambala, Tatar Khan, despite his brave resistance, was defeated and slain.³⁴

DEATH OF BAHLUL, HIS CHARACTER AND ACHIEVEMENTS

In 1488 Sultan Bahlul marched to Hisar-Firuzah, Gwalior and Etawah. The Raja of Gwalior, Man Singh Tonwar, made a present of eighty lakhs of *tankas*. Bahlul removed from Etawah the Chauhan

³³ *Ibid.*, II, 448. But see also the chapter on Kashmir in this volume (Sect. I, passage on Sultan Hasan Shah).

³⁴ *Waq'at-i Mushtaq*, ff 9b-10a.

chief, Sakta Singh, who had been in charge of the town since its capture from Husain Shah Sharqi and assigned it to Rai Dadu. While on his way back to Delhi, Sultan Bahlul fell ill on account of a heat-stroke, and died on 13 Sha'ban 894/12 July 1489 at Milauli, where he had encamped during his illness.

A posthumous child, brought up under the protection of his uncle, Bahlul was destined to carve out his future by sheer dint of merit. He started his career as governor of Sirhind and ended it at the ripe old age of eighty as the Sultan of Delhi, whose authority extended from the Punjab to the frontiers of Bihar and embraced important cities like Delhi, Badaun, Baran, Sambhal, Rapri, Kampil and Patiali. A part of Rajasthan was also under him and the rulers of Gwalior, Dholpur and Bari paid tribute to him. It was a great achievement in an age when centrifugal tendencies were the order of the day, and a mad race for political power had created widespread political confusion and chaos.

Bahlul had the clear vision of a political realist and a dogged tenacity of purpose which guided his activities all through. For him the end justified the means and he never hesitated to have recourse to chicanery, treachery or fraud, if it suited his purpose. In his dealings with Husain Sharqi, the rulers of Malwa and Hamid Khan, he employed foul means to realize his objectives. He did not hesitate in bribing Darya Khan Lodi on the battle-field of Narela. He was, however, not devoid of chivalrous sentiments. He displayed typical Afghan chivalry when he sent the wife of the defeated Sharqi ruler back to her husband with all dignity and respect.

Bahlul ruled for more than thirty-eight years—the longest period during which any Sultan had held the sceptre of Delhi. This was, in itself, a great achievement considering the general political climate of the country. From the time of the later Tughluqs there had been a persistent tendency towards decentralization; and from the provincial governors down to the local zamindars everyone was eager to grab at power and to defy the centre. Bahlul handled the situation with great tact. Afghan military strength was exploited by him to the full in dealing with his adversaries, but he did not surrender his royal authority to them, though he made a display of profound respect for Afghan sentiments.

Two major problems confronted Bahlul—the Sharqis of Jaunpur and the Rajput chiefs of the Doab—and he succeeded in dealing effectively with both of them. The Sharqi power was completely shattered by him while the Rajput chieftains were also humbled. The effacement of the Rajput dynasties which had raised

their head in the last quarter of the 14th century in the middle and lower Doab was primarily the work of Bahlul, achieved by his generalship and fraternization with the Afghans.³⁵

Since his energies were mostly devoted to military affairs, Bahlul could not make any experiments in the sphere of civil administration. Nothing original emanated from his mind. He simply continued the administrative institutions of the Delhi sultanat as he had inherited them from his Saiyyid predecessors. His only contribution, as the author of the *Tabaqat-i Akbari* has pointed out, was to appoint his own officers³⁶ where he found the administration in the hands of undesirable officers of the previous regimes. One very important measure of Bahlul, which has perpetuated his name in the numismatic history of the Delhi sultanat, was the introduction of the coin, named *Bahluli*, which remained the medium of exchange for commodities till the time of Akbar.

Bahlul had a very affable personality, just and generous, simple and unostentatious. He got up early in the morning and attended to the business of the state till about midday. According to Abdulla, he personally heard the petitions of the people and did not leave this work to his amirs or wazirs.³⁷ From noon till the night-prayer (*isha*) he either remained in the company of the *ulama*, or spent his time in reading the Quran or offering congregational prayers. After offering the night-prayers, he went to his *haram* and remained there for some time. Then he retired to his *khilwat khana* (private chamber). He was very punctilious in performing his religious duties and had considerable regard for the *ulama* and the divines; but he was singularly free from the fanaticism which characterized the activities of his son, Sikandar Lodi. He enjoyed the confidence of a very large number of Rajput and other Hindu zamindars and entrusted responsible posts to them. Rai Karan, Rai Pratap, Rai Bir Singh, Rai Tilokchand and Rai Dhandhu were some of his trusted chiefs.

Bahlul's despotism was tempered by Afghan traditions of tribal equality. The author of the *Tarikh-i Da'udi* remarks about him:

'He was a simple and unostentatious king. He removed the *darbans* from the gate when he took his meals; whoever came to him (at that time) took his meal with him. He did not sit on the throne in the *majlis* and forbade the amirs from standing. In the *Darbar-i 'Am* (Public Audience) also he did not sit on a throne. He used a small carpet. In his *farmans* he addressed the amirs as *masnad-i*

³⁵ Nirodbhusan Roy, *Ni'matullah's History of the Afghans*, 56.

³⁶ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 310-12.

³⁷ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 10.

a'li. If by chance any amir was offended, he tried his best to placate him. He would go to his house, take off his sword from his waist-belt and place it before him and apologize saying: "If you do not consider me worthy of kingship, you appoint some one else to this job and give me some other assignment".³⁸

The following practices of his particularly struck the imagination of contemporaries as well as posterity:

(1) When he captured the treasures of the kings of Delhi, he distributed the spoils among his soldiers and took for himself only a proportionate share.³⁹ Whether this principle of distribution was applied to all booties that fell to his lot in his long military career is not clear. Dr. Halim's observation that 'he distributed the booties of war among his soldiers, and like the "Pious Caliphs", preferred to take an equal share with them'⁴⁰ lacks confirmation by early authorities and seems to be a generalization only from the measures adopted with reference to the treasures of Delhi. Maybe that he resorted to this equal distribution to win the confidence of the soldiery soon after his occupation of the throne of Delhi.

(2) He did not maintain any personal guards.⁴¹ While this could have been in conformity with Afghan traditions, it shows his confidence in himself and his popularity.⁴² Sikandar had to appoint a special guard for his protection at night.

(3) His food was not prepared in his palace but was sent, in rotation, by the nobles. Ferishta says: 'His food was not prepared at home nor did he ride a horse from the royal stables. Every day one of the nobles sent him his meal and similarly at the time of riding, one of them supplied him with a mount.'⁴³ If he actually followed this practice, it must have been intended to give a sense of participation in the administration to his Afghan nobles. Abdulla says that he used to remark: 'It is enough if my name is associated with the kingdom.'

(4) Mushtaqi says: 'He did not sit on the throne in the presence

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 11.

³⁹ Ferishta, 1179. The author of the *Tarikh-i Da'ud* says (11) that whatever came to him—wealth, property or new parganas—he distributed amongst the soldiers and did not retain anything for himself. He did not accumulate any treasures.

⁴⁰ A. Halim, *History of the Lodis*, 52.

⁴¹ *Waq'at-i Mushtaqi*.

⁴² Only in a palace without a guard could the following incident, as recorded by Mushtaqi, take place: 'A *mulla* went to Bahlul's private chamber. The Sultan was just proceeding to the bath-room; the *mulla* caught hold of the Sultan's loin cloth and asked him to listen to his request and grant it.' *Waq'at-i Mushtaqi*.

⁴³ Ferishta, I.

of the nobles and forbade them to stand. All used to sit together on fine carpets and (the Sultan) called everyone *masnad-i a'li*. He held the *darbar* every day and sat on the carpet. Some of the nobles were ordered to stand. All did not sit in the assembly.⁴⁴

The government of Bahlul was based and carried on in the spirit of a *biradari* (clan). Sikandar Lodi was correct when he told the nobles in 1494 on the eve of his struggle with the Sharqi Sultan: 'You discharged during the reign of the late Sultan Bahlul what was *haqq-i biradari* (obligations of the clan).'⁴⁵

44 *Waqfat-i Mushtaqi*, f. 9a-b.

45 *Ibid.*, f. 12b.

III. SULTAN SIKANDAR LODI (1489-1517)

ACCESSION

SOON AFTER THE DEATH OF Sultan Bahlul Lodi, the nobles met at Milauli, a village 15 miles north of Sakti, in order to discuss the question of his successor. There were three groups among them supporting the three princes in the field—Nizam Khan, Barbek Shah and Azam Humayun. Nizam Khan's mother, who was the daughter of a Hindu goldsmith, vigorously pleaded the case of her son and held out the promise of good treatment to the nobles.¹ Isa Khan Lodi, who was backing up the candidature of Barbek Shah, rebutted her, declaring that the grandson of a goldsmith had nothing to do with the throne. This direct insult of a wife of the deceased Sultan provided Khan-i Khanan Farmuli with an excuse to question the propriety of such remarks. Isa Khan snubbed him saying: 'You are a servant and have nothing to do with the affairs of royal relations. Khan-i Khanan Farmuli felt insulted and in great anger he declared his allegiance to Nizam Khan and left the meeting. He collected together his supporters and carried the bier of Sultan Bahlul to Delhi. The two other groups remained quarrelling without arriving at any decision.

In the meantime Nizam Khan had been summoned to the camp by his mother and Umar Khan Sarwani, the wazir. Before leaving Delhi, Nizam Khan visited Shaikh Samauddin, a distinguished Suhrwardi saint of Delhi, and sought his blessings in an interesting manner. He submitted to the Shaikh: 'O Shaikh! I desire to study orthography and prosody with you!' The Shaikh replied: 'Recite: May God render thee fortunate in both the worlds.' Nizam Khan requested the Shaikh to repeat the formulae three times, and then taking it as a happy omen and a blessing from the Shaikh, he went to assume the reins of government.² He joined the funeral procession of Sultan Bahlul at Jalali, sent the bier to Delhi³ and crowned himself on Friday, 17 Sha'ban 894/ 16 July 1489. The coronation took place on the bank of the Kali Nadi, on a mound which was once a hunting pavilion of Firuz Shah Tughluq and was known as *Kaushak-i Firuz*.⁴

Soon after his accession, Sultan Sikandar proceeded to Delhi. The

¹ Ferishta, I, 179.

² *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 34; Yadgar, *Tarikh-i Shahi*, 34.

³ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 314.

⁴ *Ibid.*, I, 314; Ferishta, I, 179.

most formidable task before him was to induce the Afghan nobles to accept his authority and to force his relations to submit.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST ALAM KHAN LODI, ISA KHAN LODI AND BARBEK SHAH

Sikandar first marched towards Rapri, where his brother, Alam Khan Lodi, had joined Azam Humayun. He besieged the forts of Rapri and Chandwar. Alam Khan fled to Patiali and sought the protection of Isa Khan Lodi. Rapri could not stand a siege and had to surrender. It was assigned to Khan-i Khanan Lodi. The Sultan then marched towards Etawah, where it took him several months to finally subjugate the area. Alam Khan surrendered and Sikandar not only pardoned him but placed Etawah also in his charge.

The next important noble to be dealt with was Isa Khan Lodi, who was living at Patiali. Isa Khan Lodi was defeated in battle and died soon afterwards of a wound which he had received in the engagement. Sikandar entrusted Patiali to Rai Ganesh, who had deserted Barbek Shah and joined him.

Sikandar next deputed Ismail Khan Nuhani to contact his brother, Barbek, and demand from him the acceptance of Sikandar's suzerainty and the recitation of the *Khutba* in his name. Barbek declined and Sikandar marched in person against him. The two armies came face to face at Kanauj. Shaikh Muhammad Qurban, better known as Kala Pahar, who was the commander of Barbek's forces, was captured. Sikandar was, however, not inclined towards a stern policy at this stage. He forgave Kala Pahar and showed him kindness and consideration. Kala Pahar then threw about his weight in favour of Sikandar and fought Barbek and defeated him. Barbek fled to Badaun but he was chased and had ultimately to surrender. Sikandar, who was eager to win over rather than crush his rivals and enemies, extended the same benevolent treatment to Barbek and placed him again on the throne of Jaunpur. It was a wise and diplomatic step, calculated to satisfy the ambition of his rival-brother and also to create a situation in which Husain Sharqi's return to power would become difficult, if not impossible. To ensure that Barbek did not throw off the yoke of Delhi, Sikandar took steps to consolidate his position in Jaunpur. He assigned a number of parganas there to his trusted nobles,⁵ thus creating an effective check on the ambitions of Barbek.

The only important member of the royal family who was now opposed to his authority was Azam Humayun Lodi. Sikandar marched against him, and having defeated and overthrown him, entrusted Kalpi

⁵ *Ibid.*, I, 316.

to Mahmud Khan Lodi. This was probably the first occasion on which Sikandar did not confirm a rebel in his territory. Probably he did not consider Azam Humayun Lodi fit enough to hold Kalpi, one of the sensitive areas of his empire.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST TATAR KHAN LODI AND SULTAN ASHRAF

Having consolidated his position at Kalpi, Sikandar proceeded against Tatar Khan Lodi, the governor of Jaithra.⁶ The governor submitted and the Sultan confirmed him in his area.

The Sultan next turned his attention towards Bayana. Sultan Ashraf, its chief, exercised independent authority over his territory. His father, Sultan Ahmad Jilwani, had owed allegiance to Sultan Husain of Jaunpur, but when the kingdom of Jaunpur passed through a period of crisis and Sultan Husain suffered one defeat after another at the hands of Bahlul, Sultan Ahmad Jilwani became independent to all intents and purposes. Sikandar deemed it an essential part of his scheme of integrating the Sharqi kingdom to the empire of Delhi to liquidate all such former vassals of the Sharqis. He made a proposal to Ahmad Jilwani that he would assign Jalesar, Chandwar, Marahra and Sakit to him, if he surrendered Bayana. Jilwani at first accepted the proposal and expressed his willingness to deliver the keys of the fort to Umar Khan Sarwani, but on second thoughts he decided to resist. Sikandar ordered the siege of Agra, which was under Haibat Khan Jilwani, who owed allegiance to Sultan Ashraf, and then proceeded towards Bayana. Sultan Ashraf was forced to capitulate and Bayana was annexed to the kingdom of Delhi in 897/1491. Sikandar assigned Bayana to Khan-i Khanan Farmuli and returned to Delhi.

ATTACK ON JAUNPUR BY THE BACHGOTI RAJPUTS

A couple of days after his arrival in Delhi, Sikandar was going out to play chaugan when he received reports about the attack of the Bachgoti⁷ Rajputs, under Juga, on Jaunpur. A huge army of one hundred thousand soldiers, both mounted and footmen, had marched against Jaunpur. Mubarak Khan Nuhani was captured by the invaders while trying to cross the Ganges and was put in the custody of Rai Bhid of Bhattah (Rewa). Sher Khan, brother of Mubarak Khan

⁶ Jaithra is a village in Aligarh tehsil of Etah, 3 miles from Etah. *UP Dist. Gazetteer*, XII, 174.

⁷ Originally a tribe of the Mainpuri Chauhans, the Bachgotis lived on the borders of Jaunpur and Gorakhpur and were known for their contumacy and turbulence. See Elliot, *Memoirs of the Races of the North-West Provinces*, I, 47.

(Nuhani), was killed in battle. Finding the situation beyond control, Barbek Shah fled to Daryabad and joined Kala Pahar.

On receipt of this report, Sikandar ordered immediate mobilization. He did not visit his palace but took his meals in the camp and spent all his time in military preparations. In 897/1491 he marched towards Jaunpur. Barbek Shah joined him at Dalmau.⁸ Rai Bhid was alarmed at the approach of the Sultan and he set free Mubarak Khan Nuhani. The Sultan pushed ahead and at Kathgarh⁹ he pounced upon the army of Juga. According to Abdulla and Ahmad Yadgar, the Sultan's main army was coming behind him and he had only five hundred mounted soldiers with him. The army of Juga comprised of 15,000 cavalry and 200,000 infantry. Juga fled from the battle-field without risking an encounter. Sikandar carried fire and sword into the army of Juga and caused heavy losses in men and material. Juga first went to the fort of Jaund and then sought shelter with Sultan Husain Sharqi. Sikandar wrote a polite and conciliatory letter to Sultan Husain and asked him to surrender Juga. The Sharqi ruler replied in an extremely contemptuous and arrogant strain and Sikandar was left with no alternative but to strike. Sultan Husain came out of the fort and took the initiative himself. Sikandar personally led the army and defeated Husain, who fled to Bihar.

Sikandar then proceeded to Jaunpur and again placed Barbek Shah on the throne of Jaunpur. But soon afterwards he came to know about Barbek's expulsion by the zamindars of the area. Sikandar sent Kala Pahar and Azam Humayun Sarwani to Jaunpur and ordered them to seize Barbek Shah, as he had proved his utter incompetence in dealing with the situation. Sikandar himself attacked Chunar.¹⁰ The nobles of Husain Sharqi shut themselves up in the fort. Sikandar did not press the siege as he knew that the fort was almost impregnable.

From Chunar Sikandar proceeded to Kantat,¹¹ included in the territory of Rewa (Bhattah). Rai Bhid hastened to surrender and submit. Sikandar then marched towards Arail¹² and from there to Dalmau. At Dalmau he married the widow of Sher Khan Nuhani, who had been killed in the Bachgoti revolt. She was a very charming and accomplished lady.¹³

⁸ A town on the banks of the Ganges in the Rae Bareli district.

⁹ A small village in the Dalmau pargana, *UP District Gazetteer*, XXXIX, 137.

¹⁰ In Mirzapur district, UP, on the right bank of the Ganges.

¹¹ Situated at the confluence of the Ujla and the Ganges and within the municipal limits of Mirzapur. See *NWP District Gazetteer*, 1884, XIV, 195.

¹² Opposite the Allahabad fort, on the right bank of the Jumna at its confluence with the Ganges. *Imperial Gazetteer*, X, 332-33.

¹³ Ni'matullah, I, 180.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST RAI BHID

Though Rai Bhid had submitted to Sikandar, yet he was so nervous that he fled to Rewa, leaving behind all his valuables at Kantat. Sikandar sent all this property to him, but later on, when he was convinced that the Rai had definitely pro-Sharqi feelings, he marched against him in 900/1494. The Rai's son, Bir Singh, was defeated in battle. The Rai himself fled towards Sarkutch. Sikandar chased him but the Rai died in the way.

Sikandar then proceeded to Phapund, but famine and inundations destroyed his considerable army¹⁴ and he found himself in an extremely difficult position. He returned to Jaunpur in order to reorganize and replenish his troops.

INVASION OF HUSAIN SHARQI

This was an ideal opportunity for Husain Sharqi to strike at the Lodi Sultan. The Hindu zamindars of the locality, who still had sympathy with the displaced ruler of Jaunpur, persuaded him to come out of his refuge in Bihar. Husain collected an army and moved forward to strike at Sikandar. Sikandar reacted to it immediately by crossing the Kantat ford of the Ganges and reaching Banaras. The two armies clashed at a place some 36 miles from Banaras. Husain Sharqi met a disastrous defeat and hastily fled to Bihar.

Sikandar pursued his defeated adversary, who fled from pillar to post in search of shelter. Leaving Malik Kandu in Bihar, he went to Colgong in the Bhagalpur district of Bihar, which was then under the ruler of Bengal.

Sikandar left Mahabat Khan Lodi in Bihar and proceeded to Durweshpur.¹⁵ The Raja of Tirhut also submitted and the Sultan entrusted the collection of revenues from the Raja to Mubarak Khan. During his stay at Durweshpur, the Sultan went to visit the tomb of Shaikh Sharafuddin Yahya Maneri. Later he marched against Sultan Alauddin of Bengal, because he had given protection to Husain Sharqi. Further, the ruler of Bengal had also sent a reconnaissance party under his son, Daniyal, in order to watch the activities of Sikandar, who was throwing his tentacles towards Bengal after having established himself in Bihar.

It was at Barh, a town in the Patna district of Bihar, that the forces of Sultan Alauddin of Bengal, under the command of Daniyal, met the forces of Sikandar Lodi, under the command of Mahmud Khan Lodi and Mubarak Khan Nuhani. Ultimately terms of peace were negotiated

¹⁴ Khairuddin, *Jaunpur Nama*.

¹⁵ In Sherpur tehsil of Patna district.

between them and it was agreed that—(a) Sultan Alauddin would not give asylum to the enemies of Sikandar Lodi; (b) no encroachment would be made by either ruler on the territory of the other; and (c) Sultan Alauddin would recognize Sultan Sikandar's authority over Bihar, Tirhut, Saran sarkars and other territories conquered by him.

On his return from the Bengal campaign, Sikandar gave Saran to his soldiers in jagirs and came to Jaunpur. During his stay of six months at Jaunpur Sikandar applied himself to destroying all Sharqi monuments, palaces, gardens, etc. He would have even demolished the mosques built by the Sharqi sultans, but the *ulama* dissuaded him from this vandalism.¹⁶

INVASION OF REWA AND ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS AT JAUNPUR

In 904/1498 Sikandar Lodi attacked Rewa (Bhattah) a second time. He was bitterly incensed at the invitation sent by the ruler of Rewa to Sultan Husain Sharqi to attack Lodi territory. Sikandar besieged the fort of Bandhogarh.¹⁷ He, however, could not capture it and, irritated at his failure, devastated the region he passed through.

From Bandhogarh Sikandar proceeded to Jaunpur and looked after its administrative arrangements, particularly its financial affairs. Mubarak Khan Lodi Mochi Khail, the governor of Jaunpur, was taken to task for embezzlement and mismanagement of funds. The Sultan showed such strictness in dealing with him that some of the nobles resented it.

COUP AGAINST THE SULTAN

Having set the affairs of Jaunpur in order, Sikandar proceeded to Sambhal and stayed there for four years (905-909/1499-1503). During this period some discontented elements joined hands to organize a *coup*. Twenty-two nobles, operating in different parts of the kingdom, planned to depose him and raise Fath Khan to the throne. The prince, however, divulged the secret to his mother and to his spiritual master, Shaikh Tahir, who insisted on the matter being brought to the knowledge of the Sultan. Asghar Khan, the governor of Delhi, Sa'id Khan Sarwani, Tatar Khan, Mahmud Shah and others were either executed or deported for complicity in the conspiracy. Some of the disgruntled nobles went to Gwalior and from there proceeded to Gujarat.

¹⁶ This story of the Sultan's vandalism in Jaunpur is based on traditions, which the compilers of the *District Gazetteers* found floating down the stream of time.

¹⁷ An old fort 60 miles south of Rewa town, *Imperial Gazett.*, VI, 359.

CAMPAIGNS AGAINST GWALIOR,
DHOLPUR AND MANDRIL

In 907/1501 Raja Man Singh of Gwalior sent a eunuch, Nihal, to Sultan Sikandar with presents and professions of friendship. The eunuch failed in his mission, and the relations between Delhi and Gwalior became further strained.

The Rai of Dholpur was suspected of having incited the rebels who had dislodged Imadul Mulk, the governor of Bayana. Sikandar assigned Bayana to Khwaja Khan, and ordered Alam Khan, governor of Mewat, and Khan-i Khanan Lohari, governor of Rapri, to join Khwaja Khan in his operations against Dholpur. Rai Manik Deva put up a determined defence and killed Khwaja Babban,¹⁸ a veteran soldier. Thereupon Sikandar marched in person against Manik Deva. He reached Dholpur on 6 Ramazan 906/25 March 1501. The Rai grew panicky and fled to Gwalior. Dholpur was occupied and the Lodi army not only pillaged and plundered it but even uprooted the the gardens. Adam Khan was put in charge of the fort of Dholpur.

Sikandar next marched against Gwalior. Apart from the failure of Nihal's mission, the protection given by the Rai of Gwalior to certain rebels and also to Rai Manik Deva had irritated the Sultan. For two months he encamped on the bank of the Asi (Asan), a lake near Gwalior. Ultimately the Rai sued for peace (909/1503). He expelled Sa'id Khan, Babu Khan, Rai Ganesh (the Chauhan chief of Patiali) and sent his son, Bikramajit, as a hostage. The Sultan was pleased at this gesture; he honoured the prince and later on even returned Dholpur to Manik Deva.

In 910/1504 Sikandar marched against Mandril,¹⁹ and besieged it. The garrison, however, surrendered the fort. Sikandar destroyed the temples of Mandril, built mosques in their place and plundered the land. The fort was entrusted to Mian Makan and Mujahid Khan.

FOUNDATION OF THE CITY OF AGRA

In 911/1506 Sikandar Lodi founded the city of Agra. The site for the new city was selected after considerable search and deliberation. A commission of several sagacious and experienced men sailed on boats from Delhi and examined the area on both sides of the banks of the Jumna. The Sultan then himself went on a boat to see the site. 'He embarked on a boat', writes Ni'matullah, 'and sailed, enjoying fully the journey and hunting on the way, until he reached the place (selected by the commission) and liked the elevation of the area for

¹⁸ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 324.

¹⁹ A tehsil town 62 miles west of Gwalior on the right bank of the Parbati river.

purposes of habitation. He asked the captain of the crew, Nayak, who piloted his boat: "Which of these two elevations is better suited for (our purposes)?" Nayak replied: "That one in the foreground (*ag-i rah*) is better." The Sultan smiled and said: "The name of this city will also be Agra."²⁰ The site selected by the Sultan was in the villages of Bashi and Poiya in the pargana of Deoli, and 9 parganas out of a total of 52 from the sarkar of Bayana were included in it.²¹

THE GWALIOR CAMPAIGN

In 911/1506 Sikandar Lodi again marched towards Gwalior. The commissariat arrangements having broken down, the advance-guard of the Delhi forces was attacked at Chatawar.²² The heroism of Awadh Khan and Ahmad Khan saved the situation, but Sikandar abandoned the idea of marching further and returned to Agra. Next year (in 912/1506) Imad Khan Farmuli and Mujahid Khan were sent to effect the conquest of the fort of Untgarh,²³ which was regarded as the key to Gwalior. Later on Sikandar himself joined the advance-party and attacked the fort from all sides. The garrison put up a heroic defence, and when a breach was made in the wall of the fort, they desperately fought hand-to-hand and their resistance continued even after the fort had been occupied. Mujahid was put in charge of the fort but was removed soon afterwards, when Sikandar came to know that he had accepted a bribe from the Rai of Untgarh for removing Muslims from the fort. The Sultan returned to Agra on 27 Muharram 913/8 June 1507. The march of the army from Untgarh was made extremely difficult due to scarcity of water and a very large number of soldiers died of thirst.

On 10 Muharram 915/30 April 1509 the Sultan marched upon Hatkant, a stronghold of the Bhadauria Rajputs. Police stations (*thanas*) were established at different strategic places in order to keep a watch over the activities of the inhabitants of that area.

In 916/1510 Shahzada Shihabuddin rebelled against his father, Sultan Nasiruddin of Malwa and fled to Sipri.²⁴ Nasiruddin deprived his erring son of his right to succeed and nominated his third son, Azam Humayun, as his heir. Shihabuddin approached Sikandar Lodi for protection and support. The Lodi ruler expressed his willingness to help him provided he ceded Chanderi to Sikandar. In Zil Hij 916/March 1511 Sikandar Lodi sent his envoys with presents to

²⁰ Ni'matullah, I, 195.

²¹ *Ibid.*, I, 195-96.

²² Abul Fazl mentions it as a town in the Gwalior sarkar.

²³ Untgarh or Utgir is a tehsil in Karnauli.

²⁴ In Chanderi.

Sultan Mahmud of Gujarat in order to placate him and ensure his neutrality in the event of conflict with Malwa. It was also the recognition of the independent status of Gujarat by the Sultan of Delhi—something which had been withheld by the Lodi Sultan so long.

But before any concerted action could be planned by Sikandar and Shihabuddin, Sultan Nasiruddin of Malwa expired. The rebel-prince immediately altered his plan of action; he gave up the idea of going to Delhi and marched straight to Mandu. In his struggle with his brother he was, however, defeated.

Azam Humayun who had ascended the throne of Malwa as Sultan Mahmud II was not destined to rule in peace. In 917/1510 his brother, Sahib Khan, effected a *coup* and ascended the throne as Sultan Muhammad. Sultan Mahmud II reached Chanderi and sought the help of its governor, Bahjat Khan, but Bahjat firmly replied that his loyalty was to the person who held Mandu. Mahmud II then turned to Sikandar for help. The latter demanded Chanderi in return for his help. Not waiting for this political bargain to mature, Mahmud II secured the help of Medini Rai and his powerful Rajput contingent, and occupied Mandu on 16 Shawwal 917/16 January 1512.

Medini Rai's ascendancy in Malwa led to the rebellions of Bahjat Khan, governor of Chanderi, of Sikandar Khan, governor of Siwas and Hindia, and of Mansur Khan in 918/1512. Medini Rai defeated Sikandar Khan but Bahjat appealed to Agra for help. 'If you send an army', he said, 'to place Sahib Khan on the throne, I will recite the *Khutba* and issue the coins in your name.' Sikandar was quick to respond and Sahib Khan was placed on the throne. But Bahjat went back on his promise and refused to recite the *Khutba* or issue the coins in the name of Sultan Sikandar Lodi. Sikandar avoided a conflict and his army returned to Delhi in 919/1513. Unfavourable developments at Mandu, however, brought Sahib Khan to Sikandar Lodi. Disgusted with the overweening ambition of Medini Rai, Mahmud Khalji first planned his assassination, and when he failed in that attempt, he fled to Muzaffar Shah of Gujarat in 920/1514. Sikandar Lodi decided to act and sent an army for the conquest of Chanderi. It was occupied and Sahib Khan was installed there. Sikandar Lodi, however, appointed his own officers to carry on the administration of Chanderi.

Taking full advantage of the situation prevailing in Malwa, Sikandar sought to extend his authority in that region. He occupied Sui Sopar²⁵ and assigned it to Abu Bakr Khan, brother of the

²⁵ Abul Fazl mentions Sui Sopar in the sarkar of Ranthambhor.

displaced governor, Ali Khan. In 923/1517 he marched towards Ranthambhor but could not conquer the fort. The governor of Ranthambhor, however, accepted his overlordship.

DEATH AND ESTIMATE

Sikandar Lodi died of diphtheria or throat-cancer on 7 Ziqā'd 923/21 November 1517.

Endowed with a rare physical charm²⁶ and gift of the gab, fond of poetry, music and good cheer,²⁷ Sikandar Lodi was in certain respects a very striking figure of medieval India. He gave a new orientation to Afghan polity in India and considerably raised the stature and dignity of the office of the sultan. The Afghan nobility, despite its attachment to Afghan democratic traditions, was made to recognize the superior status of the monarch. He adopted several measures to emphasize the dignity and authority of the king:

(1) While Bahlul used to sit on a carpet, Sikandar started sitting on a throne. There was no question of any noble sharing the seat with him. The Sultan was no longer *primus inter pares*.

(2) In order to impress the superior position of the sultan on the minds of the nobles and the people, he laid down elaborate rules for the reception of royal *farmans* in the distant parts of the kingdom. The governors were required to meet the courier from the court at a distance of about six miles from their headquarters. The royal messenger sat in a specially constructed pavilion and delivered the *farman* to the governor, who held it with great respect on his head and took it to the mosque to be read out from the pulpit.²⁸

(3) The nobles were made to realize that they were servants of the sultan and that their position and power depended entirely on his good will and pleasure. Those who held jagirs were required to submit accounts regularly to the *diwan-i wizarat*. All cases of malversation, mismanagement, misbehaviour or corruption were sternly dealt with.²⁹

(4) A highly efficient spy-system kept the sultan informed of all the developments in the kingdom and particularly of the activities of

²⁶ A mystic eccentric of Rapri, Shaikh Hasan Majzub (for whom see, Abdul Haq Muhaddis, *Akhbarul Akhyar*, 281), had fallen in love with him. See *Waq'at-i Mushtaqi* f. 23b-24a.

²⁷ *Tarikh-i Shahi*, 49; *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 36-39. Mushtaqi says that he took wine also secretly, *Waq'at*, f. 36a.

²⁸ *Waq'at-i Mushtaqi*, f. 19a; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 338.

²⁹ Mubarak Khan Lodi, governor of Jaunpur, was strictly dealt with in connection with a charge of malversation. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 321. Asghar, a governor of Delhi, Mujahid Khan, Shams Khan and others were punished for corruption and misconduct.

the nobles.³⁰ The Sultan himself went out *incognito* to have direct and intimate knowledge of the affairs of the kingdom. Surprised at his knowledge of even the clandestine activities of the people, the public, in its credulity, thought that some mysterious supernatural power kept him informed of all that happened in his territory.

Sikandar was an able administrator, clear-headed in his analysis of situations and vigorous in the enforcement of his orders. He displayed a great sense of responsibility in discharging the functions of his kingly office. It is reported that he worked from morning till late in the night. It was his daily routine that after the morning prayer and recitation of the Quran,³¹ he plunged into administrative affairs. His private audience began at night and it was at that time that he usually sent his orders to governors and communications to rulers. His meal was served at midnight. Some *ulama*, who were his close companions, sat by his side but were not permitted to eat anything in his presence. They took their share of the royal dinner to their homes.

Sikandar's vigorous administration ensured peace and prosperity and guaranteed justice to the common man. All the highways of the empire were safe from bandits and robbers, and steps were taken to create a sense of security among the people.

His judicial system was very efficiently organized under Mian Bhu'a. The Sultan himself considered and decided cases which were brought to him. Darya Khan Nuhanī had to be present at the court from early morning till late in the night to receive petitions and inquire into grievances.

All chroniclers refer to the prosperous and affluent condition of the kingdom during the time of Sikandar. Every morning the price schedule of the market was reported to him. The prices of essential commodities were generally cheap. 'But we cannot shut our eyes', writes Dr. S. A. Halim, 'to the grim fact that cheapness was caused by the dearth of bullion and the absence of movement of goods and exchange of commodities, for no part of the kingdom touched the sea; and, secondly, corruption in the revenue department still persisted as is evidenced by the record of a conversation between Mian Bhu'a and the Sultan as to how to check corruption.'

Barring 1496, when there was failure of crops, the agricultural produce was generally good. The Sultan himself used to take keen personal interest in the development of agriculture. He abolished

30 Even the private life of the nobles was reported to him. He knew how a noble, Bhikan Khan, had carried his bed into his room when it had started raining at night. *Waq'at-i Mushtaqi*, 15b.

31 According to *Tarikh-i Shahi* (49) he recited three parts (*paras*) of the Quran standing after midnight prayers.

zakat (import duty) on grain,³² and introduced a measurement-standard known as *gazz-i sikandari*, which continued to prevail till the Mughal period. The rent-rolls prepared during his reign proved of immense value to his successors. 'The statistical returns of Babur's time', remarks Edward Thomas, 'were clearly based upon the old rent-rolls of that unacknowledged contributor to the efficiency of all later Indian revenue systems, Sikandar bin Bahlol. A single subdued confession in Babur's table suffices to prove this.'³³

Sikandar Lodi appreciated fully the necessity of organizing the army on the traditions of the early sultans of Delhi. He kept close contact with his soldiers, and it is said that he used to send two *farmans* every day to his army when it was on the march. The morning *farman* directed the army about the journey it had to cover during the day and the evening *farman* told them about the place they had to encamp at night.³⁴

Some of the philanthropic and charitable works of the Sultan particularly elicited the praise of the people. He had arrangements for the daily distribution of cooked and uncooked food to poor people in the capital. Biannual, weekly and daily allowances and stipends were fixed for the poor and the destitute in his kingdom.³⁵ When he changed his clothes and beddings, they were sold and the money obtained was given away as dowry to orphan girls.³⁶

Sikandar Lodi undertook some measures with a view to checking immoral trends in society. He prohibited the Bahraich processions,³⁷ which were taken out in the month of Jeth (May-June) in memory of Salar Mas'ud Ghazi, but had become an occasion for immoral practices. He forbade also the visit of women to the shrines of saints³⁸—an interdict originally issued by Firuz Shah Tughluq in view of the corruption that usually tarnished such gatherings, but which must have been disregarded after his death and needed fresh promulgation. Sikandar also checked the worship of Sitala, credulously believed to be the goddess of small-pox.³⁹

Sikandar's contribution to art and culture was not negligible. He patronized men of letters, artists, poets, etc., and himself composed poetry under the *nom de plume* of *Gulrukhi*. His munificence attracted

³² *Tabaqat-i-Akbari*, I, 320.

³³ Edward Thomas, *The Revenue Resources of the Mughal Empire*, 3-4.

³⁴ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*.

³⁵ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 336; Ferishta, I, 186; *Waqi'at-i Mushtaqi*, ff. 14a-b.

³⁶ *Tarikh-i Shahi*, 49.

³⁷ *Waqi'at-i Mushtaqi*, f. 15; *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 38.

³⁸ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 38.

³⁹ *Waqi'at-i Mushtaqi*, f. 15.

scholars from Arabia and Persia.⁴⁰ Seventy scholars sat every night by his cot and discussed academic and religious problems.⁴¹ It was at his invitation that two eminent philosophers—Shaikh Abdullah and Shaikh Azizullah—came to Delhi from Tulamba and strove to change the pattern of Muslim education by introducing a greater portion of rational subjects in the curriculum of the day.⁴²

It must, however, be mentioned that Sikandar Lodi was narrow-minded and fanatical in religious matters, and that his otherwise successful reign was marred by an intolerant religious attitude towards the non-Muslims. In his early years, when he was a prince, he was irritated at Maulana Abdullah Ajudhani, who had objected to his interference with a religious practice of the Hindus at Thaneswar, telling him boldly that Islam did not permit such interference. But when he ascended the throne, his iconoclastic zeal found an expression in the destruction of the idols of the temple of Nagarkot, which he gave to butchers for weighing meat. While determining his motivations in following this religious policy, one cannot afford to ignore the fact that tradition holds him responsible for also destroying edifices of the Sharqi rulers at Jaunpur. Besides, it is a significant fact that during his regime the Hindus took to learning Persian⁴³ and were recruited in large numbers to different posts—a fact to which Shaikh Abdul Quddus Gangohi drew the attention of Babur.⁴⁴

40 *Akhbarul Akhyar*, 220; *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 36.

41 *Waq'at-i Mushtaqi*, ff. 49a-b.

42 For Sikandar's respectful visits to Shaikh Abdullah, see Badauni, *Muntakhabat Tawarikh*, I, 324.

43 *Ferishta*, I, 187.

44 *Maktubat-i Quddusi*, 337.

IV. SULTAN IBRAHIM LODI (923-32/1517-26)

ACCESSION

AFTER THE DEATH OF SULTAN Sikandar Lodi, his eldest son, Ibrahim, was raised to the throne on 8 Ziqā'd 923/22 November 1517. The nobles, however, did not like political power to be concentrated in the hands of one person, as had happened during the reign of Sikandar, and so they arranged for the division of the empire into two units: one under Ibrahim and the other under his younger brother, Jalal Khan. The country up to the border of the former kingdom of Jaunpur was to be under Ibrahim, while Jalal Khan was to govern the territory ruled over by the Sharqis. A covenant was arrived at and the empire was accordingly divided.

Jalal Khan then set off for Jaunpur to take charge of his share of the patrimony, but he stayed at Kalpi for a few days and wasted his time in pleasures and hunting. He appointed Fath Khan, son of Azam Humayun Sarwani, as his wazir.

The division of the kingdom had been agreed to solemnly by the two brothers and, given the will to honour it, the plan would have worked well. But the arrival of Khan-i Jahan Lodi, the jagirdar of Rapri, at the court upset the arrangement. He told Sultan Ibrahim and the amirs that the division of the empire was ill-advised, and that the sooner it was abrogated, the better it would be in the interest of the Afghans. Notwithstanding the political wisdom of Khan-i Jahan Lodi's advice, it was Machiavellian in spirit and was a flagrant breach of trust. Ibrahim was quick to respond to Khan-i Jahan Lodi's advice as it was in consonance with his own ambitions.

Once the abrogation of the treaty was decided upon, ways and means were explored to undo it. It was suggested that action was necessary before Jalal Khan had established himself at Jaunpur. A *farman* was, therefore, sent to Jalal, couched in extremely polite and persuasive language, asking him to return quickly to the court as his advice was urgently needed on an important matter. Haibat Khan Gurgandaz, a shrewd man with considerable plausibility and power of persuasion, was sent to allure him into the net. But before Haibat could reach his destination, reports of the conspiracy had reached Jalal. Cautioned in time, he refused to be the victim of the treacherous game of the nobles. Ibrahim then sent a deputation consisting of nobles like Shaikhzada Sultan Muhammad (son of Shaikh Sa'id Farmuli), Malik Ismail (son of Malik Alauddin Jilwani) and

Qazi Hamiduddin Hajib to undertake the mission in which Haibat Khan had failed. This deputation also could not persuade Jalal Khan to visit Agra. Ibrahim then decided to take some positive action against Jalal and paralyse him before he had consolidated his position at Jaunpur.

In order to alienate the nobles of Jalal from him and to win them over to his side, Ibrahim sent a number of *farmans* to them with big presents and promises of future rewards. Each *farman* was sent through a confidential officer. Some of the eminent maliks of Jalal Khan, who had thirty to forty thousand soldiers under their commands—like Darya Khan Nuhani, *hakim* of the *wilayat* of Bihar, Nasir Khan, jagirdar of Ghazipur, and Shaikhzada, the *zabit* of Awadh and Lucknow—deserted their master and joined Ibrahim.

A second coronation was then celebrated by Ibrahim on 15 Zil Hij 923/29 December 1517. Jagirs, robes of honour, posts and assignments were bestowed on nobles and officers on this occasion. This second coronation was, in fact, a public declaration of the abrogation of the earlier arrangement and of Ibrahim's claim to have sovereign rights over the areas formerly assigned to Jalal.

CONFLICT WITH JALAL

Jalal could hardly accept this position, which was a brazen-faced departure from the covenant arrived at between him and his brother. He started consolidating his position at Kalpi by increasing his military strength and by conciliating the local zamindars. He assumed the title of Sultan Jalaluddin and caused his name to be read in the *Khutba* and inscribed on the coins. As soon as he had stabilized his position, he marched towards Gwalior, where Azam Humayun Sarwani was besieging the fort and sent a message to him, saying: 'I regard you (Azam Humayun) as my father and my uncle. You know that the fault is not mine. The treaty has been violated by Sultan Ibrahim. . . It is your duty, as an honest Musalman, to uphold and support the just cause.'¹ Azam Humayun was moved by this message and decided to join Jalal. It was agreed upon between them that they would first reduce the *wilayat* of Jaunpur and clear it of all hostile nobles. So they attacked the governor of Awadh, Sa'id Khan, who fled towards Lucknow and wrote to Ibrahim about the attack.

Ibrahim had to act now. As a safeguard against any emergency, he sent his imprisoned brothers—Ismail Khan, Husain Khan and Shaikh Daulat Khan—to the Hansi fort, but provided all normal conveniences for them. On 24 Zil Hij 923/6 January 1518 he

¹ Ni'matullah, *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*, I, 236-37.

reached Bhongau by forced marches and planned to attack Kanauf. On the way he received a report that Azam Humayun Sarwani and his son, Fath Khan, had deserted Jalal Khan and were coming to join him. Ibrahim sent his distinguished nobles to receive them and bestowed on each of them a special robe of honour and a dagger studded with jewels.

The zamindars of Jartoli, a dependency of Koil, who were notorious for their contumacious activities, rebelled at this time and killed Umar Khan (son of Sikandar Khan Sur) in an encounter. Malik Qasim, the governor of Sambhal, marched against them and killed their ringleader. The rebellion was crushed.

Many nobles of Jaunpur, like Sa'id Khan and Shaikhzada Farmuli, abandoned Jalal and joined Ibrahim Lodi. This considerably strengthened his position. A huge army led by eminent Afghan nobles, like Azam Humayun Sarwani, Azam Humayun Lodi and Nasir Khan Nuhani, was then sent to deal with Jalal, who was encamped at Kalpi at that time. But before this force could reach Kalpi, Jalal marched at the head of an army comprising of thirty thousand cavalry and a number of elephants for an attack on Agra. Ni'amat Khatun, the family of Qutb Khan Lodi Imadul Mulk, Malik Badruddin Jilwani, and those connected with Jalal's *haram* were left in the fort of Kalpi. The army of Delhi besieged Kalpi and there was exchange of fire for some days. Eventually the fort of Kalpi was reduced and the city was plundered. An enormous booty fell into the hands of the forces of Delhi.

Sultan Ibrahim sent an army under Malik Adam Kakar for the defence of Agra. When Jalal reached near Agra, he thought of ravaging the town in retaliation for the destruction of Kalpi by the forces of Ibrahim. Malik Adam Kakar handled the situation with tact and succeeded in delaying Jalal's onslaught against Agra. Then reinforcements arrived under Malik Ismail Jilwani, Kabir Khan Lodi and Bahadur Khan Nuhani. Malik Adam Kakar then decided upon firm action, but he preferred to make an overture for peace before adopting a tough line. He sent a message to Jalal saying that if he surrendered his *chatr*, *aftab-gir*, *naubat*, *drums*, *sikka* and other insignia of royalty and agreed to live as an ordinary malik, he would request Sultan Ibrahim to restore the jagir of Kalpi to him. Jalal agreed to these humiliating terms and surrendered these insignia to Malik Adam Kakar, who took them to Sultan Ibrahim at Etawah. Ibrahim spurned the offer and decided to march personally against Jalal and liquidate him. When Jalal heard about the intention of Ibrahim, he escaped to Gwalior and sought shelter with its raja. Ibrahim stayed at Agra for some time and set its affairs in order. He

sent Haibat Khan Gurgandaz, Karimdad and Daulat Khan Inder for the protection of Delhi, appointed Shaikhzada Manjhu to the governorship (*wilayat*) of Chanderi, and also summoned Sultan Muhammad, the maternal grandson of Sultan Nasiruddin Khalji of Malwa.

Ibrahim then made up his mind to invade Gwalior and chastise Jalal. An army comprising of thirty thousand horsemen and three hundred and fifty elephants was sent to reduce Gwalior. Sultan Ibrahim, further, sent reinforcements to Gwalior under Bhikan Khan Lodi, Jalal Khan Lodi, Sulaiman Farmuli, Bahadur Khan Nuhani, Ismail, Malik Firuz Ikhwan, Bahadur Khan Sarwani, Khizr Khan Lodi, Khizr Khan Nuhani and Khan-i Jahan Lodi. As luck would have it, Raja Man of Gwalior died at this time. Azam Humayun Sarwani besieged the fort and succeeded in reducing it. Jalal first escaped to Malwa, but when he did not like the treatment meted to him by Mahmud Khalji, he turned to Kara Katanga. On the way he fell into the hands of the Bhils and the Gonds, who took him into custody and sent him to Sultan Ibrahim. He was interned in the fort of Hansi along with his other brothers, but was killed later, on the advice of some supporters of Ibrahim.

RELATIONS WITH HIS NOBLES

Ibrahim could not maintain good relations with his nobles and maliks. His overbearing attitude alienated them and created a suspicion in their minds concerning his intentions.

Miyan Bhu'a was an old and eminent noble of the Lodi kingdom. He had been held in great respect by Sikandar Lodi and had acted as head of the judiciary. On account of old age, he could not perform his duties as efficiently as before. The Sultan threw him into prison and put him in the charge of Malik Adam Kakar. His duties—his jagir as well as his honours—were transferred to his son. Miyan Bhu'a's death in prison created a deep resentment in his family and offended the old Afghan nobles also.

Ibrahim gradually lost faith in his old nobles, and one by one he threw many of them into prison. Azam Humayun Sarwani, who was besieging the Gwalior fort and had nearly reduced it, was recalled to Agra all of a sudden and thrown into prison. When Azam Humayun's son, Islam Khan, came to know of this, he rose in rebellion at Kara-Manikpur. He took all the property of his father under his own control and did not permit Ahmad Khan to take charge of his jagir. Ahmad Khan challenged him but was defeated. The Sultan thought of sending an army to chastise him. But at this time Azam Humayun Lodi and Sa'id Khan Lodi escaped to their jagirs in Lucknow. They started

correspondence with Islam Khan and planned joint action against the Sultan. Ibrahim sent a large army under Ahmad Khan (brother of Azam Humayun Lodi), the sons of Husain Farmuli, Majlis-i A'li Shaikhzada Mahmud Farmuli, Ali Khan, Ali Khan-i Khanan Farmuli, Masnad-i A'li Bukhari Khan Farmuli, Dilawar Khan Sarang Khani, Qutb Khan (son of Ghazi Khan Buloti), Bhikan Khan Nuhani, Sikandar Khan (son of Malik Adam Kakar) and others to deal with Islam Khan and the recalcitrant nobles. But when this army reached near Bangarmau, Iqbal Khan, the *khasa-khail* of Azam Humayun Lodi, came out of an ambush with five thousand horsemen and some elephants, attacked the imperial forces and scattered them.

The news of this defeat upset Ibrahim, and he declared that the nobles, who had come back defeated at the hands of the rebels, would remain condemned unless they redeemed their honour by defeating the rebellious maliks headed by Islam Khan. He sent more forces to strengthen their ranks. The rebel army comprised of nearly forty thousand mounted men and five hundred elephants. But before these forces could come into clash, Shaikh Raju Bukhari, an eminent saint, intervened, and it was agreed that if Sultan Ibrahim set free Azam Humayun Sarwani, they would not persist in their opposition to him and would move to some other territory. Both the armies separated when this agreement was arrived at. But the Sultan did not ratify this agreement. He issued orders to Darya Khan Nuhani, governor of Bihar, Nasir Khan Nuhani and Shaikhzada Farmuli to march against the rebels and bring them to book. Consequently a sanguinary battle was fought and many soldiers were killed on both sides. Ultimately the imperial forces emerged victorious. Islam Khan was killed on the battle-field; Sa'id Khan Lodi was arrested by the servants of Darya Khan Nuhani. An enormous booty fell into the hands of the forces of Delhi. The Sultan rejoiced at this victory and distributed considerable money in alms and charity. It was a major victory against the nobles.

It was at this time that Azam Humayun Sarwani and Miyan Bhu'a died in prison; and Darya Khan Nuhani, governor of Bihar, and the *amir-ul umara* Khan-i Jahan Lodi and Husain Farmuli rose in rebellion. Husain Farmuli, the governor of Chanderi, was assassinated at the instigation of the Sultan. This further antagonized the amirs, because they realized that the Sultan was bent upon liquidating them by every means.

Darya Khan Nuhani died soon afterwards and his son, Bahadur Khan, became the rallying point of all rebels. Bahadur Khan incited rebellious tendencies on a large scale in Bihar and nearly a hundred thousand horsemen gathered round him. He assumed independence

and proclaimed himself as Sultan Muhammad. The *Khutba* was read and coins were issued in his name. After being defeated by the army of Sultan Ibrahim, Nasir Khan Nuhani, the governor of Ghazipur, also joined Bahadur Khan of Bihar. Thus the position of Bahadur was further stabilized. Ibrahim sent a huge force to deal with him.

The Sultan had excited the suspicions of his nobles and they had no alternative but to rebel in self-protection. A son of Daulat Khan Lodi, governor of Lahore, who happened to visit Ibrahim at this time, was alarmed to find that the Sultan was contemplating action against all the distinguished nobles of the kingdom. Afraid of being thrown into prison, he escaped to his father and reported the situation to him. Daulat Khan started organizing a movement against Ibrahim and obtained the cooperation of all the nobles and jagirdars of the Punjab.

INVITATION TO BABUR AND THE BATTLE OF PANIPAT

Disgusted with Ibrahim, the nobles of the Punjab wrote letters to Babur in Kabul and invited him to invade India. Alam Khan, brother of Sikandar Lodi, personally went to Kabul for this purpose. Babur sent some of his nobles with Alam Khan in order to assess the situation. These nobles conquered Sialkot, Lahore and many other areas and reported the situation to Babur, who started for the conquest of India on 1 Rabi I 932/16 December 1525. When Alam Khan reached Lahore, he insisted that since the Mughals had come at his invitation, they were to assign Delhi to him after conquering it. Alam Khan and the Mughals disagreed, and Alam Khan marched with an army of forty thousand mounted men to Delhi and besieged the city. When Ibrahim heard about this, he moved from Agra at the head of an army consisting of eighty thousand soldiers. Alam Khan left the siege of Delhi and prepared to give battle to Ibrahim. He made a surprise attack at night and dispersed the forces of Ibrahim. But Ibrahim, who had stayed out of the camp with a body of five or six thousand soldiers, mounted an attack on the forces of Alam Khan in the morning. Alam Khan was defeated and fled away. Many of his men were killed.

In the meantime Babur had reached Lahore. Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan did not stick to their pledges and went over to Milwat. Mir Khalifa persuaded Alam Khan to join him. He was received well by Babur. Later Daulat Khan and Dilawar Khan also joined. After occupying Lahore, Babur proceeded to Sunam and Samana and sent Tardi Beg towards Delhi as an advance-guard at the head of four thousand horsemen. Ibrahim sent Da'ud Khan with ten thousand

horsemen and some elephants to challenge Tardi Beg, who made a surprise night assault on the army of Da'ud Khan. Many of Da'ud's men were killed and Da'ud Khan himself was arrested.

When Ibrahim received the news of Da'ud Khan's defeat, he decided to march in person. An army of one lakh mounted soldiers and five thousand elephants, besides a large number of infantry, firearms, etc., marched under him. Babur's army of effectives comprised of about 8,000 soldiers. He soon realized that the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Lodi forces could be rendered ineffective only by fighting the battle at some strategic place and through an effective combination of cavalry and artillery. Babur successfully achieved both objects. The forces of Ibrahim were lying just south of Panipat; the Mughal army could easily reach the town in two marches and use the houses and buildings of Panipat as a shelter for its right wing.²

Babur carefully planned the disposition of his forces. He protected his weak front against superior numbers by employing some seven hundred waggons fastened together by ropes of raw hide. After every six or seven waggons there was a small breastwork, where musketeers and artillery-men were stationed under the over-all supervision of two distinguished artillery officers—Ustad Ali and Mustafa. Having made all these preparations, Babur advanced two marches and reached the town of Panipat on 12 April 1526. The city protected his right wing. The left wing was protected by digging a ditch and constructing an *abatis* of felled trees. The centre was strengthened with a line of breastworks and waggons, but the line had gaps wide enough for fifty or a hundred horsemen to charge through abreast. 'The waggon-line', remarks Rushbrook Williams, 'was the stratagem of aggression rather than of defence; it was intended to hold the enemy along an extended front, so that his flanks might be open to attack. Certainly it provided shelter for the artillery-men and musketeers, but it was in no sense of the word a *laager* or a fortress.'³

For about a week after 12 April the Mughal and Afghan forces stood on the field without starting the actual combat. On 19 April Babur made an abortive attempt to provoke an attack. A few days later, however, the conflict began. 'Jammed together in a solid mass, Sultan Ibrahim's men could neither advance nor retreat.' The engagement began at about 6 a.m. and by midday the Afghan army was routed. Thousands of Afghan corpses, with the body of Ibrahim in

² Rushbrook Williams (*An Empire Builder of the 16th Century*, 128-38) has given a very interesting and detailed account of the battle.

³ *Ibid.*, 130.

their midst, covered the battle-field of Panipat. 'No sultan of India except Sultan Ibrahim', remarks Ni'matullah, 'has been killed on the battle-field.'⁴ The sultanat of Delhi, which had its birth on the battle-field of Tarain in 1192, breathed its last in 1526, a few miles away on the battle-field of Panipat.

⁴ *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*, I, 259.

Yadgar says (*Tarikh-i Shahi*, 98) that Babur was deeply moved when he saw Ibrahim amongst the dead. He picked up his head from the dust and got the body buried with great respect and distributed *qand halwa* (sweetmeats) to bless his soul.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SHARQI KINGDOM OF JAUNPUR

FOUNDATION OF JAUNPUR

IN 760/1358-59 FIRUZ SHAH set out against Sultan Sikandar of Bengal. When he reached Zafarabad,¹ monsoon had set in; further advance had become impossible and he was obliged to stay there for about six months. One day he found that on the other side of the river Gumti there were some buildings, which a displaced prince of the Gaharwar clan of Ratgarh had built. It was a site extremely pleasing to the eye and Firuz decided to build a new city there. In 1359 the foundations of the new city were laid and it was named Firuzabad.² But the city was not destined to bear that name. One night Firuz saw Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq in a dream, probably suggesting that the city be named after him, and Firuz gave it the name Jaunpur.³ Thus Jaunpur, which became the seat of a great ruling house, was founded. It would, however, be too much to conclude that passing moods alone determined Firuz's decision to found a new city at the place. Geopolitical considerations also determined his choice; it was an excellent place, which could serve as a *point d'appui* for his military operations in Bengal and Orissa.

Firuz Shah took a keen interest in the construction of the new city. When he returned from Bengal in the following year, he halted at the new city which had by now been fairly developed. There were a few government houses, houses for supervising construction work as well as military barracks, etc. for organizing an expedition against Orissa. After his arrival at Delhi, Firuz sent some nobles to Jaunpur and granted *iqtas* to them in the vicinity. Soon after its foundation, Jaunpur became the administrative headquarters of the district, and Zafarabad gradually lost its importance.

MALIK SARWAR SULTANUS SHARQ (1394-99)

The Sharqi kingdom of Jaunpur was founded by Malik Sarwar, a eunuch (*khwaja sera*) in the service of Sultan Firuz Shah Tughluq.

¹ On the right bank of the Gumti.

² *Aff*, 148-49.

³ *Ibid.*, 148-49.

Details about his early life are not available in contemporary records. Afif refers to him as the custodian of the royal jewellery;⁴ Muhammad Behamid Khani says he was *shahna-i shahr* under Firuz Shah.⁵ But these stray references are not helpful in fixing his exact position and status in the administration of Firuz Shah. But the way in which he played a leading role in the succession struggles, that followed the death of Firuz Shah, shows that he was in a strategic position to play a fairly important part in the political movements of the time.

Malik Sarwar continued to occupy the post of *shahna-i shahr* till the reign of Sultan Abu Bakr Shah.⁶ But his sympathies seem to have been with Muhammad Shah, Firuz's younger son, to whom Firuz had handed over the charge of the entire administration during his own life-time with the title of Sultan.⁷ But under the pressure of his slaves, who disliked Muhammad Shah, Firuz Shah had deprived him of this honour and appointed his grandson, Tughluq Shah II, in his place.⁸ However, Muhammad Shah continued to manoeuvre for the throne; and when he started for a second time to try conclusions with Abu Bakr Shah, Malik Sarwar gathered together an army of fifty thousand, won over some nobles and provincial governors and joined Sultan Muhammad Shah at Jalesar.⁹ Muhammad Shah was so pleased with him that he conferred upon him the title of Khwaja-i Jahan and appointed him wazir.¹⁰ But the second march of Muhammad Shah on Delhi also failed (791/1389); he was defeated at the battle of Kundli¹¹ and had to return to Jalesar with Malik Sarwar.

Frustrated and disappointed, Sultan Muhammad Shah thought of seeking the help of Timur. He entrusted the eastern districts to Malik Sarwar, conferred the title of Sultanus Sharq on him¹² and left Prince Humayun under his tutorship. But he had hardly set out for Samarqand when developments at Delhi attracted his attention; on receipt of a message from the Delhi amirs, he took the road to the great capital and ascended the throne on 19 Ramazan 792/31 August 1390. Since the invitation had come from Mir Hajib Sultani, Muhammad Shah appointed him wazir and conferred upon him the title of Islam Khan. Malik Sarwar was made his naib;¹³ this must have been

4 *Ibid.*, 148-49.

5 *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, Rotograph, f. 416b.

6 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 146.

7 *Ibid.*, 138-39.

8 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 238.

9 *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, f. 421, 422; *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 146.

10 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 146; *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, f. 421b.

11 Probably modern Kandla in the Saharanpur district.

12 *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, f. 422a.

13 *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 150.

a very uncomfortable position for Malik Sarwar, though he seems to have accepted it with temporary satisfaction.

Muhammad Shah was at Jalsar, building a fort under the name of Muhammadabad, when he received a report from Malik Sarwar that Islam Khan was conspiring against him and intended to proceed to Multan.¹⁴ Muhammad Shah rushed to Delhi, and without obtaining sufficient evidence against Islam Khan, executed him and rewarded Malik Sarwar by appointing him wazir (1392).¹⁵ It was in this manner that Malik Sarwar not only removed an inconvenient person from his own path but also got the post of wazir, which he held till the death of Sultan Muhammad Shah. When Humayun Khan ascended the throne under the title of Sultan Alauddin Sikandar Shah (22 January 1394), he recognized the ability of Malik Sarwar and entrusted to him the entire administration of the rapidly declining empire.¹⁶ When Sultan Sikandar died and the amirs and provincial governors refused to accept the accession of Mahmud, the youngest son of Sultan Muhammad, Malik Sarwar used his tact and diplomatic gifts in making matters smooth for him. It was in fact Sarwar's support which enabled Mahmud to ascend the throne on 20 Jamadi I 796/23 March 1394, after a struggle of fifteen days. In recognition of his meritorious services, Malik Sarwar was confirmed in the post of wazir.

Soon afterwards Jaunpur and the region adjoining it showed signs of tumult, and Sultan Mahmud selected Malik Sarwar for setting right the affairs of the eastern districts. He was appointed governor of Jaunpur in Rajab 796/May 1394, and the title of Sultanus Sharq, which had been originally given to him by Sultan Muhammad, was confirmed by Sultan Mahmud.¹⁷

Malik Sarwar put his adopted son, Malik Mubarak, in charge of all affairs at Delhi and honoured him by calling him Malikus Sharq. He then marched to Jaunpur to deal with the recalcitrant elements. He crushed the rebels of Dalnau (in the Rae Bareilly district), Etawah, Sandila (in Bara Banki district), Kanauj, and Bahraich, and then proceeded towards Bihar and Tirhut. Maharaj Har Raj and Maharaj Kumar Gajraj of south Bihar, whose contumacious activities had been disturbing the peace of the whole area, were defeated and killed at the battle of Chaughat. Maharaj Kumar Gajraj and Deva Raj fled away when they heard about the forces of Malik Sarwar. Malik Sarwar's strong and energetic measures restored law and order in an

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 152-53.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 153.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 155.

¹⁷ *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, ff. 422-26; 450-51

area which had long been a centre of lawless activities, contumacy and strife.

Malik Sarwar then returned to Jaunpur and sent his adopted son, Malik Mubarak, from Jaunpur with instructions to deal with the recalcitrant Rai of Jajnagar. Mubarak successfully accomplished the task assigned to him and suppressed the Rai.

Events in Delhi were moving against Sultan Mahmud. Mallu Iqbal Khan was at the helm of affairs, and the Sultan was virtually under his dictation. Later, Timur's invasion paralysed Mahmud and he fled from Delhi to find shelter with Zafar Khan of Gujarat. Then he moved to Dilawar Khan of Malwa. This gave an opportunity to Malik Sarwar; he declared his independence in Jaunpur, struck his coins and recited the *Khutba* in his own name.

Taking advantage of the disturbed condition of the country, Malik Sarwar started extending his territory. He conquered Koil (modern Aligarh), Sambhal (in Moradabad) and Rapri (in Mainpuri district). After a careful analysis of all available sources, Dr. M. M. Sayeed makes the following observation about the extent of his jurisdiction:

'All our sources agree that his boundary in the north started from Koil, including all the rich districts of what is today known as Uttar Pradesh, and stretched north-east to the district of Tirhut in North Bihar, and touched the boundary of Nepal and the Himalayan tarai. On the west side, not only was the area with Kanauj as its centre, including the adjacent territory, under him, but also the city of Bhojpur, the capital of Maharaj Har Raj and Maharaj Kumar Gajraj, and the territory up to the boundary of Ujjain. In other words, in addition to UP the territories of Baghel Khand and Bundel Khand, including the Bhopal state, were also included in his kingdom. The whole territory of North and South Bihar was also included, and the rais of Jajnagar and the rulers of Bengal were his feudatories.'¹⁸

Had circumstances favoured, the Sharqis would have established their hold over Delhi also.

Malik Sarwar died suddenly in Rabi I 802/November 1399,¹⁹ after a brief reign of five years and six months.

Malik Sarwar represented in his person the tact and efficiency of the great officers of the Tughluq sultans. His administrative talents coupled with his grim political realism and military efficiency immensely raised his stature. His established law and order in areas

¹⁸ *The Sultanate of Jaunpur*, thesis approved for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by the London University (Typescript).

¹⁹ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 159.

which were seething with discontent and brought the recalcitrant zamindars under submission. With him also begins that period of Jaunpur's glory, which has aptly been praised by many writers. He enlarged the city of Jaunpur, constructed new buildings and renovated and repaired the old ones. He gave to Jaunpur the title of *Darus Surur*, and made it a centre of culture, where men of letters and poets, scholars and saints assembled and shed lustre on the capital.

MUBARAK SHAH SHARQI (1399-1401)

After the death of Malik Sarwar, his adopted son, Malik Mubarak Qaranfal, was raised to the throne by the amirs and the maliks. According to Yahya Sirhindi, he was a nephew or cousin of Khizr Khan, the founder of the Saiyyid dynasty,²⁰ but this statement contradicts the opinion of those scholars²¹ who ascribe a Negroid origin to Mubarak.

Little is known about the early life of Mubarak Shah, but soon after his accession, he had to face an invasion from Delhi. Mallu Iqbal Khan, having overthrown Nusrat Shah, turned his attention to Jaunpur. In Jamadi I 803/January-February 1400 Mallu started for Jaunpur. When he reached the banks of the *Ab-i Siyah* (i.e. Kali Nadi), near Patiali, the zamindars of the territory challenged and opposed him, but they were defeated and chased up to Etawah. Mallu Iqbal then approached Kanauj and encamped on the bank of the river Ganges. Mubarak proved equal to the occasion; he dashed ahead with a large army consisting of Rajputs, Afghans, Mughals and Tajiks²² to prevent the advance of Mallu Iqbal and encamped on the other side of the Ganges. For two months the armies of Delhi and Jaunpur remained encamped on the opposite banks of the Ganges, but ultimately both of them gave up the campaign.

Soon afterwards Sultan Mahmud Shah Tughluq returned to Delhi from Gujarat and Malwa, and along with Mallu Iqbal Khan he organized a campaign against Mubarak Shah. The Sharqi Sultan marched out to face the invaders but died suddenly on the way.

IBRAHIM SHAH SHARQI (1401-40)

Sultan Ibrahim, who succeeded Mubarak Sharqi on the throne of Jaunpur, was his younger brother. Numismatic evidence²³ shows that he ascended the throne sometime in 803/1400-1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 181-82.

²¹ *Cambridge History of India*, III, 259.

²² *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 274.

²³ S. Lane-Poole, *Catalogue of Indian Coins in the British Museum (The Muhammadan States)*, 94.

Within the year of his accession Ibrahim had to face the joint attack of Mallu Iqbal and Sultan Mahmud Shah. Both armies met near Kanauj and for a few days only skirmishes took place between them. Sultan Mahmud, being suspicious of the character and loyalty of Mallu Iqbal, secretly met Sultan Ibrahim but the latter treated him with contempt. Sultan Mahmud then marched towards Kanauj, turned out its Sharqi governor, Shahzada Fath Khan Harvi, from the place and occupied the city. Mallu Iqbal found his position weak and returned to Delhi.

Sultan Mahmud Shah consolidated his position at Kanauj, where his occupation was generally welcomed by the people. Mallu Iqbal's attempt to overthrow him in 807/1404-5 failed, and Sultan Mahmud emerged all the more powerful from the contest. Sultan Ibrahim also made a bid to drive him away from Kanauj and besieged the fort. But he too failed and was obliged to make peace with Mahmud Tughluq.²⁴

The territory comprising the districts of Darbhanga, Muzaffarpur, Champaran and a strip of Nepal terrain, known as Tirhut, was under a Hindu ruler, who used to send regular tribute to Jaunpur from the days of Malik Sarwar, who had subdued Rai Ganesvara in 1394. In 1402 Ganesvara was killed by Malik Arsalan and the territory was occupied by him. Kirti Singh, the son and successor of Ganesvara, sought the help of Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi. The Sharqi Sultan promptly responded and his army overthrew Malik Arsalan and killed him. Kirti Singh's accession, in which Sultan Ibrahim also participated, has been graphically described by Vidyapati Thakura in his *Kirti Lata*.²⁵ Kirti Singh was succeeded by Shiv Singh, who seems to have broken his good relations with the Sharqi ruler. When Ibrahim was marching against Raja Ganesh (of Bengal), the activities of Shiv Singh forced him to attack and capture Tirhut, which thenceforward remained a vassal of the Sharqi kingdom.

Ibrahim Shah Conquers Kanauj

After the death of Mallu Iqbal Khan in November 1405, Sultan Mahmud left for Delhi at the invitation of the Delhi maliks and put Kanauj in charge of Malik Mahmud Tarmati. Sultan Ibrahim had not reconciled himself to the loss of Kanauj. This was an ideal opportunity for him, and in Jamadi I 809/October-November 1406 he marched against Kanauj. Sultan Mahmud advanced to defend it from Delhi. The two armies encamped on the two sides of the Ganges and

²⁴ *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, 434b.

²⁵ *Kirti Lata*, ed. by Ram Babu Saksena, Allahabad, 1929, 14-18.

retreated without achieving anything. But Ibrahim's retreat had been deceptive. As soon as Mahmud reached Delhi and the contingents of his *iqtadars* had returned to their own territories, Ibrahim hastened to Kanauj and besieged the fort. Malik Mahmud Tarmati stood a siege for four months but then surrendered. Ibrahim appointed Ikhtiyar Khan as governor and garrisoned the fort.²⁶ Ibrahim's conquest of Kanauj considerably enhanced his prestige and emboldened him to attempt greater objectives.

In Jamiadi I 810/October 1407 Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi marched against Delhi. Some nobles of Sultan Mahmud, like Tatar Khan (son of Sarang Khan), Nusrat Khan, etc., deserted their master and joined Ibrahim. Sambhal and Baran were conquered on the way and assigned to Tatar Khan and Malik Marhaba respectively. But when the victorious army of Ibrahim had reached the banks of the Jumna, he heard about the march of Sultan Muzaffar of Gujarat against Jaunpur. Ibrahim Shah beat a hasty retreat and returned to Jaunpur, while Sultan Mahmud immediately moved forward to recover his lost possessions, Sambhal and Baran. Malik Marhaba committed suicide; Tatar Khan fled to Kanauj.

Kingdom of Kalpi

In the ravines of the Jumna, twenty-two miles from the town of Jalaun, there had sprung up the new but small state (*masnad*) of Kalpi. Hemmed in on all sides by the kingdoms of Delhi, Jaunpur and Malwa, Kalpi led a very precarious existence for the neighbouring kingdoms were anxious to grab it.

In 1411 Qadir Shah (1411-32), the ruler of Kalpi, attacked Bhonggaon and plundered the territory around it. Ibrahim watched these activities with concern, and in April 1414 decided to attack Kalpi. Qadir Khan had been unpopular with the people and this seemed to strengthen the position of Ibrahim; nevertheless, Ibrahim Shah gave up the siege and returned to Jaunpur. But this was only a feigned retreat. He appeared again and captured Mahoba and Ruth and assigned them to Jalal Khan, son of Da'ud Khan, brother of Zahiruddin. Shahpur fell next, and then the Sharqi forces marched towards Iraj under the command of Malikus Sharq Maqbul. Muhammad Behamid Khani, the author of *Tarikh-i Muhammadi*, was governor of Iraj at this time. Iraj was conquered and assigned to Jafar, son of Da'ud. Ibrahim then joined Maqbul and marched towards the fort of Shaikhpur, where Qadir Khan challenged him. Ibrahim used naphtha engines and catapults and played havoc among the garrison of the

²⁶ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 175.

fort. The garrison appealed to Ibrahim's mercy, and when Qadir accepted the suzerainty of Ibrahim, he was allowed to rule over Kalpi. Qadir Khan, however, gave up his allegiance and strove to regain his lost position. He sent Daulat Khan (son of Junaid Khan) to recapture Iraj from the Sharqi governor, Jafar. Jafar put up a strong defence, but a couple of years later Jafar was murdered and Iraj was conquered by the Kalpi ruler, whose capital was Mahmudabad.²⁷

Campaign Against Ganesh of Bengal

In 1414 Ibrahim Sharqi was invited by Shaikh Nur Qutb-i Alam, a distinguished Chishti saint who resided at Pandua and exercised great influence over the people. Raja Ganesh of Dinajpur had at this time established himself in Bengal and was oppressing the Muslims. The two Muslim rulers, Saifuddin Hamza Shah and Shamsuddin, were completely under his control. Shaikh Nur Qutb-i Alam wrote to Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir Samnani of Kuchchocha to persuade Ibrahim to march against Ganesh. Ibrahim moved out with a strong army and in the way captured Tirhut and chastised Raja Shiv Singh. Ganesh became nervous and approached Shaikh Nur Qutb-i Alam to intercede and secure peace for him. The saint agreed to his request, provided his younger son accepted Islam and Ganesh made a definite commitment not to harass the Muslims. It was Ganesh's son Jadu, who later ascended the throne as Jalaluddin. Ibrahim returned to Jaunpur.

Qadir Shah's harsh and cruel treatment of his people created dissatisfaction and encouraged Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi to march against Mahmudabad in 831/1427. Qadir Shah sought the help of the Sultan of Delhi, Mubarak Shah, but at that time Mubarak was busy organizing a campaign against Muhammad Khan, the governor of Bayana. But Muhammad Khan left for Jaunpur to seek the help of Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi, and while Mubarak Shah was on his way, he heard about the march of the Sharqi ruler against him. According to Yahya Sirhindi, Mubarak postponed his campaign against Bayana and proceeded to deal with Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi, whose forces had already occupied Bhongaon and were moving towards Badaun. An army was sent under Mukhtas Khan to attack the army of Delhi. Mubarak Shah crossed the Jumna and attacked Atrauli; Malikus Sharq Mahmud Husain was sent to oppose Mukhtas Khan. Mukhtas, however, did not find his position strong enough and came back and joined Ibrahim.

Sultan Ibrahim reached Burhanabad, near Etawah. Sultan Mubarak's army also advanced and a battle took place in Jamadi I 831/

February-March 1427 near Mali Kotah. Ibrahim found his position weak and left for Rapri. Mubarak pursued him and at Chandwar skirmishes started between the two armies. Both armies suffered heavy losses without any result. Ibrahim returned to Jaunpur and Mubarak came back to Delhi.

Qadir Shah, ruler of Kalpi, died in 1432. The nobles ignored his eldest son, Zagher Khan Azam Humayun, and placed his second son, Jalal Khan, on the throne. Zagher turned to Ibrahim for help. Ibrahim received him well and gave him the title of Khan-i Jahan.

Jalal, however, alienated both the amirs and the people; he was imprisoned and sent to Chanderi, which his uncle, Sultan Hoshang Shah of Malwa, had assigned to him as a jagir. The nobles then placed Firuz Khan on the throne of Kalpi.

Sultan Ibrahim now made up his mind to throw about his weight in favour of Zagher Khan and besieged the city of Mahmudabad. When Hoshang Shah came to know of these developments, he marched towards Mahmudabad. Ibrahim Sharqi raised the siege. Hoshang placed Jalal Khan on the throne and returned to Malwa.²⁸

Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi, eager to do something for Zagher, gave to him the fort of Shahpur, which some time back he had captured from the ruler of Kalpi.

Jalal Khan failed to win the loyalty and co-operation of his nobles, who were disgusted at his repressive measures. Some of them went over to Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi and sought his help. But at this juncture Hoshang Shah of Malwa again came to the help of Jalal Khan and attacked the Sharqi army. Nothing, however, came out of the battle; and both sides being tired of it, Hoshang left for Malwa and Ibrahim for Jaunpur. But the nobles of the court of Kalpi, who had been living as refugees under the Sharqi ruler, prevailed upon Ibrahim to attack the city of Mahmudabad again. This time matters went against Jalal Khan, who fled away towards Bhandir. Ibrahim occupied Mahmudabad and entrusted it to Zagher Khan.²⁹

Muhammad Behamid Khani has referred to Ibrahim's invasion of Bengal in 839/1435, but no details are supplied by him except the fact that the Sharqi Sultan besieged the Ikhdala fort.³⁰

In 1437 Ibrahim Sharqi marched against Muhammad Shah of Delhi. The authors of the *Rauzatut Tahirin* and the *Jaunpur Namah* refer to this campaign, which has been either ignored or casually treated by other chroniclers. Ibrahim laid siege to the city of Delhi and captured some parganas in the neighbourhood. Sultan Muham-

²⁸ *Ibid.*, ff. 456-57.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, ff. 458-59.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 427.

mad found his position weak and sued for peace. A matrimonial alliance was also arranged and Ibrahim's son, Mahmud Khan, married Sultan Muhammad Shah's daughter, Bibi Raji.

The date of Sultan Ibrahim's death is controversial. Muhammad Behamid Khani says that he ruled for a period of forty years.³¹ This means that his death occurred in 844/1440. This is confirmed to some extent by numismatic evidence. The latest coins of his reign so far discovered belong to the year 844/1440.³²

MAHMUD SHAH SHARQI (1440-57)

Mahmud Khan, the eldest son of Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi, ascended the throne in 844/1440 with the title Sultan Mahmud Shah.

Within a couple of years after his accession he organized an attack on Bengal. Our earliest authority for this invasion is Abdur Razzaq, author of the *Matla'us Sa'dain*. According to him the ruler of Bengal, Sultan Shamsuddin, found his position weak and appealed to Shah Rukh of Herat for help. Shah Rukh sent a message through Shaikhul Islam Karimuddin Abul Mukarram Jami exhorting the Sharqi Sultan to refrain from attacking Bengal. In case the ruler paid no heed to this request, he was threatened with an invasion of his own kingdom. The message had the desired effect and Sultan Mahmud gave up the contemplated invasion.³³ The reasons for the invasion of Bengal contemplated by Mahmud Sharqi are not given; also it would have been impossible for Shah Rukh to attack Jaunpur.

*Conflict with Kalpi*³⁴

In 847/1443 Sultan Mahmud Sharqi heard about the devastation wrought by Nasir Khan (son of Qadir Khan) of Kalpi in Shahpur. Since Nasir Khan had an alliance with Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa, the Sharqi Sultan reported the matter to him and complained about the activities of Nasir Khan. The ruler of Malwa honoured the messenger of the Sharqi ruler, concurred with his approach in the matter but politely refused to send his army as 'it was busy punishing the rebels of Mewat'. Thus satisfied that the ruler of Malwa would not come to the help of Nasir Khan and in reciprocation of his gesture of good will, Sultan Mahmud Sharqi sent 29 elephants as a present to him.

³¹ *Ibid.*, f. 427a.

³² S. Lane-Poole, *Catalogue of Indian Coins in the British Museum (The Muhammadan States)*, London, 1885.

³³ *Matla'us Sa'dain*, edited by M. Shafi, Lahore, 1942, II, 782-83.

³⁴ Details are supplied by Nizamuddin (*Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 279 *et seq.*), Rizquallah Mushtaqi (*Waqiat* ff. 229-230), Ferishta (II, 596) and Nurul Haqq* (*Zubdatut Tawarikh*, f. 374 *et seq.*).

Unable to put up any defence against the Sharqi forces, Nasir Khan abandoned Mahmudabad and fled to Chanderi, made an appeal to the mercy of the ruler of Malwa and professed to be a vassal of his kingdom. The Khalji ruler of Malwa sent a message to the Sharqi Sultan to restore the displaced prince as he had promised to behave well. Matters began to move quickly, and the appeals of Nasir Khan ultimately obliged the Khalji Sultan to march towards Mahmudabad at the head of a huge army on 3 Sha'ban 848/8 January 1444. Mahmud Shah Sharqi marched to deal with him; the jagirdar of Iraj, Mubarak Khan, joined Mahmud Sharqi.

On the banks of the Jumna an indecisive battle was fought, which was followed by another encounter between the rival forces near the village of Ruth, in which the Sharqis suffered a defeat. A third encounter took place in the same vicinity and resulted in enormous losses to both sides. The Sharqi Sultan sought the intercession of Shaikhul Islam Shaikh Jailadah, who was held in high esteem by Mahmud Khalji also, to bring hostilities to an end; he also sent a verbal message to Nasir Khan offering to deliver Ruth immediately and the town of Iraj along with all other territories of Kalpi, which had come under the control of the Sharqis, four months after the departure of the Khalji Sultan. Nasir Khan was agreeable to the offer but the Khalji ruler insisted on the immediate surrender of Kalpi. But ultimately the Khalji ruler also consented to this arrangement and returned to Malwa.

Mahmud Sharqi was soon afterwards called upon to deal with the recalcitrant elements of Chunar. He suppressed the rebels with an iron hand and ravaged the territory to strike awe and terror into the hearts of the people. He garrisoned the area and returned to the capital.³⁵

Relations with Delhi

Sultan Mahmud Sharqi was keenly interested in Delhi affairs and politics for the ruler of Delhi, Alauddin Alam Shah (1445-78), was his wife's brother. The ambitious manipulations of the Delhi nobles had reduced Alauddin to a mere symbol. Hamid Khan had obtained virtual control of the capital and Alauddin had to seek shelter in Badaun. Ultimately Alauddin invited Bahlul Lodi from Sirhind and Bahlul assumed the royal authority. Mahmud Sharqi's wife prevailed upon her husband to attack Delhi to dislodge Bahlul. Some of the nobles of Sultan Alauddin also came to Jaunpur and persuaded him to attack Delhi.³⁶

³⁵ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 289; *Ferishta*, II, 598.

³⁶ *Rauzatut Tahrin*, f. 607b.

In 856/1452 the Sharqi Sultan marched at the head of an army consisting of 170,000 soldiers and 1,400 war-elephants and besieged the city of Delhi. Bibi Mato, wife of Sultan Shah Lodi and the mother-in-law of Bahlul, thought of a stratagem as the force in the fort at that time was not sufficient to meet the enemy. She ordered her women to put on male dress and stationed them on the parapets of the fort. The Afghan archers started shooting arrows at the besieging army but were ultimately forced to lay down arms. Saiyyid Shamsuddin, a noble of Delhi, brought the keys of the fort and handed them over to Darya Khan Lodi, the commander of the Sharqi forces. It was also decided that the Afghan force inside the fort would immediately vacate. Saiyyid Shamsuddin, however, thought out a plan to save the situation. He appealed in private to the racial loyalty of Darya Khan Lodi and requested him not to dishonour the Afghan women and children, who were inside the fort. The appeal touched the most sensitive cords in Darya Khan's heart and he was thus cleverly won over by Saiyyid Shamsuddin to his side. Darya Khan took the keys of the fort to Mahmud Sharqi, and told him that though the keys of the fort had been received, yet Bahlul was on his way to Delhi with a large army under his command. If the Sultan won the battle against him, not only the city of Delhi but the empire of Delhi would be at his feet. Sultan Mahmud fell into the trap so cleverly laid for him by Darya Khan Lodi.³⁷

In the meantime Bahlul marched with a large army, enlisted the support of many Afghan nobles and reached Narela some 17 miles from Delhi. The Sharqi Sultan despatched 30,000 cavalry and 30 elephants under Darya Khan Lodi and Fath Khan Harvi to deal with Bahlul. In the battle that followed at Narela, Fath Khan Harvi, the commander of the Sharqi forces, was forced to withdraw as his elephant was seriously injured by Qutb Khan Lodi. As soon as he had withdrawn from the battle, Qutb Khan Lodi approached Darya Khan Lodi and appealed to his racial sentiments to save the Afghan women. Darya Khan was so moved that he deserted the Sharqi army. As was inevitable, utter confusion prevailed in the Sharqi ranks. Fath Khan Harvi, who had been taken prisoner, was later beheaded by Rai Karan of Khor, whose brother, Rai Pithaura, had been killed by him. Fath Khan's head was brought before Bahlul.³⁸ When Mahmud Sharqi was informed about the disaster of Narela and the death of Fath Khan, he effected a retreat to Jaunpur.

Ujjain had accepted the suzerainty of Jaunpur during the reign

³⁷ *Waqiat-i Mushtaqi*.

³⁸ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, n. 15; *Waqiat-i Mushtaqi*, 8; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 302.

of Sultanus Sharq Malik Sarwar. The atmosphere of Ujjain under Ishwar Singh forced Mahmud Sharqi to send a force in 1454 to conquer Ujjain. Ishwar Singh fled and the Sharqi forces captured Dawa, the capital of Ujjain.

The ignominious retreat of the Sharqi forces from Delhi and the death and desertion of its outstanding military leaders—Fath Khan and Darya Khan Lodi—emboldened Bahlul to consolidate his position, regardless of the interests of the Sharqi ruler. When Bahlul's officers reached Etawah and the Sharqi governor was expelled from there in 1455, Sultan Mahmud Sharqi made up his mind to check and challenge the Lodi advance. The two forces met at Etawah, but peace was concluded through the intercession of Qutb Khan Lodi and Rai Pratap. It was agreed that Bahlul would return the seven elephants he had captured at Narela, and that the territories under the control of Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi and Mubarak Shah of Delhi would form the basis of the territorial adjustments between the Sharqis and the rulers of Delhi. Further it was agreed that Shamsabad would be returned to Bahlul after the monsoons.³⁹

This treaty proved short-lived and hostilities started again in 861/1456-7. When Bahlul demanded the vacation of Shamsabad by the Sharqi governor, Jauna Khan, he delayed and hesitated. Thereupon Bahlul expelled him and handed over the fort to Rai Karan.⁴⁰ Jauna appealed to Jaunpur for help and Sultan Mahmud quickly marched to Shamsabad and attacked Rai Karan. Darya Khan Lodi and Qutb Khan Lodi made night attacks upon the Sharqi camp; Qutb Khan Lodi fell from his horse and was captured. Bahlul was deeply shocked at the arrest of his cousin and wife's brother. After posting Jalal Khan and Prince Sikandar to support Rai Karan, Bahlul proceeded to deal with Sultan Mahmud. But at this time Sultan Mahmud fell suddenly ill and died in 862/1457.

MUHAMMAD SHAH SHARQI

On Sultan Mahmud Sharqi's death, his queen, Bibi Raji, raised his eldest son, Bhikan Khan, to the throne with the approval of the nobles. Bhikan assumed the title of Sultan Muhammad Sharqi. One of the interesting anomalies of the Sharqi administration was that during his life-time—two years before his death—the deceased ruler (Mahmud Shah) had issued coins in the name of his son.⁴¹

³⁹ Ni'matullah, *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani; Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 302-3.

⁴⁰ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, 302-3.

⁴¹ Nelson Wright, *Catalogue of the Coins in the Indian Museum*, Oxford 1907, II, 207; S. Lane-Poole, *Catalogue of the Indian Coins in the British Museum (The Muhammadan States)*, London, 1885, 102-3.

The first problem which confronted Sultan Muhammad immediately on his accession was the conflict with Bahlul. Realizing the basic weakness of his position, he preferred to patch up differences. Bahlul was to retain all areas already under his control and Sultan Muhammad was to keep control over his father's territories.

The next problem before Muhammad Shah Sharqi was that of his brothers, whom he suspected of rebellious intentions. He imprisoned Hasan Khan and Qutb Khan Lodi and put some nobles to death. But the problems of Muhammad Shah were far from being solved. Apart from the fact that his harsh treatment of the nobles and his brothers created widespread discontent, Bahlul marched again to Jaunpur. Bahlul's wife, Shams Khatun, who was a sister of Qutb Khan Lodi, sent him a message to the effect that 'so long as Qutb Khan remained in the prison of Sultan Muhammad, sleep and repose should be unlawful for him.'⁴² In consequence of this message Bahlul did not keep his plighted word and turned from Dankaur to Jaunpur. Sultan Muhammad did not hesitate to take up the challenge this time. He expelled Rai Karan from Shamsabad and appointed Jauna Khan again. Rai Pratap of Etawah joined the side of Sultan Muhammad. The two armies came face to face near Sarsuti.⁴³ Sultan Muhammad found his position weak and thought that this was due to the non-cooperation of his nobles. He sent an order to the kotwal of Jaunpur to put to death his brother, Hasan Khan, along with Qutb Khan Lodi. The kotwal replied that due to his mother, Bibi Raji, it was not possible to carry out the royal orders. Sultan Muhammad deceitfully removed Bibi Raji from Jaunpur and had Hasan Khan executed.

Sultan Muhammad's ruthless behaviour excited the fury and suspicions of his other brothers—Husain Khan and Jalal Khan—and created unrest among the nobles. Husain Khan and Jalal Khan thought of a stratagem for saving themselves. They spread the rumour that Bahlul was contemplating a night-attack and thus induced Muhammad Shah to put three thousand horsemen and one thousand elephants at their disposal. This army encamped on the bank of Jhirna,⁴⁴ a small tributary of the Jumna. Since Jalal Khan had been left behind, Husain Khan called him to his camp. Bahlul came to know of this and sent an army against them. Husain Khan and Sultan Shah (a Sharqi noble) turned towards Kanauj to be in a safe place, but Jalal Khan, not knowing of this, proceeded towards Jhirna,

⁴² *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 304; Ni'matullah, *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*.

⁴³ It may be Sirsaganj town on the bank of the river Sirsa, in Etawah district.

⁴⁴ It joins the Jumna near Shahdra after passing through the Bulandshahr and Aligarh districts.

which the Lodi forces had already occupied. He went to the Lodi camp under the impression that it was the camp of his brother, Husain Khan, and was immediately taken into custody.⁴⁵

Sultan Muhammad became nervous at this development and started for Kanauj. Bahlul chased the retreating army and plundered it.

In the meantime Bibi Raji had decided, in consultation with the nobles, to place Husain Khan on the throne. It was further decided to do away with Sultan Muhammad, who was encamping at the Rajgir ford, three miles south-east of Kanauj on the banks of the Kali Nadi. As soon as this new Sharqi army approached the camp of Sultan Muhammad, his nobles and officers, who were disgusted with his cruelty and harshness, deserted him and joined the army of Husain Khan. Sultan Muhammad became panicky and hid himself in a garden. When chased by Husain's soldiers, he took out his bow and arrow and started shooting at his pursuers. But to his great misfortune, Bibi Raji had already bribed his body-guard to make his arrows harmless by removing their iron-points. Sultan Muhammad was a good shot but this made him helpless. He, however, took out his sword and killed several soldiers before he himself fell dead, when an arrow pierced his neck. He was buried at Dalmau, in the district of Rae Bareilly. Husain Shah built a mausoleum over his grave.

HUSAIN SHAH SHARQI (1458-1505)

Husain found the field clear for him after the death of Sultan Muhammad Shah, but Bahlul was still there. Husain Shah decided to make peace with him and both agreed on a four-year truce. He marched from Kanauj to Jaunpur and sent an advance-message to Jaunpur for bringing Qutb Khan Lodi with honour. Husain sent Qutb Khan to Bahlul, who in return sent Prince Jalal to Jaunpur.

Husain Shah's first concern after his return to Jaunpur was to establish peaceful conditions. He punished the nobles who were involved in the murder of Prince Hasan.⁴⁶

Orissa had become a feudatory area of Jaunpur during the time of Sultan Mahmud Sharqi. Later, however, its ruler had stopped paying tribute. Having reorganized his army to deal with all recalcitrant elements, Husain Shah chastised the rajas of Tirhut and realized the revenues due from them and then proceeded towards Orissa. The ruler of Orissa, Rai Kapilendra Deva (1435-67), submitted and presented thirty elephants and one hundred horses to

⁴⁵ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 305; *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*.

⁴⁶ *Tarikh-i Firishta*, II, 601.

the Sharqi ruler.⁴⁷ Sultan Husain returned to his capital victorious and elated at his achievement.

In 870/1465 Sultan Husain Sharqi rebuilt and repaired the fort of Banaras,⁴⁸ which had a great strategic importance. He garrisoned the fort also.

In 871/1466-67 the Sultan sent an army against Raja Man Singh of Gwalior. Unable to stand a long siege, the Raja submitted and recognized the suzerainty of Jaunpur.⁴⁹

A truce for four years had been arranged between Bahlul and Sultan Husain Sharqi. During this period Husain considerably increased his military strength and gained great self-confidence and reputation by his successful campaigns against Orissa and Gwalior. The only other power which the Sharqis looked upon as a rival to their own authority was that of the sultan of Delhi.

In 1468, when Bahlul was on his way to Multan to quell certain disturbances, Husain Sharqi planned to attack his capital. Though the Sharqi Sultan's own imperialistic instincts were sufficient to goad him to action against Bahlul, the expulsion of Jauna Khan, the Sharqi governor of Shamsabad, by Bahlul had provided him with a moral justification, if any was necessary, for an attack on Delhi.

As Husain Sharqi marched towards Delhi, some of the Afghan amirs, like Ahmad Khan Mewati and Rustam Khan, governor of Koil, deserted Bahlul and joined him. Bahlul turned back to face the invader and the two armies met at Chandwar. The battle lasted nearly a week without any decisive results. Again a truce for three years was agreed upon by the combatants and the Sharqi ruler had to return to his capital.

On his return from his *first* inconclusive campaign against Delhi, Husain Sharqi turned his attention to increasing his military strength. He sought the help of his vassal chiefs and zamindars to increase his military resources; an artillery (*top khana*) was also organized. Attempts were further made to win over some allies and find some supporters. The governor of Bayana, Ahmad Khan Jilwani, joined him and recited the *Khutba* in his name at Bayana. The Sultan won the good will and alliance of Ahmad Khan of Mewat also.

Having thus consolidated his position, the Sharqi Sultan made preparations for his *second* attack on Delhi. Malik Shams, a distinguished noble, advised him to postpone the campaign by a year and to try in the meantime to win further support from the people

47 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 284; *Ferishta*, II, 601.

48 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 284. *Ferishta*, II, 601-2; he gives the date of this repair as 871/1466-67.

49 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 284.

and intensify his preparations along the border. But Sultan Husain's wife, Bibi Khunza, did not agree with this suggestion and urged her husband to seize without delay the throne of her father, Alauddin Alam Shah. So in 1469 Sultan Husain Sharqi marched against Delhi at the head of an army comprising of 140,000 cavalry and 1,400 war-elephants.⁵⁰

Bahlul realized the gravity of the situation and sought the alliance and support of a powerful potentate—the Khalji ruler of Malwa, Sultan Mahmud Khalji—to deal with the powerful Sharqi army. As a political bargain, Bahlul offered the fort of Bayana with its dependencies to the Khalji ruler. But before the terms of this agreement could be implemented or acted upon, Sultan Mahmud Khalji died (3 May 1469) and Bahlul was left to deal with the Sharqis on his own resources.

Capturing important towns that stood in the way, like Koil and Bulandshahr, Husain reached the Jumna and encamped on its eastern bank. Bahlul encamped on the opposite bank with an army of 18,000 horsemen only. The Jumna lay between the armies of Delhi and Jaunpur, and prevented a headlong clash between them. Husain started sending his troops to the neighbouring areas in order to plunder; Bahlul took advantage of this and ordered his army to cross the Jumna at midday. This unexpected attack created a panic in the Sharqi army and Husain was forced to take to flight, leaving behind his *haram*, including the Malika-i Jahan, Bibi Khunza. Malik Shams was killed. Bahlul treated Husain's *haram* with consideration and sent Bibi Khunza and Malik Shams's head to Sultan Husain. This was the disastrous result of Sultan Husain's *second* invasion of Delhi.

Husain Sharqi was a man of persistent and dogged tenacity and was not prepared to give up his ambition of conquering Delhi. In 1471 for the *third* time he led an army consisting of one lakh of horsemen and a thousand elephants against Delhi. Bahlul came out to oppose him, but before the actual combat began he sent a polite message to Husain Sharqi to 'pardon his faults' and to leave him alone as some day he might be of help to him.⁵¹ This had no effect on the ambitious Husain. The two armies fought at Bhatwara, a village in Bulandshahr district. Ultimately Khan-i Jahan Lodi intervened, peace was arranged and Husain returned to Etawah.

Undeterred by the losses he had suffered and keen on conquering Delhi, Husain marched against it for the *fourth* time. In the engage-

⁵⁰ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, II, 285; *Ferishta*, II, 602. The author of *Afsana-i Shahan*, however, says that the army comprised of 100,000 horsemen and 500 elephants. The figures given by our historians are obviously inflated.

⁵¹ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 286; *Ferishta*, II, 602.

ment that took place at Sikhara, twenty-five miles from Delhi, Husain was prevented by rain from realizing his ambition and had to return to Etawah after concluding a peace treaty with Bahlul.

In 1478 Sultan Alauddin Alam Shah died at Badaun. Husain went to Badaun to offer condolences on the death of his father-in-law but decided to occupy the place. He expelled Mubarak Khan (son of Tatar Khan) from Sambhal and occupied it also.

Having annexed Badaun and Sambhal to his kingdom, Husain proceeded against Delhi for the *fifth* time and encamped on the bank of the Jumna, near the ford of Kachh in Sambhal sarkar, in February-March 1478. Bahlul hurried from Delhi. The battle went in favour of Husain Sharqi and Bahlul's forces were outnumbered and outmanoeuvred. But Husain was not destined to reap the fruits of a hard-won victory. The deceitful planning of Qutb Khan Lodi turned the tables against him. Qutb sent a message to Husain and, referring to the affection of his mother, Bibi Raji, for himself, persuaded him to leave Delhi unmolested. Husain agreed to a peace-treaty with Bahlul according to which the territory east of the Ganges was to belong to Husain and the territory to the west of it was to be ruled by Bahlul.⁵²

Sultan Husain, who had broken one peace-pledge after another and one truce after another, had to face the serious consequences of his enemy's breaking his word of honour this time. One night Husain held a convivial party in an extremely colourful background. Qutb Khan, who was present, praised the party but suggested that it would become all the more romantic if arranged in the more pleasant surroundings on the bank of the river. Husain approved of the suggestion and the venue was changed to the river-bank. At this time Bahlul's army made a sudden and surprise attack on Husain's party. Husain's victory turned into a complete rout. His seasoned war-veterans were made prisoners; his baggage, stores and treasures were seized. Bahlul chased Husain also but he escaped somehow. His wife, Bibi Khunza, was again taken into custody. Bahlul did not lose time in establishing his hold over Kampil, Patiali, Koil, Shamsabad, Marahra and Jalali. He also pursued Husain closely. Driven to extremes, Husain turned round and gave battle to Bahlul at Rajhoar, a village some sixteen miles from Farrukhabad. Husain fought boldly and Bahlul was obliged to conclude peace. It was agreed that both rulers would keep to their old boundaries.⁵³

Sultan Husain Sharqi was not the man to rest on his oars or to

⁵² *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 309; *Ferishta*, I, 325; *Badauni* I, 309; *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*.

⁵³ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 310; *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*.

stick to his plighted word. In 885/1480-81, instigated by his wife, he marched for the *sixth* time against Delhi. The Delhi army intercepted him at Sonhar⁵⁴ and inflicted a heavy defeat on him. Bahlul plundered his equipment, treasures, stores, etc. Husain retired to Rapri; Bahlul stayed at Dhupamau.⁵⁵

Neither Husain nor Bahlul had yet been satisfied fully with the results of the battle. Another engagement took place in 1482 at Sirsa, near Rapri, and the Sharqi Sultan, effectively defeated, had to fly away from the field. While crossing the Jumna, some members of his family were drowned. Reduced to extremes, Husain sought the help of his vassal chief, the Raja of Gwalior. The area was infested with robbers and bandits and, at Hatiyakant,⁵⁶ the Bhadauryas—a band of free-booters—plundered his camp. Raja Kirat Singh offered a tribute of several lakhs to him and supplied horses, equipment, etc. Husain encamped at Rangam on the Ganges, and Bahlul proceeded there to deal with him. Skirmishes went on for several months without result as the Ganges flowed between the two armies. With the help of Raja Tilok Chand, the governor of Baksar (in the pargana Daundia Khara, Tirwa Tehsil of Unao district), Bahlul succeeded in fording the river and Husain was forced to retire to Bhattah (Rewa).⁵⁷ He was, however, pursued by Bahlul, and instead of proceeding to Jaunpur, he went to Kanauj. Bahlul chased him further and a battle was fought on the banks of the Kali Nadi (Rahib) in 886-87/1481-82, in which Husain suffered a defeat. His wife, Bibi Khunza, was taken into custody by Bahlul but she succeeded in securing her release.

BAHLUL CAPTURES JAUNPUR

Bahlul pushed ahead with his victorious forces, captured Jaunpur in 888/1483-84, and issued his coins from there.⁵⁸ Military outposts were stationed in and around Jaunpur, and the town was placed under the charge of Mubarak Khan Nuhani. But Husain was not the man to accept all this quietly. He mustered his scattered forces and marched to Jaunpur. The Lodi governor, Mubarak Nuhani, was forced to seek shelter at Mijhanli,⁵⁹ where Bahlul had planted an outpost. Bahlul sent his son, Barbek Shah, to support his entrenched forces. Bahlul subsequently marched on Jaunpur in person and forced Husain to fly away to Bihar.⁶⁰ He was chased further but he

54 A village ten miles north-east of Sakit, in the Etawah district.

55 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 310; *Ferishta*, I, 325-26.

56 A village on the banks of the Chambal in Agra district.

57 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 311; *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*.

58 *JASB*, 1922, *Numismatic Supplement*, No. XXXVI, N. 17.

59 A village in the Gorakhpur district, situated on the left bank of the Gandak.

60 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 312; *Ferishta*, I, 327; *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*.

eluded the Afghan forces. Bahlul, out of generosity to a fallen enemy, allowed him to retain a small tract in Chunar,⁶¹ which had once constituted his family jagir. Barbek Shah was placed on the throne of Jaunpur; the Sharqi kingdom was extinguished; and the Lodi prince issued coins in his own name. The Sharqi territories were annexed and Afghan officers were appointed to administer them.

Husain made another attempt to dislodge the Lodi power from Jaunpur and compelled Barbek Shah to surrender. But Bahlul returned to the scene. He divided his army into two divisions—one comprising of 15,000 cavalry under the command of Ahmad Khan and Qutb Khan; the other wing of 5,000 horse under Daulat Khan. The ambushade tactics were cleverly employed. The second wing was to give battle to the Sharqis; the first wing was to appear later and disrupt the Sharqi dispositions. Husain was again defeated and he had to seek shelter in Bihar once more. Barbek Shah was reinstated.

In 894/1488-89 Bahlul died and Sikandar Lodi ascended the throne, but some nobles were in favour of Barbek Shah's accession. Barbek, on his part, declared his independence. This was a golden opportunity for Husain Sharqi to divert the attention of Barbek towards Delhi and consolidate his own position at Jaunpur. Sikandar Lodi, however, dealt with the situation firmly; and having suppressed Barbek's rebellion, he deemed it more politic to entrust Jaunpur again to Barbek.

Though Husain had been ousted from Jaunpur and the Sharqi power had been smashed, the attachment of zamindars and chieftains of the area to Husain was such that he did not give up the hope of regaining his throne for many years, in fact till the very end of his life. One of the most powerful Rajput chiefs, who supported Husain by creating disturbed conditions in the areas under the Lodi control, was Juga, a Bachgoti Rajput.⁶² After giving considerable trouble to Barbek Shah and Sikandar Lodi, he fled to Sultan Husain and joined him at the fort of Jaund. Sikandar sent a message to Husain asking him either to deliver Juga to him or to punish him on his behalf. Husain's reply was as follows: 'Juga is my servant. Your father was a (mere) soldier with whom I was measuring swords. To me you are but a silly child. If you talk nonsense, I will belabour you with my shoes—not with my sword.'⁶³ Sikandar was left with no alternative but to march against Husain. The armies met at Kathgarh in 1492.

⁶¹ Chunar lies on the right bank of the Ganges in the Mirzapur district.

⁶² *Waqiat-i Mushtaqi; Tarikh-i Da'udi*.

⁶³ *Ibid.*

Husain was badly defeated; he had to fly to Bihar⁶⁴ but continued to hold Chunar, Cherand and Bihar for some time.

When Sikandar left Jaunpur, the local chiefs again rose against Barbek and ousted him from Jaunpur. Sikandar interpreted this as the incompetence of Barbek and had him arrested.

Sikandar was convinced that so long as Husain was in Bihar, there could be no peace in Jaunpur. So he turned to Husain's strongholds. At his order Chunar was besieged by Mubarak Khan. The Sharqi governor of the fort sought assistance from Husain, who sent a Rajput chief to help him. In the battle fought at Chunar in 1493, the forces of Sikandar were defeated and Mubarak Khan was taken prisoner.

Sikandar next marched in person against the fort of Chunar but failed to achieve anything. He then turned to Raja Bhid of Bhattah, who had Mubarak Khan in his prison. The Raja got panicky, liberated Mubarak and fled to Husain. In 1494 Sikandar again marched against Raja Bhid and defeated him.

Sikandar then turned his attention towards Phapund, which was a dependency of Bhattah. Lack of provisions, bad means of transport and bad roads caused great hardships to his army. According to Nizamuddin Bakhshi, ninety per cent of his horses were lost.⁶⁵ The supporters and sympathizers of Husain sent messages to him, advising him to make a bid to regain his lost kingdom. Sultan Husain set out immediately and was joined in the way by Rajput chiefs and others. Sultan Sikandar met the forces of Sultan Husain 36 miles away from Banaras in 1494; a fierce battle took place and Husain was defeated completely. He fled towards the country of Bhattah⁶⁶ but Sikandar followed in pursuit. Reduced to a position of extreme helplessness, Husain left Malik Kandu in the fort of Bihar and proceeded in person to Colgong,⁶⁷ a dependency of Lakhnauti. The King of Lakhnauti, Sultan Alauddin Husain Shah (1493-1518), received him cordially,⁶⁸ provided him with all comforts and assigned the pargana of Colgong to him. He was even permitted to issue his own currency.⁶⁹

Sikandar sent a detachment against Malik Kandu, who left the fort and fled in 901/1495. The fort was captured and Mubarak Khan

⁶⁴ *Tarikh-i Da'udi*, 47.

⁶⁵ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 318-19.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 319.

⁶⁷ In the Bhagalpur district of Bihar.

⁶⁸ A daughter of Alauddin Husain Shah was already married to Jalal Khan, son of Sultan Husain Sharqi.

⁶⁹ *Afsana-i Shahan*, f. 29b.

Nuhani was entrusted with the duty of garrisoning it. Sikandar next decided to deal with the king of Bengal, who had given asylum to the Sharqi ruler. He captured many frontier places of importance and consolidated his position in such a way that Alauddin Husain Shah could not help challenging his activities. He sent an army under his son, Daniyal, to deal with the Lodi Sultan. Sikandar sent Mahmud Khan Lodi and Mubarak Khan Nuhani against him. The two armies met at Barh, a town in the Patna district; but before an engagement could take place, negotiations were started and both sides agreed to respect the territorial integrity of the other and not to give asylum to each other's enemies.⁷⁰

Sikandar returned to Jaunpur and stayed there for six months. He destroyed all the Sharqi buildings and monuments, palaces, gardens, etc. He would have even destroyed the mosques built by the Sharqi rulers but the protest of the *ulama* prevented him from going that far.

Sultan Husain was deeply distressed at the way the Sharqi power was being liquidated by the Afghan rulers. He thought of making one more effort to recapture the throne before it was too late. Alauddin Husain, the ruler of Bengal, advised him to defer military action, but in 1500 Husain dashed forward, reached Bihar and besieged the fort.⁷¹ Darya Khan, the Afghan governor, shut himself up in the fort and sought help from Sultan Sikandar. This last siege was pressed forward by Sultan Husain with great courage and determination. He got the moat of the fort cleared of all water in one night.⁷² But the arrival of a division of 9,000 horsemen to reinforce Darya Khan's army made Husain's position precarious, and he was obliged to return in frustration to Colgong. A completely broken and frustrated man, Sultan Husain Sharqi breathed his last at Colgong in 911/1505.⁷³ With him the last vestige of Sharqi dynasty disappeared.

Despite many shortcomings of character, Husain was a remarkable man. His tenacity of purpose and his refusal to take any defeat as final raised his stature head and shoulders above many contemporary Indian princes. He left no stone unturned to recapture his lost power and prestige. The way in which he succeeded in winning the active and loyal cooperation of a large number of Hindu zamindars and chieftains shows that his administration had left a very

⁷⁰ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 320.

⁷¹ *Waqiat-i Mushtaqi; Afsana-i Shahan*.

⁷² *Waqiat-i Mushtaqi*.

⁷³ Numismatic evidence shows that he issued coins until his death (911/1405). *Numismatic Supplement* (36) to *JASB*, 1922, No. 35.

favourable impression on the minds of the people and he had succeeded in a remarkable way in winning regional loyalties. The Sharqi kingdom had so closely identified itself with the people and problems of the region that its fall did not go unlamented by the people. In fact the protracted fight that Husain could give to Bahlul and Sikandar was only made possible by the loyalty of his people. Sultan Husain was a highly cultured prince, interested in fine arts, poetry, music, etc.

CHAPTER NINE

KASHMIR (1320-1586)

I. SULTANS OF THE KASHMIR STATE (1320-1461)

'ABOUT TWO THOUSAND YEARS or more ago', writes Kashmir's greatest son,¹ 'Kashmir was a great Buddhist centre and some of the famous Buddhist councils were held there. From then onwards it continued to be one of the principal centres of Sanskrit learning. About a thousand years ago, Arab and Persian influences first affected Kashmir and later, under Muslim rule, Persian became the recognized official language. Thus Kashmir experienced successively, and sometimes together, Buddhist, Hindu and Muslim influences, creating a mixed but harmonized culture which is so evident even today in Kashmir.'

The independent medieval state of Kashmir consisted of the famous valley, to the beauty of which no words can do justice, and of the outer and inner hills comprising of the districts of Ladakh, Baltistan, Gilgit, Kishtwar, Jammu, Rajauri and Poonch. When the central government was strong, it succeeded in controlling the rulers of all these districts, but when it was weak some or all of these districts slipped out of its hands.

The middle ages for Kashmir begin with the Mongol invasion of 1320, but to understand the period properly some information given to us by Albairuni and Kalhana has to be borne in mind.

Sultan Mahmud had twice, in 1015 and 1021, unsuccessfully attempted to reach Kashmir, and Albairuni, writing some time before 1030 observes in his well-known *India (Kitabul Hind)*: 'This town (Varanasi) and Kashmir are the high schools of Hindu sciences² . . . Not long before our time, Vasukra, a native of Kashmir, a famous Brahman, has of his own account undertaken the task of explaining the Veda and committing it to writing. He has taken upon himself a task from which everybody else would have recoiled because he was afraid that the Veda might be forgotten and entirely vanish out of

1 Shri Jawaharlal Nehru: *Foreword* to Shri P. M. Kaul Bamzai's *History of Kashmir*, Metropolitan Book Co. (Private) Ltd., Delhi, 1962.

2 Albairuni, *India* (Sachau's translation), Vol. I, 173.

the memories of men³. . . The inhabitants of Kashmir are pedestrians, they have no riding animals or elephants. The nobles among them ride in palanquins, called *Katts*, carried on the shoulders of men. They are particularly anxious about the natural strength of their country, and therefore take always much care to keep a strong hold upon the entrances and roads leading to it. In consequence it is very difficult to have any commerce with them. In former times they used to allow one or two foreigners to enter their country, particularly Jews, but at present they do not allow any Hindu whom they do not know personally to enter, much less other people.⁴

The southern passes to India remained closed till the time of the Lodis and the classical histories of the Delhi sultanat make no reference to Kashmir. But the western pass *via* Baramulla, Pakhli and Swat could not be closed; this route, as Haidar Malik remarks,⁵ one could cross on horse-back even in the midst of winter snow and rain. Across this path the Kashmir rajas got some Turkish mercenaries for their army and a small number of other Muslim immigrants also seem to have come before 1320.

Kalhana's *Rajtarangini* gives us the curious account of a Hindu king of Kashmir, Harsa-deva (1089-1101), who plundered the religious endowments of the country and pulled down and insulted the images of the gods. Harsa-deva, first incited by a courtier, plundered the temple of Bhimakeseva and found a great treasure. 'And he reflected', says Kalhana, whose father had been a very loyal minister of Harsa, 'upon what riches there might be in other wealthy temples, when there was such wealth in this deserted shrine. The members of the local Purohita corporation then induced the king by a solemn fast (*praya*) to grant (them) in compensation exemption from the forced carriage of loads (*rudha bharodhi*) . . . Then the greedy-minded (king) plundered from all temples the wonderful treasures which former kings had bestowed there. In order to get hold of the statues of gods, too, when the treasures (of the temples) had been carried off, he appointed Udayaraja "prefect for the overthrow of divine images" (*devotpatananayaka*). In order to defile the statues of the gods, he had excrements and urine poured over their faces by naked mendicants whose noses, feet and hands had rotted away. Divine images made of gold, silver and other (materials) rolled about even on the roads, which were covered with night soil, as (if they were) logs of wood. Crippled naked mendicants and the like covered the images

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 126.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 26.

⁵ Haidar Malik: *Tarikh-i Kashmir*, f. 98, (India Office Library (E 510 = I.O. 1100). Rotograph in the history department of the Aligarh Muslim University).

of the gods, which were dragged along by ropes round their ankles, with spittings instead of flowers. There was not one temple in a village, town or in the city which was not despoiled of its images by that *Turushka*, King Harsa. Only two chief divine images were respected by him, the illustrious Rapaswamin in the city, and Martanda (among the images) in townships. Among colossal images, two statues of Buddha were saved through requests addressed by chance to the king at a time when he was free with his favours, namely the one at Parihasapura by the singer, Kanata, who was born there, and the other in the city by the Sranana Kulasari.⁶

'Shame, shame', continues Kalhana, 'when royal servants know nothing but time-serving. (It was due to this) that even the minister Gauraka, though a respectable man, old as he was, accepted upon the king's order the office of "prefect of property" (*arthanayaka*) (and with it) the function of plundering the property of all temples and villages. Sahelaka, of the Purohita corporation (*parsada*) at the temple of Samaraswamin, who as the adviser of Vijayamalla had been hateful to the king, obtained the position of "prefect of property" by securing a doubled revenue, and having (once) obtained access to the king, became in time Mahattama.'

There was no opposition to Harsa's iconoclasm, but when he attacked the *dhammaras* (landlords) they rebelled and killed him. The respect for idols must have disappeared among the lower classes.

In 1286 Simha-deva founded a new dynasty and reigned till 1301; he was succeeded by his brother, Saha-deva, who reigned till the Mongol cataclysm of 1320. The central government under the new dynasty seems to have become extremely weak. But three refugees, whose advent was pregnant for the future, came to Kashmir in the reign of Saha-deva, searching for security and livelihood. First, Rinchan, a Bhauta, revenged the murder of his father, a Ladakh chief, and then fled to the valley for security. He probably brought some soldiers with him and was settled by Ram Chand, the wazir and army-commander of Saha-deva, at Gagangir. From the north, the land of the Darads (Dardistan), came Langar Chak with his family, flying from the vengeance of his uncle's sons. He was settled at the village of Trahagam. Lastly, from Swat or beyond, came Shah Mir (son of Tahir Shah, son of Wuqur Shah) with his family. Wuqur Shah may have been a mystic of the order (*silsilah*) founded by Shaikh Abdul Qadir Jilani. Saha-deva gave Shah Mir a village in Baramulla for his livelihood.

⁶ Dr. M. A. Stein: Translation of Kalhana's *Rajtarangini*, Book VII, verses 1087 to 1098 (352 & 353), Vol. I, reprinted by Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi, Patna, Banaras.

In 1320 the Mongols invaded the valley, coming by the western pass, and Saha-deva and his government were taken quite unawares. Jonaraja says that Dalucha,⁷ the Mongol leader, was 'the commander-in-chief of the king of Karmasina (Khwarazm)'. Haidar Malik says that he came from Turkistan. In any case he was a prince or a high officer of the vanishing Chaghatai-Ogtai Central Asian empire. He lacked the strategy and foresight of the great Chengizi commanders and his reckless attempt to march to India shows that he had no firm footing in his homeland.

Both Haidar Malik and the anonymous author of the *Baharistan-i Shahi* describe the invasion in much the same way, but since the former spoils his narrative by interspersing it with well-known but irrelevant Persian verses, it is better to translate from the *Baharistan-i Shahi*.⁸

'The historians of Kashmir have at no time given account of an event more calamitous and disastrous than the invasion of Dalucha. In the beginning of the spring of 1320 a ruler, named Dalucha, came by way of Baramulla with 70,000 Mongolian and Turkish horse and foot, and from there he gave his army an order for the massacre of the people. From the confines of Kamraj to the end of Maraj they killed every one they could find. Persons, who had fled to the hills and forests from their comfortable houses, were pursued and captured. The men were killed; the women and children were reduced to slavery and sold to the merchants of Khita (Turkistan), whom the invaders had brought with them. All houses in the cities and villages were burnt. They ate as much of the corn and rice as they could; whatever was left they burnt and destroyed. In this way the whole of the Kashmir valley was trampled under foot.'

The wretched government of Kashmir offered no resistance to the Mongols either at the Baramulla pass or in the valley. Saha-deva may, as Jonaraja tells us, have attempted to bribe the invader, but his attempt proved ineffectual and he fled to Kishtwar with a few followers. Ram Chand, whose military duty it was to protect the valley, took refuge in the fort of Gagangir in the Lar district. The reputation of both the king and the commander vanished.

⁷ Jonaraja (Text), 142-65; Abul Fazl calls him Dalju (*Ain*, text, Blochmann's edition, III, 582). Whatever the original, Dalucha is the accepted Kashmiri form of the Mongol leader's name. Jonaraja (Dutt, 14-15) gives the correct date as 1320. Haidar Malik and the *Baharistan-i Shahi* are incorrect about the date of Dalucha's invasion. It is useless recording the many ways in which Dalucha's name has been written.

⁸ The *Baharistan-i Shahi*, author not known, India Office Library manuscript, E. 509 (I.O. 943); rotograph in the history department of the Aligarh Muslim University. The invasion of Dalucha is described in pages 15 to 20 by the *Baharistan-i Shahi* and in folios 95 to 99 by Haidar Malik.

'Meanwhile the invading army continued its policy of killing the inhabitants and destroying their property. No one had the courage to come out of his hiding place in the hills and forests; there could be no question of any villager being able to cultivate his field. The corn produced in the previous years was eaten up or burnt. During the eight months the invaders remained in Kashmir, they were reckless in killing the ra'yyat and shedding their blood. But with the advent of winter they grew afraid of the increasing cold and famine.' Haidar Malik says it was stupid of Dalucha not to have left Kashmir by the passable route by which he had come. But after the failure of many Mongol invasions of northern India, the political condition of the Delhi empire was at last tempting. Mubarak Shah had been assassinated on 9 July 1320, and Khusrau Khan had mounted a very precarious throne.⁹ It seemed the most appropriate time for a Mongol invasion. The news that Tughluq Shah had ascended the throne on 6 September 1320 could not have reached Dalucha in time. He marched by the route leading to Delhi by the Banihal pass. But a severe snow-storm overtook him, and the Mongols along with their captives and slave-merchants perished to the last man.

The whole society of the Kashmir valley had now to be rebuilt from its foundations. The negative decision was made by Dawa-swami and the positive step was taken by Rinchan.

'After the departure of the Mongols and Turks', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* continues, 'the surviving Kashmiris came out of their hiding places and went to their former abodes in the hope of finding some relatives or kinsmen alive. But they discovered that the whole country had been devastated; they could find no acquaintances, friends or relations, and such sadness, fear and gloom overpowered their hearts that they were inclined to prefer death to life. For years and years the cultivatable lands lay desolate; and even now, after the passage of 270 years, if a piece of land lies uncultivated, people say that Dalucha must have passed that way. Add to it, when the inhabitants of the distant hills saw the desolation of the valley, they began to attack the Kashmiris in their distress and seized their women and children. Under these circumstances in every pargana forty or fifty villages combined to accept one man as their chief and collected all possible military equipment to protect their families and property. Slowly in all parganas forts were also constructed in charge of kotwals, who claimed independence and were not prepared to obey

⁹ Khusrau in his *Tughluq Nama* gives I Jamadi II A.H. 720, as the night during which Mubarak Shah was murdered (verses 345-46) and I Sha'ban 720 (forenoon) as the day on which Ghiyasuddin Tughluq ascended the throne (verse 2599).

each other. In the pargana of Lar, Rinchan also collected his forces.'

Though the skeleton of a central government was immediately established and these kotwals or kota-rajas (castle-chiefs) recognized the ruler of Srinagar as their head and sent him occasional presents, yet the government of Srinagar did not control them. 'Till the time of Sultan Shihabuddin, there was no ruler in Kashmir with real authority.'

RINCHAN 'SADRUDDIN' (1320-23)

It is not difficult to visualize the conditions in the valley in the autumn of 1320. Though a thin stream of Muslim immigrants, Turkish and non-Turkish, had trickled into the valley, yet while adhering to their religious observances, they had adopted the dress, customs and manners of the country. No Muslim scholars (*ulama*) had been attracted to the country. The Brahmans of the valley had saved themselves and their caste by flight; men of their caste in the surrounding hill-tracts had also remained safe. But 'caste Hinduism' in the valley lay in ruins, for its basic law—the law of marriage—had been violated by men and women who had mated during the Mongol catalysm and later according to their passions, convenience, ambitions but primarily owing to necessity; and this gave rise to a homogeneous, casteless society. The future history of Kashmir will be unintelligible to anyone who fails to comprehend this basic fact. The Kashmir chronicles do not refer to Rajput or Kshattriyas as a governing class or to any caste whatsoever; Kashmir society after Dalucha consisted only of Brahmans and the non-caste masses, who lived according to their customs and traditions.

Shah Mir had carefully bettered his position by friendship and marriage alliances with the leading families of Kashmir. He accepted their daughters and gave them the daughters of his own family in marriage. He seems to have become a man of considerable importance before Dalucha's invasion. But his friend, Rinchan, who was descended from a princely family, had higher ambitions. With the help of his Bhautas, he suddenly attacked his former patron, Ram Chand, now living a futile life in his castle of Gagangir, slew him and proclaimed himself king on 6 October 1320. But such a claim by a non-Kashmiri was meaningless unless he obtained a status in the land and endeared himself to the people. Rinchan prevailed upon Kota Rani, the ambitious and competent but distressed daughter of Ram Chand, to marry him according to some ceremony not sanctioned by the *Manusmriti*. He also won over her brother, Rawan Chand, and gave him the title of 'Raina' with the command of the army and the governorship of

Lar.¹⁰ Thus he healed the wounds of Ram Chand's family. He also appointed Shah Mir as his wazir. Then he fell upon the turbulent tribe of Lavanyas, who had been guilty of disloyalty for some centuries. Saha-deva thought he could come again to rule over the country he had not even attempted to defend, but he was easily driven back. Rinchan did his best to prove himself a good king by his administration. 'Since there was no one at the time to decide cases in accordance with the Muslim *shari'at*', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* remarks, 'Rinchan decided all matters according to his intelligence, intuition, discernment and wisdom.' Cases showing Rinchan's wisdom are duly recorded.

The controversial problem about Rinchan is his religion. Our Persian authorities are correct in stating that 'Rinchan did not belong to any religion or creed known in Kashmir', but in portraying him as a student of comparative religions, to whom the leaders of every creed showed its good points and who made a free choice, they are forgetting the conservative character of medieval Hinduism. His first inclination was to Hinduism, the traditional creed of his wife and of the overwhelming majority of his subjects. But the prevailing Hindu school was Saivism, which had received a unique development in Kashmir, and Dawaswami, the leader of Saivism, refused to admit Rinchan as a respectable member in the Hindu fold as he was a Bhauta by birth. Rinchan was thus literally kicked into Islam.

Under these circumstances his friend, Shah Mir, found him a Muslim mystic, Bulbul Shah (or Bilal Shah), who taught him the elements of the Muslim faith and prayer through an interpreter and gave him the name of 'Sadrudin'. Kota Rani remained his wife, without accepting his creed. Rinchan's conversion was a purely personal affair, and did not mean the establishment of the Muslim ways of life even in the royal family. But it gave Islam a status in the country. Rinchan did the little that was possible under the circumstances for his new creed. He founded Rinchanapura, a quarter in Srinagar, after his own name. He built the first mosque, popularly remembered as the 'Bud Musjid', on the site traditionally associated with a great Buddhist shrine. He also built a mosque and a *langar khana* (public charity kitchen) in a quarter of Srinagar, which became known as 'Bulbul Langar', to commemorate the name of Bulbul Shah, his *pir* (religious teacher), to posterity. Bulbul Shah gave to Rinchan's only son, born to him from his Hindu wife, Kota Rani, the name of

10 'Raina' in Kashmiri (according to the *Baharistan-i Shahi*) means 'lord', 'master', etc. It is not to be equated with the Indian term, *Rana*. It is believed that the Rainas of later days were the descendants of Rawan Chand.

Haidar, and Rinchan entrusted him to Shah Mir to be brought up as a Muslim.¹¹

All these measures led to discontent against Rinchan, particularly his stern justice. People rose in revolt under the leadership of Udayana-deva, a cousin of Saha-deva, and in the struggle that followed Rinchan received fatal injuries and succumbed to them in November, 1323.¹²

UDAYANA-DEVA (1323-39)

Rinchan's death let loose three factions to struggle for power. They were the royalists, the kota-rajās and the followers of Kota Rani. In this triangular contest Shah Mir was the centre of gravity. As an astute diplomat, he clearly realized that it was too early for him to seize the throne. But to win popularity, he proclaimed Udayana-deva as king and arranged his marriage with Kota Rani. It was a workable arrangement. Udayana-deva, after marrying the widow of a Musalman, was content to remain the formal head of the state and devoted himself to his prayers and religious rites, while real power was exercised by his wife. Kota Rani was remarkably clever. She feared Shah Mir and to put him off his guard, and to separate him from his sons, Jamshed and Ali Sher, she appointed them governors of two districts in Kamraj (Baramulla). Then she appointed Bhatta Bhikshana, a Brahman of admitted diplomatic and military talents, as her wazir and commander-in-chief. Unfortunately, however, destiny did not work in her favour. For while she was slowly attempting to restore Hinduism, Kashmir was again invaded by the Mongols under a leader, locally mentioned as Achala. The pig-headed and cowardly Udayana-deva fled towards Ladakh at the first sight of the enemy, leaving his Rani to face the situation alone. Luckily Kota Rani proved equal to the occasion. She joined hands with Shah Mir, appealed to all the kota-rajās for such assistance as they could provide, drove out the invader and then recalled Raja Udayana-deva.

But the restoration of the Raja only brought misery to the country. While his timid conduct had made him very unpopular, Shah Mir's exertions against the Mongols had won him immense popularity. This was a golden opportunity for Shah Mir, and now he made no secret of his future plans. He fortified himself on the Chakdar Karewa; and as a rehearsal of the drama he was meditating to stage, he set up Haidar, the minor son of Rinchan Shah, against the government of his

¹¹ Jonaraja (text), 247; Jonaraja (Dutt), 21-22.

¹² According to Jonaraja, Rinchan died on the 11th lunar day of the month of *Pausa* in the Laukika year 4399 after a reign of three years, one month and 19 days (Jonaraja, Dutt, 33). This gives 25 November 1323 as the date of his death and 6 October 1320 as the date of his accession.

mother, Kota Rani. Raja Udayana-deva died in February 1339, after a nominal reign of fifteen years.¹³

KOTA RANI (1339)

Left alone, Kota Rani could only fortify herself in the castle of Indarkot. Here she proclaimed herself sovereign with the support of her capable minister, Bhatta Bhikshana. This was an open challenge to Shah Mir, who knew that in Bhatta Bhikshana he had a formidable rival. 'So taking leave of Kota Rani, he took up his residence in Srinagar, won over the leaders of the city and the country to his side, murdered Bhatta Bhikshana by a trick, and then besieged Kota Rani in Indarkot and compelled her to marry him.' Kota Rani, according to the Persian histories of Kashmir, stabbed herself to death in the bed-chamber of Shah Mir, where she had come decked as a bride. She had reigned for five months.¹⁴

SULTAN SHAMSUDDIN (1338-42)

It is useless inquiring into the ancestry of Shah Mir, for our authorities are vague about it. He ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Shamsuddin and tried to establish his state on the principles of justice and equity. He fixed the revenue of the land at one-sixth of the gross produce. Then he prepared plans for the destruction of the turbulent tribe of the Lavanyas (modern Lons), who had been a constant source of danger to the internal peace of the country, and raised a standing army from the two martial tribes of Magres and Chaks. He died in July-August 1342 and lies buried in Indarkot (Sumbal).¹⁵

JAMSHED (1342-44)

Shah Mir was succeeded by his elder son, Jamshed. But he could not get on well with his brother, Ali Sher, and the result was a war of succession. The issue was decided when Siraj, the disloyal wazir, deserted to Ali Sher. Jamshed was defeated and killed in 1344.

SULTAN ALAUDDIN (1344-56)

Ali Sher ascended the throne with the title of Sultan Alauddin. He was energetic and hardy, and vigorously combated the great famine of 1344.¹⁶ He transferred his capital from Indarkot to Alauddinpur (Srinagar), and enacted a law under which a childless widow or a

¹³ Jonaraja (Dutt), 28.

¹⁴ *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 30; Haidar Malik, f. 106.

¹⁵ Sumbal is identified with ancient Jayapur (Indarkot), Bates, *Gazetteer*, 375. A tomb ascribed to Shah Mir can still be seen there.

¹⁶ Jonaraja (Dutt), 37.

a woman of loose character could not inherit the property of her husband. The need of such a law is a clear indication of the lax morals of the age. He died in 1356 after a peaceful reign of over 12 years.

SULTAN SHIHABUDDIN (1356-74)

Known in his childhood as *Shirashamak* (the great milk drinker), Shihabuddin, son of Alauddin, was the real founder of the sultanat of Kashmir. 'No such conquering sultan has ascended the Srinagar throne.' The *Baharistan-i Shahi* quotes a history in the Kashmiri language, *Tarikh-i Bihi*, to the effect that if it recounted all the heroic deeds and conquests of the Sultan, people would not believe it. This admission was necessary for it is impossible to accept many conquests attributed to Shihabuddin by Kashmiri Muslim chroniclers. Nevertheless, there is a core of truth in their statements. Malik Chand and Auzni Raina, a descendant of Rawan Chand, were his great commanders. The kota-rajās, who had developed their power after Dalucha's invasion and behaved like independent chiefs, were Shihabuddin's first objective.

'First he put in order the parganas of Kashmir and in a short time the whole of the valley was reduced to complete subjection. He put to death some of the pargana-chiefs and the rest were brought under control. Then marching out with a small army, he conquered Pakhli and Swat-gir and also reduced the Khokars to obedience. . . Then he proceeded to the hill-tracts of Balura, Gilgit and the land of the Dards (Dardistan). Next he decided to conquer Ladakh.'

Ladakh was then in the hands of the king of Kashghar, but Shihabuddin, whose army was smaller, nevertheless won a victory over the Kashghari Mongols after a hard-fought battle. 'The victorious Shihabuddin then proceeded by way of Ladakh to Nagarkot and reduced that place and its environments to subjection. Malik Chand was sent against Kishtwar and he conquered the whole of that hill-tract till Jammu. It was Shihabuddin's practice that when he conquered a city, he enlisted and took with him all the good warriors of the place. He had always excellent horses and reliable warriors with him.' Thus the valley was brought under direct administration and the inner and outer hills within the general control of the state. Most of the nineteen years of Shihabuddin's reign were devoted to these conquests, though he came to Srinagar off and on.¹⁷

Shihabuddin must have reconstructed the administration of the

¹⁷ For the conquests of Shihabuddin, see the *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 33-39 and Haidar Malik, ff. 108-9.

It is impossible to accept the statements of the two authors that Shihabuddin conquered the following places—Multan, Kabul, Lamaghan (or Laghman) and Badakhshan;

valley and put his relations with the chiefs of the outlying districts on some permanent basis. 'Udshah Rawal (or Udayshari) was the king's adviser and the collection of the revenues of Kashmir was assigned to him. It was he who decreed that the *hanjis* (boatmen) should serve the king without wages for a week every month; this decree was cancelled by Sultan Ali Shah. But he made many other laws and most of them have survived till today.'

In 1361 Kashmir was visited by a disastrous flood, which caused immense damage to crops and swept away all that came in its way. The Sultan employed all his resources to reconstruct the country as a whole. He transferred his capital to the elevated slopes around the Hari Parbat hillock, where he founded the new town of Sharikapura. Then he founded the town of Shihabuddinpur at the confluence of the Jhelum and the Sind rivers, and shaded it with chinar trees.

The Persian chroniclers of Kashmir describe the Sultan as a bigoted Muslim and an iconoclast. But Nizamuddin and Abul Fazl state that he encouraged learning and established one law for all his subjects. In all likelihood, Kashmiri Muslim historians have drawn incorrect conclusions from Jonaraja's account of the Sultan's treatment of his rebellious subjects. Secondly, they seem to have drawn a hurried conclusion from his proposal to demolish the Hindu temples at Avantipur. On the other hand, there is ample evidence to support the view that the Sultan was a patron of Hindu religion, an upright ruler with no religious prejudices.¹⁸

But in the last years of his life he became a prey to sensuality, incited by the attractive and charming niece of his queen. At her instance he exiled his two minor sons as well as the queen, and nominated Hindal, his brother, as heir to the throne. Before long, however, he regretted his conduct, and died a broken-hearted man in May-June 1374.

SULTAN QUTBUDDIN (1374-89)

Immediately after the death of Shihabuddin, Hindal ascended the throne with the title of Qutbuddin. He was a well-meaning ruler. He gained a great popularity in the early years of his reign by taking a personal interest in the affairs of the state and the welfare of his subjects. He recalled Hasan Khan, the eldest son of Sultan Shihab-

or that he marched with 50,000 horse and 50,000 foot against Firuz Shah Tughluq, and that, since it was decided to prefer a negotiated settlement, Sirhind was fixed as the boundary between the Delhi sultanat and the Kashmir kingdom.

¹⁸ Some three decades ago the Kashmir Archaeological Department excavated a stone-slab at the temple-spring of Kuthier (Anantnag). According to the inscription on the slab, the repairs to this temple were executed in the reign of Sultan Shihabuddin.

uddin, from exile and nominated him heir to the throne. Then he sent his army against Punch. It was victorious and regained the prestige which Kashmir had lost during the last years of Shihabuddin's reign. Unfortunately Hasan Khan's impatience transcended his gratitude to the king, and he allowed himself to be made a tool by political schemers, who conspired against the Sultan. But the plot leaked out and the prince and his chief supporter, Udayshari, the capable minister of Shihabuddin, were put to death. The Sultan built Qutbuddinpur (apparently a new quarter in Srinagar) and in it he constructed a palace such as his predecessors had not possessed except at Indarkot; to the east of the city he built a mausoleum and planned a graveyard in which many *durweshes* and mystics lie buried. He died in 1389, after having reigned for over fifteen years.¹⁹

It is impossible to say how and when the non-Brahman inhabitants of Kashmir became Musalmans. It was, according to such evidence as we can collect, a slow, gradual and unconscious process. The stage which Islam had reached in this reign is thus described by the *Baharistan-i Shahi*: 'Though Sultan Qutbuddin was a Muslim, there was not in Kashmir any (Muslim) scholar or man of learning devoted to truth to teach the laws of the *shari'at* without hypocrisy; the qazis of the day were quite heedless of the difference between "acts commanded" and "acts forbidden". The Sultan himself, owing to ignorance of Islamic laws, had married two uterine sisters. . . And since the majority of the people at that time were non-Muslims (*mushriks* and *kafirs*)²⁰ and non-Muslim customs prevailed and were enforced in the land, Sultan Qutbuddin also wore the robe and dress of non-Muslims (*kafirs*).'²¹

The conquering career of Timur has been described in a previous chapter. In the regions devastated by him, Timur was very considerate of the Saiyyids, provided they transferred to him the right of governing the Musalmans which they had (so he claimed) inherited from the Prophet. But Saiyyids, who insisted on continuing their local government against his imperialistic power, like the Saiyyids of Hamadan and Subzwar (Baihaq), had to find refuge from him somewhere. The Baihaqi Saiyyids first migrated to India and then came to Kashmir. Saiyyid Ali Hamadani (popularly known as *Shah-i Hamadan* and also as *Ali-i Sani* or the Second Ali and *Amir-i Kabir*) first came to Kashmir, probably in September 1372, and stayed for four months;

19 B.S., 40-41; Jonaraja (Dutt), 54.

20 A *mushrik* is a man who sets partners to God; a *kafir* is a man who is ungrateful to God for His favours. The author could have used the term, Hindu, but he apparently prefers to restrict that term to the Brahmins.

21 B.S., 41-42.

he came for a second time in 1379 and stayed for two and a half years; he came for a third time in 1383 but left after a year. This is not the place to examine the record of that distinguished Saiyyid and mystic. His greatest book, the *Zakhiratul Muluk* (*Treasury of Kings*) has been printed. It shows that the author was a Sunni mystic of the orthodox school of Shaikh Alauddaulah Samnani, which is well-known for its reactionary slant. But it hardly adds anything to our knowledge of higher mysticism.

The Sultan did what he could for his very distinguished visitor. He divorced one of his wives, and re-married her sister, Sura, who bore him two sons, Sikandar and Haibat, after her second and legal marriage. The Saiyyid used to live in an inn and held his congregational prayers on a platform he had built by destroying a temple. The Sultan occasionally came to these prayers. At the Saiyyid's order the Sultan put on Muslim (i.e. Persian) dress and the Saiyyid gave him a skull-cap, which the Sultan and his successors up to Fath Shah used to wear under their turbans and which was buried in Fath Shah's grave. Nevertheless, the Sultan and the Saiyyid could not pull on together. Qutbuddin was prepared to obey the orders given to him personally or to his family, but he was not prepared to change the policy of the state overnight at the Saiyyid's command. In any case he could not make Kashmir a Central Asian country, and nothing less than that would satisfy the great Saiyyid. 'As Sultan Qutbuddin could not establish the grandeur of Islam and the enforcement of the *shari'at* in accordance with the wishes of His Holiness, the mind of His Holiness could not reconcile itself to making this country his permanent abode.'²² He died on the way and his disciples took his body for burial to Khatlan. Tradition says that the Saiyyid often met Lalisari, or Lal Ded of the Kashmiris, a Brahman *yogini* (female saint) of a very high order, and had discussions with her. Her *vakyas* are a rapprochement between Vedantism and Sufism. The Saiyyid's influence may have been a contributory element to her outright denunciation of idolatry.²³

SULTAN SIKANDAR (1389-1413)

During the minority of Sikandar (1389-93), his mother acted as his regent. She was assisted by two influential ministers, Rai Madari

²² B.S., 41-42. It might be added that the Khanqah-i Mualla, now known after the Saiyyid, was constructed in later days. Also one Laddi Magre brought his group into prominence by serving the Saiyyid with such devotion that he was appointed the Saiyyid's 'standard-bearer'.

²³ For Lalisari's life and thought, see Grierson and Barneth, *Lallavakyani*; Temple, *Lalla*; also *Indian Antiquary*, 1921, 300 *et seq.*

and Sahaka. She was a strong and energetic woman with plenty of political sagacity; but she was inordinately greedy of power, often acted very cruelly and according to her personal judgement, and tolerated no challenge to her authority from any quarter. This is proved by the punishment she meted out to her own daughter and son-in-law, who contested the claim of Sikandar to the throne; they were both put to death. Then encouraged by Rai Madari, her chief adviser, she administered poison to prince Haibat Khan; and this made Rai Madari so bold that he aimed at the life of the Sultan himself. But Sikandar gave him no chance; supported by the Baihaqi Saiyyids, he overthrew his mother's regency in 1393, and got the *Khutba* read and the coins minted in his own name.

Sikandar had been personally in charge of the government for some six years at the time of Timur's invasion of India and his relations with that atrocious conqueror can only be understood if two facts are kept in mind. First, Sikandar must have known through the anti-Timurid elements at his court that it was Timur's policy to annihilate all independent Muslim rulers within his reach to ensure the permanence of his far-flung dynastic empire. Secondly, that even the officers of Timur were ignorant of the fact that, before reaching Jammu, he had received secret reports of grave disturbances in the eastern part of his empire and had decided to leave his army behind and to proceed to Samarkand as soon as was possible by a constant relay of horses and litter-bearers. Sikandar, anxious to keep Timur out of Kashmir, started to pay his respects to the invader at Jammu. But at Bhimbar Timur's envoys—his grandson, Rustam, with Faulad Bahadur and Zainuddin—met Sikandar and demanded 30,000 horses and 100,000 gold *tankas* of Alauddin Khalji.²⁴ Sikandar sought safety in returning to Srinagar on the ground that he had to arrange for such a heavy tribute. Timur blamed his envoys for asking too much and, since he could not reveal his programme even to his confidential officers, he directed Sikandar to meet him after twenty-eight days on the bank of the Indus. But when Sikandar reached Baramulla, he was informed that Timur had left in great haste.

The controversial question has been Sikandar's religious policy. He had the name of Shankar as a boy and his two wives, who are referred to by historians—Mira and Sobha Devi²⁵—must have been converts from Hinduism. But Sikandar as he grew up developed a pious and puritanic outlook; he never touched wine; and he hated all frivolities from gambling to music.²⁶

²⁴ Ferishta, Persian text, Newal Kishore, Vol. II, 341.

²⁵ B.S., 49.

²⁶ B.S., 50; also see Vogel, *Panjab Hill States*, Vol. I, 127.

It is sometimes said that Sikandar, the 'Idol Breaker', was an aggressive Muslim fanatic, who by his ruthless persecution compelled his Hindu subjects to become Muslim. It is difficult to believe that Sikandar had over his subjects a power greater than Iltutmish or Alauddin Khalji, and neither of these autocrats would have endangered their throne by attempting such a futile and suicidal enterprise. The ideology of the subjects cannot be changed overnight by the order of a king, however strong. In so far as Sikandar went too far in his prohibition of wine, gambling and the detailed suppression of all non-military instruments of music, the pendulum inevitably swung too far to the other side. Says the *Baharistan-i Shahi*: 'After the period of this religious king, tyrannical commands and the instruments of sin, which are the support of *shirk* and *kufr*, revived their (idolatrous) sway. Every day the customs of sin and the ways of the innovators, the religious ideas of *kafirs* and *mushriks* and the habits of the wicked became more prominent and obvious. The ways of the *kafirs* and the *mushriks* attained to even greater glory than they had before.'²⁷ It is true that the revival of Hindu culture by the deliberate and conscious effort of Sultan Zainul Abidin gave to it a stability it had lacked since the invasion of Dalucha. But there were definite changes in the reign of Sikandar and they should be carefully examined and estimated. The main items are as follows:

(1) *Muslim Immigrants:*

Owing to the devastating conquests of Timur, a large number of Muslims came to the valley from Central Asia and Persia. What arrangements were made for the ordinary refugees we do not know. But the *Baharistan-i Shahi* tells us in detail what land-grants and other provisions the Sultan made for distinguished scholars. The Baihaqi Saiyyids of Sabzwar, led by Saiyyid Mahmud Baihaqi, had fought Timur when he invaded Persia, reckless of consequences, and being defeated in battle, they fled to India *via* Mashhad. 'From India they came to Kashmir, but since they were unable to find here any security and stability, they returned to India and settled in the village of Charija near Delhi.'²⁸

The most distinguished visitor in Sikandar's reign was Saiyyid Muhammad Hamadani, son of Saiyyid Ali Hamadani. The Sultan received him very cordially, gave him a generous land-grant and built a *khanqah* for him where the present Dargah-i Mualla stands.²⁹

²⁷ B.S., 48.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 50.

²⁹ The 'Dargah-i Mualla' is also called 'Khanqah-i Shah-i Hamadan'. There is a

The Saiyyid, in his turn, wrote a short treatise (*risala*) on *tasawwuf* for the Sultan to study. Unfortunately another descendant of the Prophet, referred to as Saiyyid Hisari, raised the banner of opposition to him, and Saiyyid Muhammad Hamadani left Kashmir with the Sultan's permission after he had stayed there for about twelve years (1393-1405). The *Baharistan-i Shahi* gives a list of twelve other scholars, who got financial support and land-grants from the Sultan, built their houses and *khanqahs*, and got their mausoleums and graveyards respected by the people.³⁰ When our author wrote in the reign of Jahangir, their descendants were still enjoying these land-grants. The Sultan, in addition to building a palace for himself, also constructed a Juma Mosque at Srinagar. Lastly, he established the office of Shaikhul Islam for supervising and maintaining charitable endowments.

These immigrants gave to Islam in Kashmir a cultural and educational basis it had hitherto lacked. But speaking a foreign language and using a highly developed theological technique, they could in no way have had any immediate effect on the ideology of the masses. They were anxious to build up their own shattered lives and made no attempt to contact the non-Muslims.

(2) *The Shari'at*:

Qazis for the decision of judicial cases had been appointed by the earlier sultans all over the valley. Hitherto they had, apparently, decided all cases according to local customs (*urf*). They were now ordered to enforce the *shari'at*. But the *shari'at*, for medieval Kashmiris as for medieval Indian Muslims, could only mean the enforcement of personal laws—primarily the laws of marriage and inheritance and some other topics like *shifa*. Religious rites and duties cannot be enforced by the qazis. Criminal law, even according to the *mullahs*, had become a part of state law (*zawabit*). The enforcement of the *shari'at* did not mean that Muslim law would override non-Muslim law, but only that in case of litigation between persons of different communities, the law of the defendant would prevail. Even in the sphere of personal laws, custom or *urf* could override the *shari'at* in many matters. Thus where custom has denied to women

copy of the Endowment Deed of the Dargah-i Mualla in the Gracy Museum, Islamia Intermediate College, Etawah, UP.

³⁰ According to our author they seem to have spent their time in writing their books, saying their prayers and building their *khanqahs* (B.S., 57-61). Sikandar's contemporary, the world-famous Persian poet, Hafiz, probably overestimated the knowledge of Persian in Kashmir when he claimed that 'the black-eyed Kashmiris and the Turks of Samargand recite the verses of Hafiz of Shiraz and dance'.

the right of inheritance to property, the *shari'at* has not insisted upon their getting it. It has to be remembered that the qazis were only judges; they could not function without the help of officers, equivalent to the *amir-i dads* of India, who brought cases before them and executed their judgements.

Kashmiri histories do not refer to *amir-i dads*; nor do we hear of officers, generally called *muhatsibs*, to whom the duty of enforcing the Sultan's order for the prohibition of intoxicants, gambling, music, *sati* and the *qashqa* (Hindu foreheadmark) would be assigned. The enforcement of the *shari'at* did not mean the compulsory conversion of the people to Islam. But it did mean the integration of Kashmiri family life according to a uniform law—or, in the alternative, according to a uniform exception to that law.

(3) *Persecution of the Brahmans:*

It was in consonance with the tolerant traditions of the Kashmir sultanat for Sikandar to appoint a Brahman, Suha Bhatt, as his supreme commander and chief adviser, probably after the dismissal of Rai Madari. But Suha Bhatt got himself converted to Islam by Saiyyid Muhammad Hamadani, and he turned bitterly against the group he had forsaken. Ferishta, though a later writer, gives us the most authentic account of what happened.

*'Suha Bhatt strove hard so that the Sultan at his suggestion ordered that all Brahmans and learned Hindus should become Musalmans and those who did not accept Islam should leave the realm (i.e. the valley); the qashqa was not to be put on the forehead; widows were not to be burnt with the corpses of their husbands, and idols of gold and silver were to be melted in the royal mint and the metal used for the currency. Owing to this a great calamity befell the Hindus of the region, who were mostly Brahmans. Many Brahmans, who could not either accept Islam nor leave the country, committed suicide; others left their watan (homeland) and went to foreign countries; and another group, afraid of the Sultan and his wazir, resorted to the principle of taquyya or 'outward conformity' as practised by the Rafizi group (of the Shias) and declared themselves to be Muslims.'*⁸¹

In view of the definite survival of Kashmiri Brahmans, it is

⁸¹ Ferishta, Persian text (N.K.), Vol. II, 341. Two facts are implied here; *first*, that Sikandar's order of expulsion applied exclusively to the valley, which was directly controlled by his government; we have positive evidence of the survival of Hinduism in the inner and outer hills; *secondly*, that very few non-Brahman Hindus had been left in the valley when the persecution began.

probable that the majority of them preferred the last and the wisest alternative, which Muslim sectaries had discovered for evading the persecution of the orthodox. The *Qur'an* is explicit on the point that no inquisition into the inner mind of man can be permitted. If the persecution, as we may safely assume, started after the death of Timur in 1405, the Brahmans were able to return openly to their old creed after some fifteen years of hypocrisy. It is not possible to discover the inner motives of Suha Bhatt, who took the Muslim name of Saifuddin. He may have been a sincere fanatic of an ordinary type or, unable to foresee the future policy of Sultan Zainul Abidin, he may have decided that the best he could do for the preservation of his community was to make it the governing class of the new creed.

(4) *Destruction of Temples and Idols:*

Hindu places of worship during the middle ages were of three types: (a) the *canonical* with Brahman priests, which the lower classes could not enter; (b) the *semi-canonical*, in which animal sacrifices were performed by the lower classes under Brahman supervision; and (c) the innumerable *local* deities, rites and sacrifices, which no one has been able to list, but which the lower classes had developed (or preserved) and which the Brahmans permitted but did not join. Hinduism, of course, included all the three, but it is obvious that with the disappearance of the caste system and the acceptance of the worship of one God—in spite of such old social customs as may have survived—the last two types of places of worship would gradually vanish. Jonaraja, in order to praise Sultan Zainul Abidin for reviving them, blames Sikandar for destroying all Hindu places of worship. The chief temples destroyed were those of Martand, Chakradhar, Tripureshvar, Sureshvar, and two at Avantipore and Paraspor. But we must not over-exaggerate the fact of destruction, for the worshippers had also disappeared.

Mirza Haidar Dughlat, writing in 1543-44, states that there were 150 large temples in Kashmir and gives with reverence an account of their massive structure and their average size; Abul Fazl and Jahangir also praise the temples of Kashmir. But we are not told how many of them were at that time places of actual worship or merely archaeological monuments of man's constructive achievements.

ALI SHAH (1413-20)

Sikandar died in May-June 1413, and was succeeded by his eldest son, Mir Khan, with the title of Sultan Ali Shah. He was a minor and, therefore, Suha Bhatt acted as his regent, suppressed his rivals and continued his policy till his death in 1417. For an unstated reason

Saiyyid Mahmud Baihaqi and his followers left Kashmir for India. Ali Shah appointed Shahi Khan, his younger brother, as his wazir. Shahi Khan disapproved the policy of Suha Bhatt and was very popular. Shortly afterwards the Sultan decided, in spite of every one's advice, to go to Mecca, and left Kashmir after appointing Shahi Khan as his regent. But when he reached Jammu, his father-in-law, Raja Bhimdeva of Jammu, reprimanded him for his quixotic decision and Ali Shah returned to Kashmir with troops supplied by the rajas of Jammu and Rajauri. Shahi Khan wisely left Kashmir in peace and took refuge with Raja Jasrath Khokar at Sialkot in 1419.³² Jasrath espoused his cause with sincerity and vigour, and marched upon Kashmir at the head of his army of brave Khokars in May-June 1420. The armies met at Thana. Ali Shah was defeated and killed and Shahi Khan was proclaimed sultan with the title of Zainul Abidin.

SULTAN ZAINUL ABIDIN (1420-70)

The new Sultan, whom the Kashmiris still call *Bud Shah* or the 'great king', ascended the throne at the age of nineteen and was destined to give his country half a century of peace and to deeply affect every aspect of the life of the countrymen he loved. Zainul Abidin was not a great ruler in the sense Alauddin Khalji or Akbar were great. But students of Islamic history have yet to discover a Muslim king who comes nearer to Plato's conception of the 'good ruler' or 'philosopher-king'. Drastic as some of his measures may seem to us, there can be no doubt that he carried public opinion with him. At least we do not hear of any popular opposition.

(a) *War and the Maintenance of Order:*

The real object of the great king's government was *ra'iyyat parwari*—the welfare of his subjects. But he knew that no government could serve the public unless it had the requisite strength for the maintenance of law and order and the protection of the frontiers. At the same time he was not prepared to degenerate into a whole-time warrior. The Sultan found an appropriate compromise between the two alternatives. First, he had no tolerance for rebels. A group of 'professional mischief-makers' at Nau Shahra, referred to as *kokal tashan*, were severely punished. At a later date his hand fell heavily on Pandu Chak and his group after they had pulled down the Sultan's buildings in Kamraj for a second time; all male Chaks of fighting age were put to death and their women and children were taken from

³² For the life and exploits of Jasrath Khokar, see *JASB*, 1871, 67-101; and *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XXXVI, 1907, 1-9.

their homes at Trahagam and settled at the other end of the valley, where they were destined to multiply. Jasrath Khokar was given an army for his adventure against Delhi in which he came to grief. The Khan of Kashghar invaded Ladakh with a large army. The Sultan marched against him with 25,000 horsemen under his five commanders—Muhammad Magre, Malik Mas'ud Thakur, Hilmat Raina, Ahmad Raina and Saiyyid Mirak Hasan Baihaqi. In spite of the accepted superiority of Mongol tactics, the larger army of Kashghar was signally defeated on the second day of the battle at the village of Yashya in Ladakh. On another occasion the rajas of the west Tibetan regions of Ladakh and Baltistan were defeated at the battle of Shel.³³ The Sultan had nothing to fear from any foreign power, and his military officers were in a position to guarantee both internal security and the safety of the frontiers.

(b) *The Sultan and His Policy:*

All authorities agree in stating that in his personal life Sultan Zainul Abidin was a pious, orthodox and learned Muslim, but unlike his father he was not a puritan. He loved music, dancing and the fine arts and took part in all festivals, whether Hindu or Muslim or merely in celebration of natural phenomena, like the birth of the Jhelum. He was a cultured man and could read and understand Kashmiri, Persian, Sanskrit and, probably, also Arabic. He spent his leisure hours in the study of the *Nilamata-purana*, *Vashishta*, *Gita Govinda* and the practice of the *yoga*.³⁴ At the same time he wrote Persian poetry under the *takhallus* (pen-name) of *Qutb*, and though his volume of verses (*diwan*) seems to have perished, yet the quotations that have survived show a mind deeply inclined to mysticism. In his old age, when tired of his worthless sons, he wrote a short treatise, named *Shikayat* (Complaints), he used to find consolation in hearing both Hindu and Muslim scriptures. We need not be surprised, therefore, that he built up Muslim and Hindu cultures with an equal zeal. On the production-plane he realized that his subjects had only one harvest a year, and that the best he could do for them was

³³ Jonaraja's 'Saya-desa' is the village of Shel, pronounced as She (Jonaraja, Dutt, 84; *Indian Antiquary*, 1908, 188-89). For an account of the reign of Sultan Zainul Abidin see the *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 78-110; and Haidar Malik, folios 115 to 122. 'Though in piety and the maintenance of the traditions of the Prophet', Haidar Malik remarks, 'Zainul Abidin did not equal his father, nevertheless with reference to the building up of the country and looking after the welfare of the subjects (*ra'iyyat parwari*) very few kings like him are referred to in history.' (Folio 116).

³⁴ Jonaraja (Dutt), 50.

to make Kashmiris specialists in the arts and crafts of the age by a careful utilization of the cold, snow-bound months.

Muslim Culture

The grants which his father had made to foreign Muslim scholars were continued, and grants were also made to Muslim scholars who came during his reign. Among those assisted by the Sultan, the *Baharistan-i Shahi* names ten mystics of various types (including one *rishi*, a Hindu-Muslim compound of mysticism peculiar to Kashmir), seven *ulama* and four educated courtiers (*nadims*). But there were lots of others. Saiyyid Mahmud Baihaqi was invited back to Kashmir, but he was poisoned soon by his enemies and he wrote a verse assigning his son, Saiyyid Mirak Hasan, to the Sultan's care. So far as Muslim mystics and scholars were concerned, the *Baharistan-i Shahi* frankly tells us that 'nothing more could be expected and nothing more was desired'.

Hindu Culture

'But this king', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* adds with regret, 'while assisting the scholars and leading men of Islam, also showed the same kindness to the leaders of infidelity and non-Muslim groups. He conferred both glory and popularity on the laws of infidelity and error and on the customs of the idol-worshippers and the ignorant. He reconstructed and rehabilitated all the temples and non-Muslim places of worship, which had been destroyed or pulled down during the reign of the late Sultan Sikandar. He conciliated and brought back many non-Muslims (*kafirs* and *mushriks*), who had fled to Kishtwar and Jammu owing to the strength of Islam; their libraries and sacred books, which they had taken out of this land, were also brought back. The learning of the *kafirs* and the customs of the *mushriks* were revived again, and the Sultan strove for the honour and glory of these erroneous groups. Wherever in a village or by the side of a spring there had been an idol or an infidel ceremony, he insisted on its rehabilitation. Wherever in a city or any other place there had been infidel ceremonies at a specified time, he ordered them to be recommenced with greater zeal and was himself present. He gave so many rewards to dancing-girls, singers and musicians that all the inhabitants of the country, old and young, were contented during his reign³⁵... And gradually the customs of the Hindus and non-Muslims attained to such honour and universality that even Muslim scholars, *ulama*, Saiyyids and qazis of the country followed these

customs without any hesitation; there was no question of anyone keeping away from them or prohibiting them.³⁶

These statements are confused and their purport must not be misunderstood. The conversions of Brahmans to Islam through illegal state force by Suha Bhatt were cancelled by legal state force, and the converts were made Brahmans again. Hindu culture based on the sacred Sanskrit scriptures was revived, and a promise was taken from the Brahmans that they would live according to the canons of their creed. But it was only the Brahman group whom the Sultan could reorganize. As to the non-Brahman Hindu orders—Kshattriyas, Vaishyas and Sudras, with their caste and sub-caste rites, as well as the various Chandala groups, to whom medieval Hinduism did not give a proper human status—they had all vanished into thin air after Dalucha's invasion and medieval Kashmiri histories do not refer to them.

Zainul Abidin had two homogeneous groups—Muslims and Brahmans. Still the Brahmans were sub-divided; Brahmans of Kashmir origin were known as *Malamasis* and Brahmans who came from India were called *Banamasis*; Brahmans, who studied Persian and were eligible for government service, business, etc., were called *Karkuns*, while Brahmans, who clung to their old priestly functions and studied Sanskrit alone, were known as *Bachibhattas*. In consonance with the new policy of the state, the cremation-tax and the *jizia* were abolished, cow-slaughter was prohibited and *sati* was permitted again. Hindus naturally came to occupy high positions. Some of the more distinguished Hindu officers were Tilaka-charya, a Buddhist minister; Sriyabhatta, minister of justice and Hindu rehabilitation and court physician; Jonaraja and his pupil, Srivara, chroniclers; Simhabhatta and Rupabhatta (court astrologers); Yudhabhatta (a Persian scholar and author of *Zainaparakash*); Uttasoma, author of *Jaina-Carita*; and Bhatta-avatara, author of *Jainavilas*.

Patronage of Arts and Crafts

A service even greater than the establishment of religious toleration was the revival of indigenous arts and crafts and the importation

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 109. Ferishta has raised the question. Since apostacy (*irtidad*) or the acceptance of another creed by a Musalman, was, according to the accepted principles of the medieval *shar'at*, a crime punishable with death, why did the *ulama* raise no objection to the reconversion of Brahmans to Hinduism? The opposite question may also be raised—How could Brahmans, who had lost their caste, be re-admitted to their old status in the Hindu fold? The answer is simple. The laws (or *zawabit*) of the state could, when absolutely necessary, override both the *shar'at* and the *shastras*.

of crafts from foreign lands. 'Gunpowder was not known to the Kashmiris before; but one Habib, a maker of fireworks or of guns, who first manufactured muskets in Kashmir, lived in his reign and had no rival in his art. The Sultan in concert with him wrote a book on gunpowder in the form of questions and answers; this work is of great value.'³⁷ Paper-making and book-binding were not known to the country; so the Sultan sent two men to Samarqand to learn these arts and saw to their establishment in the country on their return. In general, every foreigner, who knew a craft not found in Kashmir, was obliged to teach his craft to one or two men before he could leave the country. For the manufacture of one of their world-famous product—the shawl—the Kashmiris were probably indebted to the Tibetans.

Our histories do not give details of all that the Sultan did, but Mirza Haidar Dughlat, who claimed not only to be a poet and a man of letters but also to be a superb master of such crafts as 'seal-engraving, jeweller's and gold-smith's work, saddlery, armour-making, construction of arrows, spear-heads and knives, etc.', has left us his over-all opinion of the Sultan and his achievements. 'In order to humour all nations of the world', he writes in the *Tarikh-i Rashidi*, 'Sultan Zainul Abidin paid attention neither to infidelity nor Islam. . . In Kashmir one meets all those arts and crafts which are in most cities uncommon, such as stone-polishing, stone-cutting, bottle-making, window-cutting (*taban-tarashi*), gold-beating, etc. In the whole of Mawaraun Nahr (Trans-Oxiana), except in Samarqand and Bokhara, they are nowhere to be met with, while in Kashmir they are even abundant. This is all due to Sultan Zainul Abidin.'³⁸ Thanks to the great Sultan's efforts, their long and cold winter season and their God-given genius, the inhabitants of the valley hereafter produced per capita more art-products than any other region, except China, during the pre-machine age.

Administration of Justice

Justice had of late become corrupt; the judges accepted bribes and litigants resorted to forgery; theft, highway robbery and drunkenness were common. To abolish this lawless state of things, the Sultan established a High Court of Justice, which consisted of judges, who were known for their character, integrity and ability. Since he himself was the final Court of Appeal, he appointed qazis and pandits to assist him in deciding cases. The principles of judicial

³⁷ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Vol. III (translation), 657.

³⁸ *Tarikh-i Rashidi*, translation of Elias and Ross, 3-4 and 434.

procedure were recorded, and laws and judgements of permanent value were inscribed on copper plates. Jonaraja quotes examples which are illustrative of the Sultan's impartiality, profound common-sense and extraordinary judicial acumen.³⁹ He never committed anyone to prison nor put any of his subjects to death for their crimes; as an alternative, he employed them on his public works, in factories and in industries. He reduced highway robberies and murders to a minimum by holding every village and township responsible for crimes which were committed within its area.

Revenue Administration

Kashmir, like all other regions of India, depended primarily on agriculture; and a proper distribution of land among the tenants on payment of a reasonable rent was the precondition of prosperity. Zainul Abidin had the entire country measured; he divided the valley into parganas, the parganas into villages and the villages into peasant-holdings. A record of all holdings was maintained. The state demand on land was fixed at one-sixth of the produce, and in the newly built pargana of Zainagir, it was fixed at one-seventh. Revenue was realized in kind and revenue-officials were enjoined to be honest, lenient and just to the peasants. In times of famine, the Sultan supported his subjects with grants of corn, fodder and other necessities of human and animal life.

Irrigation Works

Sultan Zainul Abidin constructed a network of canals and the entire valley, including the arid regions locally known as Udars (*Karewas*) which had till then depended for their productivity entirely on rainfall, which was fitful and undependable, was irrigated. The result was abundance of rice and an enormous increase in the national wealth. The new canals were cut from rivers which were perennially fed by snow. Chief among these canals were: the Kakapur Canal, the Tsakdar Canal, the Karala Canal, the Avantipur Canal, the Shah Khul (Safapur) Canal, the Zainganga (Lachman Khul), the Phru (Lall Khul), the Shah Khul (Martand) Canal, and the Mar Canal.

Economic Security

To prevent fluctuations in the prices of commodities, especially in times of famine, the Sultan introduced a system of price-control. The price of food-stuffs was regulated by the government; notifications to

³⁹ Jonaraja (Dutt), 91-99.

this effect were issued and variations in prices, when permitted, were inscribed on copper-plates fixed at important public places. The royal mint, known as 'Tanki Serai', issued new copper and silver coins to facilitate the free flow of commodities of all kinds. More important still, by establishing a colony of professional carriers at Hirapur, the Sultan assured a regular supply of salt, which was usually imported from West Punjab, but when the gates leading to the Punjab were closed, it had to be imported from distant Ladakh and Tibet. By affording all conveniences and facilities to salt-importers, the Sultan assured a regular supply of Punjab salt, which was better and cheaper.

The Sultan's Foundations

The Sultan's foundations testify to the prosperity of the country as well as to the income of the government. He founded the towns of Nowshahr (Vicharnag), Zaingir, Zainpur and Zainkot. He constructed the *khanqah* of Saiyyid Muhammad Madani, and laid out the islands of Rupa Lanka and Sona Lanka in the Dal Lake, which can still be seen. But his chief engineering achievement was Zaina Lanka, the artificial island in the Woolur Lake on which he built his palace and a mosque. Zaina Kadal, the first bridge of masonry and wood built in Srinagar, and Zaina-Dab, his magnificent and lofty palace of 12 storeys (each comprising of 50 rooms), were objects of great wonder to Mirza Haidar Dughlat.⁴⁰

Educational Policy

Zainul Abidin's singular contribution to the cause of mass-literacy and a nationally integrated culture was to impart education in the mother-tongue. He appears to have realized that Hindu and Muslim cultures could be blended and coordinated and amity between them could be effected, if useful and popular works of the Hindus were translated into Persian and those of the Muslims translated into Sanskrit and Kashmiri. Thus he appointed Mulla Ahmad, a versatile genius of his time, to translate the *Mahabharata*, *Dasavatra* and Kalhana's *Rajtarangini* into Persian. Utta Soma Pandita composed a history of the kings of Kashmir in Kashmiri. Yuda Bhatta composed the *Zaina Prakash*, or the biography of Sultan Zainul Abidin, in Kashmiri verse. Bhattavajara, who had studied the *Shah Nama* of Firdausi, composed the *Zainavilas*, or history of Kashmir, on the model of the Persian epic. Jonaraja continued the *Rajtarangini* of Kalhana and brought it down to the year 1458. Thereafter it was continued by his pupil, Srivara.

⁴⁰ *Tarikh-i Rashidi* (translation), 422.

Foreign Policy

The Sultan's foreign policy had many objectives. So far as the districts of inner and outer hills were concerned, he wanted to keep them in subjection. The frightened Raja of Jammu offered him two daughters (successively) in marriage. The Raja of Rajouri, another Dogra chief, also offered his daughter to the Sultan.⁴¹ Punch, the third Dogra state, was annexed to Kashmir and Zainul Abidin appointed his second son, Haji Khan, its governor. Zainul Abidin took the title of *Naib-i Amirul Muminin* (Deputy of the Commander of the Faithful) on his coins;⁴² and when his envoys contacted distant rulers—Bahlul Lodi, Mahmud Begarha, Jam Nizamuddin of Sind, the Rajas of Gwalior in India and Sultan Abu Sa'id of Khurasan, Mirza Shah Rukh of Herat and even the Sharif of Mecca—his objects were not political but commercial and cultural. Kashmir, as the *Baharistan-i Shahi* points out, was desperately in need of classical treatises on Muslim learning and culture. Shah Rukh is said to have sent him a good stock of manuscripts. A special scribe was sent by the Sultan to make a copy of Kashshaf's famous commentary on the *Quran*, the *Zamikhshari*, from an authentic manuscript at Mecca. So far as was possible, the Sultan strove to put Kashmir on the same cultural level as India and Persia.

His Domestic Life

Zainul Abidin married thrice. According to Jonaraja, he married the two daughters of the Raja of Jammu. They were the mothers of his four sons, Adham Khan, Haji Khan, Bahram Khan and Jasrath. Jasrath seems to have died when young. After the death of the Jammu princesses, the Sultan married Makhdumah Khatun, the daughter of Saiyyid Mahmud Baihaqi, and remained intensely devoted to her to the last.

Though a great sultan, Zainul Abidin was destined to be an unhappy father. His two sons, Adham Khan and Haji Khan, caused him great anxiety and annoyance by rebelling against him and also waging war against each other. He used both coercion and conciliation to reform them, but it was of no use. He was, therefore, compelled to banish Adham Khan, his elder son, and declared that Haji Khan, his younger son, was heir to the throne. Even then his last days were unhappy, and he died on a Friday, May-June 1470, at the age of 69.⁴³

⁴¹ The Sultan never married the lady though she lived in his palace.

⁴² Rogers, *Copper Coins of the Sultans of Kashmir*, JASB, 1872, 294.

⁴³ Srivara (Dutt), 175.

The independent state of Kashmir had reached its zenith. 'During the reign of Sultan Zainul Abidin', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* declares, 'all the inhabitants of the country passed their lives in peace and comfort owing to his devotion to the welfare of the *ra'iyat*. We are not told of any other time when food was so plentiful and grain so cheap as during his reign. He made great efforts to build up the country and rehabilitate the land. Many villages and plots of land, which had remained desolate since Dalucha's invasion, were cultivated once more owing to his efforts.'

SULTAN HAIDAR SHAH (1470-72)

Three days after the death of Sultan Zainul Abidin, Haji Khan ascended the throne with the title of Haidar Shah. The rajas of the different districts, who had come to congratulate him, were sent back with presents. The Sultan appointed his son, Hasan Khan, as his heir-apparent and gave him the jagir of Kamraj with the title of *Amirul Umara*. His younger brother, Bahram Khan, was given the jagir of Nagam. The great difficulty about Haidar Shah, however, was his perpetual drunkenness, which brought about a variety of diseases, made him vindictive in temper and lost him the confidence of his amirs. A barber, named Luli, obtained undue influence over him and Hasan Kuchay, a venerable amir, who had helped Haidar to obtain the throne, was put to death at the barber's instigation; subsequently Brahmans were also persecuted and their temples desecrated at his instance. Fortunately for the Sultan, his elder brother, Adham Khan, died while fighting for his father-in-law, Raja Manik Deva of Jammu, against the Turks. His son, Hasan Khan, who had been married to the daughter of Saiyyid Mirak Hasan Baihaqi, the most influential family of foreign Muslims, also showed energy in suppressing rebellions in Punch and Rajouri. However Haidar Shah fell down in a fit of drunkenness and died before he had completed the second year of his reign, and was succeeded by his son, Hasan Shah.

HASAN SHAH (1472-84)

Hasan Shah had shown considerable energy as heir-apparent; as king at first he manifested much administrative ability and tact. Soon, however, he changed his mode of life. 'He passed his whole reign in enjoyments and music', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* states, '... He had two hundred male and female *qawwals* (singers of mystic songs) of Hindustan in his service; Kashmiri musicians, tambour-beaters, etc., in the same proportion, were also employed in his palace.' He never marched out at the head of an army, but sent his amirs and sardars with his troops. Assisted by his queen, he built palaces, *khanqahs*,

madrasas and mosques, which are detailed by Srivara. He was a patron of the arts and was himself a master-musician; he composed both Kashmiri and Sanskrit songs.⁴⁴

Under such a ruler the state was bound to suffer; still in spite of his devotion to music and culture, Hasan Shah was no fool, and so long as he lived he kept control over state affairs. Both Nizamuddin and Ferishta state that he restored the regulations of Sultan Zainul Abidin, which his predecessor had not been able to enforce. Ahmad Yatu, who had helped Hasan against Bahram Khan, was reappointed to his posts of wazir and commander-in-chief and worked well for some years. The seat of government was retransferred to Nowshahr (Srinagar). Bahram, who returned to claim the throne, was signally defeated at Dulipura by Malik Tazi Bhatt, the redoubtable commander of the Kashmir army. Further, Tatar Khan Lodi, governor of the Punjab, had given protection to Fath Khan, son of Adham Khan, and attacked Rajouri. The united armies of Jammu and Kashmir marched against him under Tazi Bhatt, and Tazi, finding Sialkot undefended, sacked it in 1480. It is useless discussing what Tatar Khan could have done in retaliation, for the prestige of the Kashmir state was still so great that Tatar contented himself with a rectification of the frontier on the Indian plains.

The last four or five years of Hasan Shah's reign were a presage of the unhappy time to come. In 1479 a great fire destroyed the north-eastern quarter of Srinagar. Next a quarrel between Ahmad Yatu and Tazi Bhatt, whom Ahmad had once regarded as a son, divided the nobles into two parties. Space will not permit us to go into details, but when some nobles, supposed to be allies of the wazir, attacked the royal palace, the Sultan ordered Ahmad Yatu to be imprisoned and his property to be plundered. Then, unaware of the future consequences of his act, he recalled his father-in-law, Saiyyid Mirak Hasan, leader of the Baihaqi Saiyyids, and gave him the wizarat. 'The Saiyyid turned the mind of the Sultan from the Kashmiri amirs, and a large number of the officers of the state were put to death at his instance and by his endeavours. Malik Tazi Bhatt was put in prison. The other nobles fled owing to fear and went to different places. Jahangir Magre, who was a great noble, fled to Loharkot.'⁴⁵ The Sultan made a will to the effect that as his son, Muhammad, was only seven years old, he should be succeeded by one of his nephews—by Yusuf, son of Bahram, who was then in prison, or by Fath, son of Adham, who was then in India—and that the throne should afterwards revert to his

⁴⁴ B.S., 111.

⁴⁵ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, English translation, 691.

son. Saiyyid Mirak Hasan accepted the will which he had no intention of enforcing.

To understand the future history of Kashmir, three facts should be kept in mind. *First*, though kings of the Shah Mir dynasty were put on the throne one after another till 1561, yet *all* of them were mere figure-heads, with no right except that of having the coinage and the *Khutba* in their names with such allowances or jagirs as their masters were pleased to allot to them. *Secondly*, all real power was exercised either by a master-adventurer or by a coalition of adventurers till the annexation of the country by Akbar. In a general history of India only a very brief reference is possible to these group-leaders. *Lastly and inevitably*, an autocrat or a coalition-group could only control the valley; Srinagar under them could not exercise any control over the rulers of the districts of inner and outer hills as almost all sultans from Shihabuddin to Hasan Shah had done. 'After this the nobles and rulers of Kashmir', says the *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 'made it their profession to oppose and harass each other. And since the amirs and rulers were constantly quarrelling and fighting with each other, they could neither maintain their power over the outlying districts nor conquer them afresh. Consequently, these areas were lost and nothing remained in the hands of the rulers of Kashmir, except the soul of Kashmir—the valley.'

II. POLITICAL GANGSTERS OF THE VALLEY (1484-1540)

MUHAMMAD SHAH (1484-87) : FIRST REIGN¹

SAIYYID MIRAK HASAN BAIHAQI, the wazir, proclaimed his daughter's son, Muhammad Shah, then a boy of seven, as the sultan and began to act as his regent. But the past record of the Saiyyids in Kashmir had been bad and the ways of Saiyyid Mirak Hasan made it worse. The Kashmiris were not prepared to tolerate their high-handedness and claims to superiority; their return to power, therefore, led to an acute hatred and discontent against them and the outcome was a war of Kashmiris against the Saiyyids. The Kashmiris were helped by Raja Parsuram of Jammu and he marched upon Srinagar, which was then the stronghold of the Saiyyids. The details of the conspiracy are obscure, but one day some three hundred armed men fell upon Mirak Hasan and slew him along with his fourteen sons and nephews, while he was transacting business in open court. Meanwhile another Kashmiri army defeated a force, which had been sent by Tatar Khan Lodi to help the Saiyyids, at Bhimbar. The Mirak's son, Saiyyid Muhammad, and his younger brother, Hashim, fought bravely at the head of their partisans, but they were totally defeated at Takht-i Sulaiman (Shankaracharya hillock), which was then their headquarter in Srinagar; the Durgha-i Mualla was burnt; and they were forced to quit Kashmir in 1484.²

The defeat and banishment of the Saiyyids brought four Kashmiri leaders to the forefront—Jahangir Magre, Saif Dar, Idi Raina and Jalal Thakur—and they signed an agreement to act as joint-regents of the minor prince, Muhammad Shah. But the quadruple alliance proved to be a short-lived arrangement. Jahangir Magre, who had the largest following, seized the reins of government and declared himself wazir. The other three leaders in sheer disgust sent an invitation to Fath Khan, son of Adham Khan, who was living in Rajouri.

¹ Haidar Malik discusses the period, 1484-1540, in folios 125-56 of his work and the *Baharistan-i Shahi* in pages 116-225. Both are very detailed but suffer from *a priori* prejudices. Ferishta and Nizamuddin are more impartial but less well-informed (EDITORS).

² The events are engraved in a bilingual inscription on a stone-slab, which was discovered in 1885 by Dr. Hultzsch in the Mazar-i Bahauddin Sahib in Srinagar: see ZDMG, Vol. XL, 1886, 9; see also Sir John Marshall, *Note on Archaeological Work in Kashmir*, 1908, 17-18.

Fath invaded Kashmir immediately, but was defeated at Kalampur (Kalyanapura) in 1485. But the victory turned the head of Jahangir Magre, a hot-headed, uncompromising and bad man. He drew wrong conclusions from his success and thus contributed to his own fall. Saif Dar, his most dangerous rival, collected together the military strength of all disgruntled Kashmiris, and persuaded Fath Khan to try his luck again. The result was the battle of Damodar Udar (1487); Fath Khan was victorious this time; Jahangir Magre quitted Kashmir to seek his personal safety and left the boy, Muhammad Shah, at the mercy of the victors. It is to their credit that Muhammad suffered no harm.³

FATH SHAH (1487-99): FIRST REIGN

Fath Shah's early life had been a long struggle against anxiety and unhappiness in exile, but ascending the throne brought him neither power nor security. He appointed Saif Dar his wazir. The choice was not bad, and Saif Dar was by all accounts a competent man. But the permanent basis of the state among the Musalmans could only be the personal power of the king. Mirak Saiyyid Hasan had proved that the will of a dead king could be set aside and that the reigning king could be completely ignored. When Saiyyid Hasan was killed, the Kashmiri nobles discovered that the power which tradition had vested in the king could be obtained through intrigues supported by force, and as crisis followed crisis, the Kashmiri nobles developed all the virtues and vices of political gangsters. Their basic vice was lack of loyalty to the king or to the country or to their own plighted word; their basic virtue was the singular personal prowess and courage, which like gangsters all the world over, they developed in the pursuit of their own ambitions.

Saif Dar was drawn into an ambushade and killed in 1496, and Shams Chak, who had played the leading role in this plot, was appointed wazir. But Shams Chak and Saiyyid Muhammad Baihaqi, the leader of the Baihaqi Saiyyids, who had returned in the meantime, could not get on together. They fought a battle in 1499; Shams Chak was defeated, and fled from the country for safety, taking Fath Shah with him.

³ A curious feature of this period was the personal security of the Mir Shahi kings. Where the occupant of the throne wielded all the executive authority of the state, his opponents after deposing him had no alternative but to put him to death. But since the Mir Shahi kings from Muhammad Shah to Habib Shah (1484-1565) had no executive authority, they were allowed to survive after being deposed and could be put on the throne again. So we find several kings of the dynasty ruling more than once. But since they reigned but did not rule, the general precept about Muslim monarchs—'the throne or the block' (*ya takht ya takhta*)—did not apply to them.

MUHAMMAD SHAH (1499-1505) : SECOND REIGN

The triumphant Saiyyid Muhammad Baihaqi placed Muhammad Shah on the throne for a second time with himself as wazir. But the restoration of the Saiyyids also meant the restoration of their anti-Kashmiri designs with their habitual aggressiveness. The situation was utilized to his advantage by Shams Chak. A war was forced upon the Saiyyids in 1505; they were totally defeated, and Saiyyid Muhammad Baihaqi and other leading Saiyyids were killed. Muhammad Shah fled for safety to Rajouri, and Fath Shah was once more proclaimed king.

FATH SHAH (1505-16) : SECOND REIGN

Shams Chak on becoming wazir put Fath Shah on the throne, and led a ruthless campaign against all that survived of the Saiyyid regime. The palace of Saiyyid Muhammad was destroyed. Murtaza, his eldest son, was put to death; Ibrahim, the second son, was imprisoned, but after two and a half years the Kashghar army set him free; Yaqub, the youngest son, being a minor, was allowed to live peacefully in Srinagar. But this was only a transitory phase. Musa Raina, the main rival of Shams Chak, succeeded in putting him in prison. But though he had nothing more than a pen-knife and some brick-bats to defend himself with, the imprisoned wazir succeeded in killing three men before the soldiers, who had been sent for the purpose, could put him and his son to death by shooting arrows at them from a safe distance.

Musa Raina became the next wazir, but his regime came to an end owing to his patronage of Shams Iraqi, the founder of the Nur Bakhshi movement in Kashmir, who started a *jihad* against the Hindus. The opponents of Musa Raina—Jahangir Padru, Osman Dar, Kachi Chak and Ibrahim Magre—decided to resist this theological frenzy by force. Musa Raina was defeated by them at the battle of Zaldragar in 1513 and died while trying to escape from Kashmir. There was much distress and bloodshed in the next two years (1514-16) owing to the constant struggle between the rival political groups; and Pandit Kantha Bhatta, a zealous Hindu social reformer, persuaded many Hindus who had embraced Islam to return again to the Hindu fold.

MUHAMMAD SHAH (1516-28) : THIRD REIGN

Meanwhile the fugitive ruler, Muhammad Shah, obtained the throne once more by appealing to Sultan Sikandar Lodi of Delhi and Kachi Chak, and appointed Kachi Chak as his wazir. Since Kachi was a Shia, he also came under the influence of Shamsuddin Iraqi, who

once more found an outlet for his bigotry. According to the *Baharistan-i Shahi*, he had eight hundred leading apostates to Hinduism massacred in 1518, and the movement started by Pandit Kantha Bhatta was stopped. Shams Iraqi, however, died in 1526 and was buried in Zadi Bal, the well-known Shia quarter in Srinagar.

SHAMSUDDIN IRAQI AND THE NUR BAKHSHI MOVEMENT

The author of the *Baharistan-i Shahi* is such a sectarian that he wants us to believe that the inhabitants of the valley, after swinging over from Hinduism to Islam and Islam to Hinduism several times over, were finally made Musalmans by the Nur Bakhshi movement of Shams Iraqi. But he tells us nothing about the movement itself apart from the fact that it sought 'the orthodox path of the Prophet'. It is not possible to accept this view. Shamsuddin Iraqi first came in 1484 as an ambassador from Sultan Husain Mirza of Iraq to Hasan Shah, but after he had been in Kashmir for some eight years, he was asked to depart owing to the opposition of 'the amirs and *hakims*' to his religious propaganda. He came again after twelve years, but had to go to Ladakh as Saiyyid Muhammad Baihaqi, who was an orthodox Sunni and with whom he had acute controversies, was not prepared to tolerate him. After the Saiyyid's death, he returned to Srinagar and obtained influence by converting Musa Raina and Kachi Chak to his views. This also meant inviting the hostility of their enemies, and Malik Usman, a former wazir, went so far as to declare, 'I will first roast Shams Iraqi over fire and then enter the city.' Fath Shah also had a bitter controversy with him before the end of his last reign. This is not the place for inquiring into theological controversies, which were obscure to start with and are now quite dead. It will be enough to quote two somewhat opposed opinions.

Mirza Haidar Dughlat writes in his *Tarikh-i Rashidi*: 'The people were (formerly) all Hanafis, but in the reign of Fath Shah, the father of this Sultan Nadir (Nazuk), a man of the name of Shams came from Talish (Gilan) in Iraq, who gave himself as a Nur Bakhshi. He introduced a corrupt form of religion, giving it the name of Nur Bakhshi (Giver of Light) and practised many heresies. He wrote a book for these cowardly people, called the *Fiqh-i Ahwat* (Comprehensive Law), which does not conform to the teachings of any of the sects, whether Sunni or Shia. These (sectarians) revile the Companions of the Prophet and Ayesha (the Prophet's wife), as do the Shias, but contrary to the teachings of the latter, they look upon Saiyyid Muhammad Nur Bakhshi as "the Lord of the Age and the promised Mahdi". They do not believe in the saints and holy persons in whom

the Shias believe but regard all of these (as appertaining to) Sunnis.

'I have seen many Nur Bakhshi elders in Badakhshan and elsewhere. I discovered that outwardly they follow the precepts of the Prophet and hold with the Sunnis. One of the sons of this amir, Saiyyid Muhammad Nur Bakhshi, showed me his tract.' (This tract tried to prove that prophets could be kings.)

The *Ahwat*, then well-known in Kashmir, was condemned by the religious scholars of India. 'Chastizement and (even) death should be inflicted on the Nur Bakhshis', they declared. Mirza Haidar continues: 'Thanks be to God that at the present time no one in Kashmir dares openly to profess this faith; but all deny it and give themselves out as good Sunnis. They are aware of my severity towards them, and know that if anyone of the sect appears, he will not escape the punishment of death.'⁴

Ferishta, who had carefully studied the *Tarikh-i Rashidi*, observes: 'I have inquired from educated Kashmiris about the religion of their people. They say that the whole *ra'yyat* of the country is Hanafi and Sunni, that most warlike groups of the country are Shias, but there are very few Shias among the *ulama*. Owing to his connection with the warrior groups, the ruler of Ladakh is so far gone in Shiaism that if an outsider goes to his city and does not curse the Companions of the Prophet, they turn him out. The Chak clan claims that Mir Shamsuddin was of the Shia faith; that the sultans as well as the unbelievers of his time came to believe in him and recited the *Khutba* (Friday sermon) in the Asna Ashari (orthodox Shia) manner in accordance with his order; and that the book, *Ahwat*, was not written by Mir Shamsuddin Iraqi but by a misguided agnostic. And God knows the truth.'⁵

While Shamsuddin Iraqi was occupied with his crusade against the Hindus, Fath Shah died in exile in 1519. Thereupon his Kashmiri adherents—Abdal Magre, Idi Raina and Jahangir Padru—collected their troops and invaded Kashmir in 1521 in order to place Sikandar Khan, son of Fath Shah, on the throne. They were defeated at Shihabuddinpur (Shadipur), but did not despair of success. They

⁴ *Tarikh-i Rashidi* (English translation), 434-36. The Mirza was well-acquainted with Shia-Sunni controversies. He is unable to tell us how and when the claim of Saiyyid Nur Bakhshi to be the 'promised Mahdi' was made. But he is correct in thinking such a claim to be incompatible with orthodox or Asna Ashari Shiaism. So the followers of Shams Iraqi, since they had already condemned the first three Pious Caliphs, were gradually led to discard those elements that separated them from the orthodox Shias. By the time of Ferishta this change had been completed.

⁵ Ferishta, Persian text, (N.K.), Vol. II, 337.

made a second attempt in 1525 but were again defeated, and Sikandar Khan was captured and blinded in order that he may cease to be a political weapon.

**IBRAHIM SHAH (1528-29) AND
NAZUK SHAH (1529-30)**

But Kachi Chak considered the cruel treatment meted out by Sultan Muhammad Shah to Sikandar Khan wholly unjustified; so he sent Muhammad Shah as a state-prisoner to Lohkot and placed his son, Ibrahim Shah, on the throne in 1528. Later on Abdal Magre, the popular and energetic leader of the Magre group, succeeded in securing help from the Emperor Babur, and invaded Kashmir with the support of a Mughal contingent of one thousand under the command of Shaikh Ali Beg, Mahmud Khan and Muhammad Khan. Kachi Chak and Abdal Magre fought a battle at Thaper (Patan). Kachi Chak was defeated and Abdal Magre proclaimed Nazuk Khan as sultan in 1529.

Abdal Magre, however, soon realized that Nazuk Shah was not popular among the Kashmiris; so to gain public opinion on his side he restored Muhammad Shah to the throne for the fourth time in 1530, and kept Nazuk ready for an emergency by making him heir-apparent.

MUHAMMAD SHAH (1530-37): FOURTH REIGN

The much harassed Muhammad Shah had been on the throne for a year and a half only when Kashmir was invaded by the army of Kamran, then governor of the Punjab. The Mughal army marched to Kashmir under the command of Mahram Beg Kokah, who was guided on the way by Shaikh Ali Beg and others. They occupied Srinagar in October/November 1531 without meeting any resistance, and began to massacre the Kashmiris. In this hour of crisis Malik Kachi Chak and Abdal Magre, who were the two most powerful Kashmiri leaders at the time, fortunately forgot their rivalries, collected their troops, defeated the Mughals at Athwajan, a hamlet lying a couple of miles to the south-east of Srinagar, and compelled them to quit Kashmir. In order to restore peace and order the Magre and Chak leaders—Kachi Chak, Regi Chak, Abdal Magre and Ali Mir—constituted a coalition government with Abdal Magre as wazir and began to rule the country.

But Kashmir had hardly returned to normal when she had to face another invasion. Sultan Sa'id Khan, ruler of Kashghar, having repented of his many sins, came to the conclusion that a *jihad* or 'holy war' against the infidels was his surest way to salvation. So he

sent an army under Mirza Haidar Dughlat, who had been in his service for some ten years, along with his second son, Sikandar, against Baltistan and Ladakh. Mirza Haidar conquered these districts in the autumn of 1532 and then proceeded to Kashmir to find winter quarters for his 4,000 horsemen and to conquer the country, if possible. The 'holy war' was quite forgotten. The number of the invaders was reinforced on their march by the local people, who joined them out of sheer fright and also acted as their guides. The Kashgharis entered the valley by way of the Zoji-la pass in January 1533, after meeting a feeble resistance from the Kashmir army at the narrow defile of Hang-Satu. The inhabitants took to their heels, leaving their homes and hearths to the tender mercies of the Kashgharis. The invaders entered Nowshahr (Vicharnag), which they found to be the first inhabited quarter of the Sonemarg-Srinagar road. They rested here for twenty-four days, during which time their troops and horses shook off their fatigue. Then they left this place, driving every one before them and behaving with ruthless barbarity.

'Wherever the Mughals went', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* says, 'they slew the people and indulged in reckless slaughter. In their shameless disregard of religion, they considered a region inhabited by Muslims as a place for "holy war"; and they shed the blood of the Musalmans as if it was their mother's milk.'⁶ The Kashmiri *ulama* retaliated by declaring a religious war against the invaders. When the enemy had spread into the valley, the Kashmiri nobles collected their troops together and offered him a tough battle at Bavan (Matan) in Anantnag (28 February 1533). But though the Kashmiris were defeated, they mustered their courage and persisted in surrounding and attacking the enemy. Fortunately for them, Mirza Haidar's victory soon turned into defeat, because there arose opposition against him among his own followers, who were worn out and wanted to return home. The opposition was led by Mirza Ali Taghai, who was jealous of Mirza Haidar's triumphs and compelled him to make peace with the maliks of Kashmir. So Mirza Haidar Dughlat made peace and left Kashmir on 15 May 1533 in sheer disappointment.⁷

After the departure of the Kashgharis, Kashmir was visited by the terrible famine of 1534. It was caused by the savage destruction of men and the means of cultivation by the Kashgharis, and because no

⁶ B.S., 188.

⁷ It is possible to obtain the view-points of both parties in this war. See *Tarikh-i Rashidi* (English translation), 417-42, which also includes Mirza Haidar's account of Kashmir; Suka (Dutt), 373, and Suka (text), 340 *et seq*; *Tubaqat-i-Akbari* (Persian text, N. K. edition), 615. The Kashmiri view-point is well-represented by the *Baharistan-i Shahi* and by Haidar Malik.

sowing of crops in the war-year had been possible. Foodstuffs became so scarce that 'one *khari* (*kharwar*, ass-load) of *shali* was sold for ten thousand *dinnaras*'. The famine lasted for ten months; thereafter the country had respite from internal strife and external danger for three years (1534-37). Muhammad Shah died at the age of 60 in 1537. Then the intriguing Kashmiri nobles threw the country again into disorder which lasted for about three years (1537-40). During this period the throne was occupied by Shamsuddin II (1537-40), the son and successor of Muhammad Shah, who was a mere figure-head, while Malik Kachi Chak was the virtual ruler. Shamsuddin was succeeded by his brother, Ismail Shah. During the latter's reign Kachi Chak worked indefatigably to impose the Shia creed on the people.

MIRZA HAIDAR DUGHILAT (1540-50)

Mirza Haidar, who was related both to Babur and Sultan Sa'id Khan, had to fly from Kashghar owing to the fate that awaited him at the hands of Rashid Khan, son of Sa'id Khan, the ruler to whom he has dedicated his *Tarikh-i Rashidi* with plenty of curses. He managed to reach India, where he took service first with Kamran and then with Humayun. When Humayun was finally defeated by Sher Shah, Mirza Haidar suggested that he should conquer Kashmir. Two opponents of Kachi Chak—Malik Abdal Magre and Malik Regi Chak—had come to ask for Mughal assistance. But when Humayun was unable to accept his advice, Mirza Haidar, with 400 men given to him by Humayun and such soldiers as he himself could enlist, marched with the two maliks into Kashmir. Kachi Chak and Saiyyid Ibrahim Baihaqi with Ismail Shah marched to meet him; but they moved by the wrong route and as a result Mirza Haidar and his allies captured Srinagar and the valley without striking a blow. Kachi Chak left for India with Ismail Shah and appealed to Sher Shah for assistance.

Mirza Haidar at the beginning acted entirely on the advice of Abdal Magre and Regi Chak. The valley was divided into three *jagirs* between them; Nazuk Shah, son of Fath Shah, was proclaimed king and Abdal Magre was appointed wazir. Abdal died after some months and his son, Husain Magre, succeeded to his *jagir* and the wizarat. But the Mirza had not governed Kashmir for more than a year and a half when he was called upon to fight Kachi Chak, who had marched upon Kashmir at the head of five thousand horse, two elephants and many foot-soldiers supplied by Sher Shah Sur. The brilliant strategy of Mirza Haidar enabled him to defeat the Indian troops of Sher Shah at the battle of Watanar. 'So long as Regi Chak occupied the seat of power', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* states, 'the Mirza

was obedient to him in every way and did not show any opposition.' He even showed respect to the Nur Bakhshi cult out of regard for Regi. But in view of subsequent developments, this friendship between Mirza Haidar, a fanatic Sunni, and Regi Chak, a die-hard Nur Bakhshi, must be considered an illogical compromise necessitated by political exigency. And Regi Chak speeded his own fall. The Mirza having won over Idi Raina and Husain Magre to his side, Regi escaped to Kamraj, which was his stronghold and raised a revolt. The Mirza marched against him and compelled him to escape for safety to Punch, where he rejoined Kachi Chak, another sworn enemy of the Mirza. Then they made a joint attack from Gulmarg but were defeated in 1544. Sher Shah Sur died in 1545 and Kachi Chak in 1546; in 1547 Regi Chak was killed by some unknown persons.

These opportune casualties among his enemies, both Kashmiri and Indian, left the Mirza apparently in sole command of Kashmir and he attempted to conquer the lost districts of the state. Idi Raina, now the Mirza's right-hand man, failed to conquer Kishtwar in 1548. But Baltistan and Ladakh were conquered in the same year (1548) and were put in charge of Mulla Qasim and Mulla Baqi. Rajouri and Pakhli were also annexed. In 1549 Haibat Khan Niyazi rebelled against Islam Shah Sur and some Kashmiri chiefs wanted him to attack the valley. The Mirza's diplomacy succeeded in keeping him away; nevertheless his regime was coming to an end.

Mirza Haidar should have realized that the basis of his military power was very weak owing to the small number of pure Mughal troops. Then, as now, the majority of the people were Sunnis, but the warrior groups were Shias and it was suicidal for the Mirza to alienate them. In his *Tarikh-i Rashidi*, written in 1543-44, the Mirza gives us a vivid account of the persecution of the Sunnis at Herat by Shah Ismail Safavi; and quite forgetting that he was not the representative of a national movement like the Safavi monarch, he proceeded to persecute the Nur Bakhshis, who had by now become indistinguishable from the Asna Ashari Shias, as a retaliatory measure. The mausoleum of Shams Iraqi at Zadi Bal was destroyed; his son, Shaikh Daniyal, a highly respected man, was put to death along with other leading Nur Bakhshis. The Mirza obtained *fatawas* of the Sunni *ulama* for what he did, but the initiative very definitely came from him. This persecution, combined with the attempt to concentrate all power in his own hands and to delegate it exclusively to his Mughal officers, succeeded in alienating the two Kashmiri chiefs, Idi Raina and Husain Magre, and the warrior gangsters whom they represented.

In the autumn of 1550 there was a rebellion at Mankot and

Mirza Haidar sent his Mughal troops under his cousin, Qara Bahadur, along with Idi Raina, Husain Magre and Khwaja Haji against the rebels. The Kashmiris, led by Idi, decided to attack the Mughals after they had reached their destination. Most of the Mughals succeeded in escaping to the Khokars, but Qara Bahadur, Qutb Ali Koka and Muhammad Nazar, who came to negotiate with Idi, were imprisoned, while the hands of their followers were cut off. Idi then marched towards Srinagar and encamped at a distance of some ten miles.

Simultaneously there were successful rebellions against the Mirza's officers in Pakhli, Baltistan and Ladakh and only one of these officers succeeded in reaching him. The Mirza put his family in the fort of Indarkot and proceeded against Idi Raina with a small force of horsemen to Khanpur. Here he decided on a night-attack, during which only seven men were left with him. He was killed by an arrow-shot in the dark. The Kashmiris suppressed their resentment, buried the Mirza in the mausoleum of Sultan Zainul Abidin and permitted his family with all honour to retire from Indarkot to Kashghar. They seemed to have been in a mood of forgive and forget.⁸

8 There are differences of opinion with reference to the exact way in which the Mirza met his death. See *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (translation), 717-18. It was a clouded night; 'there was nothing on his body except a wound caused by an arrow'. The arrow was probably shot by mistake by one of the Mirza's own followers in the dark.

III. THE CHAK ASCENDANCY (1540-86)

THE FALL OF MIRZA HAIDAR'S regime left Nazuk Shah in the royal palace and Idi Raina in charge of the wizarat. But *jagirs* had to be given to Husain Magre, Daulat Chak, Ghazi Chak and other claimants who were Nur Bakhshi Shias. It was soon realized that these arrangements had tilted the balance against Idi Raina and his party, which included the Magres and the Baihaqi Saiyyids, who were Sunnis, while Idi Raina had offended the sentiments of the Nur Bakhshis as he had behaved disinterestedly and unconcernedly when the coffin of Shaikh Daniyal was brought to Srinagar. Still the dividing line was not religious. Fortunately for Daulat Chak and his group, Haibat Khan Niyazi decided to invade Kashmir. Idi Raina and Husain Magre were slow in taking the offensive, but Daulat Chak and Ghazi Chak hastened to meet the invader. The Afghans found their small force faced by 10,000 Kashmiris; they fought courageously and all except two of them were killed. The Chak leaders cut off the heads of the Niyazi chiefs and sent them as a present to Islam Shah Sur. They did not care to consult Idi Raina's representative at any stage. Idi naturally tried to organize his soldiers against them, but the Chaks struck before he was ready. They seized Saiyyid Ibrahim and Husain Magre, and Idi Raina died as a fugitive. His regime had lasted for about a year.

MALIK DAULAT CHAK (1551-54)

Daulat Chak, who seized power in 1551, should be given credit for what he did. 'This virtuous malik issued an order in all his territories', the *Baharistan-i Shahi* tells us, 'that every inhabitant was free to follow any religion he liked and no one was to molest another in the matter of religion.'¹ Subject to the above condition, however, he followed his personal religious policy. He rebuilt the mausoleum of Shams Iraqi, which Mirza Haider had destroyed, and also constructed new mausoleums for Shaikh Daniyal and Baba Ali Najjar. He revived the religious orders (*silsilahs*) of Saiyyid Hamadani and Shams Iraqi and made good material provisions for their leaders. The names of the twelve Shia imams were put in the Friday sermon.

Among his political actions the following deserve to be noted. In

¹ B.S., 232; Suka (Dutt), 381. About one-half of the *Baharistan-i Shahi* is devoted to the Chak regime and it is not possible to summarize all its details. Haider Malik devotes about a third of his work (folios 149 to 237) to the Chak period.

1552 he deposed Nazuk Shah and placed Ibrahim Shah, son of Muhammad Shah, for a second time on the throne. In 1555 Ismail Shah, the brother of Ibrahim Shah, was put on the throne for a second time. Then Saiyyid Ibrahim Baihaqi was deprived of his post and *jagir*, which were transferred to his son, Saiyyid Mubarak. On one occasion at least tribute was exacted from Ladakh. There was a terrible earthquake in 1554. According to Pandit Suka, a contemporary chronicler, the earthquake affected the course of the Vesav river, which transplanted the sites of the villages, Hasanpur and Husainpur; also so many houses fell down that the people of Kashmir had to 'live under canvas'.

After governing Kashmir for four years, Daulat made the terrible mistake of marrying the aged widow of his uncle, Kachi Chak. All Chaks were shocked, or pretended to be so. The revolt against Daulat was led by Ghazi Chak, who had already distinguished himself by his heroism. Ghazi was probably not the son of Kachi Chak, as has been generally assumed, but the son of the wife of Hasan Chak, the deceased brother of Kachi; after her widowhood, she married Kachi and her son, Ghazi, was born three months after the marriage.² Be this as it may, Ghazi seized Daulat while he was fishing in the Dal Lake on 17 October 1555, and had him blinded two days later.

MALIK GHAZI CHAK (1555-61)

Had the Chaks remained united, they could have governed the whole valley in peace. The clan may have been foreign in origin, but it had been thoroughly domiciled. No group in Kashmir had produced such brave fighters. When Kachi Chak appeared before Sher Shah, the latter was surprised by the number of wounds on Kachi's body, and in recognition of his superb military career he gave Kachi the title of Khan-i Khanan. But it was not to be expected that the Chaks would submit to Ghazi's power without resistance. There was, first, a conspiracy against him at Srinagar and he had to punish its Chak leaders. Then some Chak chiefs rebelled against him at Sopur and he had to adopt stern measures. The *Baharistan-i Shahi* states: 'He built the kingdom of Kashmir into a single fort consisting of himself and his brothers, Husain Chak and Ali Chak. . . His government of Kashmir was stable and cruel.'³

On two occasions Ghazi had to fight a Mughal invader and on both occasions he showed his mettle. In 1558 the Kashmir chiefs living in India, led by Shams Raina, thought that Shah Abul Mu'ali,

² See *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (translation), 720.

³ B.S., 239 and 240.

who had escaped from Akbar's court, could lead them to conquer Kashmir, and they all advanced by the Punch-Baramulla pass. Abul Mu'ali throughout his life deceived those who relied upon him and the Kashmir venture could not be an exception. Ghazi met the invaders at Patan; seeing that the battle was going against them, Shams Raina stood firmly on his ground to enable Shah Abul Mu'ali to escape, with the result that he was himself captured by the Kashmir army and executed. Ghazi ordered the heads of the Mughal captives to be cut off and piled into a tower.

The government of Bairam Khan made the mistake of sending Qara Bahadur, a cousin of Mirza Haidar, to Kashmir in the hope that his presence would lead the Kashmiris to rise against Ghazi. It was a hopeless choice. Qara Bahadur's presence evoked no response, and he was afraid of marching deep into the country. But Ghazi marched forward and defeated him at Rajouri. The Mughal defeat was certainly serious, though the estimates of the soldiers killed vary from 500 to 7,000.

NASIRUDDIN MUHAMMAD GHAZI SHAH (1561-63)

On coming to power Ghazi had allowed Ismail Shah to remain in the palace. When Ismail Shah died in 1557, Ghazi put Ismail's son, Habib Shah (who was also the son of Ghazi's sister), on the throne. In 1561 he deposed Habib Shah on the ground that 'he was not even worthy of the name of a king' and, after consulting his partisans, ascended the throne with the title of Nasiruddin Muhammad Ghazi Shah. As wazir and king Ghazi ruled over Kashmir for nine years, but the events of his reign are not important. In 1560-61 his brother, Husain, suppressed the rebellion of two Chak chiefs. Next year his attempt to capture Ladakh failed. In 1563 Ghazi, who was a victim of leprosy, lost his eyesight and nominated his brother, Husain, as his successor. But when, misguided by his advisers, Ghazi wanted to alter this arrangement, Husain retaliated by deposing him. 'His two victories over the Mughals', says the *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 'are the remarkable achievements of Ghazi Chak. But with reference to the tyrannical oppression of the *ra'iyyat*, and the traditions established about the shedding of blood, blinding, severing of limbs and killing of blood-relations—no one knows whether a man so cruel has existed at another epoch or not.'⁴

NASIRUDDIN HUSAIN SHAH GHAZI (1563-69)

'Husain Shah was so just and regardful of the welfare of the subjects', says the *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 'that the inhabitants, who had

⁴ *Ibid.*, 241.

suffered from the cruelties of Ghazi Shah, considered him to be like Naushirwan, the Just, of Persia.⁵ Nevertheless, it adds, mischief-makers, who had escaped the talons of Daulat Chak and Ghazi Shah, continued to conspire against him, and he ordered them to be punished. He had Muhammad Khan, son of Ghazi Shah, blinded in 1566-67 and this hastened the death of the blind ex-king. He granted Rajouri and Naushahr to his elder brother, Shankar Chak, and two expeditions had to be sent to suppress Shankar's rebellions. One of his wazirs, Mubariz Khan, was found guilty of conspiring and had to be put to death. Mubariz's successor, Malik Luli Laund, was dismissed on grounds of corruption. One of the king's ex-favourites, Khan-i Zaman, collected a number of disgruntled nobles and attacked his palace (*haveli*) while he was away on a hunting trip. But his officers captured the rebels and Khan-i Zaman was publicly executed.

But while punishing rebels and conspirators, the king tried to lead a rational life. 'He founded a college', says the *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, 'and lived in the society of learned men in its precincts. Every day of the week had its specified business and Saturday was allotted for the company of Hindu and Buddhist priests.' The king, though a Shia, was not intolerant. Nevertheless, the Shia-Sunni fanaticism created by the case of Qazi Habib *versus* Yusuf Yandar (1568-69) brought ruin to his reign.

Qazi Habib, a Sunni, while riding on a Friday in a Srinagar street, came across one, Yusuf Yandar, a Shia.⁶ The qazi abused Yusuf for his religion; Yusuf abused the qazi on the same ground. The controversy was purely theological. The qazi struck Yusuf with his whip; Yusuf, 'a self-respecting soldier', struck the qazi with his sword—two blows or three blows. The qazi fell down from his horse, but recovered from his slight wounds. Yusuf went into hiding. The incident raised the sectarian frenzy of the people to a high pitch. The king and a large part of the governing class were Shias; the wazir and the mass of the people were Sunnis.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 243.

⁶ All historians concerned relate these events in detail, but from their own point of view—e.g. *Baharistan-i Shahi*, 245-53; *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (translation), 744-46. There is no difference about the outline of the events, though different writers indulge in horrifying details. Two accepted principles of medieval Muslim jurisprudence have to be kept in mind. (a) The king was the head of the state with reference to criminal law; appeals from the qazis could be made to him and he could not divest himself of his responsibility. (b) Secondly, *muftis* were only private citizens and the king was under no obligation to enforce their *fatawas*; they were not criminally responsible for the opinions they expressed, but which they had no means of enforcing.

The king left the matter to the decision of a group of Sunni *muftis*, who declared that Yusuf deserved the death penalty. So in spite of Qazi Habib's own protest, that the death-penalty could not be inflicted as he had survived, Yusuf Yandar was put to death. The king was clearly wrong in handing over his authority to the *muftis* and in failing to protect an innocent person. When the frenzy among the Sunnis had subsided, another body of Sunni *muftis*, led by Qazi Zain and Mulla Razi, made a house to house canvass to prove that the judgement against Yusuf Yandar was wrong by the law of all Muslim sects and of all creeds. At this juncture the king's youthful son, Ibrahim, died and he was made to feel that it was God's punishment. Then Mirza Muqem, a Shia who had come as Akbar's envoy, wished to deal with the matter, and Husain Shah left the matter to him. Only two of the *muftis*, who had passed the judgement against Yusuf—Mulla Yusuf Almas and Mulla Firuz—could be arrested, and Mirza Muqem ordered them to be dragged through the streets and put to death. This was a second grievous error; the *muftis* had only expressed their academic opinion and the death-penalty had been inflicted by the king's officers. Husain Shah sent his envoy, Yaqub Mirza, with Mirza Muqem and his daughter, who was probably intended for marriage with Akbar. Akbar's reply was to send back the princess and to put Mirza Muqem and Yaqub Mirza, the Kashmir envoy, to death.

The *Baharistan-i Shahi* blames the *ulama* at Akbar's court, specially Abdullah Sultanpuri and Abdun Nabi, for Akbar's decision. But the *ulama* had ceased to have any influence over Akbar's policy by then. The two real criminals were the king of Kashmir, who had against all proper traditions allowed the enforcement of a patently incorrect *fatawa*, and Mirza Muqem, who had no legal authority to inflict the death penalty on anyone.

Husain Shah fell seriously ill. It had been arranged that he would be succeeded by his brother, Ali Shah. But Husain was advised to nominate one of his sons. Ali Shah retired to Sopur, where he was joined by all the nobles, and in particular by Saiyyid Mubarak Baihaqi. When Ali Shah marched to Srinagar, Husain sent him the insignia of royalty and retired to Zainpur, where he died after a year and some days.

ZAHIRUDDIN MUHAMMAD ALI BADSHAH (1570-78)

'Ali Shah during his reign laid aside the practice of blinding, severing of limbs and the infliction of the death-penalty, which had been the tradition of former kings. He enforced justice and looked after the welfare of the subjects, so far as was possible. He also

rehabilitated noble families, who had fallen into distress.⁷ He worshipped God and was particular about his religious duties. On coming to the throne he appointed Saiyyid Mubarak Baihaqi as his wazir, and married his daughter to the Saiyyid's son, Abul Mu'ali. Saiyyid Mubarak Baihaqi, on whose advice the king almost entirely relied, was throughout his life pulled in two directions; he had the political ambitions of his ancestors but at the same time he wished to lead a secluded life of piety and prayer. As a result he retained his high office but tried to solve all problems by compromises and without bloodshed. The first two years of the reign were peaceful. Then Ali Chak, son of Nauroz, rebelled, but the Saiyyid insisted that he should not be punished but exiled to Kamraj. When Ali Chak broke his agreement and fled to seek help from Husain Quli Khan, Akbar's governor of the Punjab, the courtiers naturally blamed the Saiyyid for his leniency. However Husain Quli did not help him and Ali Chak was imprisoned when he returned to Kashmir again. Nevertheless, the Saiyyid set him free after some time with a present (*in'am*) of 100 gold coins.

The next rebellion was more serious. It had been arranged by Ghazi Shah that he would be succeeded by his brothers, Husain and Ali, but nothing had been decided about the future devolution of the crown. This led to strained relations between the king's son, Yusuf, and Aiba Chak, the son of Ghazi Shah. Yusuf went to Aiba's house, killed him and then retired to Sopur and raised the banner of revolt. The king ordered his brother, Abdal Chak, to take an army and crush the rebellion. But the Saiyyid was not prepared for a civil war between father and son. 'Will your Christ-like breath recall the dead to life?' he asked Abdal. Yusuf followed the Saiyyid's advice, came to Srinagar and was reconciled with his father. Later on, two other nobles, Shams Duni and Muhammad Maraj, who had rebelled and fled for safety to the Saiyyid's house, were also forgiven. The peace of the kingdom was also disturbed by the invasion of two pretenders from the Mir Shahi dynasty—Haidar Khan and Salim Khan, sons of Nazuk Shah. But Muhammad Khan Chak, a commander of the Kashmir army, handed over his superior officer, Lohar Chak, to Haidar; and when Haidar was deceived into considering Muhammad Khan his friend, he invited Salim to his camp and put him to death; he then fell on Haidar Khan and drove him away.

Saiyyid Mubarak's object may also have been to keep the country united in view of the growing expansion of the Mughal empire. When in 1578 two envoys of Akbar came to the country, Ali Shah received

them with honour and had the coinage and the *Khutba* put in Akbar's name. Kishtwar was twice invaded by Husain Shah's troops, but though on both occasions Bahadur Singh paid tribute, no permanent control of that principality was possible. Ali Shah, who was too fond of polo, fell down from his horse in such a way that the pommel of the saddle pierced his breast. He nominated his son, Yusuf, before expiring.

NASIRUDDIN MUHAMMAD YUSUF BADSHAH
GHAZI (1578-86)

Yusuf Shah was destined to fail as a ruler, but as a prince he is one of the most romantic figures in Kashmir history. He was a man of culture, a scholar, a born naturalist; and he spent much of his time in appreciating the beauties of Kashmir—her woods, meadows, springs and cascades. Along with his famous wife, Habba Khatun, he is said to have discovered the beauties of Gulmarg. Habba Khatun is remembered as the best and the most popular lady of romance in medieval Kashmir. Zun, for that was Habba's real name, was born in a village, Chandrahar, in the vicinity of the famous saffron fields of Pampur. She was beautiful and accomplished, with an affectionate heart and a ravishing voice. Though born in a middle class peasant family, she received an excellent education from the family *maulavi*; she knew the Quran by heart and could speak and write both Persian and Arabic.

But her happy maiden life ended when she was married to a pig-headed fool, from whom she obtained a divorce. It threw her for several years into misery and unhappiness, during which she tended cattle on the hills and dales, singing pathetic Kashmiri songs of her own composition, some of which are still very popular. Yusuf, then only a prince, happened to hear her and fell desperately in love. They got married and lived a happy life together. The surviving compositions of this lady are really peerless. Like her great predecessor, Lal Ded, she has been fortunate in the fact that tradition has preserved her name, her history, her songs and her *Shikayats* (Complaints). She may be justly regarded as the pride of Kashmir womanhood. In her songs she castigates society, because it was society that had destroyed the rose of her life. Her songs are painful and touching. Her marriage with Yusuf brought her into prominence, but when Yusuf was imprisoned by Akbar, she took to the life of a wandering *faqir*.⁸

⁸ Our knowledge of Habba Khatun is based on tradition: see Birbal Kachru, *Tarikh-i Kashmir*, 89-90 (manuscript in the Kashmir Archaeology and Research Library); *Tarikh-i Hasan*, 296-98, Vol. II; and Lawrence, *The Valley of Kashmir*, 193.

Yusuf Shah on his accession had to face two difficult problems. The first was the expansion of the Mughal empire. It was clear by now that Akbar would not tolerate any subordinate Muslim principality within his reach; that the privilege of having a *watan-jagir* was confined to Hindu dynasties of long standing; and that the honour of being represented by the heir-apparent at the Mughal court would only be extended, if at all, to the Rana of Mewar. Yusuf Shah lived in mortal fear of the Mughal empire. He was equally afraid of the 'gangsterism' of the Kashmir nobles—their constant intrigues, conspiracies, faithlessness in general and their readiness to resort to force. The third difficulty was of his own making; though he could put in hard work during a crisis, and some of his achievements are really surprising, he was too fond of enjoyment and pleasures. He was quite incapable of becoming the hero of Kashmir independence. This independence was the explicit desire of his advisers, but he knew that they would have no hesitation in deserting him. Had Yusuf Shah gone to Akbar on his own initiative at any time when he had full control of the valley, he could have got the highest *mansab* for himself, like the Persian governor of Kandhar, and the greatest possible privileges for his people. It would not have been a bad arrangement. But Yusuf took the wrong turn on all important occasions; the gangsters lost the independence of Kashmir, whatever its value; and Yusuf's end was tragically prosaic.

The conquest of Kashmir appertains to the reign of Akbar, the Great. Here it can only be traced in the briefest outline. Even before he could bury his father, Yusuf had to crush the rebellion of his uncle, Abdal Chak. Then a series of intrigues followed; the nobles, led by one Abdal Bhat, placed Saiyyid Mubarak on the throne, and Yusuf had to leave Kashmir before he had reigned for two months. The Saiyyid's aims are hard to understand, let alone justify. When placed on the throne, he behaved like a saint but insisted on exercising real authority, and this was not acceptable to the nobles, who had expected him to be a mere figure-head. So before he had 'reigned' for two or three months, they summoned him to a meeting to which he came overworked and sick. He was induced to abdicate, and the nobles put Lohar Chak, son of Shaunkar Chak, on the throne. Lohar Shah Chak's reign of one year (1579-80) was economically, perhaps, the happiest period in the history of the Chak kings. Foodstuffs became so cheap that one *kharwar* (ass-load) of *shali* (paddy) could be purchased for a copper coin, weighing one and a half *tola*; and the *Lohar mund*, the big, cheap loaf of Lohar's time, is proverbially quoted in our days.

On 3 January 1580, Yusuf Shah appeared as a suppliant before

Akbar at Fathpur Sikri and the emperor ordered Raja Man Singh and Yusuf Khan Rizvi to restore him to his throne. The Kashmir nobles, afraid of the Mughal army, promised to help him if he came without foreign assistance. They did not keep their promise; still Yusuf decided not to come with a foreign army, and enlisting such troopers as would join him, he defeated his opponents at the battle of Sopur on 8 November 1580. Lohar Chak was captured and blinded; severe punishments were meted out to his partisans also. During the next two years Yusuf was busy in suppressing domestic rebellions.

In 1581, when returning from Kabul, Akbar sent Mirza Tahir and Saleh Diwana as his envoys to Kashmir. Yusuf received the envoys with great respect and sent his third son, Haidar, a minor, to the imperial court. But the envoys informed Akbar that Yusuf was behaving like an independent ruler. In 1582 Akbar ordered Haidar to be returned as he was unfit for military service and sent a formal *farman* to Yusuf summoning him to the imperial court; Yusuf in reply sent his eldest son, Yaqub. In 1585 Akbar sent Hakim Ali Jilani and Bahauddin Kamboli from Kalanaur to bring Yusuf to his court; but the Kashmiri nobles gave Yusuf an ultimatum that if he left them, they would raise his son, Yaqub, who had fled back, to the throne and resist the invader. Akbar's envoys returned after waiting for some time. It was obvious that an imperial army would have to conquer the country.

In December 1585, Akbar sent an army against Kashmir under Raja Bhagwandas and other officers by the Pakhli pass. The pass was well-chosen but not the season. The Raja's army suffered terribly, while Yusuf, on his part, made a show of collecting his whole army though he had no intention of fighting to the last ditch. Two secret emissaries of the Raja succeeded in convincing Yusuf that his cause was hopeless. So hiding the fact from his officers, Yusuf escaped to the imperial camp. His treaty with the Raja definitely promised that he would be allowed to return as a ruler and the items of imperial control—*shawl*, *shikar*, saffron and *sikka* (mint)—were explicitly enumerated. The Raja's army returned with Yusuf in its camp. But Akbar ordered Yusuf to be imprisoned and Raja Bhagwandas attempted to commit suicide. After he had been in prison for two and a half years, Yusuf was given a *mansab* of 500 under Raja Man Singh in Bihar. He died in September 1592.

NASIRUDDIN MUHAMMAD YAQUB SHAH (1586-88)

When the Mughal army withdrew, the Kashmir nobles placed Yaqub on the throne, and put the coinage and the *Khutba* in his name. But both Yaqub and the nobles ignored the precarious

position of the country. Yaqub showed an intolerance towards the Sunnis, which, to say the least, was ill-timed; it led to a revolt of the Sunni nobles and Yaqub put Qazi Musa, a Sunni divine, to death because he would not change the form of the Friday sermon. Representatives of the harassed Kashmir nobles appealed to Akbar to finally annex the country, and a Mughal army under the *amir-i bahr* Mir Qasim and other officers invaded Kashmir in the summer of 1586. Srinagar was occupied without any opposition and many Kashmiri nobles submitted. But Mir Qasim was unable to subdue the whole valley against the repeated attacks of Yaqub Shah and one Shams Chak, who had also declared himself king. At times the Mughals in Srinagar itself were hard-pressed. Mir Qasim, whose political policy had been a failure, was summoned back and his successor, Yaqub Rizvi, succeeded in winning over the nobles. Shams Chak surrendered, and when Akbar came to Kashmir in the summer of 1588, Yaqub also surrendered. He was kept a prisoner at first but was given the command of his father after his death. He was probably poisoned soon after. It appears from the *Baharistan-i Shahi* and the *History of Haidar Malik* that many Kashmiri nobles, including Saiyyid Mubarak Baihaqi and his son, Abul Mu'ali, were brought to India and given employment or *jagirs*.

The annexation of Kashmir to Mughal India opened a new era for both. The Mughal governors may not have been always up to the standard, but the peculiar gangsterism that had prevailed in the country since the death of Hasan Shah was brought to an end. Something was no doubt lost but more was gained. The southern passes were opened, and the art-products of Kashmir could now find a world market. The views of the Kashmiris also broadened with the march of time. The unwritten laws of the Mughal empire prevented the Chaks from being appointed to high *mansabs* in view of their past, but there was equality of opportunities for Kashmiris and non-Kashmiris. And no critic will assert that the Mughal emperors failed to appreciate the value of Kashmir and its people.

CHAPTER TEN

RAJASTHAN¹

I. THE HOUSE OF MEWAR

THE RISE OF THE RAJPUTS

THE MOST CONSPICUOUS PHENOMENON of the early medieval period was the rise into political prominence of new royal families, which are collectively known as Rajputs. During the period preceding and following the supremacy of the early and later Guptas, many foreign races, like the Sakas, the Pahlavas and the Hunas had come to India, settled in the northern parts of the country, assimilated Indian culture, manners and customs and got merged with the Kshatriyas and other warlike elements. The chiefs of these new races claimed descent from the sun, the moon and *agni*. Out of regard for their valour and their devotion to neo-Vaishnavism, the priestly class and the hards conferred upon them the status of Kshatriyas. As this new class enjoyed royal privileges, the title of Rajputs—*Rajputra* or princes of royal blood—was given to them. In course of time the Kshatriya and the Rajput became identical. Though it would be dull and tedious to trace the connecting link between the outgoing Kshatriyas and the newly emergent Rajputs, it is interesting to note that the Rajputs trace their genealogy in an unbroken line from the seventh or the eighth century. This kind of supposed continuity at least suggests, if it does not conclusively prove, that the Rajputs were the representatives of the Kshatriyas.

1 The following abbreviations have been used in the footnotes of this chapter:

ALB	— <i>Anoop Library</i> , Bikaner.
Annals	— <i>Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan</i> by Col. J. Tod.
ARRMA	— <i>Annual Report Rajputana Museum</i> , Ajmer.
Briggs	— <i>Tarikh-i Firishta</i> .
BSS	— <i>Bombay Sanskrit Series</i> .
BRI	— <i>Bikaner Rajya-ka-Itihas</i> .
DRI	— <i>Dungarpur Rajya-ka-Itihas</i> .
GOS	— <i>Gayakwad Oriental Series</i> .
ED	— Elliot and Dowson, <i>History of India as Told by Its Own Historians</i> .
EI	— <i>Epigraphia Indica</i> .

THE EXTENT AND PHYSICAL FEATURES OF
RAJASTHAN

The land which the Rajputs occupied in northern India also came to be called after them—that is Rajasthan, 'the abode of the princes'. It comprised independent and semi-independent principalities, the chief of which were Maru, Mada, Jangaladesh, Ajayameru, Arbud, Mewar, Vagad, Devaliya, Dhundhar and Haraoti, roughly corresponding to the modern regions of Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, Bikaner, Ajmer, Sirohi, Udaipur, Dungarpur and Pratapgarh, Jaipur, Kota and Bundi respectively. These units assumed their independent forms through a gradual process of expansion and contraction. But on the whole it remained approximately bounded by the empire of Delhi in the north, north-east and east, the province of Malwa in the south-west, Gujarat in the south and Uchh, Dipalpur and Multan in the west. It is now enclosed within the space of nearly 8° of latitude and 9° of longitude, embracing an area of about 3,50,000 square miles.²

Roughly speaking, Rajasthan in shape is an irregular rhombus presenting a great variety of physical features. The ranges of the Aravallis stretch from north to south-east in the midst of the great desert of the west, the cultivated plains of north-east and the prosperous plateau of the south-west. The river systems of north-eastern and south-western slopes contain the rich valleys and fertile and populous parts of Rajasthan.³

These geographical features have, to a large extent, determined the political boundaries and settlements of Rajasthan and affected the social, cultural and economic life of the people. The hilly regions offered facilities for complete military protection against attacks and provided strongholds for organizing defence. The desert areas also helped in securing refuge against the invaders. The physical surroundings of the region nourished a resolute, enduring and audacious

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| IHRC | — <i>Indian Historical Records Commission.</i> |
| JASB | — <i>Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.</i> |
| Jain Lekha Sangraha | — P. C. Nahar, <i>Jain Lekha Sangraha.</i> |
| JARI | — <i>Jaipur Alwar Rajya-ka-Itihas—Gahilot.</i> |
| Minhaj | — Minhajus Siraj, <i>Tabaqat-i Nasiri.</i> |
| Nizamuddin | — <i>Tabaqat-i Akbari</i> by Nizamuddin Ahmad Bakhshi. |
| Rasmala | — Forbes, <i>Rasmala.</i> |
| SBLU | — <i>Saraswati Bhawan Library, Udaipur.</i> |
| SJGM | — <i>Singhot Jain Granth Mala.</i> |
| SRI | — <i>Sirohi Rajya-ka-Itihas.</i> |
| URI | — <i>Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas.</i> |
| Vir Vinod | — Kaviraja Shyamaldas, <i>Vir Vinod.</i> |

² Tod, *Annals*, p. 1.

³ *Ibid.*, 7-15.

spirit, which enabled its inhabitants to hold out against their enemies, even when they were reduced to great straits. This feeling of security—the insularity of Rajasthan—has been the dominating fact of its history. It is true that its homeland as well as its border territories were often exposed to invasions during the period under review, but it is equally true that from the Arab invasions up to the beginning of the sixteenth century no invader succeeded in completely conquering it. The abundance of luxuriant vegetation, the peaceful atmosphere of the fertile valleys and productive land of the plateau have also contributed to the cultural development of Rajasthan.

RAJASTHAN AND ITS NEIGHBOURS

Towards the end of the fourteenth century of the Christian era the empire of Delhi had been reduced to meagre dimensions, while the provincial governors or *maqtas*, taking advantage of the chaotic state of the country, consolidated their territorial resources and declared themselves independent. Thus province after province separated itself from the Delhi sultanat. During this state of rapid disintegration and reintegration, various Rajput clans, among whom may be included the Guhilots, Chauhans, Rathors, Kachhwahas, Hadads, etc., who were exercising their political influence in different regions of Rajasthan, exerted their strength against the rulers of Delhi, Malwa and Gujarat, although they were then too disunited to establish an empire or kingdom of Rajasthan. Of course, rulers like Rana Kumbha, Raja Jodha and Rana Sanga organized powerful states of their own, patronized arts and letters and asserted their military power against the neighbouring Muslim kingdoms and, later on, against the Mughals.

THE GUHILOTS OF MEWAR, BAPA RAWAL

The earliest Rajput clan, which is said to have migrated from Gujarat and dominated the south-western part of Rajasthan in the seventh century A.D., was that of the Guhilots. The importance of this clan was due, in the first instance, to its stability, for it outlived the eight centuries during which India was dominated by Delhi; but it also won honour and glory by the prolonged and determined resistance which it offered to Turkish aggression.

In the illustrious dynasty of Mewar the name of Bapa Rawal occupies a pre-eminent place. Starting with the occupation of the territory in and around Nagda, a small town fourteen miles to the north of Udaipur, he succeeded in capturing the fort of Chitor from Man Mori (the last king of the Mori line) with the blessings of Harita, a Pashupata saint. He is credited by the *Khyats* for having success-

fully repelled the attacks of an Arab general, probably Junaïd. After living a long life of heroic efforts to extend his dominion far and wide, he retired in favour of his son, became a Shaivite recluse and died at a ripe old age.⁴

Bapa's descendant, Khumman II (A.D. 812-36), maintained the warlike reputation of his predecessor in the ninth century by making a common cause with the rulers of Gujarat in checking the Arab expansion beyond Multan and Sindh during the caliphate of Mamun Rashid.⁵

During the four centuries that followed, the Guhilots of Mewar had occasionally to face reverses at the hands of their powerful neighbours, the Chauhan kings of Sambhar, the Pramara kings of Malwa and the Chalukyas of Gujarat.⁶ Ahar, their new capital near Udaipur, was occupied by Vakpatiraja II, the Chauhan king of Sambhar.⁷ There was also a temporary occupation of Chitor by Munja II, the Pramara king of Malwa.⁸ However, the Guhilots did not submit meekly but remained restive and gathered their strength slowly and steadily. The defeat of Prithviraja Chauhan by Mu'izzuddin Ghuri and the weakness of the kingdoms of Gujarat and Malwa offered a favourable opportunity to Jaitra Singh (1213-61) to consolidate his own power and shake off completely the ascendancy of rival princes. He tried to check the advance of the Turks towards Rajasthan; but Iltutmish destroyed Nagda and this compelled Jaitra Singh to make Chitor the seat of the government.⁹

Alauddin's attack on Chitor in 1303 has been described in a previous chapter. Amir Khusrau, who was personally present, says that two frontal attacks on the fort failed. Then, for some unknown reason, possibly an epidemic in the fort, Rana Ratan Singh came out of the fort, submitted and was forgiven. The heir-apparent, Khizr Khan, was given nominal charge of Mewar, but Malik Shahin, the *naib-i barbek*, was given real administrative responsibility. Malik Shahin, however, fled to Rai Karan in Gujarat, and Alauddin assigned Chitor to Rana

4 Nensi's *Khyat*, f. 2(b): *Shisod Vanshavali*, f. 7b.

5 *Rawal Ranaji—ri-cat*, f. 5(b); Tod, *Annals*, Vol. I, 294.

6 *Dynastic History of Northern India*, II, 1153-63.

7 *Prithviraja Vijaya*, vv, 55-60.

8 *Chirva Inscription*, EI., II, 421. *Chitorgarh Inscription of Kumarpala*, *Vienna Oriental Journal*, XXI, 142-62.

9 *Chirva Inscription*, vv. 5-20, 28, 48; *Ghaghra Inscription*, v. 6; *Abu Inscription*, v. 42; *Vastupala Inscription*, vv. 65-69; *Hammiramadmardana*, 1-11; *Vienna Oriental Journal*, XXI, 142, XXXI, 142; EI., Vol. 16, 349; Briggs: *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 157, 207; Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, I, 156-67; Dr. R. P. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), pp. 38-39.

Maldeva, who had been in his service and was the son of Rana Ratan Singh's sister (Brigg's *Ferishta*).

What happened to Chitor after the death of Maldeva is not clear. Perhaps tribal jealousies flared up, and Jaisa, a son of the deceased chief, fled to Delhi to seek the help of Sultan Muhammad Tughluq. According to the Rajput bards the Sultan led an expedition to Chitor but was defeated and taken prisoner by Hamir. For various reasons this appears to be quite impossible. What may be justly presumed is that, taking advantage of the dynastic revolution at Delhi, Hamir (1326-64) occupied Chitor, ousted the Chauhans and laid the foundation of the Sisodia rule there.¹⁰ Not only this, he also helped Devi Singh Hada to expel the Minas and occupy Bundi.¹¹ He consolidated his power and extended the frontiers of his kingdom. His influence and leadership were recognized by the rulers of Marwar, Amber and others as far as Gwalior, Raisen, Chanderi and Kalpi.¹² He left a name which is still honoured for gallantry and valour of a very high order.

Hamir¹³ bequeathed a strong kingdom to his son, Kshetra Singh, who succeeded him about the year 1364. He worthily upheld the family reputation by capturing and annexing Ajmer, Jahazpur, Mandalgarh and Chhappan, and by obtaining a victory over Dilawar Khan Ghuri of Malwa. He also subjugated the Hadas of Hadavati.¹⁴

LAKHA (1382-1421)

Lakha mounted the throne of Chitor in 1382. His first act was the subjugation of the mountainous region of Marwar and the destruction of the frontier chiefs. He vanquished the Mers and Bhils of Chhappan, defeated the Sankhala Rajputs of Nagarchal at Amber and captured the Badnor region.¹⁵ He maintained the traditional hostility towards the Turks. Luck also favoured him for during his reign silver and lead mines were discovered at Jawar, which substantially strengthened the financial resources of the state. The wealth of the mines was utilized by him in rebuilding the temples and palaces, which had been levelled with the ground by Alauddin Khalji, and in constructing dams to form reservoirs and lakes. The Pichchola lake of Udaipur was excavated

10 *Mahavirswami Inscription*, Chitor, V.S. 1495 (A.D. 1438), BSS, Vol. 23, 50.

11 Nensi's *Khyat*, f. 23.

12 Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, I, 233-43.

13 'Hammir' is the correct Rajasthan pronunciation, but Persian histories write it as 'Hamir' and this spelling has been adopted in the preceding chapters. I have written 'Hamir' in the text but 'Hammir' in the footnotes.

14 *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, v. 198; *Eklinga Inscriptions*, v. 31; *Bhavanagar Inscription*, 119; *Shringirish Inscription*, v. 7.

15 *Eklinga Inscription*, v. 35; *Bhavanagar Inscription*, 119; *Chitor Inscription*, v. 38; EI, Vol. 2, 415-16.

during his reign. He is known to have erected massive strongholds and ramparts for organizing his military power. During his reign, two important Sanskrit poets, Jhotinga Bhatta and Dhaneshwara Bhatta, lived at his court.¹⁶

Of Lakha's numerous progeny, Chunda, the eldest, was his heir, but on account of strange circumstances he had to forgo his right of succession to the *gaddi*. Once the Rathor chief, Rao Ranmal of Mandor, sent an offer of his sister for Chunda, the heir of Mewar. Chunda being absent at the time, Rana Lakha in jest remarked that such an offer could not be meant for an old greybeard like himself. When the harmless jest was reported to the crown-prince, he declined the match. Thereupon the old Rana accepted the offer on condition that the male issue from the Rathor princess should succeed him. Chunda willingly and selflessly resigned his birth-right. In recognition of the voluntary sacrifice made by Chunda in renouncing his claim to the throne of Mewar, the Rana conferred upon him the privilege of the first place in the councils of the state and authorized him to superadd his symbol, the lance, on all deeds of grant. The Rawats of Salumber, the lineal descendants of Chunda, long held this right in memory of their filial respect of the great hero.¹⁷

MOKAL (1421-33)

Mokal succeeded his father in 1421 at the age of twelve, and for a time Chunda conducted all public affairs on behalf of his minor brother with skill and devotion. But polygamy proved to be a fertile source of trouble. Hansa Bai, the queen-mother, watched the growing influence of Chunda with a suspicious and jealous eye; and regarding herself as the natural guardian of her minor son, she doubted the integrity of Chunda. And Chunda, out of regard for the feelings of his step-mother, retired to the court of Mandu, where he was welcomed with honour.¹⁸

The queen-mother, then, invited Ranmal, her brother, from Marwar to take up the reins of the government in his hands on behalf of Mokal, the minor ruler. Ranmal took charge of the administration and conferred all high posts upon his own clansmen and numerous followers. Thus it appeared that Mewar was completely under the tutelage of the Rathors.¹⁹

While Ranmal was attending to the business of the administration,

¹⁶ *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 308; *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 280-82.

¹⁷ *Tod, Annals*, 224; *Rajputana Gazetteers*, Vol. II — A, 16. *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 285-86.

¹⁸ *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 271-72.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 272.

Mokal was strengthening his territory by waging continuous wars against his enemies. He undertook an expedition to Nagaur and won a victory at Rampura over Firuz Khan about 1428. He overran the territories of Sambhar and Jalor. He is said to have succeeded in inflicting a crushing defeat upon Ahmad Shah of Gujarat. He also besieged the fort of Jahazpur and humbled the pride of the Hadas.²⁰

Mewar not only became a great power during the reign of Mokal; the period was also marked by considerable intellectual and artistic activities. Mokal repaired the temple of Samidheshwara at Chitor, a magnificent relic of Rajput art. He constructed the ramparts around the Eklinga temple. The epigraphs of his time record benefactions to several temples of Shiva, Vishnu and Shakti. As a pious follower of Brahmanism, he constructed a beautiful tank at *Papamochan Tirtha* and celebrated *tuladans* of gold, silver and precious jewels. The famous sculptors, Mana, Fanna and Visal, flourished in Mowar under royal patronage. A scholar, Yogeshwar, better known as Kaviraj Vanivilas, and another scholar, Bhatta Vishnu, adorned his court with their learning. He took a great interest in the teaching of the Vedas to the Brahmins and established a seminarv for the purpose.²¹

Towards the close of his life, Mokal's enemies became very strong and powerful. As the result of a well-planned conspiracy, when he was busy quelling a revolt in the region of the western hills, he was murdered in cold blood by his uncles, Chacha and Mera, the natural sons of Kshetra Singh.²²

KUMBHA (1433-68)

Mokal was succeeded by his son, Kumbha, in the year 1433. Kumbha's first task was to punish Chacha and Mera along with their fellow-conspirators. Ranmal, the brother of Hansa Bai, who had recovered the throne of Marwar with the help of Mokal, came to Mewar with 500 horsemen to avenge the murder of his benefactor. He started with the Sisodia and Rathor contingents in pursuit of the assassins towards the Pai hills. Luckily he got the cooperation of a Bhil chief, who enabled him to trace the culprits in that inaccessible region. The zeal and intrepidity of his followers enabled him to capture the offenders, who were put to the sword. Many of their followers either shared the fate of their leaders or fell into the chains of bondage. The valiant Rathor took Chacha's daughter to wife and reserved 500

²⁰ *Mokal Inscription*, V.S. 1485, v. 51; *Shringirishi Inscription*, v. 14; *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, v. 221; *Daksinadwara Inscription*, v. 43.

²¹ *Shringirishi Inscription*, v. 16; *Jawar Inscription*, V.S. 1478; *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, vv. 22, 24, 39, 225, etc., EI, Vol. II, 410-21; *Bhavanagar Inscription*, 96-100.

²² *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 278.

girls, who had fallen into his hands, for distribution among his favourites.²³

Raghadeva, brother of Chunda, who was assisting the Rana in conducting the administration of the state, did not like the idea of enslaving these innocent girls. He, therefore, removed the maidens to his own camp and organised a party of nobles to free the state from the growing menace of the Rathors. Ranmal, on his part, devised a plan to put an end to Raghadeva's life. One day the latter was invited to a *darbar*, where he was given a robe of honour. As he was putting it on, his arms became entangled with the sleeves, and he was cut to pieces then and there by Ranmal's men.²⁴

The murder of Raghadeva sent a thrill of horror through the entire state and naturally excited the jealousy of the chiefs of Mewar. Ranmal's overbearing action was taken to indicate an attempt to reduce the influence of the Rana and to ensure the dominance of the Rathor bureaucracy. In order to remove Ranmal from his position of authority, Chunda was invited to come back to his land and save it from the clutches of the Rathors. Chunda started immediately in response to this invitation, and on reaching Chitor, he removed the Rathor outposts from the neighbourhood of the fort. In the meantime the chiefs of Mewar, who were jealous of the Rathors, hatched a plot with the help of a fair maid, named Bharmali, with whom Ranmal was in love. She tied Ranmal to his bed with his turban at a time when he was quite intoxicated; he was then shot dead by those who were apprehensive of their position and the future of their country. Thus Rathor interference in Mewar politics came to an end.²⁵

Kumbha's Wars and Conquests

Having secured his power at home, Kumbha turned his attention to conquests. The warlike activities of the Sisodia house reached their zenith under him. The contemporary inscriptions discovered at Chitor,²⁶ Kumbhalgarh,²⁷ Ranpur²⁸ and literary works, like the *Eklingamahatmya*,²⁹ throw a flood of light on his exploits. He vanquished his enemies, reduced them to submission and added parts

²³ *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 319.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 319.

²⁵ Nensi's *Khyat*, ff. 148(a), 150(b); *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 221-22; Sarda, *Maharana Kumbha*, 58-65.

²⁶ *Kirtisthambha Inscription*, vv. 11, 12, 18-23, 150, 187, etc.

²⁷ *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, vv. 262-64.

²⁸ *Ranpur Inscription*, *Bhavanagar Inscription*, 114.

²⁹ *Eklingamahatmya*, *Rajvarana*, vv. 1-204.

of their territories to his kingdom. Places like Virndavati (Bundi), Hadavati (Kota), Chatsu, Malpura, Amradadri (Amber), Nardiyanagar (Narwar), Naraina, Giripur (Dungarpur) and Sarangpur were conquered by him and then returned to their rulers, who acknowledged his suzerainty or at least remained within the sphere of his political influence. He annexed Sapadlaksha (Sambhar), Didwana, Mandor, Nagaur, Ranthambhor, Sirohi, Gagraun, Abu, Mandalgarh, Ajayameru (Ajmer) and Toda. Places which fell within the jurisdiction of Mewar but showed signs of independence, e.g., Yagnapur (Jahazpur), Yoginipur (Jawar), Vardhavan (Badnor) and Hamirpur (Hamirgarh) were taken after continued fighting. These expeditions resulted in the acquisition of immense wealth; Rana Kumbha won a reputation for victories over the enemies of his state and established garrisons on the frontiers of his kingdom.³⁰

Kumbha's Relations with Malwa

When Kumbha ascended the throne, Malwa had attained to considerable power under Mahmud Khalji I. Malwa offered shelter to the chiefs of Mewar, who had some grievance or other against their own state. Thus Chunda, Aija and Mahpa Panwar were received with open arms by the government of Malwa.³¹ The growing power of Malwa naturally did not look favourably towards the Rana's assertion of suzerainty over Haraoti, Mandasor, Gagraun and other Rajput principalities of the border, which had once acknowledged the authority of Malwa. Moreover, Kumbha's efficient garrisoning of his frontier outposts added to the Sultan's anxiety. Further, a promise by the Rana to help Umar Khan to get the throne of Malwa from Mahmud Khalji was taken as an indication of hostile intentions of the Rana towards the Sultan.

The leaders of both kingdoms made no secret of their ambitions and were in search of some pretext for open hostility. The opportunity came when the Rana made a demand for the person of Mahpa Panwar, one of the assassins of Mokal, who had sought shelter with the Sultan. Mahmud, thinking that Mewar was in a state of turmoil owing to the rivalry between the Sisodias and Rathors, declined to surrender the refugee; and this refusal was taken as a signal for war. Immediately both armies moved forward and met in 1437 near Sarangpur, and a severe engagement ended in the utter rout of the Sultan's forces. According to Rajasthan bardic traditions, which find confirmation in Ranpur and Kumbhalgarh inscriptions, the Rana burnt down Sarang-

³⁰ Sarda, *Maharana Kumbha*, 77-84; Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 209-308.

³¹ According to the historians of Malwa they were given jagirs within the state.

pur, captured countless captives, laid siege to Mandu and carried Mahmud as prisoner of war to Chitor. In commemoration of this victory he is said to have erected the triumphal pillar—Jaistambha—in the fort of Chitor.³²

Mahmud Khalji was kept a prisoner in Bhakshi for a period of six months, after which on account of the Rana's generosity, he was sent back to his kingdom. According to some writers this was an act of misplaced generosity due to lack of political insight, because Sultan Mahmud after regaining his freedom embarked on a ceaseless war of revenge against Mewar. But, in fact, the Rana acted wisely as it was not possible for him to keep control over Malwa for a longer time.

This defeat at the hands of Rana Kumbha continually rankled in the mind of Sultan Mahmud and he took full five years in making preparations to avenge the insult to which he had been subjected. There was some confusion in Mewar in 1438 after the murder of Ranmal; in 1441 Khem Karan, the brother of the Rana, was expelled from Mewar and found an asylum at Mandu; and in 1442 Sultan Mahmud marched against Mewar. He directed his first attack on the fort of Kumbhalgarh, which was repulsed by a desperate action of the Rajputs. Having failed to make any impression on the fort itself, the Sultan led an assault on the temple of Banmata, which was situated at the foot of the hill. The temple was properly garrisoned and could not be occupied immediately; but after seven days of heroic defence under the command of Dip Singh, the temple fell into the hands of the Sultan. It was razed to the ground and the images were burnt to ashes. The entire force then moved to Chitor; but here the stubborn resistance of the Rajputs made victory impossible. After all the inconvenience he had to face in crossing the hilly tracts of Mewar, the Sultan retreated back to his own capital.³³

Owing to the repeated failures of the Malwa army, the Sultan began to feel that the attempt to conquer Mewar was a perilous enterprise. The physical features of the region and its great distance from Mandu made the permanent subjugation of Mewar impossible. Mahmud, therefore, decided to change his plan of action. He gave up the policy of attempting to penetrate into the interior of Mewar, but tried to occupy the border areas of Malwa, which were merely within Mewar's sphere of political influence. With a grim determination he

³² *Ranpur Inscription*, V.S. 1496 (A.D. 1439), lines 17-18; *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, vv. 268-70; Nensi's *Khyat*, f. 178a; *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 320. (There are pillars of victory both at Chitor and at Mandu. For an alternative interpretation see U. N. Day's Chapter on Malwa — Editor.)

³³ *Ferishta*, Vol. IV, 208-9; *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 325; Sarda, *Maharana Kumbha*, 85-86.

led his forces in 1444 against the Khichis of Gagraun, who had acknowledged the Rana's suzerainty. The boldness and vigour of the Sultan's army brought success and the fort was occupied within a week. Two years later he proceeded against the fort of Ranthambhor and put it under the command of Saifuddin.³⁴

Emboldened by his success, the Sultan proceeded towards Ajmer in 1455 and inflicted a crushing defeat upon Gajadhar, governor of Ajmer. Saif Khan was appointed governor on behalf of Malwa and the attendants of the holy place were rewarded. After the border areas had been brought under the control of the Sultan and his line of communication had been properly guarded, better success attended his arms in his last expedition against Mandalgarh in 1457. The idols of the temples were overthrown and treated with indignity, and mosques were constructed from the material of the temples. After making necessary arrangements for the administration of the fort, Mahmud returned to his capital.³⁵

Relations of Kumbha with Gujarat

During the confusion that followed the repeated and pressing offensive wars of Mahmud, Sultan Qutbuddin of Gujarat marched towards Mewar at the head of a large army on the pretext of avenging the wrong done to Shams Khan of Nagaur. The Deora chief of Sirohi also attended upon Qutbuddin on the way and appealed for his help in recovering the fortress of Abu, which had been forcibly seized from him by Rana Kumbha. The Sultan deputed Malik Shaban to lay siege to Abu and hand it over to the Deora chief, but the Rana's forces rendered all his attempts futile. The Sultan, on his part, failed to recover Nagaur for Shams Khan. He laid waste the Rana's territory in his rage and returned to his capital.³⁶

On returning to his capital, Qutbuddin received a proposal from Mahmud Khalji for joint action against the Rana; the two sultans were to ravage those parts of the Rana's territory which adjoined their dominions. The suggestion of a treaty to this effect was favourably received by Qutbuddin and in response to it the forces of Gujarat marched towards Kumbhalgarh in 1457. Mahmud, on his part, moved towards Mandsor in order to invest the fort of Mandalgarh. From the account of Ferishta and the Kumbhalgarh inscription it appears that

³⁴ *Ma'asir-i Mahmudshahi*, ff. 135b, 137a-b, 138b; *Zafrul Walih*, 199, cited in the chapter in this work on 'The Independent Kingdom of Malwa'.

³⁵ *Ferishta*, Vol. IV, 214-15; 221-24.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 40-41.

prolonged sieges and hardships exhausted the patience of both sultans, and they decided to retire to their capitals.³⁷

One cannot fail to observe that in these wars Rana Kumbha generally followed a defensive policy while the policy of the sultans of Malwa and Gujarat was offensive. The reason is not far to seek. The position of the Rana was difficult because he had to face internal disturbances as well as foreign invasions; in particular the Rathors headed by Jodha were a constant thorn in his side. He could not take the offensive against Malwa and Gujarat, but it must be said in his favour that, in spite of these prolonged wars, he did not lose an inch of his patrimonial kingdom and that the contest was left unfinished. The hostile relations between Rana Kumbha and the two sultans were left as an inheritance to their successors.

Kumbha's Achievements

Kumbha was not only great in war, he was also great in the arts of peace. He was an accomplished scholar, learned in sacred lore, a poet of the highest order and a patron of learning. He was equally at home in logic, philosophy, mathematics, political science, grammar, metaphysics and general literature. The authorship of the commentary on *Gita Govind*, named *Rasika Priya*, and the last part of the *Eklīngamahatmya* have been attributed to him. There are references in contemporary records which lead us to conclude that four dramas were written by him. He had a good command of the Sanskrit, Prakrit, Karnatakī, Medapatī and Maharashtrī languages, and made extensive use of them in his writings. He was an excellent musician and possessed a knowledge of the science of music, which was unequalled in his time. He was an accomplished player on the *vina*; his works, like *Sangitarāja*, *Sangita Mimāṃsā*, *Sudprabandha* and *Sangita Ratnakar*, are evidence of his mastery of the science. A great scholar himself, the Rana was also interested in the promotion of learning. He extended his patronage to Atri and Mahesh, the celebrated composers of the inscription of the Tower of Victory.³⁸

He took great interest in architecture and was an enthusiastic builder. In spite of the pressure of constant wars, he found time for beneficent undertakings. He repopulated Vasantapur, and built several palaces, monasteries, inns and schools. He dug several lakes for irrigation purposes as well as stepped wells and reservoirs for storing water.

³⁷ *Mirat-i Sikandari*, 148-49; *Kirtisthambha Inscription*, vv. 18-23; Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 202-3.

³⁸ *Eklīngamahatmya Rajvarnana*, vv. 172-73; *Kirtisthambha Inscription*, vv. 157-66, 191-92.

He constructed Kirtisthambha in Chitor, a monument of his genius and superb architectural taste. During his reign the temples of *Sringar Chori*, *Kumbhashyam*, *Chaturmukha Vihar*, etc. were constructed; they reveal the art of stone-building, sculpture, design and execution in its perfection.³⁹

His architectural capacity was also manifested in the construction of a line of gigantic forts, which are the highest achievements of his military and constructive genius. Forts like Kumbhalgarh, Achalgarh, Machan, Kolana, Vairat, etc. were constructed to strengthen the defences of Mewar and also to protect his frontiers against the Mers and the Bhils of Aravalli. He also strengthened the defences of Chitor and built seven of its gates and a road leading up the hill. Numerous artisans were employed by the state of whom Jaita, Napa, Punja, Dipa, etc. were well known. The chief architect of the state was Mandan, who was not only a qualified artisan but was also a great writer of books on architecture and sculpture.⁴⁰

It is a sad irony of fate that such an accomplished ruler should become the victim of a wanton assassination contrived in 1468 by Uda, 'the inordinately tyrannical son of Kumbha who bore wild ambition and passion'. Such was the end of Kumbha, who left behind him a name which is honoured in history and is remembered to this day as one of the greatest rulers of Hindu India.

U D A (1 4 6 8 - 7 3)

On his accession to the throne in 1468, Uda found himself in a difficult situation. The nobles could not forget the murder of Rana Kumbha and secretly plotted to avenge it. Being helpless at home, Uda looked abroad for assistance to maintain his position. He handed over Abu to the Deora chief of Sirohi and bestowed Sambhar, Ajmer and the adjacent districts on the ruler of Jodhpur to make sure of his help against his own kinsmen. The disaffected nobles of Mewar, in order to get rid of the patricide, invited Raimal, the younger brother of Uda, from Idar to Mewar. When in response to this invitation Raimal reached the hilly region of Chhappan, Uda tried to oppose his progress at various places like Jawar, Dadimpur, Javi, Pangarh and Chitor. But when Uda at last suffered a severe defeat at the capital, he made off for Sojat with some money and a few horses.

³⁹ *Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India* for 1907-8, 205, 211; *History of Indian and Eastern Architecture*, 241-42; Cunningham's *Archaeological Survey Report*, Vol. XXIII, 118; Sarda, *Maharana Kumbha*, 146-62.

⁴⁰ *Kirtisthambha Inscription*, 8-10, 34-42; *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, vv. 184-241; *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-ka Itihas*, Vol. I, 308-12; Dr. R. P. Tripathi: *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), 82-88.

Finding his position insecure in Marwar also, he left for the court of Mandu to seek the help of the Sultan of Malwa for regaining his authority. But the patricide, who was not destined to enjoy the sovereignty of Mewar again, was struck dead by a sudden stroke of lightning. His reign had lasted only for five years.⁴¹

RAIMAL (1473-1508)

Though Raimal had been successful in wresting the sceptre from the impious hands of his murderous brother in 1473, he was not recognized as the rightful heir to the throne by a certain section of the nobles. Sahasmal and Surajmal, the two sons of the patricide, were also secretly plotting to avenge the defeat of their father. Another Surajmal, a son of Kshema Singh and a grandson of Rana Mokal, who had effectively brought under his sway the distant territory of Sadri, was also cherishing the dream of capturing the supreme authority for himself. During this period of crisis Raimal acted with commendable energy and ability. In order to meet the danger from his nephews, he strengthened himself by matrimonial alliances with his immediate neighbours. He gave one daughter in marriage to the Yadu chief of Girnar, and bestowed another daughter on the Deora chief of Sirohi. These early measures restored order in the state and re-established the moral prestige of the monarchy.

But such alliances could not make Mewar safe from external attacks. Taking advantage of the mutual jealousies and quarrels among the members of the royal family, Sultan Ghiyasuddin of Malwa took up the cause of the sons of the deceased Uda and laid siege to the fort of Chitor. The Rana faced the invading army of Malwa with vigour and courage, and compelled the Sultan to raise the siege and return to Mandu. This was followed by an invasion of Malwa by the Rana, which caused damage and disorder on the frontier of Ghiyasuddin's kingdom.⁴²

To avenge these defeats, Sultan Ghiyasuddin sent an army under Zafar Khan to reduce the region of Mandalgarh. Zafar relentlessly ravaged the eastern part of Mewar, but the forces sent by the Rana and headed by the princes, Prithviraja, Jaimal, and Sanga and by some chosen chiefs like Ram Singh, Patta, Kandhal, etc., fell upon the army of the Sultan and completely defeated it.⁴³ Another expedition against Chitor led by Sultan Nasiruddin, successor of Ghiyasuddin,

⁴¹ *Dakshindwara Inscription*, V.S. 1545, vv. 63-66; *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-katthas*, Vol. I, 324-27.

⁴² *Dakshinadwara Inscription*, vv. 68-71, *Bhavanagar Inscriptions*, 121; Day, *Mediaeval Malwa*, 224.

⁴³ *Dakshinadwara Inscription*, vv. 77-78, *Bhavanagar Inscription*, 121.

also met a similar fate in 1503.⁴⁴ Thus the Rana walked in the footsteps of his forefathers; he was prepared for the hostility of the neighbouring state of Malwa and carried on a constant strife with Sultan Ghiyasuddin, whom he defeated in several pitched battles.⁴⁵

As to Raimal's relations with the Lodi dynasty, there were a few skirmishes on his northern frontiers. But Mewar continued to enjoy external prestige because of the absence of any paramount all-India power or a formidable enemy who could either interfere effectively or utilize the internal differences within the kingdom to his own advantage. Sultan Sikander was too preoccupied for the affairs of the interior of Rajasthan.

Though Raimal faced the hostility of the Muslim states with success, he was unable to find a solution for the family feuds and dissensions which seriously threatened the internal security of the state. These dissensions centered round the ambitious plans of the princes of the blood royal. The four sons of Raimal—namely, Prithviraja, Jaimal, Jai Singh and Sanga—were characteristically brave and ambitious and had their separate dreams for acquiring the sovereignty of Mewar. Prithviraja had been nominated by his father as his successor owing to his great gifts and accomplishment; the title of 'Maharaja-kunwar' had been conferred upon him along with the fiefs of Godwad and Kumbhalgarh.⁴⁶ This aroused the jealousy of Sanga, who was a man of intellect and sound judgement. But the chances of Sanga's succession to the throne seemed remote as his brothers, Jaimal and Jai Singh, stood between him and Prithviraja. Sanga could only have the claims of these two princes put aside if he won over a section of the *sardars* and they pronounced Jaimal and Jai Singh unworthy of the throne because they were addicted to pleasures and sport. His plan of acquiring power also could not succeed unless Prithviraja, the heir-designate of Raimal, who commanded the respect and esteem of the nobility, was got rid of.

Fortunately Sanga found in Surajmal, a son of Kshema Singh and a grandson of Rana Mokal, another ambitious prince, who was trying to make himself the independent ruler of the south-eastern part of Mewar. Sanga and Surajmal made common cause against Prithviraja and Jaimal, and harboured designs of usurping the throne at a favourable moment. Prithviraja, on his part, was making his power stronger by consolidating his authority over territories, which were under his control.⁴⁷

⁴⁴ Ferishta, Vol. IV, 243.

⁴⁵ *Vir Vinod*, I, 337.

⁴⁶ *Bhavanagar Inscriptions*, 141.

⁴⁷ Sarda, *Maharana Sanga*, 15.

These dissensions for power among the four princes became an open secret. If tradition is to be believed, once all the four brothers along with Surajmal decided to entrust their future to an omen. They, therefore, repaired to the abode of Charna Devi, near Nahar Nagra. Prithviraja and Jaimal, who were confident of their position, entered the shrine first and seated themselves on a pallet; Sanga followed them and took his seat on the panther's hide of the goddess. Surajmal, the accomplice of Sanga, squatted with one knee resting on the same panther's hide which was occupied by Sanga. Before the disclosure of the mission by the princes, the sybil predicted the sovereignty for Sanga and a portion of it for his uncle. This prediction made Prithviraja restless; he drew his sword and aimed it at Sanga to falsify the omen.⁴⁸

However, Surajmal came to the rescue of Sanga, who lost one of his eyes in the duel. This story may not be accepted as historically correct, but it at least suggests that both Surajmal and Sanga were conspiring against their rivals and were prepared to fulfil their ambitions by some kind of treachery.

In consequence of these quarrels, Sanga went into exile to save his life and wandered about among goat-herds and peasants. Then he went to Ajmer and took service with Karam Chand Pramara of Sringer. When his identity was revealed, the Pramara chief offered him the hand of his daughter and promised him all possible assistance. For the other princes the prospects were not at all bright. Jaimal, who was insistent for the hand of the daughter of Rao Surtan, was killed by him. Surajmal was compelled to leave Mewar. Prithviraja, who had been banished by his father, had to come back to attend to the businesses of the state on behalf of his father, who was disgusted at the declining condition of his dynasty. Unfortunately Prithviraja also met a sad end; he was treacherously poisoned by his brother-in-law, Jagmal of Sirohi. Under these unhappy circumstances Raimal died in 1508, nominating Jai Singh as his successor.⁴⁹

RAJA SANGA (1508-28)

It seems from the account of Nensi that the *sardars* passed Jai Singh over and managed to recall Sanga, the exiled prince, during the illness of the Rana. After Raimal's death in 1508, the destiny of

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 13-15, 44, etc.; Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 331-42.

⁴⁹ Nensi's *Khyat*, ff. 4, 61(b); *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 351-52; Sarda, *Maharana Sanga*, 17-19.

Mewar came into the hands of Sangram Singh I, popularly known as Rana Sanga. Sanga did not find the throne of Mewar a bed of roses. The struggle between the brothers had adversely affected the financial and military resources of the state, and the sultans of Malwa, Gujarat and Delhi were making preparations to invade the kingdom. But the new Rana was well-suited to face the crisis. He was a distinguished warrior, an able general, an indefatigable organizer and a calculating politician. By nature and upbringing he was ambitious. Not content with the traditional glory and glamour of his ancestors, he further enhanced the prestige of his dynasty by rallying many rajas and rais under the crimson banner of the Sisodias.

Sanga's relations with Malwa and Gujarat

Inspired by such ambition and determination, Rana Sanga opened his career with fair prospects of success. The internal troubles, which had been brewing for some time in Malwa, turned to his advantage. Medini Rai, a Purbiya Rajput chief who had been instrumental in securing the throne of Malwa for Mahmud Khalji II and who had been working loyally and faithfully as the chief minister of the state, came to be suspected by his master and the Muslim nobles for the simple reason that he was conducting the administration very efficiently with the help of his Rajput associates. The exasperated Muslim nobles and the Sultan made an unsuccessful attempt to have Medini assassinated. This was followed by a revolt of the Purbiya Rajputs. Alarmed at the growing strength of the minister, the Sultan fled to Gujarat to seek the help of Muzaffar Shah II. Muzaffar responded readily and escorted Mahmud back to Mandu in 1517. Meanwhile Medini Rai, after reinforcing the Mandu garrison, had gone to Chitor to secure the assistance of the Rana. The Rana responded to his appeal, and took Gagraun, Bhilsa, Raisen, Sarangpur and Chanderi under his protection. Though he could not save Mandu from falling into the hands of the Gujarat army, he was successful in defeating a Malwa force which tried to regain Gagraun in 1518. In the course of this battle Mahmud Khalji II was wounded and taken as a prisoner to Chitor. Owing to this victory Malwa lay at the feet of the Rana. But as its annexation would have given rise to serious inter-state complications and created difficult administrative problems, the Rana very wisely treated the Sultan with Rajput magnanimity and attended to his wounds in person. After Mahmud had recovered, he was sent back to Mandu; the Rana was content to take his belt and crown as a trophy of victory. Kalpi, Bhilsa, Ranthambhor, Sarangpur and Chanderi were sliced off from Malwa and handed over to their old governors, who acknowledged the Rana as

their protector. Sanga also kept a son of the Sultan at his court as a surety for his future friendly conduct.⁵⁰

The growing influence of Mewar and the power of the Rajputs in Malwa was not liked by Muzaffar Shah II of Gujarat, and he was in search of some pretext for a direct conflict with Sanga. The opportunity came in connection with the succession question of Idar. On the death of Surajmal, his minor son, Raimal, and his nephew, Bhar Mal, both claimed the throne of Idar. Rana Sanga supported the cause of Raimal, while the Sultan of Gujarat supported Bhar Mal. The Gujarat army at first succeeded in driving Raimal from Idar, but in 1517 Raimal reoccupied Idar with the Rana's help. In order to achieve a definite success against Raimal, Muzaffar Shah placed Mubarizul Mulk at the head of the Gujarat army. This made war almost inevitable. In 1520 the Rana invaded Idar, drove out Mubarizul Mulk and, chasing him up to the walls of Ahmadnagar, defeated the Gujarat army there. He plundered Ahmadnagar and Visalnagar, established his protege in Idar and then returned to Chitor.⁵¹

Next winter (1520) Muzaffar Shah raised a very large army, which some historians have put at the impossible figure of one hundred thousand horsemen, to retrieve his prestige. The supreme command was entrusted to Malik Ayaz, the semi-independent governor of Junagarh. Ayaz mobilized the gigantic war-machine, which on its way ravaged and burnt Dungarpur and Banswara and besieged Mandasor. Here he was joined by Mahmud II of Malwa, who was equally anxious to retrieve his honour and recover his territory.⁵²

Undeterred by the fighting strength of the two kingdoms, Rana Sanga came forward with a large army and encamped at Nandsa, ten miles from Mandasor. His plan was apparently to wait and see whether the Muslim army would make an assault on Mandasor or move forward for battle. Meanwhile in the Muslim camp counsels were divided between Ayaz, the general of the Gujarat forces, and Qawamul Mulk, commander of the Malwa army. Malik Ayaz preferred an immediate action against the Rana, while Qawamul Mulk desired to capture the Mandasor fort before tackling the Rana. There was also a difference as to which party should take possession of the Mandasor fort, after it had been captured. Rana Sanga probably knew of the differences of opinion between Ayaz and Qawamul Mulk.

⁵⁰ *Baburnama*, f. 205; *Ferishta*, II, 564; *Mir'at-i Sikandari* (P.T.), Vol. I, 166, 167, 192; *Mir'at Ahmadi*, 105; *Jagannath Rai Inscription*; *Raj Ratnakar*, f. 32; *Amar Kavya Vamshavali*, f. 30; Dr. R. P. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), 105.

⁵¹ *Mir'at-i Sikandari* (P.T.), Vol. I, 140-50; *Mir'at-i Ahmadi* (Ms.), 101-08; *Amar Kavya Vamshavali*, f. 30; Forbes, *Rasmala*, 382-90; Bayley, 252-70.

⁵² Briggs, Vol. IV, 90-95; Dr. R. S. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), 106.

The Rana, on his part, did not desire a decisive conflict for various reasons. The policy of the Lodis in eastern Rajasthan had been hostile and Ibrahim Lodi was anxious to push his authority at least as far as Ajmer and Ranthambhor. Moreover, the situation in northern India was very uncertain as Babur had opened his campaigns on the frontiers of the Punjab. It was, therefore, necessary for the Rana to maintain his full fighting strength and not risk his men and material in a premature engagement.

Since Ayaz and the Rana were both in favour of a settlement, negotiations were conducted in a friendly spirit. An agreement was reached according to which the Rana was to send a handsome present to the Sultan of Gujarat along with a son, who was to live in Gujarat as a hostage; he also undertook to maintain peace and amity with the Gujarat kingdom. Mahmud of Malwa had the satisfaction of welcoming back his son, who had been detained as a hostage at the court of the Rana. The vagueness of the terms and the easy conditions of settlement show that both parties were anxious for peace. The Sultan of Gujarat took the settlement coldly as there was nothing in it for him to enthuse over; but as the Rana sent some gifts to him he was reconciled. It seems that this settlement enormously increased the influence of Rana Sanga at the court of Gujarat; this is proved by the fact that the Shahzadas, Bahadur, Chand Khan and Ibrahim, repaired to Chitor in 1524 to seek the Rana's help against the intrigues of Sikandar, the crown-prince.⁵³

The Rana had hardly made his peace with Malwa and Gujarat when Sultan Ibrahim sent against him a large army under the general command of Mian Makhan. Other generals—Mian Husain, Zar Bakhsh, Mian Farmuli and Mian Ma'ruf—were also associated with him. The Rana advanced to meet the Afghan forces and won several pitched battles against them. He created such an impression of his power that Mian Husain Khan decided to join him. Then Ibrahim Lodi came to oppose the Rana in person at Ghatoli; the imperial forces were defeated with great slaughter in the battle that followed, and they left a prisoner of the royal blood to grace the triumph of Chitor.⁵⁴

Although Rana Sanga had established his fame as one of the greatest warriors of the time and had proved his worth as a ruler and a statesman, he had now to meet Babur, an adversary who proved more than a match for him. Babur's conquest of north-western India

⁵³ Briggs, Vol. IV, 96; Nizamuddin, III, 184-91; Bayley, 277-78, 304-6; Dr. R. P. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), 109-10.

⁵⁴ *Baburnama*, II, 561 and 593; *Amar Kavya Vamshavali*, f. 29(b); *Vamshavali*, ff. 63, 64; *Suryavamsha*, f. 49; *Vir Vinod*, I, 354; Ojha, *Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 331.

and the defeat of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat made it evident that a clash between him and Sanga was inevitable. The decisive character of Babur's victory and his military operations after it had shocked the Rana. He was in search of some pretext for commencing hostilities; so when Hasan Khan Mewati requested him to support the claims of Mahmud Lodi, brother of Ibrahim Lodi, against Babur, Sanga readily acceded and lost no time in establishing control over important frontier fortresses, like Kandar near Ranthambhor.⁵⁵ He also moved rapidly to Bayana and drove out the Mughal garrison without any difficulty.⁵⁶ Flushed by these successes, he then moved towards Khanua with an immense army.⁵⁷

Babur, on his part, watched these developments with undaunted courage and grim determination, though not without considerable anxiety. But as he was fully convinced that Sanga's power was a great obstacle to his scheme of expansion in northern India, he began to make preparations at Agra for an onslaught against the Rana by enlisting new soldiers. As there was no other alternative for him but to fight to the bitter end, he carefully marshalled his forces near Sikri.⁵⁸ The allegation of a breach of faith on the part of Sanga, or of Babur's failure to fulfil his promise of dividing Ibrahim's kingdom between them, is not an adequate reason for the hostility between the two indomitable rivals.⁵⁹ The decisive clash between them is sufficiently explained by their initial successes as well as their opposed economic and political interests. Hasan Mewati and many Indian Musalmans fought on the side of the Rana. The deadly conflict began at about half-past nine on 17 March 1527 at Khanua, and for a considerable period it appeared that the conflict would terminate indecisively. But unfortunately the Rana was severely wounded by an arrow and fainted. He was quickly removed from the battle-field to Baswa, while his place as commander was taken by Raja Rana Ajja, the Chunda of Halwad, who was adorned with the royal *chhattra* and *chanwar* and directed the operations. The advantage of fire-arms joined to the *tulughma* charge as well as his superior generalship brought victory to Babur. The loss of life on the Mughal side was terrible, but the Rajputs also suffered a devastating slaughter.⁶⁰

⁵⁵ *Baburnama*, ff. 234b, 243a.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, ff. 234-35b.

⁵⁷ The village by the side of the Fathpur-Sikri lake is still known by the name of Khanua.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, f. 224a; *Amar Kavya Vamshavali*, f. 30b.

⁵⁹ G. N. Sharma, *Mewar and the Mughals*, 20-25, 27

⁶⁰ *Baburnama*, ff. 243-50; *Amar Kavya Vamshavali*, f. 31; *Phutkargita*, f. 102; *Mewar-ka-Samkshipta-Itihas*, ff. 141-42; Dr. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), 111-18.

When Rana Sanga regained consciousness at Baswa, he learnt that the battle was lost. He vowed never to enter the portals of Chitor till he had defeated his enemy. In memory of the disaster he also gave up wearing his turban and used to wrap a cloth round his head. He fixed his headquarters at Ranthambhor and began to prepare plans for further action. On hearing that Babur was engaged in the siege of Chanderi, he moved to its relief; but while encamped at Erich he was poisoned by some cowardly conspirators, who were afraid of the prospects of a second sanguinary war. As his condition deteriorated, he was taken to Kalpi, where he breathed his last on 30 January 1528. His body was removed to Mandalgarh, where his cremation-place, crowned by a *chhatri*, can still be seen.⁶¹

So far as the expansion of Mughal power was concerned, the consequences of the battle of Khanua were immense; the victory shifted the sovereignty of the country from the Rajputs to the Mughals, who were to enjoy it for over two hundred years. Nevertheless, the battle, so far as the Rajput powers were concerned, was not so destructive as the battle of Tarain between Prithviraja III and Mu'izzuddin Ghuri. Though it weakened the power of the kingdom of Mewar and lowered its general prestige, it did not destroy the grip of the Sisodias over their own kingdom, nor did it affect the social and economic conditions of life in the state.

Sanga was one of the most notable princes of Rajasthan. He had passed his early life in adversity and suffered many reverses in conflict with his own kinsmen. Nevertheless, undaunted by his misfortunes, he had eventually triumphed against his enemies, established the sovereignty of Mewar over Rajasthan and successfully established his supremacy over Malwa and Gujarat. In diplomacy and lofty idealism, he was a leader *par excellence*. One of the greatest warriors of his time, he also proved his worth as a ruler and a statesman. Though Khanua proved to be a tragic climax to his military career, he was, nevertheless, at his best when struggling against his adversaries. Owing to his dauntless courage and love for his country, Sanga is still remembered as the champion of Indian interests and the protector of Indian culture.

⁶¹ *Akbarnama*, (P.T.), Vol. I, 139; *Rawal Ranaji ki vat*, f. 81; *Amar Kaoya Vamshavali*, f. 31b; *Mewar-ka-Samkshipta Itihas*, f. 143b.

II. THE GUHILOTS OF VAGAD

SAMANT SINGH

THE TERRITORY NOW COMPRISING the districts of Dungarpur and Banswara was known as Vagad in olden days. It was occupied chiefly by Bhils and to a small extent by Rajputs of the Chauhan and Pramara clans. Samant Singh of Mewar was forced by circumstances to migrate to Vagad and to set up a separate principality with its capital at Baroda in the first half of the twelfth century.¹ But his rule was short-lived. After a reign of about ten years, he was overpowered by Bhim Deva II, who established his sway about the year 1185 and posted his chief, Vijayapal, over Vagad.² The fugitive prince, according to local traditions, repaired to the court of Prithviraja and died a martyr's death at the famous field of Tarain.³

JAGAT SINGH AND DEVAPALA

When the control of Gujarat over Vagad had become lax, Jagat Singh recovered the lost power of his dynasty and reestablished his sway over his patrimony during the early part of the thirteenth century.⁴ His successor, Sinhad-deva, was a devotee of Shakti and repaired the famous temple of Jagat, which affords a striking example of medieval Hindu architecture.⁵ Vijaya Singh Deva, who succeeded his father sometime between 1234 and 1250, showed his devotion to Shaktism by offering a golden staff for the temple of Jagat.⁶ The epigraphic records available lead us to believe that the Chhappan area of Mewar also formed a part of his kingdom.⁷ His son, Devapala, is said to have extended his principality on the north-east by defeating the Pramaras of Arthuna and Galiyakot.⁸

RAWAL VIR SINGH AND HIS SUCCESSORS

Rawal Vir Singh (1286-1303), Devapala's successor, defied the power of Dungariya Bhil by sending a large force which attacked

1 *Boreshwara Inscription*.

2 *Virpura Inscription*, V.S. 1242 (1185).

3 Ojha, *Dungarpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 52-53.

4 Someshwara: *Kirtikaumudi*, canto 2, v. 61.

5 *Jagat Inscription*, V.S. 1277 (1221).

6 *Ibid.*, V.S. 1308 (1250).

7 *Ibid.*, *Jhadol Inscription*, V.S. 1308 (1251).

8 *Dungarpur Khyat*.

the *pal* of Dungarpur and destroyed it.⁹ Vir Singh was followed from 1303 to 1388 by a series of rulers like Bhachunda, Dungar Singh and Karma Singh, who completed certain works of public utility in the town of Dungarpur, such as the construction of gates and tanks, extension of the town and the founding of villages. During Dungar Singh's time the capital of Vagad was removed from Baroda to Dungarpur.¹⁰ All these rulers assumed the title of *Rawal* and also retained the clan appellation of *Ahariya* to perpetuate the memory of their affinity with their original home of Ahar. In contemporary records there are references to persons of the ranks of *Sandhivigrahika*, *Mahamatya*, *Mantri*, *Pandit*, etc., proving that these rulers had raised the status of their small state to a position of preeminence.¹¹

Karma Singh was succeeded by his son, Kanhad Deva (1388-98). He is credited with having constructed some of the buildings at Dungarpur and a gate of the town.¹²

Kanhad Deva was succeeded by his son, Pratap Singh (1398-1423). After a prosperous reign of about twenty-five years, Pratap Singh died about 1423 or 1424. That his reign was prosperous is well attested by his construction of the Patela lake, the Patela gate and the founding of the village of Pratappur.¹³

GOPI NATH

The next ruler of Vagad was Gopi Nath (1424 to 1447 or 1448), better known as Gepa. We are told by the *Tabaqat-i Akhari* that Rawal Gepa fled away at the approach of Ahmad Shah I of Gujarat in 1433. It further says that subsequently Gepa repented and came back to wait upon the Sultan with befitting tribute.¹⁴ As against this description of Muslim victory, the *Antri Inscription* of 1468 mentions that Gepa attacked the Muslim army and repulsed it with heavy losses. Though it is very difficult to form a definite opinion about the result of this war, we are inclined to conclude that the Rawal tried to win the favour and good-will of the Sultan by paying him tribute. This assumption is further confirmed by the fact that Rana Kumbha led an expedition against Dungarpur to have it set free from the influence of the Sultan.¹⁵

In domestic affairs Gopi Nath's significant achievement was to

⁹ Malagnon *Inscription*, V.S. 1343.

¹⁰ *Desa Inscription*, V.S. 1453; *Ojha, Dungarpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 62-63.

¹¹ *Jagat Inscription*, V.S. 1277 (1221); *Badoda Inscription*, V.S. 1349 (1292).

¹² *Kanhad Deva Inscription*, V.S. 1455 (1398).

¹³ *Pratap Singh Inscription*, V.S. 1456 (1399); *Badva Khyat*.

¹⁴ Bayley, *History of Gujarat*, 120.

¹⁵ *Kumbhalgarh Inscription*, V.S. 1517 (1460).

reduce to submission some Bhil chiefs, who had enjoyed independence for several years.¹⁶ He was a patron of art and architecture. He caused the temple of Deva-Somnath to be repaired, the Geb Sagar lake to be excavated and the Geb Pol gate to be constructed at Dungarpur.¹⁷ He died in 1447 or 1448, leaving his throne to his son, Som Nath or Somdas.

SOMDAS AND RAWAL GANGA DAS

Somdas (1447 or 1448-80) annexed the hilly region of Katara by defeating Bariya, a powerful Bhil chief of Chundawada.¹⁸ But his attempt to stand against Mahmud Khalji, who was on his way back to Malwa, proved unsuccessful. The Rawal purchased peace by paying Mahmud two lakhs of *tankas* and twenty-one horses.¹⁹ Similarly, the campaign of Ghiyasuddin of Malwa in 1474 resulted in defeat and disaster for him.²⁰ He died in 1480. Like his father he was a patron of art and architecture, and several Jain and Vishnu temples were constructed during his reign. The art of making copper and stone images also received due patronage. He encouraged learning by granting lands to Brahmans, who were reputed for their scholarship.

Rawal Ganga Das (1480-97), after ascending the throne of Dungarpur, devoted himself during his reign of seventeen years to defending the frontiers of his kingdom against his neighbours. Success attended his campaigns against Idar and the Bhils. By repairing old temples and granting lands to Brahmans, he gave proof of his charitable disposition.²¹

UDAI SINGH

Udai Singh (1497-1527), the son and successor of Ganga Das, was by far the most eminent Rawal of his dynasty. He was a brave warrior, and both as a prince and a ruler, he gave proof of his valour by participating in all the wars, which Mewar fought against Zafar Khan in 1488 and Mubarizul Mulk of Malwa in 1514.²² He also helped the Rana in supporting the cause of the Rawal of Idar. He saved his kingdom with courage and ability from the aggression of

16 Antri Inscription, V.S. 1525 (1468).

17 Ojha, *Dungarpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 66-67.

18 Antri Inscription, V.S. 1525 (1468).

19 Ferishta, Vol. IV, 225.

20 Rampol Inscription, V.S. 1530 (1474).

21 Itawa Inscription, 1536 (1480); Talwada Inscription, V.S. 1538 (1481); Deva Som Nath Inscription, V.S. 1548 (1491); Kanba Inscription, V.S. 1553 (1496).

22 Raimal Inscription, V.S. 1545 (1488); Rammala, 295.

the Muslim generals sent against him by Muzaffar Shah II of Gujarat to punish him for being in league with the Rana of Mewar.²³ Udai Singh seems to have kept pace with the warlike activities of the Guhilots by fighting constant wars against the sultans of Mandu and Gujarat in order to keep his territory intact.

Udai Singh was not only a daring warrior but also a generous prince towards those who sought his aid. Bahadur Khan, who was driven away from Gujarat by his elder brother, seems to have taken shelter at Dungarpur. The Rawal treated him with chivalrous generosity and helped him by intercepting the letter for help, which the Gujarati nobles had sent to Babur against Bahadur. But Bahadur forgot the valuable assistance rendered to him by the Rawal during the most critical period of his career and raided his kingdom in 1526.²⁴ Endowed with considerable courage and energy, he fought for Rana Sanga and met a glorious death at the battle of Khanua in 1527.²⁵ During the last days of his reign, Udai Singh, perhaps to please one of his wives, divided his kingdom between his two sons, Prithviraj and Jagmal; the former got Dungarpur and the latter got Banswara.²⁶ This division made the small kingdom of Vagad weak and gave rise to unhappy quarrels between his two sons.

²³ Bayley, *History of Gujarat*, 272.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 272, 319, 339.

²⁵ *Baburnama*, 573.

²⁶ *Chitragaon Inscription*, 1577 (1520).

III. THE GUHILOTS OF PRATAPGARH

KHEM SINGH

THE FOUNDATION OF THE STATE of Pratapgarh was laid under strange circumstances. The chiefs of Pratapgarh belonged to the Guhilot clan of Rajputs, being descended from Khem Singh, the second son of Rana Mokal of Mewar. On receiving only a meagre jagir from his elder brother, Rana Kumbha, he forcibly occupied Sadri and a few villages on the south-eastern border of Mewar. But when the Rana was free from the preoccupation of punishing his father's murderers, he deprived Khem Singh of his illegal possessions. This compelled Khem Singh to seek shelter with Mahmud Khalji of Malwa; he tried to deprive the Rana of his kingdom with Mahmud's assistance, but a stubborn resistance on the part of the Rana rendered all his attempts futile. Later on, during Uda's reign, he managed to get back Sadri as his appanage, and he continued to exercise his authority over it till he fell fighting at the battle of Dadimpura in 1473.¹

SURAJ MAL

After the death of Khem Singh, his son, Suraj Mal, inherited the jagir of Sadri. Like his father he too was not satisfied with this petty jagir. His ambition was to establish his authority over the south-eastern corner of Mewar and to make himself an independent ruler. He, therefore, made an alliance with Sarangadeva, another descendant of Rana Lakha, and tried to foment quarrels among the sons of Rana Raimal in order to create dissension within Mewar. When he failed to achieve any success, he repaired to the court of Malwa to invoke the assistance of the Sultan against his own clan. The Sultan invaded the Rana's country several times along with Suraj Mal, but most of his attempts proved futile. The Rana's position could not be challenged; Suraj Mal, giving up all hopes of success, abandoned Mewar for good. He distributed the villages of his jagir among the Brahmans and bards and migrated towards the wilderness of Kanthal. Here he subdued the Bhils, erected the town and stronghold of Deolia and became the lord of a thousand villages. Thus the principality, later on known as Deolia-Pratapgarh, was founded. His death probably took place between 1528 and 1530. Suraj Mal was eulogised for his

¹ *Khadavada Inscription*, v. 26, V.S. 1541 (1484); *Ekalunga Inscription*, v. 64, V.S. 1545 (1488); Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. I, 93-94; *Vtr Vinod*, Vol. II, 1053-54; *Ojha, Pratapgarh Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 47-52.

pious acts, among which the construction of Sursagar and giving away lands in charity stand preeminent.²

The early history of this state is full of internal conflicts and the unsuccessful attempts of its rulers to interfere in the affairs of Mewar. The history of this region is, consequently, a dreary tale of conspiracies and strifes. The wars of revenge and intrigues undertaken by Khem Singh and Suraj Mal weakened the state to such an extent that it could never claim preeminence among the principalities of Rajasthan.

² Briggs, *Ferishta*, Vol. IV, 243; Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. I, 44, 45, 94; *Pratapgarh Badwa Khyat*, 1; *Haribhushan Kavya*, canto 2, vv. 1-3, 18-28, canto 3, vv. 25-53; *Vir Vinod*, I, 338, 339, 341, 343, 344, 347, 348, 349; II, 1054; Ojha, *Pratapgarh Rajya-ka-Itihaas*, 54-74.

IV. THE RATHORS OF MARWAR

ANOTHER IMPORTANT CLAN OF THE Rajputs, which had migrated to the western part of Rajasthan, was that of the Rathors. The origin of the Rathors of Jodhpur, like that of other Rajput clans, has been a matter of controversy. Traditionally the ruling family is believed to have belonged to the Gahadwal clan of Kanauj.¹ Another view is that the dynasty of Jodhpur was connected with the Rathors of Badaun, the contemporaries of the Gahadwals of Kanauj.² Nothing can be said positively about these views; but the significance of these traditions lies in the fact that the ruling family of Marwar claimed descent from Rajputs of historic fame.

THE FOUNDER OF THE RATHOR DYNASTY

The founder of the Rathor dynasty of Marwar was Siha, son of Set Ram, who emigrated to Pali, probably to carve out his fortune, about the middle of the thirteenth century. Pali was then an opulent and prosperous city inhabited by Pallival Brahmans. Being a commercial centre, its relations with the neighbouring tribes of Mirs and Minas were none too peaceful, and the raids of these tribes were a constant source of danger and anxiety to the citizens. Siha, at the request of the citizens, undertook the responsibility of guaranteeing them freedom from aggression. He conquered the area round Pali, and planted the first Rathor standard in or about 1243. He died while resisting a Turkish invasion about 1273.³

ASTHAN AND HIS SUCCESSORS

His son and successor, Asthan, walked in the footsteps of his father. A warlike and powerful ruler, he extended his territory in the south-west as far as Khed in the Malani district by defeating the Guhilots and wrested Idar from its Bhil chief. He secured his western frontiers by handing over Idar to his brother, Sarang. Like his father he fell fighting against a Turkish army about 1291.⁴

It is difficult to put the dates and events of the successors of Asthan in proper order till the end of the fourteenth century.

1 *Rai Singh Inscription*; V.S. 1650.

2 *Reu, Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, VIII-IX.

3 *Bithu Inscription*, V.S. 1330 (1273), IA, Vol. 40, 141; *Nensi's Khyat*, Vol. II, 266-75; *Ojha, Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 146-58.

4 *Nensi's Khyat*, Vol. II, 55-57; *Ojha, Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 158-65.

However, subsequent events prove that during the thirteenth and the fourteenth centuries they continued their policy of expansion by fighting ceaselessly against their neighbours. Rao Dhuhar, the eldest son of Asthan, for example, extended his possessions by bringing one hundred and fifty villages under his control. He captured Mandor by defeating the Parihars, but he could not retain it for long. He met his end while fighting against the Parihars in 1309.⁵ His eldest son, Rao Rayapal, again captured Mandor from the Parihars, but was destined to retain it only for a short period. By defeating the Pramaras he got possession of the Mallani region. He extended his territory towards Jaisalmer by killing Pharara, a Bhati Rajput who had put his cousin, Pabu, to death.⁶ His successor, Rao Karnpal, also met his sad end in one of his engagements against the combined forces of the Bhatias and the Turks.⁷ His son, Bhim, pushed the boundary of Marwar as far as the banks of the river Kak by defeating the Bhatias,⁸ but he died in one of his encounters with them.⁹

Rao Jalanasi, another son and successor of Karnpal, humbled the pride of the Sodha Rajputs, the Muslim governor of Multan and the Solankis of Bhinmal owing to his military achievements, but he was also slain like his father while conducting his forces against the combined armies of the Bhatias and the Turks in or about 1328.¹⁰ Rao Chhada, the eldest son of Jalanasi, crossed swords with the Bhatias of Jaisalmer and came into conflict with the Turkish governors of Jalor and Nagaur. Unfortunately he failed against the combined forces of the Sonigra and the Deora Chauhans and was killed in 1344.¹¹ Rao Tida repelled the Sonigras, the Deoras, the Bhatias, the Baluchis and the Solankis; and died a hero's death while defending the fort of Siwana against the Turkish army.¹² His successor, Mallinath, who succeeded in recovering Maheva from the Turks, assumed the title of Rawal. He is reported to have held his own against the Muslim rulers of Sind and Malwa.¹³

5 Bhandarkar, *Indian Antiquary*, December 1911.

6 JASB, 1919, 38ff, quoted from Banerjee's *Medieval Studies*, 41.

7 Bankidas, *Aitihāsik baten*, Nos. 1614, 1672.

8 Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. I, 54.

9 Bankidas, *Khyat*, No. 784.

10 *Ibid.*, No. 786.

11 *Ibid.*, No. 787. Reu, *Glories of Marwar and the Glorious Rathors*, XII.

12 Bankidas, *Aitihāsik baten*, No. 1616. (According to Khusrau's *Khazainul Futuh*, Rai Sital Deva had died in the defence of Siwana against Alauddin Khalji on 9 September 1309. But reference here, probably, is to a different struggle for the same fort — Editor.)

13 Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 185-91.

In short, the Siha branch of Rathors can be credited with deeds of valour and enterprise. They were not only able to keep their small kingdom intact but also successfully resisted the aggression of the Bhatīs, Solankīs, Chauhāns, Johiyās and other neighbouring chiefs. They were gallant and active warriors and fought wars and met their heroic end in maintaining their independence. They also added Maheva, Bhinmal, Amarkot, etc. to their kingdom. Like the Sisodias of Mewar, they carried on an incessant struggle with the rulers of Malwa and Gujarat.¹⁴

RAO CHUNDA (1384-1423)

It was Rao Chunda, son of Rao Biram, who rose into prominence by establishing his power at Mandor, which he had received in dowry in 1395 from the Indas, a branch of the Parihars. He successfully resisted the attack of Zafar Khan of Gujarat on Mandor in 1396. Taking advantage of the confusion and disorder due to the weak rule of the Tughluqs of Delhi, he conducted continuous operations against the imperial officers and occupied Khatu, Didwana, Sambhar, Nagaur and Ajmer. By defeating the Chauhāns he also captured Nadol. He not only invaded the imperial territories but also turned against his own brother, Jai Singh, and captured Phalodi in 1411, because Jai Singh did not cooperate with him in his expeditions against the imperial territories. But his enterprises entailed disaster to his life. Being jealous of his rising power, the Bhatīs, the Sankhalas and the governor of Multan joined in a coalition against him. They invaded Nagaur and treacherously murdered Chunda in 1423. Nevertheless during Chunda's reign Marwar rose to a position of eminence.¹⁵

RAO RANMAL (1427-38)

Rao Chunda's eldest son, Rao Ranmal, renounced his claims to the throne of Marwar and left his native land for Mewar in 1408. Rao Kana and Rao Satta ruled over Marwar during his absence. Rana Lakha of Mewar received Ranmal with honour and gave him a jagir for his maintenance. The relations between the fugitive prince and the dynasty of the Sisodias were further cemented by the marriage of Hansa Bai, a sister of Rao Ranmal, with the Rana. On the death of Rana Lakha, his minor son, Rana Mokal, ascended the throne at the age of about twelve years, and Ranmal was asked to manage the affairs of the state. He helped the Rana during his attack on Nagaur,

¹⁴ Bankidas, *Atihasik baten*, Nos. 1671, 1063, etc.; Bayley, *History of Gujarat*, 148.

¹⁵ Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. II, 87-93, quoted by Ojha; Bankidas, *Atihasik baten*, Nos. 637, 792, 6618; *Vir Vinod*, Vol. II, 803, 804; Bayley, *History of Gujarat*, 82, 83, 121.

Jalor, Sambhar and Jahazpur. It was also due to him that his brother, Rao Satta, was successful in keeping Marwar, which then included Mandor, Pali, Sojat and Jaitaran, intact. With considerable valour and energy he reduced the Sonigras and the Bhatias to submission; he was also successful in his expedition against Jalor and he compelled the Behari Pathans to conclude peace with Marwar. After Rana Lakha's death, he was required to guide the destinies of Mewar. He acquired supreme influence in the state and appointed Rathors to offices of trust and responsibility. Getting jealous of his power, the Mewari nobles contrived to cut short his career by a treacherous murder in 1438.¹⁶

JODHA (1438-89)

The history of the Rathors of Marwar becomes more definite from the time of Jodha, who after the murder of his father quitted Chitor for Marwar. Jodha during his flight was closely pursued by Rawat Chunda, the uncle of Rana Kumbha. He lost almost all his followers in the skirmishes that took place, and in order to be beyond the reach of his enemies, he went to Kahuni, near Bikaner, and began to enlist soldiers to drive away the intruders.¹⁷

For fifteen years he was engaged in collecting a band of trusted men. He first effectively utilized their services in capturing Mandor in 1453, and then brought under his control the different parts of Marwar like Merta, Phalodi, Pokharan, Bhadravan, Sojat, Jaitaran, Siva, Siwana, some part of Godwad and a large part of the Nagaur district. He extended his kingdom by vanquishing the neighbouring chieftains, and carried his raids in the north as far as Hisar, where his progress was stopped by the Afghans. Out of this extensive area, he entrusted Sojat to his elder brother, Merta to his own son, Bir Singh, and Chhapar Dronpur to Megha. He allowed one of his sons, Bika, to migrate to the Jangaladesha, where he laid the foundation of the independent state of Bikaner. By creating these principalities along the borders of Marwar, he secured the frontier defences of his state.¹⁸

In order to consolidate his power, Jodha laid the foundation of a new fort and town in 1459, and named it Jodhpur, after his own name.¹⁹ Under his leadership the political status of the Rathors was

¹⁶ Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. II, 95, 102, 104, 105, 117; *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Khyat*, Vol. I, 37; Bankidas, *Atithasik baten*, Nos. 812, 813; Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 219-26.

¹⁷ *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Khyat*, Vol. I, 40, 41; *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 322.

¹⁸ *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Khyat*, Vol. I, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, etc.; Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. I, 192-96.

¹⁹ Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. II, 131.

considerably raised; even Rana Kumbha entered into an alliance with him by fixing the boundaries between Mewar and Marwar.²⁰ Kumbha's successor, Rana Uda, sought his help against his own kinsmen by giving him Sambhar and Ajmer.²¹ After a strenuous career of forty years, he died in 1489.

JODHA'S SUCCESSORS

Jodha was followed by three Rathor successors, Rao Satal (1489-92), Rao Suja (1492-1515) and Rao Ganga (1515-32) during the period under review. Rao Satal extended his kingdom by the addition of Kundan, which he received from his father-in-law, Devidas of Jaisalmer. He also laid the foundation of the town of Satalmer. He was severely wounded in his deadly conflict with Mallu Khan, the governor of Ajmer, and this led to his death in 1492.²²

When Rao Suja ascended the throne of Marwar, the kingdom included Bahadmer, Kotara and Jaitaran in addition to the territory which had belonged to his ancestors. But during his reign some portions of this extensive territory were snatched by the feudal chiefs of the kingdom. The most important of them was Biram, who increased his power by establishing the independent principality of Merta. Rao Suja also seems to have come into conflict with the chiefs of Pokarana and Bahadmer, who entered on the scene as rivals against his authority and asserted their independence. He died in 1515 at the ripe age of seventy-six years.²³

After Suja came his grandson, Rao Ganga.²⁴ He allied himself with Rana Sanga against Muzaffar Shah II of Gujarat in 1517; he also offered his help to the Rana in resisting Mubarizul Mulk and in getting Rao Raimal seated on the *gaddi* of Idar.²⁵ Lastly, he supported the cause of the Rana at the battle of Khanua, where two of his generals along with 4,000 warriors laid down their lives for the cause of the Rajputs in general and of the Rana in particular.²⁶

During the last few years of his life Rao Ganga devoted his energies to suppressing his uncle, Shekha, and his elder brother, Biram. Shekha with the help of Sarkhel Khan and Daulat Khan of Nagaur tried to capture Jodhpur in 1529, but he was killed in a battle

20 *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Khyat*, Vol. I, 44-45.

21 *Ojha, Udaipur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 243.

22 *Jodhpur Rajya-ki-Khyat*, Vol. I, 47-48; Bankidas, *Atitihastik baten*, No. 795.

23 *Jodhpur Rajya-ki-Khyat*, Vol. I, 58, 59, 62, 63; *Ojha, Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 264-70.

24 *Nensi's Khyat*, Vol. II, 144.

25 *Sarda, Maharana Sanga*, 79.

26 *Baburnama* (SBL), f.246a.

fought near Sevaki, and his associates were forced to quit the field in 1529.²⁷ Biram's patrimony, Sojat, was overrun and in order to humble his pride only the village of Bala was left to him for his maintenance.²⁸ Ganga, according to some writers,²⁹ died of an accidental fall from a window in 1532, but the more reliable authorities declare that he was pushed from the window by his ambitious son, Maldeva, when he was in a state of intoxication.³⁰

²⁷ *Jodhpur Khyat*, Vol. I, 64; Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. II, 11-13; Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 277-79.

²⁸ *Reu, Glories of Marwar*, XX.

²⁹ *Reu and Asopa*.

³⁰ *Nensi's Khyat*, II, 154; Ojha, *Jodhpur Rajya-ki-Khyat*, Vol. I, 63.

V. THE RATHORS OF BIKANER

BIKANER IS THE MOST NORTHERN and the second largest division of Rajasthan. It is said to have taken its name from its capital, the city of Bikaner, i.e., the settlement or habitation (*ner*) founded by Rao Bika in 1488; others say that the spot on which the city stands was the birthright of a Jat, called Naira or Nera, who gave it up on the condition that his name was linked with that of Bika, and hence the word Bika-ner.¹

BIKA (1465-1504)

The chiefs of Bikaner belonged to the Rathor clan of Rajputs. Bika, the fifth son of Jodha, being ambitious and enterprising, left his father's home in 1465, and led an expedition into the region of Jangala, which was then occupied by various tribes. The tract that he chose for his settlement was weakened by the mutual wars among the Bhatias, Johiyas, Qaim-khanis,² Mohils, Chauhans, Chayals and Khichis. A band of trusted warriors accompanied him together with his uncle, Kandhal, and his brother, Bida, to conquer the territory.³

Taking a straight route from Mandor, he reached Deshnok, where Karniji blessed him and predicted his future progress. Thereafter, Chandasar, Kodamdesar, Jangala and hundreds of villages around these towns fell before the advancing arms of Rao Bika. He strengthened his position by an alliance with Rao Shekha of Pugal, who gave his daughter in marriage to him. Fearing him as a formidable opponent, the Bhatias and the Jats measured swords with him, but they were forced to acknowledge his suzerainty. In 1488 he founded the town of Bikaner, which has given permanence to his name and fame.⁴

He hospitably received Uda of Mewar, who, having been driven from his kingdom by Raimal, was on his way to Mandu; the fugitive prince was allowed to live at Bikaner for some time. Rao Bika was

1 Erskine, *The Western Rajputana Residency and Bikaner Agency*, 309.

2 The Qaim-khanis were originally Chauhan Rajputs but were converted to Islam. They are said to have formerly owned the tract of country now called Shekhawati, but were afterwards dispossessed by Shekhaji, the founder of the Shekhawat clan of Rajputs.

3 *Bika Memorial Stone*; Ojha, *Bikaner Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 109; Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. I, 239-40.

4 *Jaitsi-ro-chhanda*, v. 48; *Karmachand-a-camshotkirtanakam Kavyam*, v. 124; Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. II, f.2.

also successful in defeating Sarang Khan at the battle of Jhansa. After the death of his father, Bika led an expedition against Jodhpur but it seems that his attack was finally repulsed. Thus through his dauntless efforts Bika extended the boundaries of his state to the southern limits of the Punjab, including therein Sirsa, Ladnu, Bhatner, Bhatinda, Singhana, Rini, Nohar, Pugal, etc. He died in 1504 leaving a territory which comprised 40,000 square miles of land and about 3,000 villages. His advent marks the commencement of a new dynasty, which endured for over five hundred years.⁵

RAO NARA AND RAO LUNAKARNA (1504-26)

Bika was succeeded by his eldest son, Rao Nara, whose reign was more or less uneventful. He died within a year of his accession, and was succeeded by his younger brother, Rao Lunakarna in 1505. Lunakarna was a powerful prince. He successfully fought with the neighbouring chiefs—the Chauhans of Dadrewa in 1509, the Qaim-khanis of Fathpur in 1512, and the Chayats of Chayatwada and the Khan of Nagaur in 1513. As a result of these conflicts he wrested 120 and 440 villages from the Qaim-khanis and Chayats respectively. To keep them within their limits, he posted strong Rathor garrisons at important centres.⁶

Having suppressed these chiefs, Rao Lunakarna led an expedition against Jaisalmer, proceeding straight to that fort with his army. The whole region round the fort was laid waste and the Rao's army seized a vast amount of booty. The fort was besieged with such vigour that, being reduced to extremities, Jaitsi sued for peace. The Rao treated him kindly and gave back the fort to him. Jaitsi in turn married his daughters to the Rao's sons.⁷

After this success, Lunakarna, determined to bring the northern region of Rajasthan under his authority, occupied Kanthaliya, Didwana, Vagad, Narhad, Singhana, etc., and marched against the Muslim ruler of Narnol. The chiefs of the neighbouring principalities became jealous of his growing power and joined the side of Narnol; and as a result Lunakarna was defeated and slain at the battle of Dhosi in 1526.⁸ According to Jayasoma, Rao Lunakarna was a charitable and righteous ruler and a patron of art and literature.⁹ The

⁵ *Bhattvamsa Prashasti Kavya*, vv. 44, 47; Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. II, ff. 2, 6, 7, 8; Nensi, *Khyat*, Vol. II, 198-99; *Vir Vinod*, Vol. I, 338.

⁶ Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. II, 7-8.

⁷ Bithu Sujo, *Jaitsi-ro Chhanda*, vv. 65-73; Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. II, 8-9.

⁸ *Jaitsi-ro Chhanda*, vv. 74-75, 91-92; Nensi's *Khyat*, Vol. II, 207; Dayaldas, *Khyat*, Vol. II, 9.

⁹ *Karmachand-a-camshotkirtanakam Kavyam*, v. 153.

author of *Jaitsi-ro Chhanda* credits him with having satisfied poets and scholars by giving them liberal grants. He was reputed to have taken proper measures to extend help to the famished population of his state.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Jaitsi-ro Chhanda*, vv. 54, 55, 56, 62.

VI. THE BHATIS OF JAISALMER

EARLY HISTORY OF THE BHATIS

THE ORIGIN OF THE BHATI STATE of Jaisalmer is shrouded in fable and legend. The Khyats ascribe to the BhatIs a Lunar origin and consider them descendants of the Yadava dynasty.¹ Their ancestral residence was the western part of the Punjab, where they are said to have founded several towns, each associated with some section of the tribe.

In tracing the early history of the BhatIs, several hypotheses present themselves, and we propose to select one of them, which rests on plausible grounds, in order to give a brief and connected account of the early history of this tribe. Although the ruler, who founded the dynasty, retained the epithet of Yadava, one of his descendants, Bhati (fifth in the line), who was a renowned warrior and subdued many neighbouring chiefs, gave the new title of Bhati to his dynasty. He is designated as *Maharawal* in the Khyats and is credited with having founded the town of Bhatner in the Punjab.²

CONFLICT WITH THE TURKISH INVADERS

It is likely that during the period of their stay in the Punjab the BhatIs came into conflict with the Turkish invaders. On being pressed by these invasions, Maharawal Deva Raj (eleventh in the line) abandoned his original home, and settled in the desert of the north-eastern region of Rajasthan, which has since then been the home of their descendants. In one of his exploits Deva Raj subdued the Lodra Rajputs, and captured the city of Lodrawa and made it his capital about the beginning of the eleventh century.³

Deva Raj's grandson, Vachha Raj (thirteenth in the line), who was endowed with considerable courage and energy, devoted himself to extending the limits of his kingdom. Vachha Raj and his successors measured swords with various clans, such as the Bhuts, the Channas,

1 The relation between the Yadavas of Devagiri and the Yadavas of Rajasthan is not known. But it is not unlikely that they were related, for both are known to claim their descent from Krishna, who ruled Dwarka. After the death of Krishna, the tribe was dispersed; some members proceeded northwards and others southwards. After several generations the branches of the tribe established themselves in independence in their respective regions of north and south.

2 Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 1176, 1183.

3 *Ibid.*, Vol. II, 1199-1200.

the Barahas, the Langahars, the Sodhas and the Lodras. They also strengthened their position by entering into matrimonial alliances with the neighbouring chiefs.⁴

At the time of Bhojdeva (sixteenth in the line) his uncle, Jaisaldeva, moved by jealousy, conspired to kill him; but since he was always surrounded by his guards, Bhojdeva was personally unassailable. Jaisal, therefore, sought the help of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri and successfully ousted his nephew from power, and occupied his throne. Finding Lodrawa (or Lodrova), the former seat of the Bhatīs, ill-adapted for defence, he established the capital of his kingdom at Jaisalmer.⁵

CONFLICT WITH KHIZR KHAN & ALAUDDIN KHALJI

About 1200 Kailan (1200-1218) was the ruler of Jaisalmer. He repulsed an invasion led by Khizr Khan, a Baluchi chief who, having crossed the Indus, had entered Khadala. One of Kailan's descendants, Karna Singh, protected Bhagwati Das Jhala from Izzuddin, the governor of Nagaur, who wanted to compel the Rajput chief to give the hand of his beautiful daughter to him. Karna Singh attacked Nagaur and defeated and killed the governor.⁶

Concerning the history of the Delhi sultans, reference is made by the Rajput chronicles to the campaign of Alauddin Khalji in the time of Maharawal Jait Singh I, who ascended the throne of Jaisalmer in 1276. The Sultan is said to have invaded Mandor, from where Rana Rupsi fled to seek shelter in Jaisalmer. This led prince Mulraj to plunder the imperial treasure while on its way from Bhakkarkot to Delhi, and the Sultan was provoked to diverting a part of his army to Jaisalmer. The Maharawal stood a prolonged siege which, according to Nensi, lasted for about twelve years (1300-12). This brought untold suffering to the garrison owing to the scarcity of food and provisions. In sheer desperation the Rajput ladies performed *jauhar* and the soldiers led by Mulraj and his brother, Ratan Singh, rushed out of the fort and died fighting to the last man. Jaisalmer remained in the hands of the Turks for the next two years. In the end it was restored by Nasiruddin Khan to Maharawal Ghadsi.⁷

⁴ *Bhatti Kavya*, vv. 87, 114, 130, 184; Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 1201.

⁵ *Bhatti Kavya*, vv. 205, 206, etc; *Jaisalmer Khyat*; Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 1204.

⁶ Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 1210.

⁷ Nensi, *Khyat*, Vol. II, 295, 482 (Kashi ed.); Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 1216.

(The Rajput traditions seem to confuse the siege of Jaisalmer with the siege of Siwana, which (according to the poet Khusrau) lasted for about seven years. The Persian records are silent about Jaisalmer — ERROR.)

CONFLICT WITH NEIGHBOURING CLANS

After the death of Maharawal Jait Singh, a number of rulers ascended the throne of Jaisalmer. Most of them were involved in local conflicts with the neighbouring clans of the north and north-west and the rulers of Multan and Amarkot. An instance in point is that of Maharawal Vairsi (1396-1448), who helped Rao Jodha, the founder of Jodhpur, to recover his patrimony near about Mandor, which had been seized by the state of Mewar.⁸ His successor, Chachak II (1448-62), fought with the Langah chief of Multan and lost his life during the struggle.⁹ He was succeeded by his son, Devi Das, who ruled till 1497. He was engaged in a struggle with Rao Bika and interfered with the latter's efforts in consolidating his power at Bikaner.¹⁰ During the time of his successor, Jait Singh II (1497-1529), the state of Bikaner became aggressive. The Rao of Bikaner attacked Jaisalmer, plundered the state extensively, not even sparing the capital, but in the end came to terms.¹¹

The Bhatīs, as a tribe, spread over an extensive belt of southern Punjab and north-western Rajasthan, including Jaisalmer, Bhawalpur, Bhatner, Nariana and Bayana. Some of its leading chiefs were valiant fighters and displayed extraordinary vigour and intrepidity in dealing with their foes. They were patrons of public works. In the course of their long predominance of about four centuries, various temples and lakes were constructed. The famous temple of Lakshminath and that of the Sun-god of Jaisalmer are ascribed to Rao Lakshmana and Rao Vairsi. Similarly, Jaisaldeva, Ghadsi and Jaitsi constructed the dams of the lakes of Jaisalsar, Ghadsisar and Jaitbundh respectively. It was through their efforts that it became possible to consolidate and sustain local independence.¹²

8 *Vairsi Inscription*, V.S. 1493. 1497.

9 *Chachak Inscription*, V.S. 1518.

10 *Jaisalmer Khyat*.

11 *Cahalot, Rajputana-ka-Itihas*, 668.

12 *Bhatti Kavya*, vv. 87-236.

VII. THE CHAUHANS OF AJMER

EARLY HISTORY OF THE CHAUHANS

IN SOME RESPECTS THE CHAUHAN TRIBE of the Rajputs is the most important, both for its valour and the extent of its expansion. But to have a correct idea of this famous tribe with its clans and sub-clans in the history of Rajasthan, we must survey its fortunes from the period preceding the Ghurian invasion. The story has been partly told in a previous chapter but it will bear retelling.

There were a number of Chauhan dynasties ruling in different tracts with their headquarters at Sambhar, Ranthambhor, Bhargukachcha, Nadol, Jalor, etc. Of these the Chauhans of Sambhar were the most important. Their cradle-land was Sapadalaksha or the region of Sambhar and Nagaur to which they might have migrated from trans-Hindustan (modern Uttar Pradesh). One of their chiefs, Samanta, came to a region where his services proved effective in stemming the tide of Arab expansion. Rising into influence and power during the regime of the Pratiharas as their feudatories, one of their chiefs, Vigraharaja II, struck for independence about 973.¹ From that time onwards their progress was steady. By the close of the eleventh century they had established and fortified themselves effectively at Ajmer, the heart of Rajasthan. By 1164 eastern Punjab, Rewari, and north-eastern Rajasthan were under the suzerainty of the Chauhans. Their kingdom virtually extended to the foot of the Himalayas and thus they became the gate-keepers of the western plains of northern India and formed a barrier between the Ghaznavid state of the Punjab and Rajasthan.²

PRITHVIRAJA III

The glory of the Chauhans rose to its height under Prithviraja III (1180-92), who played a conspicuous part in the history of India on the eve of the Ghurid conquest. From 1180 when he took the reins of government in his hands, he was engaged in a number of wars. After defeating his rival, Nagarjuna, and making his position strong in his

¹ *Harsha Inscription*, vv. 11, 25; *Bijolijan Inscription*, vv. 10-25; *Hamirmahakavya*, Canto I, vv. 1-20, Canto II, vv. 1-30; *Prithvirajavijaya*, Canto I, vv. 50-70; *EI*; II, 116-27; *EI*, XXVI, 84-112; *Dynastic History of Northern India*, II, 1069-76; Dasharath Sharma, *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, 24-71.

² *Prithvirajavijaya*, X-XII; Dr. R. P. Tripathi: *Rajputs of Northern India*, (Ms.), 3.

homeland, he entered upon a career of conquests and exploits. The Bhandanakas were the first to meet the brunt of his attacks; they were subdued and their territory was annexed. It included the area comprising the villages of Rewari *tahsil*, and Bhiwani and a part on the Alwar side.³ Next he turned his arms against Parmardin, the Chandel chief.⁴ The Chalukyan and Chauhan rivalry took a serious turn during his time, but neither of them could claim a decisive victory over the other.⁵

Tradition speaks also of the opening of hostility between Jayachandra of Kanauj and Prithviraja. Both were ambitious of attaining to fame as conquerors, and their mutual rivalry made them sworn and implacable enemies. The well-known affair of Sanyogita's abduction by Prithviraja, if true, would have accentuated this rivalry and paved the way for the destruction of both. The political relations between the Chauhans, on the one hand, and the Chandels and Gahadwals on the other, were seriously strained; and most likely a serious conflict would have followed but for the invasion of India by Mu'izzuddin Ghuri. Other Hindu kingdoms of northern India were also passing through similar phases; they were preoccupied either with the suppression of internal disorder or had to meet the attack of neighbouring states.⁶

Taking advantage of the strained relations of the Chauhans with the Chalukyas on the one hand and with the Gahadwals on the other, Mu'izzuddin Ghuri, who had already conquered the Ghaznavid kingdom of the Punjab, first occupied Multan and Uchh and, making them as a sort of bridgehead, advanced towards Gujarat through Kiradu and Nadol in 1178.⁷ The Ghurian arms sustained a severe reverse at the hands of the Chalukyas; but Prithviraja, who could have intervened decisively on the Rajput side, preferred to remain a passive spectator, calculating wrongly that the conflict between the Chalukyans and the Ghurians would lead to the destruction of both parties and leave him supreme. This attitude was extremely shortsighted, for, as subsequent events were to show, the unwise policy of Prithviraja III proved detrimental both to the cause of Indian liberty and to Chauhan glory.

³ Dr. Dashrath Sharma: *Early Chauhan Dynasties*, 74.

⁴ *Pranbandhachintamani*, Singhvi Jain Granthamala, I, 1160; EI, V, (Appendix).

⁵ *Kharatargachchapattavali*, v. 1244.

⁶ *Prithvirajavijaya*, X, 2; XII, 1-38; *Prithviraja Raso*, Samayas, XLV-L and LX-LXI; Dr. R. P. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India* (Ms.), 7.

⁷ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 449-51 (Raverty); *Tarikh-i Ferishta* (Briggs), I, 169.

MU'IZZUDDIN'S ATTACKS AND THE LOSS OF AJMER

With an intelligent grasp of the existing political situation in the northern India, Mu'izzuddin led his first attack against Prithviraja in 1191 and met the Chauhan forces at Tarain. The fight began with the Chauhan charge on the right and left flanks of the Ghurian army and resulted in its decisive defeat.⁸ But this victory meant only a temporary success. Prithviraja seems to have overestimated its significance, while Mu'izzuddin strove hard to prepare a second army. So he came again with an army, which some historians have put at the impossible figure of 1,20,000, to the same battle-field and avenged his former defeat by taking the Rajputs by surprise.⁹ This time the Rajputs were completely routed. The contest not only led to the downfall of the Chauhan power, but it also virtually ended the age of chivalry and heroism for which the Rajputs were reputed. The victory of Tarain was followed by the fall of Ajmer and Delhi.¹⁰

The policy of the Turkish rulers of allowing Prithviraja's nephew to rule at Ajmer as their vassal was resented by Hari Raja, the brother of Prithviraja. Hari Raja had neither the ability nor the character to be an effective leader of the Chauhans. He captured Ajmer in 1194 but failed to retain it; and in despair and anguish he stupidly committed self-immolation along with his followers. The invasions of Mu'izzuddin Ghuri tore the political map of northern India of the twelfth century into shreds. No other invader since the days of Alexander had succeeded in influencing the history of this country to the same extent as Mu'izzuddin Ghuri. The second battle of Tarain in 1192 and the capture of Ajmer in 1194 produced changes at once kaleidoscopic and cataclysmic. Within ten years of the second battle of Tarain the advance of the Turkish arms made their influence felt from Anhilwara in Gujarat to Nadiya in Bengal. The disappearance of the Chauhan kingdoms of Ajmer and Delhi gave a stunning blow to the prestige and power of the Rajputs, and destroyed the cobweb of Rajput dynastic imperialism from one end of northern India to the other.¹¹

Though Ajmer was lost, the Chauhans remained a powerful clan in Rajasthan. They were still masters of Ranthambhor and of the area covered by Sambhar, Nadol, Jalor, Sachor, Bundi and Kotah. If

⁸ *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* (Raverty), 455-60.

⁹ *Prabandhachintamani*, Singhvi Jain Granthamala, X, 45:

Puratanprabandhasangraha, Singhvi Granthamala, 116-18; *Hamamimahakavya*, Canto III, vv. 1-72.

¹⁰ *Tajul Ma'asir*, ED, II, 215; De, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 39.

¹¹ Dr. R. P. Tripathi, *Rajputs of Northern India*, 11-12.

the resources of these principalities could be fully mobilised and concentrated against the Turkish invaders by a warlike and able leader, there was every chance of recovering the lost prestige of the Rajputs. But since these principalities involved themselves in family feuds, they remained weak and helpless.

VIII. THE CHAUHANS OF NADOL

LAKSHMANA, SON OF VAKPATIRAJA, was the founder of the principality of the Chauhans of Nadol. He made himself master of Nadol during the disorders that followed the death of the Chavda Raja, Samant Singh, in 960. He was a very brave ruler and extended his territory up to the present district of Jodhpur. He died about 983.¹ He was followed by Sobhita, Balaraja, Mahendra, Ahila, Balprasada, Prithvipala, etc., who, like other Chauhans, maintained their position by undertaking wars against the rulers of Malwa and Gujarat. Ahila, for example, defeated the forces of Bhimdeva of Gujarat and cut off with his own hand the head of Sadha, the general of Bhoj of Malwa. He seems to have come into conflict with the army of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni when he pressed through Nadol and Anhilwara in the expedition against Somnath in 1024. Similarly one of the descendants of this branch, Prithvipala, defeated Karna of Gujarat.²

But it seems that three or four generations later, in the time of Asraj, Alhan and Kelhan, the Nadol branch of Chauhans grew weak and acknowledged the suzerainty of the Solankis of Gujarat. Kelhan in 1178 fought against Mu'izzuddin Ghuri at the battle of Kayadran as a feudatory of Mulraja II. In or about 1205 the Nadol branch was absorbed by the Jalor branch.³

The reign of the Chauhans of Nadol is also memorable for the cultural progress achieved during the period. The fort of Nadol is said to have been constructed by Lakshmana.⁴ Kelhan erected a golden *torana*, like a diadem, for the abode of the holy Someshwara.⁵ Though personally devoted to the worship of Shiva and Vishnu, the Chauhans of Nadol were catholic enough to offer gifts to Neminath, Rishabhadeva and Mahavir at Sevadi, Bali, Nadli, etc.⁶ A copper plate grant of Nadol informs us that Alhanadeva, after worshipping the Sun and Ishana and making gifts to Brahmans and *gurus*, granted a monthly sum of 5 drammās to a Jain temple of Mahavir from the office of a customs house in the Naddula *talapada*.⁷ Similarly reference

1 P. C., *Jain Lekhasangraha*, I, 210-11, 253-58.

2 *El.*, IX, 76-77, vv. 14, 17, 22.

3 *Sundha Hill Inscription*, v. 26; *Dynastic History of India*, II, 1115; *Singhvi Jain Granthmala*, Vol. I, 51; Choudhary, *Political History of Northern India*, 158.

4 Choudhary, *Political History of Northern India*, 148.

5 *Sundha Hill Inscription*, v. 34.

6 Choudhary, *Political History of Northern India*, 147-58.

7 *Nadol copper plate grant*, V.S. 1218; *El.*, IX, 63-66.

is found in the Kiradu inscription to an edict of non-slaughter by which the subjects were forbidden by Alhan to slaughter living creatures on the 8th, 11th, and 14th days of both fortnights of every month in the towns of Kiradu, Latashada and Siva on pain of capital punishment. He also specified a scale of punishments for Brahmans, priests, ministers and others.⁸

⁸ *Kiradu Inscription*, V.S. 1216; *JASB*, IX, 66-70.

IX. THE CHAUHANS OF JALOR

THE JALOR BRANCH OF THE CHAUHAN dynasty was founded at Jalor about 1182 by Kirtipala, the younger brother of Kelhan of Nadol. This branch is also called Sonigra after the name of the hill Sovarnagiri of Jalor. His successor, Samar Singh, was a great builder. He built fortifications on the Jalor hill and mounted various kinds of *munjaniqs* on its ramparts. He founded the town of Samarpur and embellished it with gardens. He also weighed himself against gold, which he distributed among the Brahmans.¹

He was succeeded by his son, Udai Singh, about 1205. Udai Singh extended his territory beyond Jalor by including in it Nadol, Bhinmal, Baharmer, Ratanpur, Sanchor and other neighbouring towns.² He appears to have come into conflict with the rulers of Gujarat and Sindh and asserted his independent position.³ But his power was threatened by Iltutmish, who led an army to capture the fortress of Jalor. Though Iltutmish failed to reduce the fort, he compelled the Rai to sue for peace by offering camels and horses.⁴ The history of his successors, Chachigdeva and Samant Singh, has very little to record about their political activities but it, of course, preserves details about their religious deeds and grants made by them for the worship of various deities.⁵

Samant Singh's son, Kanhaddeva (1292-1310), was a brave warrior, who fought several times against the Turkish forces. He extended the limits of his kingdom beyond Marwar by measuring his strength with the chiefs of the neighbouring states. He earned fame for his just administration. Alauddin Khalji could not tolerate the growing power of the Rai. He, therefore, marched with a huge army under Kamaluddin Gurg to capture Jalor in 1309 or 1310. The fort was bravely defended by the Chauhans, but they had no alternative but to open the gate of the fort when no provisions were left and their chosen warriors, along with Kanhaddeva and his son, met their glorious end. The kingdom of Jalor thus ended about 1310.⁶

1 *Jain Lekhasangraha*, I, 205, 238, Nos. 730, 903. *Ibid.*, 238-39; *Sundha Hill Inscription*, vv. 38, 40.

2 *Sundha Hill Inscription*, v. 43.

3 *Puratanprabandhasangraha*, SCGM, II, 51.

4 Elliot, II, 238; Briggs, Vol. I, 207.

5 *Jain Lekhasangraha*, I, 233, 240, 244, 249, etc.

6 *Puratanprabandhasangraha*; EI, XI, 77; Briggs, *Fertishta*, Vol. I, 370; *Reu. Marwar-ka-Itihas*, 15.

X. THE CHAUHANS OF RANTHAMBHOR

GOVINDA RAJA AND HIS SUCCESSORS

THOUGH AJMER WAS LOST, THE CHAUHANS remained a powerful clan in Rajasthan. After the death of Hari Raja, his followers left Ajmer and went to Govinda Raja, the exiled son of Prithviraja, who had established his capital at Ranthambhor.¹ After him the throne passed to his weak successors, whose reigns are not marked by any event of importance. Govinda Raja's son, Balhana, ruled for some time as a feudatory of Iltutmish.² His brother, Pahlad, neglected the business of government and spent his time in hunting.³ After his death the mutual jealousies and quarrels of Viranarayana (Pahlad's son) and Vagbhatta (Pahlad's brother) plunged the principality into disorder. When Iltutmish came to know of this, he had Viranarayana treacherously murdered.⁴ Soon after his assassination the Sultan sent one of his generals against Vagbhatta; the general attacked the fort, captured it and killed Vagbhatta in 1226.⁵ Though Vagbhatta's successor, Jaitra Singh, was able to capture the fort of Ranthambhor, he was unable to get possession of the contiguous land. Having failed to save the rest of the principality from the aggression of the Turks, he finally abdicated in favour of his promising son, Hamir, in 1283 and went to live in the forest.⁶

HAMIRDEVA (1283-1301)

Hamirdeva, son of Jaitra Singh, was one of the greatest kings who have ruled at Ranthambhor. His accession to the throne took place between 1283 and 1289.⁷ Like his forefather, Prithviraja, he raised his principality to a position of preeminence by embarking on a series of warlike expeditions. At the beginning of his reign Raja Arjuna of Sarasapura had to bear the brunt of his attack. Arjuna was defeated and reduced to submission.⁸ Hamir is also credited with having won

1 *Hammirmahakavya*, IV, vv. 20-26.

2 *Mangana Inscription*, V.S. 1272.

3 *Hammirmahakavya*, IV, vv. 48-72.

4 *Ibid.*, IV, vv. 72-126.

5 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, ED. Vol. II, 370-71.

6 *Hammirmahakavya*, VIII, vv. 56, 72-105, 106; *Dynastic History of Northern India*, II, 1093-95.

7 *Hammirmahakavya*, Introductory, 47; *EI*, XIX, 45-52.

8 *Hammirmahakavya*, IX, vv. 15, 16.

victories over the ruler of Garhamandala, Raja Bhoja of Dhar, the Rana of Mewar and the chief of Mt. Abu.⁹ We, however, have no further evidence to support the great claims of his successes. What we can infer from local records is that Hamir collected rich presents and tributes from the neighbouring chiefs and won recognition as a warrior from the powerful rulers of Malwa and Mewar.

His reign also saw the beginning of a conflict with the Delhi empire. Jalaluddin Firuz Khalji (1290-96), as described in a previous chapter, planned the siege of Ranthambhor but gave it up on ground of the lives it would cost.

This victory raised the reputation of Hamir, and some new Muslim or Mongol officers, who had rebelled against the army of Delhi in 1299 during its return from its victorious campaign from Gujarat, fled to Hamir for protection. Ulugh Khan, the Sultan's brother, demanded that Hamir should, as a good neighbour, hand over the fugitives. Hamir, in spite of the advice of his counsellors, who saw no reason for risking the dynasty for foreigners with no moral claims upon it, refused to hand over the refugees and the Sultan ordered Ulugh Khan and Nusrat Khan to proceed against Ranthambhor.

Two Rajput deserters from Hamir's kingdom, named Bhoja and Pitama, also instigated the Sultan against Hamir. The siege and fall of Ranthambhor has been described in a previous chapter and the details need not be repeated. But it has to be noted that the Sultan had to come and direct the siege in person, that there were three rebellions against him while he was away from Delhi, and that the fort could only be taken after the construction of a *pasheb* during the terrible summer months of 1301. Hamirdeva and his men, whose provisions were also exhausted, died fighting at the head of the *pasheb* after the Rajput ladies had committed their bodies to the flames according to the sacred rite of *jauhar*. It is difficult to guess at the sources of Hamir's strength, but all the best fighting men and all the resources of the Delhi empire under its most capable ruler were needed for the reduction of Ranthambhor. In view of Jalaluddin Firuz's failure before Ranthambhor, Alauddin had no alternative but to persist in the siege. Still Hamir's advisers were correct. It was not necessary for him to challenge Delhi with no consideration for the fortunes of his dynasty or the welfare of his subjects.

With the death of Hamir the glory of the Chauhan branch of Ranthambhor also came to an end. In the annals of Rajasthan Hamir is not only remembered for his valour in war but also for his policy of toleration towards different sects. When he visited Ujjain, he

⁹ *Ibid.*, vv. 17-47.

worshipped Mahakala; and during his stay at Pushkar, he offered his devotion to Adivarsha. At Abu he worshipped both Rishabhadeva and Achaleshwara. He celebrated a *kotiyajna* sacrifice to which a large number of Brahmans from all over the country were invited. The ceremony was concluded by observing *munivrata* or living a life of seclusion for a month.¹⁰

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Canto IX, vv. 77-99.

XI. THE CHAUHANS OF SIROHI

DEORA KINGDOM

THE CHIEFS OF SIROHI BELONG to the Deora sept of the Chauhan clan of Rajputs. It appears that Lumba, who owed his origin to a Deora Chauhan of Jalor, founded the Deora kingdom, consisting of Abu and Chandrawati, which he wrested from the Pramaras about 1311. Lumba is said to have died in 1321. Nothing eventful is known of his five immediate successors—Tej Singh, Kanhardeva, Samant Singh, Salkha, and Ranmal—except that they restored the temple of Achaleshwara and endowed villages to the temple of Vashistha. All these rulers appear to have had their capital sometimes at Chandravati and sometimes at Achalgarh (about four miles north of Abu).¹

FOUNDATION OF SIROHI

Ranmal was succeeded by Shivabhan, who founded the town of Shivapuri below the Siranwa hill in 1405 and built a fort on the top of the hill. His son, Sahasmal, found the site of Shivapuri unhealthy and decided to transfer his capital to a place with a better strategic position; so the town of Sirohi was founded in 1425. The removal of the capital from Chandravati to the new site may have been also due to the attacks of the neighbouring powers, in particular Ahmad Shah of Gujarat. It is rightly believed that the latter carried off a good deal of marble from Chandravati to be used for his newly founded town of Ahmadabad.²

Sahasmal, like an ambitious ruler, extended his kingdom by annexing a part of the neighbouring territory of the Solanki Rajputs. Finding Rana Kumbha engaged in punishing rebels, he marched with his victorious army to the frontiers of Mewar and took possession of a few border villages. But the Rana sent an expedition against Rao Sahasmal under Dodiya Narsingh, who by force of arms conquered Abu, Basantgarh and Bhula and annexed the eastern part of Sirohi territory to Mewar in or about 1437. The Rana later on built the fort of Achalgarh and the temple of Kumbhaswami and a lake and a palace there to celebrate his victory.³

1 *Achaleshwara Inscription*, V.S. 1397; *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Part 3A, 238; *Sirohi Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 155.

2 Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 193; Sitaram, *History of Sirohi Raj*, 164-65.

3 Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 195.

It was Lakha, the son and successor of Sahasmal, to whom Rana Uda handed over Abu, which Rana Kumbha had seized. During the course of the conflict the Rana's forces had inflicted severe losses on the Gujarat army, which had laid waste the country through which it passed. Lakha was a benevolent and enlightened ruler. He recalled the people, who had left the kingdom during the days of disorder, to settle there again. His public works, like the construction of the temple of Kalika Mata and the Lakhelao tank, speak of his munificence.⁴

Lakha was succeeded by his ambitious son, Jagmal. In order to strengthen his position he allied himself with Rana Raimal of Mewar in routing Bahlul Lodi in 1474. He was credited with having defeated and captured Malik Majid Khan of Jalor in a battle; but later on Majid was released after the payment of a handsome ransom of turquoise worth nine lakhs.⁵

But family feuds for position and influence began to affect the inner harmony of the Sirohi state. Jagmal's younger brother, Hamir, by a sheer act of aggression seized nearly half of the state and began to harbour designs of ascending the throne. He was paid back in his own coin and was killed in action, but his refractory attitude contributed to creating a disorderly atmosphere in the state. When confusion and lawlessness had become the order of the day, a party of merchants was robbed of its goods and four hundred Persian and Khurasani horses while on its way from Delhi to Ahmadabad. The matter was reported to Mahmud Shah Begarha of Gujarat who thus got an opportunity of interfering in the affairs of the state. The Sultan wrote a letter to the Rao asking him either to surrender the horses and goods or prepare for an invasion. Jagmal, finding that the robbery had been committed within the limits of his state, returned everything with a suitable tribute. This undoubtedly undermined the prestige of the Rao.⁶

In 1523 Jagmal was succeeded by his son, Akheraj I, who was such a renowned warrior as to get the epithet of *Urana Akheraj*—'the flying Akheraj'. His military enterprises continued unabated towards the north-west; this is proved by the fact that he built the fort of Lohiana in Jodhpur territory. He fought at the battle of Khanua as an ally of Rana Sanga. We are told by the writer of *Vashistha Inscription* that Akheraj I was a mighty king in his dynasty; this is expressed in the title—'Maharaj Shri'. He died in 1533.⁷

4 *Ibid.*, 201; Tod, *Annals, Mewar*, Chapter VIII.

5 Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 204-5; *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Part 3A, 240

6 Ojha, *Sirohi Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 205; Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 348.

7 *Vashistha Inscription*, V.S. 1589; *Badla temple Inscription*, V.S. 1589; Dr. G. N. Sharma, *Mewar and the Mughal Emperors*, 36.

XII. THE CHAUHANS OF HARAOTI

DEVA SINGH

THE REGION CONSISTING OF THE TWO principalities of Bundi and Kota, which were formerly separate, is called Haraoti. Deva Singh, a chief of Bambavada (Mewar) who belonged to the Hada sept of the great Chauhan clan, captured this region from the Usara tribe of the Minas, and erected Bundi, the capital of the Hadas, in the heart of the Bandu valley in 1241.¹ He defeated Gajmal, Manohardas, Jaskaran and other enemies and conquered Khatpur, Patan and Karwar. He claimed victory over the Gonds from whom he wrested Genoli. He is also credited with having defeated a Turkish army at Lakhcri. Being a devoted worshipper of Shakti, he constructed the temple of Gangeshwari along with a step-well in Umarthan. After extending his kingdom from Bambavada to the region on the left bank of the Chambal, he abdicated in favour of his son, Samar Singh, in 1243.²

SAMAR SINGH

Deva Singh's son, Samar Singh, was equally ambitious. He renewed the struggle with the Kotia sept of the Bhils and claimed victories over them. Their strongholds in and around Akalgarh and Mukandara pass were first completely destroyed and then converted into guard-houses of the Hadas. As Jaitra Singh, son of Samar Singh, had taken the leading part in suppressing the tribes, he was allowed to keep control over that region with Kota as its capital in 1274. He also measured swords with Goda, Panwar and the Med Rajputs, and captured Kaithun, Siswali, Barod, Railawan, Ramgarh, Mau and Sangod. Thus the Hada kingdom during his time extended over a large part of the present Bundi and Kota districts.³

Samar Singh also seems to have come into conflict with the Turks. About 1252-53 he successfully defended Bundi and Ranthambhor against Balban's raid. But when Alauddin's forces invaded the fort of Bambavada, he met his end in a heroic defence against the invaders.⁴

1 Nensi, Vol. I, 106; Tod, *Annals*, Vol. III, 1465; *Vamshabhasakara*, Vol. II, 1624-27.

2 Nensi, Vol. I, 106; Tod, *Annals*, Vol. III, 1465-66; *Vamshabhasakara*, Vol. II, 1621-27.

3 *Vamshabhasakara*, Vol. III, 1678-81.

4 Dr. M. L. Sharma, *Kota Rajya-ka-Itihas*, I, 62-63; Tod, *Annals*, Vol. III, 1478-79; Majumdar, *The Struggle for Empire*, 121.

NAPUJI AND HIS SUCCESSORS

Samar Singh was succeeded by Napuji. Napuji, like his father, brought Maheshdas Khichi and Ropal Solanki under subjection, and wrested Palaitha and Toda respectively from them at the beginning of the fourteenth century. In his action against the Solankis, Jaitra Singh of Kota died. These victories enabled Napuji to extend the limits of his kingdom up to Patan in the south and Toda in the north. He probably met his end in one of his engagements against Alauddin Khalji in 1304.⁵

After the death of Napuji, his son, Hallu, ascended the throne, but his reign was short. The only remarkable achievement recorded about him is that he subdued the chief of Sisvali, when he tried to assume independence. He abdicated in favour of his son and retired to live a peaceful life at Varanasi.⁶

Hallu's successor, Bir Singh, proved to be an incompetent ruler; so confusion and disorder were inevitable. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, Rana Lakha (1382-1420) of Mewar marched against Bir Singh. Bir was defeated and the fortresses of Mandalgarh and Bamba-vada were captured by the Rana, who also subjugated other Hada lands. In 1432 Sultan Ahmad Shah of Gujarat extracted tribute from Bundi and Kota. Three times (in 1449, 1453 and 1459) Mahmud Khalji of Mandu led his army against Bundi. In its last defence, Bir Singh, the ruler of Bundi, lost his life. The Sultan carried off two of his sons, Samar Singh and Amar Singh, to Mandu and converted them to the Muslim faith. They were given the names of Samarkandi and Umarmkandi.⁷ Unfortunately the weak successors of the energetic early rulers had not the courage or the ability to save the kingdom from the aggressions of its external enemies.

After the death of Jaitra Singh, referred to above, Surjan and Dhirdeh occupied the throne of Kota. Their reigns also were not marked by any event of importance except the construction of twelve lakes in the vicinity of the town. But during the days of aggression and disorder, they remained loyal to the dynasty of Bundi.⁸

Bando, the next ruler of Bundi, devoted himself energetically to the suppression of disorder. He distributed grain freely in the famine stricken areas. But finding his position weak, his two apostate brothers

⁵ *Vamshabhashkara*, Vol. III, 1714, 1727, 1787; Dr. M. L. Sharma, *Kota Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 63-65.

⁶ *Bundi-ki-Tawarikh*.

⁷ Dr. M. L. Sharma, *Kota Rajya-ka-Itihas*, Vol. I, 66

⁸ Tod, *Annals*, Vol. II, 506; *Vamshabhashkara*, Vol. III, 1708.

attacked his kingdom. As a result Bando was driven back with heavy losses to the hills of Matunda, where he died in 1503.⁹

RAO NARAIN

The military record of Rao Narain, son of Bando, is one of triumph. In order to centralize the authority of the state, he embarked upon the policy of suppressing those nobles who had made themselves independent. This he succeeded in accomplishing with the faithful services of some of the Hada chiefs. He frustrated an attempt on the part of the Sultan of Malwa to take possession of Haraoti by having Daud, son of Samarkandi, murdered. He also fought against the Sultan of Malwa in alliance with Rana Raimal of Chitor. His relations with Mewar were further strengthened when the Rana married his niece to him. He also joined the Rajput confederacy under the leadership of Rana Sanga against Babur at Khanua in 1527. The courageous Rao, who had done so much for his state, was assassinated about 1529 due to a conspiracy organised by a baronial clique, headed by the fiefholder of Khatkado, when he and his brother, Narbad, were engaged in a hunting excursion.¹⁰ Up to this time the dynasty of the Hadas seems to have acknowledged the political preeminence of Mewar, and the state of Kota was in subordination to Bundi Raj.¹¹

⁹ *Rajasthan District Gazetteers*, Bundi, 36.

¹⁰ *Vamshabhaskara*, Vol. III, 2029, 2065; *Vamsha Prakash*, 51.

¹¹ *Nensi*, Vol. I, 109.

XIII. THE KACHHWAHAS OF DHUNDHAR

ORIGIN OF THE KACHHWAHAS

THE ORIGIN OF THE KACHHWAHAS OF Dhundhar, who ruled over the principality of Jaipur, including Shēkawati, has been a subject of acute controversy. The prevalent *legend* traces back their lineage to Kush, the second son of Rama, who ruled at Ayodhya.¹ On the other hand, most modern scholars hold that the dynasty of these rulers was named after the region which was originally occupied by a tribe, known as Kacchapakas. As this tribe was subdued by them, they naturally took the title of *Kacchapaha*, *Kacchapaghata* and *Kacchapahana*. In common speech they were called Kachhwahas.² Some writers link up the Kachhwahas with Kacchapavahini, the family deity of this sept,³ while others are inclined to believe that the rulers of this dynasty traced their origin to Kurma, the father of Vatsavagha. We do not know in what exact relation Kurma stood to the founder of this dynasty, but we learn from some epigraphs⁴ that he was an outstanding monarch owing whom several rulers of this house have been called *Kurmavamshi*, a title which corresponds to Kacchwaha.

Whatever might have been the origin of the dynasty, it appears that the early ancestors of Kachhwahas migrated from eastern India to Rohtas on the Sone river, and from there after several generations, Raja Nal migrated westward across the Jumna. His followers ruled over the territories of Gwalior, Dubkunda and Narwar as subordinate chiefs of the Gurjara-Pratiharas. But when the power of the Gurjara-Pratiharas disintegrated, the Kachhwahas became independent.⁵

DULLAH RAI AND HIS SUCCESSORS

While branches of the Kachhwaha dynasty were ruling at Gwalior, Dubkunda and Narwar, Dullah Rai, a scion of the Narwar branch, defeated the Badgujara and took possession of the fortress of Dosa. He then reduced the Mina chief of Manch and built the fort of Ramgarh. Later on he compelled other Minas to submit to him and to surrender Khoha, Jhotwada and Caitor. Thus after years of warfare Dullah Rai is said to have subdued many petty chiefs, both

¹ *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. II, 135.

² *Bengal Asiatic Report*, 1913, 24.

³ *EI*, Vol. II, 28.

⁴ *Sanganer Inscription*, V.S. 1658; *Revasa Temple Inscription*, V.S. 1661; *Lili Inscription*, V.S. 1803, 1814; *Gahalot, Jaipur and Ahicar Rajya-ka-Itihas*, 55-56.

⁵ *Sasabahu Temple Inscription*, Gwalior, V.S. 1150; *IA*, XV, 33-46.

Rajputs and Minas, and to have founded the small state of Dhundhar. When returning on one occasion from visiting the shrine of Jamwaya Mata, his passage through that region was opposed by the Minas, who had temporarily acknowledged his supremacy. He gave them battle but was killed after slaying a vast number of his foes.⁶

His son, Kakildeva, gathered a powerful army and resumed the struggle against the Minas. He captured the fort of Amber about 1037 from Bhatto, the leader of the Soosawat Minas, and made it his headquarters. He also subdued the Yadavas and added Med and Bairat to his territory.⁷

Janaddeva emulated the exploits of his grandfather, Kakildeva, by defeating the Minas again. The next ruler, Panjandeva, seems to have come into conflict with the Chandels and wrested Mahoba from them. He was one of those who enabled Prithviraja Chauhan to carry off Samyogita, the princess of Kanauj. But he met his end in the battle of Tarain while fighting against the Ghurids.⁸

Punjandeva was succeeded from about 1070 to 1389 by a series of rulers—Malsi, Bijaldeva, Ramdeva, Kilhan, Kuntal, Jansi, Udaikaran, Narsingh and others—who were not wanting in warlike qualities. Malsi, for example, gained a victory at Rutrali over the ruler of Mandu. Others also increased their resources by raids against the Minas, Chauhans and Yadavas, and became independent masters of Dhundhar. They were followed by Udaikaran and Chandrasen, who defeated the Qaim-khanis sometime between 1439 and 1467 and brought the productive area of Shekhawati within their territory. These rulers, in order to consolidate the newly acquired regions, seem to have assigned appanages to their younger sons who were styled as 'Narukas', 'Patalas', 'Pithavats', 'Shekhawats', 'Nathavats', etc., after the names of their progenitors.⁹

Chandrasen was succeeded by his son, Prithviraja (1503-27), who was a devoted follower of Krishnadas, a Ramanuja of Galtā. His wife, Balabai, was also a great devotee. As a feudatory of Rana Sanga, he fought against Babur and helped in removing the wounded Rana from the battle-field. He reorganized the Kachhwaha nobility in twelve chambers, styled as the *bara kotri*. In course of time the descendants of this hereditary aristocracy were elevated to high positions, both in the state and outside it. The separation of the branch of Jobner, for example, led to the establishment of several baronial fiefs belonging to the Khangarot branch of the Kachhwahas.

⁶ Tod, *Annals*, 282.

⁷ *Ibid.*

⁸ *Ibid.*, 284; *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, 534.

⁹ Tod, *Annals*, 285; Hanuman Sharma: *Nathavatn-ka-Utthas*, 25-35.

XIV. THE YADAVAS OF KARAULI

VIJAYAPALA AND HIS SUCCESSORS

LIKE THE BHATIS OF JAISALMER, the chiefs of Karauli also belonged to the Yadava clan of Rajputs. This Yadava dynasty of Karauli began with Vijayapala. He migrated from Mathura and settled in the hilly region of eastern Rajasthan, where he laid the foundation of the fort and the capital of Vijayamandirgarh in 1040. This fort was later on known as Bayana. The *Khyata* writers refer to his conflict with the Turkish invaders from Ghazni. In contemporary records he is called *Paramabhattacharaka*, which establishes his political preeminence in this line. He may have lived till 1093. The fort of Bayana, as we shall see, was captured by the Ghurid invaders.¹

Tawanpala (1093-1159), son of Vijayapala, was a powerful king of this dynasty. In the course of a long reign of sixty-six years he did much to increase the power of his kingdom by constructing the fort of Tawangarh (the Thankar of Persian histories), fifteen miles from Bayana, and by making fresh conquests. He extended his kingdom by bringing within it the major parts of Dang, Alwar, Bharatpur, Dholpur, Gudgaon, Mathura, Agra and Gwalior. His political sovereignty over the wide expanse of territory is further established by his title of *Paramabhattacharaka Maharajadhiraja Parameswara*.²

The two succeeding rulers, who followed Tawanpala, could not maintain their hold over their patrimony, partly due to the conflicts within the family and partly owing to the growing power of their feudatories. They also failed in opposing Mu'izzuddin Ghori, who took possession of Bayana and Tawangarh (or Thankar) in 1196. From 1196 to 1327 the chronology of this line is uncertain. It seems that this period was marked by disorder and that the fortunes of the dynasty had declined for a time.³

RAJA ARJUNPALA AND HIS SUCCESSORS

Raja Arjunpala (1327-61), son of Gokuldeva, was one of the greatest kings of this dynasty. By defeating Miyan Makkhan of Mandrahal, who was unpopular in the region, he again got a foothold in his home territory. He further established his authority over his kingdom by suppressing the Minas and the Panwar Rajputs. He

1 *Jaisalmer Khyat*; *Archaeological Survey of India*, Vol. 20, 38; *Karauli Gazetteer*, 2.

2 *Archaeological Survey of India*, Vol. 20, 3.

3 *Chronology of India*, 170.

is also credited with having founded the town of Kalyanpur (Karauli) in 1348, and making it beautiful with mansions, lakes, gardens and temples.⁴

Arjunpala's successors were more or less insignificant. They became involved in family feuds and this made them too weak to face the onslaught of their enemies. During the reign of Prithvipala, the Afghans captured Tawangarh (Thankar) in the first quarter of the fifteenth century. Though he repulsed the attack of the ruler of Gwalior, he failed to suppress the Minas who had grown formidable.⁵ Maharaja Chandrapal (fifteenth in the line) was a religious-minded ruler; he could not withstand the attack of Mahmud Khalji of Malwa, who penetrated into his kingdom and stormed his capital in 1454. The victorious Sultan retired to his capital after handing over Karauli to his son, Fidvi Khan. After being ousted from Bayana, Chandrapala led the retired life of a devotee at Untagarh. It seems that he and his successors retained their authority over a narrow strip of land around the place of their refuge till one of his successors, Gopaldas, got back a portion of his territory during Akbar's time.⁶

4 Elliot, Vol. V, 98; Gahalot, *History of Rajputana*, 601-2.

5 *History of Rajputana*, 602-3.

6 *Akbarnama*, III, 157, 434, 598; *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. I, 564, 593.

XV. THE TANWARS OF DHOLPUR

THE EARLY HISTORY OF DHOLPUR is lost in darkness. According to local tradition, Dholpur derives its name from Raja Dholun Deva Tanwar (an offshoot of the family reigning at Delhi), who established his kingdom between the Chambal and Banganga rivers about 1005. He made Belpur on the Chambal the capital of his state, 10 miles south-west of the present town of Dholpur. He also seems to have built in the ravines of the Chambal a fort, the ruins of which can yet be seen.¹

It is likely that the narrow strip of territory, which constituted this state, was a part of the kingdom of Kanauj, which under the Rathors extended westward towards the open country along the Chambal. For a while the Yadavas of Karauli also occupied some parts of this state as is proved by the fact that they built a fort at Dholpur in 1120.²

Before the Ghurid invasion a major part of the state was under Gwalior. Mu'izzuddin Ghuri overthrew the kingdom of Kanauj in 1194 and the forts of Bayana and Gwalior along with their territories came under the command of his generals in 1196. From this time onward the Tanwars tried to capture the Gwalior fort and the land round it; and there was a constant struggle during which the country beyond the Chambal was conquered and lost.³

In order to reduce Gwalior, Sikandar Lodi sent a force in 1502 under Alam Khan Mewati, Khan-i Khanan Luhani and Khawas Khan to occupy Dholpur, which was a dependency of Gwalior. Raja Vinayakdeva, the ruler of Dholpur, resisted with all his might and caused a serious loss of men and material among the invaders. When the news of these reverses reached Sikandar, he lost no time in reaching the place of action. But as soon as it was known that the Sultan had arrived, Vinayakdeva retreated to Gwalior, leaving a handful of soldiers in the Dholpur fort. Before the overwhelming strength of the invaders the Rajputs could not hold the fort for long, and it came into Sikandar's hands in 1504.

Flushed with this victory, the Sultan's men laid waste the whole country, seized much booty, indulged in plunder and destroyed the temples. The fort was then put in charge of Adam Lodi. When

¹ *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. I, 246-47.

² *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 346.

³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, 246-47.

the Sultan was returning to Agra *via* Dholpur after his Gwalior campaign, he gave back Dholpur to Vinayakdeva. But when a campaign against Gwalior was again organized in 1505, the Raja was replaced by Qamruddin and the fort was properly garrisoned. The Tanwar chiefs of Dholpur, it seems, gradually sank to the position of mere zamindars and finally succumbed to Babur after holding out for a short time. Under Akbar Dholpur belonged to the subah of Agra.⁴

⁴ *Tarikh-i Daudi* by Abdullah (Allahabad University Ms.), 68; *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, Persian Text, I, 403; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Persian Text, I, 324; *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani* (India Office Library Ms.), 101; A. B. Pandey, *The First Afghan Empire in India*, 132-35.

XVI. THE MEWATIS

THE REGION OF MEWAT MAY BE roughly described as north-eastern Rajasthan which contained parts of Dig, Bharatpur, Rewari and Alwar. From local tradition it appears that the whole of Mewat was held by the Yaduvamshi Rajputs continuously from about the eighth century to the thirteenth century. Mahesh, the lord of Mewat, is said to have offered homage to Bisaladeva Chauhan of Ajmer. His descendant, Mangal, who had strengthened his position by entering into matrimonial alliance with the Dahiya Rajputs, attempted to assert his own power against the Chauhans; but Prithviraja III coerced him into obedience. Largely in cooperation with the Chauhans and other dynasties in eastern Rajasthan, they engaged in wars against the Turks.¹

The earliest mention of the Mewatis in Muslim chronicles is found with reference to Iltutmish, who captured Bayana, Tawangarh (Thankar) and a part of Alwar and took prompt measures to check their power. But his success proved temporary; and the Mewatis got back the greater part of their lost territory as soon as the Turkish forces were withdrawn. As the century progressed, they continued their offensive. Early in the reign of Mu'izzuddin Bahram, hostilities between the Mewatis and the Turks began again. Ghiyasuddin Balban, then governor of Hansi and Rewari, sent an army against the 'Hindu rebels of *Kohpayah*'. This compelled them to take to organized plunder and robbery along with the Chauhans. They harried the districts under Turkish control and carried their arms up to the outskirts of Delhi.

Again when the government of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud was facing the formidable danger of Qutlugh Khan's rebellion and the invasion of the Mongols, the Mewatis, under the leadership of one Malka, revived their marauding activities; they seized cattle from the districts of Hansi, Haryana, the Siwalik region and Bayana in 1256 and distributed them among the Rajputs who were living as far as Ranthambhor. In 1258 Balban twice invaded and devastated Mewat, but the enterprises of the Mewatis continued unabated. Their success must be attributed partly to the incompetence of

¹ Cunningham, *Reports*, XX, ii; *Rajputana Gazetteer*, Vol. III, 167-68; Elliot, Vol. IV, 273; Ojha, *Rajputana*, I, 238.

Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud and partly to the extent and density of the jungles which sheltered them.²

It was only after Balban had ascended the throne that the Mewati menace was rooted out. He first suppressed the Mewatis and captured their fortresses. Other neighbouring chiefs, who had been cooperating with them, were also reduced to obedience. The woods round the capital were cleared and the dens of the robbers were converted into guard-houses assigned to Afghans. By putting a large number of Mewatis to the sword, the region was rendered safe and freed from trouble for a long time. For about a century after that the Mewati chiefs appear to have maintained cordial relations with the Turks.³ The Yaduvamshi Rajputs, the ancestors of the present Meos and Khanzadas, were probably converted to Islam during the reign of Firuz Tughluq.

After the death of Firuz Shah, Bahadur Nahir, who was a very powerful Mewati chief and resided in a fort (*Kotal* or *Kotila*) in the Tijara hills, occupied a prominent place among the nobles of Delhi. He was a gallant and active warrior and fought for Abu Bakr Shah against Prince Nasiruddin Muhammad Tughluq, but in the end he suffered a severe defeat and Muhammad occupied the throne in 1390. After that Bahadur Nahir was treated as a rebel chief by Muhammad Tughluq and his successor, Nasiruddin Mahmud Tughluq. The imperial forces ravaged Mewat and plundered the lands of Bahadur Nahir several times. But Bahadur continued his resistance by occupying a strategical position in Jhirka and making inroads into environs of Delhi.⁴

It appears that Bahadur Nahir's attitude towards Timur in 1398 was one of submission. But when Saiyyid Khizr Khan laid claim to suzerainty, Bahadur opposed him and did not lose heart even when his main fortress, Kotila, was levelled with the ground by the Saiyyids in 1421. Thus Bahadur Nahir played a prominent part on the political stage for more than thirty years, both by asserting his authority at the court of Delhi and by strengthening his position within the hilly ranges of Mewat.⁵

Khizr Khan was succeeded in 1421 by Saiyyid Mubarak Shah, who concentrated his energies on suppressing the Mewatis. A force was despatched in 1424 to ravage rebellious Mewat. The Mewatis, on

² Minhaj, 213, 285, 292, 313, 314, 316; Brigg's *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 249; *Ain-i Akbari* (Blochmann), Vol. I, 334; *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 104; Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, 153-54.

³ Briggs, *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 255.

⁴ For Bahadur Nahir's activities prior to Timur's invasion, see the chapter on 'The Successors of Firuz Shah'.

⁵ Briggs, *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 471-81, 465; Elliot, Vol. III, 449; Vol. IV, 35, 53.

their part, laid waste their own country, took refuge in the hilly fastness of Jahara and forced the imperial army to retreat. In order to reduce them to obedience, Saiyyid Mubarak Shah marched against Jallu and Kaddu, the grandsons of Bahadur Nahir, in 1425. They, receiving assistance from other Mewatis, laid waste their own territories and retreated to Indor, a place of refuge in the Tijara hills. The imperial army laid siege to Indor and captured it. Flushed with this success, it advanced and captured Alwar. In the campaign of 1427 Kaddu was put to death, but Jallu continued his stubborn resistance. A year later Mubarak again marched against Mewat, carrying fire and sword throughout the land, and compelled the Mewatis to come to terms.⁶

In 1451 Bahlul Lodi succeeded to the imperial throne. In order to make his position strong against his neighbours, he led his army against Ahmad Khan Mewati, who held the country from Mahrauli to Ladhu Serai, near Delhi. Ahmad offered a stubborn resistance, but was overpowered by Bahlul, who reduced him to obedience and forced him to send his uncle, Mubarak Khan, as his representative to the Delhi court. He was deprived of seven parganas, but was allowed to retain the rest of his land as a tributary. But when Ahmad Khan supported the cause of Husain Shah of Jaunpur in 1465, Bahlul chastized him and induced him to submit after immense losses.⁷

During Sikandar Lodi's reign, though Alam Khan Mewati held the position of a respected noble at the Delhi court, Mewat was not included in the kingdom of Delhi. In the period of confusion following the rebellions of Ibrahim Lodi's officers and the emergence of the new power of the Mughals, Hasan Khan Mewati, following the example of his forefathers, declared his independence. He joined hands with Rana Sanga against Babur and fell fighting in the battle of Khanua. Babur advanced from Fathpur Sikri, occupied the important outposts of Mewat and gave a pargana to Nahir Khan, son of Hasan Mewati, who swore fealty to him. Thus the Khanzadas as a political force ceased to exist. Unlike Bahadur Nahir and Hasan Mewati, they never appeared as the powerful opponents or allies of the Mughal empire. Their powerful forts of Tijara and Alwar were controlled by the Mughal governors or fort-commandants. Of course, the Khanzadas retained their local importance, which did not quite disappear till the present century.⁸

⁶ Briggs, *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 518, 521; Elliot, Vol. IV, 61.

⁷ Yadgar, *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Afaghina*, 10 (Bib. Ind. P.T.); Nizamuddin, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, I, 302-8 (Bib. Ind. P.T.); Abdul Baqi, *Ma'asir-i Rahimi*, I, 441-46; Ni'amatullah: *Tarikh-i Khan-i Jahani*, 81; Pandey, *The First Afghan Empire in India*, 67, 78.

⁸ *Baburnama* (Beveridge), Vol. II, 573; Nizamuddin, *Tabaqat*, Vol. II, 38; Briggs, *Ferishta*, Vol. I, 566; Elliot, Vol. V, 36, 37, 97; *Rajputana Gazetteers*, Vol. III, 172-73; G. N. Sharma, *Mewar and the Mughal Emperors*, 37.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

GUJARAT AND KHANDESH

TIMURID INVASION AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF TUGHLUQ EMPIRE

THE TOTTERING TUGHLUQ EMPIRE was shaken to its very foundations by the invasion of Timur in 801/1398-99. Cities and forts fell before him like ripe plums and soon the Central Asian hordes were at the gates of Delhi. Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud got ready for battle, but his forces broke up in the very first encounter, and the Tughluq Sultan fled from the capital leaving his women and children behind.¹ He took refuge with Zafar Khan, the Tughluq governor of Gujarat, who received him hospitably but declined to undertake the hazardous expedition to Delhi, which was desired by his royal guest.² Despairing and disappointed, Mahmud made his way to Dhar, where he was welcomed by Dilawar Khan Ghuri, the Tughluq governor of Malwa, and was allowed to remain in hiding till the Timurid hordes had departed from India.³

When the tide of the Timurid invasion rolled back, the provincial satraps, who had kept up the fiction of allegiance to the Tughluq *roi faineant*, proclaimed their independence. First among such satraps was Malik Nasir, the son of Malik Raja Ahmad Faruqi, who claimed descent from Umar Faruq, the second Orthodox Caliph. In his youth Raja Ahmad had attracted the notice of Sultan Firuz Tughluq during a chase; he was able to supply some food to the hungry Sultan, who as a reward conferred on him the districts of Thalner and Karanda on the border of the Deccan. Soon afterwards he conquered some neighbouring territory and carved out for himself a small principality in the valley of the Tapti.⁴ He, however, came into conflict with Sultan Mahmud Bahmani of the Deccan, and set out for Daulatabad where he approached Shaikh Zainuddin, who welcomed him as a disciple and said, 'Well done, Raja Ahmad!' From this circumstance the family

1 Yahya Sirhindi, *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, Calcutta, 1931.

2 Abdul Husain, *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, Commonwealth Relations Office, No. 3842, 20a.

3 Yahya, 170.

4 Ferishta, *Tarikh-i Ferishta*, II, Bombay, 1832, 542-43.

derived the title of Raja.⁵ Before his death on 22 Sha'ban 801/29 April 1399, Raja Ahmad sent for his two sons, Malik Nasir and Malik Iftikhar; he nominated the former as his successor and bestowed the fort and district of Thalner on the latter. Immediately after the death of his father, Raja Nasir proclaimed his independence, assumed the insignia of royalty, caused the *Khutba* to be read in his name and 'thereby realized the wish which his father had carried with him to his grave'.⁶

MUZAFFAR SHAH I, MUHAMMAD SHAH I

The example of Raja Nasir was soon followed by his more powerful and ambitious neighbour, Tatar Khan, son of Zafar Khan of Gujarat, whose father, Sadharan, entitled Wajihul Mulk, was a Rajput convert to Islam and had given his sister in marriage to Firuz Tughluq.⁷ After Firuz's death, his son and successor, Muhammad Tughluq, sent Zafar Khan as governor of Gujarat in 793/1391 but kept his son, Tatar Khan, at the capital.⁸ While Zafar Khan built up the nucleus of power in Gujarat, Tatar Khan took active part in the intrigues at the court of the later Tughluqs.⁹ Outmanoeuvred by his powerful adversary, Mallu Iqbal Khan, in 800/1397, Tatar Khan was forced to flee to Gujarat and began to importune his father to march on Delhi.¹⁰ Zafar Khan, deterred by the tokens of Timur's impending invasion, declined to undertake the hazardous expedition.¹¹ On Timur's departure from India, Tatar Khan revived his importunities, but Zafar Khan, well-stricken in years, shrank from the risky enterprise.

At this stage commences a divergence in the accounts of our authorities. According to Abdul Husain, the official historian, Zafar Khan, finding his son insistent on his ambitious designs, abdicated in his favour, crowned him as Nasiruddin Muhammad Shah in Jamadi II 806/December-January 1403-4, while he himself retired into private life in the town of Asawal. Immediately after his accession, Muhammad Shah equipped a large army and moved out of Asawal with the object of marching against Mallu Iqbal Khan; but when he received intelligence of the revolt of the Raja of Nandod, to the east of Broach, he

⁵ Hajiud Dabir, *Zafarul Walih bi Muzaffar wa Alihi*, ed. E. D. Ross, I, London, 1910, 52.

⁶ Ferishta, II, 543-44.

⁷ Sikandar, *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, ed. S. C. Misra and M. L. Rahman, Baroda, 1961, 9-10.

⁸ Abdul Husain, ff. 3a-4a.

⁹ Yahya, 161-64.

¹⁰ Abdul Karim, *Tabaqat-i Mahmud Shahi*, Eton College Library, No. 160, *Tabaqa*, IX, year 800.

¹¹ Abdul Husain, f. 19b.

set out against him, and after suppressing the revolt, resumed his march to Delhi. On his way he fell ill and, though treated by the best physicians, succumbed to his illness in Sha'ban 806/February-March 1404.¹²

The above theory of abdication has been challenged by non-official historians, like Sikandar, Nizamuddin, Ferishta and Ali Muhammad Khan, who maintain that Tatar Khan, being disappointed by his father's indifference towards his ambitions and being advised by ill-intentioned friends, imprisoned his father, Zafar Khan, by a sudden *coup d'état* and proclaimed himself king at Asawal. Thereafter he appointed his father's brother, Shams Khan Dandani, as his *wakil-i mamalik* and marched towards Delhi, as stated earlier. Meanwhile Zafar Khan made overtures to his younger brother, Shams Khan Dandani, and appealed to him to secure his release from his ignoble situation. Shams Khan, therefore, administered poison in a cup of wine to his nephew and thus brought about his death.¹³

It may be argued that Sikandar, Nizamuddin, Ferishta and Ali Muhammad compiled their chronicles during the Mughal period and were likely to be prejudiced against the founder of the sultanat of Gujarat. This charge, however, cannot be valid in the case of Yahya Sirhindi, who categorically states that in 806/1404, Tatar Khan, having treacherously confined his father, adopted the title of Nasiruddin Muhammad Shah, collected a large army and was leading it against Delhi; but while he was on his way, Shams Khan administered poison to him and he died owing to it on the same day.¹⁴ Yahya compiled his chronicle earlier than Abdul Husain and was at liberty to call a spade a spade.

An argument may be advanced that Abdul Husain wrote his chronicle while in Gujarat and Yahya compiled his history at a place far removed from the scene of action and as such was not in a position to know the truth. This argument is not, however, valid against Abdul Karim, who not only wrote his general history in Gujarat but also dedicated it to Mahmud Begarha on its completion in 905/1499-1500. He records both versions about the death of Muhammad Shah, but unequivocally selects the poison version as the *asha-i riwayat* or the most veracious report.¹⁵

But whatever may have been the cause of Muhammad Shah's

12 Abdul Husain, ff. 25b-26a.

13 Sikandar, 21-23; Nizamuddin, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, Calcutta, 1935, 92; Ferishta, II, 356-57; Ali Muhammad, *Mir'at-i Ahmadi*, I, Baroda, 1928, 43-44.

14 Yahya, 172.

15 Abdul Karim, 806.

death, Zafar Khan lamented the loss of his son. Released from imprisonment, he proceeded post-haste to Patan, where Muhammad Shah was buried amidst universal mourning. Thereafter Shams Khan was sent back to Nagaur, and Zafar Khan carried on the administration as before. He refrained from assuming the insignia of royalty till 810/1407-08, when at the request of his nobles he proclaimed his independence as 'Muzaffar Shah' at Birpur on his way to Malwa, where he was proceeding to avenge the death of his friend, Dilawar Ghuri, who had been poisoned by his son, Alp Khan.¹⁶

After assuming the insignia of royalty at Birpur, Zafar Khan resumed his march to Malwa, which was both weak and distraught after the death of Dilawar Khan. The latter's young and inexperienced son, Sultan Hushang (Alp Khan), came out of Dhar to meet his old and veteran adversary in battle but was beaten in the very first encounter and taken prisoner by Muzaffar. With Hushang as his prisoner, Muzaffar moved to the north as he had come to know that Sultan Ibrahim Sharqi of Jaunpur had launched a full-scale invasion on the nominal emperor, Mahmud Shah Tughluq, and after reducing Kanauj and investing Sambhal, had finally laid siege to Delhi. As soon as the Sharqi Sultan came to know about the movements of Muzaffar, he gave up his offensive campaign, and cutting short his siege, returned to Jaunpur in order to guard his own frontiers against the Sultan of Gujarat. Since his object had been attained, Muzaffar gave up the projected distant and risky campaign, and returned to his capital with Hushang as his captive, leaving Malwa in charge of his brother, Khan-i Azam Nusrat Khan.¹⁷

Nusrat Khan was not welcomed as a ruler in Malwa; within a year the nobles rose against him, selected Musa Khan from amongst themselves as their leader, and recovered Mandu in Rajab 811/November-December 1408.¹⁸ When Hushang came to know about this revolution, he appealed to Muzaffar and offered to hold Malwa for the Sultan of Gujarat, provided he was released from prison. Muzaffar, who had by now realized that it was difficult to govern Malwa directly, agreed to the proposal and sent him to Mandu under the escort of Prince Ahmad, son of late Sultan Muhammad Shah. Ahmad reinstated Hushang and returned to Gujarat.¹⁹

As soon as Muzaffar was free from the Malwa problem in 812/1409, his attention was drawn to the revolt of the Rajputs of Kanthakot, which is situated in Vagad to the east of Cutch. The aged

16 Abdul Husain, 290-96; Abdul Karim, 810.

17 Abdul Husain, f. 30a; Abdul Karim, year 810; Yahya, 176.

18 Shihab-i Hakim, *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, Bodleian Library, No. 270, f. 35a.

19 Abdul Husain, f. 30b; Abdul Karim, year 811.

Sultan sent a large force under the command of Khudawand Khan, who succeeded in suppressing the revolt and returned triumphant to the capital.²⁰ This was the last campaign of the reign of Muzaffar.

There is some discrepancy among historians about the date and cause of Muzaffar's death. Sikandar, Mahmud and Ali Muhammad tell us that at the end of Safar 813/June-July 1410, Muzaffar was compelled to take a cup of poison administered to him by his grandson, Ahmad, who afterwards ascended the throne of Gujarat on 14 Ramazan 810/10 January 1411.²¹ Entirely at variance with this is the version given by Nizamuddin and Abul Baqi Nahavandi. They inform us that about the middle of 813/October-November 1410, Muzaffar fell seriously ill, and realizing that his end was near, abdicated in favour of his grandson, Ahmad Khan, who was raised to the throne. Though Muzaffar lingered on till his death in Safar 814/May-June 1411, the *Khutba* was read and coins were struck in the name of Ahmad Shah.²² Ferishta supports the abdication theory and states that Muzaffar fell ill at the end of Safar 814/May-June 1411 but passed away on 8 Rabi II 814/30 July 1411.²³ Abdul Husain and Abdul Karim, both near-contemporary historians, refer neither to the poisoning of Muzaffar nor to his abdication in favour of his grandson. They simply state that Muzaffar died a natural death in 814/1411 and was succeeded by his grandson, Ahmad.²⁴

It will be noticed that the natural death theory of Abdul Husain and Abdul Karim is not irreconcilable with the abdication theory of Nizamuddin, Ferishta and Nahavandi, but it is certainly in conflict with the poison theory of Sikandar, Mahmud and Ali Muhammad. It may be argued that Abdul Husain and Abdul Karim were the proteges of Mahmud Begarha, the grandson of Ahmad Shah, and as such could not be expected to have enjoyed complete freedom of expression. This charge of expediency cannot, however, be brought against Shihab-i Hakim, who refers to the death of Muzaffar, but does not throw even a hint to show that he was poisoned by his grandson.²⁵ It may be noted that Shihab-i Hakim was the official historian of the sultanat of Malwa and his work was inspired by Mahmud Khalji I (839-73/1436-69), who was an inveterate enemy

20 Sikandar, 26-27; Nizamuddin, III, 94.

21 Sikandar, 27-30; Mahmud Bukhari, *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Gujrat*, ed. S.A.I. Tirmizi, Aligarh, 1964, 15; Ali Muhammad, I, 45.

22 Nizamuddin, III, 95; Abul Baqi Nahavandi, *Ma'asir-i-Rahimi*, II, Calcutta, 1925, 134.

23 Ferishta, II, 358.

24 Abdul Husain, ff. 32a-32b; Abdul Karim, year 814,

25 Shihab-i Hakim, f. 37a,

of the House of Muzaffar. Shihab-i Hakim would, therefore, have been only too ready to credit and record any rumour which reflected adversely on the character of the enemies of his patron. The contemporary official as well as non-official chroniclers of the sultanat of Gujarat are, thus, unanimous in maintaining that Muzaffar died a natural death.

It is significant to note that the poison theory appeared immediately after the downfall of the sultanat of Gujarat and the annexation of the province to the Mughal empire by Akbar. It was first propounded by Sikandar and Mahmud, and thereafter found an echo in the work of the eighteenth century chronicler, Ali Muhammad. It may be noted in this connection that these chroniclers record the poison episode centuries after the death of Muzaffar, and they neither disclose the source of their information nor name their authorities. It, therefore, seems obvious that they based their theory on oral tradition. A number of questions are naturally posed at this stage. Was the oral tradition so strong and popular as to survive down the centuries? If it was so strong, why did it not reach the other contemporaries of Sikandar and Mahmud? Nizamuddin, Abdul Baqi and Ferishta do record the death of Muzaffar but none of them even hint at the poison episode. It may, indeed, be argued that Sikandar, Mahmud and Ali Muhammad wrote their chronicles in Gujarat, and as such were in a better position to acquaint themselves with the local tradition than those who wrote their histories at distant places. This may be true of Abdul Baqi and Ferishta but certainly not of Nizamuddin, who was *bakhshi* of Gujarat from 991/1583-84 to 996/1587-88 and as such had every opportunity of discovering the so-called popular poison episode. He also enjoyed absolute freedom to record what he considered to be true.

Moreover the absolute dependence of Sikandar, Mahmud and Ali Muhammad on 'hearsay' makes them slip into a very serious pitfall. They place the death of Muzaffar at the end of Safar 813/June-July 1410 and the enthronement of Ahmad in the middle of Ramazan 813/December 1410-January 1411. They thus unconsciously leave a fairly long interval of more than six months between the death of Muzaffar and the accession of Ahmad. Now the question naturally arises: What happened during this long interval? Did the throne of Gujarat remain unoccupied from Safar to Ramazan 813/July 1410 to January 1411? If Ahmad was so impatient for the throne, why did he wait so long to assume the reins of government after forcing his grandfather to take a cup of poison? Sikandar and Mahmud have no reply to give. They are silent and their silence knocks the bottom out of their poison theory. In view of the facts stated above it would

not be wrong to conclude that Muzaffar died a natural death in 814/1411 and was succeeded by his grandson, Ahmad, who assumed the title of Shihabuddin Ahmad Shah.

AHMAD SHAH

The succession of Ahmad Shah to the throne was contested by his uncle, Maudud Sultani *alias* Firuz Khan, who held the *iqta* of Baroda. In this rebellion Firuz was supported not only by his brothers, like Shaikh Malik Sultani *alias* Haibat Khan, Sher Khan and Sa'adat Khan, but also by disaffected Hindu nobles, like Jiwan-das Khattri and Priyagdas. The rebels collected a large army and assembled at Broach, where they waited for help from Hushang of Malwa, who wanted to exploit the situation in exactly the same manner as Muzaffar had done at the beginning of his reign. When Ahmad Shah came to know about this, he marched to Broach and pitched his tents on the bank of Narbada on 1 Shawwal 815/4 January 1413. He sent conciliatory letters to the rebels, who were by now divided among themselves. Their troops had begun to desert to the Sultan and dissensions among them had broken up the league. Firuz Khan, Haibat Khan, Sher Khan and Sa'adat Khan threw themselves on the clemency of the Sultan, who allowed them to retire to their respective *iqtas*. Firuz was given the *iqta* of Navsari in place of Baroda, which he had formerly held. In the meantime Hushang, who had marched to the border of Gujarat, retreated when he learnt that the rebellion had been extinguished.²⁶

Immediately after putting down the rebellion, Ahmad felt the necessity of transferring his capital from Patan to a central place. He selected a spot near Asawal on the bank of the Sabarmati, laid the foundation of the new metropolis in 815/1413, and called it Ahmadabad after his own name. There is some difference among historians as regards the date of the foundation of Ahmadabad. Abdul Husain and Abdul Karim, supported by Ferishta, place the foundation of Ahmadabad in 815/1413, but Sikandar, Mahmud, Nizamuddin and Ali Muhammad maintain that Ahmad Shah founded the city on 3 Ziqad 813/27 February 1411.²⁷ It may be noted in this connection that Abdul Husain and Abdul Karim compiled their chronicles more than a hundred years before Sikandar, Mahmud, Nizamuddin and Ali Muhammad.²⁸ Moreover, they had access to

²⁶ Abdul Husain, ff. 33b-34b; Ferishta, II, 358-59; Nizamuddin, III, 95-97.

²⁷ Abdul Husain, 34b; Abdul Karim, year 815; Ferishta, II, 360.

²⁸ Sikandar, 31-34; Mahmud, 18; Nizamuddin, III, 98; Ali Muhammad, *Khatima-i Mir'at-i Ahmadi* (Calcutta, 1930), 2.

the state archives, which was not possible for the later chroniclers, who wrote after the downfall of the sultanat. On historical grounds, therefore, the statement of Abdul Husain and Abdul Karim must be preferred to that of later historians.

It is significant to note in this connection that Sikandar, Mahmud and Ali Muhammad place the coronation of Ahmad on 13-14 Ramadan 813/9-10 January 1411, and the foundation of Ahmadabad on 3 Ziqad 813/27 February 1411, as stated earlier. It is difficult to believe that hardly forty-eight days after his accession to the throne Ahmad could have consolidated his position so well as to think of founding a city, which he proposed to make his capital. It may also be noted that immediately after his accession Ahmad was confronted by a formidable rebellion headed by his four uncles, who resented their nephew's elevation to the throne. In fact Ahmad was too much occupied with the suppression of the revolt to think of founding a city hardly forty eight days after his accession. This hypothesis gains further support when we find that Sikandar, Mahmud and Ali Muhammad place the foundation of the city of Ahmadabad on 3 Ziqad 813/27 February 1411, but defer the foundation of the first mosque of the metropolis to 815/1413.²⁹ Contemporary epigraphical evidence tells us that the foundation of the first mosque of the reign of Ahmad Shah was laid on 1 Rajab 815/7 October 1412.³⁰ It will be observed that there is (according to these authors) an interval of more than one and a half years between the foundation of the metropolis and its first mosque. It is difficult to believe that Ahmad Shah, a zealous Muslim as he was, should have laid the foundation of his metropolis on 3 Ziqad 813/27 February 1411, and deferred the foundation of its first mosque till 1 Rajab 815/7 October 1412. It is probable that the foundation of the metropolis was simultaneous with the foundation of its first mosque.

Hardly had Ahmad Shah laid the foundation of the new capital when he was called upon to deal with another insurrection led by Firuz Khan, Haibat Khan and Malik Badr-i Ala. This revolt was supported by some Rajput chiefs, prominent among whom was Rao Ranmal, the Raja of Idar. Ahmad Shah marched against them and encamped near Modasa. He offered conciliation as before, but getting no response stormed the fortress of Modasa. Most of the rebels, including Badr-i Ala, fell fighting. The news of the fall of Modasa unnerved Ranmal, who parted company with Firuz. The latter fled to his uncle, Shams Khan Dandani, at Nagaur, leaving

²⁹ Sikandar, 37; Mahmud, 23; Ali Muhammad, *Khutimah*, 2-3.

³⁰ M. A. Chaghtai, *Muslim Monuments of Ahmedabad*, Poona, 1942, 41.

behind his treasures which were seized by Ranmal, who surrendered them to Ahmad as a token of his submission.³¹

The suppression of the revolt of Badr-i Ala did not mean the end of all troubles. Ahmad had now to face a fresh revolt of disgruntled nobles led by Shah Malik, who was in league with Hushang of Malwa and Kanha Satarsal, the Raja of Mandal. Hushang marched from his capital and pitched his tents on the frontier of Gujarat. When Ahmad Shah came to know of this development, he too marched to Champaner, and encamping there, sent his noble Imadul Mulk against his adversary. Confronted by Imad, Hushang retreated into his own territory under the pretext that he considered it below his dignity to fight a slave of Ahmad. As a result, Kanha Satarsal was frightened into abjuring his alliance with Hushang. Ahmad then despatched prince Latif Khan against the insurgents, who were compelled to disperse. Shah Malik took refuge with Rao Melaga, the Raja of Girnar in Saurashtra.³²

For harbouring the rebel fugitives, Rao Melaga (according to Gangadhara) incurred the hostility of Ahmad.³³ Abdul Husain, however, is of the opinion that Ahmad was attracted by the lure of the conquest of the impregnable fortress of Girnar, which he attacked in 816/1414. Melaga opposed Ahmad but was defeated and forced to seek refuge in the fortress of Girnar. Thereupon Ahmad invested the fortress, and as the siege was prolonged, Melaga made overtures for peace. He offered to acknowledge the overlordship of the Sultan and to pay tribute. Ahmad accepted the proposal and, leaving Saiyyid Abul Khair and Saiyyid Qasim Khan to collect the *salami*, returned to Ahmadabad.³⁴

Soon after his return to Ahmadabad, Ahmad marched to Sidhpur, which was one of the most ancient pilgrim centres in north Gujarat. It was studded with beautiful temples, some of which were laid low. In the same year he introduced the *jizya* and entrusted its administration to Malik Tuhfah, entitled Tajul Mulk, with instructions to put down all turbulent elements and to realize the iniquitous tax with a strong hand.³⁵ Malik Tuhfa, therefore, suppressed some of the

31 Abdul Husain, ff. 36a-36b; Sikandar, 38-40; Nizamuddin III, 98-100; Ferishta, II, 360-61.

32 Abdul Husain, ff. 37a-37b; Abdul Karim, year 816; Sikandar, 40-41; Nizamuddin III, 100-1; Ferishta, II, 362.

33 Gangadhara, *Mandalikanrpa Carita*, ed. H. D. Velankar, *Bhartiya Vidya*, XV, 1953, 371, XV, 1954, *Sarga* II, *Sloka*, 88.

34 Sikandar; 43-44; Nizamuddin, III, 102; Ferishta, II, 362.

35 The *jizya* levied from the chiefs by the central authority should not be confused with the *shar'at jizya*, which is a personal tax levied on non-Muslim inhabitants directly — EDITOR.

Rajput chieftains and collected both *jizya* and *salami* from them.³⁶ It is significant to note in this connection that this iniquitous tax was unknown to Gujarat for nearly a century and quarter of Muslim rule.

While he was busy demolishing temples at Sidhpur, Ahmad was called upon to deal with the invasion of Nandurbar by Nasir of Asir. Nasir, who had proclaimed his independence after the death of his father in 801/1399, first conquered Lalang, Songir and Dilkot.³⁷ After that he captured by stratagem the hill fortress of Asirgarh from the pastoral chieftain, Asa Ahir, from whom it has taken its name. Raja Nasir founded a new city at the instance of Shaikh Zainuddin, the spiritual guide of the dynasty, who had come from Daulatabad to visit him; and as desired by the Shaikh, he named it Burhanpur after Shaikh Burhanuddin, a *khalifa* of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, who is buried in the hills above Daulatabad. On the eastern bank of the Tapti, where Shaikh Zainuddin had lodged, Raja Nasir founded a village, which he named Zainabad. Having thus established himself in eastern Khandesh, Raja Nasir resolved to extend his authority over Thalner, which was ruled over by his younger brother, Hasan *alias* Malik Iftikhar. In order to achieve this end, he sought the aid of Hushang of Malwa, who had married Nasir's sister. Hushang sent his son, Ghazni Khan, to the assistance of Nasir, while Hasan sought the help of Ahmad Gujarati. But before any assistance from Gujarat could arrive, the combined force of Nasir and Ghazni Khan captured the fort of Thalner and Hasan was taken prisoner. Nasir then invaded Gujarat to forestall interference from Ahmad and also to recover the parganas of Sultaupur and Nandurbar lost to Muzaffar by his father.³⁸

As soon as Ahmad came to know about this alarming development, he sent Malik Mahmud Turk to the threatened area and prepared to follow him in person without delay. Meanwhile Rao Punja of Idar, Rawal Trimbakdas of Champaner and Raja Satarsal of Mandal had combined against Ahmad; they also invited Hushang, who had not only marched right up to Modasa in Gujarat, but even sent word to Shams Khan at Nagaur promising to give him Patan if he joined the allies. Shams Khan curtly refused the offer and informed his young nephew about the danger threatening him.³⁹

In view of this dangerous situation, Ahmad left Malik Mahmud to relieve Sultaupur and to conduct a limited war against

36 Abdul Husain, f. 38b; Abdul Karim, year 817; Sikandar, 44-46; Ferishta, II, 362-63.

37 Hajiind Dabir, I, 52.

38 Ferishta, II, 445-47.

39 Sikandar, 46-47; Nizamuddin, III, 103; Ferishta, II, 363.

Raja Nasir. He himself marched against Hushang on 10 Rajab 820/23 August 1417, and within a short period of six days he confronted his enemy at Modasa. The rapid movements of Ahmad seem to have completely frustrated the plans of the allies. Hushang upbraided them for their incautious optimism and retreated to Malwa without risking a battle. Abandoned by their chief ally, the Rajput princes retired to their respective principalities. Malik Mahmud then turned to Sultanpur, which had been besieged by Nasir and Ghazni Khan. They raised the siege and attempted to get away; Ghazni Khan succeeded, but Nasir had to surrender near Sultanpur on 1 Zil Hij, 820/9 January 1418. In the meantime Ahmad had marched from Modasa to Sultanpur. Abandoned by his allies, Nasir now appealed for terms. Peace was made on Nasir's swearing fealty to Ahmad and acknowledging his overlordship. Ahmad, in return, gave him the title of 'Khan' and allowed him to use the red canopy (*chattr*), though he was subordinate to Gujarat. Nasir's brother, Hasan, retired to Gujarat, where he and his descendants found a home for generations and intermarried with the royal house. With cordial relations thus established, Ahmad returned to his capital.⁴⁰

Ahmad now realized that the real enemy was Hushang. Consequently he marched against Malwa on 19 Safar 821/28 March 1418. Hushang came out of his capital to give battle, but his troops broke up in panic when Malik Farid attacked the Malwa army from the rear. Hushang fled to Mandu; as the rainy season had set in, Ahmad returned to his capital but resumed the offensive in the following year at the commencement of the campaigning season. But he had hardly left Mankani, an outpost on the Gujarat-Malwa frontier, when he was waited upon by the Malwa envoys who sued for peace. Ahmad accepted these pacific overtures; and after scoring this prestige victory, he returned to his capital by the end of Rabi II 822/May 1419, as the rains were approaching. During the next year Ahmad remained busy in building and garrisoning bastions round about the eastern border adjoining Malwa. He repaired and strengthened the old forts.⁴¹

Relatively secure at home, Ahmad resumed his offensive against Malwa at the end of 824/December 1421. When he reached Sankhera on 22 Safar 825/15 February 1422, he received the news that Hushang had gone to Jajunagar (Orissa) to secure elephants in order to gain superiority over his rival. Ahmad made up his mind to exploit the opportunity, and advanced to Maheshwar, which fell to

⁴⁰ Sikandar, 47-48; Nizamuddin, 103-4; Ferishta, 363-64.

⁴¹ Sikandar, 50-52; Nizamuddin, III, 107-8; Ferishta, II, 364-65.

him without much resistance. Entrusting the fallen fortress to his officers, Ahmad marched to Mandu and invested it on 12 Rabi II 825/5 April 1422. The siege continued till the advent of the rains compelled Ahmad to shift to a better encamping spot—Ujjain—where he remained during the rainy season. When the weather cleared, the siege of Mandu was resumed on 20 Ramazan 825/7 September 1422.⁴²

In the meantime Hushang had succeeded in entering his capital and his return infused a new spirit in the defenders. Finding that he had failed to prevent the entry of Hushang into Mandu, and that the reduction of the massive fort was impossible in spite of the *munjanis* and *iradas* that he had specially ordered from Gujarat, Ahmad left the place and marched towards Sarangpur, where he was encountered by Hushang, who had reached the place by a more direct route. After a number of skirmishes, Ahmad defeated Hushang in a pitched battle and, seizing several elephants Hushang had brought from Jainagar, he returned to his capital on 4 Jamadi II 826/15 May 1423. In consideration of the fatigue of his soldiers, Ahmad refrained from embarking on any military enterprise for three years and devoted himself entirely to the work of consolidation and administrative reform.⁴³

When the army had been reorganized, Ahmad turned his attention to the Rajput princes of Gujarat, who had viewed the rise of the sultanat in their midst with apprehension and were ever ready to take advantage of its weakness. Ahmad, on his part, considered that the control of these principalities on the periphery was vital for the defence of the sultanat. In 829/1426 he, therefore, resumed his offensive against Rao Punja of Idar, the son of Rao Ranmal, who had not only joined hands with the enemies of Ahmad but had ceased to send any tribute for several years past. Ahmad despatched a force against Idar and immediately afterwards took the field in person against the Rajput Raja. The pressure of the Sultan made Punja abandon his capital and take refuge in the hills, thus harassing the Sultan's army. To overawe the refractory feudatory, Ahmad founded Ahmadnagar (now called Himmatnagar) after his name on the banks of the river Hatmati, and made up his mind to stay there till the successful conclusion of the campaign.

Establishing himself at Ahmadnagar, he sent troops all over the principality to ravage and lay waste the land. In a skirmish with the royal troops, Rao Punja was entrapped in a precipitous defile and

⁴² Sikandar, 52-53; Nizamuddin III, 109; Ferishta, II, 365.

⁴³ Sikandar, 53-56; Nizamuddin, 109-12; Ferishta II, 366-68.

was killed by falling into an abyss on 5 Jamadi 831/21 February 1428. Next day his head was recovered and brought before Ahmad by a wood-cutter. Punja's son, Iar Rao, sought pardon; he was duly forgiven and installed in his father's place on promising to pay a heavy tribute of three lakhs of silver *tankas*. Leaving Malik Hasan Safdarul Mulk in the *thana* of Ahmadnagar, the Sultan returned to Ahmadabad. Next year when Iar Rao was required to pay the promised tribute, he delayed payment under various excuses. When the news reached the Sultan, he marched against the refractory feudatory, who fled from his capital and took refuge in the forest. The Sultan entered Idar on 6 Safar 832/15 November 1428, and after laying the foundation of the Juma Mosque he returned to the capital.⁴⁴

The subjugation of Idar created apprehensions in the heart of Rai Kanha, the Rajput ruler of Jhalawar, who, considering discretion to be the better part of valour, proceeded to Asir and sought the help of Nasir of Khandesh in 833/1430. The latter, chagrined at the subjugation imposed upon him by Ahmad Gujarati more than a decade back, had entered into a matrimonial alliance with Ahmad Bahmani by giving his daughter, Agha Zainab, in marriage to Alauddin, son of Ahmad Bahmani. Nasir could not venture to invite the wrath of Ahmad Gujarati by giving shelter to Kanha. He, however, sent him to Ahmad Bahmani with a letter of recommendation. Ahmad Bahmani not only welcomed Rai Kanha but provided him with a small force with which he raided Nandurbar and Sultanpur. When this was reported to Ahmad Gujarati, he immediately despatched a powerful army under his son and heir-apparent, Muhammad Khan, who forced the Deccanis to retreat to their own territory. Ahmad Bahmani then sent his own son and heir-apparent, Alauddin Ahmad Khan, to check the Gujaratis. But before reinforcements could reach the Decannis, the Gujaratis had already reached near Daulatabad; Alauddin Bahmani was joined by his father-in-law, Nasir of Khandesh, and in one of the sharpest encounters that ensued, the allies were worsted. Prince Alauddin Bahmani was compelled to take shelter in the fort of Daulatabad, while Nasir and Kanha fled to Asir. Perceiving that it would be futile to besiege Daulatabad, Muhammad laid waste a part of Khandesh and retired to Nandurbar.⁴⁵

While these developments were taking place in Khandesh, Khalaf Hasan, entitled *Malikut Tujjar*, a Deccani noble, occupied

44 Sikandar, 56-57; Nizamuddin, III, 113-15; Ferishta, II, 368-69.

45 Nizamuddin, III, 115-17; Ferishta II, 369-70.

Mahim, the most southern outpost of Gujarat. Ahmad Gujarati sent his younger son, Zafar Khan, to the relief of the town and asked Mukhlisul Mulk, the kotwal of Diu, to collect a fleet and sail to the coast of the Konkon in order to cooperate with the land forces. Zafar Khan blockaded Thana, which was a Bahmani outpost, by land and sea. Unable to maintain the defence for long, the commander of the fort withdrew and the town capitulated. The Gujaratis then laid siege to Mahim, while the relieving force, led by Ahmad Bahmani's younger son, Muhammad Khan, approached the beleaguered outpost. The Deccanis complained to the prince that while the fighting was done by them, the credit for victory would be taken by Malikut Tujjar. The prince was deceived and withdrew, leaving Malikut Tujjar to his fate. This opportunity was fully exploited by the Gujaratis, who stormed the fort. Malikut Tujjar fought valiantly but lost the battle and fled to his master, Ahmad Bahmani.⁴⁶

Exasperated by these two successive reverses, Ahmad Bahmani attacked Baglana, a small Rajput principality between Gujarat and the Deccan, and ravaged the frontier parganas of Sultanpur and Nandurbar in 835/1432. Prince Muhammad Khan, who had been staying in Nandurbar since his earlier expedition to the south-east, informed his father of his inability to hold the fort against the Bahmanis. Ahmad Gujarati, therefore, instantly marched to Nandurbar and Ahmad Bahmani withdrew to Gulbarga. Ahmad Gujarati started on his return march to Ahmadabad, but hardly had he crossed the Tapti when news arrived that Ahmad Bahmani had invested Tambol, which was valiantly defended by the Gujarati officer, Sa'adat Sultani. Ahmad Gujarati marched to the relief of the fortress. A pitched battle was fought from morning till evening but remained indecisive. Dismayed by the extent of his losses, Ahmad Bahmani retreated back to his own territory in the darkness of the night. Ahmad Gujarati repaired to the fort of Tambol and, after honouring the valiant defender, returned to his capital.⁴⁷

Free from the Bahmanis of the Deccan, Ahmad turned his attention to the Rajputs of the north, who had not only supported their disaffected kinsmen in Gujarat but had also offered them shelter in time of trouble. Closest in contact with Gujarat was Mewar, then ruled over by Rana Mokal. Ahmad, therefore, marched against Mewar in Rajab 836/February-March 1433. Subjugating Ganesa, the Raja of Dungarpur, on his way, he destroyed the temples of Kelwarah and Dilwarah. Rana Mokal of Mewar proceeded to meet

⁴⁶ Abdul Karim, year 833; Nizamuddin, III, 117-19, Ferishta, II, 370-71.

⁴⁷ Abdul Karim, year 835; Nizamuddin III, 119-22; Ferishta, II, 371-73.

Ahmad, but before he could contact the invader, he was assassinated by his own followers. Thereafter Ahmad entered Mewar, and having taken ransom from the Rathor chieftains, he reached Nagaur, which was then ruled over by Firuz Khan, the son of Shams Khan Dandani and the nephew of Muzaffar Shah of Gujarat. Firuz, who had no desire to challenge the overlordship of the senior branch of the family, came out of the city, welcomed Ahmad and offered several lakhs of *tankas* as tribute. This voluntary acknowledgement of his authority pleased Ahmad so much that he generously returned the presents and confirmed his uncle in the government of Nagaur. Having thus accomplished his mission, Ahmad returned to his capital.⁴⁸

Not long after his return, Ahmad was called upon to intervene in the dynastic feud of Malwa, which followed upon the death of Hushang in 838/1435. Hushang was succeeded by his son, Ghazni Khan, with the title of Muhammad Shah, but within a year he was poisoned by his wazir, Mahmud Khan Khalji, who seized the throne and ruled Malwa with the title of Mahmud Shah Khalji. In order to escape persecution, Masud Khan and Umar Khan, the surviving sons of Hushang, fled to Gujarat. The latter proceeded to the northern frontier of Malwa, while Masud stayed on in Gujarat and requested Ahmad to help him in gaining the throne of his father. Ahmad espoused his cause and in Ramazan 841/February-March 1438 marched against Mandu. He encamped on the bank of a tank in Jaisinghpur and sent Masud to begin the siege. As the siege was prolonged, Mahmud Khalji realized the futility of being cooped up in the fort. Meanwhile Umar Khan, the other son of Hushang, appeared in Chanderi and was proclaimed leader of the garrison by the nobles at that place. Mahmud, therefore, left his beleaguered capital in the charge of his father, Malik Mughis Khan-i Jahan, and proceeded to Sarangpur where he arrived early in 842/June 1438. Sarangpur capitulated and Mahmud marched against Umar Khan. In the encounter that took place between the two armies, Umar Khan was defeated and slain. After that Mahmud turned to Ahmad, who had moved to Ujjain to exploit his adversary's difficulties. But at this time the army of Ahmad was so severely struck by a virulent form of epidemic plague that within two days several thousand people perished. This scourge frustrated the plans of Ahmad, who was compelled to retreat to Gujarat after promising Masud to return some time later to restore his ancestral throne to him. This promise he was unable to keep as he passed away on 4 Rabi II 846/

⁴⁸ Nizamuddin, III, 123-24; Ferishta, II, 373.

12 August 1442, leaving the throne to his son, Muhammad Khan, who succeeded him with the title of Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Shah.⁴⁹

Ahmad Shah, thus, extended the boundaries of the sultanat by his relentless wars. In these campaigns political interests more often than not transcended religious considerations. If he waged wars against the Rajput rulers of Gujarāt, he also fought with the Muslim rulers of Malwa, Khandesh and the Deccan.

Nevertheless the religious sentiments of Ahmad Shah, though somewhat exaggerated by the theological chroniclers, cannot be entirely ruled out. We are told that from the time of his attaining to majority till the time of his death, he had never omitted to perform the prescribed religious duties.⁵⁰ At times his religiosity verged almost on iconoclasm. This is testified by his wanton demolition of the beautiful temples at Sidhpur and the imposition of the iniquitous tax, the *jizya*, which had been unknown to Gujarat before.

Apart from this iconoclasm, Ahmad was a ruler far above the average. He infused into his administration a spirit of unrelenting justice. It is on record that he did not hesitate to execute his own son-in-law in the market-place for a murder he had committed.⁵¹ Moreover he introduced the check-and-balance system in the revenue administration with a view to discouraging collusion among the *amils* (revenue collectors) and adopted the land-grant-cum-cash system for his army.⁵²

Furthermore, he well-nigh realized the necessity of inducing Hindus into the hierarchy of the government. Manikchand and Motichand, belonging to the *banya* or commercial community, held the important offices of ministers under him.⁵³ Moreover he is reported to have employed a Brahman for the specific purpose of searching out a suitable Hindu bride fit for the Sultan.⁵⁴ In this way Ahmad Shah laid the foundation of what ultimately became a polyglot polity.

It may, however, be pointed out in this connection that Ahmad could not resist the urge of the flesh, and demanded the daughters of his vanquished foes as an offering to his authority. Such requisitions could not but meet with resistance from the Rajputs, who were proud of their lineage. Matrimonial alliance with the Muslims inevitably

49 Shihab-i Hakim, 258-59; Abdul Karim, year 846; Nizamuddin, III, 124, 316-20; Ferishta, II, 373-74.

50 Nizamuddin, III, 124.

51 Sikandar, 60-61; Mahmud Bukhari, 16.

52 Sikandar, 57-59.

53 A. K. Forbes, *Ras Malu*, ed. H. C. Rawlinson, I, London, 1924, 318.

54 *Ibid.*, 324.

brought a stigma on the Rajputs as is testified by the case of the Waghela brothers, who courted the dishonour of their compeers in marrying their sister to Ahmad Shah.⁵⁵ Rawal Satrasal Singh of Matar preferred death to the disgrace brought on him by his wife, who sent their beautiful daughter, Raniba, to the *haram* of the Sultan in order to secure the release of her husband from imprisonment.⁵⁶ Such alliances were not without political and social implications. They made the allying Hindu family an outcaste among its own people, linking thereby the bride's house indissolubly to the sultanat. The example of the Sultan was followed by the Muslim nobility. Out of such alliances sprang up a new class of Rajput-Muslims—the *Mole Islam*—which provided the most dependable support to the sultanat.

If Ahmad Shah encouraged matrimonial alliances between the Rajputs and the Muslims, he also tried his best to reconcile the Jain and the Islamic architectural styles in the monuments he built in his new metropolis of Ahmadabad. This blending of the two divergent styles explains why Muslim architecture assumed in Gujarat a distinct local form. Ahmad Shah built magnificent mosques, *khanqahs* and *madrasas*, where the seekers of knowledge drank deep from the fountain of learning. Describing the new metropolis, Hulwi Shirazi, the poet-chronicler of Ahmad Shah, says:

'Innumerable are the colleges therein;
there are inns for the residence of travellers.'⁵⁷

Ahmad himself was a learned man, endowed with literary talents. He is said to have composed a panegyric in praise of Burhanuddin Qutb-i Alam Bukhari and recited it in the presence of the saint as was the custom of the day. One of the couplets, translated into English, runs thus:

'Burhan, the Proof, our Polar Star,
Our pattern and our guide—
The Proof, in whose convincing truth,
We, and all men, confide.'⁵⁸

Being a learned man, Ahmad was naturally fond of men with the same inclination. Badruddin Damamini, the renowned Egyptian savant who visited Gujarat in his reign, calls him 'the learned of the sultans and the Sultan of the learned'.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, 319-20.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 324-25.

⁵⁷ Hulwi Shirazi, *Tarikh-i Ahmadshahi*, III; Sikandar, 36.

⁵⁸ Sikandar, 36; Ali Muhammad, *Khatimah*, 27.

⁵⁹ Hajiud Dabir, I, xiii.

NASIR AND MIRAN ADIL OF KHANDESH

In the meantime, Nasir of Khandesh had embroiled himself in hostilities with the Deccan. His daughter, Agha Zainab, complained that her husband, Alauddin Bahmani, who had succeeded his father in 839/1436, was neglecting her for his new handsome Hindu queen, who was given the name of Zib Chihra. In order to avenge his daughter's wrongs, Nasir, after obtaining the consent of Ahmad Gujarati, invaded Berar, where many of the amirs welcomed him owing to his descent from the Caliph Umar and caused the *Khutba* to be recited in his name. In 841/1437, Khan-i Jahan, the loyal Bahmani governor, shut himself up in Narnala and appealed for assistance to his king, Alauddin Bahmani. The latter sent against his father-in-law a large army under the command of Malikut Tujjar Khalaf Hasan, who drove Nasir into his hill-fortress of Laling, whither Khalaf Hasan followed him after laying waste the fertile plains of Khandesh. Nasir made a sortie with 12,000 horse and a large force of foot but suffered a severe defeat, which so preyed upon his mind that it is said to have contributed to his death, which occurred on 19 Rabi I 841/20 September 1437. He was buried in the family vault at Thalner by the side of his father, Raja Ahmad.⁶⁰

Raja Nasir was succeeded by his son, Miran Adil Khan, whose mother was the sister of Hushang of Malwa. Soon after his accession Adil wrote pressing letters to the sultans of Gujarat and Malwa for aid. In response to his appeal, Ahmad Gujarati immediately sent his army to Sultanpur. When Khalaf Hasan heard that a Gujarati force was advancing from Nandurbar to the succour of Adil, he raised the siege of Laling and retired to the Deccan with his plunder, which included seventy elephants and many guns. Thereafter Adil ruled in peace for about three years till he was assassinated in the city of Burhanpur on Friday, 8 Zil Hij 844/30 April 1441, and was buried at Thalner by the side of his father. Adil was succeeded by his son, Miran Mubarak.⁶¹

MUHAMMAD SHAH II

Now turning to Gujarat we find that Muhammad Shah, the son and successor of Ahmad Shah, marched against Rai Har, the son of Raja Punja of Idar, in 849/1446. Confronted with a huge army, Rai Har sought submission by offering his beautiful daughter in marriage to Muhammad, who was so infatuated by her beauty that only a few days after the wedding he agreed to restore the fort of Idar to Rai

⁶⁰ Abdul Husain, ff. 55a-55b; Ferishta, II, 548-49; Hajiud Dabir, I, 53.

⁶¹ Ferishta, II, 549; Hajiud Dabir, I, 53.

Har, as desired by his beloved queen. Thereafter Muhammad advanced to Bakur. Gansa, the Raja of Dungarpur, sought shelter in the hills, but when he saw the distress his people were suffering, he came out and, through the good offices of Khan-i Jahan Malik Munir Sultani, waited on the Sultan and regained his principality by agreeing to pay tribute. The Sultan returned triumphant to his capital.⁶²

Five years later Muhammad marched against Rawal Gangadas, son of Trimbakdas, the Raja of Champaner. Gangadas gave battle but was defeated and took refuge in the hill-fort of Pavagadh, above Champaner, which was closely invested by the Sultan. Finding himself in straits, the Rawal sent an emissary to Mahmud Khalji of Malwa appealing for help and offering to pay him one lakh of *tankas* for each day's march to cover his expenses.⁶³ Mahmud marched to the relief of the Rawal with 1,00,000 horse, 2,00,000 foot and 2,000 elephants and ravaged the Sultan's districts adjoining the borders of Malwa.⁶⁴ When Muhammad came to know of this new development, he raised the siege of Champaner and went to Godhra in order to collect more troops and arms, but he fell seriously ill and was removed to Ahmadabad, where he passed away on 8 Muharram 855/10 February 1451.⁶⁵

Muhammad Shah possessed neither the military genius and administrative skill nor the character of his great father. He had a pleasure-loving disposition and was so generous that people commonly called him *Zarbakhsh* or 'giver of gold'.⁶⁶ Moreover, he was extremely mild and the mildness of his disposition earned for him the title of *Karim* or merciful.⁶⁷

Besides being merciful and generous, Muhammad revelled in the company of beautiful women and could not resist the urge of the flesh. We are told that the Jam of Thatta in Sind had two daughters, named Bibi Mirki and Bibi Mughali. The first was betrothed to Muhammad Shah and the second to Sirajuddin Muhammad Shah-i Alam, son of Burhanuddin Qutb-i Alam, the renowned saint of Gujarat. When Muhammad came to know that Bibi Mughali was more beautiful than his fiancée, he secured her hand for himself partly by force and partly by gold.⁶⁸

⁶² Sikandar, 63-64; Nizamuddin, III, 125-26.

⁶³ Sikandar, 64; Nizamuddin, III, 126.

⁶⁴ Gangadhara, *Gangadas Apartapayilasa*, Art. B. J. Swodesrara, *Journal of the Central Institute*, Baroda, IV, No. 1, September 1954, 202-3.

⁶⁵ Nizamuddin, III, 126; Hajiud Dahir, I, 3.

⁶⁶ Sikandar, 63.

⁶⁷ Ferishta, II, 375.

⁶⁸ Sikandar, 89.

In keeping with the policy of his father, Muhammad Shah espoused Rajput princesses. As we have seen Rao Har of Idar, finding his kingdom ravaged by the Sultan, sought submission by offering to him the hand of his handsome daughter in marriage. So tremendous was her influence on her husband that soon after her nuptials she got the kingdom of Idar restored to her father.⁶⁹ Under him Hindus enjoyed high official positions. A *banya* is said to have risen to the high position of being his counsellor and favourite companion.⁷⁰

QUTBUDDIN AHMAD SHAH II

A day after his death, the nobles raised to the throne Prince Jalal Khan, the eldest son of Muhammad Shah, who assumed the style and title of Qutbuddin Ahmad Shah II. The young Sultan was at once confronted with the formidable task of defending his kingdom against the invasion of Mahmud of Malwa, who having crossed the frontier, had invested Sultanpur. Malik Alauddin Suhrab, who commanded the fort on behalf of the Sultan of Gujarat, purchased his safety by surrendering the fort and entering Mahmud's service. Thereafter Mahmud marched on Broach where Marjan, the governor of the place, refused to surrender. Mahmud was about to besiege the town, when he was advised by Malik Alauddin to attack the capital instead. He, therefore, continued his march and arrived at Baroda, where he was joined by Rawal Gangadas of Champaner and other chiefs. Crossing the river Mahi, Mahmud marched right to Kaparbanj. On the last day of Safar 855/2 April 1451, Mahmud left his camp with the object of making a night-attack, but lost his way and, after wandering about the whole night, found himself at dawn in front of his own camp. Disappointed in his attempt to surprise the enemy, Mahmud arranged his army for fighting. In the battle that ensued Qutbuddin threw in his reserves at a very critical moment, with the result that the great army of Malwa was utterly routed, and Mahmud fled to Mandu leaving eighty elephants and his baggage in the hands of the victor, who returned triumphant to Ahmadabad.⁷¹

Two years after his return, Qutbuddin was called upon to interfere in the affairs of Nagaur. His kinsman, Firuz Khan, had passed away, leaving the throne to be contested by his brother, Mujahid Khan, and his son, Shams Khan; and taking advantage of this

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 66.

⁷¹ Abdul Karim, year 855; Abdul Husain, ff. 70a-71b; Sikandar, 69-80; Nizamuddin, III, 127-29, 331-34; Ferishta, II, 370-77.

situation, Rana Kumbha of Chitor occupied the territory. Shams Khan fled to Ahmadabad to seek help and gave his daughter in marriage to Qutbuddin, who immediately set out to avenge the wrong done to Shams Khan. On his way Gita Deva, the Raja of Sirohi, attended his camp and prayed for his help in recovering the fortress of Abu, which had also been seized by Rana Kumbha. Qutbuddin deputed Malik Shaban to take possession of Abu and hand it over to the Raja, but Malik Shaban was defeated by Rana Kumbha's troops with great slaughter. Enraged by this defeat, Qutbuddin laid waste all the low lands of the Rana's territory, defeated him in the field of battle and besieged him in Kumbhalgarh. As the siege was prolonged, Rana Kumbha was obliged to purchase peace by the payment of ample compensation to Shams Khan and a heavy indemnity to Qutbuddin, who returned to his capital.⁷²

Not long after his return to Ahmadabad, Qutbuddin received a mission from Mahmud Khalji proposing a treaty of alliance between the Sultans of Gujarat and Malwa against Rana Kumbha of Chitor. These overtures were favourably received by Qutbuddin and a treaty was concluded. It was stipulated that Qutbuddin should ravage such parts of the Rana's territories as were contiguous to Gujarat while Mahmud should seize the country of Mewar and Ajmer. It was also agreed that whenever necessary they should not fail to help and assist each other. Soon after the conclusion of the treaty, intelligence arrived in 861/1457 that Rana Kumbha had broken all his pledges and attacked Nagaur. Qutbuddin, therefore, set out for Kumbhalgarh. On his way he captured Abu, and made it over to Gita Deva, the Raja of Sirohi, who had been expelled from his mountain fortress by Rana Kumbha. On the other side, Mahmud Khalji moved to Mandasor in order to harass Rana Kumbha. Thereupon Qutbuddin attacked Kumbhalgarh but failed to take it and returned to Ahmadabad.⁷³

While Qutbuddin was campaigning in Kumbhalgarh, Raja Mubarak of Khandesh attacked Baglana. Its ruler, Rai Manu, sought the help of Mahmud Khalji to whom he owed fealty and allegiance. In 857/1453 Mahmud sent Iqbal Khan and Yusuf Khan with a huge army to Baglana. Mubarak gave battle but fled back to Asir after suffering a heavy defeat. Next year Mubarak again attacked Baglana but Mahmud Khalji again came to the rescue of the Raja, and deputed his son, Ghiyasuddin, to Baglana. Mubarak retreated to his country without risking a battle. Thereafter Mubarak reigned without undertaking any expedition till his death on 12 Rajab 861/5 June

⁷² Sikandar, 82-84; Nizamuddin, III, 129-31; Ferishta, II, 377-78.

⁷³ Nizamuddin, III, 336; Hajiud Dabir, I, 201; Ferishta, II, 550.

1457, and was succeeded by his son, Malik Aina, who assumed the title of Adil Khan II.⁷⁴ Two years later Qutbuddin of Gujarat passed away at Ahmadabad in Rajab 863/May 1459. As he was young and had hitherto enjoyed good health, his death aroused the suspicion that he had been poisoned by his wife, the daughter of Shams Khan of Nagaur, so that her father might succeed to the throne of Gujarat. When Qutbuddin was in the agony of death, his nobles killed Shams Khan, and the Sultan's mother ordered her slave-girls to tear the unsuspecting queen to pieces.

Qutbuddin was brave but he possessed a violent disposition, a capricious temper and a sanguinary nature. Often he put to death some of his most confidential servants and favourites without the slightest provocation. Under the influence of liquor he was particularly reckless in shedding blood.⁷⁵ More often than not on his return from a battle-field, he abandoned himself to his passions and sensuality.⁷⁶ He had a number of queens in his *haram* but the most favoured was the Rajput princess, Rani Manjhari, who wielded great influence over her husband.⁷⁷ Furthermore, he appointed Hindus to some of the highest offices under him. Among his nobles we find Aminchand Manek, who was sent at the head of an expedition along with Malik Gadai to help Firuz Khan of Nagaur against Rana Kumbha.⁷⁸

Qutbuddin kept up the traditions of his dynasty for architectural works. He completed the mausoleum of Shaikh Ahmad Khattu at Sarkhej, which his father had begun, and constructed the *Hauz-i Qutb* with the Nagina Bagh in the centre.⁷⁹ The Sultan could compose verses in Gujarati and one such verse has come down to us.⁸⁰

DAUD; MAHMUD I BEGARHA

On the death of Qutbuddin, the amirs raised to the throne Daud Khan, the late Sultan's uncle; but immediately after his accession Daud elevated a *farrash* (carpet-spreader) to the dignity of a noble, effected economies in the royal household and reduced the allowances of the amirs. These acts of the Sultan were unconventional and must have given umbrage to the amirs, who led by Malik Shaban approached Bibi Mughali and persuaded her to allow them to raise

⁷⁴ Nizamuddin, III, 336; Hajiud Dahir, I, 201; Ferishta, II, 550.

⁷⁵ Ferishta, II, 380; Nizamuddin, III, 134.

⁷⁶ Sikandar, 82.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, 87.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 83.

⁷⁹ Mahmud Bukhari, 27; Ali Muhammad, *Khatmah*, 19.

⁸⁰ Saiyyid Muhammad Rizvi, *Jumati Shahtiya*, V, Juma, 24.

Fath Khan, then only thirteen years old, to the throne of his father on 1 Sha'ban 863/3 June 1459, with the title of Sultan Nasiruddin Abul Fath Mahmud Shah.⁸¹ He is commonly known as Mahmud Begarha, because he conquered the two Rajput forts (*garhs*) of Girnar and Champaner.⁸²

Four months after his accession, young Mahmud was faced with a formidable conspiracy hatched by leading nobles like Kabiruddin Azdul Mulk, Maulana Khizr Safiul Mulk, Piarah Ismail Burhanul Mulk and Jhajju Muhammad Nizamul Mulk. They went to Mahmud and told him that Malikush Sharq Malik Shaban was intriguing to depose him and Mahmud, new as he was to political intrigues, believed them. Consequently they arrested Malik Shaban on 29 Ziqad 863/27 September 1459, and imprisoned him. During the following night Malik Abdullah, the *darogha* of the elephant-stables, informed Mahmud privately of the real state of affairs. The young Sultan consulted his mother and decided on his course of action. Early in the morning he proceeded to the place where Malik Shaban was confined, and stamping his foot on the ground demanded the immediate surrender of the traitor so that he might suffer instant death. The gaolers complied with the royal order, thinking that the designs of their masters were on the point of being fulfilled. But as soon as the Sultan had secured the person of his loyal minister, he ordered his fetters to be removed and begged his pardon. Finding the tables turned against them, the conspirators assembled their troops to give battle. When the Sultan came to know about this, he ordered the royal elephants to be assembled and with 3,000 adherents issued out from the citadel with a bow in his hand and a quiver at his back. Seeing the Sultan moving about in person, the assembled troops deserted the conspirators, who in their turn took to their heels. The conspiracy having been thus frustrated, Malik Shaban was restored to his office; but shortly afterwards he retired and Mahmud assumed charge of the administration of his kingdom.⁸³

In 866/1462 Mahmud of Gujarat went on a hunting expedition and encamped on the bank of the Khari, where he received an appeal for help from the infant Bahmani ruler, Nizam Shah of the Deccan, whose dominions had been ravaged by Mahmud Khalji of Malwa. Mahmud Begarha, consequently, moved to the border, where another messenger informed him that Mahmud Khalji had

81 Abdul Husain, ff. 76b-82b; Abdul Karim, year 863; Ferishta, II, 380; Sikandar, 85-95; Nizamuddin, III, 133-35.

82 Sharfuddin, *Tarikh-i Gujarat*, Maulana Azad Library (Aligarh), No. 162.

83 Abdul Husain, ff. 99a-109b; Abdul Karim, year 863; Sikandar, 95-99; Nizamuddin, III, 136-38; Ferishta, II, 381-84.

defeated the Deccanis. He, therefore, marched into Khandesh and cut off the retreat of the Malwa army, which was compelled to retire by way of Gondwana and suffered terribly. Next year Mahmud Khalji again invaded the Deccan but retreated on hearing that the Sultan of Gujarat was marching against him. Thereafter Mahmud Begarha wrote to Mahmud Khalji that it was unfair on his part to molest a child, who had not reached the age of maturity, and warned him that if he ever attacked the Deccan, he would find his own dominions overrun by the army of Gujarat. The threat proved effective in preventing further hostilities between Malwa and the Deccan.⁸⁴

In the following year Mahmud Begarha led an expedition against the Raja of Dun, a place situated between Gujarat and Konkan, as the Raja had been guilty of piracy. The Raja gave battle, but confronted with heavy odds, he took refuge in his hill-fortress. Mahmud Begarha scaled the fort with his retinue. The Raja sent his old mother with the keys of the fort to the Sultan and sued for peace. Mahmud restored the stronghold to the Raja on his agreeing to pay a tribute.⁸⁵

In 871/1466 Mahmud Begarha marched against Rao Mandalik, the Yadava Prince of Girnar, now called Junagadh. A body of Rajputs, called *pradhans* or 'chief's men', gave battle but perished fighting. The state was pillaged and the Rao was obliged to pay tribute to the Sultan, who returned to his capital. In the following year it was brought to his notice that the Rao was in the habit of using the insignia of royalty in public. He, therefore, commanded him to discontinue this practice, and the Rao readily obeyed. Two years later Mahmud Begarha decided to incorporate Girnar into his kingdom and led a large army against Rao Mandalik, who sued for peace and pleaded that he had remitted tribute regularly and had been an obedient vassal. This had no effect on Mahmud, who was bent on the annexation of Girnar. Mandalik had no alternative but to defend himself. Confronted with heavy odds, Mandalik retired to the citadel of Uparkot, which was closely invested by Mahmud Begarha.⁸⁶

The fall of this inaccessible fortress is traditionally associated with domestic treason. It is said that Mandalik had forcibly taken to

84 Abdul Husain, ff. 118a-27a; Abdul Karim, years 866-67; Sikandar, 11-13; Hajiud Dabir, I, 17-18; Nizamuddin, III, 139-41; Ferishta, II, 384-85.

85 Abdul Husain, ff. 134a-39b; Abdul Karim, year 860; Nizamuddin, III, 41-42; Ferishta, II, 385.

86 Abdul Husain, ff. 149b-59a; Abdul Karim, years 871-74; Sikandar, 115-21. Hajiud Dabir, I, 19-20; Nizamuddin, III, 143-47; Ferishta, II, 387-89.

himself Mohini, the handsome wife of his *kamdar*, Vishal, who schemed in secret for the downfall of his master. Finding the provisions in Girnar running short, Vishal sent a messenger to the Sultan advising him to avail himself of the opportunity and to take the fort by assault. The Sultan acted on this advice and before long the Rao, reduced to straits, came down to surrender the fort on 10 Jamadi II 875/4 December 1470.⁸⁷ Thereafter Mandalik joined the service of the Sultan and through the influence of Shamsuddin Durwesh embraced Islam. He was given the title of Khan-i Jahan and his kingdom was incorporated in the sultanat of Gujarat. At the foot of the hills, Mahmud Begarha founded the city of Mustafabad, which became the capital of the Sultan.⁸⁸

While Mahmud Begarha was besieging Girnar, Jai Singh, the son of Gangadas of Champaner, had ravaged the territory between Champaner and Ahmadabad. He, therefore, sent Jamaluddin Muhammad to govern this tract, conferring on him the title of Muhafiz Khan, and intended to follow him personally in order to conquer Champaner. But the Sultan was called upon to deal first with the frontier tribes of Sumras, Sodas and Kahlās, who lived on the border of Cutch and claimed to be Muslims, though they were absolutely unaware of the *shari'at*. They were *Ibahatiyas* and intermarried with the Hindus. Mahmud Begarha, therefore, marched against them in Ramazan 876/February-March 1472. The *Ibahatiyas* confronted the Sultan with 30,000 horse but soon surrendered. Mahmud forgave their offences and gave them amnesty. He brought some of their leaders with him to Mustafabad and asked the *ulama* to instruct them in the tenets of Islam.⁸⁹

In the following year it was reported to the Sultan that 40,000 archers had risen against his maternal grandfather, Jam Nizamuddin of Sind, and were harassing the inhabitants on the border. He, therefore, equipped a large army and again crossed the Rann of Cutch by forced marches. On hearing of his approach the rebels dispersed. Some of his amirs advised him to incorporate Sind into his kingdom, but he declined because his mother was descended from the Jams of Sind, and it would be unbecoming on his part to seize the territory.

⁸⁷ Banchodji, *Tarikh-i Surath*, Eng. tr., J. Burgess, Bombay, 1882, 117-18; Sikandar, 122-23.

⁸⁸ Abdul Husain, ff. 159b-70a; Abdul Karim, year 875; Sikandar, 120-25, Hajrud Dabir, I, 20-21; Nizamuddin III, 148-54; Ferishta, II, 389-90.

⁸⁹ Abdul Husain, ff. 173b-74a; Sikandar, 127; Hajrud Dabir, I, 22; Nizamuddin, III, 148-49; Ferishta, II, 390-91.

He hunted as far as the bank of the Indus and then returned to Mustafabad.⁹⁰

On his return from Sind, Mahmud Begarha was called upon to deal with a new situation. Maulana Mahmud Samarqandi, who was returning from the Deccan to his native country in a vessel bound for Hurmuz, was driven ashore to Jagat (Dwarka), where the pirates robbed him of all his property and left him adrift on the shore with his two young sons. After many hardships Maulana Samarqandi arrived at Mustafabad and appealed for redress to the Sultan, who sent him to Ahmadabad on 16 Zil Hij 873/27 June 1469, and marched against Jagat, which was soon evacuated by its Rajput prince, Bhim, who took refuge in the island-fortress of Bet Sankhodhar. Mahmud Begarha proceeded towards Bet Sankhodhar through a dense forest, in which his army had to face great difficulties owing to lions and poisonous snakes. There ensued a sea-fight in which Mahmud Begarha defeated Bhim, who was taken prisoner on 13 Jamadi I, 874/18 November 1469, and sent to Ahmadabad where he was impaled. The plundered goods of Maulana Samarqandi were delivered back to him.⁹¹

The incessant campaigns of the Sultan combined with his contemplated invasion of Champaner created discontent among the nobles, who, with Khudawand Khan at their head, hatched a conspiracy to dethrone their master when he was to go in a procession to the Idgah on the festival of *Idul Fitr*, 1 Shawwal 855/4 December 1480, and put Prince Ahmad on the throne. The conspiracy, however, leaked out owing to Rai Ravan, the chief Hindu noble, who kept his friend, Imadul Mulk, informed about the movements of the conspirators. Imad secretly summoned his troops from his *iqta*, and Qaisar Khan Faruqi privately informed the Sultan of the affair. Instead of arraigning the conspirators for treason, Mahmud Begarha decided to test the fidelity of his nobles, and publicly announced that he intended to go on a pilgrimage to Mecca, leaving his son, Prince Ahmad, as his regent. The Sultan made all necessary preparations for the pilgrimage; then summoning his nobles, he left the matter to be finally decided by them, but he would neither eat nor drink until he had received their decision. Perceiving that their plot had been discovered, the courtiers found themselves in a quandary. After some parleys, they sent Nizamul Mulk to the Sultan

⁹⁰ Abdul Husain, ff. 174b-75b; Sikandar, 127; Hajiud Dabir, I, 22-23; Nizamuddin, III, 149-50; Ferishta, II, 391-92.

⁹¹ Abdul Husain, ff. 167a-83b; Sikandar, 127-30, Hajiud Dabir, I, 24-25; Nizamuddin, III, 150-52, Ferishta, II, 393-94.

requesting him to conquer Champaner before making a pilgrimage to Mecca. This advice was accepted but Champaner could not be attacked till 887/1482.⁹²

In 887/1482 Malik Sundha, the *khasakhail* of Rasulabad, made a plundering raid on Champaner in search of supplies, which had fallen short owing to an unusual drought; but he was driven back by Rawal Jai Singh, son of Rawal Gangadas of Champaner, who sallied forth fiercely and carried fire and sword into the territories of the Sultan. The latter was highly incensed by this incident, and having assembled his forces, set out for Champaner on 1 Ziqad 887/12 December 1482. Jai Singh came out to meet his enemy but was obliged to take refuge in the hill-fortress of Pavagadh, which the Sultan closely invested. During the investment the Rawal sent his minister, Suri, to Mandu to seek help from Sultan Ghiyasuddin, the son and successor of Mahmud Khalji of Malwa, who readily agreed and marched as far as Nalcha. Mahmud Begarha, leaving his officers to continue the siege, marched to Dohad to meet Ghiyasuddin Khalji, but the latter retired to Mandu, and Mahmud Begarha returned to Champaner to continue the siege. He ordered the construction of a mosque in his military lines as a token of his firm resolve not to desist from the siege until he had taken the fortress. In the meanwhile a cannon-ball fired by one of the *tops* or mortars of the Sultan created a breach in the city-wall and caused consternation among the garrison, who, in a state of confusion, fired their *huqqas* or rockets, which instead of falling on the army of the Sultan fell on the palace of the Rawal. Finding their end near, the Rajputs performed the *jauhar*-rite. They flung into fire their women and children and charged on the enemy with their swords and fought to the end. Thus on 2 Ziqad 889/21 November 1484 fell the fortress of Champaner—the last bastion of Rajput glory in Gujarat. Mahmud Begarha made Champaner one of his principal places of residence and gave it the name of Muhammadabad.⁹³

While Mahmud Begarha was hunting near Champaner in 892/1486, a band of Samarqandi merchants complained to him that the Raja of Abu had robbed them of their four hundred horses and a few *mans* of the musk of Tartary, which they were bringing to Gujarat. The Sultan made good their loss and gave them a *farman* to the Raja, demanding restitution of their plundered property. This

⁹² Abdul Husain, ff. 184b-89; Sikandar, 133-34; Hajiud Dabir, I, 25-26; Nizamuddin, III, 153-59.

⁹³ Abdul Husain, ff. 191b-207b; Abdul Karim, years 887-89; Sharfuddin, ff. 15a-16a; Sikandar, 134-37; Hajiud Dabir, I, 27-31; Nizamuddin III, 158-62; Ferishta, II, 396-98.

terrified the Raja, who not only restored the goods to the merchants but also sent some valuable gifts for Mahmud Begarha, who passed them on to the merchants.⁹⁴

In 896/1490 it was reported to Mahmud Begarha that Bahadur Gilani, a rebel noble of the Bahmanis, had committed various acts of piracy off the coast of Gujarat and had carried on depredations as far as the island of Mahim and Cambay. In order to punish the marauder, Mahmud Begarha sent Kamal Khan and Safdar Khan, but they were defeated and sent to Dabul as prisoners. Thereupon Mahmud Begarha sent a large army under Malikush Sharq Qawamul Mulk, who discovered that he could not reach Bahadur Gilani without invading the Deccan. Mahmud Begarha, therefore, sent Bahr Khan with a letter to Mahmud Bahmani reminding him of the claims which Gujarat had on the gratitude of his dynasty, and requesting that the rebel be brought to book. In response to this letter, the Bahmani Sultan sent his minister, Qasim Baridul Mamalik, who with the help of Ahmad Nizam Shah undertook a campaign against the pirate, but it was not till 901/1495 that Bahadur Gilani was defeated and slain, and full reparation was made to Gujarat.⁹⁵

Freed from the menace of Bahadur Gilani, Mahmud Begarha turned his attention to Raja Adil Khan II of Khandesh, who had not sent his tribute for a long time. Adil II had, in fact, become one of the most powerful rulers of Khandesh; he had not only consolidated his authority but extended it over Gondwana and Garha-Mandla. He had suppressed the depredations of the Kolis and Bhils, strengthened and extended the defences of Asir, and fortified Burhanpur by building a citadel on the Tapti. In consequence of the great strength he had acquired, he assumed the title of *Jharkandi Sultan* or 'King of the Forest'; and contrary to the practice of his ancestors, he not only withheld the annual tribute to the Sultan of Gujarat but openly declared that he owed no allegiance to that monarch. As a result Mahmud Begarha marched into Khandesh in 904/1498 and laid waste the country. Adil moved out to oppose the army of Gujarat; but failing to resist the power of Mahmud Begarha, he was obliged to pay the arrears of tribute before the forces of Gujarat retired to their own country. Thereafter Adil maintained friendly relations with Gujarat and visited the court of his suzerain.⁹⁶

⁹⁴ Abdul Husain, ff. 208b-9b; Hajiud Dabir, I, 32-33; Sikandar, 144; Nizamuddin, III, 162-63.

⁹⁵ Shamsuddin, *Zamimah-i Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, Commonwealth Relations Office, No. 3841, ff. 7b-13b; Hajiud Dabir, I, 33; Nizamuddin, III, 56-63, 163-64; Ferishta, I, 718-19, II, 399-400.

⁹⁶ Ferishta, II, 401, 550-51.

Raja Adil II of Khandesh passed away on 15 Rabi I 907/28 September 1501,⁹⁷ leaving the throne to his younger brother, Daud Khan, who fell completely under the control of two brothers, Husam Ali and Yar Ali, and made the former the wazir of his realm with the title of Husamuddin. At the instigation of the latter, Daud contrived to embroil himself with Ahmad Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar, who invaded Khandesh and could not be expelled until Daud had purchased the aid of Nasiruddin Khalji of Malwa by the humiliating concession of causing the *Khutba* to be recited in his name. His inglorious reign came to an end with his death on 1 Jamadi 914/28 August 1508. His son, Ghazni Khan, succeeded him, but after a short reign of ten days he was poisoned by Husamuddin.⁹⁸

Meanwhile Mahmud Begarha was confronted with the great naval power of the Portuguese, whose discovery of the Cape route in 1498 had diverted the bulk of the spice trade from Egypt and the Red Sea to the Cape route in less than a decade, and thereby deprived Egypt and Turkey of the commercial advantages of the lucrative trade between Europe and the East and also seriously affected the sources of the revenue of Gujarat, which then served as the emporium of commerce for the Indian sub-continent. This brought about an alliance between Egypt, Turkey and Gujarat against the Portuguese intruders on their monopoly.

The struggle commenced when in 913/1507 Qansaul-Ghauri, the last Mamluk Sultan of Egypt, sent an expedition to the coast of Gujarat for the extirpation of the Portuguese from the Indian waters. The Egyptian fleet was placed in charge of Amir Husain, who was the governor of Jedda at that time. He was accompanied by Salman Rais, who had been sent by Sultan Salim, the Ottoman ruler, to help the Egyptian enterprise and also to effect a combination with the Gujarat flotilla organized by Malik Ayaz, the famous governor of Junagarh and Diu under Mahmud Begarha. The combined fleet anchored at Chaul. When Mahmud Begarha came to know about the arrival of the fleet, he first went to Mahim and thereafter to Diu. In the meanwhile he received a letter from the *wali* of Hormuz describing the atrocities perpetrated by the Portuguese. This further enraged Mahmud Begarha, who sent Malik Ayaz with the Gujarat flotilla to help the allies against their common foe.⁹⁹

⁹⁷ Hajiud Dabir, I, 54.

⁹⁸ Ferishta, II, 551.

⁹⁹ Shamsuddin, ff. 28b-29b; Hajiud Dabir, I, 37-39; E. D. Ross, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, October, 1921, 549.

The Portuguese squadron was commanded by Dom Lourenco, son of the Portuguese viceroy, Francisco de Almeida (1505-9). In Ramazan 913/January 1508, a pitched naval battle was fought near Chaul, in which about four hundred Rumis fell and two to three thousand Portuguese were killed. A cannon-ball fired by the allies struck Lourenco's ship, which sank along with its Portuguese commander. This victory of the allies was the occasion of much jubilation and Mahmud Begarha is reported to have bestowed a *khilat* on Malik Ayaz as a token of the appreciation of his services.¹⁰⁰

In order to avenge the Portuguese defeat as well as the death of his son, Francisco de Almeida personally led a fleet up the west coast of India on 12 December 1508, with 18 ships and 1,200 men. He found the Egyptian fleet and the *fustas* of Gujarat assembled near Diu. On 3 February 1509, there ensued a desperate sea-fight in which Almeida scored victory over the allies. Amir Husain's fleet was completely broken up and Malik Ayaz made peace with the Portuguese by returning the prisoners captured at Chaul and by helping to provision their fleet. The Portuguese returned triumphant to Cochin on 18 March 1509, with little loss.¹⁰¹

The significance of the naval actions at Chaul and Diu with the Portuguese was not lost on Mahmud Begarha, who sent an ambassador to Albuquerque (1509-1515), the new Portuguese governor. The envoy met the governor at Cannanore in September, 1510, and conveyed to him the Sultan's desire for peace and alliance; he also handed over two letters—one from the Christians stranded in Gujarat and the other from Malik Gopi, the Hindu minister of Mahmud Begarha, known as Gopicaica to the Portuguese. Malik Gopi's letter suggested an alliance between the Sultan of Gujarat and the Portuguese and sought an assurance to the effect that Portuguese ships would not cruise about ruining the maritime trade of Gujarat. In return Malik Gopi undertook to get the Christian captives set at liberty and to secure freedom for Portuguese ships to frequent the ports of Gujarat.¹⁰²

The above proposals evoked a favourable response from Albuquerque, who summoned the envoy and expressed his desire for the settlement of the terms of the alliance. He placed his army and fleet at the disposal of Mahmud Begarha and requested the restoration of the Christian captives at his court. In his letter of 16 September

100 Sharfuddin, f. 18a; Shamsuddin, ff. 35a-36b; Ross, 547.

101 R. S. Whiteway, *The Rise of Portuguese Power in India, 1497-1550*, London, 1916, 115-18; F. C. Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, I, London, 1894, 129-30.

102 Alfonso de Albuquerque, *The Commentaries*, Eng. tr. Walter De Gray Birch, London 1877, II, 210-13.

1510, addressed to Malik Gopi, Albuquerque hoped for an alliance between the Sultan of Gujarat and D. Manuel, the King of Portugal, by virtue of which the Sultan would find his harbours safe and his ships free to navigate the seas.¹⁰³ Soon after these negotiations, Albuquerque captured Goa from Ismail Adil Shah of Bijapur (916-41/1510-34) on 25 November 1510. The fall of Goa immensely increased the prestige of the Portuguese and brought about a great change in the attitude of the Indian princes towards them. Mahmud Begarha set free the Portuguese prisoners at his court, and Amir Husain, the Egyptian admiral, after obtaining the Sultan's permission, set out from Cambay for Yaman.¹⁰⁴ The formidable confederacy of Egypt, Turkey and Gujarat against the Portuguese was thus broken up.

In the month of Safar 914/June 1508 there arrived at Muhammadiabad-Champaner an embassy from Sultan Sikandar Lodi (894-923/1489-1517) with a pair of rhinoceros, thirty horses and other precious commodities for Mahmud Begarha, who in his turn bestowed a rich *khilat* on the ambassador and sent some parrots, herons and Arabian horses as presents for Sikandar Lodi.¹⁰⁵ These presents, according to Nizamuddin and Ferishta, were sent as a matter of friendship.¹⁰⁶ But whatever may have been the intentions of Sikandar, the fact remains that it was for the first time that a ruler of Delhi sent presents to a ruler of Gujarat, and as such this step was not without diplomatic significance.

Mahmud Begarha was obliged to intervene in the succession disputes which broke out on the death of Ghazni Khan, who had left no male heir to the throne of Khandesh. Some of the nobles selected one Alam Khan, a scion of the Faruqi dynasty, who was also backed by Ahmad Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar. Adil Khan, son of Ahsan Khan, also advanced his claims to the throne and he was supported by his maternal grandfather, Mahmud Begarha. Khandesh itself was divided into two factions, one supporting the Ahmadnagar protegee and the other supporting the Gujarat claimant. The adherents of Alam Khan under Malik Husamuddin established themselves in Burhanpur, where they were joined by Ahmad Nizam Shah and Imad Shah of Berar. Malik Laddan Khalji, the leader of the Gujarat party, shut himself up in Asir, where he was besieged by the partisans of Alam Khan. Mahmud Begarha marched to Thalner

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 215-72.

¹⁰⁴ Danvers, I, 208-13.

¹⁰⁵ Shamsuddin, ff. 37a-37b.

¹⁰⁶ Nizamuddin, III, 171-72; Ferishta, II, 404.

with his grandson, Adil Khan. When news of his arrival reached Burhanpur, Ahmad Nizam Shah and Imad Shah withdrew, carrying their claimant with them, and Malik Husamuddin was obliged to submit to Mahmud Begarha, who held a *darbar* at Thalner on 19 Zil Hij 914/10 April 1509, and installed his protege on the throne of Khandesh with the title of Azam Humayun Adil Khan III. Malik Laddan was given the title of Khan-i Jahan and Malik Husamuddin that of Shahryar.¹⁰⁷

Adil Khan III, now established on the throne of Khandesh, further cemented his alliance with Gujarat by marrying a daughter of Khalil Khan, son of Mahmud Begarha, who afterwards succeeded his father as Muzaffar Shah II. Thereafter Adil Khan shifted his capital from Thalner to Burhanpur, and had Malik Husamuddin Shahryar, who was again plotting with Ahmad Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar, assassinated. But this did not stop disaffection. In 916/1510 Sher Khan and Saif Khan conspired with Ahmad Nizam Shah; they raised the standard of revolt at Asir and invited the pretender, Alam Khan, from Ahmadnagar. Adil Khan immediately reported the situation to Mahmud Begarha, who sent Dilawar Khan, Qadr Khan, Safdar Khan and other nobles with twelve lakhs of *tankas* and a considerable force to the rescue of his grandson. When the Gujarati force arrived at Nandurbar, the rebels took to their heels and fled to Kowil. Finding his country free from menace, Adil Khan gave the Gujarati nobles leave to go back, while he himself returned to Burhanpur at the close of 916/1510.¹⁰⁸

Very early in the following year Mahmud Begarha fell ill and sent for his son, Prince Khalil Khan, from Baroda and gave him fatherly advice; but as his condition improved slightly, he permitted the prince to return to Baroda.¹⁰⁹ At this time Farhatul Mulk reported to the Sultan that Shah Ismail Safavi of Persia had sent an embassy under Yadgar Beg Qizilbash with elegant presents.¹¹⁰ The Sultan ordered all necessary preparations to be made for the reception of the embassy,¹¹¹ but before the envoy could arrive at the capital, Mahmud Begarha had breathed his last on Monday, 2 Ramazan 917/23 November 1511, and was buried at Sarkhej in the mausoleum he had constructed for himself during his life-time.¹¹²

Mahmud Begarha is regarded not only as the greatest of the

107 Shamsuddin, ff. 39b-47b; Hajiud Dabir, I, 56-57.

108 Ferishta, II, 403-4; Nizamuddin, III, 170-71.

109 Sikandar, 151.

110 Nizamuddin, III, 172.

111 Hajiud Dabir, I, 88.

* 112 Sikandar, 151; Nizamuddin, III, 172; Ferishta, II, 404; Hajiud Dabir, I, 88.

sultans of Gujarat but holds a prominent place among the warrior princes of India. Though the ruler of a small region, Mahmud Begarha was in reality much more powerful than his contemporary Sikandar Lodi of Delhi; and it must have been a matter of no small gratification to him when a little before his death the sovereign of Delhi sent him some presents acknowledging thereby the independent status of the Sultan of Gujarat. Mahmud, according to Varthema, the famous Bolognese adventurer, presented a striking appearance with a flowing beard that reached his girdle, and his moustache was so long that he tied it over his head.¹¹³ From his very childhood Mahmud, according to Barbosa, had been nourished on some poison with the result that if a fly settled on his hand, it swelled and immediately fell dead.¹¹⁴ To satisfy his proverbially voracious appetite, he is reported to have eaten daily one Gujarati *man* of food and another 5 *seers* of parched rice as dessert; and at night two plates of *samosas* (meat-patties) were placed on each side of his bed, so that he might find something to eat on whichever side he woke up from his sleep. For breakfast he took a cup of honey with a cup of butter and one hundred and fifty golden plantains.¹¹⁵ The works of Varthema and Barbosa were translated into European languages and thereby Mahmud Begarha gained an unenviable notoriety. It is to this ruler that Samuel Butler, the English satirist of the seventeenth century, makes reference in his *Hudibras*:

‘The Prince of Cambay’s daily food
Is asp and basilisk and toad.’

Mahmud was a brave Sultan who constantly led campaigns against the neighbouring princes. These campaigns were motivated by territorial ambitions rather than religious zeal. He fought successfully against the neighbouring Rajput princes as well as Muslim rulers. He did not debar Hindus from rising to some of the highest positions in his government. Malik Gopi, a Brahman, for instance, was the chief minister of the Sultan.

Moreover Mahmud possessed abundant capacity for decisive action, as is borne out by his successful suppression of two revolts. He was also a wise and just administrator. We are told that the relative of a powerful noble, Bahaul Mulk, committed a murder. In order to save the offender, Imadul Mulk and Azdul Mulk induced an innocent person to plead guilty and he was consequently hanged for a murder he

¹¹³ Ludovico de Varthema, *Travels*, Eng. tr. Jones and Winter, ed. Dr. Badgar, Hakluyt Society, 1863, 109-10.

¹¹⁴ Duarte Barbosa, *A Description of the Coasts of East Africa and Malabar in 1514*, Hakluyt Society, 57.

¹¹⁵ Sikandar, 96.

had not committed. Sometimes afterwards, when the true facts of the case were brought to the notice of the Sultan, he ordered both Imadul Mulk and Azdul Mulk, to be executed for their heinous act.¹¹⁶

Besides being a just ruler, Mahmud was also a benevolent monarch, who was always solicitous for the welfare of his people. He saved his soldiers from the clutches of the usurious money-lenders by appointing *khazanchis* (treasurers) at different places to advance money to such soldiers as were in need of loans.¹¹⁷ Moreover, he personally consoled the families of those who had fallen in his wars. On his return from the successful expedition against Girnar, the Sultan halted for three days at Sarkhej before entering Ahmadabad. During these three days his eyes were often filled with tears and his countenance marked with grief. When Najmuddin, the qazi of Ahmadabad, went out of the city to congratulate and welcome the Sultan, he is reported to have said, 'Oh, Qazi! It is well with me, but you should tell me of those whose sons and brothers have been killed during the last five years.'¹¹⁸

Equally solicitous was the Sultan for the welfare of his other subjects. He helped his subjects in the repair and restoration of old houses and also in getting wells dug for those who planted shady trees by the roadside.¹¹⁹ He constructed fine caravanserais and inns for the comfort of travellers. The merchants were happy because the roads were safe for traffic.¹²⁰ The Sultan was a great builder. He founded Mustafabad at Junagadh and Muhammadabad near Champaner, and adorned them with lofty buildings and beautiful gardens. The *Bagh-i Firdaus* (Garden of Paradise), which was about ten miles long and two miles broad, and the *Bagh-i Shaban* (Garden of Shaban) were laid out during his reign.¹²¹ He also built lofty mosques and madrasas for seekers of knowledge.¹²²

Though Mahmud was denied a systematic education, he is credited with having equipped himself with considerable knowledge through associations with the *gens de lettres*. No one who came into contact with him could describe him as unlettered. Ibn-i Afrash, in his translation of the *Shifa* of Qazi Ayaz, mentions several instances of the Sultan's quick judgement in deciding different points of law. He talked on religious, historical and other subjects with such care that he could pass off for one well-versed in these branches of learn-

116 Abdul Husain, ff. 40b-41a.

117 Sikandar, 104.

118 *Ibid.*, 112.

119 *Ibid.*, 105.

120 *Ibid.*, 100-1.

121 *Ibid.*, 105.

122 *Ibid.*, 101.

ing.¹²³ He took keen interest in the Persian translations of Arabic works. The well-known *Biographical Dictionary* of Ibn-i Khallikan was rendered into Persian by Yusuf bin Ahmad under the title of *Manzarul Insan* and dedicated to Mahmud Begarha.¹²⁴ Likewise he patronized Sanskrit. His court-poet, Udayaraj, wrote a poem, called *Mahmudacarita*, in praise of the Sultan. The poet describes his patron as a crown-jewel of the royal race as if he was a Kshattriya. He says hyperbolically,

'In battle Mahmud is equal to Bhima, in beneficence he surpasses Karna, in sport he is like Narayana, in mercy he resembles Rama, in wisdom he is better than Brihaspati and in beauty he excels Manamatha.'¹²⁵

MUZAFFAR SHAH II

Mahmud Begarha was succeeded by his eldest son, Prince Khalil Khan, who ascended the throne on 3 Ramazan 917/24 November 1511, and assumed the title of Abun Nasr Shamsuddin Muzaffar Shah II.¹²⁶ On 25 Shawwal 917/15 January 1512, he gave audience to Yadgar Beg, the Persian envoy, with his forty *Qizilbash* (red cap) followers, who had been waiting near the capital ever since Mahmud Begarha's death. Among the presents which the envoy placed before the Sultan were a turquoise cup of great value, a chest full of jewels and thirty Iraqi horses. Muzaffar bestowed on the envoy and his suite rich *khilats*, and soon left Ahmadabad for Baroda on his way to Champaner, to which capital he seems to have been followed by the Persian ambassador and his team.¹²⁷

At Baroda Prince Muhammad *alias* Sahib Khan, the eldest son of Sultan Nasiruddin Khalji (905-16/1500-10) of Malwa, waited upon Muzaffar to seek his help in recovering the throne of Mandu, which had been seized by his younger brother, Mahmud, after the death of his father.¹²⁸ In the protracted fratricidal war that followed Nasiruddin's death, Mahmud's claim to the throne was supported by his powerful Rajput adherent, Medini Rai, against his elder brother, Prince Muhammad, who was forced to flee to the neighbouring court of Gujarat, where he was warmly welcomed.¹²⁹ Muzaffar promised

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 109-10.

¹²⁴ Hajiud Dabir, I, 32, 126.

¹²⁵ Udayaraj, *Mahmudacarita*, also called *Rajetnod*, ed. G. N. Bahura, Jaipur, 1956, p. 5.

¹²⁶ Hajiud Dabir, I, 97.

¹²⁷ Sikandar, 174; Nizamuddin, III, 173-74.

¹²⁸ Sikandar, 174; Ferishta, II, 405.

¹²⁹ Nizamuddin, III, 393.

to enquire into the merits of his claim and deputed Qaisar Khan to the border town of Dohad in order to study the real state of affairs in Malwa. Meanwhile Prince Muhammad was offered the royal hospitality at Champaner along with his followers.¹³⁰

While at Champaner Prince Muhammad and his followers fell out with the Persian ambassador and plundered his lodging.¹³¹ When Muzaffar was informed of the strife, he sent his minister, Malikush Sharq Imadul Mulk, who at once put down the riot and shifted the ambassador to the royal apartments. Soon afterwards on 14 Ramazan 918/23 November 1512, Muzaffar despatched the Persian ambassador in the escort of Khurasan Khan to the coast, where two large ships were made ready to carry him and his suite. At the time of his departure he was presented with seven elephants, a rhinoceros and other animals and birds with some wonderful horse-armours and other precious commodities.¹³²

Some time before the departure of the Persian ambassador, Prince Muhammad, who was quite ashamed of the whole unhappy episode, quitted Champaner without taking formal leave of Muzaffar. He first sought refuge with Adil Khan III of Khandesh and then with Alauddin Imad Shah of Berar.¹³³ Not long after the departure of Prince Muhammad from Gujarat, Muzaffar received the intelligence that Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa had entrusted the entire administration of his country to Medini Rai, who had not only acquired supreme power in the state but had reduced his master to the position of a mere puppet. As the increasing influence of Medini Rai was likely to tilt the balance of power in favour of Rana Sanga of Mewar, Muzaffar decided to intervene in the internal affairs of Malwa. In the month of Shawwal 918/August-September 1512, he marched from Champaner with a huge army and halted for a few days at Godhra on his way to Malwa.¹³⁴

Taking advantage of the preoccupation of Muzaffar in the affairs of Malwa, Rao Bhim (1509-15), son of Rao Bhar Mal of Idar, raided the country to the east of the river Sabarmati. Ainul Mulk Fauladi, governor of Patan, who was on his way to Godhra to join the Sultan, turned aside to punish the Rao, but he was defeated and his brother, Abdul Malik, along with two hundred men, was slain. When Muzaffar came to know of this, he personally marched against the Rao who,

¹³⁰ Sikandar, 175; Ferishta, II, 405-6.

¹³¹ Nizamuddin, III, 174-75.

¹³² Sikandar, 176-77.

¹³³ Nizamuddin, III, 385; Ferishta, II, 406.

¹³⁴ Sikandar, 176-78.

finding it difficult to face the royal army, fled to the hills in 919/1513.¹³⁵ Muzaffar laid waste the country and ordered the general destruction of the metropolis of Idar. Rao Bhim then sought the intercession of Malik Gopi, the favourite Hindu minister of Muzaffar, and was forgiven on paying the large tribute of twenty lakhs of *tankas*. Muzaffar accepted it and proceeded to Godhra in order to resume his campaign against Malwa.¹³⁵

Meanwhile Affonso de Albuquerque (1509-15), the Portuguese governor, had sent Tristao Dega to Muzaffar with the terms and conditions of an alliance with Gujarat, which he had received from his monarch, Dom Manuel, by December 1512. Among other things the terms of the alliance included (1) permission for the Portuguese to erect a fortress at Diu for the security of the persons and property of the subjects of the king of Portugal; (2) an order to the traders of Gujarat that they were to send their merchandise to no place except Goa, where they would find all that they needed for a home-ward-bound cargo; (3) agreement on the part of the ruler of Gujarat not to receive in his kingdom any Rumis or Turks 'because they were the capital enemies of the Portuguese'.¹³⁶

When Tristao Dega arrived at Cambay, he found that Muzaffar had gone on an expedition against Mandu. He, therefore, had to wait till his return at Champaner, where he delivered to him the letters which he had brought. Muzaffar agreed not to allow the Rumis or Turks to enter his territory again, but he turned down the Portuguese request for the construction of a fort at Diu. He, however, after further conversation, offered certain other islands along the coast of Gujarat, where the Portuguese could build a fortress and make a settlement, but Tristao would not accept them on behalf of his country, because he had no permission from Albuquerque to do so. He, therefore, left Champaner for Goa with an envoy from the Sultan of Gujarat.¹³⁷

Before Tristao and the envoy of Gujarat could reach Goa, Albuquerque himself arrived at Diu in August 1513, on his way back to his metropolis after he had tried in vain to take Aden. Malik Ayaz, governor of Diu, received him very kindly and the two conversed together. Albuquerque stayed at Diu for six days and set sail for Goa after his ships had taken in their store of water, leaving behind the Portuguese ship, *Exnobregas*, laden with merchandise for sale in the charge of Fernao Martinz Evangelho as his factor, and Jorge

135 Hajiud Dabir, I, 99-100; Ferishta, II, 407, Nizamuddin, III, 176.

136 Albuquerque, III, 245.

137 *Ibid.*, IV, 60.

Correa as his scrivener, with secret instructions to report on political matters.¹³⁸

On his voyage back to the south, Albuquerque halted at Chaul and gave an interview to the envoy from Gujarat, who had accompanied Tristao. The envoy conveyed his monarch's request for permission to send a trading company of the Gujaratis to Malacca and also for a safe conduct of the ships of Gujarat to navigate in those waters. He also complained of the capture of a ship, *Meri*, belonging to the Sultan when he was at peace with Portugal and asked for its restitution. Albuquerque told the envoy that he had never made war upon Gujarat, nor burned its villages, nor bombarded its fortresses, but if the ships and the subjects of the Sultan of Gujarat had received any harm at the hands of the Portuguese, it must have been on account of his having taken the side of those rulers with whom the king of Portugal was at war. He, however, declared that he had caused the aforesaid royal ship to be refitted at Cochin and would return it to the Sultan through the envoy. As soon as Albuquerque reached Goa, he passed on the captured ship to the ambassador, who set sail in that ship to Cambay.¹³⁹

Immediately after the return of the envoy to Gujarat, Fernao Martinz Evangelho, the Portuguese factor at Champaner, reported to Albuquerque that Malik Ayaz was greatly opposed to the Portuguese and had persuaded Muzaffar not to accede to their demand as regards Diu. Albuquerque, therefore, sent Diogo Fernandez de Beja and James Teixeira as ambassadors with costly presents to the court of Gujarat to negotiate on this matter with Muzaffar. The embassy reached Surat on 15 March 1514, and after a short stay proceeded to Champaner, where they met Malik Gopi, who told them that Malik Ayaz had advised the Sultan not to grant to the Portuguese a site for fortification at Diu as 'it was in order to wrest his kingdom eventually from him'. Not deterred by this report, the ambassadors proceeded to Ahmadabad, where they were cordially received by Khudawand Khan, the wazir, who presented them to the Sultan. The ambassadors offered the presents which they had brought with them and the Sultan conferred on them dresses of honour. In the negotiations which followed, the plenipotentiaries explained to Khudawand Khan that the main purpose of their visit was to request for a site at Diu, where the king of Portugal might construct a fortress for the safety of his men and property. The wazir placed these proposals before the Sultan, who was willing to grant them a site at Broach, Surat, Mahim,

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, IV, 59.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, IV, 59-61.

Dumas or Bacar, but not at Diu, which he had already granted to Malik Ayaz. The embassy thus failed in its mission and left Gujarat for Goa on 15 September 1514.¹⁴⁰

In the following year Rao Bhim of Idar passed away and was succeeded by his son, Bhar Mal (or Bihari Mal), but the latter's claim to the throne was contested by his cousin, Raimal, who sought the help of his brother-in-law, Rana Sanga of Mewar. The Rana seized this opportunity and by sending his army to Idar set up Raimal on the throne. Muzaffar could ill-brook this interference by the Rana of Mewar in the internal affairs of a neighbouring state, which had for generations owed allegiance to the sultans of Gujarat. In order to expel the pretender, Muzaffar despatched Nizamul Mulk, the son of the last Rawal of Champaner, who succeeded in restoring Bihari Mal to the throne. Nizamul Mulk then pursued the pretender into the hills, but in the battle which followed he was defeated with severe losses. Muzaffar reproved his general for having exceeded his instructions and recalled him to the capital. He, then, sent Nusratul Mulk to Idar, but before Nusratul Mulk could reach Idar, Nizamul Mulk set out for Champaner, leaving Zahirul Mulk with no more than a hundred men to hold Idar. Raimal marched on Idar and inflicted a crushing defeat on this small garrison. However, Nusratul Mulk, who was at Ahmadnagar, pressed on and drove away Raimal to the hills in 923/1517.¹⁴¹

Muzaffar now turned his attention to Malwa, where the increasing domination of Medini Rai had reduced Mahmud Khalji to insignificance. Unable to bear the predominance of his powerful minister, Mahmud escaped to the frontiers of Gujarat to seek the help of Muzaffar. The latter readily responded, and taking Mahmud with him, he marched against Malwa on Tuesday, 15 Zil Hij 923/29 Decembar 1517.¹⁴² Medini Rai entrusted the command of Mandu to Rai Pithaura, while he himself repaired to Dhar with 12,000 cavalry and a large force of elephants. Muzaffar and Mahmud reached Dhar with a formidable army on Friday, 18 Zil Hij 923/1 January 1518, and Medini Rai, finding it difficult to resist the combined army, quitted Dhar and went to Chitor to seek help from Rana Sanga.¹⁴³ Dhar fell without much resistance, and the two sultans marched to Mandu, where they arrived on 23 Zil Hij 923/6 January 1518 and laid

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, IV, 93-105.

¹⁴¹ Hajjud Dabir, I, 101-2; Nizamuddin, III, 178-79.

¹⁴² Qanil, *Tarikh-i Muzaffar Shahi*, ed. M. A. Chaghtai, Poona, 1947, 19; Sikandar, 182-84.

¹⁴³ Qanii, 26; Nizamuddin, III, 180; Ferishta, III, 408,

siege to the fortress.¹⁴⁴

Rai Pithaura, who had secret knowledge of Rana Sanga's forthcoming aid, feigned negotiations and asked for an armistice, which Muzaffar readily granted on Friday 25 Zil Hij 923/8 January 1518. This truce, however, came to an end on 24 Muharram 924/5 February 1518, when Muzaffar came to know about the arrival of Rana Sanga at Ujjain. He sent Azam Humayun Adil Khan III of Khandesh, who was his nephew and son-in-law, with Qawamul Mulk to check the progress of the Rana and Medini Rai, while he directed the investment of the fort in person. The battle actually began on 3 Safar 924/14 February 1518, and by the break of the following day Muzaffar had carried Mandu by escalade. Finding the Gujarati troops in their midst, the Rajputs performed the *jauhar*-rite and fought till life was left in them.¹⁴⁵

In the meanwhile Muzaffar came to know about the arrival of Medini Rai at Dhar. Leaving Mandu in charge of Mahmud, Muzaffar moved to Dhar on 5 Safar 924/16 February 1518, and Medini Rai, finding it difficult to offer resistance, took to his heels.¹⁴⁶ Muzaffar returned to Mandu where he reinstated Mahmud on his throne. This was followed by a grand banquet which Mahmud gave in honour of his benefactor on 15 Safar 924/26 February 1518.¹⁴⁷ Thus having restored the balance of power between Mewar and Gujarat, Muzaffar returned to Champaner after leaving at Mandu a contingent of 10,000 horse under Asaf Khan.¹⁴⁸

Immediately after his return to Champaner, Muzaffar realized the significance of the occupation of Mamluk Egypt and Hijaz by the Ottoman Sultan Salim I (1512-20) as well as his victory over Shah Ismail Safavi of Persia. This introduced the prospect of a new and powerful alliance against the Portuguese as well as of greater control over the Indian Ocean for trade with Egypt and beyond, and of greater security for pilgrims to Mecca. The importance of friendly relations with the Ottomans was thus brought home to Muzaffar. He wrote to Sultan Salim I congratulating him on his victories in Iraq and Persia; still the greater part of his letter was full of an account of his own victories in Malwa, which he had recovered from Medini Rai and his Rajput confederates and restored to Mahmud Khalji.¹⁴⁹

¹⁴⁴ Qanli, 27.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 30-48; Sikandar, 183-58.

¹⁴⁶ Qanli, 55-56.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 62-70.

¹⁴⁸ Nizamuddin, III, 183.

¹⁴⁹ Baridun Bey, *Munsha'at-us-Salatin*, Istanbul, 1845-49, 695-96. in Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, 49.

The news of the fall of Mandu compelled Rana Sanga and Mcdini Rai to retire to Chitor, but in 925/1519 the Rana inflicted a crushing defeat on Mahmud, who was wounded and taken prisoner. Muzaffar sent reinforcements to Malwa but it was too late; for the Rana, after the wounds of Mahmud were healed, had restored him to his throne in 926/1520.¹⁵⁰ In the same year Raja Adil Khan III, who had so successfully served his father-in-law, Muzaffar, in the Malwa campaign, passed away at Burhanpur and was succeeded by Miran Muhammad Shah, his eldest son by the daughter of Muzaffar.¹⁵¹

Flushed with his success, Rana Sanga decided to measure his strength with the more powerful Muzaffar. He penetrated into the territories of Gujarat as far as Idar, which he occupied, and then marched on to Ahmadnagar, where he defeated Mubarizul Mulk in 926/1520. The Rana compelled Mubariz to retreat to Ahmadabad and then returned to Chitor. In order to chastize the Rana, Muzaffar sent Malik Ayaz who besieged the fortress of Mandasor. The Rana asked for peace but his request was turned down. But soon afterwards the jealousy between Ayaz and Qawamul Mulk compelled the Gujaratis to patch up peace with the Rana. Muzaffar was very much incensed by this development and in 928/1522 he made preparations to march in person against the Rana; but before he could start from Ahmadabad, the son of the Rana arrived with gifts from his father and the expedition was abandoned.¹⁵²

In 930/1524 Alam Khan Lodi, son of Sultan Bahlul Lodi of Delhi, who had been a refugee at the court of Gujarat since the days of Mahmud Begarha, informed Muzaffar that according to reports received by him from Delhi, there was great dissatisfaction with his nephew, Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, as he had put the great amirs to death, and the chances of Alam's obtaining his father's throne appeared to be good. Muzaffar, accordingly, gave him a standard, a drum, 40,000 *Muzaffaris* and sent him to Delhi with a strong detachment to secure his ancestral throne.¹⁵³

In the following year Prince Bahadur Khan was annoyed with his father, Muzaffar, who refused to treat him on equal terms with his elder brother, Sikandar Khan, the heir-apparent, and left Gujarat. Passing through Dungarpur, Chitor and Mewat, he reached Delhi on the eve of the battle of Panipat.¹⁵⁴ Bahadur was cordially received by Ibrahim and, consequently, the young but experienced prince took

¹⁵⁰ Nizamuddin, III, 401-2; Sikandar, 192-93.

¹⁵¹ Ferishta, II, 534.

¹⁵² Nizamuddin, III, 154-91; Sikandar, 193-203; Ferishta, II, 411-15.

¹⁵³ Hajiud Dabir, I, 120; Sikandar, 203-4; Nizamuddin, III, 192-93.

¹⁵⁴ Sikandar, 304-5; Hajiud Dabir, I, 128.

up the Lodi cause. This made him popular with the Afghan army but roused the jealousy of Ibrahim.¹⁵⁵ When Bahadur discovered this, he refrained from further activities and sent letters to Babur seeking his assistance. Babur sent him a gracious and encouraging reply and invited him to join the Mughals.¹⁵⁶ Consequently, in the actual battle fought at Panipat, Bahadur remained a mere spectator.¹⁵⁷ Immediately after the defeat of the Afghans, when Bahadur was halting at Baghpat, near Delhi, on his way to Jaunpur in response to the invitation of the nobles of that kingdom, he received a letter from his adherents in Gujarat informing him of the death of his father, Muzaffar.¹⁵⁸

The deceased Sultan was so merciful that he is commonly known as Muzaffar, the *halim* or clement. He carried his clemency to such a length that the criminal, the turbulent and the rebellious forgot all fear of punishment and took to highway robbery and violence without apprehension, while libertines shed blood even within the city-walls of the metropolis, and 'the Sultan would not extend the hand of punishment from out of the sleeve of patience'. When the people went to him and complained of these atrocities, he would calmly say, 'You must pray and I also will pray to the Almighty to put an end to oppression and the oppressors.'¹⁵⁹ Again, we are told that owing to the carelessness of the royal *aftabchis* (water-carriers) a musk-rat was boiled down and its remains were poured over Muzaffar's head during his bath. The Sultan summoned the offenders and said, 'I am an old man and can pardon the offender but my sons are young—how will you satisfy them? Will your lives be safe if you are equally careless with them?'¹⁶⁰

In keeping with the traditions of eastern potentates, Muzaffar was in the habit of making nocturnal rounds of the capital in disguise in order to obtain first-hand information about the state of affairs prevailing in his kingdom.¹⁶¹ The Sultan always spoke with propriety and never offended anyone. He used to say, 'If I were left alone in a solitary place, no one would do me any harm for I have never done, and am not doing, any harm to anyone.'¹⁶² Muzaffar loved his subjects immensely. When Gujarat was in the grip of a great drought, he lifted

¹⁵⁵ Sikandar, 204-5.

¹⁵⁶ John Leyden, William Erskine and Lucas King, *Memoirs of Zahiruddin Muhammad Babur*, II, Oxford University Press, 1921, 261.

¹⁵⁷ Mir Abu Turab Vali, *Tarikh-i Gujarat*, ed. E. P. Ross, Calcutta, 1900, 3.

¹⁵⁸ Hujjūd Dabir, I, 128-29.

¹⁵⁹ Sikandar, 223-24.

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 214.

¹⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 220-21.

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, 213.

up his hands in prayer and is reported to have said, 'Oh, Lord! If for any fault of mine my people are afflicted, take me from this world and relieve them from this drought.'¹⁶³ Moreover, Muzaffar displayed his high sense of justice and respect for law when in response to the summons of the qazi of Champaner he attended the qazi's court like an ordinary person, while the qazi remained seated. The suit was decided against the Sultan who complimented the qazi on his impartiality and sense of justice.¹⁶⁴

Muzaffar was of a charitable disposition. His munificence was not confined to his subjects in Gujarat but was also extended to the deserving people of Mecca and Madina, where he is reported to have constructed a *ribat* or hospice consisting of a madrasa and *sabil* (water-channel), etc. For the maintenance of these institutions he set apart a special endowment and the proceeds thereof were sent to these places every year.¹⁶⁵ Furthermore, ships were provided free of cost for those who wished to make the pilgrimages to Mecca and Madina. The expenses of these pilgrims while on board were also met by the state treasury.¹⁶⁶ In addition to these charities, the Sultan sent to the aforesaid cities two copies of the Quran transcribed by his own hand with gold-water, and made a special annual grant for the upkeep of these presents and the maintenance of those who made use of these copies for the purposes of recitation.¹⁶⁷

Linked with the religious piety of Muzaffar was his strict observance of religious injunctions. We are told that he never tasted anything intoxicating and abstained from even mentioning the name of intoxicants. It is reported that his favourite horse was one day seized with grips of pain and when all other remedies failed, he recovered on being administered pure spirits. The *mir-i akhur* (master of the horse-stables) reported the incident to his sovereign, who 'bit the finger of sorrow with the tooth of regret but did not ride that horse again'.¹⁶⁸ We are told that when Mahmud Khalji of Malwa took Muzaffar round his palace, they entered a building in which there was a quadrangle, painted and gilded with rooms all round. As soon as they were at the centre of the building, the doors of all the rooms were opened and two thousand women beautifully attired and decorated like *huries* and fairies appeared with plates full of gems and

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 205; Hajiud Dabir, I, 122.

¹⁶⁴ Hajiud Dabir I, 131.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 131.

¹⁶⁶ Sikandar, 219.

¹⁶⁷ Hajiud Dabir, I, 131; Muhiuddin al Aidrusi, *Al-Nuras Safir an Qarnil Ashir*, Baghdad, 1934, p. 192; Sikandar, 214-15.

¹⁶⁸ Sikandar, 209-10.

golden ornaments. Mahmud observed: 'They all belonged to me and are now at your disposal.' Muzaffar lowered his eyes, thanked his host and begged them to return within the *pardah* 'as looking on what is unlawful is a crime'.¹⁶⁹

It must not, however, be taken to mean that Muzaffar was an extreme puritan. Born of a Rajput mother, Rani Hirabai, he had a lot of Hindu blood circulating in his veins. He was unorthodox enough to marry as many as three Rajput princesses, viz. Rajbai, the daughter of Rana Mahipat, Lakshmibai, the daughter of a Gohel Rajput, and Bibi Rani. The last was a lady of great beauty and exercised tremendous influence on the Sultan. The control of the palace and the army was in her hands. Seven thousand state-servants were in her service and she was a counsellor of great influence in the affairs of the kingdom.¹⁷⁰

Moreover Muzaffar was extremely fond of music, so vehemently frowned upon by orthodox Muslim theologians. He was himself an accomplished musician; he could not only play upon a number of musical instruments but could hold his own against any master of musical science. His love for music, dance and drama can very well be gauged from the *swang* or role of Saraswati (goddess of learning) enacted at his court by Bai Jhau, the chief *patar* or dancing-girl of the Sultan. It took six months for *hamsa* or the traditional vehicle of Saraswati to be constructed; it was made wholly of gold, studded with precious stones. On the appointed day Bai Jhau, attired in the garb of the goddess, cast an ecstatic spell on the audience with her music and dance.¹⁷¹

Besides being a musician, Muzaffar was a fine calligraphist. He used to transcribe every day a passage from the Quran in the *naskh* style, and when the copy was completed he sent it either to Mecca or Madina for the use of those who recited it publicly.¹⁷² The Sultan had learnt the Quran by heart¹⁷³ and was well-versed in the religious sciences. We find him studying Baizawi's *Malimut Tanzil*, the well-known commentary on the Quran, and taking part in discussions of a religious and literary character.¹⁷⁴ He had learnt Arabic grammar from Bahraq and the *hadises* (or the Prophet's traditions) under Majduddin Muhammad al-Iji, whom he elevated to the position of a wazir with the title of Khudawand Khan.¹⁷⁵ He also

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 189-91.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 203-33.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 222-23.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 214-15.

¹⁷³ *Ibid.*, 208.

¹⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 205-6.

¹⁷⁵ Hajind Dabir, I, 119, 127.

greatly promoted learning with the result that men of letters from Iran, Turan, Arabia and Asia Minor found it worth their while to settle down in Gujarat during his liberal reign.¹⁷⁶

Muzaffar was, thus, merciful, gentle, pious, just, munificent, kind and clement. Though personally unselfish and amiable, he was fatally weak. It was with great difficulty that he could bring himself to act with sufficient sternness and energy, even when these qualities were most needed. Notwithstanding this weakness, Muzaffar was a benevolent, liberal, tolerant and cultured ruler.

SIKANDAR; MAHMUD SHAH II

When Muzaffar passed away on 22 Jamadi II 932/5 April 1526, Prince Sikandar Khan, the heir-designate, ascended the throne with the support of two powerful nobles, Imadul Mulk Khushqadam and Khudawand Khan al-Iji. The new Sultan was by all accounts a very handsome person, but he was destitute of all political sagacity. We are told that whenever he passed through the market-place, all persons, male and female, came out of their houses and shops to have a glimpse of the Sultan.¹⁷⁷ He was so exultant and happy in the pride of his youth and the glory of his state and authority that 'all his days were like the days of the Id and all his nights like the nights of *shab-i barat*'. He collected together every means of pleasure which it is possible to conceive. Amongst other things he had a concubine, called Nazuk Lahar, to whom he was greatly attached.¹⁷⁸ In less than a week he had estranged the old nobility by lavishing favours and honours on his personal favourites, and given himself up completely to pleasures. Consequently on the night of 14 Sha'ban 932/26 May 1526, he was murdered by Imadul Mulk Khushqadam, who raised Nasir Khan, Muzaffar's youngest son of hardly six years, to the throne with the title of Sultan Mahmud Shah II. The king-maker, thereafter, wrote to the neighbouring chiefs, Imadul Mulk of Berar and Rana Sanga of Chitor as well as to Babur, requesting support for his government.¹⁷⁹

BAHADUR SHAH

As the plans of Imad meant the loss of independence for Gujarat, some old nobles headed by Taj Khan Narpali sent Khurram Khan to Prince Bahadur with the offer of the throne of Gujarat. Khurram Khan met Bahadur at Baghpat and delivered the message. Without any loss of time Bahadur reached Ahmadabad by rapid marches and ascended

¹⁷⁶ Ferishta, II, 418.

¹⁷⁷ Mir Abu Turab Vali, *Tarikh-i Gujarat*, ed. E. D. Ross, Calcutta. 1909. 3.

¹⁷⁸ Hajiud Dabir, I, 128-29.

¹⁷⁹ Sikandar, 239-43.

the throne of Gujarat on 26 Ramazan 932/6 July 1526; after that he marched to Champaner and executed Imadul Mulk Khushqadam and other assassins of Sikandar. The infant ruler, Mahmud II, was also murdered.¹⁸⁰ Thus Bahadur was left without any rival with the exception of Chand Khan, who had already taken refuge in Malwa. Firmly established in his kingdom, Bahadur embarked upon his ambitious designs of campaigns and conquests.

Twice he invaded the Deccan in order to help his nephew, Miran Muhammad II of Khandesh, who had allied himself with Alauddin Imadul Mulk of Berar against Burhan Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar and Amir Ali Barid of Bidar. So successful were these operations that Burhan Nizam Shah and Ali Barid were obliged to yield the issues in contest with Khandesh and Berar, and to cause the *Khutba* to be read in the name of Bahadur.¹⁸¹

In the meanwhile Nuno da Cunha (1529-38), the new Portuguese governor, had attacked Diu on 16 February 1531, but a little earlier Mustafa, the Turkish admiral, accompanied by Khwaja Safar Salmani, had succeeded in entering Diu with a large Rumi fleet and a picked train of artillery. The combined navy of the Gujaratis and the Rumis completely routed the Portuguese fleet which, after repairing the damage, sailed back to Goa on 15 March 1531 in considerable disorder.¹⁸² Bahadur commemorated this naval success by erecting a tower of victory at Diu and naming it *Burji Bahadur Shahi*.¹⁸³ Mustafa, the Turkish Admiral, was given the title of Rumi Khan and was placed in charge of the *naft khana* or the royal arsenal.¹⁸⁴

Free from the Portuguese menace, Bahadur turned his attention to Mahmud Khalji II of Malwa, who had not only been harbouring his younger brother, Chand Khan, the pretender to the throne of Gujarat, but had also ravaged the territories of Rana Ratan Singh of Chitor who, as a friend and an ally, had sought the help of Bahadur. Bahadur, therefore, accompanied by Miran Muhammad II of Khandesh, pushed on to Mandu and took it by escalade. He caused the *Khutba* to be read in his name on Friday, 12 Sha'ban 937/31 March 1531, and annexed Malwa to his hereditary kingdom. Mahmud Khalji was taken prisoner and sent to Champaner, but he was killed in an affray on his way to Gujarat.¹⁸⁵

Bahadur soon realized that his conquest of Malwa would remain

180 Hajiud Dabir, I, 129; Sikandar, 251-65.

181 Sikandar, 268-73; Ferishta, II, 427-28.

182 Whiteway, 224-28; Danvers, I, 400-2.

183 Mutii, *Ganj-i Maani*, Curzon Collection, Asiatic Society of Bengal, No. 251, 21a.

184 Hajiud Dabir, I, 220.

185 Sikandar, 274-78; Nizamuddin, III, 405-9; Ferishta, II, 530-31.

incomplete so long as Silhadi, the powerful fief-holder of Raisen, Sarangpur and Bhilsa, continued his semi-independent sway in the eastern districts of Malwa. He, therefore, arrested Silhadi while he was on a visit to Bahadur's camp and marched against Raisen, which was defended by Lakshman Singh, brother of Silhadi, while Bhupat, a son of Silhadi, fled to Chitor to seek help from Rana Bikramajit, whose sister he had married. Bikramajit advanced towards Raisen but withdrew when Bahadur sent Miran Muhammad II of Khandesh against him. Bahadur then delivered a final assault on Raisen and carried the fortress by storm at the end of Ramazan 938/ May 1532. The conquered territory was conferred upon Alam Khan Lodi, who had been expelled from Kalpi by Humayun and had sought shelter at the court of Gujarat.¹⁸⁶

Flushed with his repeated successes, Bahadur decided to punish Rana Bikramajit of Chitor for helping Lakshman Singh during his siege of Raisen. So much had the power of Mewar diminished under this 'Commodus of Rajputana' that Bahadur could commence his operations directly with the siege of Chitor. The powerful artillery of Rumi Khan made an extensive breach in the ramparts of the Rajput stronghold, which fell on 3 Ramazan 941/8 March 1535; Bahadur granted it not to Rumi Khan, to whom he had promised it when the siege had begun, but to Burhanul Mulk Bimbani. This greatly disappointed Rumi Khan, who made up his mind to take revenge by playing Bahadur false by ruining his cause, and waited for an opportunity.¹⁸⁷

The opportunity did not take long to come. Bahadur had already incurred the displeasure of Humayun by giving shelter to the political refugees of whom the chief was Muhammad Zaman Mirza, a turbulent Timurid prince and brother-in-law of Humayun, who had escaped from the confinement in which he had been placed near Bayana. Humayun demanded the surrender of the fugitive but Bahadur's reply, couched in insolent language, so offended Humayun that he marched to Sarangpur while Bahadur was occupied with the investment of Chitor.¹⁸⁸

Immediately after the fall of Chitor Bahadur moved to Mandasor, where he was confronted by Humayun, who had cut him off from the capital of Malwa and threatened his hold on Gujarat. At this critical juncture Taj Khan and Sadr Khan urged Bahadur to deliver an attack

¹⁸⁶ Sikandar, 282-89; Nizamuddin, III, 217-26; Ferishta, II, 432-37.

¹⁸⁷ Sikandar, 307; Hajiud Dabir, I, 230.

¹⁸⁸ Abu Turab Vali, 2-13; Abul Fazl, *Akbar Nama*, I, Eng. tr. II. Beveridge, Calcutta, 1907, 294-95.

on the Mughal army while the Gujarati troops were flushed with their victory at Chitor. But Rumi Khan advised Bahadur to entrench his army and rely on its greater superiority in guns. The voice of the Turkish artillery captain prevailed over the counsels of the Gujarati cavalry commanders, and Bahadur entrenched himself in a huge *araba* or fortified camp, bristling with artillery which at this time was the finest in India.¹⁸⁹ Confronted by the great guns of Gujarat, Humayun adopted the tactics, secretly suggested to him by Rumi Khan, of cutting off all Bahadur's supplies and forage-parties. Complete blockade and gradual starvation made the position of Bahadur untenable; and the treachery of Rumi Khan became at last evident when the Turkish captain deserted his master for Humayun, with the result that at dead of night on 21 Shawwal 941/25 April 1535, Bahadur fled to Mandu.¹⁹⁰

Humayun set out in the pursuit of Bahadur, who finding himself hardpressed at Mandu continued his flight to the fort of Champaner. Though Bahadur had put the fortress in a state of defence, he did not feel himself secure in it. He handed over his treasures to his trusted minister, Asaf Khan, to be taken to Sulaiman, the Magnificent, of Turkey. They consisted of 400 chests of gold, *ashrafs*, gold-bars and gold-bricks. With this gorgeous treasure Asaf Khan left the Indian shore and went to Jedda. From there Bahadur's letter of appeal for aid against Humayun and the accompanying treasures were sent to the great Caliph, who on account of the powerful resistance by the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean could not afford to be hasty.¹⁹¹

Before the Ottoman Caliph could think of any constructive plan, Humayun reached Champaner to find that both Bahadur and his treasure had gone. Bahadur had escaped to Cambay, where some time back he had gathered a fleet of 100 war-ships in order to fight the Portuguese. But he was now afraid that after his departure they might fall into the hands of the Mughals.¹⁹² So he burnt them and sailed for Diu, where he turned to the Portuguese for help. On 25 October 1535, a treaty of alliance between Bahadur and Nuno da Cunha was concluded. Under the terms of this treaty the Portuguese agreed to assist Bahadur against his enemies by land and sea. In return they received permission to erect a fortress at Diu and a site was granted for the purpose.¹⁹³

189 Abu Turab Vali, 13-14; Hajrud Dabir, I, 239-40.

190 Sikandar, 307-9; Abul Fazl, I, 301-3.

191 Mahmud Bukhari, *Tarikh-i Salatin-i Gujarat*, ed. S.A.I. Tirmizi, Aligarh, 1964, 32; Danvers, I, 425.

192 Hajrud Dabir, I, 243.

193 Danvers, I, 406.

When Humayun reached Cambay, he found that Bahadur had already left the port for Diu. Having failed in his immediate object, Humayun turned to Champaner, which he took by escalade on 9 Safar 942/9 August 1535.¹⁹⁴ To commemorate his victory, Humayun caused coins to be struck at Champaner in his name both in silver and copper.¹⁹⁵ The conquest of Champaner was followed by that of Ahmadabad, which he placed in the charge of his younger brother, Askari, with Hindu Beg as his minister and commander-in-chief.¹⁹⁶

After completing the conquest of Gujarat, Humayun pushed on towards Diu in pursuit of Bahadur; but he had hardly reached Dhan-dhuka, when urgent messengers from Agra overtook him, bearing the alarming news of the revolt of Sher Khan Sur in the eastern provinces of his kingdom. Humayun was, therefore, constrained to retrace his steps from Gujarat, and he proceeded to Agra by way of Burhanpur and Mandu. The emperor had hardly turned his back on the province, when a counter-revolution commenced in favour of Bahadur, who soon afterwards emerged from his retreat at Diu and assumed charge of the operations. His army swelled in number as he marched till he pitched his tents at Sarkhej near Ahmadabad. Hindu Beg advised Askari to assume the ensigns of royalty in Gujarat in order to encourage his soldiers, but Askari was dreaming of proclaiming himself emperor of India. So without offering a single battle in defence, he pushed on towards Agra. Bahadur closely followed the retreating Mughals, and as he approached Champaner, Tardi Beg evacuated the fortress, which was reoccupied by Bahadur on 3 Zil Hij 942/24 May 1536.¹⁹⁷

Immediately after regaining his kingdom, Bahadur received news about the arrival of a large Portuguese fleet at Diu.¹⁹⁸ As he had recovered his kingdom without any substantial help from the Portuguese, he regretted the concessions with which in the days of his distress he had purchased their help against Humayun. The Portuguese lost no time in commencing the construction of their fort, which was completed within five months in March 1536. Further, Bahadur resented the refusal of the Portuguese to give him permission to erect a wall to cut off the fortress from the city of Diu. Bahadur hastened from Champaner to settle these issues and also to recover, if possible, the rights he had bartered away.¹⁹⁹ On reaching Gogha he deputed

¹⁹⁴ Sikandar, 315.

¹⁹⁵ Geo. P. Taylor. *The Coins of Gujarat Sultanat*, Art Journal BBRAS. 1903, XXI, 317-18.

¹⁹⁶ Hajind Dabir, I, 230; Abul Fazl, I, 217.

¹⁹⁷ Abul Fazl, I, 317-21; Abu Turab Wali, 29-32.

¹⁹⁸ Mahmud Bukhari, 38.

¹⁹⁹ Whiteway, 240-44.

Nur Muhammad Khalil, one of his confidential officers, to the Portuguese governor, with instructions to persuade him by any device to pay a visit to the Sultan. The envoy was thrown off his guard under the influence of wine, and revealed the secret intentions of his monarch.

Next morning the governor sent the envoy back with the excuse that, owing to indisposition, it was impossible for him to wait on the Sultan. Bahadur then took four or five of his favourite officers in his barge and, contrary to the advice of his counsellors, he went straight to the ship of the Portuguese governor, felt his pulse and found that the sickness was a mere pretence. He sought to return to the shore at once, but the Portuguese attempted to detain him, ostensibly that he might inspect the gifts which they had brought for him from Goa, but doubtless with a view to obtaining a pledge that he would abandon his designs against them and of extorting further concessions from him. Bahadur told them to send the gifts to him and hastened to leave, but a Portuguese priest placed himself in his way and ordered him to stop. The Sultan impatiently drew out his sword and cleft him in twain. The Portuguese vessels, which were near by, closed in and a scuffle ensued. When the Sultan wanted to leap into his own barge, the Portuguese drew away the vessel with the result that the Sultan fell into the sea. The Portuguese struck him with spears and lances till he was drowned. This took place on 3 Ramazan 943/13 February 1537.²⁰⁰

Bahadur was a brave and ambitious ruler who possessed the martial valour of his ancestors and surpassed his grandfather, Mahmud Begarha, in military glory. He was so famed for his rapid movements that making *Ilghar-i Bahaduri* (March of Bahadur) became a proverbial saying, applied to anyone who covered a great distance in a short time. Besides being brave and hardy, Bahadur was an ambitious prince whose mission in life was to widen the frontiers of his empire. Within the short period of six years after his coronation, he obtained the homage of Burhan Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar and Ali Barid of Bidar, defeated the Portuguese in a naval action, annexed the kingdom of Mahmud Khalji II of Malwa, and then turned his attention to the Rajput rulers of Raisen and Chitor. Till the time of his defeat by Humayun, his alliance was sought by Muslim as well as Hindu rulers of the neighbouring kingdoms, while the discontented princelings of the house of Timur sought his protection.

Bahadur's campaigns were not motivated by religious ideas. Born

²⁰⁰ Sikandar, 321-22; Abu Turab Vali, 32-33; Mahmud Bukhari, 38-39; Abul Fazl, I, 323-24.

of Lakshmibai, the daughter of a Gohel Rajput, Bahadur had inherited the liberal policy of his tolerant father. In pursuance of the policy of his forebears, he married the sister of Raja Baharji, the Rajput chieftain of Baglana. Moreover, he freely received Hindus in his service. Narsingh Deo, the nephew of Raja Man Singh of Gwalior, and Prithvi Raj, the nephew of Rana Sanga, were two of his trusted Rajput nobles.²⁰¹ He allowed Karma Singh, the minister of Ratana Singh, to repair a temple at Satrunjaya.²⁰² All these factors went a long way to make Bahadur popular with his subjects. This explains to some extent why the *ra'iyyat* of Gujarat sent deputations of their elders to suggest to Bahadur to depute some one to collect the revenue that was due to him, even when he was in exile at Diu after being defeated by Humayun.²⁰³

Besides being tolerant, Bahadur had inherited his father's love for music. He patronized Manjhu Kalawant, who was supposed to be unrivalled in his art throughout India. It was the bewitching effect of his music that ultimately succeeded in stopping the ruthless massacre ordered by Humayun after the fall of Mandu. Soon afterwards Bahadur lost his kingdom; but when Manjhu rejoined him, he is reported to have remarked, 'Today, I have, so to say, regained everything I had lost.'²⁰⁴ This remark pays a brilliant tribute to the musician on the one hand, and to Bahadur's love of music on the other.

Moreover, Bahadur was generous and munificent. When famine stalked the land, he opened *langars* or alms-houses for the poor. Wherever he went, he dispensed his charity and to no one did he give less than a gold *ashrafi*. We are told that the small and great of the city lived comfortably. He was so generous to his people that the nobles and soldiers were unwilling to go to their homes and remained near him in the hope of sharing his bounty.²⁰⁵

In striking contrast to this generosity stands his sanguinary, passionate, violent and rash disposition. This is testified by the fact that at the very outset of his reign he got murdered all his near relatives, excepting his nephew, Mahmud Khan.²⁰⁶ Nazuk Lahar, after the death of Sultan Sikandar, was taken to the seraglio of Bahadur, who also like his elder brother was greatly attracted by her; but under the influence of wine, he became displeased with her for some trivial fault, and in a fit of uncontrollable passion drew his sword and cleft

201 Sikandar, 271-72.

202 *Epigraphia-Indica*, II, 1892, 35-47.

203 Hajrud Dabir, I, 249-50.

204 Sikandar, 311-18.

205 *Ibid.*, 263.

206 *Ibid.*, 326.

her in twain. Soon afterwards he realized his mistake, but it was of no avail.²⁰⁷ Moreover, Bahadur was addicted to all sorts of intoxicants. It was while in his cups that he dictated his reply to Humayun, who, greatly incensed by the impolite tone of the letter, made up his mind to march against Gujarat.²⁰⁸

In sum, then, Bahadur's character presents an admixture of opposed qualities. Though brave, warlike, ambitious, kind-hearted, tolerant and generous, he at times, nevertheless, became ferocious and violent. Occasionally he showed rashness even in dealing with his favourites. He was fond of displaying the trappings of royalty, and like many eastern potentates, he loved both magnificence and power. He was lavish in his gifts, and his generosity and tolerance won him the affection of his people.

As Bahadur had left no son, Muhammad Zaman Mirza claimed the throne of Gujarat on the ground that the queen-mother had adopted him as her son and got the *Khutba* recited in his name in the chief mosque of Diu by bribing the Portuguese. But the amirs of Gujarat frustrated all his designs,²⁰⁹ and invited Miran Muhammad Shah of Khandesh, son of Bahadur's sister, who had been nominated by the late Sultan as his successor. In order to overcome constitutional difficulties, they decided to read the *Khutba* in the following form: 'Miran Muhammad Shah, son of the sister of Bahadur Shah.' Miran Muhammad Shah set out from Burhanpur to ascend the throne of Gujarat, but died on 13 Ziqad 943/4 May 1537, on his way and was buried at Burhanpur.²¹⁰

On the death of Miran Muhammad Shah Faruqi an attempt was made to raise to the Khandesh throne his young son, Ahmad, but the majority of the amirs supported the cause of Muhammad's brother, Mubarak, who was duly proclaimed king of Khandesh. Soon afterwards a deputation from Gujarat waited on Mubarak Shah and demanded the surrender of Mahmud Khan, the minor son of Bahadur's brother, Latif Khan, who during his uncle's reign had been placed in the custody of Miran Muhammad.²¹¹ But Mubarak Shah, who had hoped to receive the summons to the throne of Gujarat for himself, delayed in handing over Mahmud. But when the Gujarati amirs assembled their forces and assumed a threatening posture, Mubarak delivered Mahmud to the amirs, who carried him off to Gujarat and enthroned him as

²⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 247-48.

²⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 303-4.

²⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 323-24.

²¹⁰ Abu Turab Vali, 38.

²¹¹ *Ferishta*, II, 556.

Nasiruddin Abul Fath Mahmud Shah II.²¹²

It was in Mubarak Shah's reign that Khandesh came under Mughal suzerainty. Frightened by the march of Akbar to Mandu in 972/1564, Miran Mubarak Shah sent his daughter for the *haram* of Akbar and agreed to recite the *Khutba* in the name of the Mughal emperor.²¹³ This made no alteration in the status to which the rulers of Khandesh had long been accustomed. They had for many years been subject to the suzerainty of Gujarat; and though it appears that the feeble Mahmud Shah II had not ventured to assert his suzerainty, they now merely exchanged their former allegiance to Gujarat for allegiance to Akbar, who allowed them to rule over Khandesh under his suzerainty till it was annexed to the Mughal empire in 1009/1601.

Meanwhile the affairs of Gujarat had fallen into great confusion. Taking advantage of the boyhood of Mahmud, the powerful nobles usurped the control of the whole government and kept the Sultan under surveillance till about 956/1545, when with the help of Saiyyid Mubarak Bukhari and other loyal amirs, he tried to assert his position as a king and shifted his capital to Mahmudabad, whence he governed with some authority.²¹⁴ Humayun, after his return from exile, sought Mahmud's help in annihilating the Afghans on the Indian soil. In response to this request, Mahmud was planning to march towards Mandu, when he was assassinated on the night of 12 Rabi I 961/15 February 1554.²¹⁵ The assassination of Mahmud was followed by chronic anarchy and disorder. The ambitious amirs became independent in their fiefs and quarrelled among themselves, while puppet princelings, like Mahmud III, Ahmad III and Muzaffar III, were propped up on the throne of Gujarat by one faction or another. Taking advantage of this situation, Akbar, at the invitation of Itmad Khau, the powerful minister of Muzaffar III, marched to Gujarat in 980/1573 and with little difficulty annexed this maritime province and coveted emporium of commerce to the Mughal empire.

²¹² Sikandar, 326-29; Abu Turab Vali, 39-40; Ferishta, II, 444.

²¹³ Hajiud Dabir, I, 64-87.

²¹⁴ Sikandar, 360-62; Hajiud Dabir, I, 294.

²¹⁵ Abu Turab Vali, 43-49; Mahmud Bukhari, 40.

CHAPTER TWELVE

MALWA

I. THE INDEPENDENT KINGDOM OF MALWA

DILAWAR KHAN GHURI

THE COLLAPSE OF THE TUGHLUQ EMPIRE in the wake of the invasion of Timur ushered in a period of disintegration in northern India. The governors of the erstwhile provinces, who had been professing fealty to the Tughluqs, threw off their allegiance to the last Tughluq monarch and became independent rulers in their respective domains. It was in this general scramble that Dilawar Khan Ghuri, who had been given the governorship of Malwa by Sultan Nasiruddin Muhammad bin Firuz Shah in 793/1390-91, assumed independence in the year 804/1401-2.¹ He took the title of Amid Shah Da'ud,² assumed royal prerogatives, like the white canopy and the scarlet pavilion, and caused the *Khutba* to be recited in his name. He thus laid the foundation of the independent kingdom of Malwa.

The territory of Malwa constitutes a triangular plateau with the Vindhya mountains as its base. The area is almost uniform in height, about two thousand feet above the sea level, and has a climate which is both pleasant and invigorating. The soil is fertile and mostly consists of loose rich black loam. The rivers of Malwa have their origin in the table-land and flow northwards, except the Narbada, which originates in the Maikal range and runs from east to west along the southern fringe of the Malwa territory. Thus nature has provided Malwa with an ideal setting, suitable for the peaceful pursuits of life and material prosperity as well as ample natural beauty for inspiring cultural development.

The ancestry of Dilawar Khan Ghuri is obscure, but it is recorded that his grandfather had migrated from Ghur. Dilawar Khan's personal name was Husain and the title of Dilawar Khan was conferred on him by Firuz Shah Tughluq. Before attracting the attention of Firuz

¹ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 13-14.

² *Ibid.*, 21.

Shah, he seems to have been working as a customs officer in Malwa.⁸

On being appointed governor of Malwa, Dilawar Khan took up his residence at Dhar, which was in those days the headquarters of the province. From Dhar he gradually extended his sway over the countryside and restored order in the whole territory. During the period of disorder in Delhi, following the death of Sultan Nasiruddin Muhammad (20 January 1394) and the victory of Timur over Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud (18 December 1398), Dilawar Khan kept himself assiduously busy in consolidating his own hold over Malwa. Realizing the importance of forts for the defence of the country, he started the fortifications of Mandu and frequently stayed there overnight.

Dilawar Khan's position in Malwa as an independent ruler was not strong enough when he heard of the arrival of the fugitive Delhi Sultan, Nasiruddin Mahmud, on the borders of his province. So as a matter of political policy, he at once accorded the Sultan a warm reception and escorted him to Dhar. He offered all his wealth in species and jewels to Sultan Mahmud along with repeated protestations of his own loyalty and fidelity. Sultan Mahmud was pleased with Dilawar Khan's behaviour and stayed in Dhar up to 804/1401-2, when at the invitation of his nobles he left for Delhi. Still, during the period of Sultan Mahmud's sojourn at Dhar, Dilawar Khan's son, Alp Khan, remained at Mandu and completed the fortifications of that place.

It was only after the departure of Sultan Mahmud that Dilawar Khan assumed royal prerogatives and proclaimed himself an independent ruler. He then divided his kingdom into *iqtas* to be governed by his officers. With his base at Dhar, he acquired the territory of Nimar, where he encouraged the Rajputs to settle. The districts of Saugar and Damoh, which once formed a part of the Delhi sultanat, came under his control. He also established his suzerainty over Chanderi. By his policy of toleration towards the Rajputs and other Hindus living in Malwa, Dilawar Khan established a very healthy tradition in the independent kingdom that he founded. As a sagacious statesman he also strengthened his position by matrimonial alliances. He married his sister to Ali Sher Khalji, thus securing the alliance of a strong group of nobles. To win Khandesh to his side, he married his daughter to the son of Malik Raja Faruqi, and took his daughter as a bride for his son, Alp Khan. This alliance strengthened the south-eastern frontier of Malwa. He also maintained good relations with the governor of Kalpi and rendered valuable assistance to him against the Chauhans of Etawah. By his tactful friendship with Muzaffar

Shah of Gujarat, he successfully prevented the latter from invading Malwa. He was unable to accomplish any more as his death in 809/1406-7 came too soon. Nevertheless, he had succeeded in creating an independent kingdom.

HUSHANG SHAH

On the death of Dilawar Khan, his son, Alp Khan, ascended the throne of Malwa in 809/1406 with the title of Hushang Shah. But before Hushang Shah could establish his power on a firm basis, he had to face the invasion of Sultan Muzaffar Shah Gujarati in 1407. Though Hushang Shah boldly stood against the Gujarati Sultan, he was defeated and imprisoned. Muzaffar Shah annexed Malwa to Gujarat and appointed his brother, Nusrat Khan, as governor of Malwa. He then returned to Gujarat, taking Hushang as a captive with him.⁴

Nusrat Khan, however, failed to understand the situation in Malwa; and on account of his ruthlessness he created extreme discontent in places like Dhar, Ujjain, etc. Taking advantage of this discontent, the nobles of Malwa collected their scattered soldiers and attacked Nusrat Khan, who was unable to make a stand and fled to Gujarat. Thus by the end of 1408 the Gujarat occupation of Malwa had come to an end; and the Malwa nobles, being afraid of Muzaffar Shah's vengeance, retired to the fort of Mandu and prepared to defend it under Musa Khan, a cousin of Hushang.

The news of Nusrat Khan's expulsion from Malwa greatly disturbed Muzaffar Shah. His first desire was to attack Malwa and inflict a severe punishment on the people by bringing about the destruction of their country; on second thoughts, however, he realized the difficulty of keeping the country under subjection. His courtiers advised him to set Hushang Shah free, for he alone, in their view, was capable of maintaining peace in Malwa. While Muzaffar Shah was still deliberating on his course of action, he received a petition from Hushang Shah urging his release and promising to recover Malwa for the Gujarat Sultan. Hushang Shah's cause was also advocated by Prince Ahmad Khan. Muzaffar Shah finally agreed to set Hushang Shah free and, after taking some engagements on oath from him, he deputed Prince Ahmad Khan to accompany Hushang Shah to Malwa, to recover the country and hand it over to him. But if by this act Muzaffar Shah thought he was laying Hushang under an obligation, he was doomed to disappointment, for Hushang Shah, on his part,

⁴ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, (Bod. Ms.) ff. 31b, 32a; *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 26; *Ferishta*, II, 462; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 290.

considered it only an act of expediency, and he never forgot the ignominy and disgrace that he had suffered at the hands of the Gujaratis. He remained hostile to Gujarat all his life.⁵

Prince Ahmad Khan accompanied Hushang Shah up to Dhar and, after occupying that place and some neighbouring districts, handed them over to Hushang, while he returned to Gujarat. After the return of Prince Ahmad Khan, Hushang Shah stayed for some time at Dhar and negotiated with Musa Khan, who was holding the fort of Mandu, for an amicable settlement. But finding Musa Khan unwilling to recognize him as Sultan, he besieged the fort of Mandu and also won over to his side a number of nobles, amongst whom Malik Mughis and Malik Ichha were most prominent. This precipitated desertions within the fort and Musa Khan, losing both courage and hope, fled away while Hushang occupied it. Hushang Shah then made Mandu (also called Shadiabad) his capital and distributed offices among his supporters. Malik Maghis was made his *naib* and *wazir*.⁶

For Hushang Shah matters did not immediately alter with his re-occupation of Mandu. The people had to be assured of a stable government with an administrative policy that would not discriminate among his subjects. The Gujarati invasion within a year of his accession had made him conscious of foreign menace, and he also apprehended danger from other neighbouring kings—the Bahmanis, the Sharqis and the Rajputs of Mewar. For one full decade he remained engaged in a war with Gujarat, partly to avenge the past disgrace and partly because of the hostile policy of Sultan Ahmad Shah Gujarati. Though he never won any battle against Ahmad Shah during the course of this war, he maintained the integrity of the territory of Malwa and succeeded in strengthening its frontier with Gujarat. While busy with Gujarat, he realized that for the defence of the kingdom two things were essential; *firstly*, an increase in the material resources of the kingdom, *secondly*, the establishment of his authority over those regions which lay on the borders of Malwa. He devoted his whole life towards the achievement of these two objects.

Among the adjoining territories, he first turned towards Kherla. The region of Kherla, situated in the southern part of Gondwana, was a regular source of elephant supply. Besides this, Narsingh Rai, the ruler of Kherla, had accepted Bahmani suzerainty in 802/1399-1400. To Sultan Hushang Shah the existence of a chief, owing allegiance to a kingdom which claimed to have once exercised suzerainty over Malwa, was highly objectionable. The subjugation of Kherla, there-

⁵ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 31.

⁶ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 35a.

fore, was a matter of political necessity for him. Hushang Shah attacked Kherla in 823/1420 and defeated the Rai, who accepted the suzerainty of the Malwa Sultan and gave him eighty-four elephants and much gold as indemnity and tribute.⁷ This was the first victory of Hushang Shah; while the acquisition of elephants added strength to his army, the tribute replenished his treasury, which had been depleted on account of his wars with Gujarat.

In 824/1421 Hushang Shah went to Jainagar in the disguise of a merchant, and in a surprise attack captured Bhanudeva IV, the ruler of that kingdom. He, however, released Bhanudeva IV after taking a ransom of seventy-five elephants. On his return, while he was near Kherla, he received information that Ahmad Shah had besieged Mandu. He at once decided to use Kherla as a second shelter on which to fall back in case of emergency. To achieve this, he induced Rai Narsingh to come out and join him; he then put the Rai in close confinement and garrisoned the fort with his own men. But after the departure of Ahmad Shah from Malwa, Hushang Shah restored Kherla to Rai Narsingh, who remained loyal to Hushang Shah for about eight years and also assisted him in the conquest of Gagraun.

Gagraun, situated in the heart of Khichiwarra, was a stronghold of the Khichi Chauhans, and served as a vantage-point for establishing authority both in Harauti and Khichiwarra. Hushang Shah, who was consolidating the kingdom of Malwa, could not remain indifferent to such a strategically located strong fort. He started for its conquest in 826/1423 with a large army consisting of the contingents of Rai Narsingh of Kherla, Lakhan Rao of Matangpuri, some chiefs of Bundi, Maldeo Chauhan and Samar Singh, besides his own force, which included the contingents of his officers. The siege of the fort lasted from 13 September to 27 September 1423. Achaldas Khichi, the ruler of Gagraun, tried to defend the fort and even sought help from Rana Mokul of Mewar by sending his son, Palhan Singh, to the court of the Rana, but timely help failed to arrive and Achaldas fell fighting after the *jauhar*-rite had been performed in the traditional Rajput manner.⁸

After the occupation of the fort, Hushang Shah placed it under his own officers while he himself pushed further north with the intention of conquering Gwalior. But he could only succeed in causing some damage to the countryside, because the timely arrival of Saivyyid Mubarak Shah, who claimed suzerainty over Gwalior, prevented him from achieving any success. The Delhi and the Malwa armies

⁷ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 43-45.

⁸ Achaldas Khichi *ri Vachanika*, 44.

remained encamped near each other for a few days, but ultimately peace was concluded on the basis that Hushang Shah should give up his plans for the conquest of Gwalior. Hushang Shah realized the difficulty of conquering Gwalior and returned to his own country, reaching his capital by the beginning of 827/1423.⁹

Hushang Shah had to turn towards Kherla again, because Rai Narsingh had transferred his allegiance to Ahmad Shah Bahmani in 829/1425-26. When punitive expeditions failed, Hushang Shah personally marched out in 832/1428-29 to subdue Kherla. Rai Narsingh, being alarmed, turned for help to Ahmad Shah Bahmani, who ordered Abdul Qadir, the governor of Berar, to collect his levies and march to the aid of the Rai, while he personally marched to Elichpur, from where he moved further towards Kherla. But Hushang Shah reached Kherla with a force of 30,000 earlier than Ahmad Shah Bahmani. Rai Narsingh, thus hard-pressed, came over to Hushang's side and again accepted his suzerainty. Sultan Ahmad Shah Bahmani, finding that Hushang Shah had forestalled him in Kherla and realizing the difficulty of his position, hastily retired to his own territory. Ahmad Shah's movement emboldened Hushang Shah, who at once marched against the Bahmanis. But in the battle that followed he was completely routed and had to beat a precipitate retreat. Some of his elephants as well as his *haram* fell into the hands of Ahmad Shah Bahmani, and the rear of his army was attacked and plundered by Rai Narsingh.

This unexpected behaviour of the Rai thoroughly exposed his undependable character, and Hushang Shah decided to wait for a proper opportunity for punishing him. Ahmad Shah Bahmani, on his part, sent back Hushang Shah's *haram* with honour and costly presents, but Hushang Shah could neither forget this defeat nor the treachery of Rai Narsingh. In 837/1433-34 when Ahmad Shah Bahmani was engaged against Ahmad Shah Gujarati, Hushang Shah suddenly attacked Kherla, slew Rai Narsingh in battle and occupied the fort and its dependent territories. Ahmad Shah Bahmani immediately marched into Berar and was on the point of attacking Hushang Shah, when Nasir Khan Faruqi of Khandesh intervened and induced both sultans to come to an amicable settlement. After some negotiations a treaty was concluded according to which Kherla and its dependencies were allowed to remain in Hushang's hands while Berar was declared a Bahmani territory.¹⁰

The small kingdom of Kalpi had grown out of the *shiq* of Firuz-

⁹ *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, 202; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 299; *Zafar-ul Walili*, 915.

¹⁰ *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, 68; *Ferishta*, I, 632.

pur, which had been placed under Malikzada Firuz by Firuz Shah Tughluq. His son, Malikzada Mahmud, was driven out of Firuzpur by Rai Sumer of Etawah and had moved to Kalpi, which was granted to him by Sultan Nasiruddin Muhammad bin Firuz Shah. Malikzada Mahmud had gradually consolidated his position in Kalpi, and after the return of Timur he had assumed the insignia of royalty, which the last Tughluq ruler had no alternative but to concede. But before Kalpi could be properly consolidated, the kingdoms of Malwa and Jaunpur had grown quite powerful. Thus the small kingdom of Kalpi, situated between Delhi, Jaunpur and Malwa, became a buffer state between them.

Dilawar Khan had established friendly relations with Kalpi by rendering timely military assistance to Malikzada Mahmud against Rai Sumer. Malikzada Mahmud (Mahmud Shah) was succeeded by his son, Ikhtiyaruddin Qadir Shah. While Hushang Shah was engaged in Malwa, Ibrahim Shah Sharqi invaded Kalpi in 815/1413 and forced Qadir Shah to accept the suzerainty of Jaunpur. But after the departure of Ibrahim Shah, Qadir Shah again asserted his independence and also started searching for allies. Hushang Shah, who was looking for friends, gave his sister in marriage to Qadir Shah. Hushang Shah, however, was interested in maintaining Kalpi as a friendly state and not as a part of his kingdom. Qadir Shah died sometime in 834/1430-31 and after his death Kalpi was engulfed in troubles. The nobles raised Jalal Khan, the second son of Qadir Shah and nephew of Hushang, to the *masnad*¹¹ of Kalpi in preference to Nasir Khan, the eldest son of Qadir Shah. Nasir Khan left for Jaunpur, where he was welcomed by Ibrahim Shah, who bestowed the title of Khan-i Jahan on him and used him as a tool against Kalpi. Jalal Khan failed miserably as a ruler in Kalpi and was driven out by the nobles. About 837/1433-34 Hushang Shah invaded Kalpi to restore Jalal Khan, but just then Ibrahim Shah had also marched towards Kalpi to place Nasir Khan-i Jahan on the Kalpi *masnad*. A war between the two rulers was almost in sight, but Ibrahim Shah had to leave for his own kingdom, which was threatened by an invasion of Saiyyid Mubarak Shah of Delhi. Hushang Shah restored Jalal Khan to the *masnad* of Kalpi, but he also allowed Nasir Khan-i Jahan to remain undisturbed in the *qasba* of Shahupur.¹²

Having settled the affairs of Kalpi, Hushang Shah returned to Mandu, but after a short rest he again marched out to chastize the

¹¹ *Masnad* was a large pillow before which high officers used to sit. Here it is used to indicate something not equal in dignity to a royal throne.

¹² *Tarikh-i Muhammadi* (British Museum), ff. 457 a-b.

turbulent chiefs of the east, who had taken shelter in the island of lake Bhojtal. He cut the dam of the lake so that its water flowed away, and after chastizing the chiefs, he returned to his capital. Then after a short stay, he went out on a hunting excursion and was suddenly taken ill. While on his way back he breathed his last on 8 Zil Hij 838/5 July 1435.¹³

Sultan Hushang Shah was a wise ruler. Finding Malik Mughis to be an officer of great insight, he had appointed him his wazir and entrusted the capital to his care during his recurring absences. For proper administrative control, he divided the kingdom into divisions with headquarters at Sarangpur, Ujjain, Chanderi and Bhilsa, while he kept Mandu, Na'cha and Dhar under his direct control. At all important frontier outposts he appointed his most trusted and experienced officers. To guard the south-eastern frontier he founded the city of Hushangabad on the Narbada.

To increase the glory of his kingdom he extended his patronage to scholars and established a madrasa at Mandu for the promotion of learning. His patronage attracted Muslim *ulama* (scholars) and *shaikhs* (mystics) to Malwa. Within the first decade of his rule, Shaikh Makhdum Qazi Burhanuddin came to Mandu and Hushang Shah honoured him by becoming his disciple (*murid*). Shaikh Burhanuddin was a great scholar and mystic (*wali*). His presence enhanced the prestige of Malwa, and *sufis* like Saiyyid Najmuddin *Ghausud Dahr*, Shaikh Yusuf Buddha and Hazarat Shaikhul Islam, a khalifa of Shah Raju Qattal, came to Malwa and settled there.

Hushang Shah adopted a policy of perfect religious toleration and encouraged Rajputs to come into his kingdom and settle in Nimar. He welcomed Chunda and Ajja, the two elder brothers of Rana Mokul, and granted them jagirs in Malwa. The Lalitpur inscription of the year v.s. 1481/A.D. 1424 clearly indicates that Hushang Shah had imposed no restrictions on the construction of temples by the Hindus. Malwa had a large Hindu population and the policy of religious toleration adopted by Hushang Shah did not disturb its normal life. To encourage the trade and commerce of the kingdom, Hushang Shah extended his patronage to the Jains, who constituted the chief commercial class during this period and were also the chief bankers. He appointed Nardeva Soni, a successful Jain merchant, as his *bhandarika* (treasurer) and included him in the royal council. Mandan, a Jain banker, received honours from Hushang Shah in return for the financial assistance given by him.

Hushang left behind him seven sons, of whom Ghazni Khan,

Ahmad Khan, Umar Khan and Abu Ishaq were from one wife, and Usman Khan, Fath Khan and Haibat Khan were from another. These brothers formed two groups and the relations between the two groups were not cordial. Hushang Shah nominated Ghazni Khan, his eldest son, as his successor. This was disliked by Usman Khan and his group. The rebellious attitude of Usman Khan, Fath Khan and Haibat Khan so deeply offended Hushang that he imprisoned them and refused to release them in spite of the appeals of his nobles. Consequently when he died, these three brothers were in confinement in the fort of Mandu. An attempt on the part of the nobles to set aside Ghazni Khan after the death of Hushang Shah failed on account of the alertness and the initiative of Mahmud Khan, son of Mughis, who supported the cause of Ghazni Khan.

MUHAMMAD SHAH GHURI

Ghazni Khan ascended the throne of Malwa with the support of Mahmud Khan and assumed the title of Muhammad Shah Ghuri. He was absolutely incompetent and depended entirely on Mahmud Khan, with the result that a large section of the amirs became dissatisfied with him and also jealous of Mahmud Khan. His reign of nine months was uneventful in the history of Malwa, except for the fact that he tarnished his hands with the blood of his step-brothers, thereby exposing his cruel nature; also some uprisings took place in Khichiwarā.

The domination of Mahmud Khan in the administrative affairs of the kingdom led some nobles, who were hostile to him, to put into the Sultan's mind the suspicion that Mahmud Khan wanted to usurp the throne by removing him. Sultan Muhammad conspired with the instigators to have Mahmud Khan assassinated. But the conspiracy leaked out and its only result was greater caution on the part of Mahmud Khan. Mahmud Khan, in his turn, instigated one of the inmates of the *haram* to administer poison to the Sultan and this resulted in his death in Shawwal 839/April-May 1436.¹⁴ After the death of Muhammad Ghuri some nobles tried to place Prince Masud Khan, son of Sultan Muhammad Ghuri, on the throne, but Mahmud Khan outmanoeuvred them. He attacked the nobles, who had with them Prince Masud Khan as well as Prince Umar Khan, son of Hushang Shah. The nobles were defeated; Umar Khan escaped out of the fort, but Masud Khan sought sanctuary with Shaikhul Islam Shaikh Chain Laddah. After this success, Mahmud Khan allowed Masud Khan to leave Malwa and he went to the court of Sultan Ahmad Shah Gujarati. Having brought the situation under control,

¹⁴ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 57a.

Mahmud Khan sent a message to his father, Malik Mughis, who had been all this time engaged in the subjugation of the Khichiware uprising, informing him about the situation in the capital and inviting him to ascend the throne of Malwa. Malik Mughis, however, declined the offer and advised his son to ascend the throne.

The failure of the nobles to set up Masud Khan as ruler of Malwa ended the Ghuri rule and brought the Khaljis to the throne. The families of Malik Mughis Khalji and Hushang Shah Ghuri were closely related to each other by inter-marriages. The mother of Malik Mughis was Dilawar Khan Ghuri's sister, and two daughters of Malik Mughis were married to Ghazni Khan and Usman Khan, the two sons of Hushang Shah. This blood-relationship and the close association of Malik Mughis and his son, Mahmud Khan, with the government of Hushang Shah and Muhammad Shah made the transition easy. For the people of Malwa there was hardly any noticeable change either in the policy or in the working of the government; and such opposition, as there was, came from the nobles, who were interested in taking the reins of administration in their own hands and not for sustaining the Ghuri dynasty.¹⁵

MAHMUD KHALJI I

The advice of Malik Mughis settled the question of accession and Mahmud Khalji ascended the throne of Malwa on Monday, 29 Shawwal 839/16 May 1436, at the lunar age of thirty-three.¹⁶ He was born on 28 Shawwal 806/8 May 1404, and had been brought up under the care of his father. His intelligence and ability had attracted the attention of Hushang Shah, who had raised him to the status of a Khan when he was only sixteen, and had always kept him by his side in his expeditions. He was so captivated by Mahmud's ability that he had often expressed the wish that Mahmud had been his son.¹⁷ Mahmud's first act after his coronation was to distribute offices among his supporters. Thus Mushirul Mulk was given the title of Nizamul Mulk and appointed wazir; Malik Barkhurdar was given the title of Taj Khan and appointed *ariz-i mamalik*. He gave a high position to his father but without any office, for the simple reason that an office would have reduced him to the position of a subordinate. He conferred on him the title of Azam Humayun and added to his paraphernalia such royal dignities as the white umbrella, the white quiver, and household equipage with staffs of gold and silver. He also ordered

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, f. 57b.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, f. 376b; Day, *Medieval Malwa*, note 1.

¹⁷ Ferishta, II, 471.

that at the mounting and dismounting of Azam Humayun all attendants should loudly pronounce, *Bismillahir Rahmanir Rahim*, which was the exclusive privilege of Sultans.¹⁸ Thus Mahmud started his rule under the direction and guidance of his father. Azam Humayun proved a great blessing to Mahmud, and with his mature judgement, timely action and tact he prevented many situations from taking an ugly turn.

The outwitted nobles of Muhammad Ghuri, however, were not prepared to accept the accession of Mahmud Khalji without resistance. Being afraid of open hostility, they hatched up a conspiracy to assassinate him. Their plan was to enter the royal palace by scaling over the walls of the adjacent mosque. But Mahmud was always on the alert, and he attacked them while they were still scaling the walls. All of them, however, managed to escape with the exception of one injured person, who fell a captive into Mahmud's hands and gave the names of all the rest.¹⁹ After proper investigations a number of them were executed, but Azam Humayun interceded on behalf of the rest and advised Mahmud to adopt a policy of appeasement by granting them jagirs in different parts of the kingdom. Acting upon this advice, Mahmud granted Islamabad to Prince Ahmad Khan, son of Hushang Shah, Bhilsa to Qawam Khan, Hoshangabad to Malik Ichha and Chanderi to Nusrat Khan, the *ariz* of the old regime.

This policy of appeasement, however, did not succeed; the recipients of the jagirs raised the standards of rebellion immediately after reaching the places assigned to them. Their plan seems to have been to paralyse the Sultan by simultaneous uprisings in different parts of the kingdom. Prince Ahmad Khan was the first to raise the standard of rebellion and the rebellions of Qawam Khan, Malik Ichha and Nusrat Khan followed. Sultan Mahmud sent Taj Khan immediately on receiving the news of Ahmad Khan's revolt, but finding the situation more complicated, he asked Azam Humayun to proceed against them.

Azam Humayun first of all tried to persuade Prince Ahmad Khan to give up hostility and submit to the established order, but finding him adamant, he solved the problem by instigating one of his cup-bearers to poison him. After the death of Ahmad Khan, he occupied Islamabad and placed it under one of his own officers. He then proceeded towards Hushangabad. The news of his arrival unnerved Malik Ichha, who fled towards Gondwana, where he was attacked

¹⁸ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 634; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 312.

¹⁹ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 66a.

and killed by the Gonds. Azam Humayun thus got possession of Hushangabad without any trouble. After making new administrative arrangements for the place, he proceeded to Chanderi. Here he conducted an enquiry and as the guilt of Nusrat Khan was proved, he removed him and placed Chanderi under Malikul Umara Haji Kamal. From Chanderi Azam Humayun marched towards Bhilsa; Qawam Khan offered a feeble resistance, but he was defeated and killed and Bhilsa was occupied. Azam Humayun made fresh appointments here also. Thus by Rajab 841/January 1438, Azam Humayun, after completely crushing the disturbances created by the refractory nobles of the old regime, could start for Mandu from Bhilsa. In suppressing these rebellions he had shown rare ability and tact; by exposing the guilt of the rebels he had proved to the people that they were a disturbing element, whose punishment was justified.

While Azam Humayun was subjugating the rebels, Ahmad Shah Gujarati took up the cause of Masud Khan, and keeping him in the advance-guard, marched on Malwa. When Azam Humayun was on his way to Mandu from Bhilsa in Rajab 841 (January 1438), he received information of this invasion. Instead of attacking the invading army, he hurried to Mandu, which was besieged by Ahmad Shah soon after his arrival.²⁰ Finding the situation critical and being desirous of keeping the people inside the fort satisfied, Sultan Mahmud opened the state-granaries for the supply of grain and also established free kitchens for the supply of cooked and uncooked food to the poor. It seems that Malwa was facing a crop failure that year, because we are informed that Ahmad Shah, who occupied the open country, found it difficult to procure grain, and that grain was dearer in his camp than inside the fort.

As the siege of Mandu continued, treachery, which was a common feature of the age, affected both camps and neutralized the efforts of the rival sultans to gain a decisive victory. A number of Gujarati nobles, who were displeased with the policy of Ahmad Shah and hoped to get more from Mahmud Khalji, left the Gujarati camp and came to Mandu, where they were welcomed by the Sultan. The arrival of these nobles considerably improved the position of Mahmud Khalji, who after getting the necessary information from them, decided to make a night-attack. But information of the proposed night-attack was secretly conveyed to the Gujarati Sultan by Qaisar Khan, the *dawatdar* of late Hushang Shah. Consequently the night-attack of Mahmud found the Gujarati army ready to receive him, and after a severe fighting during the night he had to return in

²⁰ *Ibid.*, f. 74b.

the morning, sorely disappointed in his venture.

During the continuance of the siege Umar Khan, who had gone to the country of the Rana of Chitor, appeared in Malwa with a small force. He came to Chanderi and with the help of the people defeated and killed Malikul Umara Haji Kamal, who had been posted there by Azam Humayun. The revolt of Chanderi, with Umar Khan as its leader, naturally complicated the situation. Sultan Mahmud also received information that Ahmad Shah had ordered Prince Muhammad Khan Gujarati to march to the aid of Umar Khan with a force of five thousand horse and thirty elephants. To avoid this combination of Umar Khan with Prince Muhammad Khan, Sultan Mahmud at once came out of the fort of Mandu by a southern gate and marched towards Sarangpur. The advance-contingents of the Malwa army, led by Taj Khan and Mansur Khan, captured the Kambal outpost of Sarangpur on their first attack; and Malik Haji Ali, the Gujarati officer, fled straight to the court of Ahmad Shah at Ujjain and informed him of this fact. Ahmad Shah immediately recalled Prince Muhammad Khan from Sarangpur and thus the plan of joining forces with Umar Khan fell through.²¹

Sultan Mahmud moved to Sarangpur and pardoned Malik Ishaq, the *maqta* of the place, who had been rendering assistance to Prince Muhammad Gujarati. He then marched straight towards Bhilsa, from where Umar Khan was advancing towards Sarangpur. Umar Khan was defeated and killed, and Sultan Mahmud gave orders for circulating his head among the soldiers of Chanderi. Overwhelmed by the news of the sad end of Umar Khan, the Chanderi officers submitted at first, but during the night they retired to Chanderi, where they set up Malik Sulaiman, son of Sherul Mulk Ghuri, the *naib* of Umar Khan, as their leader and proclaimed him Sultan with the title of Shihabuddin. Sultan Mahmud, however, left the Chanderi affair in abeyance and turned towards Sarangpur. But before his arrival Ahmad Shah had started for Gujarat, as plague was raging in his camp and the mortality was very heavy. Shihab Hakim, the court historian of Malwa, considered this pestilence to be the punishment of God for the destruction and ravages caused by Ahmad Shah in Malwa.²²

The departure of Ahmad Shah was a great relief to Sultan Mahmud, who immediately returned to Mandu to reequip his army. After seventeen days, when his army was ready, he marched against Chanderi for its final subjugation. Chanderi offered a tough

²¹ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 104.

²² *Ibid.*, 106, note 4.

resistance, and heavy rains hindered the progress of the siege. But after the siege had lasted for about four months, Sultan Mahmud succeeded in capturing the fort. He then put Muzaffar Ibrahim Malikus Sharq in charge of the fort and territory of Chanderi.²³

After completing the administrative arrangements of Chanderi, Sultan Mahmud intended to return to Mandu. But just then he received a petition from Bahar Khan, the *maqta* of Shahr-i Nau, appealing for his help against Dungar Sen of Gwalior, who was then besieging Shahr-i Nau. Sultan Mahmud knew that his army was in no condition to fight Dungar Sen; yet he was not willing to forego the opportunity of rendering assistance to Bahar Khan and making him a feudatory of Malwa. So instead of moving towards Shahr-i Nau, he marched on Gwalior and threatened the capital of Dungar Sen. Dungar Sen, finding that his capital was in danger, raised the siege of Shahr-i Nau and returned to Gwalior. As the real aim of Sultan Mahmud was to divert Dungar Sen from Shahr-i Nau, he immediately left Gwalior, and marching by a route which avoided the army of Dungar Sen, he managed to reach Shahr-i Nau. During his march he ordered every soldier to carry a 'donkey-load' of grain, which he distributed among the people of Shahr-i Nau. He also gave fifty thousand *tankas* to Bahar Khan to repair the damages caused by Dungar Sen. Bahar Khan, in return for this assistance, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Malwa Sultan and Shahr-i Nau was thus added to the kingdom. From Shahr-i Nau, Mahmud returned to Mandu and stayed there for about a year.

A year of peaceful residence at the capital gave Mahmud sufficient time to reequip his army and also to look after the administrative affairs of the kingdom. He then turned his attention towards the petty border chiefs. His policy was not to annex their territories but to establish his suzerainty over them and to have them as allies.

In 844/1440-41 Sultan Mahmud started from his capital with a well-equipped army and fifty elephants and marched towards Khandwa. The territory of Khandwa, lying in the Nimar region, was strategically of great importance as it lay directly between Malwa and Khandesh. Sultan Mahmud marched with a speed that took Rai Narhar Das, the ruler of Khandwa, by surprise. Narhar was not willing to submit, but finding himself unable to face Mahmud, he left his territory and fled away.²⁴ After overawing the inhabitants, Mahmud annexed Khandwa; he then marched into the territories of Khora and Khirki, and after subjugating these places, he proceeded

²³ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 92a.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, f. 101b; *Zafarul Walih*, 198.

towards Kherla. Narsingh Deva of Kherla²⁵ had submitted to Hushang Shah and accepted his suzerainty, but after his death he had behaved like an independent ruler. On receiving the news of Mahmud's advance, he came out of the fort and, advancing a few stages, welcomed Mahmud, attended upon him personally and gave eleven elephants as tribute.

From Kherla Sultan Mahmud, accompanied by Narsingh Deva, proceeded towards Sarguja, but the guides lost their way and the whole party came near the Kaimurs hills. Mahmud, however, won over the local tribes by the distribution of presents and with their help reached the region of Bandugarh. Near Bandugarh Mahmud's officers happened to come across Chatur Sen, the son-in-law of Rai Bhoj of Sarguja, and Bijal Bhan; they were taking four elephants to Khora for sale, but were persuaded to meet Sultan Mahmud and got a handsome price for their four elephants. The movements of Sultan Mahmud had created a terror among the petty local chiefs; they all began to send him elephants as tribute and requested him to spare their territories. Thus the *muqaddams* of Amurta in the *mauza* of Bartunka sent fifteen elephants, for which the Sultan rewarded them. After a march of three days from there, Sultan Mahmud reached Sarguja. The *muqaddams* of the place, including Rai Bhoj, at once submitted to him and presented many elephants. The Sultan, on his part, also gave them many presents consisting of cloth and gold. Rai Bhoj accepted the suzerainty of Mahmud and agreed to send ten elephants annually as tribute; he also promised to send in future all the elephants that were procured in the area for sale to Malwa and not to any other market. Rai Bhoj kept his promise to the last days of his life.

From Sarguja, Sultan Mahmud marched towards Ratanpur and Raipur. The *muqaddams* of these places, on receiving information of Mahmud's march towards their districts, at once came forward to receive him. They brought twelve elephants and some diamonds and presented them to the Sultan. Mahmud in return gave them presents and asked them to refrain from aggression against each other. He then returned to Sarguja; from there he came to his capital in 845/1441-42 and started the construction of his madrasa.²⁶ His chief aim in this campaign had been to procure elephants; but by extending friendship and protection to the *muqaddams* of these places, he succeeded in winning them over. The region of Sarguja became a regular source of elephant supply for his army.

²⁵ Narsingh Deva was the family title of the rulers of Kherla.

²⁶ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, ff. 102a-108b; *Zafarul Walih*, 198-9.

By 845/1441-42 Mahmud's reputation as a powerful ruler had spread far beyond the limits of Malwa. As a result, the dissatisfied elements of Delhi as well as the Mewati chiefs, such as Jalal Khan, Ahmad Khan, Hasan Khan and Mubarak Khan, invited him to march on Delhi either to punish the ruler, Saiyyid Muhammad Shah, or to occupy the throne himself. A number of *ulama* and Saiyyids, who had come to Malwa as refugees, also expressed the same desire.²⁷

Induced by these invitations and goaded by his own ambition, Sultan Mahmud marched towards Delhi by the end of 845/1442. During his march of fifteen days, his camp was swelled by the arrival of important politicians, *ulama* and *shaikhs*. When he was in the vicinity of Hindaun, Yusuf Khan Hindauni also came and joined his camp. From Hindaun he moved to Tilpat, a distance of two *karohs* from Delhi, and pitched his tents there. Sultan Saiyyid Muhammad Shah sent his son, Alauddin, to oppose the Malwa forces. An indecisive battle was fought on the plain of Multan, a place between Tilpat and Tughluqabad. Next day, however, overtures for peace were made by Sultan Saiyyid Muhammad Shah and were readily accepted by Sultan Mahmud. After concluding the treaty, Sultan Mahmud at once started for Shadiabad-Mandu and reached his capital on 1 Muharram 846/12 May 1442.²⁸

Contemporary historians have assigned Mahmud's acceptance of peace, and his hasty return, to his dream that some persons had revolted in his capital. Nizamuddin says in addition that information was brought to Sultan Mahmud that Sultan Ahmad Shah Gujarati was about to invade Malwa and that his presence at his capital was necessary. The real cause, however, seems to have been that when he started for Delhi, Sultan Mahmud had expected a warm welcome from all; but since in the very first engagement he met with a tough resistance, he became apprehensive of the final issue. So when overtures for peace came from the other side, he considered it prudent to accept them and to return to his kingdom without delay.

After his return from Delhi, envoys from various courts came with felicitations and presents. Among them special mention has been made of the envoys of Sultan Ahmad Shah Gujarati and Sultan Mahmud Shah Sharqi.²⁹ The arrival of these envoys indicates that by the beginning of year 846/May 1442, Mahmud Khalji had fully consolidated his position in Malwa and that this fact was recognized by his contemporary rulers.

²⁷ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 116.

²⁸ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 114b.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, f. 117a.

RELATIONS OF MAHMUD KHALJI WITH THE
NEIGHBOURING KINGDOMS :

(a) *Mewar*

In his relations with the neighbouring kingdoms, Mahmud Khalji first turned towards Mewar. The accession of Rana Kumbha and the guardianship of Ranmal Rathor introduced an era of aggressive foreign policy in the kingdom of Mewar. Mewar asserted her suzerainty over Harauti, Dasur (Mandsor) and other neighbouring Rajput chiefs on the borders of Malwa, who had once accepted the suzerainty of Hushang Shah.

Mewar also gave shelter to prince Umar Khan at the accession of Mahmud Khalji; later it assisted him in his bid for the throne of Malwa, when Mahmud Khalji was engaged in suppressing internal revolts and facing the invasion of Ahmad Shah. Thus to Mahmud Khalji, Mewar posed a menace and a danger. But the earlier years of his reign were full of troubles at home, and he did not feel himself strong enough to launch an offensive against Mewar. However, by 1442 the course of events had considerably altered the situation in his favour. During the period in which Mahmud had consolidated his kingdom and increased its resources, Mewar had passed through a series of internal troubles—the murder of Ranmal in 1438, followed by the hostility of the Sisodias and the Rathors, and the struggle between Rana Kumbha and his brother, Khem Karan. Towards the end of 1441, or the beginning of 1442, Khem Karan was expelled by the Rana from Bari Sadri; he thereupon became an avowed enemy of the Rana and took shelter at the court of Mahmud Khalji and sought his help to recover his lost territory. Mahmud Khalji welcomed the Sisodia prince and granted him a jagir near Rampura-Bhanpura. The arrival of Khem Karan gave Mahmud a pretext for invasion; Khem Karan and his Rajput followers were also of considerable help to Mahmud in his campaigns. Khem Karan had, in fact, a great hand in Mahmud's invasions of Mewar.³⁰

The death of Ahmad Shah on 12 August 1442 also relieved Mahmud of fear from Gujarat. On 26 Rajab 846/30 November 1442, Sultan Mahmud started for Mewar, and directing his first attack on Kilwara and following a scorched-earth policy, he finally reached Kumbhalgarh. The fort was sufficiently strong to stand a long siege; therefore instead of wasting time in besieging it, Mahmud attacked the Banmata temple, situated almost at its base and also protected by fortifications. Dip Singh, who was in charge of the fortifications,

³⁰ *Vitr Vinod*, II, 1054.

fought for seven days; but when he fell fighting, the temple passed into the hands of Mahmud, who razed it to the ground. The destruction of the temple had a military objective, since it also contained the store-house of arms for the defence of the main fort. It was, in fact, a part of the defence, though outwardly it had the appearance of a temple.³¹ Mahmud then turned towards Chitor, and while marching he ordered Pankrah to be plundered. But before he could attack Chitor, he received news of his father's death, who was just then engaged in subduing the uprisings in Mandsor. The death of his father was a great loss to Mahmud and, overtaken by grief and sorrow, he at once returned to Mandsor. After the rites of mourning were over, he appointed Taj Khan to look after the affairs of Mandsor, while he proceeded against Chitor in person.

On Friday 25 Zil Hij 846/26 April 1443, Rana Kumbha made a night-attack on the camp of Mahmud.³² Though the attack was repulsed, Mahmud became doubtful of achieving any major success and, therefore, returned to his capital. The result of the battle having remained indecisive, the historians of both sides have claimed victory for their monarchs.

Mahmud seems to have realized that the problem of Mewar was one which could not be solved easily. He, therefore, decided to cut off slices from the expanded Mewar by conquering those territories over which Rana Kumbha had merely established his suzerainty. With this aim in view, he started for Gagraun on 2 Sha'ban 847/25 November 1443. The fort of Gagraun had been lost to Malwa during the period of Mahmud's difficulties, when Palhan, son of Achal Das Khichi, captured it from Dilshad, the Malwa governor of the fort. Mahmud reached the vicinity of Gagraun on 13 Shawwal 847/3 February 1444, and invested the fort. After the siege had lasted for about a week, Dahir, who had been sent with military aid by Rana Kumbha, was killed. Palhan was also killed in an attempt to escape and the inmates of the fort performed the *jauhar*-rite. The fort was conquered; Sultan Mahmud gave it the name of Mustafabad and made it his base for controlling Khichiwara. The fortifications were restored and further strengthened.³³

From Gagraun Mahmud turned towards Mandalgarh. It seems that at the earlier stage some negotiations were started but fell through. Rana Kumbha was present in Mandalgarh during this attack; Mahmud found it difficult to gain any advantage and might

³¹ *Ibid.*, I, 324-25; Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 174, note 3.

³² *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 131a.

³³ *Ibid.*, ff. 135b, 137a-b, 138b; *Zafar-ul Walah*, 199.

have even suffered some reverses in the skirmishes. He, therefore, returned to his capital on the pretext of the approaching rainy season.

Sultan Mahmud again marched towards Harauti and Ranthambhor on 20 Rajab 850/11 October 1446. At Ranthambhor he made fresh administrative arrangements and replaced Bahar Khan by Malik Saifuddin as the commandant of the fort. He also sent Taj Khan and Ikhtiyar Khan to reduce Alhanpur and to bring it under the jurisdiction of Ranthambhor. After settling the affairs of Ranthambhor, he attacked Mandalgarh, but as on the previous occasion, he failed to gain any success and returned to his capital. After a short stay in the capital, he again set out in 851/1447-48 and first marched towards Gwalior. But instead of concentrating on Gwalior, he just fought a few engagements; and pushing Dungar Sen back into his shell, he marched in person towards Agra and from there he turned towards Bayana.

Muhammad Khan of Bayana at once submitted to Mahmud and acknowledged his suzerainty. Yusuf Khan Hindauni also submitted to him and sought his intervention in settling his dispute with Muhammad Khan of Bayana. Mahmud asked them both to remain within their own territories and not to stretch their hands over the territory of the other. After establishing his suzerainty over these places, he returned to his capital. In 859/1455 he moved to Mandsor, where he received a petition from the Muslim population of Ajmer against their Hindu governor. On the plea of this petition, Mahmud at once marched to Ajmer and encamped opposite to the tomb of Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti. Gajadhar Singh, governor of Ajmer, defended the fort for four days but on the fifth day he fell fighting and the fort was captured. Mahmud appointed Khwaja Naimullah governor of Ajmer with the title of Saif Khan, and after distributing rewards and stipends among the attendants of the holy place,³⁴ he turned towards Mandalgarh and attacked it. But Rana Kumbha, who was then present in the fort, repulsed him and he had to return to his own kingdom.

Next year Mahmud Khalji again attacked Mandalgarh. He started on 26 Muharram 861/24 December 1456 and summoned his forces, which were posted in different parts of the kingdom. He was already acquainted with the topography of Mandalgarh, which was not only situated on a hill but was surrounded by a rugged stony land and dense vegetation. On reaching the vicinity, he pitched his tents at a distance of one *karoh* on the eastern side, and ordered the preparation of a passage to the top of a high land situated on the western

³⁴ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, ff. 200a-b; *Ferishta*, II, 496.

side. Fighting had started immediately on his reaching the vicinity, but the soldiers of Malwa succeeded in constructing this passage. Mahmud took up his position on this high land and directed the siege of the fort from there. He succeeded in breaking the dams of the reservoir and causing a large part of the water to flow away; the remaining water was rendered useless by pollution with refuse and filth. Finally, after filling up a part of the ditch, Mahmud succeeded in effecting a breach in the wall. Some of the Rajputs fought up to the last but others surrendered. The fort was conquered on 1 Zil Hij 861/20 October 1457, and Mahmud took possession of everything that was found in the fort. As a mark of his victory, he destroyed the old temple and ordered the construction of a mosque with the same material. He also appointed a *qazi*, a *mufti*, a *muhtasib*, a *khatib* and a *muazzin*.³⁵ After making necessary arrangements for the control of Mandalgarh, he returned to his capital with great satisfaction. Mahmud's success was due to the fact that Rana Kumbha was fighting against the Rathors under Jodha, and this did not permit him to send an army for the relief of Mandalgarh.

After the conquest of Mandalgarh, Mahmud marched towards Chitor on 15 Muharram 862/3 December 1457. He pitched his tents at Khaljipur, near Mandsor, and from there he sent some punitive expeditions in the direction of Kelwar and Delwara and Chhappan. He also had to send an expedition for suppressing the rebellion of Bundi; and after quelling this rebellion he returned to Mandu. In 863/1458-59 Mahmud made another attack on the territory of Rana Kumbha, and returned after plundering some places and causing some damage. Mahmud Khalji's last attack on Mewar was made in 871/1466-67 but without any success. Thus we find that Mahmud Khalji practically devoted his whole life to fighting against the power of Mewar. In this contest, however, we find that Mahmud was always on the offensive and never for once did Rana Kumbha attack Malwa. The contest between these two rulers was left by them as a legacy to their successors, and continued practically throughout the period of the existence of Malwa as an independent state.

(b) Jaunpur

Hushang Shah had placed Jalal Khan on the *masnad* of Kalpi and had allowed Nasir Khan-i Jahan to continue in the *qasba* of Shahupur. But after the death of Hushang Shah, Nasir Khan-i Jahan occupied Mahoba and Rath, while Junaid Khan and Ismail Khan became independent in Erachh and Jatahara respectively. Jalal Khan, find-

³⁵ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 210a; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 340.

ing himself not strong enough to subjugate these places, remained content with his reduced jurisdiction of Muhammadabad-Kalpi. Mahmud Khalji, who was busy during these years, kept himself aloof from the affairs of Kalpi. But the death of Jalal Khan in 846/1442-43 and the accession of Nasir Khan-i Jahan to the *masnad* of Kalpi changed the situation. Nasir Khan's attempts to consolidate and extend his authority led to the hostility of a section of people, who tried to overthrow him by falsely charging him with anti-Islamic activities. The Sharqi ruler felt that Nasir Khan-i Jahan was ungrateful to the Sharqis, who had espoused his cause and had conferred on him the title of Khan-i Jahan. Mahmud Khalji was displeased with Khan-i Jahan because he had renounced the suzerainty of Malwa over Kalpi. Thus when Mahmud Sharqi sent his envoys to the court of Mahmud Khalji in 846/1442 and sought his permission to punish Nasir Khan-i Jahan, thereby acknowledging Malwa's claim of suzerainty over Kalpi, Mahmud Khalji gave his consent. But Mahmud Khalji did not wish the Sharqi ruler to establish his direct administration over Kalpi. Therefore, when Nasir Khan-i Jahan was driven out of Kalpi and took shelter in the Malwa kingdom at Chanderi, Mahmud Khalji felt that he had been taught the necessary consequence of leaving Malwa protection, and asked Mahmud Sharqi to restore Kalpi to Nasir Khan-i Jahan.³⁶ When Mahmud Sharqi evinced no intention of complying with his repeated requests, Mahmud Khalji marched against the Jaunpur ruler. He started on 2 Sha'ban 848/14 November 1444, and moved to Chanderi; and from there he marched to Erachh and Bhandar, but Mahmud Sharqi had forestalled him. Skirmishes and fighting continued for some time, though no pitched battle was fought. Mahmud Sharqi, whose soldiers were not doing well during these engagements, sought the intervention of the *ulama* to bring about peace. Finally, a treaty was concluded and Mahmud Sharqi agreed to hand over Kalpi to Nasir Khan-i Jahan four months after the signing of the treaty. Thus friendship between the two states was established.³⁷

(c) Gujarat

Malwa's relations with Gujarat had remained strained ever since the imprisonment of Hushang Shah. Ahmad Shah had espoused the cause of Masud Khan; but after his return from Malwa and towards the end of his reign, he had recognized in Mahmud Khalji a potential danger to Gujarat, and had sent envoys and presents to appease

³⁶ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 133a.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, ff. 152b-53b; Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 130-40.

him and establish friendly relations. This gesture of friendship was welcomed by Mahmud Khalji as it gave him some security from the Gujarat side, but he did not remain altogether indifferent to that kingdom. Ahmad Shah died in 846/1442; his successor, Muhammad Shah, proved to be an incapable ruler; and this gave Mahmud opportunities for fomenting disaffection in Gujarat. Though engaged elsewhere, he maintained his good relations with Shaikh Kamal by regularly sending him presents (*futuh*)³⁸ and patiently waiting for an opportune moment for invading the country. The first opportunity he got was in 854/1450-51 when Ganga Das, the ruler of Champaner, appealed to him for help against the invasion of Muhammad Shah Gujarati. To remove the misgivings of those Muslims of Malwa, who were not in favour of rendering assistance to a *kafir* against a Muslim, Mahmud sought the *fatwa* (opinion) of the Muslim jurists, who unanimously gave a verdict sanctioning his action.³⁹

Sultan Mahmud invaded Gujarat, but instead of marching towards Champaner he directed his attack on the capital of the kingdom. He first moved from Dohad to Godhra, where he pitched his tents, and then moved to Balasinor. This movement of Mahmud alarmed Muhammad Shah Gujarati, who immediately raised the siege of Champaner and returned to his capital to arrange for its defence. Ganga Das of Champaner, being thus relieved, came to the camp of Mahmud Khalji and presented thirteen lakhs of *tankas* in cash with some horses. Sultan Mahmud returned from the Mahendri river to make fresh arrangements for his army and decided to attack Gujarat from another direction: Just then he received the invitation of Shaikh Kamal to invade Gujarat, and this implied that the Shaikh had created a favourable situation for Mahmud.⁴⁰

Sultan Mahmud started his march towards the end of 854/January 1451, and directed his attack from the south-eastern side of Gujarat. First he attacked Sultanpur, which surrendered after a siege of seven days, and Malik Alauddin Suhrah, the Gujarati governor of Sultanpur, entered the service of Mahmud. He then moved forward and plundered Nandurbar (or Nundarbar). While Mahmud was at Nandurbar, he received the news of Sultan Muhammad's death and at once sent his condolences on his predecessor's death along with felicitations on his own accession to Qutbuddin, the new Sultan of Gujarat. From Nandurbar he marched to Broach, but finding Broach difficult to subdue, he moved to Baroda and after plundering it

38 *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 65.

39 *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 167a.

40 Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 125.

moved northwards. Sultan Qutbuddin had also come forward and was already encamped at Wakaner-Khanpur. Mahmud, therefore, considered it expedient to cross the river Mahendri further up near Kaparbanj. While Mahmud was marching north to cross the river, Alauddin Suhrab left the Malwa camp and, crossing the river near Wakaner-Khanpur, informed Sultan Qutbuddin about Mahmud's intention of crossing the river near Kaparbanj. Mahmud, however, reached Kaparbanj earlier and pitched his tents there. Sultan Qutbuddin also arrived soon after, but he had to pitch his tents at Khanpur at a distance of three *karohs* from Kaparbanj.⁴¹

While the two armies were thus posted, Mahmud Khalji made a futile night-attack on the last night of Safar (April 2). The real battle, however, started next morning. Muzaffar Khan of Chanderi made the first charge of the battle and pushed back the right wing of the Gujarati forces, but he was ultimately killed. The Gujaratis then charged the centre and created confusion. While Sultan Mahmud was making efforts to reassemble his forces, Nizamul Mulk, who was holding the key position in his army, informed the enemy of his weakness and circulated a false rumour about Mahmud's death in the Malwa army with the result that it lost the battle.

However, during the confusion of the battle, Sultan Qutbuddin fell down from his horse and lost his belt with his sword and scabbard; this was found by Mahmud Khalji and brought to Malwa as a trophy. After his return Mahmud sent Prince Ghiyas Shah to punish the inhabitants of the flourishing Gujarat ports of Surat and Raider. Ghiyas raided the suburbs of Surat, ravaged and plundered the countryside and returned to Mandu with his booty.

Mahmud had realized from the beginning of his reign that Gujarat was a great menace to his far-flung designs of territorial aggrandisement, and this defeat convinced him of the superiority of the Gujarat arms. But as a shrewd politician he expected to obtain by diplomacy what he had failed to achieve through military strength. So instead of directly opening talks for an understanding, he attacked Gujarat in the hope that a military move would facilitate treaty negotiations. He ordered Taj Khan to move to the borders of Gujarat with a force on 6 Zil Hij 855/30 December 1451. When Taj Khan reached Sartaba, Sultan Qutbuddin got alarmed and, after consulting his ministers, sent a messenger to Taj Khan asking for a peaceful settlement. Sultan Mahmud, who really wanted a treaty with Gujarat, sent Shaikh Mahmud, Qazi Daniyal and Malik Lala to Champaner where Qazi Husamuddin and Harhar Brahman from

⁴¹ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 171a; *Zafar-ul-Walsh*, 9; *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 77.

the Gujarat side had already arrived. After discussions, a treaty was concluded on the basis of mutual respect for territorial boundaries, and the Mewar state was divided into two areas for the military activity of each party. This treaty brought about friendly relations between Malwa and Gujarat but, because of its religious colouring, it failed to serve the purpose of Mahmud Khalji. His attempt to seize some part of the Bahmani kingdom failed twice on account of Mahmud Begarha's timely assistance to the southern state.⁴²

(d) *The Bahmani Kingdom*

While Mahmud was engaged elsewhere, he kept a vigilant eye over the affairs of the Bahmani kingdom and kept waiting for a suitable opportunity. This opportunity seemed to have come when Jalal Khan, the brother-in-law of the Bahmani Sultan, Alauddin Ahmad II, revolted at Nalgunda; and on being besieged there by Ahmad II, he sent his son, Sikandar Khan, to seek the help of Mahmud Khalji. Sikandar told Mahmud Khalji that the Bahmani Sultan was dead, that the country was in grave danger, that Mahmud should protect it, and that if he came quickly, the territories of Berar and Telingana would easily come into his possession. On the basis of this information Mahmud started from Hushangabad in Muharram 857/January-February 1453. But when he reached the borders of Mahur, he learnt that Alauddin Ahmad was alive and had advanced personally against him with an impressive army. Mahmud did not find himself strong enough to give battle and hastily retreated to Malwa.

Sultan Mahmud again invaded the Bahmani kingdom in 866/1461. Starting from his capital on 20 Muharram/25 October he first moved towards Khandesh and from there he marched to Balapur. From Balapur he pushed forward and reached the *mauza* of Maheskar on the Manjar river on 12 Jamadi I/12 February 1462, where the Bahmani forces had already arrived. The battle started immediately after he reached Maheskar. The Malwa forces did not fare well, but luck favoured Mahmud. The Deccanese, finding the Malwa forces hard-pressed, had driven about fifty elephants towards them, but a volley of arrows turned the elephants back towards the Deccanese. This created confusion in their ranks, and Sikandar Khan Deccani, fearing danger to the life of the boy-king, Nizam Shah, carried him away from the battle-field straight to Bidar.⁴³

⁴² Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 135-36.

⁴³ *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, 99; Ferishta, I, 666; *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, I, 223b; Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 156.

The confusion caused by the elephants and the disappearance of the boy-king disheartened the Deccanese. Just then Mahmud attacked them with the force under his personal command and completely routed the Deccanese, who precipitately fled towards Bidar. Mahmud, to his surprise, found the entire Bahmani army retreating in haste. To consolidate his victory Mahmud pushed forward towards Bidar, the Bahmani capital. The Dowager Queen, in concurrence with Mahmud Gawan, placed the Bidar fort under Mallu Khan Deccani and retired with the boy-king to Firuzabad. In the meantime Mahmud arrived at Bidar and, after occupying the environs, invested the citadel. While Mahmud was besieging Bidar, the Dowager Queen sought the help of Mahmud Begarha, who marched at once and soon arrived at Sultanpur. The movement of Mahmud Begarha encouraged the Deccanese. Mahmud Gawan was sent to attack Mahmud Khalji from the side of Bir, where he was further reinforced by 20,000 Gujarati soldiers. Khwaja-i Jahan was also sent to march towards Bidar. Mahmud Khalji, finding that he was being hemmed in from three sides, at once retraced his steps; and as the regular routes were barred by those armies, he had to return through the uneven land of Berar. Thus while he was about to capture Bidar, the Gujarati intervention prevented him from gaining any advantage.

After resting for a brief period at Mandu, Mahmud again invaded the Deccan kingdom and marched on 26 Rabi I 867/19 December 1462. He moved through Khandesh and besieged Daulatabad. After a brief siege Malik Parvez, the governor of Daulatabad, who seems to have been on unfriendly terms with Mahmud Gawan, surrendered the fort. Mahmud seems to have stayed for some time at Daulatabad and permitted his officers to move about; for we find his treasurer, Sangram Singh Soni, visiting Paithan for a holy dip in the Godawari. During this period Mahmud also visited the tombs of Shaikh Burhanuddin and Shaikh Zainuddin and distributed charity among the *faqirs*.

While Mahmud Khalji was at Daulatabad, the Bahmani ruler had again sought the help of Mahmud Begarha, who readily came to his assistance. So in Rajab 867/April 1463, Mahmud received news of Gujarati Sultan's arrival at Nandurbar, and at once decided to return to Malwa. But the route through Khandesh was barred by the Gujarati forces; he had, therefore, to return through Gondwana. He reached Mandu on 20 Sha'ban 867/20 May 1463.⁴⁴

These three attempts convinced Mahmud that it was not possible to gain anything by marching into the Deccan territory. So hereafter

⁴⁴ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 242b.

he concentrated on the Berar front, started strengthening Kherla and sending punitive raids against Elichpur. He removed the chief of Kherla, appointed Sirajul Mulk as its governor and renamed it as Mahmudabad. He personally marched to Bairagarh and subdued it, while Taj Khan plundered Kalam. These activities of Mahmud alarmed the Bahmani ruler, Muhammad Shah Lashkari, who ordered Nizamul Mulk Turk to attack Kherla and destroy it. Nizamul Mulk easily captured Kherla and occupied it in 870/1465-66, but soon after he was assassinated by two Rajputs, who sought to avenge the death of their relatives.⁴⁵ The death of Nizamul Mulk weakened the Bahmani hold over Kherla, and Taj Khan succeeded in recovering the fort, which was then placed under Maqbul Khan. Maqbul Khan started raiding Elichpur and hostilities continued for some years with advantages for Malwa. These attacks and counter-attacks created a disturbed condition, and then Shaikh Ziya'uddin Biyabani intervened.

Since neither of the two kingdoms was in a position to continue hostilities for an indefinite period, they agreed on Shaikh Biyabani's intervention to negotiate for a peaceful settlement. Qazi Shaikh Muhtasib was sent for the purpose from Bidar. After a good deal of discussion and some delay the treaty was finally concluded, and it was agreed that Elichpur would be considered the boundary of the two kingdoms. The territory up to Elichpur became a part of Malwa and Mahmud agreed not to disturb the kingdom of the Deccan.⁴⁶ The treaty created good-neighbourly relations and remained effective till the end of the Bahmani kingdom.

Though Mahmud was constantly engaged in wars, he did not neglect the domestic affairs of his kingdom. Due to his care and concern, Malwa reached the peak of her glory during his reign. In his personal life Mahmud was a pious and a religious Musalman, but he was not a bigot. No doubt we find instances of his destroying temples, but he perpetrated such acts only in the territories of his enemies. Within his own kingdom the Hindus and the Muslims lived peacefully together and maintained friendly relations.

Mahmud followed a policy of toleration towards his non-Muslim subjects and associated them with his administration. We find Sangram Singh Soni working as his treasurer and Rai Rayan Rai Siva Das as an important noble.

In order to encourage cultivation, Mahmud took all possible precautions not to damage the crops of the peasants during his campaigns; but where some damage was inevitable, he paid full

⁴⁵ Ferishta, I, 674; *Riyazul Insha*, 85; *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 200a.

⁴⁶ *Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi*, f. 275b; Ferishta, II, 500; *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, 111.

compensation. To encourage the trade and commerce of his kingdom, he patronized Jain financiers and encouraged them to settle in Malwa. He also established friendly relations with foreign rulers, like Abu Sa'id Mirza. To remove impediments on the movements of commodities, he took care to make the roads safe both from highway robbers and wild animals.

For the health of his subjects, he established a big hospital in Mandu and a large store-house of medicines was attached to it; adequate arrangements were made for the residence of the patients during their convalescence, and a wing was added for keeping the insane. The expenses of this large establishment were met from state endowments. For the promotion of learning, he founded a college at Mandu with free residential arrangements for both teachers and students. He also established a department for the study of Islamic Traditions (*Darul Hadis*).⁴⁷

Mahmud reorganized the accounts branch by modifying the earlier system. In the old system the receipts were made according to the solar calendar and payments according to the lunar calendar; Mahmud adopted the lunar calendar for both receipts and payments. He also reorganized the services by adopting uniform rules.⁴⁸

Thus, in short, Mahmud revitalized and gave a new life to the kingdom of Malwa; and by his prudent policy of concluding treaties with the neighbouring kingdoms, he left a peaceful Malwa as a legacy to his son. While returning from an expedition to Khichiwara he fell ill and died on 10 Ziqad 873/31 May 1469 at the age of sixty-eight.⁴⁹

GHIYAS SHAH

After the death of Sultan Mahmud, his eldest son ascended the throne of Malwa with his title of Ghiyasuddin Shah. He was a person of mature experience and had already shown his ability both in administrative affairs and on the battle-field during the reign of his father. He desired to take advantage of the many peace treaties concluded by his father, and therefore refrained from adopting an aggressive foreign policy. He wanted his subjects and his kingdom to enjoy peace, prosperity and plenty, so that all may lead a happy life. During the first twenty years of his reign, he devoted great attention to the administrative duties of the state, but subsequently he led a more or less retired life, and left the administration of the state to his eldest son, Abdul Qadir Nasir Shah. But even after his

⁴⁷ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 204-5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 208-11.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 217, note 7.

retirement, he continued to give public audiences and solved difficult problems of the state.⁵⁰

In spite of his policy of keeping aloof from inter-state complications, Ghiyas Shah got involved in the affairs of Mewar. He took up the cause of Udai Singh some time after 1473, and though Udai Singh was killed, he invaded Mewar to assist Suraj Mal and Sahas Mal against Rana Raimal. But he was defeated and driven back.⁵¹ This was followed by an invasion of Malwa by Rana Raimal and the kingdom had to sustain some damages.

In 1482 when Champaner was besieged by Mahmud Begarha, and Rawal Jai Singh, the ruler of Champaner, sought help from Ghiyas Shah, he agreed to assist him and moved to Na'lcha. But at Na'lcha he received information that Mahmud Begarha had already taken up a position to meet the Malwa army; and Ghiyas Shah, pondering over the ultimate result, retraced his steps on the false pretence that the great *ulama* and distinguished *qazis*, whom he had summoned, had advised him to retire.⁵²

Ghiyas Shah, however, succeeded in repulsing Bahlol Lodi, who raided Alhanpur in the vicinity of Ranthambhor in 1488.

As a result of Ghiyas Shah's policy, Malwa enjoyed peace and the people devoted themselves to their economic pursuits. His reign was a period of prosperity. He continued the policy of associating the Jains with the administration and bestowed titles upon them. Thus Munja or Punjaraj was given the title of Mufarrihul Mulk and Sangram Singh Soni the title of Naqdul Mulk.

The personal life of Ghiyas, however, presents some contradictions. Though extremely pious and given to religious devotions, he was very fond of women and had collected an enormous number of them in his *haram*.⁵³ He was extremely polite and would even suffer

50 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 352; *Ferishta*, II, 507.

51 Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 224.

52 *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 136.

53 A number of stories have grown to illustrate the personal simplicity and piety of Sultan Ghiyasuddin and also about his enormous *haram*, which consisted of three groups—daughters of *rajas* and nobles, free-born women and slave-girls. According to *Ferishta* (II, 255-57, Newal Kishore) they numbered about ten thousand and were organised in 'a city of women'; they were trained in all professions, military and civil; they had their own market and arranged for the production of all commodities they needed. They were divided into various grades, but apart from the female officers, who were drawn from the highest class, all other women, and even all living creatures in the palace, got a flat salary of two *tankas* and two *shara'i mans* of grain per month. *Ferishta* and some other historians give graphic details, but it is difficult to say how far the information they collected was reliable. We are also not told how this 'city of women' vanished. It must be remembered that Ghiyas

deceit rather than be rude. The personal habits of the Sultan, however, adversely affected the *morale* of his people. Further, with his advancing years he lost the use of his faculties and this led to a struggle between his two sons for the control of the kingdom. Ghiyas Shah had appointed Abdul Qadir Nasir Shah as his successor and had transferred most of his own administrative duties to him; but Nasir's younger brother, Alauddin Shuja'at Khan, became jealous of him and, being encouraged by his mother, Rani Khurshid, started intriguing against Nasir. The Sultan, who was old, tried to be indulgent and attempted to pacify his sons by overlooking their actions and at times even issued commands cancelling the orders of Nasir Shah. Such a state of affairs created confusion and led to some unnecessary bloodshed.

Spurred by his ambition and disappointment, Nasir Shah revolted; and collecting a force, he attacked and captured Mandu. He then executed his brother, Shuja'at Khan, and imprisoned Rani Khurshid; he also confined the old Sultan in the Sarsati Palace. He then proclaimed himself Sultan on 27 Rabi II 906/ 20 November 1500. Ghiyas Shah, however, went through the legal form of abdication on 13 Jamadi II 906/4 January 1501, and handed over his crown, robe of state and the keys of the state-treasury to Nasir Shah and bade him adieu with felicitations and congratulations.⁵⁴ Ghiyas Shah did not live long after this; he died on 9 Ramazan 906/29 March 1501. The death of Ghiyas Shah created a suspicion in the minds of some officers, who were opposed to Nasir Shah, that he did not die a natural death. This suspicion, however, seems to have been unfounded.

NASIR SHAH

Nasir Shah ascended the throne as the result of a rebellion; so the storm he had raised could not be suppressed immediately. After his accession he executed a number of nobles, who had been loyal to the old regime during his rebellion; this alarmed the remaining old nobles, and Sher Khan of Chanderi and Maqbul Khan of Mandisor left for their respective territories without obtaining royal permission. To subjugate these nobles, Nasir Shah had to march personally. He pursued Sher Khan up to Chanderi, but Sher managed to escape beyond the frontier of Malwa. Nasir Shah, thereupon, persuaded the Shaikhzadas of Chanderi to entice Sher Khan to return to Malwa

was a trained administrator and warrior, and there is no reason to believe that he was a simpleton (Error — H).

⁵⁴ Ferishta, II, 514.

by giving him false information. The plan succeeded and in a hotly contested battle Sher Khan was killed. After inflicting exemplary punishments on the associates of Sher Khan, and appointing Bahjat Khan as governor of Chanderi, Nasir Shah returned to Mandu on 18 February 1502.⁵⁵

After his return he was slightly alarmed when he received information about Mahmud Begarha's intention to invade Malwa. He at once sent a polite letter with presents and his humility appeased the Gujarati Sultan.⁵⁶ In 1503 he had to march into Khichiwara to subjugate the uprising of local chiefs, and during the course of his stay at Agrah he constructed a palace. After his return he led an expedition against Mewar and attacked Chitor. But he failed to achieve any success, and very probably he had to return after suffering some reverses.

Towards the end of his reign his son, Shihabuddin, revolted against him owing to the instigation of some nobles. He raised the standard of rebellion in 1510, and coming out of Mandu, occupied Dhar. Realizing that the events were taking a course similar to those which had resulted in his own accession, Nasir Shah at once marched out of Mandu to overtake his son. At Dhar Shihabuddin was defeated and fled towards Chanderi and Nasir Shah followed him. He then thought of pacifying his son, who had in the meantime gone to Narwar, because he did not want his son to go to the camp of Sikandar Lodi. But the attempt failed. Nasir Shah finding Shihabuddin adamant in his attitude, summoned his third son, Azam Humayun, from Ranthambhor and nominated him as his successor with the title of Mahmud Shah. While Nasir Shah was still in the vicinity of Sipri in the village of Bashishtpur, he fell seriously ill. Finding that his end was near, he gave some advice to Mahmud Shah on the duties of a monarch and died in the month of Ramazan 916/December 1510.⁵⁷

Nasir Shah was cruel by nature and had no compassion for anybody. Temperamentally he was stubborn and rigid. Still the sorrow and affliction he had caused his father in his old age weighed heavily on his mind, and the fear of retribution constantly haunted him as he grew old. Nevertheless, in matters concerning the state he continued the policy of his father and grandfather and granted perfect freedom and toleration to the non-Muslim population of his kingdom.

⁵⁵ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 254.

⁵⁶ *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 147; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 165.

⁵⁷ Day, *Medieval Malwa*, 265.

MAHMUD KHALJI II

After the death of Nasir Shah, Mahmud Shah II was recognized as Sultan and his first coronation took place in Bashishtpur. But his brothers, Shihabuddin and Sahib Khan, were not prepared to accept his accession without challenge. While Mahmud Shah was still at Bashishtpur, Shihabuddin started for the capital. He could not, however, succeed in entering it, and finding that Mahmud Shah was almost at his heels, he moved into Khandesh. Mahmud Shah entered Mandu and his formal coronation took place on 6 Rabi I 917/3 June 1511.⁵⁸ The new king ascended the throne of Malwa at a time when the state had been ruined by group-formations among the nobles, and a monarch of strong will, firm determination and indefatigable energy was needed. Mahmud Shah was lacking in all these qualities with the result that very soon the kingdom became a cockpit of rival factions.

Among the Muslim nobles there were two groups—one consisted of Iqbal Khan, Mukhtas Khan, Sadr Khan and Afzal Khan, while the other was led by Muhafiz Khan, Khwas Khan and Jawash Khan. Mahmud Shah depended on the support of these groups, but by following a weak policy, he played into their hands instead of using them for his own purposes. The trouble was started by Iqbal Khan and Mukhtas Khan, who assassinated Basant Rai, the wazir, in the audience hall. Mahmud Shah, instead of punishing them, tried to overlook their crime, and in order to please them further, he banished Naqdul Mulk (Sangram Singh Soni). This attitude of the Sultan made them bold and increased their power, and this, in turn, caused Muhafiz Khan and Khwas Khan to become jealous. Muhafiz Khan instigated the Sultan against Iqbal Khan and Mukhtas Khan. When these two nobles discovered that their lives were in danger, they left Mandu and marched towards Khandesh to join Shihabuddin. But the sudden death of Shihabuddin shattered their hopes. In the meantime Muhafiz Khan had been appointed wazir and had become too powerful. Mahmud Shah soon lost his patience, but before he could get rid of Muhafiz Khan, he was himself besieged in his palace, and his brother, Sahib Khan, was raised to the throne with the title of Muhammad Shah.⁵⁹ Mahmud Shah managed to escape out of Mandu and left for Ujjain. While Mahmud Shah was at Ujjain, Muhammad Shah marched out with his forces to attack him. Finding himself in a precarious position, Mahmud Shah moved towards Chanderi and sought the help of Bahjat Khan, the governor of the place, but the latter politely

⁵⁸ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 376.

⁵⁹ *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 174.

refused, declaring that he was bound to obey any one who was master of Mandu, the capital. Thus Mahmud Shah, when halting at Bashishtpur, was a forsaken monarch with hardly any supporter.

It was at this critical moment that Rai Chand Purbiya and his Rajputs came to the assistance of Mahmud Shah. The arrival of the Rajputs considerably improved his position and revived his hopes. He bestowed the title of Medini Rai on Rai Chand Purbiya and made him his chief adviser.⁶⁰ Mahmud Shah then attacked Sahib Khan (Muhammad Shah) and with the help of the Rajputs routed him in battle. Sahib Khan fled for shelter to Mandu, which was immediately besieged by Mahmud Shah. Sahib Khan could not hold Mandu and, accompanied by Muhafiz Khan, he fled to Gujarat, where he was welcomed and given shelter by Muzaffar Shah II.

Thus Mahmud Shah once again became ruler of Malwa, and in recognition of the services of Medini Rai, he appointed him wazir. Medini Rai strengthened the administration and appointed his own men to several important posts. In the meantime Sahib Khan, who had received no material assistance from the Gujarati Sultan, returned to Malwa.⁶¹ His presence caused some disturbances, because the nobles who were against Medini Rai took up his side, some openly and others secretly. Sikandar Khan of Satwas rebelled towards the middle of 1512, and Bahjat Khan of Chanderi also declined to comply with the orders of the Sultan. Mahmud deputed Medini Rai to quell these rebellions. Medini Rai succeeded in reducing Sikandar Khan to submission but he also procured a pardon for him from the Sultan and got him reinstated at Satwas. Mahmud Shah and Medini Rai then proceeded towards Chanderi. Bahjat Khan at the beginning remained defiant; he attempted to negotiate for assistance with Sultan Sikandar Lodi and also invited Sahib Khan from Gawil and proclaimed him Sultan. The progress of Mahmud Shah's affairs was somewhat hindered because of the sudden march of Muzaffar Shah II on Malwa. But Muzaffar Shah found the Malwa capital well-protected and hastily returned to Gujarat.⁶²

The settlement of the Chanderi affair and the final expulsion of Sahib Khan took about two years. During this period the wavering character of many of the nobles was fully exposed. Sikandar Lodi also made an ineffective attempt to annex Chanderi by giving military assistance to Sahib Khan. During all these months of anxiety and fear, Medini Rai and his band of Rajputs remained loyal to Mahmud

⁶⁰ *Zafar-ul-Walikh*, 213; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 383.

⁶¹ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 385.

⁶² *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 179; *Ferishta*, II, 522.

Shah, and with their assistance he finally succeeded in capturing Chanderi and entering it on 12 July 1514. Mahmud Shah granted a general pardon and also distributed some robes of honour and rewards to assure the people and the officers of Chanderi of his forgiveness. After making the necessary arrangements for the administration of Chanderi, Mahmud Shah returned to Mandu.

The success of Mahmud Shah in subjugating the rebellious nobles and driving out his rival was due to the support of Medini Rai and the bravery of Medini's men; Mahmud, therefore, began to rely more and more upon Medini Rai, with the result that Medini Rai became very powerful. The consequence was inevitable. Medini Rai gradually built up his position by filling all important posts with his own adherents; and with the passing of all administrative power into the hands of Medini Rai, Sultan Mahmud Shah found himself reduced to the position of a mere puppet. Though not a capable ruler, Mahmud Shah was, nevertheless, not prepared to tolerate the domination of any one. But Medini Rai's loyalty and his own helplessness seemed to leave him no alternative. Ultimately, however, he imposed three conditions on Medini Rai; *firstly*, the old Muslim officers were to be reinstated; *secondly*, Medini's men were not to interfere in state affairs; and *thirdly*, they were not to keep Muslim women in their *harems*. Medini Rai at once agreed to comply with the Sultan's orders, but his assistant, Salivahan, continued to behave as in the past and kept Muslim women in his *haram*.

Finding that matters did not alter even after his clear instructions, Sultan Mahmud decided to get rid of Medini Rai and Salivahan. But instead of dismissing them from service, he asked his men to assassinate them. An attempt on their lives was made; Salivahan was killed but Medini Rai escaped with some injuries.⁶³ This was immediately followed by a revolt of the Purbiya Rajputs, but the revolt was suppressed by the Sultan and the Rajputs were pacified by Medini Rai. Mahmud Shah then tried to conciliate Medini Rai and asked him to resume his duties; he was permitted to attend to his official business with a personal guard of five hundred armed men. Since it was not possible for him to get rid of Medini Rai, Mahmud decided to leave Malwa and seek the help of Muzaffar Shah II in ousting Medini Rai. According to this plan, he escaped out of the fort of Mandu unnoticed sometime towards the end of 923/1517 and hurriedly proceeded towards Gujarat. He was well received by the governor of Dohad, who immediately informed the Sultan of Gujarat of the arrival of the royal guest. Muzaffar Shah at once came to meet him and gave

63 *Tabaqat-i Akbari*. III, 395; *Ferishta*, II, 524.

him a reception on 29 December 1517. After giving solemn assurances to Mahmud Shah, he started for Dhar on January 1518.⁶⁴

Medini Rai, in the meantime, had not only maintained law and order in Malwa, but had even requested the ladies of the royal *haram* to recall Mahmud Shah and pointed out the disastrous results of bringing the enemy into the country. When he received information of the invasion of Muzaffar Shah, he made necessary arrangements for the defence of Mandu; he also opened negotiations with Muzaffar Shah, but finding that an attack on Mandu was inevitable, he left the defence of the fort to his men and proceeded personally to the court of Rana Sanga to bring the Rajputs to his assistance.

Muzaffar Shah II started the siege of Mandu on 6 January 1518, but at the request of the garrison he gave it a month of grace for evacuating the fort. But the garrison did not evacuate the fort during the month, and Muzaffar Shah also received information that Rana Sanga and Medini Rai were marching to Malwa. He, consequently, resumed the siege of Mandu on 6 February and conquered it on the 13 February.⁶⁵ Though the Rajputs had performed the *jauhar*-rite, nevertheless Muzaffar Shah ordered a general massacre. He then restored Mahmud Shah to the throne of Malwa and returned to Na'icha on 16 February. The reason for this generosity was his concern about the possible arrival of Rana Sanga. From Na'icha he directed his attention to Rana Sanga, but the Rana returned to Chitor on receiving news of the fall of Mandu. Mahmud Shah gave a royal reception to his deliverer on 26 February. Muzaffar Shah returned to Gujarat after reinstating Mahmud Shah and leaving behind a Gujarati contingent for his protection.⁶⁶

The immediate effect of the expulsion of the Rajputs from Mandu was that they spread to different parts of the kingdom. The massacre at Mandu had completely alienated them and they had started looking towards Rana Sanga for help. After the departure of Muzaffar Shah, Gagraun was occupied by Medini Rai and he started rallying the Rajputs there. Mahmud Shah immediately attacked Gagraun, hoping thereby to prevent Medini Rai from consolidating his position. But while Mahmud Shah was besieging Gagraun, Medini Rai appealed to Rana Sanga and the Rana at once came to his help. Mahmud raised the siege and proceeded against the invading army to prevent it from reaching Gagraun. But he came into clash with the Rana without properly arranging his own army; in the battle that followed Mahmud's army was completely routed, and he was

⁶⁴ *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 185; Ms. Add. 26279, f. 18b.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 187; Ms. Add. 26279, f. 51b.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 192.

wounded and taken prisoner. He was taken to Chitor, and after his wounds were healed, the Rana released him and restored him to his throne. But as a matter of precaution the Rana kept a son of Mahmud Shah at his court as a surety for his future friendly attitude and also took from him the crown of Hushang Shah as a trophy of his victory.⁶⁷ Thus Mahmud Shah now owed his crown to Muzaffar Shah as well as to Rana Sanga.

Muzaffar Shah II, fearing the destruction of Gujarat influence at Mandu, sent a soothing letter to Mahmud Shah immediately after his return along with a large force. The ostensible object of this force was to help Mahmud but it could also maintain the hold of Gujarat on Malwa. Mahmud Shah, on his part, did not like the presence of the Gujarati force, and as soon as he felt that he was strong enough, he requested the Gujarat Sultan to recall it. Muzaffar Shah complied with the request and recalled his force.⁶⁸

After the departure of the Gujarati force, the dismemberment of the territory of Malwa set in. Mandisor and its environs passed to Rana Sanga; Harauti and Khichiwarra became independent; Chanderi was occupied by Medini Rai; Sarangpur, Bhilsa and Raisen passed to Silahdi; and Satwas became independent under Sikandar Khan. In 926/1519-20 Mahmud made an attempt to reassert his authority and marched against Silahdi. The two armies met in the vicinity of Sarangpur; though his army was routed, Mahmud saved the day by his personal valour and finally succeeded in capturing Sarangpur. But he could not oust Silahdi from Bhilsa and Raisen.

Mahmud Shah afterwards desired to rule peacefully, but he brought troubles on himself by his own actions. He involved himself with Gujarat and offended Bahadur Shah, the new ruler, by granting asylum to Chand Khan, a brother of Bahadur Shah. He also permitted Raziul Mulk, a supporter of Chand Khan, to use Mandu as a centre for negotiations with Babur, and in spite of Bahadur Shah's protests, he allowed Raziul Mulk to continue his activities. Bahadur Shah was so incensed that he decided to punish Mahmud Shah and marched against Mandu in 1530. His original intention probably was only to humble Mahmud's pride, but when he found that Mahmud was not prepared to attend his court, he laid siege to Mandu. All officers, who were not happy with Mahmud, betrayed him and went over to Bahadur Shah. The fort of Mandu was captured by Bahadur Shah on 9 Sha'ban 937/28 March 1531; Mahmud was unable to escape. On 12 Sha'ban 937/31 March 1531, the

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 193; *Vir Vinod*, I, 357.

⁶⁸ *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 403.

Khutba in the main mosque of the capital was read in the name of Bahadur Shah, thus proclaiming the establishment of Gujarati rule over Malwa. Mahmud Shah and his sons were despatched as prisoners to Champaner; but while the party was on its way, there was some disturbance in the camp and Mahmud made an attempt to escape. So his guards overpowered him and killed him along with his sons on the night of 14 Sha'ban 937/2 April 1531.⁶⁹

Mahmud was brave and courageous and always distinguished himself by his valour on the battle-field. But he was extremely self-willed and quite incapable of understanding a complicated political situation. His repeated political blunders brought ruin to his kingdom and with him the Khalji dynasty also came to an end. After him Malwa never regained her former glory, though for brief intervals her rulers, Qadir Shah and Baz Bahadur, proclaimed their independence.

MALWA UNDER GUJARAT

Though Gujarati rule over Malwa was formally proclaimed on 31 March 1531, the hold of Bahadur Shah over the region had yet to be consolidated. His main task was to reduce Silahdi, who had become very powerful and had established his authority over Ujjain, Sarangpur, Bhilsa and Raisen. After the death of Medini Rai, Silahdi had become the leader of the Purbiya Rajputs and had gained the friendship and support of quite a number of powerful Malwa Muslim nobles. Bahadur Shah, therefore, had to move cautiously.

He first declared that he had no intentions of punishing Silahdi or dispossessing him of his territories; he only wanted that Silahdi should hand over all Muslim women whom he kept in his *haram*. Thus he enticed Silahdi to come to his camp by false promises and then imprisoned him. While keeping Silahdi confined in Mandu, Bahadur Shah captured Ujjain, Sarangpur, Ashta, and Bhilsa, and finally started for Raisen on 17 Jamadi II 932/31 March 1526. Silahdi at the last moment tried to save Raisen by embracing Islam, but though his conversion was welcomed,⁷⁰ Bahadur Shah remained firm in his determination to occupy Raisen, for without it his hold over Malwa would not be complete. Lakshman, brother of Silahdi, sought help from Rana Bikramajit of Chitor, and Bikramajit sent a Rajput contingent; but before it could reach Raisen, it was checked and driven back by Bahadur Shah. This half-hearted help of the Rana had no effect on the fate of Raisen, apart from prolonging

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, III, 409; Ferishta, II, 531.

⁷⁰ *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 284.

the siege; it also offended Bahadur Shah and gave him a pretext for attacking Chitor. When the siege was again started with full vigour, Silahdi offered to hand over the fort, and requested that he be permitted to enter the fort in order to persuade the defenders to submit. Bahadur Shah permitted Silahdi to enter the fort under an escort, but once Silahdi was inside the fort he agreed with the rest of the garrison to fight to the last. The inmates of the fort performed the *jauhar*-rite on 6 May 1532; Silahdi, Taj Khan and Lakshman along with their soldiers perished on the battle-field; and the fort passed into the hands of Bahadur Shah. Bahadur granted the fort of Raisen along with the territory of Bhilsa to Alam Khan of Kalpi, who had come to him seeking his shelter about this time.⁷¹

From Raisen Bahadur Shah moved towards Chitor to chastize Rana Bikramajit for the assistance he had given to Bhupat, son of Silahdi, during the siege of Raisen. He reached the vicinity of Chitor and started the siege in February 1533. The heavy damage caused by the guns of Rumi Khan unnerved Rani Karnavati; she sued for peace, offered to withdraw all claims from those territories of Malwa which had been conquered by Mewar, and also sent as a present the crown of Hushang Shah, ten elephants, a hundred horses and some cash. Bahadur Shah accepted the offer and withdrew from Chitor.

He next embroiled himself with the Mughal emperor, Humayun, by offering asylum to his enemies. Consequently, when he launched his second attack on Chitor in November 1534, Humayun marched on Malwa. While the siege was progressing, Humayun moved about freely in Malwa. He arrived at Sarangpur by January 1535; from Sarangpur he moved to Ujjain and thence to Mandor. Thus when, after conquering Chitor on 8 March 1535, and making arrangements for its occupation, Bahadur Shah turned south, he found Humayun already stationed at Mandor. At Mandor Bahadur found that his position was untenable; so abandoning his camp, he left for Mandu by a circuitous route, and reached there on or about 19 May 1535. Humayun followed him to Mandu and encamped at Na'lcha. He succeeded in throwing Bahadur Shah off his guard, made a sudden attack in the small hours of the morning, and easily conquered the fort. Bahadur Shah, however, managed to escape from Mandu and took shelter in Champaner. After making the necessary arrangements for the fort of Mandu, Humayun besieged Champaner; but Bahadur Shah again managed to escape, and with Humayun almost at his heels, he moved to Cambay and from there he escaped to the

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 288; Ferishta, II, 437.

island of Diu. Humayun reduced Cambay and captured the fort of Champaner on 5 August 1535, and finally occupied Ahmadabad. Thus in the course of a campaign lasting only a few months Humayun succeeded in acquiring both Malwa and Gujarat.

But Humayun could not make adequate arrangements for consolidating the Mughal conquests. Very soon his presence in the north became necessary and he left Mandu for Agra *via* Chitor in 1537, leaving behind a few military contingents which were soon driven out by the local chiefs. After Humayun's departure, Bahadur Shah reestablished his authority over Gujarat and Malwa, but he had to devote most of his time to Gujarat; so far as Malwa was concerned, he placed it under the nominal control of Muhammad Miran Shah Asiri with Mallu Khan as governor of Mandu. The death of Bahadur Shah on 3 Ramazan 943/13 February 1537 created a political void in Gujarat; and Mallu Khan was permitted by Imadul Mulk, the king-maker of Gujarat, to assume independence with the title of Qadir Shah sometime in June-July 1537, and thus Malwa became independent once again.⁷²

MALWA INDEPENDENT AGAIN

Qadir Shah proved to be a successful ruler. He tried to appease the Rajputs of Malwa by permitting Bhupat and Puranmal, the sons of Silahdi, to reoccupy Raisen, and they, in return, accepted his suzerainty and offered their allegiance. The zamindars of the surrounding country also offered their allegiance and began to send regular annual tribute. Very soon Malwa seemed to have regained her former position.

But Qadir Shah was not destined to enjoy peace for long. His claim to equality with Sher Shah and his refusal to render military assistance to his son, Qutb Khan, against the Mughals, offended the Afghan ruler. So after consolidating his position in the north, Sher Shah started for the subjugation of Malwa in April 1542. Thus after a peace lasting for about five years, Malwa had again to face an enemy. Qadir Shah at the last moment tried to appease Sher Shah by submitting to him, but he was soon forced to escape from the Afghan camp and fly from Malwa. After occupying Malwa, Sher Shah appointed Shuja'at Khan over Handia and Satwas, Haji Khan over Mandu and Junaid Khan over Dhar, and then returned to the north. But in March 1543, he again returned to Malwa and attacked Raisen; the fort was conquered after a siege lasting for a little more

⁷² *Mir'at-i Sikandari*, 337.

than four months.⁷³ Sher Shah then appointed Shuja'at Khan governor of Malwa and again returned to the north.

MUGHAL CONQUEST OF MALWA

The death of Sher Shah (22 May 1545) again created disturbed conditions in Malwa; Shuja'at Khan was removed and Isa Khan was made governor in his place. However, no major conflict took place, because Shuja'at Khan, instead of challenging Isa Khan, decided to withdraw. After some time Shuja'at Khan was given the jagir of Sarangpur and Raisen. The death of Islam Shah (961/1553-54) was followed by disturbances in the north; but Muhammad Shah Adil, after his accession, tried to win over some important Afghan chiefs to his side, and with this end in view he appointed Shuja'at Khan as governor of Malwa once more. Shuja'at Khan made fresh administrative arrangements; he appointed Daulat Khan Ajiyala to Ujjain, Malik Mustafa to Raisen and Bhilsa, and Miyan Bayazid to Handia and Ashta, while he established himself at Sarangpur. Under Shuja'at Khan's administration Malwa enjoyed peace once more. Shuja'at Khan felt no obligation towards Delhi after Humayun's return; and just before Humayun's death in 1555, Malwa became independent again.⁷⁴ After Shuja'at Khan's death, his son, Miyan Bayazid, ousted his rivals and proclaimed himself ruler of Malwa with the title of Baz Bahadur.

Baz Bahadur's military activities came to an end when, in his attempt to conquer Garha, he suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Gondhs led by Rani Durgawati. Thereafter he devoted his time to music and the cultivation of the fine arts. Owing to his cultural pursuits, Baz Bahadur discarded all religious prejudices, and the process of cultural assimilation, which had started with the foundation of the independent kingdom of Malwa, reached its culmination under his rule. Malwa became the home of music, dance, colour and festivities; but from the point of view of defence it lost its strength, and became an easy prey to the growing power of the Mughal empire.

On 12 March 1561 Akbar sent a Mughal army for the conquest of Malwa under Adham Khan with Pir Muhammad and a host of veterans to assist him. Baz Bahadur was defeated near Sarangpur, and though he personally managed to escape, his *haram* and treasure fell into the hands of Adham Khan. The treasure and the beauties of Baz Bahadur's *haram* turned Adham Khan's head; he kept everything

⁷³ Qanungo, *Sher Shah*, 297-99.

⁷⁴ Ferishta, II, 537.

for himself and sent only a nominal present to Akbar with the information of victory. Adham Khan then divided Malwa into four divisions. He kept Sarangpur under his personal supervision, and appointed Pir Muhammad to Mandu and Ujjain, Qiya Khan to Handia and Sadiq Khan to Mandor.

Akbar was so offended by Adham Khan's behaviour that he started immediately from Agra on 27 April and on 13 May he suddenly appeared before Adham Khan, who had just then started from Sarangpur for the conquest of Gagraun. Akbar came to Sarangpur and recovered everything from Adham Khan, but he returned to Agra without altering the administrative arrangements and without staying in Sarangpur for more than a few days. From Agra he sent orders recalling Adham Khan and appointing Pir Muhammad as governor of Malwa.

For the people of Malwa Pir Muhammad was a scourge of God. He was base and cruel and inflicted untold sufferings on the people. Baz Bahadur in the meantime had collected a force and organized some resistance; this infuriated Pir Muhammad so much that he sacked and plundered Bijagarh, Sultanpur and Burhanpur. But while returning laden with booty, he was attacked by Baz Bahadur and suffered a defeat. He tried to cross the Narbada in haste but was drowned in the deep waters of the river. The Mughal officers were so demoralized by Pir Mohammad's death that Baz Bahadur had no difficulty in driving them out and reoccupying Malwa.

The loss of Malwa was a great blow to Mughal prestige and Akbar wished to retrieve it at once. But he also realized that the mere occupation of a region, which had enjoyed freedom for a century, would not be successful unless competent officers, possessing the requisite experience and courage, energy and sense of justice, were appointed to take charge of its affairs. He, therefore, appointed Abdulla Khan Uzbek to reconquer Malwa and act as its governor; Khwaja Muinuddin Farkhundi was appointed *diwan* and put in charge of revenue administration and the settlement of the territory.⁷⁵ This second Mughal invasion unnerved Baz Bahadur. Though defeated, he managed to escape from the country, but submitted to the emperor later. Abdulla Khan and Khwaja Farkhundi restored peace, and Malwa was incorporated as a *suba* of the Mughal empire in 969/1562. Thus ended the independent kingdom of Malwa founded by Dilawar Khan Ghuri in 804/1401-2, but as a Mughal *suba* the territory once more prospered and enjoyed peace.

⁷⁵ *Akbar Nama*, II (Tr. Beveridge), 259-60.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

ORISSA

I. LATER GANGA KINGS

IN 1198 RAJARAJA III, the son of Aniyankabhima or Anangabhima III, came to the throne. In 1205 Bakhtiyar Khalji sent Muhammad Sheran Khalji 'with a portion of his forces towards Jajnagar'.¹ Muhammad Sheran probably advanced as far as Lakhnora (Nagara in the Birbhum district) and hurriedly went back without invading Orissa after the tragic death of his master, Bakhtiyar Khalji. An inscription in the Bhimeswara temple at Draksharama in the east Godavari district records that Rajaraja easily defeated 'Gauda-Garjjana pati'.²

Rajaraja III was succeeded by his son, Aniyankabhima or Anangabhima IV, in 1211. It is stated in the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* that Ghiyasuddin Iwaz Khalji, the Sultan of Lakhnauti, collected tribute from Jajnagar.³ Ghiyasuddin finally occupied the Lakhnora tract and pushed the southern frontier of his kingdom up to the Damodar about 1214. The undated inscription in the Chhateswara temple in the Cuttack district (JASB, LXVII) refers to the success of Vishnu, the minister of Anangabhima, in his war against the Lord of the Yavana kingdom. These were probably border clashes in south Radha in which both sides claimed victory.

Vishnu also fought with the king of Tummana. This place in the Bilaspur district (Madhya Pradesh) was the capital of a branch of the Hailhayas or Chedis.⁴

Some Hailhaya chiefs worked under the Ganga kings. In 1211, the year of Anangabhima's accession, a certain Kandamarajan, a scion of the Hailhaya family, made a gift to the Srikurmam temple in the

1 Raverty, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 573.

2 *SII*, Vol. IV, No. 1377: The word 'Garjjana' cannot be satisfactorily explained. The reference to the victory over the Gaudapati probably means that Muhammad Sheran invaded Orissa and was repulsed. But the evidence is too weak to permit a definite statement.

3 Minhajus Siraj probably refers to Orissa as Jajnagar. The source of his information is not given by him.

4 Dr. B. Ch. Chhabra: *EL*, XXIX, 127-131.

Srikakulam district (*SII*, Vol. V, No. 1283, dated *Saka* 1133). It is also stated in that inscription that the Ganga kingdom extended up to the river Ganga.⁵ Anangabhima gave his daughter, Chandradevī, in marriage to Paramardi, an ornament of the Hailhaya race.⁶

An inscription in the Draksharama temple dated 1230 (*SII*, Vol. IV, No. 1360) indicates that the kingdom extended up to the Godavari in the south. Anangabhima shifted his headquarters (*kataka*) from Chowdwar to the village of Barabati. Because of the presence of the temple of Visheshvar Shiva at that place, he renamed the place as New (Abhinava) Varanasi. The Nagari copper plates of Anangabhima were issued from Abhinava Varanasi Kataka in 1230.

Anangabhima was succeeded by his son, Narasimha I (1238-64). Narasimha wanted to wrest Radha from the Muslims. Minhajus Siraj, the contemporary historian, writes that in the year 641 A.H. (June 1243-May 1244) the Rai of Jajnagar began 'molesting the Lakhnauti territory'.⁷ The Orissa army raided Radha. Tughril Tughan Khan, the governor of Lakhnauti, had to wait for the return of his full force from its campaign to distant Kara. In March 1244, he took the field in person against the Orissa army, which made a strategic retreat to the fortress of Katasin, 'which was the boundary of Jaj-nagar'.⁸

During his retaliatory expedition, Katasin was occupied and plundered by Tughan Khan's army. The Orissa army then suddenly attacked the Muslim army, which suffered discomfiture and retreated towards Lakhnauti.⁹

To follow up this success, the king of Orissa sent an army in 1245 to attack Lakhnauti. Karimuddin Laghri, the feudatory of Lakhnor,

5 In the Draksharama temple inscription (*SII*, Vol. IV, No. 1329) of the 8th Anka of Anangabhima, it has been stated that Anangabhima and his father bore the title of 'Trikalingeswara' or 'the Lord of Three Kalingas'. Anangabhima has been styled as 'Trikalinganath' in the Chhateswara temple inscription.

6 P. Acharya, 'The Commemorative Inscription of the Anantavasudeva temple at Bhubaneswar', *OHRJ*, Vol. I, 279.

In the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan *History of India*, Vol. V, 207, Paramardi has been stated to be the king of Tummana, and Chandradevi to be the sister of Anangabhima III. Paramardi's title of 'Samantaraya' and the absence of any royal title for him in the Anantavasudeva temple inscription show that he was not a king. Chandradevi was the daughter of Anangabhima (Anantavasudeva Temple Inscription, v. 18).

7 Raverty, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 738.

8 Katasin appears to be Kotsimul on the Damodar in the Hughli district. Dr. Bhattasali identifies Katasin with Kathasanga about 12 miles south of the Damodar (*History of Bengal*, Vol. II, 48).

9 'A greater disaster had not till then befallen to the Muslims in any part of Hindustan'—*History of Bengal*, II, 49.

was killed. The leader of the force of Jainagar was Sabantar, 'the son-in-law of the Rai'.¹⁰

After the occupation of Radha, the Orissa army invaded Varandra (North Bengal). On 14 March 1243, the Orissa soldiers appeared before the gates of Lakhnauti. Tughan Khan confronted them but was repulsed. He then appealed to Alauddin Mas'ud, the Sultan of Delhi, for assistance. Alauddin ordered the governors of Kara-Manikpur and Awadh to proceed to Lakhnauti 'for exterminating the infidels of Jainagar'.¹¹

Malik Tamar Khan, the governor of Awadh, advanced with a large army towards Lakhnauti. The Orissa army, being threatened on the flank, raised the siege and withdrew to Lakhnor. Malik Tamar Khan, who had seized the throne of Lakhnauti, and his successor, Malik Jalaluddin, could not dislodge the Ganga king from Lakhnor.¹² Mughisuddin Yuzbek became governor of Bengal and Bihar after the death of Malik Jalaluddin. About 1253 Yuzbek marched on Lakhnor to recover the prestige and the territory lost by the Muslims. Three battles were fought with the Hindu feudatory chief (probably Paramardin) whose capital was Umurdan or Garh Mandaran.

Yuzbek suffered reverses but he did not lose heart. About 1255 he captured Mandaran. Paramardin fell in the conflict with the Muslims, and with his death the Radha country came under the authority of the Muslims.

Vidyadhara, the court-poet of Narasimha I, wrote the *Ekavali*, a Sanskrit work on rhetoric. Vidyadhara styled his patron as 'Hamira-mada-mardana' or 'the vanquisher of the Amir', and praised him for his victorious war in Bengal.

The reigns of Rajaraja III, Anangabhimha IV and Narasimha I roughly correspond with the period of the Shamsi sultans of Delhi.

Narasimha I was succeeded by his son, Bhanudeva I (1264-78). During his reign Narahari Tirtha came from the south and preached the Madhya faith in south Orissa. After an uneventful reign of fourteen years, Bhanudeva I died and was succeeded by his son, Narasimha II

10 Sabantar probably means Samantaraya. He was the son-in-law of Anangabhimha. It is stated in the Anantavasudeva temple inscription that Chandradevi's husband, Paramardideva, died in battle after winning several victories for Narasimha.

11 Raverty, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 762-763.

12 Narasimha was left in possession of the Radha country, bounded on the north by the white waters of the Ganga, which was blackened 'by the collyrium washed away by the tears from the weeping Yavanis of Radha and Varendra'. ('The Kenduapatna copper plates of Narasimha II', *JASB*, LXV, 232).

Probably to commemorate his victory, Narasimha constructed the Sun temple at Konarak, which has perpetuated his memory to posterity.

(1278-1306). Chandradevi constructed the temple of Anantavasudeva at Bhubaneswar in 1278.

It is stated in the *Narahari Yati Stotra* that Narahari acted as the regent of Narasimha II for twelve years. There is no inscriptional evidence to corroborate this statement. An inscription of the seventh *Anka* or the fifth actual year of the reign of Narasimha II records the appointment of Narahari as 'mandlika' or 'governor' of Kalinga (*SII*, Vol. IV, No. 1288).

Barani writes that Tughril Khan, the governor of Lakhnauti, attacked Jainagar.¹³

The Kenduapatna copper plates (*JASB.*, 1896) record grants to the Brahmans in 1295 from the royal camp at Remuna in the Balasore district. Narasimha II, like his father, reigned peacefully. There are no Ganga inscriptions in the territory south of Simhachalam from the time of Narasimha II. Bhanudeva II (1306-27), the son and successor of Narasimha II, came into conflict with the Muslims.

The Puri plates of Narasimha IV give Bhanudeva II credit for victory over a king, named Gayasadina.¹⁴ This Gayasadina appears to be Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah, who ruled at Lakhnauti between 1310 and 1328 and not Sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughluq of Delhi who invaded Bengal. During Bhanudeva's reign, Prince Ulugh Khan (afterwards Muhammad Tughluq) proceeded to Rajamahendry after the conquest of Warangal.¹⁵ He then raided Jainagar and took forty elephants.¹⁶

Bhanudeva II was succeeded by his son, Narasimha III (1327-52).

13 Ziyauddin Barani in his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* refers also to another Jainagar, 70 *karohs* beyond Sonargaon in East Bengal (*E&D*, III, 112-13). Tughril Khan was apprehended by the advance-party of Balban's army, while he was trying to escape in the direction of Jainagar. M. M. Chakravarti identifies the Jainagar with Tipperah which, according to tradition, was called 'Jahajagar' (*J&PASP* 1919, 217). Dr. K. Qanungo expresses the opinion that Tughril fled to Orissa (*History of Bengal*, Vol. II, 66). But his explanation for 'the inaccuracy of distance in Barani's history is not convincing' (see A. H. Askari's article, *J&PASP* 1950, 62). The Muslim historians refer to Orissa, and sometimes only to the highlands of Orissa, as Jainagar. Afif writes that Sultan Firuz invaded Jainagar—Udisah (Raverty, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 592, footnote). The Rai of Udisah (Purushottama) aided by the *rais* of Jainagar invaded Telingana (Briggs, *Ferishta*, III, 101-2). The Sharqi sultans, Mahmud and his son, Husain, really raided the highlands of Orissa.

14 *JASB*, 1895, 136: The war took place after 1312 because the king's own Puri plates of that year make no mention of such an achievement.

15 A mosque was built at Rajamahendry in 1324 when Ghiyasuddin was ruling in Delhi and his son, Ulugh Khan, was the governor of Telingana: *Epigraphica Indo-Moslemica* (1923-24), 14.

16 Barani's *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* (*E&D*, III, 234).

Nothing politically important happened during his reign. The country enjoyed respite from foreign aggression.

Bhanudeva III (1352-78) succeeded his father, Narasimha III. His reign marks the southward rush of Islam into the interior of the Ganga kingdom. Some scholars write that about the middle of the fourteenth century Sultan Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah of Bengal invaded Orissa, and that overcoming all opposition, he advanced up to the Chilka lake and returned with a rich booty and a number of elephants.¹⁷

According to the inscription of Choda II, a chief of Panchadharla in the Visakhapatnam district, dated 1403, his father went to the protection 'of the harassed army of the Sultan of Panduva' and completely defeated the 'Suratrana' (Sultan) of Dhilli. He also gave the goddess of victory together with twenty-two elephants to the king of Utkala.¹⁸

In December 1360, Sultan Firuz Shah, while returning from his Bengal campaign, decided to invade Jainagar. But it was an afterthought, and he, therefore, had to retrace his steps through Bihar and cross the highlands of Mayurbhanj. He took the Rai of Jainagar by surprise and occupied his capital, Banaras or Kataka-Varanasi. The author of the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* writes that the Sultan proceeded to Puri and desecrated the temple of Jagannath.¹⁹ He then went into an island inside the Chilka lake, where a large number of Hindus had taken shelter. The island was converted into 'a basin of blood by the massacre of the unbelievers', and even women were not spared. The Rai in utter distress offered his submission and presented some elephants as tribute.²⁰ Both Ainul Mulk Mahru and the author of

17 Briggs, *Ferishta*, IV, 331. The contemporary historians, Shams-i Siraj Afif, Ziyauddin Barani and the author of the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi*, would have referred to such an exploit by a Muslim king against the infidels, even though he was an enemy of Sultan Firuz Tughluq. This raid has been mentioned by Nizamuddin (De, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, IV, 331) and by Ghulam Husain (*Riyazus Sulatin*, ASB edition, 98).

'Shamsuddin, with his capitals at Pandua and Sonargaon, is more likely to have invaded Tipperah less than one hundred miles from Sonargaon.' (B. De's note, *Tabaqat*, III, 421).

18 *El*, Vol. XIX, 156. Without corroborative evidence, it is not possible to believe that Bhanudeva, in spite of his strained relations with the Muslim king of Bengal, sent reinforcement under a chief from south Orissa, who defeated Sultan Firuz.

19 According to the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* (J&P ASB, VIII, 66 ff) and the *Munsha'at* (Letters) of Ainul Mulk Mahru (J&P ASB, 1023, 284-87) the object of the Sultan was to massacre the unbelievers and to demolish their temples. But the desecration of the temple of Jagannath at Puri has not been mentioned by Shams-i Siraj Afif, whose father accompanied the Sultan's army.

20 For a more detailed account of Firuz Shah's Jainagar campaign see *supra*, pp. 591-93 [Errors].

the *Sirat-i Firuz Shahi* refer to an Oriya traitor, named Bali Patra. The Sultan returned to Delhi after an elephant hunt.

In a Simhachalam temple inscription dated 1383-84, there is reference to the royal title of 'Gajapati' for the first time.²¹

Bhanudeva III was succeeded by his son, Narasimha IV (1378-1414). His Puri plates, actually granted from Varanasi-Kataka or Cuttack, styled him as the 'Lord of the Fourteen Worlds' (*JASB*, Vol. LXIV, 128). Muslim historians refer to the invasion of Jainagar by Malikus Sharq of Jaunpur, a contemporary of Narasimha IV.²²

Dr. N. Venkataramanayya writes that about 1375 the Reddi king, Anavama, invaded Orissa and pushed forward his conquests up to Simhachalam. In 1391 Kataya Vema, the commander of Kumaragiri Reddi, the Chief of Kondavidu, is said to have advanced as far as the Chilka lake.²³

Bhanudeva IV (1414-35) was the successor of Narasimha IV and the last of the Ganga kings of Kalinga.²⁴

Hostile relations prevailed between the Reddis of Rajamahendry and of Kondavidu in the first two decades of the fifteenth century. Consequently, the southern frontier of Orissa was free from incursions. Allada Reddi, the chief of Amlapuram, made himself the master of the kingdom of Rajamahendry. Allada had friendly relations both with the Gajapati king, and the king of Karnata.²⁵

Dr. Venkataramanayya writes that Allada Reddi hastened to the aid of Bhanudeva IV, when he was taken prisoner by Sultan Hushang

21 Bhanudeva IV was called 'Gajaghotapati' (*SII*, Vol. IV, No. 1064, dated 1274).

22 Raverty, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, Vol. II, 592, 589 & footnotes; Badauni (Ranking), *Muntakhab-ut Tawarikh*, Vol. I, 348; Nizamuddin (De), *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Vol. I, 273. The invasion of Jainagar became a conventional achievement for the sultans of Jaunpur.

23 'Gajapati Bhanudeva IV', *PIHC*, XIII, 160-61. Dr. Venkataramanayya has not adduced evidence for his statements. Unfortunately the inscriptions and literary works of this period are full of exaggerated statements which distort the truth and at times make it difficult to separate the grain from the husk.

24 Dr. A. K. Majumdar writes (*Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, History of India*, VI, 428) that Bhanudeva IV ascended the throne 'sometime between 1402 and 1414'. The last inscription of Narasimha IV's reign is dated *Saka* 1335/1413 A.D. (*SII*, VI, No. 1072). The earliest inscriptions of Bhanudeva's reign are dated the 28 March 1414 (*SII*, VI, Nos. 1113 and 1115). Thus Bhanudeva came to the throne in the *Anka* year corresponding to 1413-14. This date corresponds with the astronomical details of the only inscription of Bhanudeva IV, giving the *Anka* year (*SII*, VI, No. 720).

25 The Vemavaram Grant of Vema Reddi dated *Saka* 1356/1434 A.D. (*EI*, XIII, 238). Deva Raya II's inscription at Potnuru in the Guntur district shows that the Reddi kingdom of Kondavidu had already been conquered by Vijayanagar. Allada Reddi naturally wanted to cultivate friendly relations with Deva Raya II for the sake of his throne. Some scholars are of opinion that Deva Raya sent military assistance to Allada Reddi, whose kingdom was attacked by the Gajapati king.

Ghuri of Malwa; and that 'the defeat which he inflicted upon Hushang had something to do with the release of Bhanudeva IV'.²⁶

In 1421 Hushang Ghuri raided Orissa to obtain elephants. He captured the king of Orissa by a ruse. According to Muslim historians the captive king bought his freedom by presenting some elephants.²⁷

The Muslim historians and the *Madala Panji* do not refer to Allada Reddi's victory over Hushang Ghuri in Orissa. Allada Reddi died about 1423.

Allada was succeeded by his son, Vema Reddi. Bhanudeva IV now waged a war to recover the territory south of Simhachalam. Deva Raya, who wanted to reduce Rajamahendry to the status of a vassal kingdom, came forward to help Vema Reddi. He despatched an army under his general, Telungu Raya, who pushed the Orissa army back beyond Simhachalam.²⁸

Immediately after the departure of the Vijayanagar army, Bhanudeva recovered Simhachalam, as is evidenced by the latest inscription of his reign (No. 277 D of 1899) which records the gift of his wife to the Simhachalam temple in *Saka* 1352/1430 A.D. But his success was short-lived.

The Vemavaram Grant, dated 1434, states that Vema Reddi overran Kalinga and set up columns of victory at Simhachalam and Purushottama (v. 17). Only a part of this statement is based on true facts. Two inscriptions at Simhachalam, dated in the same *Saka* year 1356, record Vema Reddi's gift of villages to the Brahmans of Oddadi and other places (*SII*, VI, Nos. 1168 & 1169). Thus he extended his sway up to Simhachalam between the *Saka* years 1352 and 1356.

Bhanudeva could not view with equanimity the aggression by the Reddi king. He marched out in person against Vema Reddi at the

26 'The Gajapati Bhanudeva IV', *PIHC*, XIII, 161. These contemporary Telugu sources refer to Allada's victory over the Sultan of Dhara in battle. The Vemavaram Grant, v. 8, states that Allada defeated Hushang Shah.

We require more definite evidence to assert that Allada Reddi went up to Cuttack to help a Hindu enemy in distress, and effected his release. He might have defeated Hushang during the Sultan's return journey.

27 Briggs, *Ferishta*, IV, 178; Dc. *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 475. *Madala Panji*, the Jagannath temple chronicle, alludes to the invasion of a 'subedar' from Bengal, who returned after obtaining tribute. The subedar may be identified with Hushang Ghuri, the only Muslim king, who is definitely known to have invaded Orissa during the reign of Bhanudeva IV.

28 Telungu Raya's inscription at Simhachalam dated *Saka* 1350/1429 A.D. (No. 293 of 1899) records the gift of a lamp to the temple. Deva Raya II 'destroyed like the king of the beasts the herd of the powerful elephants of Matangaraja'. (The Mudubidara Inscription, dated 1430, No. 33 of 1901).

beginning of 1435. Taking advantage of his absence from the capital, Kapilendra, one of his ministers, seized the throne.²⁹

Visvanath, author of the Sanskrit rhetoric, *Suhitya Darpana*, was a court-poet of Bhanudeva IV. Visvanath composed a drama, entitled *Chandrakala*, which was acted before Bhanudeva IV, when he returned after 'the conquest of Gauda'. Probably he had repulsed a Muslim attack on the northern frontier of his kingdom.

²⁹ The *Ganga Vamsanucharitam* states that when Kajjala Bhanu went to the South for conquest (*digijaya*), his ministers in the capital deposed him and gave the throne to Kapilendra.

II. SURYAVAMSI GAJAPATI KINGS

KAPILENDRA

NO RELIABLE INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE regarding the ancestors of Kapilendra, who usurped the throne. We learn from the Veligalani plates (No. 17 of 1935) that Kapilendra was the son of Yajneswara. No authentic details are known about his early life. It is stated in the *Madala Panji* that Kapila was a 'Rauta' (Kshattriya caste) and that he belonged to the Solar line. Kapilendra served under Bhanudeva IV and after some years he held a high office. A *subedar* (also called *nawab*) invaded Orissa. Kapilendra was deputed by Bhanudeva to settle the amount of tribute to be paid to the *subedar*. When Bhanudeva died, 'the *nawab* gave the throne to Kapila'.¹

The account of the *Madala Panji*, given above, is rather confused and leaves many things doubtful. The titles of *nawab* and *subedar* were not used before the Mughal conquest of northern India. The statement that a *nawab* raised Kapilendra to the throne cannot be accepted in the absence of any confirmatory evidence. The literary sources, the *Ganga Vamsanucharitam* and the *Bhakti Bhagavata*, go unmistakably to show that Kapilendra seized the throne with the help of the nobles and ministers.²

The Ganga kings had become unpopular due to their failure to ward off enemy attacks. The Muslims invaded Orissa and carried off rich booty. The Reddis of Rajamahendry seized the Ganga territory up to Simhachalam. It appears that some nobles and ministers wanted a strong and vigorous king and, consequently, elevated one of themselves to the throne.

We learn from the inscriptions (Nos. 313 of 1896 and 248 of 1896), which give both the *Saka* and the *Anka* years, that Kapilendra's accession took place in the *Anka* year, which began in August 1434 and ended in September 1435. The date given in the *Madala Panji*, which is not correct with reference to the week day, corresponds to 29 July 1435.

Though Kapilendra seized the throne without much difficulty, he had to overcome considerable opposition before he could enforce his authority over the nobles of the kingdom.

1 *The Madala Panji* (Prachi edition), 49.

2 It is stated in the *Bhakti Bhagavata Kavya* of Jivadeva, a court-poet of Pratapa Rudra, that after the fall of Nissanka Bhanu, whose head was turned due to pride, the kings of the Solar dynasty prospered with the support of the nobility of the land,

In his inscription in the Jagannath temple of the 4th Anka, the king threatened the chiefs of his kingdom with confiscation of property and expulsion 'in case they behaved badly towards their sovereign'.

The warning had the desired effect. Seated securely on the throne, Kapilendra was now free to pursue a vigorous policy. The Reddis of Rajamahendry were pushed back from Simhachalam, as is evidenced by an inscription (No. 2309 D of 1899, dated 1441), which records the gift of an officer of Kapilendra to the Simhachalam temple.

It is stated in a Sanskrit work, entitled *Gangadasa Pratapa Vilasam*, that the Gajapati and the Hayapati (Bahmani Sultan) took advantage of the youth of Mallikarjuna and attacked the kingdom of Vijayanagara. Kapilendra also wanted to wipe out the disgrace of a 'previous defeat'. But Mallikarjuna routed the army of the invaders and drove them away. But in the large number of inscriptions of Mallikarjuna we find no reference to the discomfiture of the king of Orissa. It is difficult to believe that the Bahmani king and the king of Orissa—whose relations with each other were far from cordial—made a combined attack upon Vijayanagara and were worsened.

The kingdom of Rajamahendry at that time had fallen on evil days. Dr. Venkataramanayya writes that Deva Raya II sent an army under Mallappa Vodeya which seems to have defeated Kapilesvara and put him to flight.³ But Mallappa Vodeya was sent by Deva Raya to occupy the kingdom of Rajamahendry and not to defend it.

The kingdom of Rajamahendry again changed hands. The death of Deva Raya II in 1446 removed the last obstacle to the path of southward aggression by the Gajapati king. An inscription from Penugonda, Tanaku taluk, West Godavari district dated *Saka* 1370 (1448 A.D.) shows that Kapilendra was already in effective possession of the Godavari delta.⁴

For a few years, Kapilendra postponed further aggression in the South as he was engaged in a campaign against Sultan Nasiruddin of Bengal (1442-59). In his Jagannath temple inscription, dated April 1450, Kapilendra made a reference to his *digjaya* against 'Malika Parisa' (*Malik Padshah*). In all probability he won a victory over Sultan Nasiruddin and assumed the title of 'Gaudesvara' or

³ *Further Sources of Vijayanagar History*, Vol. I, 105. Dr. Subrahmanyam holds a similar opinion (PIHC, Anamalai Session, 207). But the inscription of Mallappa Vodeya (No. 442 of 1893 dated January 1445) does not bear out the assumption of these learned scholars. It records the gift at Draksharama by Malla Bhupala, the ruler of Rajamahendry, and the *Mahapradhana* of Praudha Deva Raya, for his merit and makes no mention of any conflict with Kapilendra.

⁴ *The Mackenzie Manuscripts*, 13-4-4.

'Overlord of Bengal'. This was mentioned for the first time in the Jagannath temple inscription referred to above.

We have no information as to the territorial conquest of Kapilendra in Bengal. Probably he took the strip west of the river Hughli including the fort of Mandaran.⁵

After the campaign in Bengal, Kapilendra again turned his attention to the South.⁶ He occupied the kingdom of Rajamahendry about 1453. An inscription, No. 163 of 1893, in the Krishna district, records the gifts by a private person in the 24th *Anka* (1453-54 A.D.) of Kapilesvara Maharaja.

The territory to the south of the Krishna river was under the political sway of the Vijayanagara kings till 1453. This fact is borne out by an inscription of Mallikarjuna (No. 386 of 1915) dated 19 August 1453, at Matamuru in the Guntur district. After August 1453, Kapilendra's army crossed the Krishna and occupied Kondavidu. Ganadeva Rautaraya, a relation of Kapilendra, was appointed *pariksha* of Kondavidu, Addanki and Vinukonda. An inscription (No. 17 of 1917) at Chintapallipadu in the Guntur district, dated 12 April 1454, records his gifts to a temple. Thus almost the whole of the Guntur district passed into the hands of the Gajapati king between August 1453 and April 1454.

A new figure now appears on the scene. Hamvira Rai (or Hamir Rai), the eldest son of the Gajapati king, led his father's army in a conquering expedition which pushed the Orissa boundary southward up to the Pennar river. Nizamuddin writes that Sultan Mahmud Sharqi of Jaunpur invaded Jajnagar shortly before his death, which took place in 1458. He laid the country waste and destroyed some temples. Ferishta's account corroborates Nizamuddin's statement.⁷ Mahmud Shah's eldest son, Muhammad Shah, was overthrown after a brief reign by his brother, Husain Shah.

According to Nizamuddin and Ferishta, Husain Shah invaded Jajnagar-Odessa with a large army shortly after his accession to the

⁵ It appears that he could not retain his hold upon Mandaran. If we are to believe the statement of an obscure Persian work, entitled the *Risalat-us-Shuhada*, Ismail Ghazi, the commander of the Bengal Sultan, Barbek Shah (1459-74), completely defeated the Gajapati Raja at Mandaran. There is a large gate, south of Mandaran, which is known as 'Oriya Mardana' (Abdul Wali, 'Mandaran', *JPASB*, 1917, 131). According to tradition the gate was built by Ismail Ghazi to commemorate his victory over the Oriyas.

⁶ Raghudeva Narendra Mahapatra was appointed governor of Rajamahendry. He was ruling over the *rajya* of Rajamahendry in May 1458 (No. 494 of 1893).

⁷ De, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 458; Briggs, *Ferishta*, IV, 369.

throne.⁸ The Rai in great distress negotiated for peace and sent tribute. The truth of the statements made by Nizamuddin and Ferishta has to be ascertained by further investigations; for it looks strange that within 1455 and 1460 two rulers from distant Jaunpur could successfully invade coastal Orissa during the reign of one of its greatest warrior kings.⁹

We now turn to the Deccan. A clash between the conflicting ambitions of the Bahmanis and the Gajapati king was inevitable, and it came to a head within four years after Kapilendra's conquest of the province of Kondavidu. Sanjar Khan, a noble of the Bahmani king, Alauddin Ahmad, was soon involved in fighting with the 'Oriya leader of the infidels of Telingana'. The Sultan actually warned him that he would be no match 'in the battle against the possessor of elephants'.¹⁰

Sultan Alauddin was right in his prediction. Sanjar Khan was probably one of the two Muslim chiefs (*Turashka Nripati*) who were defeated by Ganadeva Rautaraya, as stated in his Chavali copper plates dated in August 1455 (IA, Vol. XX, 390). This was the beginning of the direct hostilities between the rising Hindu power of Orissa and the Bahmanis of the Deccan.

After establishing his authority effectively over the coastal strip of Telingana, Kapilendra turned his attention towards the highlands of that region. His first aim was to check the attempts of the Bahmani king to reduce the Velama chiefs of the Telingana plateau. He also wanted to conquer a portion of that plateau for the safety of the newly conquered provinces of Rajamahendry and Kondavidu. An opportunity for action soon arose and he fully utilized it.

In April 1458, Kapilendra was present in the Guntur district. He granted the village of Veligalani to the Brahmans for the religious merit of his parents. The Veligalani plates describe Kapilendra's victories over the kings of Dhara, Hampi, Delhi and Gulbarga. The claims of victories over the kings of Dhara and Delhi are undoubtedly exaggerated. According to the Oriya supplement of the record, Kapilendra assumed for the first time the title of 'Overlord of Karnata and Kalbarga' (Gulbarga).

⁸ De, *op. cit.*, 459-60. Ferishta, Persian text, II, 310. They write that Husain Shah's army contained 300,000 horsemen (an impossible figure).

⁹ Recently, 13 coins of Muhammad Sharqi have been found at Deogarh in the Sambalpur district. The Sharqi sultans probably invaded the upper Mahanadi valley, which was then separated from Kapilendra's kingdom by a dense and impenetrable forest.

¹⁰ The *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, IA, Vol. XXVIII, 237.

In May 1458, Sultan Humayun, the successor of Alauddin Ahmad Shah, despatched a force with the object of chastizing the Velamas. The Bahmani soldiers besieged Dewarkonda (in the Nalgonda district, Andhra Pradesh), the stronghold of the Velamas. The besieged garrison sought assistance from Kapilendra, promising to pay a large sum of money. The Rai of Orissa, 'from greed of gain and for the defence of paganism', thought himself bound to assist the Hindus of Dewarkonda. The Bahmani army was taken by surprise by the Orissa army under Hamir. 'The forces of Islam were routed.'¹¹

Hamir put an end to the Bahmani rule in Telingana. An inscription in the fort of Warangal (No. 110 of 1902), dated February 1460, records the conquest of the fort by Hamviradeva Kumara Mahapatra, son of Kapilesvara Maharaya. Kapilendra was now the master of almost the whole of Telingana.

Humayun Shah died in October 1461, and was succeeded by his son, Nizam Shah, who was only eight years old at the time of his accession to the throne. Kapilendra seized this opportunity and invaded the Bahmani kingdom in conjunction with the zamindars of Telingana. He plundered the country and advanced towards the Bahmani capital. Muhibullah, a volunteer, proceeded with an escort of one hundred and sixty horsemen and boldly charged the vanguard of the Rai's army consisting of 400 horse and 10,000 foot. After a fighting which lasted for a few hours, the Hindu army retreated.

This statement of Ferishta must be taken with some reservation. It is difficult to believe that the large army of Kapilendra could not withstand a very minor enemy offensive. The zamindars of Telingana continued their military activities. Ferishta writes that the rais of Orissa and Telingana renewed their depredations on 'the country of Islam', taking advantage of the invasion of Sultan Mahmud of Malwa.¹²

11 *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, IA, VVXIII, 244. See also Briggs, *Ferishta*, II, 457 and De, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 79.

12 Briggs has not correctly translated the history of the campaign of Kapilendra. What Ferishta says may be briefly summarized as follows. After the accession of the boy-king, Nizam Shah, the king of Orissa invaded the Bahmani kingdom. The affairs of the Bahmani king were managed by a triumvirate consisting of the dowager-queen, Khwaja-i Jahan, the regent, and Mahmud Gawan, the *wazir-i kul* or the minister of all affairs.

'First the Rai of the kingdom of Odessa and Oriya with the help of the *zamindars* of Telingana attacked the territory of the Deccan by way of Rajamahendry; they attacked in full force, destroying all they could and left no sign of habitation till Kaulas. The triumvirate was in no way upset; but it determined to drive back the invaders and succeeded in summoning forty thousand horsemen from the provinces to the capital. Then carrying the boy-king with them, they marched towards the invader. The Rai of Odessa and Oriya also marched forward and the two armies encamped opposite to each other ten *karohs* from Ahmadabad-Bidar, the Bahmani

Nevertheless, it is not possible to reject the statement of Ferishta, corroborated by two other authorities, that the Rai of Orissa failed in his attempt to take Bidar, and withdrew to his capital after the abortive campaign.¹³

Kapilendra's withdrawal may be attributed to his aggressive designs upon the Tamil coastal districts. He knew that Mallikarjuna and his governor in the north-east coast, Saluva Narasimha, would not reconcile themselves to the territorial losses they had sustained at his hands, and he wanted to deal an effective blow so as to cripple the power of the Vijayanagara king. The province of Udayagiri, south of the province of Kondavidu, was in possession of Mallikarjuna till 1462, as is evidenced by an inscription, No. 92 of 1919. In that year Kapilendra sent a large and powerful army under prince Hamir, which occupied the province of Udayagiri.¹⁴ Kapilendra's army next invaded the province of Chandragiri, 'and took Kanchi by force' (Gopinathpur temple Inscription, v. 14, JASB, 1900).

A war of conquest was now waged in the heart of the Tamil capital. The Rai of Odessa and Oriya was thinking of wresting (a part of the) country from the control of the Musalmans and of returning after fixing a tribute on the ruler of the Deccan. But before he had clarified his intentions, the Nizam Shahi officers sent him envoys with the following message: "This king of ours, with his youthful good fortune, has been wishing to march with an army to the lands of Odessa, Oriya and Jainagar in order to conquer them. It is good that you have simplified our work by coming here yourself. Now understand definitely that unless you promise to pay a tribute and unless you return all the money you have seized from the land of the Musalmans, not one of your men will be able to go back alive." In continuation of this message, (the mystic) Shah Muhibullah, son of Shah Khalilullah, who had joined the campaign for the sake of *jihad* (holy war) only, separated himself with 160 well-equipped and courageous horsemen from the army of Nizam Shah and went forward to attack the advance-guard of the Rai of Odessa and Oriya, which amounted to 400 horse and 10,000 foot. They fought from morning till midday; ultimately the breeze of victory blew over the banner of the holy-warriors, and the Rai fled and joined his main army.

'Overcome by despair and gloom, the Rai of Odessa and Oriya left his excess baggage at the place and fled away at night with light equipment. The Bahmani army followed in pursuit. Seeing that two or three thousand of his men were killed every day, the Rai took refuge in a fort and began negotiations with Mahmud Gawan. After much wailing and talking and the coming and going of messengers, the Rai of Odessa and Oriya paid five lakhs of *tankas* into the royal Bahmani treasury and was allowed to leave in peace. Nizam Shah returned victorious to his capital' (Ferishta, Persian text, Vol. I, 343-44) — Editor.

¹³ De, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, p. 87; *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, IA, XXXVIII, p. 277.

¹⁴ 'At Kapilendra's command, Kumara Hamvira conquered the kings of the southern quarters and washed his blood-stained sword in the water of the southern ocean.' (*The Anantavaram copper plates of Pratapa Rudra*, V. 9)

Pusapati Tammaraya ruled the Rajya of Udayagiri as Kapilendra's vassal (*Nellore District Inss.*, III, Udayagiri, 28 and 29).

country. In some inscriptions of the South Arcot district, recorded by Annamarasar, the agent of Saluva Narasimha, this invasion was called *Oddiyan Galabhai* or 'Confusion Caused by the Oriyas'. These inscriptions, excepting one, are dated 12 October 1470. They mention that some temples in the South Arcot district had become neglected without any worship being conducted therein for eight or ten years owing to the *Galabhai*.¹⁵

In 1463, Kapilendra extended his political sway as far as the Kaveri. Hamir, who led the Orissa army, made gifts to the Srirangam temple on the Kaveri, as recorded in his epigraph in that temple, dated *Saka* 1386/1464 A.D. (No. 87 of 1927-28).

That year marked the zenith of Orissan imperialism. Kapilendra appointed his grandson, Kapileswara Kumara Mahapatra, as governor of the newly conquered Tamil districts. Two epigraphs at Munnur in the South Arcot district register the gift of Kapileswara Kumara Mahapatra, son of Ambhiradeva, for festivals and repairs of two temples (Nos. 51 and 92 of 1919, dated in June 1464).

In 1485, Saluva Narasimha successfully fought for the expulsion of the Oriyas from the banks of the Kaveri. An epigraph at Conjeevaram (No. 37 of 1890, dated 3 November 1465) records gifts during the reign of Mallikarjuna Maharaya.

In 1465 Kapilendra marched to defend his possessions in the South. He went as far as Vijayawada (Ins. No. 308 of 1892 dated 1465) and returned to his capital. The Tamil districts had been lost by that time and probably he was not prepared for extensive military operations.

He was present at Puri in the middle of December 1466 (Jagannath temple inscription dated 14 December 1466). Thereafter, at the beginning of 1467, the aged king once more marched to the South to recover his territories. He had reached the banks of the Krishna, when death struck him down.

As the earliest inscription of the reign of Purushottama is dated 20 March 1467, we may reasonably conclude that Kapilendra died in January or February 1467.

Kapilendra's reign inaugurated a new epoch in the history of Orissa. His dominions extended for some time from the Hughli in the north

¹⁵ An inscription at Jambai in the South Arcot district (No. 93 of 1906) dated *Saka* 1395/1472-73 A.D. refers to the *Oddiyan Galabhai*, which took place ten years earlier. As most of these inscriptions are found in the Tirukkoyilur taluk, South Arcot district, we may assume that the Tirukkoyilur taluk suffered most as a result of the *Oddiyan Galabhai*.

to the Kaveri in the south. But Kapilendra's aggressive policy in the South proved harmful in the long run. It made the Gajapati kings forget that the most implacable enemies of Orissa were not the Bahmanis of Bidar or the rayas of Vijayanagara but the Muslim kings of Bengal. He made no attempt to recover Mandaran as he was deeply engaged in military operations beyond the Pennar. In the interests of his kingdom, he should have pursued a forward policy against the Muslims of Bengal, like Narasimha I, the great Ganga king. He might have attacked Gaud, the capital, or seized the district of Satgaon. Instead of doing so, he set himself to the task of conquering territories in South India, and advanced as far as the banks of the Kaveri. Successful as the Orissan military enterprise was in the initial stages, it could have no stability. The wisdom of Kapilendra's far-flung exploits is open to grave doubts. It was not possible for him to retain possession of the far-off territories south of the Pennar. To the Hindus of the Tamil country, he appeared as a ruthless conqueror who laid waste their villages.

PURUSHOTTAMA

Purushottama ascended the throne in supersession of the claims of Hamir, who was probably the eldest son of Kapilendra.¹⁶ We learn from an undated inscription at Jakkampudi that Ambideva Raja, son of Kapilendra Maharaya, confirmed his father's grant, dated 1465, to a Siva temple at Vijayawada (No. 148 of 1913). Thus Hamir was ruling in the southern portion of the kingdom at the time of his father's death.

Before his death, Kapilendra nominated his younger son, Purushottama, as his successor, believing that Jagannath had urged him to do so. Purushottama's Srikurmam temple inscriptions and his Potavararam grant (which record both *Anka* and the *Saka* years) prove that Purushottama ascended the throne in the *Anka* year (23 August 1466-1 September 1467).

It is almost certain that the popular belief in the dispensation of Jagannath in Purushottama's favour enabled Purushottama to get the throne. Hamir, who found no support from the people, again retired to the south. He, however, did not give up hope; for after a few years he made a bid for the throne of Orissa with the help of the Bahmani ruler, Shamsuddin Muhammad III.

After firmly establishing himself upon the throne, Purushottama wanted to emulate military exploits of his father. He set out to recover

¹⁶ It is stated in the *Sarasvati Vilasam*, compiled by Pratapa Rudra (I, v. 22), that Purushottama made his 'great enemy', Hamir, prostrate before him. Purushottama's brother, Tirumala Rautaraya (NDI, Vol. III, Nos. 37 and 41), served under Pratapa Rudra at Udayagiri.

the Tamil territory, which had been lost towards the end of his father's reign. According to the Kanchi-Kaveri tradition, which is popular in Orissa, he took Kanchi. But he returned from Kanchi without affecting a complete subjugation of the Tamil coastal districts north of the Kaveri, the legacy of his father's imperialism. Purushottama probably encountered stiff opposition which discouraged him. It may also be a fact that the intrigues of Hamir with the Bahmani Sultan reached his ears and demanded his immediate presence at the capital.

Ferishta writes that in 876 A.H./1471 A.D. 'Hamir Oriya',¹⁷ cousin of the late Rai of Oriya, approached Muhammad Shah III for assistance against Mungal Rai, 'a Brahmin and the adopted son of the late Rai', who had usurped the throne in defiance of his prior claim of inheritance.¹⁸ Muhammad sent Nizamul Mulk to assist Hamir. The armies of Nizamul Mulk and Hamir defeated Mungal Rai. Hamir was placed in possession of his 'hereditary dominions'. Hamir then helped Nizamul Mulk to conquer Kondavidu (Kondnir) and Rajamahendry.¹⁹

Though Ferishta correctly states that Hamir Oriya's claim to his ancestral throne was superseded, he also gives wrong information. We definitely know that Mungal Rai was not a name of Purushottama, nor was the Rai of Orissa a Brahmin. The Bahmani Sultan conquered Kondavidu and Rajamahendry with the help of Hamir and then neglected his cause. Hamir was given asylum in the fort of Kondavidu.

Purushottama made an attempt to recover the lost province, when a rebellion broke out in the province of Kondavidu (Kondnir). Ferishta writes that the garrison at Kondnir revolted against the authority of the wicked governor of the fort and made over the place to Hamir Oriya.

Hamir sent information to the Rai of Orissa stating that if the Rai would make over Telingana to Hamir, the latter would surrender the fort of Kondnir and its dependencies to him. The Rai marched south and took Rajamahendry. The Sultan also advanced towards

17 Briggs misreads Ambur Rai for Hamir Oriya in his translation of Ferishta's Persian text.

18 After telling us that in 876 A.H. (1471-72) news was received that the Rai of Oriya had died after a short illness, Ferishta quotes two verses from an unnamed poet: 'He had an adopted son who was a Brahmin; he had also an uncle's son, named Hamir, who was a man of great valour. There was a struggle between the two, and the adopted son, Mungal Rai, drove Hamir into the hills and forests.'

Purushottama is not an easy name to be put in Persian verses of short metres; so the poet wrote Mungal Rai by which name Purushottama was probably known in the Bahmani kingdom — Error.

19 The *Burhan-i Ma'asir* gives Nizam-ul Mulk full credit for the conquest of the Telingana coast.

Rajamahendry with a large army. At his approach Purushottama lost heart and hurriedly withdrew to his own kingdom. Rajamahendry was invested by Muhammad and the besieged garrison was forced to surrender.

Ferishta writes that in A.H. 882/1477 A.D. Muhammad invaded Orissa to punish the Rai for helping the rebels of Kondavidu (Kondnir). The Rai negotiated for peace and gave 25 elephants and costly presents to the Sultan.²⁰

Muhammad's next object was the reduction of Kondavidu (Kondnir) which was held by Hamir. Muhammad laid siege to the fort for five months and compelled Hamir to submit after a stiff resistance.²¹

Hamir's career thus ended in tragedy. Abandoned by Muhammad after his purpose had been served, the unfortunate prince sought help from his brother, Purushottama, who had deprived him of the throne which legitimately belonged to him. Hamir wanted now from Purushottama only a fraction of the territory over which he was destined to rule. Purushottama proceeded southward up to Rajamahendry on his way to Kondavidu (Kondnir). But he changed his mind and withdrew to his kingdom. For two years Hamir defied the Sultan and then surrendered, when 'he was granted security for his life'. The history of his last years is not known to us. Hamir had a more brilliant military career than his brother. Had he ascended the throne, he might have restored the prestige of the Oriya arms by retaking the north-eastern Tamil districts.

Saluva Narasimha could easily occupy the province of Udayagiri after the subjugation of the Telingana coast by Muhammad. This achievement of Narasimha had been highly exaggerated in the work, *Saluvabhyudayam* (*The Sources of Vijayanagar History*, 91). Saluva Narasimha did not help his Hindu neighbours, Purushottama and Hamir, in distress, and remained a passive spectator when Muhammad reduced Rajamahendry and Kondavidu (Kondnir). He had to suffer for his indifference. In 1481 Muhammad attacked his territory and sacked Kanchi.

Purushottama made no further attempts to recover the provinces of Rajamahendry and Kondavidu as long as Muhammad was alive. In March 1482 Muhammad died. The disturbed conditions which prevailed in the Bahmani kingdom after the death of Muhammad gave Purushottama the opportunity which he had sought so long. An inscription (No. 226 of 1935-36) dated November 1484, at Matukapalle

²⁰ Briggs, *Ferishta*, II, 495. The *Burhan-i Ma'asir* and the *Tabaqat* do not allude to any such invasion of the Hindu kingdom of Orissa by Muhammad III.

²¹ Ferishta, Persian text, I, 356-57; *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, IA, 1899, 180; De, *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, III, 104.

in the Guntur district, shows that within three years after the death of Muhammad III Purushottama had recovered the provinces of Rajamahendry and Kondavidu. The donor of the Matukapalle inscription was Behara Mahapatra Sri Ajama Khan Samantaraya. It appears that Azam Khan was a Bahmani officer who took service under Purushottama and was rewarded by high sounding titles for his defection. An inscription (No. 221 of 1892), dated October 1485, records the gift of Tirumaladasa Mahapatra, an Oriya officer, to a temple at Guntur. In 1489, the Gajapati king granted the village of Potavaram in the Guntur district to a temple (*EI*, XIII, No. 12).

Purushottama now devoted his attention towards the recovery of the province of Udayagiri from Saluva Narasimha, who had crowned himself king (*EC*, Vol. XII, Tumkur 54, dated 1 November 1486). According to the Anantavaram plates (v. 13) and the *Sarasvati Vilasam* (I, 22) Narasimha, the king of Karnata, was made a prisoner by Purushottama. He secured his release by offering Udayagiri (Anantavaram plates). It is permissible to suppose that Purushottama defeated Narasimha and wrested the province of Udayagiri from him between 1486 and 1491, the dates of Narasimha's accession to the throne and his death.

Thus Purushottama's kingdom extended from the Bhagirathi to the Pennar river. Purushottama made no attempts to extend the southern boundary of his kingdom beyond that river by conquering the territory which had been lost by Kapilendra shortly before his death.

The war-weary Gajapati king now wanted to spend his closing years in peace. The latest inscription of Purushottama's reign (*SII*, Vol. VI, No. 1162) is dated 3 April 1497, in the 38th *Anka*. This is the last *Anka* year of Purushottama and the second *Anka*, or first actual year, of Pratapa Rudra, as evidenced by an inscription of Pratapa Rudra in the Jagamath temple (*JASB*, 1893, No. 2, dated 17 July 1499 in the 4th *Anka*). Thus Purushottama died between April and September in the year 1497 and was succeeded by his son, Pratapa Rudra. Purushottama reigned for thirty years. He was the last of the great warrior kings of Orissa.

Purushottama met with failure in the early part of his reign. His brother, Hamir, turned traitor and joined his enemy, Muhammad III. The Bahmani king seized the Telingana coast and Saluva Narasimha occupied the province of Udayagiri. Thus he lost all the three southern provinces which his father had conquered, and miserably failed in his attempt to recover the Telingana coast. But he retrieved his fortune before his death.

While his attention was diverted southward, Bengal was convulsed with internal strife. Between 1487 and 1493 the Abyssinian nobles,

Shahzada Malik Andil and Sidi Badr, waded through blood to the throne. In 1493 Saiyyid Husain seized the throne. 'Husain Shah with the exception of Ilyas Shah was the greatest of the Muslim kings of Bengal.'

Had Purushottama attacked and crippled Muslim Bengal during this period—1467 to 1493—Krishnadeva Raya would have met with stiffer resistance, when he crossed the Pennar in 1513, from Pratapa Rudra, who had just then faced an attack by Husain Shah. But wounded pride clouded Purushottama's judgement. He missed a good opportunity for which his son had to suffer.

PRATAPA RUDRA

After his accession, Pratapa Rudra followed in the footsteps of his father and marched with a large army 'in order to occupy the southern quarters'. In November 1500, he made grants at Anantavaram and Idupulupadu in the Guntur district. He reached the southern boundary of the kingdom during 'the victorious campaign' (Rajovrolu plates, Nellore district, dated May 1501).

The Gajapati king returned to his capital instead of measuring arms with Narasa Nayaka, the *de facto* ruler of the Vijayanagara kingdom. There were probably border raids by Sultan Husain Shah of Bengal. Periodical clashes seem to have begun even before Pratapa Rudra's march to the south with little territorial advantages to either side. It is stated in the Idupulupadu grant (No. 802 of 1922) that Vira Rudra, king of Utkala, completely defeated the king of Gaud. Husain Shah similarly called himself the conqueror of Jainagar on his coins, dated 1504-5. It appears that Husain Shah increased his military activities near the frontier of Orissa, which compelled Pratapa Rudra to return to his capital.

In 1509 Vira Narasimha Tuluva was succeeded by his brother, Krishnadeva Raya, the greatest of the kings of Vijayanagar. The Deccan sultan informed Pratapa Rudra that Krishna Raya was making preparations for war against him and was intending to cross the river Krishna. 'The Gajapati king was cautioned to be on the alert and to garrison his fortresses.'²²

This warning awakened the Gajapati from his lethargy and he immediately marched to the south to take defence measures. An inscription (No. 375 of 1926) at Tangeda in the Guntur district indicates his presence on the banks of the Krishna in November 1509. He proceeded to the Nellore district and made a grant in January 1510 (Gundlapalam copper plates, No. 185 of 1933-34).

²² Rayavachakamu, *The Sources of Vijayanagar History*, 90.

Husain Shah again took advantage of the absence of Pratapa Rudra. Desultory fighting had already broken out by the time Chaitanya decided to visit the temple of Jagannath at Puri (Kavikarnapur, *Chaitanya Chandrodaya*, VI, 16).

Chaitanya started from Bengal in January 1510, and visited some temples in north Orissa on his way to Puri.²³ Pratapa Rudra at that time had gone to the South 'to wage war against Vijayanagara (Brindavan Das, *Chaitanya Bhagavata*, III, 3,269).

The biographies of Chaitanya do not allude to invasion of Orissa by Husain Shah during the saint's sojourn at Puri. The invasion took place after his departure from Puri on the pilgrimage to South India in April 1510.

The *Madala Panji* states that 'Amura Surathana', the 'Patisa' (Padshah) of Gaud, entered Puri and desecrated the temple of Jagannath. The Gajapati, on receipt of this news, hurried towards his capital.²⁴ Husain Shah retreated on his approach, and was chased by the Gajapati up to Mandaran in the Hughli district.²⁵

An inscription at Gonugunta in the Ongole taluk records a gift for the merit of the Vijayanagara minister, Timmarasu, during the reign of Krishna Raya.²⁶ This inscription, dated 4 November 1511, indicates a temporary military occupation of the Ongole taluk in the province of Kondavidu by Timmarasu, which forced Pratapa Rudra to come back to the south again. Timmarasu withdrew when Pratapa Rudra returned. Krishnadeva Raya was not prepared at that time to launch a large-scale military operation against the Gajapati. Moreover, he wanted to reduce the rebellious chief of Unmattur before waging war against the king of Orissa.

The Gudimalapadu plates (No. 56 of 1945-46), dated January 1512, record Pratapa Rudra's gifts in the Nellore district. He went back to his capital before July 1512 to attend the Car Festival at Puri (*Chaitanya Charitamrita* by Krishnadas Kaviraj).

²³ From the descriptions of Chaitanya's visits, it appears that these temples had not been profaned by Husain Shah till then.

²⁴ During his return journey, Pratapa Rudra made a gift of the village of Velicharla in the Nellore district. In the Velicharla plates, dated 4 October 1510 (No. 12 of 1920-21), it is recorded that the huge elephants of Pratapa Rudra, the Gajeswara, terrified the king of Gaud, probably referring to his victory in a previous border conflict.

²⁵ *Madala Panji* (Prachi edition, 52). 'Amura Surathana' is undoubtedly Husain Shah. 'Surathana' or 'Suratrana' is a corrupt form of the word 'Sultan'. Pratapa Rudra styled himself as the protector of Suratrana Husain Shah in a colophon of his compilation, the *Saraswati Vilasam*. Further, the *Chaitanya Bhagavata* by Brindavan Das clearly states that Husain Shah destroyed a number of temples in the country of the Oriyas (III, 4, 67 and 78).

²⁶ *The Nellore District Inscriptions*, Vol. II, 789

In 1513 Krishna Raya began his first campaign against Orissa. He besieged the fort of Udayagiri with an army of 34,000 foot and 800 elephants, according to the account of Nuniz. The fort fell on 9 June 1514. Pratapa Rudra marched southward for the fourth time with the object of raising the siege. But he was defeated and had to fall back upon Kondavidu.²⁷

In 1515 Krishnadeva began his second campaign. He advanced towards Kondavidu, leaving behind him a scene of desolation.²⁸ He took Kondavidu by vigorous assault and captured Pratapa Rudra's son, Kumara Virabhadra, and Kumara Hamir's son, Narahari Patra (No. 272 of 1897 at Amaravati in the Guntur district). He then repaired to his capital.

Krishnadeva Raya planned his third campaign with greater vigour than before. He marched towards Vijayawada and took the fort of Kondapalli, about ten miles north of Vijayawada. Nuniz writes that the king of Orissa came with a large army to defend Kondapalli. But he was defeated and put to flight (*A Forgotten Empire*, 317-18). Krishnadeva Raya then proceeded northward and captured Rajamahendry (No. 74 of 1903 at Sandamangalam). Finally he reached Simhachalam and offered worship to the deity, Varaha-Narasimha, for the successful completion of *purva digvijaya*. (Nos. 243, 245 and 365, III of 1893, dated 30 March 1516).

The Raya then proceeded to Potnuru, where he erected a pillar of victory to commemorate his achievements.²⁹

Krishnadeva Raya returned to Vijayanagara by the middle of 1516.³⁰ But though the Raya returned, the army pushed on under his general, Rayasam Kondamarasayya, and advanced as far as Srikurmam. The Gajapati now negotiated for peace. The Vijayanagara army returned after planting another pillar of victory at Srikurmam.³¹

Pratapa Rudra's defeat was partly due to the physical exhaustion

27 Inscriptions at Tirupati (Nos. 53 and 54 of 1889), at Sandamangalam (No. 74 of 1903) and at Tiruvanamalai (No. 574 of 1902) record that the Raya captured Udayagiri and chased the Gajapati up to Kondavidu.

28 *The Kaiyyat of Kunmur (Further Sources*, III, 115). Tatyaprakasur, a Tamil poet, compared the *Ouddiyā Galabhai* during the reign of Kapilendra with the Muslim invasion under Malik Kafur. But a South Indian army now laid waste the Telugu districts of the kingdom of Orissa.

29 Nos. 196 of 1903, 371 of 1913, 74 of 1903, etc. Potnuru is situated on the banks of the Chitivilasa river in the Bimalipatnam taluk. 'Telugu literature is never tired of describing the prowess of Krishnadeva Raya and his setting up of a pillar of victory in the heart of Kalinga.' *Arch. Survey Report*, 1908-9, 179.

30 Krishnadeva Raya reached his capital before 5 November 1516. On that date he made a gift (EC, III, Mandya, 115).

31 Kondamarasayya's inscription at Cholasamundram (No. 87 of 1912).

from which his army had suffered. Pratapa Rudra acted wisely when he proceeded to the southern part of his kingdom in view of the hostile activities of Krishnadeva Raya. But the invasion of Husain Shah forced him to abandon his line of defence in the south. The Orissa army marched up to Mandaran and then came back again to the south to repulse the raid by Timmarasu. These long journeys exhausted his soldiers. Thus Husain Shah's invasion indirectly contributed to the military success of Krishnadeva Raya in his campaigns against Pratapa Rudra.

At the same time, it must be admitted that the Raya was an able commander and his three well-planned Orissa campaigns give us an indication of his brilliant and forceful personality. Thus he could easily out-general his adversary—a man of peaceful disposition.

In his inscriptions Krishnadeva Raya assumed the titles of 'Gajapati Saptanga Harana' or 'the Appropriator of the Gajapati's Seven Elements of Royalty' (No. 184 of 1925) and 'Oddiya Dala-Vibadana' or 'the Conqueror of the Oriya army' (No. 493 of 1907). The second title was not an empty boast for his victory irretrievably shattered the military strength of the Oriyas.³²

Krishnadeva Raya married the daughter of Pratapa Rudra. The Gajapati ceded the territory south of the Krishna, which was euphemistically stated to be the dowry of the princess.³³ The Orissan princess was subsequently neglected by her husband (*Sources*, 11 and 113).

Krishnadeva appreciated the bravery of Kumara Virabhadra, son of Pratapa Rudra, for his defence of Kondavidu. After the fall of the fort, the Raya appointed him *nayaka* of a part of Mysore, while the war with his father was still being continued. Virabhadra did not forget this generosity on the part of his father's enemy and two of his three grants in north Mysore (*EC*, XI, Devnagara taluk, No. 107, dated 1 October 1515, and No. 744 of 1917, Anantapur district, dated

³² Krishna Raya's achievements have been exaggerated by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya (*Further Sources*, Vol. I, 211) and underestimated by Dr. K. S. Ayyangar (*Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, 497).

³³ Accounts of Nuniz and of Paes, *A Forgotten Empire*, 247. Account of the Narapati Kings, (*Further Sources*, III, 116). *Tukka Panchakam*, (*The Sources*, 143).

Krishnadeva Raya could have easily forced the Gajapati to cede also the province of Rajamahendry, which was under the occupation of his army at the time of the conclusion of the peace.

History would have been different, had these two powerful Hindu kingdoms joined hands against the Muslims of the Deccan, instead of fighting against each other. The Muslims destroyed these two pre-Mughal Hindu kingdoms almost at the same time. The fall of these kingdoms once more demonstrated the fact that disunion among the Hindus was one of the main causes of the Muslim conquest of India.

19 October 1515) were made for the merit of Krishna Raya Maharaya and also of his father. The assumption of royal title by the prince, who was but a *nayaka* of a small territory, and the reference to his father as the lord of 'Dravida Mandala' in the grants were probably resented by a powerful group in the capital, who poisoned Krishna Raya's ears against Virabhadra, when the Raya returned to Vijayanagara after the third Orissa campaign. Nuniz writes that 'he sent to call the son of the king of Oriva' and asked the prince to fence with one of his retainers. Virabhadra, 'feeling himself insulted in the court of Krishna Raya', committed suicide.³⁴ He is not heard of again and this supports the story of his tragic end.

Peace was concluded between the two warring kingdoms before 8 August 1519 (the date of Krishna Raya's last inscription at Simhachalam, No. 244 of 1899—*SIL*, Vol. VI, No. 695). Krishna Raya presented to the Varaha-Narasimha temple two villages in the Kalinga *Dandapata*, which he had 'received' from Pratapa Rudra Gajapati.

On 26 February 1526, the subjects of these two kings recorded (on a pillar in a temple at Undavalli on the south bank of the Krishna) the erection of two new temples (No. 47A of 1919).

Krishna Raya died towards the end of 1529. He was succeeded by his brother, Achyuta Raya. Dr. Venkataramanayya writes that 'immediately after the death of Krishnadeva Raya, Pratapa Rudra Gajapati invaded the kingdom of Vijayanagara but was defeated and driven away'.³⁵ The evidence adduced by the learned scholar in support of his view is not conclusive.³⁶ It is almost certain that the Gajapati king spent his closing years in peaceful pursuits and that he did not wage war for the recovery of the province of Kondavidu and Udayagiri. In fact, the Muslims occupied a part of the Doab shortly after the death of Krishnadeva Raya. Nevertheless, Achyuta Raya and his successors claimed victory over Gajapati kings of Orissa—which seems to have become a customary claim.³⁷

Towards the close of his reign, Pratapa Rudra was more interested in religion than in military exploits. Quli Quthb Shah of Golkonda encountered little resistance when he seized Kondapalli in the

³⁴ *Further Sources*, Vol. II, 231. For the account of Nuniz see *A Forgotten Empire*, 319.

³⁵ *Further Sources*, Vol. I, 233. See also his *Studies in the History of the Third Dynasty of Vijayanagar*, 17.

³⁶ See my book, *History of the Gajapati Kings of Orissa*, pp. 86-87.

³⁷ Achyuta Raya (No. 253 of 1906), Venkata I (NDI, CP, No. 6) and Sadasiva Raya (No. I of 1919)—all claimed to be the conquerors of the Oriya forces. Achyuta Raya boasted of planting a pillar of victory in the Odda Rajya and even became 'Suratrana' of Orissa (No. 331 of 1917).

Krishna district. A Telugu inscription at Malkapuram in the Krishna district (No. 152 of 1893), dated March 1531, records that Kutamanna Malika, a friend of Mahamandu Sahu Sultan, reduced Kondapalli by his prowess and established a feeding house.³⁸

The Sultan in question is Muhammad Shah, during the later part of whose reign, Qutbul Mulk, the governor of Telingana, became independent and founded the sultanat of Golkonda. There are clear indications that Qutbul Mulk occupied the whole of the Doab, very probably after the death of Pratapa Rudra in 1540.³⁹

We do not possess enough information about the last two decades of Pratapa Rudra's reign. The period is uneventful as the Gajapati spent his closing years in pursuit of religion.

In the 42nd *Anka* of Pratapa Rudra (September 1528/August 1529, both inclusive) Narayana Das Mahapatra, the *Pariksha* of the Kalinga *Dandapata*, gave lands to the Simhachalam temple. This is the latest inscription (No. 280A of 1899), dated 1 April 1530, which distinctly mentions the name of Pratapa Rudra Gajapati.

His general, Govinda Vidyadhara, usurped the throne after murdering his sons, Kaluadeva and Kakharuadeva. We know from Govinda's inscription in the Jagannath temple that his 4th *Anka* began between September 1543 and September 1544. Thus he proclaimed himself king between September 1541 and September 1542.

As the *Madala Panji* assigns about two years to the sons of Pratapa Rudra, his death probably took place in 1540. He was the last king of Orissa who ruled over an extensive territory.

Fortune, which favoured Purushottama towards the later part of his reign, deserted Pratapa Rudra. He was attacked by powerful enemies from opposite directions.

Pratapa Rudra was actively engaged in warfare in spite of his close association with Chaitanya from 1512. During the Orissa campaigns of Krishnadeva Raya, he twice marched to the south to relieve the besieged garrisons of Udayagiri and Kondapalli.

The Gajapati king made peace with the Raya of Vijayanagara when further resistance was futile and gave his daughter in marriage to the victor.

The frustration caused by a humiliating peace and sadness owing to the premature death of his gallant son, Virabhadra, under tragic circumstances made a deep impression upon Pratapa Rudra's mind.

³⁸ A Persian inscription (No. 153 of 1893) at Malkapuram, dated 931 A.H./1524-25 A.D., records that Qutbul Mulk set apart money for the maintenance of a feeding house. This date is wrong because the inscription at Undavalli (No. 47A of 1919), dated 26 February 1526, refers to the reign of Pratapa Rudra.

³⁹ *History of Qutb Shah*, incorporated in Briggs, *Ferishta*, III, 360-63.

He knew that his two other sons were incompetent to bear successfully the burden of the kingdom. Broken in hope, the Gajapati now sought solace in religion—as did emperor Charles V after a few years in 1556. Pratapa Rudra's zeal for war died away. He now evinced a keen interest in the tenets of Vaishnavism. Even after the death of Krishnadeva Raya, he did not try to recover the provinces of Kondavidu and Udayagiri.

The Gajapati's devotion to religion, which gradually became more and more pronounced, weakened his authority over the outlying parts of the kingdom. Pratapa Rudra must be blamed for neglecting the defence of the frontier outposts in the province of Rajamahendry. Quli Qutb Shah occupied Kondapalli. The whole of the Godavari-Krishna Doab was lost to Orissa, probably after the death of Pratapa Rudra.

In 1553 Ghiyasuddin Mahmud Tughluq seized the throne of Gaud. He was an incompetent king whose reign was stained with blood. Here was an opportunity for the Gajapati to wage war against an unpopular king of Bengal and to recover the strip of territory which Husain Shah had wrested from him. But Pratapa Rudra did not exert himself to retrieve the prestige of the Oriya arms. He eschewed war.

Though the Gajapati made no efforts to recover the territories which had been conquered by his grandfather, he did not neglect the administration of the country. We do not hear of faction fights, which commenced after Pratapa Rudra's death and ultimately hastened the fall of the kingdom.

Pratapa Rudra's devotion to Chaitanya has been exaggerated in the saint's Bengali biographies. Pratapa Rudra made no discrimination between different schools of Vaishnavism. Himself well-versed in the Vaishnava theology (Krishnadas Kaviraja, *Chaitanya Charitamrita*, II, 14) he was undoubtedly attracted by the extraordinary personality of the saint. But he also extended his patronage to Jagannatha Dasa, Balarama Dasa and Achyutananda Dasa—the three great exponents of the Orissan school of Vaishnavism, which assimilated the Buddhist theory of the void.

Chaitanya had a large number of Oriya followers. The authoritative Gaudiya Vaishnava texts do not refer to Chaitanya's disciples of the Orissan school. The contemporary Oriya works affirm that Jagannatha, Balarama and Achyutananda and their associates were close followers of Chaitanya.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Achyutananda writes in his work *Sunya Samhita*, I, that Jagannatha Dasa, Balarama Dasa and he took part in the *kirtana* processions and danced with Chaitanya.

R. D. Banerjee observes that 'Chaitanya was one of the principal causes of the decline of the empire and the people of Orissa.'⁴¹ He describes the saint as a political adviser to the king—a distortion of facts. Oblivious of all mundane affairs, the saint spent the last seventeen years of his life at Puri in the constant contemplation of divinity and passed away in 1533.

The triumph of the Chaitanya movement did not take place in Orissa during the life-time of Chaitanya. Oriya Vaishnavas, like Syamananda, Rasika Murari and Baladeva Vidyabhusan made it popular in Orissa in the seventeenth century.

After the death of Pratapa Rudra, the kingdom rapidly declined. Hardly anything is known about the last two Suryavamsi kings, Kaluadeva and Kakharuadeva. We entirely depend on the Jagannath temple chronicle for what little information we get. According to that chronicle, Kaluadeva ruled for about a year and a half before he was put to death by Govinda Vidyadhara. Kakharuadeva was murdered after a reign of three months and the throne was seized by Govinda Vidyadhara. The Suryavamsi dynasty of the Gajapati kings came to an end before September 1542.

The successors of Pratapa Rudra were too weak to arrest the decline of the kingdom. Disabled by treachery and internecine strifes, Orissa fell an easy prey to the Muslim invaders who conquered the kingdom in 1568.

⁴¹ R. D. Banerjee, *History of Orissa*, I, 830.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

THE BAHMANI KINGDOM

I. THE BAHMANIS OF AHSANABAD—GULBARGA

INTRODUCTION

THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE GREAT revolution, which heralded the institution of an independent Deccan in 1346, are both interesting and instructive. It seems that a party had been formed at Delhi, which wanted to undermine the influence of the popular viceroy of the Deccan, Qutlugh Khan, who had been a preceptor of Sultan Muhammad Tughluq, and who was held in great respect by every one. This party began to poison the ears of the Sultan against Qutlugh, resulting in the recall of the viceroy in 1345 and the appointment of his brother, Alimul Mulk, as an interim viceroy. Qutlugh Khan was a very popular viceroy, and when he left for the north in the company of the poet, Badr-i Chach, 'even the walls cried out that all that was good was now departing from the Deccan'.¹ Alimul Mulk's appointment was only a makeshift arrangement as the viceroyalty of the Deccan had a very wide range and comprised as many as twenty-three *aqlims* or provinces, the chief of which were Jajunagar (Orissa), Marhat (Maharashtra), Telingana, Bidar, Kampili and Dwarasamudra with the subsequent addition of Malwa. Each *aqlim* was divided into a number of rural districts (*shiqs*) and urban districts (*madinas* or *shahrs*); the rural districts were divided into *hazaris* and *sadis* or collections of one thousand and one hundred villages respectively. The chief officers of the provinces were the *walis*, the *shiqdars*, the *amir-i hazaraks* and *amir-i sadaks*, while the smaller village officials were called *mutasarrifs*, *karkuns*, *batahas*, *choudhris*, *patwaris*, etc.

The position of the *sadah amirs*, who played such an important part in securing the independence of the Deccan, was peculiar. Most of these officers were of noble descent or belonged to the upper

¹ Badr-i Chach started for Daulatabad on 5 December 1344; this is gleaned from his *Qasid*, Lucknow, 64. The quotation is from Isami, *Futuh-us Salatin*, Agra, 1938, 490.

middle class of society. They were in direct and close touch with the people of the *sadis* over which they held sway.² They were not only revenue collectors but also military commanders in direct charge of the local levies, and while the *walis* and *shiqdars* were, in a way, hidden from the public view, the *sadah amirs* constituted, for all intents and purposes, the government as the people knew it.

As soon as Qutlugh Khan arrived at the capital, the Sultan appointed Imadul Mulk Sartez, surnamed *Sarir-i Sultani*, as the viceroy of the Deccan with Dhara, a Hindu, as his lieutenant, and divided the central portion of the viceroyalty into four *shiqs*, assigning them to new officers, who had 'risen from the ranks' and most of whom were probably non-Muslims. These new officers may have been mere 'upstarts' but all of them were experienced administrators; Azizuddin Khammar, for instance, had been an officer at Amroha.³ But they were not to the liking of the old *sadah amirs* with their innate pride of office and position, and these *amirs* began to smart with indignity owing to the appointment of the upstarts. Apart from this feeling, which was due to prejudice, the new officials made themselves most unpopular by their unscrupulousness, the glaring example of which was the high-handedness of Azizuddin Khammar, who had charge of Malwa from the end of 1344. Aziz called together some prominent *sadah amirs* of Malwa and Dhar and had them executed, probably to instil fear into the minds of the *amirs* of Daulatabad, whom he considered to be at the bottom of the recent insurrections in the Deccan.⁴ The result was, however, just the opposite; and the *sadah amirs* of Daulatabad, Gujarat and adjoining areas were filled with resentment against a system under which the innocent could be ground down for the supposed fault of others.

The flare up began with the insurrection of the *sadah amirs* of Gujarat, who forced the governor, Malik Muqbil, back to Naharwala, captured the city of Khambayat (Cambay), and defeated and killed the chief culprit, Aziz Khammar, at Baroda.⁵ The revolt rose to such dimensions that Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq proceeded southwards himself to quell it on 31 January 1346, after appointing a

² The *sadis* were very much akin to the English hundred, for which see Stubb's *English Constitutional History*, I, 104. For the *hazaris* and *sadis*, see Barani, 495 and Ibn-i Battuta, *Rihlah*, Cairo, 1287 A.H., II, 75. For various descriptions of the *sadis*, see Ishwari Prasad, *History of the Qarauna Turks*, Allahabad, 1926, 108-9. I have not been able to find any reference to 100 men being under a *sadah amir* as suggested by the author.

³ Barani, 500.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 503.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 503.

council of regency, with Malik Kabir as president, to look after the affairs of the empire in his absence.⁶

On reaching Mount Abu the Sultan sent an army against the rebels, who were defeated first at Baroda and again on the banks of the Narbada. He then directed a court of enquiry to be set up at Daulatabad, and ordered the recalcitrant *sadah amirs* of that place to be sent to Broach, where he had pitched his camp. This cavalcade of *sadah amirs*, which included Nasiruddin Taghalchi, Ismail Mukh, Hasan Gangu and others, started for Broach, but they held a council at the pass of Manik Dun, and having decided not to proceed further, killed their warders, Malik Ahmad Lachin and Qaltash, and retraced their steps to Daulatabad.⁷ Arriving there, they took possession of the granary, the treasury as well as the citadel after three days of continuous struggle against the acting viceroy, Alimul Mulk.⁸ They then made history by electing one of their members, Ismail Mukh, to the throne with the title of Abul Fath Nasiruddin Ismail Shah as the first independent Sultan of the Deccan.⁹

ISMAIL SHAH

It was after a certain amount of deliberation that Ismail was selected leader of the *amirs* against Sultan Muhammad. Besides being an *amir* in charge of two thousand villages, his brother, Malik Yal,¹⁰ was one of the great *amirs* of the court and was then commanding the royal army in Malwa; and it seemed a foregone conclusion that he would cross over to the Deccan to help his brother, if need be. Be this as it may, the new Sultan (September 1346-11 August 1347) distributed jagirs in the Deccan and the Maharashtra among the adherents of the new regime and accorded high honours to Nuruddin, whom he made Khwaja-i Jahan, Hasan Gangu, to whom he gave the title of Zafar Khan, and many others.

The task of the new government was not an easy one for

⁶ Isami, 483.

⁷ See *JRAS*, 1922, 536.

The pass of Manik Dun (Ferishta) or Manikganj (Badayuni) was 'between the towns of Gaj and Dun' and five *farsangs* from Daulatabad according to Isami. Barani (514) says that it was one *manzil* or about 10 miles from Daulatabad.

⁸ Isami, 495.

⁹ For Ismail's coins see Speight, *Coins of the Bahmani Kings*, *Islamic Culture*, 1935, 292; Rodgers, article in the *JASB*, 1895, I, 52 and 53; IV, 36; Thomas, *Coins of the Pathan Kings of Delhi*, supp. by Rodgers, 63; Rodgers, *Kings of Ma'abur*, 36.

¹⁰ I am inclined to think that his sobriquet was Malik Yal, in preference to Ferishta's Gul or Badauni's Fath. Yal means an athlete or wrestler, and this goes well with his brother's sobriquet, Mukh, which means 'fire'. Abdullah Makki calls him 'al-awghan'—*Zafar-ul Walah*, I, 159.

practically the whole land was controlled by the officials and partisans of the Tughluqs. There was, for instance, a Hindu, Kandhra, who held Gulbarga, and Jalal Dohni, who was in possession of Kalyani. Khwaja-i Jahan proceeded against Gulbarga while Zafar Khan proceeded to Sagar, where he defeated the Sultan's army. The united forces at last succeeded and put Kandhra to flight and Zafar Khan returned triumphant to Daulatabad.¹¹

On reaching Daulatabad Zafar Khan found Ismail in a bad way, for Sultan Muhammad had himself arrived from Gujarat and was engaging Ismail's army. The battle was intense, even after Zafar Khan had joined the Deccan forces, but the Deccan tide was gaining the day. At the critical moment, however, Khwaja-i Jahan, who happened to be in the centre besides Ismail, was killed by an arrow, and the royal Deccan bodyguard took to flight. The tables were now turned and both Ismail and Zafar Khan had to retreat, while thousands of Ismail Shah's partisans lay dead on the field of battle. The revolutionary leaders, however, met in the thick of the night and decided that Ismail should regain the citadel proper, Dharakhera, while the other *amirs* moved to their jagirs, determined to fight the enemy from all quarters. The next day Sultan Muhammad took possession of the city. But he was not long at Daulatabad, for he had to leave for Gujarat to suppress a serious insurrection there, leaving Malik Jauhar in charge of the siege of Dharakhera, and Sartezi with instruction to oppose Zafar Khan.¹²

Zafar Khan moved from Gulbarga to Miraj and thence to Arka, where he stayed for three months and managed to ensure the help of the commander of the fortress, Iskandar Khan, and of some other important chiefs. In the meantime news was brought that Sartezi had occupied Gulbarga. On hearing this Zafar Khan hurried to Daulatabad, crossed the Godavari, defeated the enemy at Dharakhera and occupied Bir. From Bir he wheeled back to the Godavari and made a mass attack on the army of Delhi under Sartezi at Sindtan and completely routed it. Sartezi himself was killed. The whole Delhi army now laid down its arms. 'Camels of Bactria, horses of Tartary, female slaves and Abyssinian males by the thousands, *mans* of gold and silver bullion, hundreds of tents' and booty without count fell into Zafar Khan's hands.¹³ He was received by Ismail ten miles from Daulatabad and a fortnight later Ismail proclaimed his abdication, while 'the army as well as the concourse of the peo-

¹¹ Isami, 501-3; Ferishta, 275.

¹² Isami, 505-9; Badauni, 238; Barani, 516.

¹³ Barani, 516; Isami, 511-18. Sindtan is probably Sind Kher in the Bir district.

ple present' unanimously elected Zafar Khan as their king with the title of Sikandari-i Sani Abul Muzaffar Sultan Alauddin Hasan Bahman Shah al-Walial Bahmani. The new king was crowned by his preceptor, Shaikh Sirajuddin Junaidi on Friday, 11 August 1347.¹⁴

ALAUDDIN HASAN BAHMANI

As is the case with all revolutions, the kingdom which Alauddin had won was by no means a bed of roses. His personal jagirs consisted of scattered strips round Mubarakabad-Miraj and Belgam, while the whole country was full of free-lances with Tughluq sympathies but with no immediate programme save that of carving out petty principalities for themselves. There were also local Hindu chiefs, who thought it best to ally themselves with these malcontents and to make themselves independent. Lastly, there was the thorn of Ismail Mukh in the side of the new sovereign, for Ismail had tasted the power of royalty and it was quite possible for a party to be created in favour of his restoration. Alauddin's reign of a little over ten years (11 August 1347-11 February 1358) was taken up by a struggle against all these forces, and in the end Bahman Shah succeeded in putting the kingdom on a firm foundation.

Bahman Shah was a very ambitious monarch and actually wished to sit on the throne of the Tughluqs. In the South he had a mind to

14 Ferishta, 276; Badauni, 236. Both Ferishta (277) and Barani (514) say that the coronation took place on 23 November 1347, but we should prefer the contemporary Isami.

Shaikh Sirajuddin Junaidi was born at Peshawar in 1271 and was one of the divines who had accompanied Muhammad bin Tughluq to the Deccan. He later became the preceptor of Alauddin Hasan. Rafiuddin Shirazi's *Tazkhatul Muluk* (f. 6a) recounts many episodes of their relationship. He died at Gulbarga in 1380. It was he who girded the sword of state on Muhammad I at his coronation.

Till quite recently the story of Alauddin's services to 'Gangu, the Brahman of Delhi', and his rise due to his honesty and integrity, was accepted without a murmur. This episode was based on Ferishta, I, 273, 274. As a matter of fact this Brahman does not appear elsewhere at all. It is stated by Ferishta (I, 278) and the *Tabaqat-i Akbari* (408) that the name of 'Gangu Bahmani' appeared on the Sultan's signet-ring, but this is not corroborated by any other evidence.

The code word on which the sobriquet, 'Gangu' or 'Kanku' was probably based, seems to be 'Kakoya' mentioned in Amin Ahmad Razi's *Haft Aqlim*, as this word connects Hasan's family with the 'Kakuyads' of Isfahan, the scions of which fled to Afghanistan. This is corroborated by the fact that Hasan was the nephew of Malik Hizhabruddin of Ghur, who was an *amir* of Alauddin Khalji. After Hasan had become king, the genealogists had no difficulty in connecting his Persian family with one of the greatest of Persian royal dynasties, that of the great Bahman himself.

His title, Alauddin Bahman Shah, is evident from his coin in the Hyderabad Museum as well as from Isami (525).

cross the peninsular India as far as Rameshwaram, in the west and the north he wished to annex Gujarat, Malwa and Gwalior and, finally, to subdue Delhi itself; and had it not been for the wise counsel of his minister, Malik Saifuddin Ghuri, he would probably have frittered away all his energy in these impossible exploits. The Malik rightly advised the Sultan to pacify the recalcitrant parts of the Deccan first, after which it would perhaps be possible to cross into Malwa and Gujarat.¹⁵

It was with this object that the Sultan directed his commanders to penetrate into Deccan in all directions. The first campaign was undertaken by Husain Gurhasp, who proceeded to Qandhar and received the homage of the garrison after the Tughluq representative had fled to Bodhan. He then went to his objective, Kotgir, which he entered in triumph after defeating the Tughluq garrison.¹⁶ Next, Qutbul Mulk was sent to the south-west and subdued Maran, Mahendra and Akhalkot, which he renamed Saiyyidabad, and gave a general amnesty to every one in the neighbourhood who came and paid homage, guaranteeing perfect security to life and property. In the same way Qir Khan subdued Kalyani. The Sultan was so overjoyed at the annexation of this great stronghold that he gave the name of Fathabad (city of victory) to his capital, Daulatabad.¹⁷

Things proved more difficult for Sikandar Khan who was sent to Malkher, where they had to fight hand to hand with the levies of local Hindu zamindars. But once they had laid down their arms, they were guaranteed full security. Thus elated by his success, Sikandar moved to the capital of Kanya Nayak (or Kapaya Nayak) of Telingana, where he was received in right royal fashion. The host and the guest became great friends, and when they parted the Nayak requested him to take a couple of elephants with him as a present to the new overlord of the Deccan.¹⁸

It was now the turn of Gulbarga to mutiny under Pocha Reddy, who professed loyalty to the Tughluq cause. The Sultan ordered the

¹⁵ Ferishta, 279.

¹⁶ Isami, 531; *Burhan*, 16.

¹⁷ Isami, 533; Cf. *Rep. of the Hyd. Arch. Dept.*, 1359 F., 52-53, which says that Fathabad was a honorific name of Dharur, although Dharur did not acquire this name till Shah Jahan's reign. There is, instead, a decisive statement in *Burhan*, 17, that it was the subjugation of Kalyani which was responsible for the change of the name to Fathabad. This fully explains the Fathabad mint, in which some of Muhammad Shah's coins were struck.

¹⁸ 'Kapa' in Isami, 535; *Burhan*, 18. His name was Kapaya Nayak or Kanya Nayak, and he was a cousin of Proleya Nayak, who rebelled against Muhammad bin Tughluq and became the independent ruler of Warangal.

stalwarts of his entourage, Khwaja-i Jahan Azam Humayun and Qutbul Mulk, to besiege the fort, but Gulbarga held on till it was reduced by heavy catapult-shots and its supply of water had been cut off.¹⁹ The Sultan, now advancing in age, was greatly depressed at the incessant fighting he had to undertake to pacify the country, and when a rebellion broke out at Sagar, he himself took the field. On the king's approach the rebel, Muhammad bin Alam, begged for pardon, which was granted. He then moved to Khembhavi and thence to Mudhol, where the local chief, Narayan, was opposed to the Bahmani hegemony. He received homage from the chiefs on the way and on his approach Narayan shut himself up in the Jamkhandi fort. The Sultan besieged the fort and battered its walls with a thousand catapults. During the night entry was effected through a breach in the wall, and with the conquering forces was Dilip Singh, son of Sajan Singh of the line of Marwar. The victory was complete. The Sultan granted Dilip a jagir of ten (?) villages in the province of Daulatabad together with the honorific title of *sadr-i khasa khel* or commander of the royal bodyguard.²⁰ After a little further struggle, Narayan himself submitted, and the Sultan in his magnanimity pardoned him and allowed him to return to his former territory, which he was now to hold as a jagir.

It will be seen that the Sultan's policy had been uniform so far. His position was by no means enviable as he had to withstand a number of revolts and to pacify the country; but at the same time he was forgiving almost to a fault, and whenever an opponent laid down his arms, he was pardoned and given his former territory to be held as a jagir. But he had no tolerance with reference to his own followers, when they appealed to the sword against him. So when Qir Khan, the conqueror of Kalyani, rose in revolt and the revolt was put down, he showed no mercy and had him beheaded in his own presence.²¹ This was the second execution of its kind, for he had also, on a previous occasion, beheaded the former Sultan, Ismail, on the charge of high treason.

The last years of the Sultan's reign were taken up by expeditions to Dabul (which was henceforth to be the chief seaport of the Bahmani kingdom), Kalhar, Kolhapur and Goa, while in the north he is said

¹⁹ Isami, 542; *Burhan*, 8. Although Gulbarga had been proclaimed capital of the Deccan on the occasion of Bahman Shah's accession, the court had evidently remained at Daulatabad.

²⁰ Isami, 552, 554; Apte, *Mudhol Samsthanchya Ghonpare Gharanchya Itihas*, Poona, 1934; *Farman*, 1.

²¹ Qir Khan's rebellion—Isami, 563-67; *Burhan*, 25-27.

to have gone as far as Mandu in Malwa and made the people of the vicinity pay him tribute.²² In the east he swept over Telingana and joined issue with Bhaktiraja Eruva, the ruler of a principality which extended as far as Nellore. On his return he seems to have occupied Warangal, but he was defeated by Katya Vema at Dharamkota on the Krishna and also by Bhaktiraja at Pedakonda. He succeeded, however, in annexing Telingana as far as Bhongir.²³

Bahman Shah died on 11 February 1358 at the age of sixty-seven, leaving behind him a strong compact kingdom extending to thousands of square miles.²⁴ When someone asked him the secret of his success, he replied that it was all due to his kindness to every one, whether friend or foe, and his benevolence to the poor and the needy.²⁵ He was one of the first Muslim kings of India to order that no *jizya* should be levied from non-Muslim, while he allowed agricultural produce to all kinds to enter the kingdom free of tax.²⁶

M U H A M M A D I

Although Bahman Shah was too much absorbed in the pacification and unification of the land to make any contribution to the better administration of the country, still he had taken care to appoint his eldest son, Zafar Khan, heir to the throne. On his accession to the throne on 11 February 1358, Zafar Khan assumed the title of Muhammad Shah, and his position as sovereign of the Deccan was further strengthened by the formal sanction for the use of the *Khutba* and *sikkah* (i.e. the right of being mentioned in the Friday prayer and the right of coining money) conveyed to him on behalf of the Abbasid Caliph of Egypt by his mother, the dowager queen of the Deccan, on her return from the pilgrimage to Mecca in 1360.²⁷

Practically the whole of Muhammad's reign was taken up by

²² Gurti Venkata Rao, *Bahmani-Vijayanagar Relation*, Proc. Ind. Hist. Cong., Allahabad, 264; *Burhan*, 27.

²³ Venkataramanayya, *Rajahmundry Plates of Telugu Choda Annadeva*; *Epig. Ind.*, January 1941, 18 ff, especially 25. The author of the article seems to be doubtful regarding the implication of the name 'Daburu Khanu' occurring in the plates. There should, however, be no difficulty in identifying 'Daburu Khanu' with Bahman Shah himself as his title previous to his accession was Zafar Khan. See *Burhan*, 27.

²⁴ He was born about 1292. Ferishta (I, 281) says that he died on 11 February 1358 at the age of 67; this is corroborated by Ainuddin Bijapuri's *Mulhiqat*, quoted by Abdul Jabbar in his *Mahbubul Watan*, 202.

²⁵ Ferishta, I, 278; Abdul Jabbar, 146.

²⁶ Isami, 575.

²⁷ Ferishta, I, 285. *Sikkah* and *Khutba* were regarded as two of the most important emblems of royalty.

incessant quarrels with Vijayanagara and Telingana.²⁸ The breach of peace occurred owing to an ultimatum on the part of these two states demanding territory which had accrued to the Bahmani Deccan. The reply of the Sultan was naturally in the negative with the result that Kapaya Nayak, Raja of Telingana (who had befriended Sikandar Khan in the previous reign) sent his son, Vinayak Deva, towards Kaulas in 1362 with a large army consisting of infantry and cavalry, and he was in turn helped by 20,000 troops from Vijayanagara. The main Bahmani force under Amirul Umara Bahadur Khan met the Telingana army, defeated it and pursued it as far as Warangal, and forced Vinayak Deva to pay him a large tribute. But this was not the end of the affair, for another quarrel seems to have been picked up by the restive Vinayak Deva. But Muhammad proved to be too clever for the young man and had him arrested by a ruse. When Vinayak was brought before the Sultan, he became desperate and used expressions which were highly insulting to Muhammad Shah, and he was, therefore, immediately put to death. This greatly infuriated the Andhra population, which rose against the Sultan's army, when it was returning back to the capital. The Sultan himself was hit by a musket-ball and had to be carried to the Kaulas fort in a palanquin.²⁹

The two sides were again up in arms next year when news was brought to Gulbarga that Kapaya Nayak had invited Sultan Firuz Tughluq of Delhi to invade the Deccan. On hearing this Muhammad proceeded to Kaulas and thence direct to Warangal. Kapaya Nayak was expecting help from Vijayanagara which, however, did not arrive as there was a turmoil there regarding the succession to the throne.³⁰

28 It is easy enough to give a religious tinge to these wars; but we are aware of how rulers made religion an excuse for their own aggrandisement. The chronicles naturally exaggerated the stories of the massacres committed by their own party; and if we were to add together the casualties inflicted on the Hindus by the Muslims as given by our Indo-Persian chronicles, there should not be a Hindu left alive in the Deccan. If anything is certain, it is that without an influx of Muslims from overseas, it was the Muslims who were in danger of dying out, especially as we do not come across any noted converts to Islam till the last years of the Bahmani rule.

29 Vinayak Deva had taken refuge in his fief, referred to as *Filampatam*, *Belampatan*; *Velampatan*, no doubt *Palampet*, was an ancient town in the Warangal district. This has been mixed up with a coastal town. *Vatlampallam*, in the *Cambridge History of India* (III, 379); there is no evidence that Muhammad's army ever reached this place. *Palampet* was once the headquarters of a province of the Warangal state, according to *Burhan*, 31.

30 There is a clear indication in *Ferishta* (I, 257) that 'Dev Rai' died about this time. We are told, however, that Bukka reigned up to 1376, but we are also aware that there was some squabble for the throne of Vijayanagara, the parties being the two brothers, Bukka and Kampa; and the rights of the latter were claimed by his son, Sangama II. We find from a Nellore inscription that Kampa was on the throne at least till 1335 (*Eptg. Ind.*, II, 21). There is another inscription at Nellore, which alludes

Also no help came from Delhi. Kapaya Nayak was, therefore, forced to lay down his arms and to accept the conditions imposed upon him by the Bahmani Sultan. In addition to a large amount of indemnity, he had to cede the town of Golkonda, which hereafter became the inter-state frontier.³¹ It was on this occasion that the Telingana envoy presented the Sultan with the famous turquoise throne, on which the Bahmani sultans sat at their coronation almost right up to the end of the dynasty. Muhammad Shah sat on it for the first time just before the autumnal equinox on 21 March 1353.

Muhammad now turned towards Vijayanagara. Perhaps in order to ascertain his position *vis-a-vis* the Rava, he cynically drew a formal draft on the treasury of Vijayanagara for the payment of the wages of three hundred singers from Delhi, who had come to Gulbarga probably to attend the celebration of Prince Mujahid's marriage to Malik Saifuddin Ghuri's daughter. Bukka, who was now securely seated on the Vijayanagara throne, was greatly incensed and replied by the invasion of the Bahmani kingdom with a huge force³² consisting of 8,000 horse, nine lakhs of foot-soldiers and 3,000 elephants. The Bahmani army, tired and fatigued by the last campaign in Telingana, seemed no match for this immense man-power, and it was with comparative ease that the Vijayanagara army crossed the Tungabhadra and captured Mudkal. But it was not for long that Mudkal could be kept by the victors; for when Muhammad appeared, the southern army took to flight, leaving the fortress to the Bahmanis. The Sultan now pursued the Vijayanagara army into its own territory, crossing the Tungabhadra

to Sangama as Raya on 3 May 1356. On the other hand we find that Bukka regarded his reign to have commenced in 1343, and he died in 1379. Sewell infers from this in his *A Forgotten Empire*, 28, that the succession to the throne was disputed after Harihara's death, and when Bukka got the upper hand, he claimed to have succeeded Harihara immediately after his death.

What seems probable is that after Harihara's death in 1343, the throne was occupied by Kampa, who reigned till 1355, and was succeeded by his son, Sangama, who died about the end of 1362. His successor, Bukka, regarded the period, 1343-63, as one of usurpation and ante-dated his rule to 1343.

Ferishta, therefore, probably alludes to Kampa's death when he says 'about this time (764/1362-63) the Raya of Vijayanagara died'. *CHI* (III, 378) does not mention Kampa and Sangama II at all. Venkataramanayya (*Mujahid Shah Bahmani*, Tr. Ind. Hist. Cong., 1941, 572) says that probably 764 A.H. in Newal Kishore's Persian edition of Ferishta is a misprint for 774 A.H., which would place the peace between Telingana and the Deccan in Mujahid's reign. But even then the conundrum of the death of a ruler of Vijayanagara would not be solved, as Bukka died some time between 12 December 1376 and 26 February 1377. I feel that the solution of the problem is possible only if my surmise is accepted.

³¹ Ferishta, I, 237.

³² The figure of 'nine lakhs of soldiers and 3,000 elephants' is physically impossible (Barrow).

at Siruguppa. This campaign is remarkable for the fact that it is the first time that we hear of Europeans serving an Indian ruler on Indian soil. A great battle took place near the village of Kautalam on 20 July 1366, resulting in the complete rout of the Vijayanagara army under its commander, Bhojmal Rai.³³

The Sultan next marched to Adoni, the headquarters of the Vijayanagara army, and after mopping up the remnants of the enemy forces, he moved on to the capital of the southern state. But here he had to face the guerrilla forces, which were intercepting his line of retreat; so it was only when the Sultan was again in his own territory that he felt strong enough to attack the southern forces and defeat them to the extent that the Raya had to lay down his arms. When Bukka's envoys reached the royal camp, Muhammad Shah smiled and said that he would be content if the draft on the Raya's treasury was paid.³⁴

The Sultan also ordered that in future wars only actual combatants should be killed and that prisoners of war should not be molested.

While the Sultan was still near Vijayanagara, the governor of Daulatabad, Bahram Khan Mazandrani, rose in rebellion but had to fly to Gujarat and the Sultan pursued him formally as far as Patan.

The Sultan died on 21 April 1375. He was one of the greatest rulers of the dynasty and was the statesman who really consolidated the comparatively loose heritage left to him by his father. He was jealous of his own power and prestige even to the extent that he made his own father-in-law, Malik Saifuddin Ghuri, stand before him while he was holding his *darbar*. He had a leaning towards acting according to the directions of religious divines; thus he left off drinking wine at the protest of Shaikh Zainuddin, and he always counted upon the prayers of his preceptor, Shaikh Sirajuddin Junaidi, whenever he set out on a campaign. His great work was the organization of the political machinery of the state on semi-civil lines. He divided the kingdom into *atraf*s (or provinces) centred round Daulatabad, Berar, Bidar and Gulbarga. Gulbarga included the town and district of Bijapur and was usually put under one of the most important officers of the kingdom, the *malik naib* or viceroy.

The military forces were similarly reorganized. The commander-in-chief was henceforth called *Amirul Umara* and a group of officers, called *barbardaran*, was created whose duty it was to mobilize troops

³³ Bhojmal Rai's real name was Mallinatha, according to Sewell, 37, and he supports this by Rice's recension of certain inscriptions of 1355-57. The name 'Bhojmal Rai' occurs in Ferishta, I, 290-91.

³⁴ It is remarkable that the Sultan did not exact any indemnity. He seems to have been satisfied with the subordinate position Vijayanagara had accepted now. See Ferishta, I, 292.

in time of need. There were, besides, two hundred *yakka jawanan* or *silahdaran*, whose duty it was to keep charge of the personal arms of the Sultan. Besides this, there was a well-equipped force of 4,000 bodyguards of the Sultan, who were called *khasah khel*.

Thus when Muhammad died, he left a strong and compact state for his successor. He had humbled Telingana and Vijayanagara and had suppressed the formidable rising of Bahram Khan Mazandarani. At his death his kingdom was at peace with foreign powers as well as its own people.

ALAUDDIN MUJAHID

Muhammad was succeeded on 21 April 1375 by his son, Mujahid, surnamed Alauddin, at the age of nineteen. The new king was fully instructed in the arts of war and peace and was an expert in riding, archery and swordsmanship. He was a man of unusual prowess and earned for himself the sobriquet of *Balwant* ³⁵

The whole of his short reign was taken up with the war against Vijayanagara. Bukka was smarting at the insult offered him by Muhammad I, and now that Muhammad was no more, he claimed the Raichur Doab from the new monarch. The Sultan, therefore, placed the whole kingdom in the charge of Malik Naib Saifuddin Ghuri, and started south with a large army. His strategy was to encircle the southern capital. So, while on the one hand he ordered Saifdar Khan Sistani to lay siege to Adoni, he also directed Bahadur Khan to proceed to Vijayanagara itself, while he himself marched first towards Ganga-wati and from there right up to the capital. Bukka had recourse to guerrilla warfare in the south and Mujahid pursued him for six months, reaching as far south as 'Sita Ban Rameshwar'. In the meantime Bukka had fallen ill and returned to Vijayanagara, where he shut himself up in a citadel situated on the top of a hillock. But the guerrilla warriors abounded, and they seem to have cut off the lines of the Sultan's communications, with the result that he had to fight his way back northwards ³⁶

At last a pitched battle was fought between the two armies under

³⁵ The accession name, Alauddin, is clear from his coins. See Speight, *Coins of Bahmani Kings*, Islamic Culture, 1935, 290. For *Balwant*, see the *Tazkiratul Muluk*, f. 88(a).

³⁶ Probably this was about the time when Bukka died and was succeeded by Harihara II. See Venkataramanavva, *Mujahid Shah Bahmani*, Transactions, Ind. Hist. Cong., (1941), where it is argued that Bukka died between 26 December 1376 and 24 February 1377. The learned doctor seems to disbelieve that Mujahid ever reached so far south as Rameshwaram and agrees with Briggs and Sewell that he only reached Cape Ramas, south of Goa. It is clear from Ferishta, I, 298 that the place was 600 *karohs* from Vijayanagara which cannot apply to Cape Ramas. Moreover the doctor

the very walls of Vijayanagara. No quarter was shown on either side, and the battle took the form of a mutual massacre. It ended in the retreat of the Bahmani forces, decimated by gun-fire as well as by pestilence. The Sultan wished to relieve his garrison, which had been beleaguered at Adoni for many months, but Saifuddin Ghuri, who was now accompanying the Sultan, advised him to reduce the Raichur Doab first. On arrival at Mudkal the Sultan set out on a hunting expedition with just four hundred companions, including his cousin, Daud. Daud had been scolded by Mujahid during the battle of Vijayanagara for abandoning his post and was touched to the quick. He now hatched a plot against the Sultan and had him stabbed to death while asleep in his tent on 16 April 1378.³⁷

DAUD SHAH

But Daud (16 April—21 May 1378) was not to reign in peace for long. Practically all the nobles of the kingdom were aghast at the foul deed, while Harihara II of Vijayanagara crossed the Tungabhadra and laid siege to Raichur. The capital was in a great turmoil, and while Daud was attending the Friday prayer in the great mosque of Gulburga Fort on 21 May 1378, he was stabbed in the act of prostration (*sijdah*) by one Bakah at the instance of Mujahid's sister, Ruh Parwar Agha.

MUHAMMAD SHAH II

Daud was succeeded by a grandson of Bahman Shah, Muhammad II (21 May 1378—20 April 1397), in preference to Daud's son, Sanjar, who was blinded. Muhammad proved to be one of the most peace-loving and cultured monarchs of the line of Bahman Shah. He found means to end the hostilities, which had been going on since the reign of Muhammad I. Except for some skirmishes at Goa, Adoni and Kottakonda, and the reputed capture of Rangini by the Vijayanagara general, Chenappa, in 1395, we find that on the whole there was peace between the two neighbouring states during the nineteen years of the reign of Muhammad II.³⁸

argues from a copper plate that Harihara 'established again a kingdom acquired by his father', which clearly shows that practically the whole state must have been overrun by Mujahid.

³⁷ The date of the murder is calculated as follows. Daud was murdered after a reign of one month and five days on 21 May 1378. Mujahid, therefore, must have been murdered on 16 April 1378.

³⁸ The genealogy and even the name of Muhammad is wrongly stated by Ferishta, I, 301. He was definitely the grandson of Bahman Shah, and was a son of Mahmud, as is clear from his brass *fuls*. Ferishta is equally wrong when he says that Mahmud's name is mentioned in *Futuh-us Salatin*, as that book was completed in 1350 and the

For a long time Muhammad had no issue, and he had, therefore, adopted the two surviving sons of his predecessor (Daud), named Firuz and Ahmad, and given them the best possible education under the supervision of the celebrated Iranian, Mir Fazlullah Inju, and had them betrothed to two of his own daughters. But with the birth of a son, Ghiyasuddin, things naturally took a different turn and Muhammad appointed his own son as heir and successor to the throne. He died of typhoid fever on 4 April 1397, and it was ominous that on the very next day also died the grand old man of the Deccan, Malik Saifuddin Ghuri, who had lived through five reigns and had been the prime minister of the Deccan during the storms and stresses of four reigns.

GHIYASUDDIN TAHMTAN

Muhammad was succeeded by his son, Ghiyasuddin (4 April—14 June 1397), surnamed Tahmtan, at the age of seventeen.³⁹ Tahmtan began his reign well and appointed capable persons, many of whom were Iranians, to places of honour and responsibility. This was not to the liking either of the old nobility or of the new Turkish element, which was gaining power at the capital, headed by one Taghalchin, who aspired to succeed to the post of the late Malik Naib Saifuddin Ghuri. When the youthful king was intoxicated with wine at his house, Taghalchin went upstairs to the *zenana* part of the building, but instead of bringing his handsome and cultured daughter, with whom the Sultan had fallen in love, he brought a shining dagger and blinded the king with the dagger-point. He then dethroned Tahmtan and sent him a prisoner to Sagar after a reign of a little over a couple of months. This was on 14 June 1397.

SHAMSUDDIN DAUD II

Taghalchin now put Tahmtan's step-brother, Shamsuddin Daud II (14 June—11 November 1397), on the throne and got himself

only Bahmani sovereign mentioned there is Bahman Shah. Mahmud's name is further proved by a number of inscriptions at Sagar; see *Epiq. Indo-Mosl.*, 1931-32, 9-12.

There is divergence in the dates of the accession of these sultans in our authorities and the only definite date given is that of Shamsuddin Daud's accession. By a series of computations, I have reached the conclusions embodied in this chapter.

There is an episode in Muhammad II's reign, referred to in the chapter on the Vijayanagara empire, which shows that the conflicts between the Bahmani kingdom and the Vijayanagara empire were purely political. It is the alliance between the Recherla ruler, Anavota of Dewarkonda, and Muhammad Shah II against the Raya of Vijayanagara, culminating in the defeat of the latter. The reference is to *Ep. Car.*, XII, CK 15.

³⁹ The word 'Tahmtan' is clear on his coins. See Speight, *op. cit.*, 294. The Hyderabad edition of the *Burhan*, 38, has 'Ghiyasuddin Bahman', which is apparently due to a misreading of the title.

appointed *malik naib* and *Mir Jumla* of the kingdom. But Bahmani politics now began to take a new shape. It has been related that Muhammad II's daughters had been married to Firuz and Ahmad, whom he had been brought up as his own sons. The two princesses now set their husbands up to take revenge on the perpetrators of the crime against their brother, Ghiyasuddin. Taghalchin sensed this and suggested to Daud that the two brothers should be blinded like the unlucky Tahmtan. On getting suspicious of what was in store for them, the two brothers fled to Sagar and from there sent an ultimatum to Daud that Taghalchin must be dismissed. The reply was, of course, in the negative, and so they advanced on the capital. They were, however, beaten at Martur, near the capital, and had to retreat to Sagar. Firuz, however, had recourse to a ruse. He pretended that he was loyal to the Sultan, and the Sultan agreed that the two brothers might enter Gulbarga, provided they kept the peace. But once in Gulbarga they were informed that Taghalchin was again conspiring against them. They, therefore, secretly gathered round them all the malcontents of the city, entered the Audience Hall of the Palace, and fighting inch by inch, they put Taghalchin to death and imprisoned Daud, who was later allowed to proceed to Mecca. Firuz now formally ascended the throne as Sultan Tajuddin Firuz Shah Bahmani.

TAJUDDIN FIRUZ

Most of the quarter of a century during which Firuz (11 November 1397—22 September 1422) reigned over the Deccan was taken up by the war against Vijayanagara and its confederates. Almost immediately after his accession, the new Sultan had to face a rebellion at Sagar, followed by the revolt of Narsingh of Kherla, who was helped by Malwa and Khandesh. Firuz began by quelling the Sagar revolt, and it is noticeable that he was helped by a number of Hindu chiefs, the most prominent of whom was Bhairon Singh, the progenitor of the rajas of Mudhol.⁴⁰

The Raya of Vijayanagara thought that the moment was opportune and, persuading Katya Vema of Rajamundry to cover his flank, he attacked the Raichur Doab in a fanlike movement, simultaneously covering Mudkal, Raichur and other places. In spite of these

⁴⁰ The name is Tajuddin in Firuz's coins; see Speight, *Coins of Bahmani Kings*, *op. cit.*, 290; Pl. II.

Concerning the limits of his reign, Ferishta and Burhan agree that his predecessor, Daud II, reigned for fifty-seven days, which brings us to 11 November 1397 as the date of Firuz's accession. He was over 70 when he died, according to Burhan, which appears here as in other places to be more reliable than Ferishta.

advantages, Bukka of Vijayanagara could not cross the Krishna on account of the floods; in fact, neither of the armies could cross over to the other bank. But a Muslim qazi, named Siraj, who must have been accomplished in the vernaculars, resorted to a strange trick for helping the Sultan. He crossed over the river with just a few persons, all disguised as beggars, and got admission to the house of a female singer, who used to perform at the Vijayanagara camp in the evening. The pseudo-mendicants begged the girl to allow them to accompany her as they were all well-versed in music and song. They sang well and played interludes to the delight of all. The Raya's son was enjoying himself and was thoroughly drunk, when Siraj suddenly stabbed him to death. There was a terrible uproar; and at the same time nearly four thousand Bahmani horse and foot appeared, putting the astonished Vijayanagaris to flight. Next morning Firuz himself appeared to finish off the work, and he pursued the fleeing army of the Raya right up to Vijayanagara. Harihara was forced to agree to pay ten lakhs of *huns* to the Bahmani Sultan, who thereupon retired, appointing Faulad Khan governor of the Raichur Doab.⁴¹

After staying for two or three months at Gulbarga, Firuz proceeded to Kherla. On reaching Mahur he received the homage of the local *muqaddam*. Narsingh of Kherla was expecting help from Gondwana, but he was disappointed and had to fight single-handed the Bahmani army, which was led by the Sultan himself. He was defeated and had to pay an indemnity of five *mans* of gold and fifty *mans* of silver besides forty elephants, while on his part the Sultan appointed him an *amir* of the Deccan and restored Kherla to him. Firuz then moved to Telingana, where a conflict was going on between the Velamas, who were the Sultan's friends, and the Vemas, the chief of whom was Katya Vema, who had sided with Harihara of Vijayanagara. We have only an obscure knowledge of Firuz's progress in Telingana, for while some authorities state that Telingana was annexed as the result of the campaign, we also find that tribute was later demanded from the ruler of that territory. Moreover, while he is supposed to have reached Rajamundry, we are also told elsewhere that he could not cross the Godavari as Doddaya Alla proved to be too strong for him. The truth seems to be that even if the Sultan did

⁴¹ 10 lakhs of *huns*, or nearly 33 lakhs of *tankas*, is the sum which seems to have been fixed as the annual tribute from Vijayanagara. It was the non-payment of this sum at regular intervals which led to so many wars in future. In this campaign Choda Annadeva assisted the Bahmanis against Vijayanagara; see EC, XXVI, 29-31, referred to in the chapter on Vijayanagara. It may be noticed that the amount is identical with that fixed on a previous occasion. *Burhan*, 44, even mentions that the sum was in arrears.

take possession of Telingana, it was a precarious possession; and when he retired home, he lost control of the territory.

It was about the end of 1398 that Timur, the great Central Asian conqueror and the progenitor of great Mughals, invaded India. When Firuz got to know the great conqueror's programme about invading India, he sent his trusted messengers to Timur's capital, Samarqand, offering him his respects and welcoming him to the country. Timur was greatly flattered and, calling Firuz his own son, made him a gift of the kingdom of the Deccan (which was Firuz's by right) and also of Malwa and Gujarat (which were beyond Firuz's reach). The rulers of central India got frightened at this and sent messages to Timur offering him their homage. This is a good illustration of the international usages of those times and also demonstrates the policy of the Bahmani Sultan, who got his title affirmed by Timur, and the virtual understanding that the great Central Asian conqueror would not molest his kingdom in case he came to South India.

Towards the end of 1406 Deva Raya I ascended the Vijayanagara throne and almost immediately got himself entangled in a love affair, which was to open a new chapter in the social relations of the Hindus and the Bahmanis of the Deccan. It was brought to the notice of the Raya that the daughter of a certain goldsmith of Mudkal, Parthal by name, was extremely pretty and was, besides, trained in music, the fine arts and polite conversation. Deva Raya thereupon sent a Brahman to Mudkal to bring Parthal to Vijayanagara by hook or by crook, and even, if need be, by the aid of religious pretensions. But Parthal would have none of it and refused to proceed south. Deva Raya was greatly incensed and invaded the Doab with a large army. The people of Mudkal were scared and left their houses for the jungle, while the Bahmani governor, Faulad Khan, made short work of the invaders.

Firuz marched south in person and pursued the Vijayanagara forces right up to the walls of their city. He laid seige to the capital, sent his brother to manage the southern provinces and despatched Mian Siddhu, the *sar-naubat*, to besiege Bankapur, which was soon captured. At last the Raya sued for peace and agreed to give his daughter in marriage to the Sultan with Bankapur as her dowry, and to pay ten lakhs of *huns*, five *mans* of pearls, fifty elephants, and a thousand male and female slaves adept in the arts of reading, writing, music and dancing.

After the bride had been brought to the royal camp, the Sultan rode in state to the Raya's palace at Vijayanagara, a distance of nearly twenty miles. Old enmities were forgotten and the cavalcade marched

over velvet and brocade, which had been spread over ten miles of the route by Deva Raya's orders. When the Sultan arrived at the central square of the city, he dismounted and walked on foot to the palace, surrounded by the nobles of Vijayanagara and the relatives of the ruler. He was his father-in-law's guest for three days; after returning, he sent for the lovely Parthal from Mudkal and had her married to his son, Hasan Khan.

In 1417 the Sultan began to aspire to the hegemony of the whole of the eastern coast of Telingana, and allying himself with his erstwhile enemy, Pedda Komati Vema of Kondavidu, marched right up to the fortifications of Rajamundry. But the ally proved too weak, and Firuz wheeled round northwards, defeated Narasimha IV of Orissa and carried off a large booty. It was now that the ruler of Vijayanagara broke his plighted word and besieged Panagal. Firuz was forced to collect his forces and, with the help of Ramachandra of Dewarkonda, he put to flight a Vijayanagara army at the pass of Bandi. The siege of Panagal went on for two long years, till Deva Raya arrived in person and put the Bahmani army to flight. The Bahmanis were put to great straits, partly owing to the appearance of pestilence in their camp; and while Deva Raya was pursuing them, Anapota Velama advanced and captured Modak. It was with the greatest difficulty that Khan-i Khanan drove the Vijayanagaris from the Raichur Doab.⁴²

Firuz was now getting very old; he appointed his son, Hasan Khan, heir-apparent in 1416 and allowed him to use all the paraphernalia of royalty. Three years previously, in 1413, a great saint, Hazrat Gusu Daraz, had come to Gulbarga from Delhi and begun to attract a large number of disciples to his place of retirement in the immediate vicinity of the fort on the western side. A strife between the erudite Sultan and the saint was inevitable and, learned as he was, Firuz began to doubt the worth of the saint in the realm of scientific thought. The tension increased and the saint had to betake himself to a spot, where his tomb now stands, a couple of miles from his *khanqah*. On the other hand, Firuz's brother, Ahmad, knew the spiritual and moral influence which the saint exercised and strove to make himself popular with the saint's disciples.

This made the Sultan's entourage jealous and they began to poison his ears against Ahmad. Two of the courtiers, Hoshiyar Ainul Mulk and Bidar Nizamul Mulk, advised the Sultan to blind Ahmad

⁴² The sequence of these events is very obscure, specially the question of the connection of the campaign of Rajamundry with the Orissan war and the siege of Panagal. I have, to a large extent, followed the order of events set down by Dr. Venkataramanayya in *Ep. Ind.*, 1941, 84-87. See Banerji, *History of Orissa*, I, 287.

and thus put him out of his way. This news reached Ahmad, and he stole out of the capital with his boon companion, Khalaf Hasan of Basrah, and barely 400 horsemen. But he soon found himself supported by an army more than twenty thousand strong. Khalaf Hasan had recourse to a ruse. In order to delude the Sultan's army, he put together four hundred oxen borrowed from the local *banjaras*, and driving them right into the enemy's camp, he attacked the royal army at the dead of night, supported by real cavalry in the rear. The army of Gulbarga was soon overpowered by the stampede of its own elephants, and the victorious Ahmad marched towards the capital. He was met by Firuz five miles outside the city, but there was no fighting as a large part of the royal army had gone over to Ahmad on the field. On 22 September 1422, the gates of the capital were flung open for Ahmad; it was a poignant scene when Firuz, reconciling himself to the changed situation, led his victorious brother to the throne-room, tied the sword of state to his waist, and helped him to take his seat on the turquoise throne.

Firuz was the last of the Bahmani sovereigns of Gulbarga, for, as will be seen, soon after his accession Ahmad shifted his capital to Bidar. Firuz was one of the most renowned potentates of the Gulbarga period and his reign saw the synthesis of what was later to develop into the Deccan culture. It was perhaps due to his lack of foresight that he developed a quarrel with the saint, Gesu Daraz, with dire effects, for he should have gauged the tremendous influence exercised by the saint over the nobles and subjects alike. It must, however, be added that during his reign Firuz successfully kept the balance between the divergent forces which were swaying the Deccan by his policy of political and social conciliation, which could not find an expression again for many years to come.⁴³

⁴³ Firuz reigned for 27 years, 7 months and 11 days. According to the solar calendar this would mean from 15 November 1397 to 22 September 1422. Ferishta, *Burhan* and the *Tabaqat-i Akbari* agree about the date of his successor's accession.

II. THE BAHMANIS OF MUHAMMADABAD-BIDAR

SHIHABUDDIN¹ AHMAD I

AHMAD (22 September 1422—14 July 1436) had not been long on the Bahmani throne when he suffered a great shock owing to the death of his benefactor, Hazrat Gesu Daraz, on 1 November 1422. He now seriously began to think of the change of capital from Gulbarga to Bidar. This change of the seat of government was really symbolic of the revolution which was taking place in the Bahmani state. What the shrewd Sultan wanted was to put the throne on a sounder pedestal than was possible in the intriguing atmosphere of Gulbarga, where regicides abounded and uncertainties of succession prevailed. It is remarkable how the right of primogeniture became firmly established at Bidar, and there was not a single instance of regicide or deposition till the beginning of the sixteenth century, when all had been lost. Apart from this, Ahmad must have weighed the salubriousness and fertility of Bidar against the sultry and arid atmosphere of Gulbarga, and it is this aspect which is exemplified in the story of the fox chasing the dog and other legends of the same category.²

These and other considerations must have led Ahmad Shah to shift to Bidar. Many dates have been assigned to this important event, and range from 1423 to 1426. The earlier date seems to be correct, as there is no reason why Ahmad should have delayed the change, especially when he must have been fully aware of the climatic excellence of Bidar, which had been the metropolis of the Deccan before Muhammad bin Tughluq made Daulatabad one of the capitals of the empire. This surmise is corroborated by the *Tazkiratul Muluk* and the *Burhan-i Ma'asir* as well as by the inscription on the Solah Khamba mosque within the Bidar fort, which indicates that the mosque was built in 1424 by Prince Muhammad, who gave his name,

¹ For the title Shihabuddin, see the inscription in *Epig. Indo-Mosl.*, 1931-32, 16, and *Burhan*, 53.

² Ferishta, I, 324, extols the beauty and the climatic excellence of Bidar. The famous episode of the fox chasing the dog is given by Ferishta and the *Muntakhabul Lubab*, III, 71, which is varied into the fox and the hare in the *Tazkiratul Muluk*. The story, strangely enough, is repeated in the search for the site of Ahmadnagar later.

As to the time of the transfer of the capital: Ferishta and Khafi Khan are for 830 A.H. (1427 A.D.), while *Burhan*, 54, is for Rajab 827/June 1423.

Gulbarga was the capital of the kingdom at least on 24 April 1423, the date on which Makhzumi finished copying out his work on the Arabic grammar, *Manhatul Sufi*.

Muhammadabad, to the new capital. *Burhan* says that the king moved to Bidar in June 1424, and we may take this to be the definite date of the shifting of the capital.

Shihabuddin Ahmad began his reign by the policy of conciliating opponents and by appointing his benefactor, Khalaf Hasan, to the posts of *malikut tujjar* and prime minister. He also systematized the *mansabdari* system by granting large jagirs to military commanders for the upkeep of the armies under their command, and by defining the amount of *mansab* of civil officers.

After putting these and other reforms into force, the Sultan proceeded against Vijayanagara, as certain matters had been left undecided in the last reign and he felt the pang of a defeat at the hands of the southern neighbour. But the Raya of Vijayanagara sought the friendship of the Velama court, with the result that the Bahmani forces were worsted in Telingana. Fortune, however, favoured Ahmad in the southern zone, for he was successful in crossing the Tungabhadra and forcing Bukka to fly back to his capital. The Sultan had a hairbreadth escape when he was surrounded by the southern guerillas in a barn, and had it not been for his *afaqi* (foreign) friends, he would have been done to death. The Sultan was able to march right up to the gates of Vijayanagara and did not turn his back till the 'arrears of tribute' had been paid. He then proceeded toward Telingana in 1425 and stopped at the hill fort of Golkonda, while his general Khan-i Azam Abdul Latif Khan defeated Anapota Velama at Warangal. The Sultan entered Warangal in triumph, and before leaving Telingana appointed Khan-i Azam its governor.³

In 1426 the Sultan advanced towards Mahur and led a number of campaigns in that part of the country. He advanced far into the Gondwana territory, reduced Ellichpur, captured Gawil and repaired the fort at Narnala. But Mahur was not subdued and the Sultan had to lead a number of campaigns in the vicinity.

What Ahmad really wanted was to preserve his lines of communications with central India, and it was his ambition to reduce Malwa, Khandesh and even Gujarat. His first great success was attained when Narsingh, the chief of Kherla, requested him to declare Kherla a Bahmani protectorate. But it was not long before Narsingh went over to Sultan Hushang of Malwa. Ahmad advanced northwards in 1429 while Sultan Hushang also moved towards Kherla. Perhaps finding the enemy more powerful than himself, Ahmad had to retreat back into the Bahmani territory and take up a strong position there.

³ *Velugotivaricamsacali*, Intr., 36; *Ferishta*, 322; *Briggs*, 406. It is probably this campaign to which *Burhan*, 58, is referring.

This had the desired effect, and the Malwa Sultan had to fall back, leaving his sons, daughters and whole of his *zenana* behind. The Bahmani Sultan was chivalrous enough to order that they should be escorted back across the border. He now pardoned Narsingh, declared Kherla a Bahmani protectorate, and made Mahur the northern outpost of the Deccan.⁴

The Malwa campaign and its hardships made Ahmad Shah reorient his policy with regard to at least one of the neighbouring states, Khandesh; and it was about this time that Prince Alauddin of the Deccan was married to Princess Agha Zainab, daughter of Nasir Khan Faruqi, ruler of Khandesh.

After a short campaign against the dacoits and rebels of Konkan, which was successfully undertaken, the Bahmani Sultan was dragged into a quarrel between Ahmad Shah of Gujarat, one of the most eminent of Gujarati monarchs, and Hushang Shah of Malwa. Ahmad Shah Bahmani opposed the pretensions of the Sultan of Gujarat, and the Bahmani army advanced right up to Nandurbar and Sultanpur. It was, however, routed at the battle of Nandurbar and again at the Manek Pass. Ahmad then ordered his troops to make a flanking movement to Mahim, near Bombay, which was occupied. The Gujarati force, in its turn, occupied the Bahmani town of Thana; and Khalaf Hasan, who had subdued Mahim, had to retreat to Bombay. Owing to an urgent call for help from him, the Sultan sent his son, Prince Muhammad, with a large army to Bombay. But as ill-luck would have it, there arose a rift between the two sections of the Bahmani forces, the Dakhini and the Afaqi, and the former decided to non-cooperate with the commander-in-chief. Defeat was inevitable; and the Gujaratis cut to pieces practically the whole of the Bahmani army, carrying off a huge amount of booty. The Bahmani Sultan now hurried to the west himself, while Ahmad Shah of Gujarat also marched southwards. The two armies met on the banks of the Tapti, but after a few skirmishes both monarchs decided to enter into a treaty at the town of Beul. This treaty is important as peace between the Deccan and Gujarat was maintained as an article of faith by both states for a whole century.⁵

All this could not add to prestige of the Deccan, and advantage

⁴ This is what can be gleaned from the different, and sometimes contradictory, accounts of the campaign given by our authorities, e.g. *Burhan*, 58-60; *Ferishta*, I, 323-25.

⁵ The Konkan and the Bombay campaigns: *Ferishta*, II, 188, I, 327; *Burhan*, 66-67; *Commissariat, History of Gujarat*, 89. There are certain differences between the description of these campaigns in *Ferishta* and *Burhan*, but the latter is fuller and more convincing.

of the weakness of the government of Muhammadabad-Bidar was taken by the chiefs of Telingana. Rajamundry had already been lost; now the Velamas declared their independence and the old Sultan had to move eastwards in person. He forced Singa III of Warangal to pay him tribute and practically pacified the whole country, though the recalcitrant chiefs were left in possession of their estates.

It was not long after his return that the king died on 14 July 1436, after a short illness.⁶ His reign was a landmark in the history of the Bahmanis, for it was he who, by appointing his eldest son, Zafar Khan, as his heir, established the rule of primogeniture and thus made the foundation of the state stronger than before. His reign was also noted for justice and fair play and he was chivalrous to his enemies almost to a fault. He was pious and God-fearing. He is even now regarded as a saint in the Deccan, while his capital, Muhammadabad-Bidar, became the rendezvous of scholars from Iran, Iraq and Arabia. But this, unfortunately, led even to a greater cleavage between the new immigrants or the *afaqis* and the old settlers, now called the Dakhinis, which had serious repercussions not long after. On the other hand the policy of marriage with Hindu ladies, which the Sultan encouraged by his own example, had a direct bearing on the general life of the people as well as in arts and architecture.

ALAUDDIN AHMAD II

The change that had been brought about in the structure of the kingdom by the late king led to the peaceful accession of the new monarch, a unique phenomenon in the Bahmani state.

Alauddin (14 July 1436—4 March 1458) had to lead a series of campaigns not only against the empire of Vijayanagara but also against Khandesh. The Vijayanagara campaign was necessitated by the usual non-payment of tribute, which had been in arrears for five years, as well as by the fact that Deva Raya II had wrongly seized Anegundi on the south-western bank of the Tungabhadra.⁷ This was in 1436, that is the year of the Sultan's accession; and he sent his brother, Muhammad, to demand the tribute by force, which was realised forthwith. But now the enemies of the dynasty instigated the young prince to demand half the kingdom from Alauddin Ahmad

⁶ The date on Ahmad's sepulchre is 29 Zil Hij 839/14 July 1426. The name, Ahmad, is found in Abdur Razzaq's *Matla'us Sa'dain* and corroborated by coins. See Speight, *Coins of the Bahmani Kings, Islamic Culture*, 1935, 291, 296, 297; Sakhavi's *Dawul Lami*, X, 144. The name is also found in a door-way at Naubad, a suburb of Bidar, *Eplg. Indo-Mosl.*, 1935-36, 35.

⁷ See Sewell and Aiyangar, *Hist. Inscr. of Southern India*, 218.

and to put the royal crown on his own head. Muhammad actually captured Raichur, Mudkal and Naldrug, and the Sultan had to move to the south in person to face his brother. Muhammad was defeated but pardoned and given the jagir of Rajachal.⁸ In the same way the prime minister, Dilawar Khan, was successful in the campaign led by him in 1436 against the ruler of Sangameshwar. He brought back the Rai's pretty and accomplished daughter with him, and the Sultan married her in the proper style and gave her the title of Queen *Zeba Chahra* or 'Beautiful of Face'.

This marriage had an acute repercussion on the international politics of the Deccan, for the pretty daughter of Sangameshwar began to exercise a decided influence on her royal husband, and this led to the jealousy of the senior queen, Agha Zainab, daughter of Nasir Khan Faruqi, the ruler of Khandesh. She complained of her maltreatment to her father, who invaded Berar with the active help of the Sultan of Gujarat and the Rai of Gondwana. The confederates were successful at the beginning and the Bahmani commander of the Berar forces was shut up in the fortress of Narnala, while Nasir Khan had his *Khutbah* read in the principal mosques of the province.

At Bidar there was an acute party rivalry between the Dakhinis (Oldcomers) and the Afaqis (Newcomers) and the former were laying the blame of the debacle of Mahim on the shoulders of the Afaqis. It was evident that only one of these two groups could be entrusted to undertake the arduous work of clearing Berar of the Khandeshis, and the Sultan decided that it should be the Newcomers who should go up north with Malikut Tujjar Khalaf Hasan as their leader. Khalaf Hasan joined battle with the ruler of Khandesh at the Ronkher Ghat, where he defeated Nasir Khan and pursued him right up to his capital, Burhanpur. Hearing, however, of the approach of the army of Gujarat, he wheeled round to Laling, where he completely routed the Khandesh army. The Sultan was greatly elated at this splendid success and decreed that on all occasions of state the Newcomers or Afaqis should be placed on the Sultan's right and the Oldcomers or Dakhinis on his left.

It was about this time, in 1442-43, that Deva Raya of Vijayanagara set his seal on the reform of his army and enlisted thousands of Muslims in his armed forces, erected a mosque at the capital for placating them and actually ordered a copy of the Quran to be placed near his throne so that the Muslims may be able to bow before the Holy Book. Feeling strong enough, the Raya crossed the

⁸ King has read 'Raichur' in his abridged translation of the *Burhan*, but the *Burhan*, 73, is clear about Rajachal.

Tungabhadra next year, marched right across the Raichur Doab, captured Mudkal, and had Nusratabad-Sagar and Bijapur plundered.

The Sultan was greatly worried and marched southwards in person. Khalaf Hasan forced the Raya's son to raise the siege of Raichur, while the Sultan engaged in a fierce battle with the Raya at Mudkal and defeated him completely. The campaign ended in the payment of all arrears of tribute on the part of the Raya and a promise by the Sultan that he would never cross the Tungabhadra again.

We now come to one of the saddest episodes in the history of the Deccan, the Chakan affair. The western coastal principalities were very restive and were systematically breaking the peace; so in 1447 Sultan Alauddin Ahmad ordered the gallant Malikut Tujjar Khalaf Hasan to proceed westwards. Khalaf Hasan made Chakan his headquarters. He thought his hands were strengthened by the conversion of the powerful local chief, Shankar Rao Shirke, who promised to pay an annual tribute and offered to show the Bahmani army the way to Sangameshwar. But it was not long before the treacherous Shirke played false. While one night Khalaf Hasan was laid up with dysentery and the army was resting after a particularly toilsome day, the Bahmani forces were surrounded and the Bahmani general as well as the flower of his army were cut to pieces.

The Dakhinis, almost all of them, had kept back; and perhaps in order to save their necks from the fury of the Sultan, they sent word to Bidar that the Afaqis had been foolish enough to be led into the jungle by the enemy, hinting at the same time that they perhaps wished to give themselves up to the Hindus. The Sultan is reported to have been dead drunk when this information reached him, and he immediately issued an order for the destruction of the remnant of the Afaqis, who had shut themselves up at Chakan. This order was enough for the Dakhini party, which had not taken part in the attempted march towards Sangameshwar; it now lured the rump of the Afaqis into a trap and did them to death. But an Afaqi, Qasim Beg Safshikan, and a few of his friends escaped and carried the sad tale to Bidar. The Sultan, pusillanimous as he was, now ordered the promotion of the Newcomers, gave the title of Malikut Tujjar to Qasim Beg, deposed the Oldcomers from all posts of honour and responsibility and had many of them beheaded.

The last few years of the Sultan were taken up by the rebellion of his brother-in-law, Jalal Khan, who proclaimed himself Sultan at Nalgonda, while Jalal's son, Sikandar, hurried to Mahur to seek help from Mahmud Khalji, who was now ruler of Malwa. Mahmud, who was one of the most ambitious monarchs of the century, allied himself with Mubarak Khan of Khandesh and crossed the Mahur

frontier in 1456. The whole situation had been brought about by the false rumour that the Bahmani Sultan was dead; and when Mahmud discovered that this was not true, he retreated home.

It is at this juncture that we hear for the first time of Mahmud Gawan, a Newcomer or Afaqi, who was destined to prove himself to be one of the most brilliant personages of Deccan history. Mahmud Gawan was put at the head of the force, which was to oppose the pretender at Nalgonda. Jalal and Sikandar knew that their cause was now hopeless and laid down their arms; and great credit is due to the Sultan, who gave them full amnesty at the intercession of Mahmud Gawan, and even restored the Nalgonda jagir to Jalal Khan.

In spite of this full dress insurrection in the heart of Telingana, we find some of the Reddi chiefs, like Linga II, siding with the Sultan, although others became restive and the great rock fortress of Bhongir had to be reconquered.⁹ Further east, Kapileshwar Gajapati of Orissa was holding Vijayawada and Kondapalli in 1455, and seems to have extended his sway as far south as Kanchi. There were a number of skirmishes between the Gajapati and the Bahmani armies, in which the Bahmani forces seem to have been worsted.¹⁰

The Sultan died on 4 March 1458, after suffering from a malignant wound in his shin. He had some fine humane qualities, as is evidenced by his treatment of his rebel brother, Muhammad, and his brother-in-law, the rebel Jalal Khan. He left no stone unturned to enforce the letter of the law at the beginning of his reign, although he seems to have become weak-minded and capricious later, as is evidenced by the massacres and counter-massacres following the Chakan affair. In spite of his comparatively loose life, he was energetic enough to take an active and strenuous part in the Nalgonda and Mahur campaigns, and it was partly his indifference to his health in the campaigns which precipitated his death.

HUMAYUN SHAH

The late king had appointed his eldest son, Humayun, heir to the throne in his life-time. Humayun (4 March 1458—1 September 1461) was harsh of temper, and some amirs, mostly Newcomers, conspired to put his younger brother, Hasan Khan, on the throne. But the intrepid Humayun marched right up to the throne-room at the

⁹ *Velugotiaricamsavali*, Intr., 39; Ferishta, 338.

¹⁰ An inscription on the great temple of Puri, dated 12 April 1450, mentions the victory of the Gajapati over 'Malika Parisa' (Malik Padshah), *JASB*, 1898, 90. It is probably this which Dr. Venkataramanayya reads as 'Malik Poplarjuna', whom he considers a local chief; see *Velug.*, Intr., 35.

palace with just eighty of his followers and, unseating Hasan, put himself on the throne (3 April 1458).

Immediately on his accession, he appointed Mahmud Gawan the chief minister of the kingdom and presented him with robes of honour befitting the occasion. He was also appointed Malikut Tujjar, governor of Bijapur and *wakil-i sultanat*. He was even considerate about his cousin, the erstwhile rebel, Sikandar; but Sikandar wanted to try his luck again, and egged on by his father, the jagirdar of Nalgonda, he again rose in arms against the king. The king heard of the rebellion when Sikandar was actually on the march against the great fortress of Golkonda, and immediately proceeded westwards. Even now the king was very forbearing and offered to forgive Sikandar's faults; but Sikandar wanted nothing less than the partition of the kingdom and Humayun had to fight it out. The two armies were engaged the whole day in a deadly battle and Sikandar was within an ace of victory, when Mahmud Gawan and Khwaja-i Jahan Turk joined the Sultan; the expected victory of the rebels then turned into a defeat and Sikandar was slain. The humane character of the earlier part of Humayun's reign is proved by the fact that when Jalal begged the Sultan to spare his life, the king pardoned his treason and was content with simply imprisoning him.

During this campaign Linga, ruler of the Velamas, had sided with the rebels; so the Sultan resolved to reduce his principality. Dewarkonda was besieged by Khwaja-i Jahan Turk and Mahmud Gawan; and Linga was forced to approach the ambitious Kapileshwar of Orissa for help in return for the payment of a tribute. Kapileshwar sent Hamvira (or Hamir) to Dewarkonda, and on his approach Linga sallied out of the fortress and surrounded the Bahmani army. Hamvira wheeled round and captured Warangal on 22 February 1460, while Linga marched to Rajahal, captured it and made it his capital.¹¹

Humayun hurried to the scene in person, but was not in time to avert a defeat. While away from the capital, he heard that Yusuf Turk had released Hasan Khan, Habibullah and many others, who had been implicated in the plot at the beginning of his reign. The Sultan left Mahmud Gawan in charge of the affairs of Telingana and left for the capital where he arrived in March 1460. Hasan escaped to Bir, where he proclaimed himself Sultan and appointed Habibullah his prime minister and Yusuf Turk his commander-in-chief.

¹¹ Kapileshwar was 'victorious over Gulbarga': S. K. Aiyangar, *A little known Chapter of Vijayanagar History*, 9; *Wars of Vijayanagar against Kalinga Desa, Kalinga Desa Charitra*, 360-61; Bannerji, *History of Orissa*, I, 292-93. Date of capture of Warangal, *Rep. Hyderabad Arch. Dept.*, 1944, F. 29.

He was, however, defeated by the royal army, and ultimately captured by the vice-governor of Bijapur and brought in chains to Bidar, where he and his party arrived in June 1460. Humayun seems not only to have lost all patience but to have become insane owing to his hatred. He ordered Hasan to be thrown to hungry tigers and punished his adherents with great barbarity. The sad episode ended with the promotion of some Dakhini converts to high offices, one of whom was Malik Hasan Bahri, the progenitor of the Nizam Shahis of Ahmadnagar.

Humayun died on 1 September 1461. He is one of the enigmas of the history of the Deccan and is painted in the blackest colours by Ferishta. *Burhan* is more moderate in tone and states that people were so tired of Humayun that they rejoiced at his death.¹² But we must remember that during the three and a half years of his reign there was not a single campaign of aggression against his neighbours, which shows that he believed in the consolidation of his kingdom rather than in the extension of its boundaries. In spite of the high ideals which run through the address he delivered on his accession,¹³ his reign was marred by continuous rebellions. He showed a remarkable sense of forbearance and mercy right up to the middle of 1460, and all the cruelties attributed to him occurred during the last fourteen months of his reign. Time and again we find him forgiving almost to a fault; and it was only when the party of Newcomers tried to reinstall the fugitive Hasan Khan on the throne that he gave vent to his cruel propensities. All compromises had proved of no avail, and the Sultan had to enter into another life and death struggle with his brother. His policy of holding the balance even between the Oldcomers and the Newcomers had been shattered for the time-being owing to the machinations of the extremists and the Newcomers. The exaggerated accounts given by Ferishta and others, who were Newcomers themselves, have caused him to be dubbed 'the cruel' (*zalim*) so much so that the destruction of his tomb at Bidar by lightning is believed to have been a Divine punishment for his cruel acts.¹⁴

While Ferishta condemns every act of Humayun as cruel, the Sultan's own minister, Mahmud Gawan, whose conduct and character were above board, praises him beyond measure, calls him the 'flower of the royal garden' and appends an ode of 38 lines to one of his letters.¹⁵ If we had nothing else in our possession, the dicta of a

¹² *Burhan*, 95, where he quotes a choronogram composed by Naziri.

¹³ For this address, see *Burhan*, 89.

¹⁴ The tomb was destroyed by lightning in 1882.

¹⁵ *Riyazul Insha*, f. 217.

statesman of Mahmud Gawan's integrity and character would be enough to remove to a large extent the horrid mask which has been put over Humayun's face. Thus both from the recorded occurrences of his reign as well as from other sources, we have to come to the conclusion that Humayun was a ruler of the ordinary Bahmani type; he was, at the same time, a strict disciplinarian intent on maintaining a balance between all sections of the people while trying to keep the peace as far as possible. But internal turmoils prevented the execution of all the praiseworthy projects of his life and, thanks to the intense propaganda carried on against him, they have even blackened his reputation after his death.

THE REGENCY

Humayun was succeeded by his son, Ahmad Khan, as Nizamuddin Ahmad III at the age of eight.¹⁶ The late Sultan had nominated a council of regency (which continued from 4 September 1461 to 30 July 1463) consisting of Khwaja-i Jahan Turk, Mahmud Gawan and the dowager queen, Makhduma-i Jahan Nargis Begam, who presided over the council and had a casting vote. Nargis Begam is one of the most astute figures of Deccan history, and it was she who really held sway over the affairs of the country during the short reign of Ahmad III.

The Triumvirate began by granting a general amnesty to all political prisoners, and by appointing to service those who were eminent in the field of learning but were not already in the employ of the state. But this policy of compromise was of no avail; and murmurs of discontent were audible, due partly to the fact that while the Afaqis (Newcomers) did not want to pursue the policy of compromise initiated by Mahmud Gawan, the Dakhinis (Oldcomers) did not wish to see an Afaqi at the helm of affairs, while there was a boy on the throne.

On the inter-state plane, the neighbours of the Bahmanis wanted to take advantage of a boy being on the throne; and Kapileshwar of Orissa was audacious enough to advance to within ten miles of Bidar and demand tribute from the youthful Sultan. The queen sent Shah Muhibbullah to lead the Bahmani army against the aggressor, who was defeated in a pitched battle and forced to pay an indemnity of five lakhs of silver *tankas*.¹⁷

¹⁶ His full name, Nizamuddin Ahmad, is mentioned in the *Ri'azul Insha*, XIX, f. 52b— Mahmud Gawan's letter to Shaikh Daud of Malwa. This is fully corroborated by numismatic evidence, Speight, *Islamic Culture*, 299.

¹⁷ Banerji (I, 296) disbelieves in the defeat of the Orissan army but gives no reasons. He deduces from the epithet 'Conqueror of Gulbarga', used in the Jagannath

The next to invade the Deccan was the inveterate enemy of the Bahmanis, Sultan Mahmud Khalji of Malwa. Mahmud was egged on in his enterprise by certain traitors of the Deccan, like Nizamul Mulk, who had fled to his court. With Mahmud Khalji were allied Kapileshwar of Orissa, who had just been humiliated almost under the walls of Bidar itself, and the ruler of Khandesh. In 1462 the confederate army crossed into the Deccan and came within thirty-two miles of the capital. The youthful Sultan took a personal interest in the mobilization of his troops and marched to meet the aggressor accompanied by Mahmud Gawan, Khwaja-i Jahan Turk and other nobles of eminence. Mahmud Gawan's policy of compromise was already bearing fruit and, in marked difference to what had happened at Chakan, the army of the Deccan was now composed of both the great factions of the kingdom, the Afaqis and the Dakhinis. The two armies met near the great fort of Qandhar and the day seemed to have ended in favour of the Bahmanis, when owing to unfortunate accident one of the elephants in the Bahmani army turned back and stampeded. The attendant of the boy-king, Sikandar Khan, greatly alarmed for his safety, removed him from his horse and hurried him back to Bidar. On seeing the royal mount without the boy-king, the whole army turned back. Mahmud Gawan, Khwaja-i Jahan and the rest came to Bidar, utterly shocked at what had happened, and were pursued by Mahmud Khalji, who was as surprised at the turn of event as any one else.

Seeing that Bidar was in grave danger, the council of regency placed the capital in charge of Mallu Khan Dakhini and moved the court to Firuzabad near Gulbarga. In the meantime Mahmud Khalji took possession of the rich provinces of Berar, Bir and Daulatabad, advanced to Bidar itself and laid siege to the citadel. At this critical juncture the queen and Mahmud Gawan gave a new orientation to the foreign policy of the Deccan by inviting Sultan Mahmud of Gujarat for help. Although Mahmud was himself young and had been on the throne only a few years, he responded to the call and moved rapidly to the south with a large army.

The sudden appearance of the new ally of the Deccan completely upset the plans of the Khalji king. Mahmud Gawan marched to relieve Bidar, which had been gallantly held by Mallu Khan, while the queen ordered Khwaja-i Jahan to join hands with these forces. Hemmed in on three sides, Mahmud Khalji had no alternative but

inscription, that the Gajapati actually conquered Gulbarga, while as a matter of fact the Bahmani kingdom was indifferently called the kingdom of Bidar and the kingdom of Gulbarga right up to the end.

to turn back; and he hurried home by way of friendly Khandesh, hotly pursued by Khwaja-i Jahan.

In spite of this ignominious defeat, Mahmud Khalji reappeared the next year, 1463, with a huge army and marched right up to Fathabad. But when he came to know that his namesake of Gujarat was on the move to help the Deccan, he retraced his steps home.

Ahmad died suddenly on the night of his marriage on 30 July 1463, and was succeeded by his younger brother, Muhammad Khan, as Shamsuddin Muhammad III.

THE AGE OF MAHMUD GAWAN AND MUHAMMAD SHAH 'LASHKARI'

It was not long after the accession of the new Sultan that Khwaja-i Jahan Turk was murdered in open court. He had made himself unpopular with the old nobility by replacing it with a new nobility, with the queen by imprisoning Sikandar Khan, who had risked bringing Ahmad III away from the battle-field of Qandhar, and with the populace by his high-handed demeanour, with the result that no one shed any tears when he was removed at the instance of the dowager queen herself. There had been a remarkable unity of action on the part of the three members of the council since Humayun's death, and had it not been for the rift brought about by Khwaja-i Jahan Turk, the experiment of the council might have continued.

The murder of Khwaja-i Jahan Turk almost coincided with the marriage of Sultan Shamsuddin Muhammad in 1464 and was followed by the retirement of the dowager queen from active politics. The scene was now laid for the formal investiture of Mahmud Gawan as the prime minister of the state, and the title of Khwaja-i Jahan was transferred to him, the title by which he is best known to the posterity. The premiership of Khwaja-i Jahan Mahmud Gawan saw the Bahmani state attain a height unequalled in the whole of its history. Apart from the purely cultural aspects of his term of office, the frontiers were made secure by the final annexation of the Konkan territory as far as Goa and the annexation of the Godavari-Krishna Doab, so that the dream of the founder of the state partly came true and the realm extended from sea to sea for the first time.

The opening years of the new Sultan's reign saw a recrudescence of fighting on the Malwa front. The fray began with the claim of Mahmud Khalji to Mahur and Ellichpur; and, forestalling his actions, Muhammad Shah sent Malik Yusuf Turk, surnamed Nizamul Mulk, against him to settle matters once for all, and ordered Mahmud Gawan to wheel round to the Khandesh border, while the aid of

Gujarat was also solicited. Nizamul Mulk was successful in reducing Kherla, the chief of which place had begged the Malwa Sultan for help but was treacherously murdered. Mahmud Khalji, thereupon, hurried towards Kherla, but when he heard of the presence of Khwaja-i Jahan at Fathabad, he retraced his steps to his capital. We have accounts of the lengthy pourparlers between Malwa and the Deccan, which give us an insight into the diplomatic procedure of the middle ages.¹⁸ After an exchange of envoys bearing autograph letters from the sovereigns of Malwa and the Deccan, a treaty of peace and friendship was signed by the plenipotentiaries and sealed by the learned and the pious men of the court at Shadiabad-Mandu under which Kherla was given to Malwa and Berar was retained by the Bahmanis. This settlement led to feelings of mutual respect and was maintained till the end of the Bahmani state.

On the eastern frontier the last years of Kapileshwar of Orissa were marred by his defeat at the hands of a unique coalition between the Bahmani and the Vijayanagara states.¹⁹ Kapileshwar's death was followed by a squabble for the throne of Jainagar and the usurpation of the *gaddi* by a Brahman, Mangal Rai, resulting in the appeal to Sultan Muhammad Shah on the part of the rightful claimant, Hamvira, who was probably the same person who had allied himself with the enemies of the Bahmani kingdom only a few years before. On Mahmud Gawan's special recommendation, the Sultan ordered Malik Hasan Bahri to lead the Bahmani forces, and he succeeded in compelling the usurper to quit Orissa and in setting up Hamvira on the Orissa throne with the title of Purushottama.²⁰ Not content with this, Malik Hasan went further and conquered

18 We find a vivid description of these negotiations in Mahmud Gawan's letters e.g., *Riyaz*, LXXV, XIX, LXXVII, LXXXV, etc.

19 Banerji, *History of Orissa*, I, 307, read with Aiyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, 90-102.

20 *Burhan*, 117; 'The dead Oriya' could only have been Kapileshwar, as his immediate successor, Purushottama, reigned up to 1497; See Banerji, I, 305. For reasons best known to Banerji, he does not believe that Muhammad Shah, then a young man of eighteen, could have taken enough interest in the affairs of far off Orissa. He further says that Mangal Rai's usurpation is a myth, although on page 321 reference is made to a stone slab where Purushottama is styled as Hamvira. The war of succession in Orissa is also proved by an Orissan tradition mentioned by Banerji that Purushottama was not the eldest but the second son of Kapileshwar. Thus *Burhan* seems to be correct in point of date, and I have followed it in my sequence of events. As regards the date of Purushottama's accession also, *Burhan's* date 875 A.H. (1470-71) seems correct in comparison with 1466, which would put Muhammad's march to Kanchi in Purushottama's time, which is most unlikely. There is further an inscription at Puri, dated 4 April 1470, the year of Purushottama's accession; *JRASB*, 1993, 91-92.

Rajamundry and Kondavidu. On his return he was greatly honoured by the king and given the title of Nizamul Mulk.

It was now the turn of the western frontier to be brought under control; and this was even more urgent as the local chiefs, such as those of Khelna and Sangameshwar, were in the habit of intercepting Muslim trading vessels plying in the Arabian Sea and robbing the pilgrims on the way to Mecca and the holy places of Islam. More recently these chiefs had gathered together three hundred sailing vessels and were waylaying travellers by sea. The country was so difficult to cross that a series of campaigns had to be undertaken before it could be pacified.

The first campaign, that against Hubli, was undertaken by the Sultan himself, most probably in order to protect the southern flank of the Bahmani army during the next phase. The second campaign was undertaken in 1469 by Mahmud Gawan, and it had far-reaching results. He proceeded to Kolhapur and made it his headquarters. He summoned forces from all round the vicinity, Dabul, Karhad, Junair, Chakan, Chaul, Wai and Man, but as the cavalry was of no avail in the thick jungles which lay on the way, he sent it back. The enemy, on seeing this huge concourse, resorted to guerilla warfare, which went on till the rains set in and the Khwaja had to retire to his thatched camp at Kolhapur.

Towards the end of the rainy season, Mahmud Gawan marched to the great fort of Raingarh, which surrendered on 9 July 1470, and thence to Machal, which had to be captured by sheer force of arms, and from there to Khelna which was subdued on 14 January 1471.

The Khwaja was now face to face with Jakhurai of Sangameshwar, whose hilly country was studded with forts.²¹ Before proceeding further Mahmud Gawan wrote to the capital for further reinforcements; but the party opposed to him there had taken advantage of his prolonged absence and had begun to poison the Sultan's mind against him, with the result that no reinforcements were sent to him and he was greatly handicapped.²² Still he did not turn his back. Before the rains set in he had captured Bulwara, Miriad and Nagar; and when the weather had cleared, he marched on to the great fort of Sangameshwar itself, which opened its gates on 13 December 1471 while the Rai submitted on the following day.²³ But this was not the end, for Khwaja Gawan boldly went forward to Goa 'with the tigers of Arabia and the lions of Persia', sending 120 boats by way of the

21 We find great details of these campaigns with specifications of dates in the Khwaja's letters; *Riyaz*, XLV, XXVIII, LXXVI, XXXVIII, XIII, XLVII, etc.

22 *Ibid.*, XLIV, XLVII.

23 *Ibid.*, XXIX.

sea; and that great fort was captured without loss of blood and annexed to the kingdom of the Deccan on 1 February 1472.²⁴ Having accomplished his purpose the Khwaja left Goa on 10 April 1472, and reached the capital on 19 May of the same year with huge spoils of war. He was received by the Sultan in right royal manner, while the dowager queen addressed him as her own brother and actually appeared unveiled before him.

In the north-west Yusuf Adil led the Bahmani armies against the chiefs of Virakhera and Antur, who were intriguing against the centre. He succeeded in suppressing the spirit of revolt and was given Virakhera as a jagir by the Sultan. When he returned to Bidar, he was received by the Sultan with great eclat. But the west still continued to be restive, and the moment Mahmud Gawan's back was turned in 1472, Parketa, the chief of Belgam, rose at the instigation of the ruler of Vijayanagara and besieged Goa. The Khwaja, thereupon, begged the king to allow him to go, but the machinations of his enemies against his power and prestige had already gone too far; the Sultan decided to lead his troops in person and left his capital on 15 March 1473. On reaching Belgam he found that Parketa was well entrenched behind the walls of the great redoubt guarding the town, and history was made when Yusuf Adil and Fathullah Imadul Mulk breached the walls of the fort by firing mines dug under them. The Sultan himself led the assault, the fort was reduced, and Parketa was pardoned and made an amir of the kingdom. It was on this occasion that the Sultan adopted the title of *Lashkari* or 'Warrior' at the petition of Mahmud Gawan. Almost immediately after these great events a gloom was cast on the court circles by the death of Makhduma-i Jahan, the dowager queen and the benefactress of the Khwaja.

As has been noticed above, the boundaries of the Bahmani kingdom now touched the Bay of Bengal in the east and the Arabian Sea in the west, and it was time to reform the administration which had remained static since the days of Muhammad I. Mahmud Gawan was fully alive to the needs of the moment and foresaw a great danger in the enlarged outlying provinces. So in order to curb the power of the provincial governors, he redivided the kingdom into eight instead of four governorships, and brought certain tracts in each province directly under the rule of the Sultan as a royal domain. He also made the *qiladars* of the forts of all provinces, except one, directly responsible to the centre, and made the jagirdars accountable to the Sultan regarding

²⁴ The date is the result of my calculations on the basis of the letters contained in the *Riyaz*, especially XXXIII. Sewell and Aiyangar, *Historical Inscriptions of South India*, say that the port was conquered as early as 1470, but this stands disproved by the actual date before us.

the revenue of their jagirs, which were earmarked for the payment of local levies. Moreover, he had the whole land measured and a record of rights set up, thus anticipating Raja Todar Mal's reforms by a century. Further, acting according to the policy of conciliation, which had been the Khwaja's watchword all along, he appointed an equal number of Dakhinis and Afaqis to the new governorships, retaining the charge of Bijapur for himself.

About 1475 news arrived from Telingana that the officials of Kondavidu had been helping the subjects, who had risen in revolt, and had invited Purushottama of Orissa to help them. The levy of the rebels joined hands with the Orissa army and crossed the border, forcing Nizamul Mulk to retreat to Wazirabad; but owing to the approach of the Sultan, the Orissa army had to retreat to Kondavidu. The Sultan left Mahmud Gawan and the Crown Prince, Mahmud, at Rajamundry and defeated Purushottama on the banks of the Godavari. In 1478 the Sultan led an expedition into the very heart of Orissa and forced the Rai to lay down his arms and make costly presents, which included a large number of elephants. At the close of the campaign, the Sultan adopted the title of Ghazi or 'Hero'. Another milestone in the progressive greatness of Bahmani state was reached when the ruler of Khandesh, Adil Khan II, paid a complimentary visit to Muhammadabad-Bidar. As we find that about this time the Bahmani coins were current in Khandesh and the Bahmani Sultan was mentioned in the Friday prayers there, we may take it that Khandesh had become, in a way, a protectorate of the Bahmanis.²⁵

But Kondavidu was again restive, and in 1480 the army mutinied, joining hands with the population, which allied itself with Saluva Narasimha, the virtual ruler of Vijayanagara. The Sultan, therefore, again proceeded east-wards in November 1480, and forced the garrison of Kondavidu to lay down their arms. Kondavidu was now given over as a jagir to Nizamul Mulk.

Next came the turn of Saluva Narasimha; the Sultan proceeded due south as far as Nellore, pursuing Narasimha, who took to flight at the royal approach.²⁶ At last he had to lay down his arms unconditionally and sent the Sultan costly presents in the form of money, jewellery and elephants. From Nellore Muhammad marched as far south as Kanchi, where he arrived on 12 March 1481. The stronghold of Kanchi was reduced, and this was the southernmost point ever reached by the Bahmani arms.

²⁵ *Burhan*, 134.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 136. Both Sewell and Dr. Aiyangar seem to have wrongly identified 'Nolwarah' with Malur in the Mysore state. See Venkataramanayya, *Muhammad Shah Lashkari's Expedition against Kanchi*, K. Aiyangar Volume, 1940, 307.

We have reached the zenith of the Bahmani power, and strange as it may seem, its nadir was soon to arrive. Before proceeding south, the Sultan had appointed Nizamul Mulk governor of the newly-created province of Rajamundry; but Nizamul Mulk did not relish the appointment as he wished to govern the whole of Telingana. Much to the dislike of Mahmud Gawan, he was allowed to appoint his son, Malik Ahmad, who had married an inmate of the royal *haram*, to act for him while he accompanied the Sultan to Kanchi. The old amirs, who hated the bisection of the governorships and a decrease in the governor's power and authority, now saw the chance of doing away with the reformer, Mahmud Gawan.

It was during the western campaign, when the Khwaja was away from the capital, that the court party, as we have seen, got a good opportunity of poisoning the Sultan's mind against the Khwaja. While Muhammad Shah was in the south and the camp was pitched at Kondapalli, the conspirators got the *habashi* (Abyssinian) secretary of the Khwaja, who was out of his senses owing to drink, to affix his master's seal on a paper, which he believed to be a petition for reprieve but which was really blank. The plotters then forged on the paper a treasonable letter on behalf of the Khwaja to the ruler of Orissa. This was meant to inflame the mind of the Sultan, and when the Sultan arrived at Kondapalli camp back from the south, this forged document was put up before him. He summoned the old wazir, who had now reached the age of seventy-three, to his presence and asked him what punishment be proposed for a traitor. The old statesman replied that death could be the only punishment. On being shown the forged document, he answered in all humility that the seal was surely his but that he knew nothing about the script. The Sultan then left the room after ordering his slave, Jauhar, to behead the Khwaja. The Khwaja knelt down, praising the Almighty for granting him the great blessing of martyrdom. The stroke of Jauhar's sword ended on 5 April 1481 the life one of the greatest administrators and generals the Deccan has ever seen.

It was only a few hours after this that Muhammad Shah found out the terrible mistake which he had committed, and was horrified to discover that the man whom he had condemned to death was, till his last breath, staunchly loyal to the country of his adoption, and that he had served his sovereigns with selfless devotion all his life. But the Khwaja could not be brought back to life; and it is remarkable that once his controlling hand was removed, there was no one left to stop the precipitate decline of the kingdom. Muhammad Shah died exactly one lunar year after the murder of the Khwaja, and during this brief period there were definite forebodings of the coming storm.

Nizamul Mulk, who had, in a way, been the leader of the opposition during the last days of the Khwaja, became the new prime minister; but there was no love lost between him and men like Yusuf Adil, who had got himself appointed governor of Bijapur, Imadul Mulk, governor of Berar, and other nobles who were setting out to carve principalities for themselves. The Sultan died on 27 March 1482, full of remorse and anguish at the early age of twenty-nine lunar years.

DEATH AGONIES OF THE STATE

As has been mentioned above, the murder of Mahmud Gawan was a landmark in the history of the Bahmanis, for with it began the precipitate downward trend of the kingdom and the disintegration of the splendid edifice built by the earlier Bahmanis of Gulburga and by a series of capable rulers and administrators of Bidar. The great minister was succeeded by Nizamul Mulk, and although his party had a monopoly of power, still the danger to his life and honour loomed large. The policy which Firuz and Ahmad I had adopted—that of encouraging the influx of overseas men into the Deccan—now led to a major problem. In order to counteract its evil effects, Humayun had initiated a policy of compromise and equilibrium, but he failed in the attempt. Mahmud Gawan, loyal as he was to the state, tried to continue this policy, but he too failed to bring about a workable understanding and had to pay for his failure with his life. With his death all hopes of maintaining a political equilibrium were shattered. Another Mahmud Gawan might have slammed the door to egotism, intrigue and disorder, but as no such statesman was forthcoming, the kingdom fell at the first rush of the wind like a house of cards.

The new Sultan, Shihabuddin Mahmud, was only twelve years old when he succeeded his father, and Nizamul Mulk became regent or *malik naib*. The coronation ceremony was marred by the absence of some of the most prominent officers of the state, such as Yusuf Adil and Fathullah Imadul Mulk, and it was decided that the whole ceremonial should be re-enacted when they arrived at the capital. Yusuf Adil and others hurried posthaste to Bidar and it was feared that this might be the beginning of a civil strife, but the two leaders, *malik naib* and Yusuf Adil, were too tactful to allow the situation to worsen; they were seen leaving the court hand in hand after the boy-sovereign had conferred robes of state upon them. This was, however, only a lull before the storm. One evening the Sultan summoned Yusuf Adil to his presence and reprimanded him at the restiveness of his Turkish entourage; at the same time he gave an order for the massacre of the Turks in the city. The city-gates were locked, the massacre began, and the butchery was stopped only after about 4,000 men were lying dead

and many more had been wounded. Yusuf Adil now realized that Bidar was not the place for him and returned to Bijapur, leaving Nizamul Mulk in full control of central affairs.

The government was now reconstituted into a council of regency with the *malik naib* and Fathullah Imadul Mulk as members and the dowager queen as president. The first act of the new council was to appoint Qasim Barid, the Turk, kotwal of Bidar, and Imadul Mulk's son, Alauddin, as his father's deputy in the governorship of Berar. This arrangement worked well for four years till 1486, when the malcontents whispered into the Sultan's ears that he had been neglected all along, and persuaded him to do away with the *malik naib* and his associates. But the plot failed, and the Sultan had to make his apologies. Imadul Mulk, however, held his life dear and quietly left for his own province of Berar, never to return. Although outwardly reconciled, the Sultan kept harbouring his rancour against Nizamul Mulk, and when the latter was away on a campaign in Telingana, the Sultan ordered that he should be beheaded. The wheel had turned a full cycle; the man, who had caused the murder of Mahmud Gawan during a Telingana campaign, was killed in a similar campaign by a similar royal order.

The king was mightily pleased and regarded the murder as an act of deliverance from the tyranny of the Dakhinis. He now began to indulge in wine, women and dance, and definitely turned towards the party of the Afaqis, who were, of course, inimical to the late *malik naib*. In 1487 the Dakhini party, allied as usual with the *habashi* (Abyssinian) group, conspired to put an end to Sultan's life, and on 8 November 1487, they actually attacked the palace-fortress and rushed into the royal apartments, where the Sultan was busy with his carousals. He had to fly to Shah Burj, where he was surrounded and protected by the meanest of the population of Bidar. In the meantime the news spread like wild fire, and the leaders of the Afaqis succeeded in scaling the battlements leading to Shah Burj and extricating the king from the danger of being hacked to pieces. The Sultan now ordered a general massacre of the Dakhini officers and soldiers, which went on for three days.

This massacre proved to be a landmark in the decline of the fortune and power of the monarchy. The first to take advantage of the decreased prestige of the Sultan was Qasim Barid, who unfurled the flag of rebellion in his jagir at Ossa and Qandhar. He defeated the royal forces sent against him and forced Mahmud to appoint him prime minister and virtual dictator of the kingdom. But there were others far abler than Qasim Barid, and the rest of Mahmud's reign was a struggle for supremacy between them. One of the most powerful and

circumspect of them was Malik Ahmad, who had adopted the title of Nizamul Mulk on his father's death. The forts in his jagir, with its centre at Junair, had all fallen into the hands of the Marathas, and he took pains to reconquer them and pacified the whole country as far as the Godavari.²⁷ At the end of the campaign, Nizamul Mulk marched to Bidar and offered his homage to the Sultan, who re-assigned the forts acquired by Nizamul Mulk to him as his jagir.

Qasim Barid did not like all this; he persuaded the puppet Sultan, first, to order Yusuf Adil to march against Nizamul Mulk, and then to send a large army against him. Nizamul Mulk, however, succeeded against all odds; he marched straight to Bidar, carried off his family in spite of the opposition of his enemies, and returned safely to Junair in 1486. Fighting with the court troops went on till 1490, when Nizamul Mulk finally defeated them at a grove near Jeur Ghat on 23 May.²⁸ He celebrated his victory by surrounding the grove with a wall and building a palace there, which was to be the centre of his newly created capital of Ahmadnagar.

The Sultan was a puppet in the hands of Qasim Barid, who got himself twice reappointed as prime minister in 1492. He was so jealous of the power of others that he actually invited the inveterate enemy of the Bahmanis, the Rava of Vijayanagara, to occupy Raichur and Mudkal in order to curb Yusuf Adil's power.²⁹ Yusuf Adil thereupon, marched to Bidar and defeated Qasim, who had the Sultan with him, at a distance of five *karohs* from the capital. He then withdrew to Bijapur and wrested back the Raichur Doab from the Vijayanagara army after a pitched battle on 29 April 1493. Raichur and Mudkal were captured in the name of the Sultan, and we find Yusuf Adil sending costly presents to the Sultan in celebration of the victory.³⁰

While this was going on, a stormy petrel was trying to carve out a principality on the western coast. This was Bahadur Gilani, kotwal of Goa, who had taken possession of the whole of coast line from Goa in the south right up to Chaul in the north and had even sent 200 sailing ships to the Gujarati port of Mahim (now a suburb of Bombay) and burnt it. On this the monarch of Gujarat, the great Mahmud Begarha, sent an embassy to Bidar to complain against the depredation of Bahadur (who had meanwhile destroyed twenty-four Gujarati ships full of merchandise) and appealed to his namesake of the Deccan in

²⁷ *Muntakhabul Lubab*, III, 124; *Burhan*, 186.

²⁸ 'Battle of the grove', *Ferishta*, II, 95. *Ferishta*, II, 98, says that it was in 1495 that Ahmadnagar was founded; 1490 is the date given in *Ma'asirul Umara*, III, 906.

²⁹ *Ferishta*, II, 98.

³⁰ Aiyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, 9, 88, 106; Banerji, *op. cit.*; *Hyderabad Arch. Report*, 1934-35, 37.

the name of the ancient friendship between the two kingdoms. Mahmud complied with the request and left Bidar for the west, ordering Yusuf Adil, Imadul Mulk, Nizamul Mulk and Qutbul Mulk Dakhini, governor of Telingana, to come to his help. On arriving at Bijapur he was received right royally by Yusuf Adil. In the battle with Bahadur, Qutbul Mulk was killed, and the Sultan granted his title to Sultan-Quli Khwas Khan Hamadani, the progenitor of the Qutb Shahis of Golkonda.

In spite of this concentrated effort, the campaign against Bahadur was long drawn and illustrates the weak state of the Bahmani kingdom. The embassy from Gujarat arrived at Bidar in 1493, but it was not till 5 November 1494, that Bahadur Gilani was overpowered in a fierce battle between Mubarakabad-Miraj and Panhala and killed by an arrow. There were great rejoicings at the capital, when the Sultan returned there after a prolonged absence of nearly two years. Once at home, he sent costly presents to the Sultan of Gujarat and ordered that the loss of ships should be made up by the formal handing over of twenty ships to the admiral of Gujarat.

We are fast coming to the end of the effective control of governors by the central power of Bidar, and this period is marked by attempts of upstarts at autonomy. Malik Ashraf occupied Daulatabad and had the *Khutba* read in the name of the Sultan of Gujarat, while Dastur Dinar Habashi expelled the royal officials from his jagir round about Gulburga. The former died before offering battle, while the latter was defeated at Mahendri in 1496 by the combined officers of Yusuf Adil and the Sultan. As has been noted above, Yusuf Adil had been of great help to the Sultan in his hours of adversity, and now in 1497 the Sultan had his infant son, Prince Ahmad, betrothed to Yusuf Adil's daughter, Bibi Sitti, aged three, at Gulburga. This was not to Qasim Barid's liking. While the betrothal ceremonies were taking place in the fort, Qasim Barid and Dastur Dinar (who had been pardoned by the king) were fighting with Yusuf Adil and Qutbul Mulk Hamadani. Yusuf Adil was victorious and his status became so high that the Sultan did not dare to sit in his presence. But once his back was turned, Qasim Barid again came into favour and was once more confirmed in the post of prime minister.

From these sickening details of intrigues and civil strife we may turn for a while to foreign relations. In 1485 Saluva Narasimha dethroned his master, Virupaksha of Vijayanagara, and became the founder of a new dynasty. He realized the depth to which the Bahmani state had sunk and ordered his general, Ishwara Nayak, to march against the Bahmani camp at Kundukur. Ishwara Nayak routed the Bahmani forces and then marched northwards right up to the

Gajapati dominions without any opposition on the part of the Bahmani army. Purushottama of Orissa, on his part, had driven off the Bahmani forces from the Godavari-Krishna Doab in 1488 and taken possession of the coastline as far as Vijayawada. This state of affairs, however, changed with the appointment of Qutbul Mulk as governor of Telingana in 1498, for the new governor regained effective control over Warangal, Rajakonda, Dewarkonda and Kovilkonda (which seem to have been lost); and in 1504 he ousted Sitapati of Khammamet, known as Shitab Khan, from Warangal and by treaty with Purushottama regained control over Elluru and Vijayawada.³¹

Vijayanagara was worsted towards the middle of 1503 when the Sultan, with the help of his great jagirdars, reconquered the Raichur Doab and forced Vijayanagara to pay off arrears of tribute. The position, however, changed in 1509 with the accession of one of the greatest of the Vijayanagara rulers, Krishna Deva Raya. Krishna Deva began to strike in all directions, and in a brilliant campaign he dispossessed Yusuf Adil of Raichur and Mudkal, and captured Udayagir in 1514 and Kondavidu in 1515 from Purushottama of Orissa. He even annexed the inland Bahmani towns of Kondapalli, Nalgonda and Khammamet.³²

When we again turn to home affairs we notice a further inconsistency in the relations between the great jagirdars and the centre. There were frequent skirmishes between Qasim Barid, Yusuf Adil and others; and whenever there was an armed fight, it invariably ended in the victors paying homage to the person of the Sultan and the reinstalment of Qasim as prime minister. Qasim died in 1505 and was succeeded by his son, Ali Barid, as prime minister. Qasim was an accomplished calligraphist and a musician of note, while in the political sphere he succeeded in putting an end to the power and authority of the Bahmani Sultan. He realized that however powerful the outlying jagirdars might be, it was the person nearest the Sultan who would lead the way, and he stuck to Bidar tenaciously right up to the end. Three years later died another great actor in the drama of the fall of the Bahmani state, Ahmad Nizamul Mulk, who was succeeded by his son, Burhan, and two years after this Yusuf Adil and Fathullah Imadul Mulk passed away. The effete Sultan betowed the title of 'Adil Khan' on Yusuf's son, Ismail, and of 'Imadul Mulk' on Ahmad's son, Alauddin Darya Khan.

³¹ Sreenivasachari, *History of Warangal*, in Hyd. Arch. Report, 1934-35. The learned author's theory that Shitab Khan and Sarang Khan were identical persons seems to be without foundation. See Sewell, *A Forgotten Empire*, 133.

³² Banerji, *op. cit.*; *Hyderabad Arch. Report*, 1934-35, 37; Aiyangar, *Sources of Vijayanagar History*, 140.

However independent these rulers might have been in their own territories, there is no doubt that they respected the person of the Sultan right up to the end. We have a remarkable testimony of an occurrence in 1517, just a year before Mahmud's death, when the levies from Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, Parenda, Golkonda and Berar, with their governors at their head, paid homage to the Sultan.³³

It is related by some of our authorities that Ahmad Nizamul Mulk declared his independence and took the title of Ahmad Nizam Shah as early as 1490, actually removing the Sultan's name from the *Khutba*, and sent messages to Yusuf Adil and Fathullah Imadul Mulk advising them to do the same. But we are also told that this was regarded as a mark of disrespect to the Bahmani Sultan, and his name was soon reinstated.³⁴ In the same way it was only for a while that Yusuf Adil succeeded in introducing his name in the *Khutba* at Bijapur; Sultan Mahmud's name was removed and inserted according to circumstances. A further proof of the fact that none of these governors declared their formal independence is that not a single coin with the name of any one of them inscribed on it has been discovered, and coinage was then regarded as one of the primary emblems of sovereignty.

All the data in our possession lead us to conclude that in 1490 the defiance to the state of affairs at the capital became more pronounced; but the spirit of loyalty to the throne persisted and neither Yusuf Adil nor his contemporaries at Junair and Ellichpur really unfurled the banner of independence.

Sultan Shihabuddin Mahmud died on 27 December 1518, and with him disappeared whatever was left of the glory of the Bahmani dynasty. He frequently bemoaned that he was a prisoner in the hands of others; he complained that nothing really belonged to him and that he was led by any one who was powerful enough at Bidar. All this proves the utter helplessness of the central government. Still the awe and respect with which the ancient dynasty was held made it the sole connecting link between the far-flung autonomous chiefs; but by and by its utility waned till it died natural death not long after.

THE LAST PHASE

Ali Barid had made himself so powerful at the capital that he could have usurped the throne, but he was wise enough to perceive that such power as he had at Bidar was no match against the great governors at Bijapur, Ahmadnagar and elsewhere. He, therefore, put the late king's son, Ahmad, on the throne. Ahmad Shah was, however, a prisoner in the palace-fortress of Bidar, and his jailor took care to

³³ *Burhan*, 164.

³⁴ *Ferishta*, I, 373, II, 95, 97.

see that his character was thoroughly tarnished. Soon the *peshkash* from the great jagirdars ceased to come, and the new Sultan was forced to break up the old Bahmani crown to provide himself with the means of ease and comfort. The unhappy potentate died on 15 December 1520.

The throne was vacant for a fortnight and it was not till 28 December 1520 that Ahmad's son, Alauddin, was put on the throne. The new Sultan was different from his father and grandfather, and not only wished to lead a sedate life but wanted to reign as well as rule. He was, however, foolish enough to conspire to do away with Amir Barid. The conspiracy leaked out and he was dethroned on 4 March 1523.

Amir Barid now put Sultan Mahmud's son, Waliullah, on the throne; but Waliullah also tried to free himself from the shackles that were suffocating him, with the result that he was imprisoned in the *zenana* part of his palace. Possibly in order to ally himself with the royal house, Amir Barid now married the pretty twenty-three year old Bibi Sitti, Ahmad's widow, and then fell in love with the queen herself, who could now appear before him as a kinswoman. About the commencement of 1526 the Sultan was poisoned after 'reigning' for less than three years.

In spite of all this, the Bahmani tradition continued elsewhere in the Deccan; and although there could have been absolutely no practical influence of the crown left at Bijapur, we find Ibrahim Adil still calling himself a mere wazir of the 'Badshah Waliullah'. The same title appears in an inscriptions affixed to a mosque at Sagar.³⁵

Waliullah was succeeded by his brother, Kalimullah, who was closely guarded by Amir Barid. About this time Babur became the arbiter of Hindustan after his victory of Panipat; and the last Sultan of the house of Bahmani wrote to the victorious monarch offering him Berar and Daulatabad (provinces which he no longer controlled) if he would help him in throwing off the Baridi yoke. The news leaked out, and the poor man had to fly to Bijapur in 1528 and thence to Ahmadnagar, where he was well received by Burhan Nizamul Mulk. It is said that he spent his remaining days there and was either poisoned or died a natural death while a guest of Burhan, and that his coffin was brought to Bidar for burial.

It would be interesting to find out the exact date of his death and incidentally to discover the date of the end of the dynasty. Although he is said to have left Bidar for good in 1528, we possess coins struck

³⁵ *Eplgr. Indo-Mosl.*, 1931-32, 19, 20.

in his name as late as 1536 and 1537.³⁶ We have again two remarkable inscriptions at Ahmadnagar in which the ruler of Bijapur is mentioned as 'Ismail Adil Khan', the reference being in the first instance to an event of 1539. We actually possess an inscription of 1537, where the ruler of Bijapur is named 'Majlis-i Rafi Adil Khan' and this date corresponds with the name.³⁷ This title is significantly followed by two inscriptions of 1539 at Bijapur, where Ibrahim is definitely and for the first time mentioned as 'Ibrahim Adil Shah'. The conclusion is, therefore, justified that the last scion of the Bahmani dynasty died sometime in 1538, on a date between the striking of his last coin and the proclamation of Ibrahim as the independent monarch of Bijapur. It is quite possible that Kalimullah moved to Bijapur from Ahmadnagar and ended his life there.

Kalimullah's son, Ilhamatullah, knew that Bidar was not the place for him and he proceeded to Mecca in disguise, never to return.

³⁶ See Speight, *op. cit.*, 275 n. and 306. The dates, 942 A.H. and 943 A.H. are clear from reproductions, No. 19 and 30 on Plate XIX, and Speight is wrong in reading them as 952 A.H.

³⁷ *Mem. of the Arch. Survey of India*, No. 49, 47, inscription No. 437; for the other inscription see the same, inscription No. 3251, also see inscriptions Nos. 439 and 410.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

THE SULTANAT OF MADURA

BIRTH OF THE SULTANAT

MADURA WAS CONQUERED BY DELHI in 1323. Muhammad bin Tughluq appointed one Sharif Jalaluddin Ahsan,¹ who had been a general of his army, as governor of the province of Ma'abar with Madura as its capital. Isami, the author of the *Futuh-us Salatin*,² says that Jalaluddin was the kotwal of Madura. But Ibn-i Battuta, who had married Jalaluddin Ahsan's daughter at Delhi, writes that he had been the governor of Sultan Muhammad Tughluq. It is safer to rely on the latter's version. Jalaluddin was loyal to his master for some years,³ and then, taking advantage of Muhammad's difficulties, he proclaimed his independence in A.D. 1333/34 (A.H. 734) at Madura under the title of Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah and struck gold and silver coins in his own name.

There is inscriptional and numismatic evidence to prove that Muhammad bin Tughluq's sway over Madura continued till 1334. There is a dated inscription in the Pudukottah state which mentions the Adhi Sultan (Muhammad bin Tughluq). It is on the eastern wall, south of the entrance of the central shrine in the Jnanapuriswara temple at Pannaiyur in Tirumayam taluk, dated 27 Panguinee of the 9th year of Muhammad Sultan (A.H. 734).⁴ A coin⁵ of Muhammad bin Tughluq of the Ma'abar fabric and found in Ma'abar bears the words, 'Al-Wasiq-bi-Nasri Allah' on one side, and 'Muhammad bin Tughluq Shah' on the other. It is dated A.H. 734. Thus it is established beyond doubt that Muhammad ruled over Ma'abar until A.H. 734 (1333-34). But the question is whether Ahsan Shah declared his independence in the year A.H. 734 itself or in a subsequent year.

We have a coin of Alauddin, the successor of Ahsan Shah, dated

1 Yahya bin Ahmad, Ferishta and Badauni wrongly give the name as Saiyyid Hasan.

2 *Futuh-us Salatin* (Madras), 469.

3 *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, 488.

4 Inscription No. 670, *Chronological List of Inscriptions of the Pudukottah State*, published at Pudukottah in 1939.

5 *JRAS*, 1909, plate between pages 680 and 681, Fig. 2.

A.H. 740 (1339-40)⁶ and do not possess any coin of his bearing any other date. Ibn-i Battuta writes that Ahsan Shah ruled for five years and was then succeeded by Alauddin Udawji.⁷ A coin of Ahsan Shah dated A.H. 735 was seen by Mr. Rodgers.⁸ On the strength of these three pieces of evidence it has been hitherto held that Ahsan Shah ruled for five years from A.H. 735 (1334-35).

On the other hand, Desika Chari and Ranga Chari examined a coin⁹ of Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah dated A.H. 734, but since they did not give the transcript of the legend, Prof. Hultzsch dismissed the coin with the remark, 'The date 734 on D. 13 is therefore not impossible, but requires to be proved by a reproduction of the coin itself.'¹⁰

Mr. Rodgers has reproduced the coin in *JASB*, 1895, Plate IV, Fig. 6. It 'is of the same type'¹¹ and fabric (mixed metal) as seen by Desika Chari and Ranga Chari. The superscriptions are as follows:

Obverse

Sultanus Salatin

Reverse

In a circle — Ahsan Shah year
Arba' wa salasin wa sab'amīya
(the year four and thirty and
seven hundred).

The unit word *arba'* (four) could not be read by Mr. Rodgers because the *alif* and the head of the *'ain* are worn out. I am able to see the main outline of the word *arba'* and also the lower part of the *ra*. There is no unit word in the Arabic language other than *arba'* (four) which can have the form which we clearly see on the coin. Moreover, the coin reported by the south Indian scholars belongs to the same group.¹²

From the foregoing evidence it is clear that Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign in Ma'abar continued till A.H. 734 (1333-34 A.D.) and that in the same year Jalaluddin Ahsan revolted and established the Sultanat of Madura.

Ferishta says that Muhammad left the capital in A.H. 742 (1341-42)¹³ to go to Ma'abar in order to punish Sharif Ahsan. But as

⁶ *JASB*, 1895, Plate IV, Fig. 8.

⁷ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 189.

⁸ Seen by Mr. Rodgers and reported to Dr. Codgrington in a letter dated 1 November 1889, *JRAS*, 1909, 673.

⁹ *Indian Antiquary*, No. 31, 232, Coin No. 13.

¹⁰ *JRAS*, 1909, 673.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ferishta* (Lucknow edition), Vol. I, 137.

Ahsan Shah revolted in 1333-34 and we possess a coin¹⁴ of his successor, Sultan Alauddin Udawji, dated A.H. 740 (1339-40), Ferishta's date is too late by several years. Sultan Muhammad, according to Sir Wolseley Haig, in all probability left Delhi for Southern India on 5 January 1335 to punish Ahsan Shah.¹⁵

Muhammad's first destination in the Deccan was Devagiri, where he spent some time in collecting the dues and punishing the recalcitrants. From there he marched to Warangal, where a pestilence broke out in his camp and carried away about a third of his army. The Sultan himself suffered from an attack of the dangerous disease.¹⁶ He left Malik Maqbul (*naib wazir*) at Warangal and returned to *Daulatabad* (Devagiri) and thence to Delhi, never to regain Ma'abar.

Thus in the year A.H. 734 (1333-34 A.D.) an independent Muslim kingdom was established, comprising most parts of Tamilakam with Madura as its capital.

JALALUDDIN

Ibn-i Battuta testifies to the fact that the first Sultan of Madura struck a gold *dinar* with the words, 'The off-spring of *Ta-Ha* and *Ya-Sin* (i.e. the Prophet Muhammad), father of the poor and indigent, Jalalud-Dunya wad-din' on one side and 'He who puts his trust in the help of the most Merciful, Ahsan Shah, the Sultan' on the other.¹⁷

This coin has not yet been discovered, but Ibn-i Battuta can be relied upon, for the great traveller had at Delhi married Saiyyid Ahsan's daughter, named Hur Nasab.¹⁸

Another coin of Ahsan Shah bearing the *Hijrah* year 738 (1337-38 A.D.) has on one side 'Ahsan Shah 738 A.H.' and on the other 'al-Husaini'. This shows that Ahsan Shah claimed to be a descendant of the Prophet through his daughter's son, Imam Husain.¹⁹

It is clear from the above-mentioned coins and the evidence of Ibn-i Battuta, who prefixed the title '*Sharif*' to the name of Jalaluddin²⁰ and to that of his son, Ibrahim,²¹ that the Sultan claimed

14 JASB, 1895, Plate IV, Fig. 8.

15 *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, 149.

16 Ferishta, Vol. I, 137.

17 Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. III, 328.

18 *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 337-38.

19 Prof. Hultzsch erroneously thought that Imam al-Husain was one of the sons of the Prophet; see JRAS, 1909, 674.

20 Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. III, 328-37, IV, 189, 190, 200.

21 *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 337-40.

descent from the Prophet Muhammad; the letters *Ta-Ha* and *Ya-Sin*, which form titles of the 20th and 36th chapters of the *Quran*, are applied to the Prophet. At one place Ibn-i Battuta calls him '*Saiyyid*',²² a synonym of the term '*Sharif*'.

Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah ruled over Ma'abar for five years,²³ but no details of his reign are available to us from any source except the fact recorded by Barani that he won over the army sent against him by the Sultan of Delhi.²⁴

Ibn-i Battuta states: 'Then he was killed (*qutila*) and one of his amirs became the ruler, and he was Alauddin Udawji.'²⁵ This passage does not warrant the statement of Sir Wolseley Haig that Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah was slain by one of his officers, who usurped the throne under the title of Alauddin Udawji.²⁶ Ibn-i Battuta's passage simply means that the ruler was killed and that one of his amirs succeeded him. Sir Wolseley Haig was probably led into this error by the French translators of Ibn-i Battuta, Defremery and Sangunetti, who translate the sentence as follows: 'Thereafter he was put to death and replaced by one of his amirs, Alauddin Udawji.'²⁷ This rendering is very likely to mislead one, who does not consult the original, into thinking that the successor had killed his predecessor.

To sum up, Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah revolted against the Sultan of Delhi in the year 1333/1334 A.D., ruled for five years and was killed in the year 1338/1339 A.D. (A.H. 739).

Prof. Hultzsch writes, 'A.H. 740 (1339-40 A.D.) is both the latest date on his (Ahsan's) own coins and the only date on those of his two successors.'²⁸ But he has not reproduced any coin of Ahsan Shah bearing the date A.H. 740. He refers to a silver coin mentioned by Captain Tufnell (*Hints*, 99) which is reported to have contained the date A.H. 740.²⁹ Captain Tufnell's report is not a reliable one as Prof. Hultzsch himself remarks about the Captain's report. But as he failed to decipher the obverse of No. 7, it remains doubtful whether the reverse is of the same type as No. 9 or as No. 7.³⁰ It is the case of a coin which was not correctly deciphered and can hence have very little value as a piece of evidence.

²² *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, 189.

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ Elliot and Dowson, Vol. III, 243.

²⁵ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 189.

²⁶ *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. III, 149.

²⁷ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 149, French translation.

²⁸ *JRAS*, 1909, 671.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 673.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

It is almost certain that Jalaluddin was killed in the year A.H. 739 (1338-39 A.D.). He had a son, by name Amir Haji, under whom a future Sultan, Ghiyasuddin Damghan Shah, served.³¹ What happened to him is not known. However, the nobles elected one of the amirs, Alauddin Udawji, to the throne of Madura.

ALAUDDIN

Concerning Alauddin, Ibn-i Battuta writes: 'He ruled for a year and then *set out* on an expedition to wage war against the infidels. He took from them great wealth and extensive booty and *returned back* to his country. He again fought against them in the second year and, after defeating them, killed a large number of them. It so happened that on the day of the battle, when he had removed his helmet to drink water, a stray arrow struck his head, and he died on the spot.'³² The words which I have put in italics suggest that Udawji went out of the territorial limits over which his predecessor, Jalaluddin, had ruled and the passage clearly mentions that Alauddin's rule covered almost the whole of two lunar years.

On the strength of a few pieces of evidence and due to his inability to understand the unit word on the coin already deciphered by me, Mr. Rodgers says: 'Alauddin could have reigned but a few months in the same year,'³³ (i.e., 1339-40). This was the position of Mr. Rodgers, which has been accepted till now.

But since I have been able to decipher a coin of Jalaluddin dated A.H. 734,³⁴ the dates of the death of Jalaluddin and of the accession of Alauddin have to be pushed back by one year to A.H. 739 (1338-39). In this I am supported by the testimony of Ibn-i Battuta, who says that Alauddin ruled during two years, A.H. 739 and 740 (1338-39 A.D.).³⁵

Alauddin was killed after a successful battle by a stray arrow in 1339-40. He was succeeded by his son-in-law, Qutbuddin Firuz Shah.

A local Muslim tradition avers that Alauddin fought against the infidels and that he was killed by one of them. He is even now venerated as a martyr who laid down his life for the cause of Islam, and his tomb at Goripalayam on the northern bank of the river Vaigai is an object of pilgrimage for local Muslims.

³¹ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 188.

³² *Ibid.*, 189.

³³ JASB, 1895, 52.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Plate IV, Fig. 6.

³⁵ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 189.

QUTBUDDIN

Sultan Qutbuddin Firuz Shah, the nephew and son-in-law of Alauddin Udawji ascended the throne in the year 1339-40 and reigned for forty days only. He was killed by his own nobles as they did not like his conduct.³⁶ Fortunately, the Sultan was able to issue, during the brief period of his reign, a coin which has come down to us.³⁷

GHIYASUDDIN

After the execution of Sultan Qutbuddin, the throne was seized by an ex-trooper of Muhammad bin Tughluq, who assumed the title of Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Damghan Shah. The new Sultan was, like Ibn-i Battuta, a son-in-law of the founder of the Sultanat, Sultan Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah. After Ibn-i Battuta left the court of Muhammad bin Tughluq at the head of a deputation to the ruler of China, he got stranded on the way and came to Madura to live as the guest of his wife's brother-in-law.

About this ruler the traveller writes: "The name of the Sultan was Ghiyasuddin Damghani. At first he was a trooper under Malik Mujir bin Abu Raja, one of the servants of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq. Later he served under Amir Haji bin Sultan Jalaluddin³⁸ and then became the ruler. Before that he was called Sirajuddin, but when he became the Sultan, he assumed the title of Ghiyasuddin."³⁹

Ibn-i Battuta also adds: "I had an interview with him and put before him the project to send an army to the Maldivé Islands. He resolved to do so, decided what vessels were to be sent, and designated a gift for the Sultanah together with robes and presents for the ministers and amirs. He charged me to draw up the contract of (his) marriage with the Sultanah's sister and ordered three vessels to be loaded with alms for the poor of the islands. Then he said to me, "You will return in five days' time." But the admiral said to him, "It is impossible to sail to the islands for three months yet." "Well then," he replied to me, "if that is the case, come to Fattan until we finish the present campaign and return to our capital, Mutra (Madura), and the expedition will start from there."⁴⁰

"The country, through which we were to pass, was a continuous and impassable jungle of trees and reeds. The Sultan gave orders

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 190.

³⁷ JASB, 1895, Plate IV, Fig. 9.

³⁸ Sharif Ahsan, the first Sultan of Madura.

³⁹ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 188-89.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, 190-92; Gibb's translation, 262-63.

that every man in the army, great and small alike, should carry a hatchet to cut it down, and when the camp had been pitched, he rode forward with his troops and they cut down these trees from morning till noon. Food was then brought and the whole army ate in relays, afterwards returning to their tree-felling until the evening. All the infidels whom they found in the jungle were taken prisoners and brought to the camp with their wives and children. The practice (of the Ma'abari Muslims) is to fortify their camp with a wooden palisade, which has four gates. Outside the palisade there are platforms about three feet high on which they light a fire at night. By the fire there is posted a night-guard of slaves and foot-soldiers, each of whom carries a bundle of canes (reeds). If a party of infidels attempts to attack the camp by night, each sentry lights the bundle he has in his hands, so that the night becomes as bright as the day, and the horsemen ride out in pursuit of the infidels. In the morning the infidels, whom our troops had captured on the previous day, were divided into four groups and impaled at the four gates of the camp. Their women and little children were butchered also, and the women were tied by their hair to the stakes. Thereafter, the camp was struck and they set to work, cutting down another patch of jungle, and all those who were taken prisoner were treated in the same way. This (slaughtering of women and children) is a dastardly practice, which I have never known of any (other) king, and it was because of it that God brought him to a speedy end.⁴¹

'One day the qazi was seated on his (the Sultan's) right and I took my seat on his left. We were eating together when an infidel was brought with his wife and a son, aged seven. He waved his hand to the executioners, signifying that his head should be cut off. Then he said, "And his wife and his son". Their heads were chopped off, and I turned in another direction. When I got up I found their heads lying on the ground. One day when I was in his company, one of the infidels was brought before him. He spoke in a language which I did not understand. A group of executioners drew their knives; I hastened to depart. He asked me, "Where are you going?" I replied, "To offer my *asr* prayer." He understood my purpose and laughed. He ordered that the prisoner's hands and legs should be cut off. When I returned I found him rolling in his blood.'⁴²

The following is the version of Ibn-i Battuta concerning the contest between the Sultan and Vira Ballala III, which cost the latter his life and kingdom. 'Vira Ballala was one of the greatest of the

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 192-94, translation, 262-63.

⁴² *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, 194-95.

non-Muslim rulers and his army exceeded one hundred thousand. He had under him about twenty thousand Muslims—men of vices, people guilty of crimes and absconding slaves. He wanted to conquer the country of Ma'abar. Muslim forces there (in Ma'abar) numbered only six thousand. Half of them were good soldiers and the other half without any good in them. They had no wealth with them. Still they met him (Vira Ballala) outside the city of Kuppam where Vira Ballala defeated them. They retreated to Madura, and the non-Muslim (ruler) marched to Kuppam which was the largest and the best fortified of the (Muslim) cities. He laid siege to it for ten months until the citizens were left with provision for fourteen days only.

'The non-Muslim (ruler) sent envoys to the citizens asking them to come out and surrender the city, promising to spare their lives. They replied that they would refer the matter to the Sultan. He gave them a fortnight to do so. They wrote to Sultan Ghiyasuddin about their predicament. On a Friday the Sultan read their letter to the people. They wept and said, "We sell ourselves to Allah. If the non-Muslim (ruler) captures that city, then he will march against our fort. Death under the sword is much better for us than that." They made a covenant to die and set out the next day. They removed their turbans from their heads and put them on the necks of their horses—the symbol of their determination to win or die.

'They placed the most courageous and skilful among them, who numbered three hundred, in the vanguard and appointed Saifuddin Bahadur, who was a pious and brave jurist, to command the right-wing and Malik Muhammad Silahdar to command the left. The Sultan rode at the head of the centre. He had with him (comprising the above three wings) three thousand soldiers and placed the remaining three thousand in the rear under the command of a Persian, Asaduddin Kaikhusrau. They marched to the camp of the non-Muslim ruler, which was situated near Qayalah.⁴³ The people of the camp were off their guard and their horses were in the pasture. The vanguard looted the horses. The non-Muslims, thinking that the raiders were thieves, attacked them without a battle-formation and engaged them in battle. Soon Sultan Ghiyasuddin fell upon them and completely routed them. The king of the non-Muslims, who was eighty years old, tried to mount his charger. The Sultan's nephew, who later succeeded to the sultanat, came up to him and was about to kill him, when one of his slaves told him that he was the king. So he made him a captive and took him to his uncle.

⁴³ Kayalpattinam, a port on the east coast of South India and west coast of the Gulf of Mannar, about 100 miles from Madura.

'The Sultan treated him with honour, and promising to set him free, extracted from him riches, elephants and horses. After taking from him all that he had, he slaughtered him, and pulling off his skin and stuffing it with straw, hung it on the wall of Madura. I saw it hanging there.'⁴⁴

Having destroyed Vira Ballala III, 'the most persistent and dangerous of his enemies', Ghiyasuddin engaged himself in extending his territory in the north. When Ibn-i Battuta landed in Ma'abar after a ship-wreck, the Sultan of that country was engaged in subjugating the territory round a place which the traveller calls Harkatu. Defremery and Sangunetti, the French translators of Ibn-i Battuta's work, identify the place with Arcot.⁴⁵

Ibn-i Battuta describes a plague which visited Madura and carried away a large number of people. 'Those who were attacked by it died on the second or the third day, or at the most on the fourth. When I went out, I saw none but the sick and the dead. The Sultan, on reaching Madura, had found his mother, wife and son ill, and after staying in the town for three days, he went out to a river three miles (one mile) away. I joined him there and he ordered me to be lodged along with the qazi. Exactly a fortnight later, the Sultan died and was succeeded by his nephew, Nasiruddin. The new Sultan gave orders that I should be furnished with all the ships that his uncle had appointed for the expedition to the islands. Later on, however, I fell ill of a fever, which is mortal in those parts, and thought that my time had come. God inspired me to have recourse to the tamarind, which grows abundantly there; so I took about a pound of it, put it in water and drank it. It relaxed me for three days, and God healed me of my illness.'

According to the report of Ibn-i Battuta, Ghiyasuddin's only son was carried off by the plague on a Thursday, his mother died on the next Thursday and the monarch himself followed her to the grave on the third Thursday.⁴⁶

Several coins of Sultan Ghiyasuddin Muhammad Damghan Shah have been recovered. The earliest of them is dated A.H. 741 (1340-41 A.D.),⁴⁷ and the last A.H. 744 (1343-44 A.D.).⁴⁸ The first coin of his successor, Nasiruddin Mahmud Damghan Shah, is dated A.H. 745 (1344-45). It is quite likely that Sultan Ghiyasuddin died in A.H. 745 and was succeeded by his brother's son and son-in-law, Nasiruddin.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 196-98.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 188.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 202.

⁴⁷ *JASB*, 1895, Plate IV, Fig. 10.

⁴⁸ *Numismatic Chronicle Series V*, Vol. IV, Plate VIII, Fig. 13.

Describing the city of Madura, as he saw it, Ibn-i Battuta writes : 'It is a city with broad streets. One who first (among Muslims) made it the capital was my father-in-law, Sultan Sharif Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah. He constructed it well and made it resemble Delhi.'⁴⁹

With reference to Fattan (Pattinam), our traveller describes it as a large and fine town on the coast, with a wonderful harbour. There is a great wooden pavilion in it, erected on enormous beams and reached by a covered wooden gallery. When an enemy attacks the place, they tie all the vessels in the port to this pavilion, which is manned by soldiers and archers, so that the enemy has no chance of capturing them. In this town there is a fine mosque, built of stone; and it has also large quantities of grapes and excellent pomegranates.

NASIRUDDIN

Nasiruddin, who ascended the throne of Madura in 1344-45, is said to have been a domestic servant at Delhi and to have fled from the capital of Hindustan to his uncle.⁵⁰ After ascending the throne, he assumed the title of Mahmud Ghazi Damghan. 'Soon after homage was paid to him, poets recited odes in his praise and he bestowed rewards on them.'⁵¹

On his accession to the throne, Nasiruddin dismissed his uncle's wazir and confiscated his property. In his place he appointed one Badruddin as wazir. But the new wazir died suddenly and was succeeded by Khwaja Surur, the Qa'idul Bahr (Admiral), who was given the title of Khwaja-i Jahan, after the fashion at Delhi. Any one who addressed him differently was fined a fixed number of *dinars*.⁵²

He had his maternal aunt's son, who had married the daughter of Ghiyasuddin Damghan, executed; and then married the lady himself. The Sultan came to know that one, Malik Masud, had visited the condemned man in his prison. Hence he put Masud to death and also executed Malik Bahadur, who was brave, noble and accomplished.⁵³

It was after this that Ibn-i Battuta fell ill and decided to leave Madura. The Sultan tried to stop him, but he insisted on leaving the town and left it.⁵⁴

By now a ruling aristocracy of the close relatives of the ex-sultans

⁴⁹ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 200.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 203.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, 203-4.

⁵² *Ibid.*, 204.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 206.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 205-6.

must have been formed at Madura, and this nobility could not have viewed with pleasure the succession of an ex-domestic servant to the throne of the powerful and prosperous sultanat. On his part, the new Sultan, realizing the contempt in which he was actually held, 'slew all the officers of the kingdom who were likely to challenge his possession of the throne and among them the husband of his predecessor's daughter.' The wary Moor, Ibn-i Battuta, who was himself a son-in-law of the first Sultan of the kingdom, must have realized the danger to his person. He left the town and resumed his travels in spite of the fact that the Sultan pressed him to continue his stay at Madura.

THE BREAK IN THE COINAGE

We have a coin of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud Damghan Shah which is dated A.H. 745 (1344-45 A.D.). Then follows a break in the coins till we come to a coin Adil Shah, bearing the date A.H. 757 (1356 A.D.). The cause for the break is not known.

Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar thinks that the break in the chain of coins between 1344 and 1356 was due to a temporary conquest of the sultanat by Vijayanagara. In his support he quotes a *record* of Tirukalakkudi, in the South Arcot district, which states, 'The times were Tulukkan (Muslim) times; the *devadana* (gift to gods) lands of the gods were taxed with *kudimai* (dues of cultivation); the temple worship, however, had to be conducted without any reduction; the *ulavu* or the cultivation of the temple lands was done by turns by the tenants of the villages; at this juncture Kampana Udaiyar⁵⁵ came on his southern campaign destroying Tulukkans and establishing a stable administration throughout the country and appointed many chiefs (Nayakkamars) for inspection and supervision in order that the worship in all temples might be revived regularly as of old.'⁵⁶

After quoting the above record, Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar writes: 'The date of this record from the astronomical details given has been equated with A.D. 1358 (Friday, 7 September). If by 1358 all this had been done by Kumara Kampana—and there is no particular reason to doubt the record—then the invasion by Kampana of the south must have taken place somewhat earlier. Does this not offer an explanation for the break in the coinage of the sultans of Madura? If it does, it means that the Vijayanagara invasions had taken place during this period, and that the Madura Sultan, Nasiruddin himself (or his successor), had suffered a crushing defeat at the

⁵⁵ Son of Bukka I.

⁵⁶ *Epigraphical Report*, 1916, Section 33.

hands of the Hindus and the rule of the Muhammadans had been put an end to, at least temporarily.⁵⁷

There is a serious difficulty in accepting Dr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar's conclusions. The record was written, according to him, in 1358. The effective rule of Kampana Udaiyar was being established, in that year, in and about the South Arcot district, and this leads the learned scholar to assume that the occupation of the entire sultanat of Madura by Kumara Kampana must have taken place much earlier. If the sultanat of Madura had been overrun by the Vijayanagara prince earlier and his systematic rule was being set up in 1358, how then are we to account for the coin of Adil Shah, which bears the date A.H. 757 (1356 A.D.), and those of his successor dated A.H. 761-770 (1359-68 A.D.).

Further, it is not too much to allow a reign of twelve years to a sultan of Madura. One of the successors of Nasiruddin, Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah, ruled for more than a decade. His coins cover nine years more, that is, till the earliest date of the available coins of his successor, Sultan Alauddin Sikandar Shah, A.H. 774 (1372-73 A.D.).

Two facts powerfully disprove the contention of the learned scholar. Firstly, we have a coin of a sultan of Madura bearing the date 1356, two years before the date of the record (1358), and other coins of another ruler of same kingdom dated 1359-68. Thus we have one coin dated two years before the record and several dated immediately after it. Secondly, the gap is before the coin dated 1356. The record thus raises the question—was there a sultan of Madura at the time (1358) or not? If there was no sultan at Madura, how are we to account for these coins both before and after the record? If there was a sultan at Madura, we must seek some other explanation for the passage of the record. The date of the record given by Dr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar may be wrong as is contended by Sewell. The mere non-availability of the coins for a period does not entitle us to assume that the sultanat was overrun by some adjacent power to reappear once again. It may be that there were not many issues of coins during this period; it is also possible that the coins of the gap period have not yet been found by coin collectors. The date of the inscription, on which Dr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar tries to base his theory of Kampana's conquest of Ma'abar as early as 1347, seems to be capable of being calculated differently. Sewell writes: 'I think that there is good reason to suppose that the date of the record was really 30 August 1364, and the Pandya prince mentioned was that Naravarman Vira Pandya *alias* Parakrama

⁵⁷ Aiyangar, *South India and Her Muhammadan Invaders*, 182.

Pandya, whose rule seems to have begun in 1335.⁵⁸ All that the Tirukalakkudi record mentions could have happened in 1364 in that area, but not as early as Dr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar thinks.

Even then there is nothing in the passage of the record to suggest that Madura was captured. About 1364 Kumara Kampana might have overrun (may be temporarily) the region of Tirukalakkudi and not the whole of the sultanat.

The rising tide of the great Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara, checked in the north by the young and vigorous state of Bahman Shah and his successors, was gradually encroaching upon the territory of the sultans of Madura and defeated them in battle more than once. But none of these defeats before the later seventies seem to have been crushing enough to enable the Hindu Raja to occupy Madura.

Further, 'the existence of a Muslim record, dated A.H. 771 (1369-70 A.D.)⁵⁹ at Devakottah, shows that the country was still under a Muslim ruler'.⁶⁰ According to Dr. Venkataramanayya, 'No Vijayanagara inscription bearing an earlier date than 1371 is found in the region south of the Kaveri'.⁶¹

Hence it is almost certain that in the early fifties the sultanat of Ma'abar was ruled over by Nasiruddin Mahmud Damghan and that his territory extended in the north up to, if not beyond, the South Arcot district.

SHAMSUDDIN ADIL SHAH

Dr. Venkataramanayya, while emphatically denying the fact that the sultanat of Madura was overrun by Kumara Kampana in the later forties,⁶² refused to recognize that the three sultans—Adil Shah, Mubarak Shah and Sikandar Shah—who are believed (on the basis of coins) to have ruled over Ma'abar, ever reigned over that region.⁶³ He writes: 'It must be pointed out that the testimony of the coins attributed to the sultans of Madura by the numismatists is not trustworthy in the absence of confirmatory evidence from other sources. There is no reason for believing that the sultans, who are said to have ruled in Ma'abar subsequent to the reign of Nasiruddin Damghan Shah, did actually rule over that country. In the first place, apart from the

⁵⁸ *The Historical Inscriptions*, 194.

⁵⁹ Inscription No. 194, *Chronological List of Inscriptions of the Pudukottah State* (Published in Pudukottah, 1339).

⁶⁰ *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. XI, No. 1. 54 note.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

⁶² *Ibid.*, 54.

⁶³ *JASB*, 1895, Part I, 51.

supposition of the numismatists, there is little evidence to show that the sultans mentioned in these coins ruled over Ma'abar rather than some other part of the world. Secondly, the choice of Ma'abar as the kingdom under the sway of these sultans is arbitrary. Excepting the fact that the coins were discovered in South India, there seems to be no valid grounds to justify this choice. One characteristic of Muslim coinage, that is, the mention of the place of mintage, which surely indicates the area where the coins were intended for circulation, is conspicuous by its absence in the so-called coins of the sultans of Ma'abar. Though one of the eminent numismatists of the last century, who examined these coins, discovered in them features of Ma'abar fabric, there is nothing to distinguish them from other coins excepting the difference of their palaeography, which admits of several explanations.

'Therefore, it is not possible to assert definitely that the coins dated subsequent to A.H. 745 (1344-45) belonged to the sultans of Madura. Having due regard for the available numismatic evidence, all that can be reasonably said is that the coins bearing a date later than A.H. 745 were discovered in the country, which was once under the sultans of Ma'abar.'⁶⁴

There are a few pieces of evidence which militate against the position taken up by the learned scholar. Firstly, the coins were found in Ma'abar and not outside its boundaries. Secondly, an eminent numismatist,⁶⁵ declares them to be of the Ma'abar fabric. The evidence of a specialist is of considerable value, for he examines not only the patterns of the coins, their weights, values and style of writing but also the minting skill involved, the metal used and similar relevant factors. Thirdly, if the place of mintage is omitted in the coins of the later sultans of Madura, the same is also the case with the coins of their predecessors. Thus this common departure from the usual Muslim practice of mentioning the place of mintage establishes an affinity instead of disproving it. *Finally, I have discovered a proclamation of Adil Shah, engraved on a big slab of stone, in the heart of the Madura town, which must set all such doubts, as Dr. Venkataramanayya has entertained, at perfect rest.* The slab which lay half buried in a cemetery known as the *Dargah of Sultan Alaiddin Auliya* was taken out by me and put inside the compound of the office of the Dargah manager along with several other Arabic and Persian inscribed stones. I took a photograph of the stone⁶⁶ and then had several impressions of the inscription taken on paper. The inscription reads:

⁶⁴ *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. XI, No. 1, 53-54.

⁶⁵ C. J. Rodgers, Honorary Numismatist to the Government of India.

⁶⁶ See, Dr. S. A. Q. Husaini, *History of the Pandya Country*, 102.

'God says, "Obey God, obey the Messenger and the people of authority among you." Therefore, he who obeys the Sultan obeys the *Rahman* (Most Merciful). Any one who from the obedience of His Majesty . . . Badshah, the Master of Rulers, the Chosen one among the slaves of the Lord of the Worlds, Shamsud-Dunya wad-Din Abul-Muzaffar Adil Shah, the Sultan (May God perpetuate his kingdom), among the kings, nobles, horsemen, footmen, shop-keepers, traders and others, deviates . . . and imprisonment and death will suffer, And he who . . .; he will have peace and safety . . . and he will be victorious and successful. . .'

Consequently there should be no doubt about the fact that Sultan Shamsuddin Adil Shah ruled over Ma'abar.

A coin of Ma'abar fabric issued by Sultan Shamsuddin was reproduced in the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 1895 (Plate V, f. 25). But it could not be assigned to any known ruler until I discovered in 1954 at Madura the inscribed proclamation of Adil Shah in which he calls himself *Shamsud-Dunya wad-Din Abul-Muzaffar Adil Shah as-Sultan*.

Ibn-i Battuta, the only contemporary authority on the history of the sultanat of Madura having left the town in the reign of Mahmud Ghazi Damghan Shah (Nasiruddin), we are left only with the legends of the coins of the subsequent sultans to construct such history as we can.

After Nasiruddin's coin dated A.H. 745 (1344-45) 'the first Hijrah date is met with after an interval of twelve years when the reigning king was Adil Shah'.⁶⁷ His earliest coin is dated A.H. 757 (1355-56 A.D.) and in it he calls himself 'the Meek Sultan'.⁶⁸ Several other coins belonging to his reign are available but none of them bears any date. The earliest coin of his successor is dated 761 A.H. (1359-60 A.D.).⁶⁹ Hence we may assume, on the basis of the coins, that Adil Shah ruled from 1356 to 1359.

As to the end of Adil Shah, we have several pieces of evidence which help us to conclude that he was killed by Saluva Mangu, one of the generals of Kumara Kampana. A few inscriptions state that the Vijayanagara forces were operating in the south as early as the fifties.⁷⁰ 'Vira Savanna Udaiyar and his cousin, Kumara Kampana, came to the country far away from the seat of their respective governments in 1352-53. Then Savanna was in Sendalai in the vicinity of Tanjore.

⁶⁷ *JASB*, 1895, Plate IV, fig. 12.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, 1895, Plate IV, fig. 14.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, fig. 26.

⁷⁰ *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. XI, No. 1, 56.

From there he moved southward along the southern bank of the Kaveri and reached the neighbourhood of Karur about the middle of 1352.⁷¹ About the same time Kumara proceeded to Tiruvannamalai from his capital Mulbagal in the Kolar district. According to the *Madura Vijayam*, a contemporary poem in which Gangadevi, the queen of Kumara Kampana, describes her husband's expedition against the Sultan of Madura, the territory of the Sultan extended in the north up to Chidambaram in the Tanjore district.⁷²

Thus we see that from the early fifties the forces of Vijayanagara were engaged in a series of efforts to conquer the sultanat of Madura. The first phase of the mortal combat seems to have dragged on until the 'Meek Sultan', Adil Shah, was killed in a combat with Saluva Mangu. This fact is borne out by the *Jaimini Bharatam*,⁷³ a Telugu work of the late 15th century, which says that Saluva Mangu defeated the Sultan of Madura and took him prisoner. The *Ramahhyudayam*⁷⁴ states that the Sultan was killed in a combat with Saluva Mangu.⁷⁵

The Sultan is venerated as a martyr by the Muslims of Madura and lies buried by the side of Alauddin Udawji, whose having been killed by a non-Muslim is recorded by Ibn-i Battuta.

The sultanat of Madura did not come to an end with the death of Adil Shah. The nobles of Madura went to the Bahmani court, brought a relative of Bahman Shah and installed him as the ruler of Madura. This is stated by Aff. 'When Sultan Muhammad Shah bin Sultan Tughluq Shah . . . left this world for the next, and Sultan Firuz Shah became the ruler, his imperial *farmans* were sent to Ma'abar. The people of Ma'abar, deciding unanimously, went to Daulatabad, and choosing a relative of Hasan Kanku as their ruler, gave up their allegiance to Sultan Firuz.'⁷⁶

This change in the stock of the rulers is clearly marked by a corresponding change in the language of the legends on the coins. Up to the death of Adil Shah the legend on the coins was inscribed in the Arabic language. After that the Persian language was used for the purpose. We know that Bahman Shah claimed to have been descended from

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 58.

⁷³ *Jaimini Bharatam*. I, 32, quoted by Dr. Venkataramanayya in the *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. XI, No. 1, 54-55.

⁷⁴ *Ramahhyudayam* also quoted by Dr. Venkataramanayya in the above journal.

⁷⁵ The Saluvas belonged to a powerful feudal house, which served Vijayanagara. The first of them, Saluva Mangu, came into prominence under Kampana. He conquered the Sultan of Madura and is said to have subordinated him to Samba Raya, a prominent feudatory king, in the North Arcot district. From the time of Mangu, the Saluvas increased in power and renown. *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XIII (1914), 12.

⁷⁶ *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* (Bib. Indica), 261.

Bahman, son of Infandiyar, an ancient ruler of Persia, and it is quite natural that a relative of his should prefer the Persian language.

FAKHRUDDIN MUBARAK SHAH

Shamsuddin's successor, according to the coins available to us, was Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah. Probably, Fakhruddin was the relative of Sultan Bahman Shah who was brought from the Deccan to rule over Madura.

Fakhruddin enjoyed a long reign of twelve or thirteen years. His earliest available coin is dated 761/1360⁷⁷ and the last 770/1368-9.⁷⁸ The earliest coin of his successor, Alauddin Sikandar Shah, is dated 774 (1372-73).⁷⁹ Hence it is likely that the reign of Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah lasted up to 1372-3.

Fakhruddin must have been a strong ruler to have carried on the struggle against Vijayanagara for more than a decade. Yet the game was a losing one. There could be no comparison between the resources of Vijayanagara and Madura. Still the Sultan seems to have held his own.

There is no evidence to show that Sultan Fakhruddin died a violent death. No tomb of a martyr named Fakhruddin is known in Madura or its neighbourhood. Therefore we may assume that he died a natural death about A.H. 774 (1372).

ALAUDDIN SIKANDAR SHAH

Evidently Alauddin Sikandar Shah, the last Sultan of Madura, ascended the throne in the year A.H. 774 (1372-73) for his earliest coin which we possess is dated that year.⁸⁰ The Sultan continued the struggle with Vijayanagara, but the result could not have been in doubt. The sultanat, however, continued to exist in spite of its checks and defeats and the last coin of Sultan Alauddin Sikandar Shah is dated A.H. 779 (1377-78).⁸¹ Sultan Sikandar Shah, according to the local tradition, was defeated and took refuge in a cave of the Tirup-parakunram hill.⁸² He was overtaken by the Hindu forces and killed.

According to Afif, Bukka, an enemy who was on the frontiers of Ma'abar with a large army and powerful elephants, invaded that country, captured the ruler and killed him. He then took possession

⁷⁷ *JASB*, 1895, Plate V, fig. 26.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, fig. 20.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 1909, 682, fig. 24.

⁸⁰ *JASB*, 1895, Plate V, fig. 29.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, fig. 22.

⁸² Three miles to the south of the town of modern Madura.

of Ma'abar.⁸³ The *Madura Vijayam* of Gangadevi says that Kumara Kampana defeated the Sultan of Madura, that the latter challenged the Hindu prince to fight a duel and that Kampana defeated and beheaded the Sultan.⁸⁴ Kampana was the general (and viceroy) of Bukka, the ruler of Vijayanagara.

Bukka died in the early months of 1377. The latest coin of Sultan Sikandar Shah is dated A.H. 779, which commenced on 10 May 1377 and ended on 29 April 1378. Therefore, the sultanat of Madura appears to have survived Bukka and come to an end soon after him.

Alauddin Sikandar Shah lies buried on the top of a hill. There is another grave near it, which is said to be the grave of his wazir. Several graves in an open space, half way to the top, are considered to be the graves of his courtiers and generals. Sultan Sikandar Shah, having died as a martyr, is regarded by local Muslims as a *wali* (saint), and his shrine is an object of veneration and pilgrimage for the Muslims of Ma'abar.

EXTENT OF THE MADURA SULTANAT

As to the extent of the sultanat of Madura, although we cannot be very definite about it, we have a number of relevant data which are helpful. At the initial stage the sultanat consisted of the entire province of Ma'abar. We have evidence on record to show that Sultan Alauddin Udawji led campaigns outside his kingdom, though the extent of the territory he may have acquired and the direction in which he marched are not given by our sole authority, Ibn-i Battuta.⁸⁵

The area mostly covered by the province of Ma'abar (in the early thirties of the 14th century) was called Tamilakam in ancient days. The earliest tradition fixed the northern boundary of Tamilakam on the east coast at Pulicat, a little above Madras, and on the west coast at the white rock near Badagara, to the south of Mahe, the frontier line between these two points (east to west) running round the hill of Venkata or Tirupati, a hundred miles to the north-west of Madras, and then inclining southward to Badagara.⁸⁶ Later traditions extended the north-eastern boundary to the North Pennar river⁸⁷ and the north-western limit to the Chandragiri river, south of Mangalore.⁸⁸ Wassaf, who wrote during the early decades of the 14th century⁸⁹ about

⁸³ ARI (Bib. Ind.), 262.

⁸⁴ *Madura Vijayam*, 46-47.

⁸⁵ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 189.

⁸⁶ *The Tamils Eighteen Hundred Years Ago*, 10, 17.

⁸⁷ Elliot, *Coins of Southern India*, 108.

⁸⁸ The Chandragiri is the boundary between the Kerala and the Tuluva country, V. A. Smith, 395.

⁸⁹ Wassaf, *Manuscript*, section on Ma'abar.

Ma'abar, says: 'Its extent from the limits of Kullam to the district of Nellore is about three hundred *farsangs* along the sea-coasts.'⁹⁰ Thus the boundaries of Ma'abar during the 14th century seem to have been conterminous with those of Tamilakam. It is no wonder that Sultan Muhammad Tughluq, who had much political genius in him, constituted the southern province on a linguistic basis.

Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah, who was the governor of Sultan Muhammad for several years before he rebelled, must have constituted his entire province into an independent kingdom. Of course, the inviolability which Ma'abar enjoyed as a province of the mighty sultanat of Delhi could not have been vouchsafed to it after it became an independent kingdom. The kings and chieftains of the Deccan must have been tempted to seize the opportunity offered by the estrangement between Delhi and Madura to extend their own territories or to carve out new principalities out of Ma'abar.

The power which made serious inroads into the territory of the sultanat up to 1442 was the Hoysala kingdom under its ruler, Vira Ballala III. He is known to have occupied Tirvannamalai⁹¹ in the South Arcot district, besieged Kuppam (*Kubban*)⁹² eight or nine miles from Trichinopoly,⁹³ and held Kaval⁹⁴ Pattinam on the east coast of the Tinnevely district, near which sea-port he was defeated and taken captive. Thus, in the early forties, the size of the sultanat of Madura must have dwindled considerably, comprising the modern districts of Madura and Ramnad, a major part of the district of Tinnevely and parts of Trichinopoly and Tanjor districts, covering most of the original Pandya kingdom and certain parts of the Chola region.

When Ibn-i Battuta disembarked on the coast of Ma'abar, Ghiyasuddin Damghan Shah was subjugating an area near a fort the name of which the traveller gives as Harkatu⁹⁵ (Arcot) at a distance of two days' journey on a palanquin from the place of landing. Where Ibn-i Battuta landed is not known. He did not land at Fattan (Pattinam) on the east coast for he went to that port later. The port now nearest to Arcot is Covelong at a distance of about 60 miles.

We have no means of discovering how much territory the sultans of Madura, especially Ghiyasuddin Damghan Shah and Nasiruddin, his successor, were able to add to their dominion after the collapse

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

*⁹¹ *Epigraphia Carnatica*, IX, Db. 14.

⁹² Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV.

⁹³ Ayyangar, 174-75.

⁹⁴ Ibn-i Battuta, Vol. IV, 197.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 168.

of the Hoysala kingdom in 1342. According to Ibn-i Battuta, the former had under him only 6,000 soldiers, one half of them being worthless. With such a small army (in addition to the garrisons of the towns and frontier posts) and the further supply of soldiers from the north cut off, he could not have annexed any substantial territory. Moreover, Ghiyasuddin was not spared for many years after his great victory over Vira Ballala. Mahmud Damghan Shah started his reign in an atmosphere of suspicion and hatred, resulting in his putting to death most of the leading nobles of the kingdom. Hence there is no room for thinking that he could have accomplished much by way of conquest and expansion.

Besides, the rising sons of Sangama, the five brothers who founded the kingdom of Vijayanagara, were already active in the field and would not have allowed the sultans of Madura to gain much territory after the fall of the Hoysala kingdom. The northern districts had already passed under the sway of the Sambuvarayan.

Hence it is probable that the sultanat of Madura, about the middle of the 14th century, comprised the territory south of a line, with dents, big and small, joining Cochin on the west coast and Trichinopoly, and produced slightly north-eastward to the Coromandel coast, enclosing the whole of the modern Madura, Ramnad and Tinnevely districts, and portions of the districts of Trichinopoly and Tanjore and perhaps some part of South Arcot. Thereafter, the territory began to shrink and finally the whole of it was conquered by Vijayanagara.

Gangadevi, the wife of Kampana, who was a contemporary poetess and has recorded the exploits of her husband, states that the territory of the Sultan comprised the whole area south of Chidambaram.⁹⁶ If we could definitely fix the date of Kumara Kampana's early campaign, this piece of information would be very valuable.

⁹⁶ *Madura Vijayam*, quoted by Dr. Venkataramanayya in the *Journal of the Madras University*, Vol. XI, No. 1, 36.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

THE VIJAYANAGARA EMPIRE

I. THE SANGAMA DYNASTY

THE NORTHERN INVASIONS

THE RISE OF VIJAYANAGARA¹ EMPIRE was one of those sudden revolutions which have been so frequently seen to spring from the troubled current of political events. It was the result of the tremendous Hindu reaction against the Turkish (*Turushka*) domination of the Deccan and South India during the first quarter of the fourteenth century.²

1 Called Bijanagar by Muslim chroniclers, Bizenegalia by Conti, Bichenegher by Nikitin, and Bisnaga or Narasinga by Portuguese writers. The empire was called after the name of the imperial city of Vijayanagara. It is in ruins today on the site of Hampi. See Longhurst, *Hampi Ruins*.

2 The following abbreviations have been used in this chapter :

ASI	<i>Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Report</i> (1887 onwards).
Barani	Ziyyauddin Barani, <i>Tarikh-i-Firuz Shahi</i> , Bib. Ind. New Series, XXXIII. Extracts in English in ED, III.
<i>Commentaries</i>	Commentaries of Afonso D'Albuquerque the Great (Hakluyt Ed., 3 vols.)
EC	<i>Epigraphia Carnatica</i> (1866 onwards)
ED	Elliot and Dowson, <i>The History of India</i> as told by its own historians.
EI	<i>Epigraphia Indica</i> (1892 onwards).
EMESI	<i>The Early Muslim Expansion in South India</i> by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya (Madras University).
Ferishta (Briggs)	Muhammad Kasim Ferishta, <i>Tarikh-i Firishta</i> , (Lucknow Text). Translated into English by John Briggs under the title <i>A History of the Rise of the Mahomedan Power in India, till the year 1612</i> , 4 vols.
FE	<i>A Forgotten Empire</i> by Robert Sewell (Reprint, 1924).
<i>Further Sources</i>	<i>Further Sources of Vijayanagara History</i> by Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri and Dr. N. Venkataramanayya (Madras University).
HISI	<i>The Historical Inscriptions of Southern India</i> by Robert Sewell (Madras University).
IA	<i>The Indian Antiquary</i> .
IHQ	<i>The Indian Historical Quarterly</i> .
JAHRS	<i>The Quarterly Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society</i> .

On the eve of Alauddin Khalji's invasion of the Deccan in 1294, there were four great Hindu dynasties ruling over the territories south of the Vindhya. The Yadavas of Devagiri were masters of the whole of the western Deccan from the Tapti to the Krishna; the Kakatiyas of Warangal ruled over the eastern Deccan. In the days of Prataparudra, their kingdom included almost the whole of the present Rayalasima, excluding the southern taluqs of Chittoor and the western taluqs of Anantapur and Bellary districts, and in the south it almost touched Kanchi. The Hoysalas of Dwarasamudra and the Pandyas of Madura divided between themselves the rest of the peninsula. Besides these four great Hindu states, there were a number of petty principalities subordinate to one or the other of them. One such feudatory state was Kampili in the Raichur Doab, which owed allegiance to the Yadavas of Devagiri.³

JASB	<i>Journal and Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal.</i>
JBORS	<i>The Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society.</i>
JBRAS	<i>Journal Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Society.</i>
JIH	<i>Journal of Indian History.</i>
JOR	<i>Journal of Oriental Research.</i>
JRAS	<i>Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland.</i>
LR	<i>Local Records.</i>
MAR	<i>Mysore Archaeological Reports.</i>
MER	<i>Madras Epigraphical Reports</i> (The inscriptions of the Report are indicated as 64 of 1916; 57 of 1901 etc.).
<i>Nellore Inscriptions</i>	A Collection of the Inscriptions on copperplates and stones in the Nellore District (3 vols.) by Allan Butterworth and Venugopal Chetty.
OH.Mss.	<i>Oriental Historical Manuscripts in the Tamil Language</i> by Rev. William Taylor.
QJMS	<i>The Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society.</i>
Saiyyid Ali	Saiyyid Ali Azizullah bin Tabataba: <i>Burhan-i Ma'asir</i> . Translated into English under the title of <i>The History of the Bahmani Dynasty</i> by Major J. S. King. (<i>The Indian Antiquary</i> , Vols. 28 and 29. References are to its reprint by Luzac & Co., 1900).
SGO	<i>The Suryavansi Gajapatis of Orissa</i> by Dr. R. Subrahmanyam.
SH	<i>South Indian Inscriptions.</i>
SPLVE	<i>Social and Political Life in the Vijayanagara Empire</i> (2 vols.) by Dr. B. A. Salatore.
<i>Sources</i>	<i>Sources of Vijayanagar History</i> compiled by A. Rangaswami Sarasvati and edited by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar (Madras University).
SHTDV	<i>Studies in the History of the Third Dynasty of Vijayanagara</i> by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya.
TTDI	<i>Tirumalai-Tirupati Devasthanam Inscriptions.</i>
VSCV	<i>Vijayanagara Six-Centenary Commemoration Volume.</i>

Financially all these states were well off; the kings possessed immense riches; their coffers were full of diamonds, pearls, and gold; agriculture and commerce were in a flourishing condition; the capital cities were great centres of trade and civilization; seaports like Kaval and Mothpali were visited by merchants from Arabia, Persia, and China; the coastline extending from Quilon to Nellore was called in Arabic *Ma'abar* i.e. a passage; here arrived the curiosities of Chin and Machin (China and greater China) and the products of Hind and Sind, laden in large ships sailing like mountains with the wings of winds on the surface of water.⁴

In religion the external manifestations were quite pleasing. Every South Indian prince considered it meritorious to build temples and to endow them richly. The famous shrines of Mahabalipuram, Kanchi, Chidambaram, Srirangam, Tanjore, Madura and other places in the south bear witness to the pious activities of generations of rulers. These temples were great centres of learning and culture, where knowledge was imparted to the pupils from far off lands. Their accumulated wealth was the pride of South India. There was complete religious freedom and even Arab and Persian Muslims were allowed to settle and pursue their own callings at Kaval, Kandur (Kaumanur) and Honavar, without any molestation on the part of the Hindu rulers of the land.

But, unfortunately, the clash of interests of rival dynasties rendered harmonious progress of the country impossible. The Yadavas against the Kakatiyas, the Kakatiyas against the Pandyas, the Pandyas against the Hoysalas and the Hoysalas against the Yadavas carried on generations of warfare with a zeal worthy of a better cause. Their conflicting ambitions were so patent that the contemporary poet, Amir Khusrau, remarked that Devagiri and *Ma'abar* were Hoysala Ballala III's quarry.⁵ While Muslim forces were delivering shattering blows at the Yadavas and the Kakatiyas, this Hoysala sovereign more than once attacked the chief of Kampili,⁶ and even tried to take advantage of the fratricidal war in the Pandyan kingdom.⁷ Their mutual animosities had taken such deep roots that even in the face of foreign invasions they could not eschew their quarrels and present a united front against their common foe. They had to be wiped out completely and a new set of heroes had to take up the leadership before the country could be rescued from the

⁴ Wassaf's *Tazjyatul Amsar*, etc., ED, III, 32.

⁵ Khusrau, JIH, IX, 55.

⁶ MAR for 1912, 45; for 1923, 119; and EC, VIII, No. 19.

⁷ Wassaf, ED, III, 52-54; Khusrau: JIH, IX, 56.

slough of political degradation into which it had been betrayed by its old masters.

This revolutionary change was forced on the land by the Muslim invaders from the north. It took nearly three decades, because the Khalji Sultans did not originally aim at the annexation of southern regions, and because their agents proved treacherous and created turmoil at Delhi, so that the hold of the central government upon subordinate Hindu kingdoms was lost after each conquest. The Hindu rulers adopted the policy of the cane-reed, bending down when the storm was strong and standing up again when it had passed. They paid tribute to their Muslim suzerain only when it could be enforced. Hence the Tughluqs followed a policy of annexation, and destroyed practically all the Hindu states that resisted their fiat.

In 1294 Alauddin Khalji personally humbled Ramadeva, the Yadava king, and exacted from him a 'ransom of 600 *mans* of gold, 7 *mans* of pearls, 2 *mans* of diamonds, rubies, emeralds and sapphires, 1,000 *mans* of silver, 4,000 pieces of silk, and an yearly tribute of the revenues of the Elichpur district.'⁸ After his accession to the throne of Delhi, he sent his redoubtable general, Malik Kafur, to realize the arrears of tribute from Ramadeva. The imperial forces once more defeated the Yadava king and sent him to Delhi in 1307. The Sultan gave him a kind reception, conferred upon him the title of Rai Rayan and sent him back to hold the kingdom of Devagiri as a fief of the sultanat.⁹ In 1309 Malik Kafur, assisted by Ramadeva, entered Telingana, defeated Prataparudra,¹⁰ the Kakatiya king, seized all his accumulated wealth, and compelled him to pay an annual tribute to the Sultan. He spent the subsequent two years in subjugating the Hoysala and the Pandyan kingdoms. Ramadeva of Devagiri 'provided material of war for the army of invasion'. Hoysala Ballala III, unable to resist the Delhi army, surrendered all his 'gems, valuables and buried treasures and enrolled himself among the imperial tributaries. The Pandyan rulers met with a worse fate. Most of the famous shrines of their kingdom were pulled down and their priests sought safety in flight to the forests. The victorious general returned to Delhi in October 1311, laden with spoils worth several millions of *tankas*, and took with him Prince Ballala, the son of the Hoysala king.¹¹

⁸ Ferishta (Lucknow text), I, 46. There are many varieties of *mans* in India—from 19 lbs. in Travancore to 163½ lbs. in Ahmadnagar. See Sewell: FE, 402.

⁹ Barani (ED, III, 200). According to Isami, Ramadeva invited Alauddin's assistance to suppress the revolt of his own son, Bhillama (Sangama?).

¹⁰ Called Rudar or Laddar Dev, Rai of Tilang, by Musalman chroniclers.

¹¹ Ferishta and Isami state that Malik Kafur took with him to Delhi Ballala III himself. Inscriptions, however, show that it was his son, who waited upon the Sultan

After Ramadeva's death, his son, Sankar (called Bhillama by Isami), raised the standard of revolt in 1312. Malik Kafur once more returned to his first scene of action, defeated and killed him, and annexed the Yadava kingdom to the empire of Delhi.¹²

But the triumph of the Musalmans was shortlived and ineffective. Taking advantage of Alauddin's indifferent health, Malik Kafur intrigued to secure supreme power into his own hands, and was suspected of hastening the death of his master in 1316. He threw all the grown-up sons of the late Sultan into prison and began to rule in the name of the youngest prince. This usurpation plunged the state into chaos, and the southern Hindu kings immediately asserted their independence and withheld the stipulated tribute. The Marathas expelled the Muslim garrison from Devagiri, and their leader, Harapaldeva, son-in-law of Ramadeva, once more restored the Yadava kingdom.

This set-back to the imperial interests was, however, a temporary phase. Some thirty-five days after the death of Alauddin, his loyal 'slaves' assassinated Malik Kafur, brought out Prince Mubarak from prison and placed him at the helm of the state. Mubarak Shah Khalji restored order in the northern provinces, and then organized a campaign for the recovery of the allegiance of the Deccan. In his time history repeated itself; like his great father, he personally took the field against the new Yadava king, Harapaldeva, defeated him in 1318 and flayed him alive. The Yadava kingdom came into the hands of the Sultan again. His general, Khusrau Khan, repeated the exploits of Malik Kafur, invaded Warangal, collected the arrears of tribute from Prataparudra, subjugated *Ma'abar*, and carried away a hundred elephants. In his greed he did not hesitate to confiscate the property of even a co-religionist, like Sirajuddin Taqi, a wealthy Musalman merchant of the seaport of Pattan.¹³

The Hindu rulers, however, could not rest in peace without another bid for independence. They got an opportunity in 1320 when Khusrau Khan killed Mubarak Shah Khalji, and made himself Sultan with the title of Nasiruddin. This revolution once more plunged the country into disorder, and gave a set-back to the Muslim power in the peninsula. Prataparudra again threw off the Muslim yoke, withheld tribute from Delhi, and even became somewhat aggressive. His example

at Delhi, and his return was celebrated in 1313 by a gift to a temple. See EC, VII, Sh. 68.

¹² Ferishta. According to Isami, Bhillama sought safety in flight; according to Amir Khusrau, the chief actor in this tragic drama was Sankama, the elder brother of Bhillama. See *Further Sources*, Vol. I, 12-13.

¹³ Barani, ED. III, 219.

encouraged others and the remaining Hindu princes reasserted their independence.

But their success too was ephemeral. Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, the warden of the North-western frontiers of India, hurried to Delhi, destroyed the usurper, and sent his eldest son, Jauna, entitled Ulugh Khan, to reconquer the Hindu states of the South. In 1323 the Kakatiya kingdom was overthrown and Prataparudra committed suicide in captivity. Telingana became a part of the Delhi empire and a Muslim governor was installed at Warangal. Madura too appears to have met with a similar fate about the same time.¹⁴ Thus one king after another bowed his head to the inevitable fate of defeat and humiliation at the hands of successive invaders from the north. By 1325 the Yadava, the Kakatiya and a major part of the Pandyan dominions were incorporated into the Delhi sultanat, and Devagiri, Warangal, and Madura became the seats of Muslim provincial governors. Only the Hoysala kingdom somehow survived the Muslim occupation and preserved its precarious existence. The Pandyan rulers appear to have retired to their more southern possessions in the Tinnevely district.

The overthrow of the Yadavas, however, released Kampiladeva, the chief of Kampili, from his oath of loyalty to that house and made him independent. He and his heroic son, Ramanatha, carved out for themselves a small but powerful state in the Raichur Doab with Kampili, Anegondi and Kunmata as their stronghold.¹⁵ They behaved as the political successors of the Yadavas of Devagiri, and thus drew upon themselves the wrath of Hoysala Ballala III.¹⁶ Between 1320 and 1325, the latter waged three successive but fruitless wars against them at a time when storm clouds were gathering with sinister portents in the political horizon of southern India. The state of Kampili

14 N. Venkataramanayya, *The Early Muslim Expansion in South India*, Ch. IV, Sec. V; also in JOR, XII, 210-13.

15 Kampil or Kampili, on the northern bank of the river Tungabhadra, about eight miles east of Anegondi, is in the Bellary district; Kummata is corrupted into Crynmata by Nuniz. For its identification see QJMS, XX, 5. The Sanskrit name for Anegondi was Hastinavati or Kunjarakona. The kingdom went under the name of either of these strongholds. For the events connected with the rise and fall of the kingdom of Kampili; see N. Venkataramanayya, *Kampili and Vijayanagar; Further Sources*, Vol. I, Ch. II.

16 EC, VIII, No. 19; MAR, 1923, No. 121; and EC, XII, 24. According to Rice's translation of the last record, the Hoysala general 'pierced and slew Kampila'. But Ibn-i Battuta's narrative shows that 'the Rai of Kampili' died in 1327, while fighting against the Muslim forces of Muhammad bin Tughluq. *ED*, III, 615. His reference to the eleven sons of the Rai precludes the identification of the 'Rai of Kampili' with Ramanatha, the son of Kampiladeva. An epigraph also refers to Kampila's death in a 'military campaign from Delhi'. *EI*, XXIII, 184, note 13.

survived the Hoysala attacks only to meet with destruction at the hands of the Turks two years later.

In 1325 Jauna became the Sultan of Delhi with the title of Muhammad bin Tughluq. His authority was challenged by his cousin, Bahauddin Gurshasp, who had been in charge of the frontier town of Sagar, near Gulbarga, in the Deccan. The Sultan ordered the army of Gujarat to take the field against the rebel. A battle was fought near Devagiri in which Bahauddin was badly beaten. The latter saved himself by seeking shelter at the court of Kampiladeva, the Raja of Kampili. In the meantime the Sultan personally came down to Devagiri and despatched three successive expeditions against his rebel cousin and his Hindu protector. In the first two campaigns the imperial forces were defeated and forced to retreat; in the third, however, they invested the fort of Kummata and captured one of its gates by assault. Kampiladeva and his protege, together with their families and retainers, made their escape to Anegondi. The imperialists took Kummata, pursued the fugitives and surrounded Anegondi from all sides. The garrison had no way of escape, and as the days passed they had to face starvation and death. Kampiladeva lost all hopes of victory. He sent away Bahauddin to seek asylum at the court of Ballala III, and prepared for the worst. After seeing that the womenfolk were removed beyond the reach of the Muslim soldiers by sacrificing themselves in the sacred flames of *jauhar*, he threw open the gates of the citadel. In the melee, he and his followers met with a heroic death.¹⁷ According to Nuniz six old men who had retired to a house were taken prisoner and kept in custody at Delhi. The conquered region was put in charge of the Malik Naib.¹⁸ Ballala III was not prepared to risk his kingdom for

17 Ibn-i Battuta, Isami, Nuniz and Ferishta. Ibn-i Battuta, however, says: 'Eleven sons of the Rai were made prisoners, and carried to the Sultan, who made them all Musalmans. The Sultan also made them amirs.' (ED. III, 614-15.) Regarding the course of the war, sequence of events and result, Nuniz differs from Ibn-i Battuta and other writers. According to him, this was purely a war of aggression on the part of 'the King of Dili' against 'the King of Bisnaga'; during the campaign, first Nagundy (Anegondi) was taken; the Hindu king and his nobles killed their womenfolk with their own hands before opening the gate of the fortress of 'Crynamata' (Kummata); the imperialists slew all, except six leading officers, one of whom was the minister, and another the treasurer of the vanquished king. These were kept in custody at Delhi. (Sewell, *Forgotten Empire*, 295.) Ferishta states that 'the Raja of Kampili' was taken prisoner. (Briggs, *Ferishta*, I, 419). Barani makes no mention of the war, but includes Kampili among Muhammad bin Tughluq's conquests. (ED, III, 236.) The events connected with the rise and fall of the kingdom of Kampili are also noticed in a few Kanarese and Telugu Mss. See N. Venkatarmanayya: *Kampil and Vijayanagara*, 4 ff.

18 Dr. N. Venkataramanayya identifies him with Prince Mahmud. See JOR, XII, 20.

the sake of a refugee. He made peace with the Sultan by surrendering Bahauddin into the hands of his pursuers.

Thus practically the entire peninsula from Tapti to Cape Comorin passed into the hands of the Turks, and Muhammad bin Tughluq's transfer of his capital in 1327 from Delhi to Devagiri, now renamed Daulatabad, proclaimed to the world his determination to hold the vast empire in his iron grip.

The Hindus, on their part, were not unaccustomed to political revolutions and changes of dynasties. They would have passively accepted the new masters, if the latter had remained content with the acquisition of mere political power. But the soldiers of the Turkish conquerors behaved as plunderers under the pretext of religion. Their anxiety for quick victory and their greed of gold clouded their religious and moral vision, as generally happens in all wars of aggression. The handful of Muslims, who had made their way into hostile lands far away from their headquarters, employed terrorism in all possible forms to cow down resistance. Neither political adventurers nor bigoted theologians had any scruples in rousing the unholy enthusiasm of their ignorant and rapacious followers by exploiting the idea of 'holy war' (*jihad*). The Hindus, who had no first-hand knowledge of the *Quran*, associated the callous cruelty of their despoilers with the message of the Prophet, and could not reconcile themselves to the new dispensation.

Indeed to the Hindus the effects of the Turkish invasions were heart-rending. Their land was ravaged, their accumulated riches were confiscated,¹⁹ and their rulers were humiliated. A Yadava king and a Hoysala crown-prince had to wait upon Alauddin Khalji, begging for mercy and forgiveness; another Yadava king was killed in battle by Malik Kafur. Harapaldeva was taken captive and flayed alive by the orders of Mubarak Shah Khalji; and the Kakatiya Prataparudra sought freedom from captivity by committing suicide on the Nerbada, while being taken to Delhi as a prisoner by the Muslim conquerors. Famous temples like those at Chidambaram, Srirangam and Madura were sacked and several others were pulled down.²⁰ An inscription refers especially to the Muslim occupation of the country and their appropriation of temple lands.²¹ Another inscription vividly describes the pitiable plight of the people of Telingana under the rule of the Turks. It records:²² 'In a hundred

¹⁹ See Sewell's *Forgotten Empire*, App. B.

²⁰ See *Sources*; extracts from *Prapannamrtam* and *Acharyasukti-Muktavali*; See also *Further Sources*, Vol. I, 39-42.

²¹ MER, 64 of 1916.

²² *Bharati*, XIX, 311.

sinful ways the rich were tortured for the sake of their wealth. At the very sight of the Parsikas (i.e. the Turks) many abandoned their lives. The Brahmanas were disallowed to perform their religious rites and ceremonies. Temples were destroyed and sacred images were desecrated and broken... During that calamity none dared to claim anything as his own whether it was a piece of property or one's own wife...

Describing the devastated conditions of the Pandyan kingdom, Gangadevi, the talented daughter-in-law of Bukka I, wrote in her *Madura Vijayam* that places like Chidambaram and Srirangam had become haunts of tigers and jackals, and despair was writ large on the faces of the southern people (Dravidas). This description, though somewhat poetic, agrees with the accounts of the Muslim chroniclers. Amir Khusrau, the poet-laureate of the early Turkish sultans, records in his *Khazainul Futuh* that Malik Kafur destroyed several hoary shrines of the Pandyan kingdom, and plundered their riches. The rapid extension of the Turkish power, so disastrous to the Hindus, did not bring any organization in its train for the permanent administration of the country. The incessant clash of arms and mutual misunderstandings gave no opportunity for the evolution of some system of government, which could reconcile the interests of the victors and the vanquished. The rule of Muhammad bin Tughluq was least fitted to hold together vast areas under one sceptre. Marvellous stories of his ambition and ferocity circulated amongst the inhabitants of the peninsula, whose past experience drew harrowing pictures of future calamities under this tyrant.

REVOLT OF THE DECCAN AND THE SOUTH

The stage was set for a tremendous revolution. Even amidst the triumphal notes of the Turks, there was heard the challenging voice of their victims, which slowly but steadily rose in intensity and pitch and ultimately submerged the joyous peals of their antagonists. The down-trodden Hindus, although stunned by the blows of the Turks at the outset, gradually recovered from the stupor, and *new* leaders came forward to emancipate them from the alien thralldom. Ambitious Muslim governors also fully exploited the situation and hastened the dismemberment of the Delhi sultanat south of the Vindhya. The details of this epic struggle are not systematically on record. Only incidental references to them are to be found in certain Muslim chronicles, and the nature of the movement is indicated in a few Hindu epigraphical records.

Isami summarily disposes of the whole episode in a few sentences. He says: 'During the reign of this unworthy monarch (Muhammad

bin Tughluq), whose promises to anyone are seldom kept, insurgents seized by force the whole of India and tumult and confusion rose on all sides. Audacious men lifted their heads in all places, and in every country there arose another king. *Ma'abar* became the seat of a separate government. A Salvyid became badshah of that region. Tilang having rebelled, the fort of Tilang (Warangal) passed away from the hands of the Turks. An apostate captured the country of Kannad from Gutty as far as the boundary of *Ma'abar*.²³ Barani, another contemporary chronicler, referring to these events remarks: 'A revolt broke out among the Hindus at Arangal (Warangal). Kanya Naik had gathered strength in the country. Malik Maqbul, the *nailb wazir*, fled to Delhi, and the Hindus took possession of Arangal, which was thus entirely lost. *About the same time* one of the relations of Kanya Naik (more appropriate Kampila or Kampiladeva),²⁴ whom the Sultan had sent to Kampili, apostatized from Islam, and stirred up a revolt. The land of Kampili also was thus lost and fell into the hands of the Hindus.' Ferishta furnishes more details about the rising of the Hindus in the South. Says he, 'This year (A.H. 744/1344 A.D.) Krishna Naik, the son of Ludder Deo (Prataparudradeva), who lived near Arangal, went privately to Bilal Deo, Raja of the Carnatic, and told him that he had heard that the Muslims, who were now very numerous in the Deccan, had formed the design of extirpating all the Hindus and that it was, therefore, advisable to combine against them. . . Krishna Naik promised, on his part also, when their plans were ripe, to raise all the Hindus of Arangal and Telingana, and put himself at their head. He (Bilal Deo) then raised an army and put part of it under the command of Krishna Naik, who reduced Arangal and compelled Imadul Mulk,²⁵ the governor, to retreat to Daulatabad. . . The confederate Hindus seized the country, lately occupied by the Muslims in the Deccan, and expelled them so that within a few months Muhammad Tughlaq had no possessions in that quarter except Daulatabad.'²⁶

Barani and Ferishta have given wrong names to Kapaya Nayaka, who was the real leader of the revolt in Telingana, and Ferishta has further blundered in assigning a wrong date to it,²⁷ and in ascribing

²³ *Indian Culture*, V, 264-65, *Further Sources*, No. 7.

²⁴ A Ms. of Barani's history found in the Govt. Oriental Mss. Library (D. No. 258), Madras, has Kampila in the place of Kanya Naik. See N. Venkataramanayya, *The Early Muslim Expansion in South India*, 181-82, foot-note 34. For Barani's account, see ED, III, 245.

²⁵ This seems to be an error; Barani gives the name as Malik Maqbul.

²⁶ Ferishta (Briggs), Vol. I, 427.

²⁷ See JAHRS, V, 231; JBORS. XX, 266; and *Further Sources*, Vol. I, 45-50.

the foundation of Vijayanagara to 'Bilal Deo' i.e. Ballala III or IV, both of whom had passed away before 1344. The events appear to have taken place in the order mentioned by Isami: 'first *Ma'abar*, then the fort of Tilang', and about the same time 'Kannada' (Kampili of Barani) threw off the yoke of Delhi. The earliest coin struck in the name of Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah of *Ma'abar* bears the date A.H. 735 (1334-35 A.D.).

But the war of liberation was started in the coastal districts of the Andhra country about a decade before the revolt in *Ma'abar*. Taking advantage of the preoccupation of Ulugh Khan with his accession to the throne of Delhi in 1325, the Hindus first regained possession of the eastern sea-board.²⁸ The Vilasa grant shows that Prolaya Nayaka of the Musumuri family became the lord of the region between the rivers Godavari and Krishna. He 'restored to the Brahmans their *agraharas*, which had been granted to them by former kings but forcibly taken away from them by those wrong-doers (the Turushkas)...' According to the Kaluvacheru grant of Anitalli (1325), Prolaya Nayaka rescued the land from the Muslim occupation. After his death, his cousin, Kapaya Nayaka, who was served by seventy-five nayakas, protected the land,²⁹ and in the words of Barani 'gathered strength in the country'. The rebellion of Jalaluddin Ahsan Shah in *Ma'abar* in 1335 brought Ulugh Khan, now entitled Muhammad bin Tughluq, to the South; but he could not proceed beyond Warangal due to the outbreak of a severe plague in his camp. He gave up the campaign against the *Ma'abar* rebel and ordered an immediate retreat to Delhi, admitting failure for once in his life. The lesson was not lost on the suppressed people of the land, who now resolved to make another bid for freedom, so pointedly noticed by Ferishta. Kapaya Nayaka appeared on the scene, expelled Malik Maqbul, the Muslim governor of Telingana, captured Warangal, and made it the seat of his government. It is not without significance that he assumed the title of *Andhradesadhivara* and *Andhrasuratrana*.³⁰ Still his resources were limited. He could not put an end to the Turkish rule in the whole of South India, nor could he prevent his quondam colleagues from establishing their own independent states in the neighbourhood—the Recherlas (Velamas) at Rachakonda and Devarakonda, and the Reddis at Addanki (later shifted to Kondavidu). Kapaya Nayaka's energies

28 M. S. Sarma: *A Forgotten Chapter of Andhra History*, 38-44.

29 For Vilasa and Kaluvacheru grants, see M. S. Sarma, *op. cit.*, Appendixes Nos. I and II.

30 III, IV, 950; M. S. Sarma, *op. cit.*, 64-65.

were wasted in fighting against these jealous rivals till he himself was slain in a battle with the Velama king, Anavota Nayaka I, about 1367.

FOUNDATION OF VIJAYANAGARA

The freedom movement, however, spread westwards into the kingdom of Kampili. Nuniz, the Portuguese chronicler, gives details of events which liberated the land of 'Ngundy' i.e. Anegondi. According to him, the people of the locality, as soon as they heard of the Sultan's departure from the country, rose in revolt against his deputy and made his position extremely precarious. The names of the Hindu leaders, who had stirred up this rebellion, are not definitely known. Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that the Araviti chief, Somadevaraja, played a decisive part in it.³¹ In his helplessness, the Malik Naib informed his master about his pitiable plight, and appealed for immediate action. The Sultan summoned his councillors, and under their advice released from prison the six men, who had been in his custody since the overthrow of the kingdom of Kampili, appointed one of them, (Harihara) Deo Rai, as the new king, and made another governor, and, after taking from them oaths of fidelity, despatched them with a large army to their country. On their arrival at Anegondi they were warmly welcomed by the people, and the Malik Naib surrendered to them the fortress and the kingdom. The exact area of the land so delivered is not known. But epigraphic evidence shows that it included almost the whole of the present Bellary district and a portion of the Raichur Doab. Deo Rai pacified the people, and by his kindness won their esteem.

One day, while he was hunting on the southern banks of the Tungabhadra, a hare boldly turned towards his hounds and bit them all. He was astonished at this unnatural phenomenon, and while returning home, he met a hermit to whom he narrated the incident. The hermit inspected the locality and advised him to build a city on the spot, for the incident signified that it would be the strongest city in the world.³² The hermit was no other person than Vidyaranya of scholarly fame.³³ The city was founded accordingly and was named Vidyanagara. The *Rajakalanirnaya* and *Vidyaranyakalajnana*, besides

31 M. S. Sarma, *op. cit.*, 48-52; N. Venkataramanayya, *Early Muslim Expansion in South India*, 177 ff.

32 Sewell, FE, 296-300. This account is furnished by Nuniz. 'Deoras' mentioned by him appears to be a shorter name for Harihara Deva Ray, i.e. Harihara I.

33 There is a great deal of controversy regarding his identity with Madhavacharya. For arguments in favour, see IA, 1916; IHQ, VIII. For arguments against, see IHQ, VI, VII and X and JIH, XII.

corroborating the account given by Nuniz, state that those who were sent by the Sultan were Harihara and Bukka. This epoch-making event took place in 1336, according to the Kapaluru and Bagepalli grants.³⁴ But the story of the hare, the hound and the hermit may be rejected as it is also associated with the foundation of other cities in the Deccan.³⁵ Vidyaranya's inspiration in laying the foundation of the city, however, may be accepted since he was on very intimate terms with the founders of the empire.

That some persons connected with the old kingdom of Kampili were sent by Muhammad bin Tughlaq to put down the revolt, and that they turned disloyal and laid the foundations of a Hindu empire is established by contemporary evidence. Isami says that *an apostate* captured the country of Kannada. Barani remarks that one of the relations of Kampila (i.e. Kampiladeva)³⁶ whom the Sultan had sent to Kambala (i.e. Kampili) apostatized from Islam, stirred up a revolt and established himself in the country. Muhammad bin Tughluq was not the first ruler to make this novel and dangerous experiment of entrusting the government of a province to converts from Hinduism. Precedents were not lacking. Sukhapal, a grandson of Jaipal, was converted to Islam and appointed governor of Ohind or Waihind by Mahmud of Ghazni. He too had apostatized and led the Hindu forces against his Turkish master.³⁷ Malik Kafur and Khusrau Khan had been given positions next only to their Khalji sovereigns in the Turkish sultanat. Muhammad bin Tughluq himself had converted and ennobled Kattu or Kannu, an officer of Prataparudra and put him in charge of the province of Tilang.³⁸ The despatch of Harihara and Bukka to restore order in the region of Kampili was quite in keeping with these precedents. But like other schemes of this ill-starred monarch, the arrangement failed miserably. Harihara, 'apostatized from Islam', reverted to his ancestral faith of Hinduism, asserted his independence and laid the foundation of the city and empire of Vijayanagara, under the inspiration of Vidyaranya.³⁹

³⁴ *Nellore Inscriptions*, I, CP. No. 15; EC, X, Bg. 70. Father Heras questions the authenticity of these records. See his *Beginnings of Vijayanagar History*, 1-42.

³⁵ IA, XXVIII, 218.

³⁶ Elliot's translation has Kanya Naik, while a Ms. of Barani's work gives 'Kampila' instead. Kampila appears to be correct, because Nuniz connects the person sent by Muhammad bin Tughluq with the court of the king of Bimaga (i.e. Kampiladeva).

³⁷ *Comb. Hist. of India*, III, 15; another case of apostasy is mentioned by Ibn-i Battuta. See K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Foreign Notices of South India*, 240

³⁸ ED, III, 867.

³⁹ There are various stories regarding the origin of the city and the empire of Vijayanagara. See Sewell, FE, 20-23; B. A. Saletore, SPLVE, Vol. I, 28-35, 82-112. A

HARIHARA AND BUKKA

According to the inscriptions of later kings,⁴⁰ which give an account of the origin of the family, Harihara I had four brothers—Kampa I, Bukka I, Marappa, Mudappa—and these were the sons of one Sangama⁴¹ of the Yadava family and lunar race. The dynasty founded by them is known as the Sangama dynasty after the name of their father. The empire of Vijayanagara was the result of the strenuous

study of these has led to the formulation of two clearly defined theories by different groups of scholars:

(a) *Telugu origin*. The city and the empire were founded by Harihara I and Bukka I, the most prominent of the five sons of Sangama, who were *originally* treasury officers of Kakatiya Prataparudra. After the capture of Warangal by Ulugh Khan in 1323, they transferred their services to Kampiladeva of Anegondi (or Kummata). The rest of their career after the fall of Anegondi is given above in the text. See Sewell, FE; B. Suryanarayana Rao, *The Never to be Forgotten Empire*; V. Rangachari, Ind. Ant. XLIII; N. Venkataramanayya, *Kampil and Vijayanagara*; and *Vijayanagara, Origin of the City and The Empire* (1933); *Further Sources*, Vol. I, Ch. III.

(b) *Karnataka Origin*: The city was founded by Hoysala Ballala III, and the empire by his feudatories—Harihara I, Bukka I and other sons of Sangama, who became legitimate successors of the Hoysala rulers after the extinction of that house. See Dr. S. K. Aiyangar in QJMS, IX, 13-22; H. Heras, *Beginnings of Vijayanagara History*; S. Srikantayya, *Founders of Vijayanagara*. According to H. Krishna Shastri, Harihara I and Bukka I were originally feudatory chiefs of Hoysala Ballala III, but later they took advantage of the weakness of their sovereign, and set up the empire of Vijayanagara at the expense of their master's territories. See ASI, 1907-08, 235-36. B. A. Saletore, while stressing the Karnataka origin of the sons of Sangama, opines that the city of Vijayanagara was founded by Bukka I in 1368. See his remarks in SPLVE, I, 33-39, 108-12; *Ind. Hist. Quart.* VIII, 295-301, 768-74; and VSCV, 139 ff. Both Father Heras and B. A. Saletore discard the story of Vidyaranya's share in laying the foundation of the city. The former even charges the *Gurus* of Sringeri *Matha* with abetment of forged documents, embodying false traditions for mundane gains; S. Srikantayya, however, enters a caveat and cites evidence to support Vidyaranya's connection with the foundation of the Vijayanagara empire. See his *Founders of Vijayanagara*, 107 ff; QJMS, XXVI, 180-226, 232-35 and VSCV, 161-68.

But the Karnataka theory depends more or less on the identification of 'Deorao' of Nuniz with Hoysala Ballala III. The statement of Ferishta that 'Bilal Deo' founded the city of Beejanagar after the name of his son, Beeja, has been responsible for this identification. Contemporary Muslim chronicles, read in the light of the account given by Nuniz and other traditions, definitely show that 'Deorao' was Harihara I. However, the Telugu or Karnataka origin of the city and the empire of Vijayanagara is not very crucial. It is sufficient to note that their founders were Harihara I and his brothers and it is *through their exertions* that South India was cleared of Muslim occupation. In this great enterprise they received substantial assistance and guidance from Vidyaranya and the *Gurus* of Sringeri *Matha*.

40 EC, VI, Ch. 64, Kp. 25, Sg. I, Mb. 158.

41 Is he Bhava Sangama who had married a daughter of Kampiladeva? If so, Barani's reference to the appointment of an unnamed relation of Kampila (Madras Ms.) as the governor of Kampil appears to have some basis. See N. Venkataramanayya, *The EMESI*, 181, note 34.

efforts of these five brothers in defence of their country and their religion. The times were opportune for them. Muhammad bin Tughluq was too much embroiled in difficulties nearer home, and Hoysala Ballala III, the old champion of the Hindus in the South, was engrossed in a war of extermination against the Sultan of Madura. Slowly and steadily these five brothers began to acquire influence and territory at their expense. Epigraphical records and the itinerary of Ibn-i Battuta show that by 1339 Harihara I was not only well-established in the regions which had been once under the rule of Kampiladeva, but had also temporarily got possession of a bit of Hoysala territory in Bangalore district. In 1342 Hoysala Ballala III was taken prisoner and treacherously put to death by Ghiyasuddin Damghan Shah of Madura.⁴² Shortly after this, his son, Virupaksha Ballala IV, also disappears from the scene.

The abject surrender of Ballala III to Muhammad bin Tughluq and subsequently his capture and execution by the Sultan of Madura clearly demonstrated that the Hoysala state could not survive the attacks of foreign foes for long. The only question was: who would acquire it—the princes of Vijayanagara or the sultans of Madura? The former, who had already repudiated their allegiance to Muhammad bin Tughluq, determined to get it for themselves. They conquered the Hoysala districts one after another—Hassan, Shimoga, Kolar, Mysore, Chitaldrug, etc. Bits of information regarding this sanguinary struggle between the two Hindu states of the South are preserved in contemporary inscriptions. An epigraph of the time of Bukka I explicitly states that one of his officers secured victories over the Hoysala army. By the year 1346 the whole of the Hoysala kingdom had passed into the hands of the rulers of Vijayanagara.⁴³

Side by side with these conquests, the five brothers and their relatives took up the administration of the territories acquired by their joint efforts. Of the late Hoysala dominions, Harihara I took charge of the western and southern portions, and Bukka I of the eastern and central divisions; Kampa I looked after the Udayagiri-rajya, comprising the modern Nellore and Cuddapah districts; Marappa governed the modern North Kanara and Shimoga districts; and Mudappa administered Mulbagal Maharajya in the south-eastern corner of Mysore. Their undivided interest in laying the foundation of the empire is clearly brought out by their joint gift of certain villages in 1346 to forty Brahmans attached to Sringeri *Matha* in celebration of their conquest of 'the earth from the Eastern to

⁴² EC, VI, Kd. 75; also K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *Foreign Notices of South India*, 280-81.

⁴³ N. Venkatarāmanayya, *Vijayanagar—Origin, etc.* Ch. V.

Western Ocean'.⁴⁴ Governors and scions of the royal family had also some share in the administration of the growing state. For instance, in 1349 Hadapa Gautarasa, a minister of Harihara I, is known to have been ruling the Mangalur-rajya, and Vira Virupanna Odeyar the Penugonda-rajya.⁴⁵

But this rapid progress of the young Hindu state did not go unchallenged. Its northern expansion was soon checked by the Bahmani kingdom founded in the Deccan by Hasan, a rebel officer of Muhammad bin Tughluq, in 1347. Alauddin Hasan Shah Bahmani, the new Sultan of the Deccan, made Gulbarga the seat of his government. He had received assistance from the 'Raja of Telingana' (Kapaya Nayaka), and yet had very little sympathy towards the neighbouring Hindu states. Ferishta⁴⁶ says that Alauddin I, the founder of the Bahmani kingdom, wrested Kaulas from the Raja of Warangal and sent a considerable force into the Carnatic, from whence his general returned successful with valuable contributions from several rajas. From Saiyyid Ali's account⁴⁷ it becomes obvious that the rajas so defeated included Harihara I, Bukka I, and Kampa I, who, as seen above, were laying the foundation of the Vijayanagara empire. In the south there was the sultanat of Madura, which in spite of three successive revolutions within a period of seven years, grew in strength and even reduced to a low condition the Cholas and Pandyas and proved destructive to the prosperity of the Hoysala Ballalas.⁴⁸ Ibn-i Battuta gives a blood-curdling story of the massacre of Hindu women and children perpetrated by Ghiyasuddin, the fourth Sultan of Madura. Indeed the Vijayanagara state found itself between two rolling mills, the Bahmani kingdom in the north and the Madura sultanat in the south. The chief concern of the early rulers of Vijayanagara was to provide sufficiently against their encroachment and, if possible, to eliminate them.

It was a question of the survival of the religious, social and economic life of the Hindus, who had once more begun to breathe freely under the protecting hand of the early Vijayanagara princes. Bukka I⁴⁹ took upon himself the task of clearing South India of the Turkish occupying forces, and sent his son, Kumara Kampana, in command of the campaign.

⁴⁴ EC, VI, Sg. 1.

⁴⁵ 57 of 1901, and EI, VI, 327.

⁴⁶ Ferishta (Briggs), II, 308-19.

⁴⁷ *Burhan-i Ma'asir*, translated by J. S. King (Luzac and Co.).

⁴⁸ *Madura Vihayam*, Canto VIII; *Sources*, 28.

⁴⁹ Of the five brothers, Bukka was the chief like Arjuna, the middle Pandava, EC, VI, Kp. 25.

It was a long-drawn contest attended with thrilling incidents and changing fortunes. During the period from 1343-44 to 1355-56 the power of the sultans of Madura was completely paralysed as is indicated by the total absence of their coinage during this period. They, however, recovered some of their lost ground about 1356, and issued coins⁵⁰ once more till 1377. This was probably due to the death of Harihara I in 1355 and the dangerous potentialities of the campaign of the Bahmani Sultan in Telingana about the same time.⁵¹ That Vijayanagara was passing through some crisis, probably due to an invasion of the first Bahmani Sultan at this time, is proved by Bukka I's anxiety to secure the presence of Vidyaranya at the metropolis in 1356.⁵²

Bukka I succeeded⁵³ Harihara I on the throne of Vijayanagara sometime in 1356. He had to wage war on two fronts. While he personally attended to the war against the Bahmani sultans, his valiant son, Kumara Kampana, pursued his campaign against the sultanat of Madura.

Kumara Kampana's southern expedition was not without substantial results. Assisted by his minister, Gopana, and his general, Saluva Mangu,⁵⁴ he overthrew the Sambuva-raya of Rajagambhirarajya, killed one of the sultans of Madura, and reinstalled⁵⁵ the divine images in the Rajasimheswara temple at Kanchi in 1364, and in Ranganathaswami temple at Srirangam in 1371. The *Pandyan Chronicle*⁵⁶ says: 'Kampanuduver (Kampana Odeyar), a native of Karnata, having conquered the Musalmans, took possession of the kingdom. He opened the Siva and Vishnu temples which had been locked up. He opened the God's temple at Madura, and obtained a personal view of the God...' Inscriptions also narrate how the land was cleared of the 'Turkish' garrisons in the South. An undated record states, 'The times were Tulukkan (Turkish) times; the *devadana* lands were taxed; ... At this juncture Kampana Odeyar came on his southern campaigns, destroying Tulukkans, established a stable administration throughout the country... in order that the worship in all temples might be revived as of old.'⁵⁷ Epigraphical

50 Supplement to Vol. II of the *Cat. of Coins in the Indian Museum*, Calcutta,

51 M. S. Sarma, *op. cit.*, 81, 84.

52 MAR, 1916, 56.

53 Sewell's date for the death of Harihara I is wrong. See MER, No. 111 of 1913. Latest known date of Harihara is 1356. See MER, 115 of 1901; SII, VII, 303.

54 An ancestor of Saluva Narasimha, the founder of the second dynasty.

55 *Sources*, Extracts 1 to 5; EI, VI, 322 ff.

56 Taylor, *O.H.Mss.*, I, 35-37.

57 MER, 1916, sec. 83.

records⁵⁸ show that Kampana's influence extended from Mysore in the north to Ramnad in the south, and that he was in power between 1361 and 1374. Still Alauddin Sikandar Shah, the last of the sultans of Madura, lingered on somewhere and issued coins as late as 1377. The complete subjugation of the South was the work of Virupaksha, a son of Harihara II, who is said to have conquered the Tundira, Chola and Pandya countries for his father.⁵⁹

THE FIRST BAHMANI-VIJAYANAGARA STRUGGLE

The problem of the northern defences, however, baffled all solution. Hardly any decade passed without a clash of arms between the the Vijayanagara and Bahmani sovereigns.⁶⁰ Ordinarily, their wars have been regarded as due to religious differences of the two states, and it has been assumed that Vijayanagara was reduced to vassalage on several occasions. These erroneous impressions should be removed before entering into the history of the times. They are created by the accounts of medieval Muslim chroniclers, who very often used history as a handmaid of theology. The fact is that the land between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra, on account of its economic wealth, had been the bone of contention between the western Chalukyans and the Cholas as well as between the Yadavas and the Hoysalas. When the Bahmani kingdom and Vijayanagara empire rose on the ruins of the Yadava and Hoysala dominions, history simply repeated itself. *The contest between the Bahmani sultans and the rayas of Vijayanagara was but a revival of the ancient economic struggle between the Deccan and South India of the purely Hindu epoch. In the Bahmani-Vijayanagara wars, their religious differences only served to brutalize the struggle, but they did not originate it.*

Further, the peculiar circumstances under which the two states came into existence made frequent warfare between them a normal feature of their existence; during the process of their formation each of them acquired only certain parts of the Raichur Doab; but each of them as the political successor of its immediate predecessor aspired to possess the whole. On the eve of the second great war between the two states, Mujahid Shah actually demanded all the territories north of the Tungabhadra, *while Bukka I put forth a counter-claim for the entire Doab, since Raichur and Mudkal had always belonged*

⁵⁸ Sewell, *The Historical Inscriptions of Southern India*, 199.

⁵⁹ EI, III, 224-30.

⁶⁰ For the details of the various campaigns, see also the chapter on the Bahmani kingdom. The account of wars in this text is based upon a comparative study of the histories written by Ferishta, Saiyyid Ali and other Muslim chroniclers and the evidence of Hindu epigraphical and literary records.

to the *Anegondi family*. This political proprietary instinct was so ingrained in the minds of the rulers that, according to Nuniz, Saluva Narasimha, the founder of the second dynasty of Vijayanagara, left a testament charging his successor to recover Raichur and Mudkal from the Bahmani sultans.⁶¹ One more cause for these wars lay in the fact that the rayas of Vijayanagara were immensely rich and their treasuries and temple-coffers overflowed with precious metals and stones. No wonder that these offered a standing temptation to the northern rulers. Thus it may be said that *the Bahmani-Vijayanagara wars were not crusades, but secular contests* for the acquisition of wealth and territory.⁶² In these wars, as the following events will show, the Bahmani rulers did not achieve an unbroken success, nor could they reduce Vijayanagara to vassalage at any time.

In 1358 Alauddin Hasan Shah was succeeded by his son, Muhammad Shah I. Kapaya Nayaka and Bukka I saw in this change of rulers an opportunity to recover their lost territories (? Kaulas). They demanded from Muhammad Shah I restitution of lands wrested from them by his father, 'threatening in case of refusal, not only to invade his country themselves, but to draw upon him the army of the king of Delhi'. Muhammad Shah I replied by making a counter-demand of *customary* offerings due to him on his accession, implying thereby that they were his vassals. Kapaya Nayaka, the Raja of Telingana, deputed his son, Vinayaka Deva, with an army to recover Kaulas, while Bukka I sent a considerable force to cooperate with him. The allied Hindu forces, however, were totally defeated by the Bahmani general, Bahadur Khan, who marched to the gates of Warangal, and forced Kapaya Nayaka to purchase peace by surrendering 100,000 gold *huns*, twenty-five elephants and many valuable jewels.⁶³

But the peace so purchased was not lasting. Vinayaka Deva offended the dignity of the Bahmani Sultan by seizing from some horse-merchants the best of their horses when they were on their way to the court of Gulbarga. In order to avenge this insult, the Sultan marched into Telingana in 1362, captured the Hindu prince in his citadel at Velamputtan and subjected him to a most cruel death. On his return march, however, the Hindus plundered his baggage, wounded him, and destroyed nearly two-thirds of his forces.

⁶¹ Sewall: FE, 307-8, 316.

⁶² Gurty Venkat Rao, *The Bahmani-Vijayanagara Relations in the Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Second Session, 1938*; J. D. B. Gribble: *History of the Deccan*, Vol. I, 26-28.

⁶³ Ferishta (Briggs), II, 301. Vinayaka Deva is called 'Nagdeo' in Scott's translation, I, 19. *Hun*=*Hon*, a gold coin worth four rupees.

These events paved the way for a major war between the two states. Kapaya Nayaka in despair appealed to Firuz Shah Tughluq, the emperor of Delhi, for assistance, in return for which he promised to become a vassal of the emperor. But the new Tughluq sovereign was quite different from his late cousin in temperament, and preferred the fruits of peaceful enterprise to the gains of military adventures. Probably his orthodoxy too dissuaded him from assisting the Hindus against his own co-religionists. He did not respond to their appeals. On the other hand, these negotiations and his own recent discomfiture rankled in the mind of Muhammad Shah I. He now resolved on the entire conquest of Telingana. His armies easily occupied the country and ravaged the land for two years. Finally, with great difficulty Kapaya Nayaka saved his state by presenting to the Sultan the district of Golkonda, an indemnity of 1,300,000 *huns* and a throne studded with turquoises.

Bukka I was not a party to this transaction. Hence probably with a view to ascertaining his attitude, Muhammad Shah I issued to his musicians a draft on the Vijayanagara treasury. The Hindu sovereign,⁶⁴ *proud of his independence*, sent back the messengers with every mark of contempt and derision, and declared war upon the Sultan in 1366. Before the latter could mobilize his forces, the Raya surprised and captured the fort of Mudkal in the *debatable land* of the Raichur Doab, and put the entire garrison to the sword with the exception of one man. The infuriated Sultan swore solemnly to avenge the disaster by the slaughter of one hundred thousand Hindus. In spite of the rainy season and in the face of opposition, he crossed the Krishna and recaptured Mudkal. Bukka I fled to Adoni, and when the enemy approached, he left the fort in charge of his sister's son, and retreated to Vijayanagara. Muhammad Shah I followed Bukka I and crossed the Tungabhadra. The war dragged on for several months with the casualty list of the Hindus soaring higher and higher. Yet the final decision remained a distant vision. The Vijayanagara general, Bhoj Mul, was mortally wounded. The Sultan lost two of his commanders and failed twice in his attempt to capture the city of Vijayanagara. In a desperate mood he ordered the massacre of the inhabitants round the metropolis. It is said that this war cost the Hindus half a million lives. At last, the protests of 'the Brahmans and principal Hindu officers' compelled Bukka I to sue for peace. According to Ferishta, the Sultan sheathed the sword only when the Raya honoured his draft and paid the musicians. In the treaty of peace, there was an agree-

⁶⁴ Ferishta calls Bukka I by the name of 'Krishna Rai'; see Ferishta (Briggs) II, 314.

ment that in future wars non-combatants should not be molested; there was no understanding—no stipulation of any kind—either about the tribute or about the boundaries between the two states.⁶⁵

The last question, however, was revived⁶⁶ by Mujahid Shah, the son and successor of Muhammad Shah I. Soon after his accession to the throne in April 1375, he wrote to Bukka I that as the joint possession of some forts and districts between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra caused constant disputes, the Raya should waive his rights over all the territories north of the Tungabhadra together with the fort of Bankapur. The Vijayanagara sovereign wrote in reply that Raichur, Mudkal and other forts between the two rivers had for ages belonged to his family, and that the Sultan should surrender them, and confine his authority to the northern bank of the Krishna. Mujahid Shah declared war and, crossing the two rivers, sent a force to besiege Adoni, while he marched in person against Vijayanagara. Bukka I withdrew to the woods and hills and avoided a pitched battle for nearly six months. At last the pestilential air of the forest affected his health, and compelled him to return to his capital. It appears that he died of his malady in February 1377, and was succeeded by his son, Harihara II.⁶⁷

The inscriptions give great prominence to Bukka I as a warrior and a statesman. The city of Vidyanagara was greatly strengthened and developed by him, and renamed Vijayanagara.⁶⁸ He truly imbibed the mission of the empire, freed practically the whole of the South from alien domination, and brought it under one sceptre. He instilled new vigour into Hindu society, renovated temples and revived *agraharas*. Under his fostering care, a number of scholars produced literary works on religion, philosophy and law, among which Sayana-charya's commentaries on the Vedas occupy the foremost place. He

65 Ferishta (Briggs), II, 308-19. Ferishta does not say anything about the tribute with reference to the treaties with the rulers of Waiangal and Vijayanagara, and yet he subsequently asserts that Muhammad Shah I in his last years was free from war because they remitted their *stipulated* tribute. *Ibid.*, 326.

66 *Ibid.*, 330-39.

67 EC, IV, Yd. 46.

68 EC, X, Mb 158, Cd 46; V, Cn 256. The genuineness of the first two records is questioned by B. A. Saletore. According to him there was no city of the name of Vidyanagara; Bukka I laid the *foundation* of the city of Vijayanagara in 1368, and completed it about 1378. See his *SPLVE*, 95-112. But his theory involves the total repudiation of the name 'Vidyanagara' mentioned in a number of inscriptions, simply because they are irregular in certain respects, or because they belong to a late date, or still because they are *supposed* to have 'emanated from some common source'. But it should be noted that the name occurs also in the literature of the period of the Sangama dynasty itself. See *JRAS*, 1902, 662; *Further Sources*, Vol. I, ch. V.

also restored harmony between the Vaishnavas and the Jainas, and his pronouncement on this occasion almost echoes Asoka's edict of toleration.⁶⁹ Ferishta pays a glowing tribute to the strength and prosperity of the empire about the close of his reign. He says, 'The princes of the house of Bahmani maintained their superiority by valour only; for in power, wealth and the extent of the country, the rajas of Beejanagar greatly exceeded them, especially in the time of Mujahid Shah, when as yet the whole of the country of Telingana had not fallen under the Bahmani yoke... The fortress of Belgaum, and other places, not included in Carnatic proper, belonged to the Rai of Beejanagar; and many districts of Tulu-ghat were in his possession. His country was well peopled, and the subjects were submissive to his authority. The rais of Malabar, Ceylon and other countries kept ambassadors at his court, and sent annually rich presents.'⁷⁰

HARIHARA II

Harihara II came to the throne amidst the clash of arms.⁷¹ Mujahid Shah made desperate efforts to capture the imperial city, but finding it impossible to reduce it, he joined his forces at Adoni. This fort too defied his attacks for nine months, and his soldiers became despondent and clamoured for return to their own country. Finally, on the advice of the minister, Saifuddin Ghuri, he made peace with the Raya and returned to his capital. In this connection Saiyyid Ali's statement⁷² that the Raya agreed to pay a large sum of *nal baha* (war-expenses) and to deliver the keys of the fort in dispute appears to be apocryphal. There is no doubt that on this occasion the Sultan had to admit failure. Adoni and Bankapur still remained in the hands of the Raya. His nephew, Vira Channappa Odeyar,⁷³ is said to have defeated the Musalmans and presented the fort of Adoni to him.

This war not only frustrated the ambitious designs of Mujahid Shah and left the boundary question unsettled, but also, in a way, cost him his life, and invited a counter-invasion from Vijayanagara. During this war Mujahid Shah publicly censured his uncle, Daud, for abandoning a strategical post. Before reaching Gulbarga, the latter murdered Mujahid in revenge in April 1378, and proclaimed himself Sultan. For thirty-five days the Bahmani kingdom was paralysed due to party factions, and this tempted Harihara II to cross the Tunga-

⁶⁹ EC, II, SB, 344 (136); IX, Mg. 18.

⁷⁰ Ferishta (Briggs), II, 837-38.

⁷¹ Called 'Pureoyre Deorao' by Nuniz.

⁷² J. S. King, *The History of the Bahmani Dynasty* (Luzac & C.), 29.

⁷³ EC, XII, Kg. 43.

bhadra and invest the fortress of Raichur. At last Daud himself was assassinated in May, and the crown passed to one of his nephews, Muhammad Shah II. The new Sultan succeeded in securing the support of all parties in the kingdom, and so Harihara II gave up the siege and retired. Ferishta says that the Raya not only raised the siege, but also agreed to pay the Bahmani Sultan 'the tribute stipulated in the reign of Muhammad Shah I'. There are two glaring inconsistencies in this statement. First, in the reign of Muhammad Shah I, no stipulation had been made for the payment of any tribute;⁷⁴ and secondly, the present occasion did not demand any such concession on the part of the Vijayanagara sovereign. There is no military triumph to the credit of the Sultan at this time in any record whatsoever; on the contrary epigraphic evidence shows that Harihara II early in his reign expelled the Musalmans from Goa.⁷⁵

The task of Harihara II was rather difficult. The close of his father's reign had witnessed the growth of small but powerful kingdoms in the north-east of the empire. Vijayanagara's friend, Kapaya Nayaka, was slain about 1367 by the Velama king, Anavota Nayaka I of Devarakonda, who seized Warangal, made it his capital, and established his sway over a large part of Telingana; on the other hand, the Reddis of Kondavidu now launched upon a policy of expansion, and Anavema Reddi (*circa* 1364-86) conquered the coastal region as far north as Simhachalam. He also turned his forces against the Recherla chief of Devarakonda in the west, and inflicted a humiliating defeat upon him.

If the Bahmani sultans barred the rayas from reaching the Krishna river for a natural geographical boundary in the north, the powerful Reddis played a similar role in the north-east and even crossed swords with them. But the greatest menace to the empire came from the alliance between the Velama rulers of Warangal and the Bahmani sultans. Harihara II waged a few wars against Telingana, probably to break up this alliance. An inscription of 1384 reveals that Harihara II sent an army into Telingana, but the 'Turushkas' (Turks) came and attacked Kottakonda.⁷⁶ In the battle Saluva Ramadeva, one of the leaders of Vijayanagara forces, was killed. Probably the expedition failed. This, however, shows the close cooperation between the Velamas of Warangal and the Bahmanis of Gulbarga. Another inscription of 1395 mentions a war between the Bahmani Sultan and the Raya of Vijayanagara, in which Harihara II succeeded in capturing Rangini in southern Maharashtra.⁷⁷ Still another inscription of 1397 refers to

⁷⁴ See *supra*, footnote on the alleged tribute.

⁷⁵ JBRAS, IX, 227.

⁷⁶ EC, XII, Ck. 15.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, XII, Tp. 44. Rangini (Rangana) is situated south of the Phond Ghat.

the capture of Panagal in Telingana by his eldest son, Bukka II.⁷⁸ These incidents are not noticed by Muslim chroniclers. But the seizure of Panagal by the Raya of Vijayanagara is indirectly admitted by them in describing the war of 1417, when Firuz Shah Bahmani is said to have *made an attack* on Panagal and besieged it for two years without success.

Ferishta and Saiyyid Ali, however, do describe a major war between the Raya and the Sultan about 1398-99.⁷⁹ At this time the affairs of the Bahmani kingdom were in a state of turmoil due to internal revolutions. In 1397 Muhammad Shah II passed away; his two sons were successively crowned, deposed and blinded within seven months, and then Firuz Shah, a cousin of his, ascended the throne of Gulbarga. Probably encouraged by these events and persuaded also by other considerations, Harihara II declared war against the Bahmani Sultan. Ferishta says, 'Deo Rai of Beejanagar with thirty thousand horse and a vast army of foot invaded the Doab with a design to reduce the forts of Mudkal and Raichur.' Probably Harihara II sent his third son, Deva Raya, on this enterprise. Firuz Shah took up the challenge and mobilized his forces at Sagar. Then through the stratagem of one Qazi Siraj, who succeeded in killing a son of Deva Raya and spreading panic in the Hindu camp, he crossed the Krishna and the Tungabhadra in pursuit of the fleeing Hindus. As usual Vijayanagara was besieged and the flourishing districts south of the city were ravaged. Finally peace was made when the Raya paid the Sultan ten lakhs of *huns* as ransom money for the release of the prisoners. By a treaty it was agreed that the boundaries of the two states should remain the same as before the war. Saiyyid Ali's version of this war is somewhat different. According to him, Firuz Shah, with the desire of waging a holy war (*jihad*), ordered a large army to be assembled and marched towards the fort of Sagar. When the chiefs of that district tendered their submission, and the Raya paid him thirty-three lakhs of *tankas*, he returned to his capital. From the copper-plates of Telugu Choda Annadeva, a chieftain of the eastern coastal districts, we learn that he assisted 'the Turushka king in defeating the king of Karnata at Sagar'.⁸⁰ Thus the fact of the defeat of Vijayanagara in this war is clearly established, although the various accounts describe in their own peculiar style its causes and results.

Harihara II may be considered to be a great sovereign. The times

⁷⁸ *South Indian Research*, II, 173; *Velugotivarivamsavali*, Ed. by N. Venkataramanayya, Intro. 21.

⁷⁹ Ferishta (Briggs), II, 370-78; Saiyyid Ali (J. S. King), 37-40.

⁸⁰ EI, XXVI, 29-31; Sagar is on the northern bank of the Krishna in the Gulbarga district.

were also propitious to him. No remnant of the Muslim power of Madura was left to threaten the security of the southern frontiers of the empire. Firuz Shah Tughluq of Delhi and Muhammad Shah II of Gulbarga were both pacifists and had little taste for foreign wars. So long as the latter ruled over the Bahmani kingdom, Vijayanagara had nothing to apprehend regarding the safety of its northern frontiers. In the north-east, tranquillity was secured by a matrimonial alliance with Katayavema, the commander-in-chief and brother-in-law of the Reddi king, Kumaragiri.⁸¹ Thus Harihara II had full two decades of peace to consolidate his state and clothe it with imperial dignity. He possessed a vast empire bounded by 'eastern, southern and western seas'. The extent of his dominion is shown by the fact that inscriptions of his reign have been discovered in Mysore, Dharwar, Kanchipuram, Chingleput and Trichinopoly. His sons acted as viceroys in Araga, Mulbagal, Udayagiri and other subdivisions of the empire. He supported 'the four castes and orders'. He was a worshipper of Virupaksha (a form of Siva), and yet he patronized the Saivas, Vaishnavas and Jains alike. He is called *Rajavyasa* and *Rajavalmiki* in his Vallur grant, indicating either his own learning or his patronage of scholars. Sayanacharya, the famous commentator of the Vedas, was for sometime his chief minister. Irugapa, the author of *Nanartha Ratnamala*, a Jain by faith, was one of his great generals. Harihara II was so popular with his subjects that they made grants and charities for his long life.

Harihara II died in August 1404, and his third son, Deva Raya I, was crowned on 7 November 1406. During the interval of over two years, there appears to have been a tripartite struggle for power between the three sons of Harihara II, viz. Bukka II, Virupaksha I and Deva Raya I. The first two occupied the throne successively for some months and issued grants in their own names with sovereign titles, when finally their place was taken by Deva Raya.⁸²

⁸¹ The Raya-Reddi marriage alliance is alluded to in the Vemavaram plates of Allaya Vema Reddi. EI, XIII, 242, v. 22. As to the parties, there is difference of opinion. According to N. Venkataramanayya, 'the marriage of Harihar's daughter was celebrated with Kataprabhu, the son of Katayavema'. *Further Sources*, I, 87. But M. S. Sarma is of opinion that the bridegroom was Katayavema himself. See his *History of the Reddi Kings*, 128, 169.

⁸² Prof. Kielhorn's *Southern List*, Nos. 478 and 480. EC, Hn. 133; VIII, Tl. 1, 13, 196. EI, VIII, 300; XV, 13. The successor of 'Pureoyre Deorao' (i.e. Harihara II) is called Ajarao by Nuniz. This Portuguese chronicler is not quite accurate in the names of rulers and their regnal periods. For these epigraphical evidence is a sure guide.

DEVA RAYA I

Deva Raya I came to the throne under unpropitious circumstances. But for the heroic and timely action of his minister, Lakshmidhara, he would have fallen victim to a plot organized by 'some ungrateful wretches' against his life.⁸³ During the period of his struggle for succession, Padekomti Vema, the Reddi king of Kondavidu, seized the rich province of Udayagiri.⁸⁴ Shortly after his accession a Bedar chief⁸⁵ in western Mysore 'slaughtered people all over the country, carrying off prisoners, and causing great disturbances and famine'. But a greater calamity than this overtook the land owing to the revival of the Bahmani-Vijayanagara hostilities in 1406-7. According to Ferishta, they were provoked by the Raya's infatuation for a lovely peasant maiden, Parthal by name, residing at Mudkal. When persuasion failed to secure her, he resorted to force and sent an expedition into the debatable land to decoy the Mudkal beauty. But on the approach of the Vijayanagara army, the girl and her parents left their home and disappeared. In their disappointment the retreating soldiers laid waste the towns and villages on their way. Firuz Shah retaliated by entering the Hindu territory and investing the citadel of Vijayanagara. Finding it impossible to reduce it, the Bahmani forces devastated the countryside, captured the fort of Bankapur, and concerted measures for an attack on Adoni. Pressed by his relentless foe and getting no response from the sultans of Malwa, Khandesh and Gujarat to his appeal for assistance, the Raya sued for peace. Under the terms of the treaty he gave his daughter in marriage to the Sultan, ceded to him Bankapur as dowry and paid a large indemnity. Saiyyid Ali in his usual style passes over this war with great brevity, and treats it also as one of the so-called religious wars of Firuz Shah.⁸⁶

Now for one full decade there was peace between the two states. But Deva Raya I does not seem to have sheathed his sword. He turned his arms against the Reddis of Kondavidu. By 1413 he had recovered Udayagiri and placed it under his son, Ramachandra. Nuniz says that he took Goa, Chaul, Dabhol, Ceylon and all the

⁸³ ASI., 1907-8, 245; SII, IV, No. 267.

⁸⁴ *Further Sources*, Extracts Nos. 39-41.

⁸⁵ EI, XV, 14.

⁸⁶ Ferishta, 380-87; Saiyyid Ali, 39. Ferishta gives a graphic description of the royal marriage. But it is surprising that a Musalman like Saiyyid Ali does not even allude to this. Nuniz, who says that Ajarao (Deva Raya I) 'was always at war with the Moors' nowhere gives a hint regarding this matrimonial alliance. Ferishta's statement is not above suspicion, especially because the circumstances did not warrant any such 'highly disgraceful' concession.

country of 'Coromandel'. There is a record of 1411 in which it is stated that prayers were offered for the success of his son, Vijaya-Bukka III, who probably took part in these expeditions.⁸⁷ But it is very likely that *some* of the alleged conquests of Deva Raya I were vicarious, based upon the achievements of Harihara II.⁸⁸ It has already been noticed that Goa and 'Simhala' were conquered in the days of his father.

In 1417 Firuz Shah made an unprovoked attack (according to Ferishta) upon the fort of Panagal (Nalagonda), belonging to the Raya. After a siege of two years, a pestilence broke out in the Sultan's army and he had to retire. At this juncture arrived Deva Raya I with a large army 'having obtained assistance from all the surrounding princes, including the Raja of Telingana'. Saiyyid Ali says that the Sultan was 'compelled' to wage this war. The Hindu sources⁸⁹ furnish greater details regarding its real nature. After the death of Kumaragiri in 1403, the Reddi kingdom was split up into two independent states with their capitals respectively at Rajamahendri and Kondavidu, under Katava Vema and Pedakomati Vema. Each of them wanted to subdue the other, and their ambitions divided the rulers of the states of the Deccan and South India into two hostile groups. Deva Raya I supported his relative Katava Vema, Firuz Shah took the side of Pedakomati Vema and his friend, Annadeva Choda. These facts explain Ferishta's allusion to the coalition headed by Deva Raya I in this war, and Saiyyid Ali's statement that Firuz Shah was forced to wage it. In the early stages of the campaign the Bahmani arms scored a series of victories. Both the chroniclers, however, are agreed that the Sultan ultimately met with a crushing defeat in 1419, owing mainly to the defection of the Velama king, Anavota II, who joined Deva Raya; many of Firuz's people were slaughtered without mercy, and he was driven back to his own country.⁹⁰

Firuz Shah completely broke down under this disaster; and being coerced by his brother, Ahmad, he abdicated the throne in his favour and died shortly afterwards in September 1422.

⁸⁷ EC, IX, Ht. 149.

⁸⁸ There is reason to think that in Nuniz's account the achievements of Harihara II have been set down under Deva Raya I.

⁸⁹ *Triveni*, VI, 273 ff; JOR, VIII, 149 ff, *Velugottivartivamsacali*, Intro. 23-30; EI, XXVI. The Recherlas are better known by their community name, 'Velamas'. Their original cities were Rachakonda and Devarakonda (both in the Nalagonda district of Andhra Pradesh). They shifted their capital to Warangal after its capture from Kapaya Nayaka.

⁹⁰ Ferishta, 389-91; Saiyyid Ali, 40-41. Sewell attributes this victory to Deva Raya II. FE, 62.66. But Deva Raya I ruled till 1422. EC, IV, Gn. 24.

Deva Raya I occupies a prominent place in the history of Vijayanagara. He brought about a diplomatic revolution by weaning the Velama king from his hereditary friendship with the Bahmani sultans. He avenged the humiliation of Bankapur by the smashing victory of Panagal. But his greatest achievement lay in his irrigation works. Nuniz⁹¹ has given a graphic description of the dam constructed by him across the Tungabhadra with a view to leading canals into the city, which had hitherto been suffering from scarcity of water. These canals 'proved of such use to the city that they increased his revenue by more than three hundred and fifty thousand *perdaos*'. He also encouraged the construction of a dam to the river Haridra for irrigation purposes.⁹² During his reign grants to temples and priests were made on a lavish scale.

In 1420 Nicolo de Conti, an Italian traveller, visited Vijayanagara, which he calls Bizenegalia. He has left us an account of some of the social institutions of the land. His graphic descriptions of the city and its festivals, which may be identified with those of the New Year's day, *dipavali*, *mahanavami* and *holi*, are especially noteworthy. He says, 'The circumference of the city is sixty miles; its walls are carried up to the mountains, and enclose the valleys at their foot, so that its extent is thereby increased. In this city there are estimated to be ninety thousand men fit to bear arms... Their king is more powerful than all the other kings of India... Thrice in the year they keep festivals of special solemnity... There weddings are celebrated with singing, feasting and the sound of trumpets and flutes...'⁹³

Deva Raya I died sometime in April, 1422,⁹⁴ Records dated in April and August of the same year have been found which refer to two of his sons—Ramachandra and Vira Vijaya I or Bukka III—with imperial titles. They, however, do not appear to have survived him by many months, and so in 1423 the crown finally passed to his grandson, Deva Raya II, son of Vira Vijaya.⁹⁵

⁹¹ Sewell: FE, 301-2.

⁹² EC, XI, Dg. 23 & 29.

⁹³ R. H. Major, *India in the Fifteenth Century*.

⁹⁴ EI, XV, 14 & EC, IV, Gn 24, Ch. 159 read with 317 of 1931-32.

⁹⁵ EC, IX, An. 79; VII, Sk. 93; 317 of 1931-32; EC, VIII, Tl. 163, Sb. 565. Vira Vijaya is also known by the names of Vijaya Raya, Vijaya Bukka and Bukka III. Ferishta makes no distinction between Deva Raya I, Vijaya Raya and Deva Raya II. To him all are 'Deo Rai' or 'Dewul Rai'. Nuniz assigns a reign of *six years* to Visarao (i.e., Vijaya Raya). Probably it is an error for *six months*. If Nuniz is correct, a joint rule has to be presumed in the case of Vira Vijaya and his son, Deva Raya II, for some time at least. See *Further Sources*, I, 64-66.

DEVA RAYA II

Deva Raya II came to the throne at a time when the Bahmani Sultan, Ahmad Shah I, was making preparations for avenging the humiliation of Panagal. The Raya being aware of this, invited the Raja of Warangal (Anavota II) to come to his assistance, and awaited the enemy on the southern bank of the Tungabhadra. The Sultan having failed in his efforts to entice the Hindus to cross the river, himself went to the other side, and attacked them on their own ground. Deserted by the Warangal army, and overwhelmed by the surprise attack of the enemy, the Raya retired from the battle-field and shut himself up in his fort. Ferishta⁹⁶ describes in detail how the contending monarchs had a very narrow escape, how the Sultan indulged in indiscriminate massacres, and how the Raya finally paid the Sultan 'arrears of tribute for many years' to save his people from further destruction. Saiyyid Ali, however, does not mention any such monetary concession to the Sultan.⁹⁷ He simply says that the soldiers of Islam took many forts and towns and an enormous amount of booty. Obviously the wealth taken away by Ahmad Shah I consisted of war-booty, and Ferishta dignified it with the name of 'arrears of tribute'.

Ahmad Shah I could never forget that in the last two wars the Raja of Warangal had appeared on the side of Vijayanagara. He took full revenge upon him about the close of 1424, when he slew him in battle, occupied Warangal and annexed a large part of Telingana to his own kingdom. Probably in order to be nearer to his new conquests, the Sultan now shifted from Gulbarga to Bidar and made it his capital. During the rest of his reign he was engaged in wars with the rulers of Mahur, Malwa, Konkan and Gujarat, so that Vijayanagara enjoyed complete immunity from northern attacks for about a decade, and the heirs of the late Velama king recovered 'various districts of Telingana'. But the success of the latter was temporary. Ahmad Shah I returned to Telingana about 1433 and reduced them to vassalage.⁹⁸

Deva Raya II, too, on his part, could not forgive the alliance of Pedakomati Vema of Kondavidu with Firuz Shah Bahmani. Taking advantage of the weakness of his incompetent successors, he conquered

⁹⁶ *Op. cit.*, 398-405. Sewell says, 'It is almost certain that Bukka III was the hero of the episode referred to (by Ferishta) though it may have been his son, Deva Raya II'. *HISL*, 214.

⁹⁷ *Op. cit.*, 53-54.

⁹⁸ *IR* (Kondavidu), 325, cited by N. Venkataramanayya in the Introduction to *Velugotivarivamaval*, 33; and *Further Sources*, Vol. I, 96.

the kingdom and annexed it to his empire. An epigraph at Kondavidu dated 1432 records his grant to a Brahman of the place.

Ahmad Shah I died in 1436 and was succeeded by his eldest son with the title of Alauddin II. He inaugurated his reign by declaring war against Vijayanagara. He sent his younger brother, Muhammad Khan, with a powerful army against the Raya, 'who had withheld the tribute for five years, and now refused to pay the arrears'. In the light of what has been said above, it appears that this plea of tribute is advanced by Ferishta to justify the aggressive conduct of the Sultan. The war, however, ran its usual course, and finally Deva Raya II got peace by surrendering twenty elephants, a considerable sum of money, and two hundred females, skilled in music and dancing.⁹⁹

But this peace proved only a truce, for Muhammad Khan, flushed with his recent success over the Hindus, raised the standard of revolt against his elder brother. He had entered into some secret pact with the Raya of Vijayanagara on his own account. Ferishta says that the rebel prince, having procured a considerable army from the Rai of Beejanagar to aid him, seized Mudkal, Raichur, Sholapur, Bijapur and Naldrug. Alauddin II promptly crushed the uprising and pardoned his brother. How he dealt with the Raya of Vijayanagara for his participation in his domestic quarrel is not mentioned by Ferishta. Saiyyid Ali, however, says that the Raya, taking advantage of the fratricidal war, 'invaded the territories of Islam, captured the fort of Mudkal and devastated all the surrounding country'. Alauddin II, after subjugating his brother, invested the fort of Mudkal and compelled the Raya to capitulate. In his usual manner, this chronicler states that the Raya agreed to pay his tribute in addition to a large indemnity. But the fact appears to be that it was not a major war between the Sultan and the Raya. Most probably the defeat and conciliation of the rebel prince resulted in the automatic withdrawal of the Vijayanagara army. This explains Ferishta's silence.¹⁰⁰

Deva Raya II, however, was much affected by his failure in his wars against the Bahmani sultans, notwithstanding his immense resources in men and material. Ferishta says¹⁰¹ that, in consultation with his ministers, he came to the conclusion that the superiority of the latter was due to their better horses and archers. Accordingly, he enrolled Musalmans in his service, allotted them jagirs, erected a

⁹⁹ Ferishta, 422; Saiyyid Ali does not refer to this war.

¹⁰⁰ Ferishta, 422-23; Saiyyid Ali, 73-74.

¹⁰¹ Ferishta, 430-32. According to an inscription of 1430 the Raya had ten thousand Turushka horsemen in his service. See EC, III, Sr. 15.

mosque in the city for their use and ordered a copy of the *Quran* to be placed before his throne for their obeisance in his presence without violation of their laws. Soon he had two thousand Musalmans, and sixty thousand Hindus well-skilled in archery, besides eighty thousand horse and two hundred thousand foot.

With this war machine, continues Ferishta, Deva Raya II resolved to conquer the Bahmani kingdom. So in 1443 he suddenly crossed the Tungabhadra, took the fort of Mudkal, sent his sons to besiege Raichur and Bankapur, while he encamped with his army along the southern bank of the Krishna. Within a period of two months three battles were fought, the Hindus being victorious in the first and the Musalmans in the second; in the third battle Deva Raya's eldest son perished and the Hindus fled from the battle-field in panic. They took shelter in the fort of Mudkal. Two Muslim officers entered the fort in pursuit of the fugitives and were captured. The Sultan threatened the Raya with dire consequences, if his officers were injured in any way. The Raya immediately surrendered the prisoners and promised to pay the Sultan annually the stipulated tribute on condition that he was not molested in future.

But Abdur Razzaq's account shows that Deva Raya II acted under great provocation. His minister, 'Dainang', had gone on a voyage to the frontier of Ceylon, and during his absence, on a day between November 1442 and April 1443, the Raya's own brother (nephew according to Nuniz) treacherously killed his leading nobles and even made an unsuccessful attempt on the Raya's life.¹⁰² Sultan Alauddin rejoiced at this, and demanded of him seven lakhs of *varahas*, and failing compliance, threatened war. Deva Raya took up the challenge. The troops sent from the two sides ravaged the frontiers of two states. The 'Dainang', who had been recalled from the Ceylonese expedition, invaded the Bahmani kingdom, and after taking 'several unfortunate prisoners', returned to the capital. From Abdur Razzaq's contemporary account it is obvious that Ferishta has given a false and distorted version of the expedition. If the eldest son of the Raya had been slain in this war, as is alleged by Ferishta,

¹⁰² Abdur Razzaq declares that he was an ambassador of Shah Rukh of Persia. He stayed at Vijayanagara from about the end of April to 6 November 1443. 'Dainang' is apparently a corrupt form of the word 'Dannayaka (skt. Dandanayaka) i.e. a commander. The traveller took it for a proper name. The person referred to appears to be Lakkanna Dannayaka, 'the lord of southern ocean'. R. H. Major, *India in the XV century*, I, 33-35. The account given by Nuniz slightly varies in details, and his version is not quite reliable. According to him, the victim of the plot was Pinarao, who had succeeded Deva Raya II and had been on the throne twelve years before the abortive attempt on his life was made by his nephew. FE, 302-4.

the court of Vijayanagara would have been plunged in gloom, and this fact could not have escaped the notice of Abdur Razzaq.

According to the *Gangadasapratapavilasam*, not only 'the Sultan of the Deccan', but also 'the Gajapati' of Orissa sustained a defeat at the hands of Deva Raya II. The exact circumstances surrounding this event are not known. Kapilesvara Gajapati seized the throne of Orissa in 1434. Probably he made an attack upon the Reddis of Rajamahendry, who in their defence sought succour from their ally, the ruler of Vijayanagara. The victory of Deva Raya II over Kapilesvara saved the Reddi kingdom from immediate annihilation.¹⁰³

Deva Raya II was the greatest ruler of the Sangama dynasty. He is sometimes called Immadi Deva Raya. He is distinguished in inscriptions by the title of '*Gajabetekara*' i.e. 'elephant-hunter'. He not only maintained the territorial integrity of the empire, but also secured for it the natural frontier of the Krishna river in the north-east by annexing the kingdom of Kondavidu. According to Nuniz, the kings of Quilon, Ceylon, Pulicot, Pegu and Tenasserim paid tribute to him. The levy of tribute from Ceylon is confirmed by an inscription at Nagar.¹⁰⁴ He raised a new model army, infused fresh vigour into the administration, and dealt out prompt and impartial justice. He seems to have had definite leanings towards Vira Saivism; yet he extended toleration to every religion and sect. He had ministers who professed Vira Saivite, Jain and Vaishnavite faiths. He admitted into his council a Christian to supply the place of 'Dainang', when the latter had gone on an expedition against the Bahmani Sultan.¹⁰⁵ He gave facilities to the Muslims in his service for the observance of their religious tenets. He took keen interest in debates, and when Srinatha defeated his cour-poet, Dindima, in a disputation, he honoured the former with the title of *Kavi-Sarvabhauma*, and 'bathed him in gold coins'. The names of thirty-four poets, who flourished under his patronage, are known, among whom may be mentioned Chamarasa, Lakkanna, etc.¹⁰⁶

Abdur Razzaq gives a detailed account of the empire and of his interview with its sovereign. A few extracts from his observations¹⁰⁷ are reproduced in the following paragraphs:

103 *Further Source*, Vol. I, 101-5; *Sources*, 65-66; SGO, 39-40.

104 MER, 144 of 1916, para 60.

105 Abdur Razzaq, 40-41.

106 S. Srikanta Sastri, *Deva Raya II* in IA, 1928.

107 Major, 19-32. Abdur Razzaq recorded an account of his mission in his work, *Matlous Sa'dain*. Some passages from this work have also been translated in ED, IV, and commented upon by S. H. Hodivala in his *Studies in Indo-Muslim History*, 410 ff.

'If what is said is true, this latter prince (Deva Raya II) has in his dominions three hundred ports, each of which is equal to Calicut, and on *terra firma* his territories comprise a space of three months journey...' 'The country is for the most part well cultivated, very fertile... The troops amount in number to eleven lakhs (1,100,000).'

'One might seek in vain throughout the whole of Hindustan to find a more absolute rai (king)... Next to him the Brahmans hold a rank superior to that of all other men...' 'The city of Bijanagar is such that the pupil of the eye has never seen a place like it, and the ear of intelligence has never been informed that there has existed anything to equal it in the world. It is built in such manner that seven citadels and the same number of walls enclose each other... The seventh fortress, which is placed in the centre of the others, occupies an area ten times larger than the market place of the city of Herat. It is the palace which is used as the residence of the king... At the gate of the king's palace are four bazars, placed opposite each other... The bazars are extremely long and broad.'

'Each class of men belonging to each profession has shops contiguous the one to the others; the jewellers sell publicly in the bazar pearls, rubies, emeralds and diamonds. In this agreeable locality, as well as in the king's palace, one sees numerous running streams and canals formed of chiselled stone, polished and smooth...'

'This empire contains so great a population that it would be impossible to give an idea of it without entering into the most extensive details. In the king's palace are several cells, like basins, filled with bullion, forming one mass. All the inhabitants of this country, both those of exalted rank and of an inferior class, down to the artisans of the bazar, wear pearls, or rings adorned with precious stones, in their ears, on their necks, on their arms, on the upper part of the hand, and on the fingers...'

'Each of the seven fortresses alike contains a great number of places of prostitution, and their general proceeds amount to twelve thousand *fanoms*, which forms the pay allotted to the guards. These latter have it assigned to them as a duty to make themselves acquainted with every event which occurs within the fortresses; if any article is lost or stolen by thieves it is their duty to recover it; if not, they are bound to make it good...'

'Such are the details which relate to the city of Bijanagar and its sovereign. The author of this narrative, having arrived in this city at the end of the month of Zil Hij (the end of April 1443) took up his abode in an extremely lofty house, which had been assigned to him... One day some messengers sent from the palace of the king came to seek me, and at the close of that same day I presented

myself at the court, and offered for the monarch's acceptance five beautiful horses, and some *tokous* of damask and satin. The prince was seated in a hall, surrounded by the most imposing attributes of state. Right and left of him stood a numerous crowd of men ranged in a circle. The king was dressed in a robe of green satin, around his neck he wore a collar, composed of pearls of beautiful water and other splendid gems. He had an olive complexion, his frame was thin, and he was rather tall; on his cheeks might be seen a slight down, but there was no beard on his chin. The expression of the countenance was extremely pleasing. On being led into the presence of this prince, I bowed my head three times. The monarch received me with interest, and made me take a seat very near him . . .'

'They presented to the humble author two packets of betel, a purse containing five hundred *fanoms*, and twenty *misqals*¹⁰⁸ of camphor. Then, receiving permission to depart, he returned to his house. Hitherto his provisions had been brought him daily consisting of two sheep, four pair of fowls, five *man*¹⁰⁹ of rice, one of butter, one of sugar, and two *varahas* of gold; and they continued supplying him regularly with the same articles. Twice in the week, at the close of day, the king sent for him, and put questions to him respecting his majesty, the happy Khaqan. On each occasion the author received a packet of betel, a purse of *fanoms*, and some *misqals* of camphor.'

Abdur Razzaq also refers to some of the public offices, such as the *dewan khana* (council chamber), the *daftar khana* (the archives), and the *zorrah khana* (the mint); he briefly notices the currency of the empire, and describes in flowing terms the 'mahavyamy' festival,¹¹⁰ which he witnessed during his stay at the capital. His account shows that the reign of Deva Raya II marked the zenith of the prosperity of the empire under the first dynasty.

This great sovereign passed away about the middle of 1446 and was succeeded by his eldest son, Mallikarjuna Raya,¹¹¹ otherwise

108 'The name both of a weight and a coin, the value of which has much changed.'

109 'The Indian *man* has varied so greatly from place to place and even from time to time in the same place, that it is not always easy to say what it stands for.' S. H. Hodivala, *op. cit.*, 418.

110 Mahanavi: obviously it refers to the Mahanavami festival described by Paes in greater detail. See Sewell, FE, 262-75.

111 A few epigraphs mention the reforms of a king, called Vijaya Raya (II?). It is suggested that he held the sceptre for a few months just before Mallikarjuna Raya. See *Further Sources*, Vol. I, 66-67. Perhaps he was either the younger brother of Deva Raya II, or an elder brother of Mallikarjuna Raya. Nuniz places Pinarao and

known also as Immadi Deva Raya and Praudha Deva Raya. Some inscriptions shorten the latter two names into 'Deva Raya' which has led scholars to assign these records to his father. He also bore the title of *Gajbetekara*.

THE END OF THE SANGAMA DYNASTY

His reign commenced with notable victories but ended with the defeat and disruption of the empire.

In the *Gangadasapratapavilasam*, a contemporary Sanskrit drama, it is stated that *immediately* after the death of Deva Raya II, the Sultan of the South (Alauddin II) and the Gajapati ruler (Kapilesvara), who had been defeated before by Deva Raya II, marched upon Vijayanagara and closely invested it. But Mallikarjuna sallied forth from his capital and routed the besieging forces.¹¹² This account is doubted by some scholars, although there is nothing absurd about it.¹¹³ Alauddin II at this stage was immersed in a life of dissipation, and his kingdom was torn asunder by party factions between the 'foreign' (*afaqi*) and the 'Dakhani' nobles.¹¹⁴ He was not in a position to wage a successful campaign. Kapilesvara Gajapati, who had taken the kingdom of Orissa from the eastern Gangas, could hardly have acquired the requisite moral and material strength to conquer the citadel of the Vijayanagara empire, which had defied many organised assaults of the Bahmani sultans in the past.

Kapilesvara, however, did not abandon his ambitious designs. He changed his tactics, and seized the border districts of the neighbouring

his unnamed son between Deva Raya II and Virupaksha Raya and assigns to them arbitrary regnal periods. Probably Pinarao stands for the crown-prince and refers to Mallikarjuna Raya. See FE, 97, 302-5. An inscription of 30 September 1446 states that the king stopped the extortion of presents by the officials, which had been in practice at the beginning of each reign. So there must have been a change of rulers at this time, and the king who abolished the evil custom was Mallikarjuna Raya, whose earliest known records are dated 1447. See EC, VII, Sk 239; XII, Pg. 69; and XIV, Gu 126. According to epigraphical records, he was the *immediate* successor of Deva Raya II and hence there is no room for a Deva Raya III between the two as suggested by Sewell. See S. K. Aiyangar, *A Little Known Chapter of Vijayanagara History*, 1-5.

112 *Ibid.*, 5-10. *Sources*, 65-66; SCO, 41-42.

113 R. D. Banerji questions the veracity of this account on the ground of improbability of an alliance between the Bahmani and the Gajapati rulers at this time. See his *History of Orissa*, I, 293-96. But it is very likely that the poet treated their simultaneous attacks as a joint-venture. That Kapilesvara threatened Hampi (i.e. Pampa or Vijayanagara) is noticed also in a record of 1458. See ARE 1934-35, para 37.

114 Ferishta (Briggs), II, 436; Prof. H. K. Sherwani, *Mahmud Gawan's Political Thought and Administration* in S. K. Aiyangar Com. Vol., 128-29.

Hindu and Muslim states alike, whenever circumstances favoured him. The Reddis, the Bahmanis and the Rayas, each more or less, fell a victim to his aggressive policy. He annexed the Reddi kingdom of Rajamahendri sometime before 1450, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the forces of Humayun Shah, the successor of Alauddin II, in the famous battle of Devarakonda in 1459 and took Warangal in the following year.¹¹⁵ Vijayanagara was also deprived of its latest acquisition, the region of Kondavidu. Mallikarjuna Raya's efforts to prevent further mischief by taking up his position at Penugonda¹¹⁶ 'in connection with the business of Narasing's (Saluva Narasimha's) territory was of no avail'. The Munnur and Jambai inscriptions¹¹⁷ show that Kapileswara conquered almost all the coastal districts of the empire as far south as Trichinopoly, and some of them remained under the sway of the Oriyas till about 1472. He proved indeed 'a yawning lion to the sheep, the Karnata king', as mentioned in a lithic record of Jagannatha temple at Gopinathapur in the Cuttack district.¹¹⁸

Mallikarjuna Raya appears to have lost the vigour and initiative with which he had begun his career, and his reign witnessed the commencement of the decay of the Sangama dynasty. He was, however, a pious and devout monarch and maintained the noble traditions of his house in making gifts to temples and priests. His rule lasted till about the end of July 1465. He had two minor sons, Rajasekhara and Virupaksha, neither of whom held power beyond a few months. The contemporary epigraphical records show that the throne was usurped by his cousin-brother, Virupaksha Raya, who claims to have 'acquired the kingdom by his own valour'.¹¹⁹

Virupaksha Raya II was crowned emperor in October 1465. He was given to vice, caring for nothing but women, and amused himself with drink. In mere sottishness he slew many of his captains. He paid the least possible attention to affairs of state at a time when the greatest vigilance was needed.¹²⁰

The Bahmani kingdom was no longer the imbecile state of the

115 SII, V. No. 100; Saiyyid Ali (J. S. King), 83-84; *Bharati*, XII, 426 ff; IA, XX, 390.

116 EC, III, Md. 12 and 59.

117 Sewell, HISI, 224-25; and MER, 92 of 1919, 1 of 1905 and 93 of 1906.

118 JASB LXIX (1900), 173 ff.

119 'Virupaksha II' by S. K. Aiyangar in *Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume*, 255-64. According to this scholar, 'Mallikarjuna and Virupaksha were sons of Deva Raya II by different wives.' But a closer study of the relevant records shows that Virupaksha was the son of Pratapa Deva Raya, one of the younger brothers of Deva Raya II. See JAHRS, VII, 211 ff. *Further Sources*, I., Ch. XIII, 123-25.

120 Srisailem Plates, EI, XV, 10, 24; and Nuniz, *op. cit.*, 305.

inglorious days of Humayun Shah. Humayun had perished in September 1461, and his eldest son and successor, Nizam Shah, followed him to the grave after a short rule of about a couple of years. He was succeeded by his younger brother, Muhammad Shah III, in August 1463, at a very tender age. Still under the wise administration of the queen-mother and ministers like Mahmud Gawan, the internal factions were temporarily set at rest, and the kingdom once more regained its status as a great power in Deccan politics.

On the other hand, Kapilesvara Gajapati's death early in 1468 was followed by a quarrel between his sons, Hamvira and Purushottama, which considerably weakened the kingdom of Orissa, and gave its quondam victims a good opportunity to retaliate. But Virupaksha Raya failed to realize the trend of political events. In an irritable mood in 1469 he ordered the extirpation of all Musalmans of Bhatkal, simply because they had sold horses to the Bahmani Sultan. About 10,000 Musalmans were massacred and the survivors fled and settled at Goa. This indiscriminate slaughter was a folly as well as a crime, and brought prompt retribution in its wake. Probably to give protection to the refugees, Mahmud Gawan attacked Goa by land and sea. Before the Raya could oppose his design, he took possession of it, and garrisoned it with his own men. In 1472, after a lapse of nearly two years, the Raya thought of recovering the place. But he was not the man to assume leadership. He contented himself with instigating the feudatory chiefs of Belgaum and Bankapur to retake it. Muhammad III anticipated their move, and himself made an attack on the fort of Belgaum, and reduced its chief to submission. Thus the empire lost the region of Belgaum as well.¹²¹

The greatest blow to Virupaksha Raya's power and prestige was struck on the east coast, where his authority was reduced to almost nothing. Taking advantage of the quarrel between the sons of Kapilesvara Gajapati, Muhammad Shah III recovered Telingana and put his own garrisons in the forts of Kondavidu, Rajamahendri and Warangal, while Saluva Narasimha, *on his own account*, captured the country along the east coast as far north as Masulipatam, and even threatened Rajamahendri in 1476. He also 'added much of the Vijayanagara territory to his own by conquest'. Virupaksha Raya passively acquiesced in these political developments. But Muhammad Shah III was made of sterner stuff. He not only prevented Saluva Narasimha from taking Rajamahendri, but also declared war against him in 1480, because the latter 'excited the zamindars on the Bahmani frontier to rebel'. Narasimha avoided battle so that the

¹²¹ Sewell, FE, 99; Ferishta (Briggs), II, 485, 491-93.

Sultan reached Kanchi, 'situated in the centre of the dominions of that malignant one, containing temples which were the wonder of the age'. The Musalmans entered the chief temple, plundered it and slew the attendant priests. They also sacked the city and took away abundant treasures. Due to the worthless character of Virupaksha Raya, the Vijayanagara empire not only met with territorial losses, but also the very ideals for which it stood were ruthlessly trampled under feet at Kanchi by its hereditary foes.¹²² It was reduced to such an abject condition that Nikitin, the Russian traveller, who visited the Deccan during this period, was led to believe that the capital city itself was taken by them.¹²³

However, the triumph of the Bahmani Sultan over the two neighbouring Hindu states proved transitory. It was like the sudden flaring up of a dying lamp. Soon the tables were turned; Isvara Nayaka, the commander-in-chief of Saluva Narasimha, appears to have made a surprise attack on the retreating forces of Muhammad III at Kandukur, and compelled them to relinquish the rich booty which they were carrying away from Kanchi.¹²⁴ The Bahmani kingdom itself succumbed to the internal party strife, which culminated in the unjust execution of the great minister, Mahmud Gawan, in April 1481. When it was too late, Muhammad Shah III discovered his blunder, and tried to drown his remorse in drink until he died of excesses in March 1482.¹²⁵ With the death of the Sultan and his talented minister, the Bahmani dynasty practically ceased to exercise any power. It is true that Mahmud Shah, son of the late Sultan, occupied the throne of Bidar for nearly thirty-seven years. But his was an inglorious reign; Purushottama Gajapati humbled his rival, Hamvira, expelled the Muslim garrisons from Rajamahendri, Kondapalle and Kondavidu, and reestablished Hindu supremacy as far as the river Brahmakundi (Gundlakamma) in the south before 1488.¹²⁶ But this was an insignificant loss to the Bahmani dynasty in comparison with what befell it due to internal disintegration. Impelled by the indiscretion of youth, Mahmud Shah devoted his time to pleasures of all sorts without attending, in the least, to the safety of

¹²² Ferishta (Briggs), II, 487-88, 497-501; N. Venkataramanayya, *Purushottama Gajapati* in the *Proc. & Trans. of the Eighth All India Oriental Conf.*, 585 ff. and 'Muhammad Shah Lashkari's expedition against Kanchi' in K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar *Com. Vol.*, 307 ff.

¹²³ Major, *India in the Fifteenth Century*, III, 29.

¹²⁴ N. Venkataramanayya, *Muhammad Shah Lashkari's Expedition to Kanchi*, *loc. cit.*, 312-13; *Sources*, Nos. 32 and 35.

¹²⁵ Ferishta (Briggs), II, 501-18; Saiyyid Ali, 113-16.

¹²⁶ N. Venkataramanayya, *Purushottama Gajapati*, *loc. cit.*

his state. There was a scramble for power among the big amirs; Qasim Barid, the premier, took the reins of government into his own hands and assumed sovereign authority, so that except the royal title nothing remained to the Sultan. The attempts of other amirs to free him from the clutches of Qasim recoiled on their own heads, so that in disgust they retired to their respective provincial headquarters, and within a few years set up their own independent sultanats.¹²⁷ About the time of Mahmud Shah's death in 1518, the Bahmani kingdom was restricted to Bidar and the districts surrounding it.

¹²⁷ The Imad Shahi of Berar in 1484; the Nizam Shahi of Ahmadnagar in 1489; the Adil Shahi of Bijapur in 1489; and the Qutb Shahi of Golkonda in 1512. The Barid Shahi of Bidar was founded in 1527 by Amir Barid, son of Qasim Barid, who played the role of a king-maker for sometime and then assumed the crown himself. Thus ended the Bahmani dynasty.

II. THE SALUVA DYNASTY

SALUVA NARASIMHA

THE VIJAYANAGARA EMPIRE WAS rescued from a similar catastrophic fate of dissolution by the timely and energetic action of Saluva Narasimha. But this was not achieved without a revolution. The Sangama dynasty, disgraced and ruined by Virupaksha Raya, had to give place to a new line of rulers. When and how exactly this momentous event occurred are not clearly known.

A comparative study of the available epigraphical and literary evidence reveals that there existed a close relationship between the Sangama rulers and the Saluva family to which Narasimha, the founder of the second dynasty, belonged. Both regarded themselves as members of the Yadava family and the lunar race. Saluva Mangul¹ served Kumara Kampana in his campaign against the Sultan of Madura, and several of his successors held important positions in the empire of Vijayanagara. His grandson, Tipparaja, married Harima, the elder sister of Deva Raya II. Saluva Narasimha was a nephew of this Tipparaja, and so Nuniz is right when he says that he was 'in some manner akin to' the last ruler of the Sangama family. He received a liberal education in Sanskrit and succeeded his father as governor of Chandragiri in the modern district of Chittoor. The Sanskrit poems, *Saluvabhyudayam* and *Ramabhyudayam*, and the Telugu poem, *Jaimini Bharatamu*, credit him with a number of conquests covering nearly the entire length of India from the Himalayas to Ramesvaram.² Throughout his progress every ruler made his submission and paid tribute; even the king of Ceylon sent a respectful embassy. But sober historical facts belie these exaggerated claims. The Muslim and Portuguese chronicles show that he was practically powerless to stem the tide of aggression on the east coast during the days of Kapilesvara Gajapati and Muhammad Shah III. It was only after the death of Kapilesvara, and the consequent war of succession in Orissa, that he could wrest the fort of Udayagiri from the Gajapatis, and by 1476 make himself master of the east coast up to Rajamahendri. But he could not prevent Muhammad Shah III from

¹ He was the first member of the family who received the sobriquet of Saluva, because he fell upon his foes like a falcon (*saluva*) on its prey. For the early history of the Saluvas and their positions in the Vijayanagara empire, see JA, VII, 74 ff; ASR, 1908-9, 165 ff; and JAHRAS, IX, 15-22.

² Sources, Nos. 33, 29 and 31.

occupying the last named place or making a raid into Kanchi in 1481. He increased his territory and power mostly at the expense of his own sovereign, as mentioned by Ferishta, and finally usurped the throne.

The events immediately preceding this revolution are briefly narrated by Nuniz.³ He says that the nobles of the empire revolted against the tyrannical rule of Virupaksha Raya, and asserted their independence. Finally the Raya was killed by his eldest son, who on being filled with remorse, gave the crown to his younger brother, 'Padearao'. The latter unscrupulously slew his benefactor to avert the same fate overtaking him, and then plunged headlong into a life of dissipation and crime. Then 'Narsyngua, who was in some manner akin to him', with a view to save the empire from further ruin, appealed to the patriotism and self-interest of the other nobles, and with their cooperation planned his overthrow. The infatuated sovereign did not heed the repeated warnings of his well-wishers, and when the captain of the army of 'Narsyngua' actually captured the imperial palace, he fled by the back-door. The captain, instead of pursuing the craven monarch, quietly took possession of the city and invited his master to occupy the vacant throne.

The above account receives some corroboration from epigraphical and literary records. 'Padearao' may be identified with Praudhadeva Raya mentioned in an inscription⁴ of 1486, and 'Narsyngua' with Saluva Narasimha, whose conquests are described in the Sanskrit poems, *Saluvabhyudayam* and *Ramabhyudayam*. His captain appears to have been Narasa Nayaka, who, according to the Telugu poem, *Parijatapaharanamu*, captured the city of Vidyapura 'when the lord of the Kuntala (Vijayanagara) country was in trouble'. Indeed this poem and another Telugu poem, *Varahapuramam*, ascribe to Isvara and his son, Narasa, of the Tuluva family, the conquest of a number of forts within and outside the empire.⁵ Although there is no means of arranging them in any chronological order with absolute certainty, yet some of them at least appear to have been acquired in the course of the campaign that culminated in the expulsion of the last prince of the Sangama dynasty.

The latest known record of Virupaksha Raya is dated 29 July 1485, while Saluva Narasimha appears for the first time with full imperial titles in a copper-plate grant of 1 November 1486. Between, these two dates the effete Sangama dynasty must have been replaced by the more vigorous Saluva dynasty.⁶

³ Nuniz, *op. cit.*, 305-7.

⁴ 593 of 1902.

⁵ *Sources*, Nos. 32 and 35.

⁶ EC, X, Mb. 104 and Tm. 54.

In usurping the throne Saluva Narasimha roused the jealousy of a number of unruly vassals of the empire, who had for sometime been defying the authority of the central government with impunity. His vigorous measures against them no doubt assured his position, but did not save the realm from the loss of certain strategic places. Internal factions thwarted him from taking effective measures against foreign foes. Purushottama Gajapati, after subduing his brother Hamvira, started on a campaign against Saluva Narasimha. He retook Kondavidu, Udayagiri and other fortresses, and between 1484 and 1489, deprived Vijayanagara of the entire east coast as far south as the Gundlakamma river. The *Sarasvativilasam* of Prataparudra and his inscriptions assert that Purushottama captured alive Saluva Narasimha in the battle of Udayagiri, and the latter purchased his freedom by surrendering to the victor the fort of Udayagiri and the dependent territories.⁷ With all the resources of the empire, the Saluva usurper does not appear to have shaken the aggressors, who had firmly entrenched themselves in Goa, Belgaum, Kondavidu, Udayagiri, Raichur and Mudkal.

'Still it cannot be denied that Saluva Narasimha rescued the empire from complete dissolution and regained (almost) all the lands which the kings, his predecessors, had lost.' He also strengthened the army by offering tempting terms for the import of horses from Ormuz and Aden. His military genius and charitable temper received the well-merited encomiums of Sanskrit and Telugu poets. His patriotism and statesmanship are revealed in his last testament in which, according to Nuniz, he mentioned some of the forts that remained to be taken, and entrusted the care of the empire and of his two sons to his valiant general, Narasa Nayaka. He charged him to administer the state during the minority of the princes and then to deliver it up to *'whichever of them should prove himself most fitted for it'*. He died sometime in 1491, after a reign of about five years.⁸ His last testament opened the way for the establishment of the Tuluva dynasty.

THE REGENT NARASA NAYAKA

Although the accounts of this period as given by Nuniz and Ferishta differ in names and details, both create the impression that

7 226 of 1935-36. *Further Sources*, III, Nos. 88 and 89.

8 The statement of Nuniz that he ruled for forty-four years appears to cover his entire career, first as ruler of Chandragiri and then as emperor. Saluva Narasimha's latest inscription is dated 14 October 1490 (MER, 269 of 1931-32) and the first available record of his son and successor with imperial titles is dated 28 November 1491. See *Further Sources*, I, 146.

Narasa Nayaka betrayed the trust reposed in him by his master and eventually usurped the throne. But inscriptions serve to correct this erroneous idea and to fill up the lacunae in the two accounts. In the light of all available evidence it is now clear that Narasa Nayaka, far from being disloyal, tried his best to carry out the wishes of his master. His loyalty and statesmanship were soon put to test. Events in the Bahmani kingdom had taken such a turn that party factions rendered the young Sultan Mahmud Shah quite powerless. Qasim Barid, who had secured the confidence of the Sultan, resolved to crush Yusuf Adil Khan, who had not only declared his independence in his principality, but also seized the lands from the river Bhima to Bijapur. Qasim Barid invited the Raya of Vijayanagara to his assistance by promising to cede to him the forts of Raichur and Mudkal. This was Narasa Nayaka's opportunity to fulfil the testament of his late master. He immediately designated the elder prince⁹ as the future emperor and despatched forces to the Bijapur front. A great battle was fought at Manuva about the end of 1491 in which Yusuf was thoroughly beaten, and the coveted forts of Raichur and Mudkal were recovered for Vijayanagara. But this triumph was short-lived. The choice of the sovereign from among the two princes was not an easy task. Probably his selection of the elder prince was challenged and caused dissensions which, according to Ferishta, led to the invasion of the Vijayanagara territory by Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur. In the face of the foreign danger, Narasa Nayaka, somehow settled the dispute at home, and advanced 'with the young Raya' to meet the foe. A battle was fought in April 1493, in which he was victorious. But due to indiscipline in his army, the victory was changed into a defeat, Raichur and Mudkal were once again lost, and during the retreat the young sovereign died of his wounds. The opponents of Narasa Nayaka tried to undermine his authority by foisting the blame for the death of the elder prince upon him. But the latter discomfited them all by promptly placing the second prince, called Tamarao by Nuniz, on the throne. The name, Tamarao, is evidently a corruption of the title Tammayadeva Maharaya or Dharmaraya borne by Immadi Narasimha, (the second) son of Saluva Narasimha, in a few of his epigraphs. Immadi Narasimha's inscriptions show that he reigned over the whole of the empire from about the close of 1493 up to, and even beyond 1503, in which year (in all probability) Narasa Nayaka passed away. Thus there is no truth in Ferishta's assertion that Timaraj (i.e. Narasa Nayaka) violently seized

9 The elder prince may be identified with Thimmabhupala, a son of Saluva Narasimha, who, according to *Tatcachintamani*, was *yucaraja* under his father (Adyar Library Bulletin, I, Part III, 91-92).

the crown or in the account given by Nuniz that Narasa Nayaka treacherously usurped the throne by compassing the death of Tamarao (i.e. Immadi Narasimha).¹⁰

But curiously enough, the literary works make no mention of Immadi Narasimha, probably because he was only a *roi faineant* while the *de facto* ruler of the land remained Narasa Nayaka, to whose care Saluva Narasimha had made over his sons and the empire. In the inscriptions of Immadi Narasimha the place of honour is generally given to the regent, who actually *ruled* the state in the name of his young master, who was allowed to *reign* as a titular sovereign.

Narasa Nayaka does not appear to have had a peaceful time. The *Parijatapaharanamu*, *Achyutarayabhyudayam* and *Varadambikaparinayam* allude to a number of successful campaigns waged by him against the rulers of Bijapur, Bidar, Madura, Srirangapatnam, etc. The epigraphical records of his successors also recount his victories over Chera, Chola, Turushka, Gajapati and other kings.¹¹ Unfortunately there is no clue to determine their chronological order. It is not improbable that most of his wars were fought during the period of his regency, as Nuniz states that he 'made war on several places, taking them and demolishing them because they had revolted.'¹² Still when he died in 1503 he left his late master's will only half-fulfilled since he could not recover any of the lost fortresses of the empire. In another direction also he failed in his duty. The Portuguese, under the leadership of Vasco da Gama, landed near Calicut (Kolikoud) in May 1498. During his second voyage to India in 1502 he imposed commercial restrictions on the chief of Bhatkal, who was a 'tenant' of the empire. Three years later Francesco de Almeida compelled the chief of Honavar, another vassal of Vijayanagara, to accept the suzerainty of the king of

10 According to Nuniz, after the death of Saluva Narasimha, his (elder) son was 'raised up to be king' by the regent, Narasa Nayaka. But one Tymarasa, with a view to ruin the regent, encompassed the death of the boy-king. The regent, who was wrongly suspected of the crime, promptly enthroned the younger brother of the late king 'called Tamarao'. But later he grew ambitious, secretly secured the assassination of the king, and usurped the throne. FE, 308-14. The epigraphical records, however, show that Immadi Narasimha (i.e. Tamarao) lived for some time even after the death of the regent. See 357 of 1912; EI, VII, 74 ff; JRAS, 1915, 383-95; S. K. Aiyangar, *A Little Known Chapter of Vijayanagara History*, 54-71.

11 Sources, Nos. 35, 36 & 54; ASI, An. Rep., 1908-9, 170-71; *Further Sources*, I, 160.

12 FE, 310. For a discussion of the authenticity and chronological order of his campaigns, see *Further Sources*, I, 160-76. But his capture of Vidyapuri, i.e. Vijayanagara, may not refer to the incident of 1492, but to an event preceding the Saluva usurpation in 1486, when he captured the imperial city and made it over to Saluva Narasimha. This event has already been described.

Portugal. Immadi Narasimha and his regent appear to have left them to their fate, without extending to them the protection of the central government.¹³

VIRA NARASIMHA

Narasa Nayaka, according to Nuniz, left five sons; but inscriptions mention only four, viz. Vira Narasimha, Krishna, Ranga and Achyuta. Vira Narasimha also bore the title of Bhujabala,¹⁴ which appears to have led the Portuguese chronicler to designate him as Busbalrao. Soon after the death of his father, he succeeded to the regency, and *then* probably got rid of Immadi Narasimha in the manner described by Nuniz, who has erroneously attributed the crime to his father. The general revolt of the provinces, mentioned by the same author, was most probably provoked by some such conduct on his part. Indeed a person, who only a few years later ordered his chief minister, Saluva Timma, to put out the eyes of Krishna, his step-brother, with a view to ensure the succession of his own son, could hardly have hesitated to remove Immadi Narasimha to secure the crown for himself.¹⁵ The epigraphical records, however, praise him as a virtuous king who made gifts to almost all the great shrines of South India. But Nuniz says that he spent the entire period of his short reign in suppressing rebel chieftains. But only a few of the successful military operations of his reign are known with some certainty: one is the defeat and capture of Kacha, the rebel governor of Advani, and another is a victory over the Sapad (Adil Khan), who had advanced on Kandनावolu (Kurnool) with a huge army.¹⁶ According to the *Local Records*, the chiefs of Ummattur and Srirangapattanam remained defiant and unsubdued. In history the role of Vira Narasimha is that of the founder of the Tuluva¹⁷ or the third dynasty of Vijayanagara. With a view to ensure the succession to his own son, who was only eight years old, he ordered his chief minister, Saluva Timma, to put out the eyes of his step-brother, Krishna. But the minister saw that Krishna 'was a man over twenty years and therefore more fit to be a king'. Hence he yielded to the entreaties of the young prince and hoodwinked the dying king by presenting him the eyes of a goat.

¹³ Danvers: *The Portuguese in India*, I, 82, 120.

¹⁴ EC; IV, Gu. 67; III, MI 95.

¹⁵ Nuniz, *op. cit.*, 310-14. *The Virappayya Kalajnana* does assert that Vira Narasimha Raya, having caused the death of Tamaraya (i.e. Immadi Narasimha), ruled for five years. *Further Sources*, III, No. 16.

¹⁶ N. Venkataramanayya's article in *C. R. Reddy Com. Vol.*, 61-71.

¹⁷ The origin of this name is not exactly known. The Tuluvas trace their descent from a mythical personage, Turvasu of the lunar race. See, *JAHR*, IX, 23 f.

III. THE TULUVA DYNASTY

KRISHNA RAYA

VIRA NARASIMHA'S LAST KNOWN DATE is 4 May 1509, and the first available record of Krishna as ruler of Vijayanagara is dated 26 July 1509. Sometime between these two dates the latter was proclaimed sovereign at the age of about twenty-one.¹ But probably due to the extraordinary circumstances under which he happened to succeed the late king, or for want of an auspicious day, his coronation was not celebrated till 8 August 1509.²

Krishna Raya was faced with multifarious problems from the moment of his accession to power. Even his title to sovereignty was weak. He was made emperor by Saluva Timma in defiance of the claims of the heir-apparent. The disappointed prince and his own two step-brothers remained a standing menace to his position. Gangaraja of Ummattur behaved almost like an independent ruler. Prataparudra Gajapati, the son and successor of Purushottama, held the coastal districts in the east down to Udayagiri, and even threatened the peace of Vijayanagara. At the time of Krishna Raya's accession to the throne, the Muslim rulers of the north were actually at war with Vijayanagara.³ On the west coast, the Portuguese were slowly feeling their way to political power. They disregarded the sovereign rights of the Raya of Vijayanagara in dictating their terms to his vassal chiefs of Bhatkal and Honawar. They defied the power of the Zamorin of Calicut in Malabar and set up their fortified factories in Cochin and Cannanore. They even defeated the combined fleets of Calicut and Egypt on 3 February 1509, and established their supremacy over the Indian Ocean. Their command of the sea gave them a monopoly of trading in horses, which they could use as a powerful weapon in their diplomatic dealings with the Indian princes. When their attempt to reduce Calicut ended in a terrible disaster in January 1510, Albuquerque turned to Krishna Raya for help. He sent Friar Luis to Vijayanagara to negotiate an offensive alliance against the Zamorin and to secure a site for a factory between Bhatkal and Mangalore; in return for these concessions the Raya was promised assistance in the conquest of Goa and a

¹ Nuniz, *op. cit.*, 314-15; MER 342 of 1892 and 703 of 1919.

² *Further Sources*, III, No. 19(a).

³ N. Venkataramanayya in JOR, X, 155-56, 165.

*monopoly in the supply of horses.*⁴ The Raya had not been on the throne for more than five months when the Portuguese envoy placed before him such far-reaching proposals. Their acceptance meant an immediate war against an unoffending neighbour, like the Zamorin, while their rejection was likely to paralyse the vital military interests of the empire.

Krishna Raya handled the situation with great tact and foresight. He confirmed Saluva Timma in his office and interned his nephew and step-brothers in the distant fortress of Chandragiri for his own greater security. He also examined the revenue and military affairs of the state, and realised the arrears from the defaulting governors. He avoided fresh complications by putting off the Portuguese envoy with vague answers, and made elaborate preparations for the defence of the empire and recovery of the regions lost by his predecessors.

The available original sources are not quite clear about the order and number of the wars waged by Krishna Raya. In the colophons of his *Amuktamalyada*, and in the chronicle of Nuniz there is no reference to any of his military achievements prior to his conquest of Udayagiri. But according to the *Rayavachakamu* and the *Krishnaraya-vijayam*, he first reduced Sivansamudram belonging to Gangaraja of Ummattur in Mysore, captured the forts of Mudkal, Raichur and Adoni in the north, and defeated the sultans of Bijapur, Ahmadnagar and Golkonda before marching against Udayagiri.⁵ His victory over the three Muslim kings at the beginning of his reign is also noticed in an official account prepared in 1604.⁶ But this does not make any reference to Sivansamudram.

According to the *Commentaries* of Albuquerque, it appears that the Raya was already at war with the 'King of Deccan', before he proceeded to subdue the chief (of Ummattur), 'who had seized the city of Pergunda (Penugonda)'.⁷ The account of Purchas⁸ shows that the Raya waged two wars against Idalcan (Adil Khan), son of Sabains (Yusuf Adil Shah), before and after the capture of Goa by Albuquerque in 1510. Since Ferishta mentions that Yusuf Adil Khan died sometime after he recaptured Goa from the Portuguese in May, it looks more probable that the Raya's first war was against Yusuf himself. That by the 'King of the Deccan' Albuquerque meant Yusuf

⁴ Albuquerque, *Commentaries*, II, 72-77 (Hakhyt).

⁵ *Sources*, Nos. 38 and 39.

⁶ Quoted by Dr. N. Venkataramanayya in the JOR, X, 154-56.

⁷ *Commentaries*, II, 76; III, 35-38. The arguments of Dr. N. Venkataramanayya (JOR, X, 153) identifying 'King of the Decan' with Sultan Mahmud Shah Bahmani are very far-fetched.

⁸ Quoted by R. Sewell, FE, 125 n.1.

of Bijapur is clear from the content of the letter of Friar Luis, who says that the Raya 'took him in battle, but released him on his promise to serve him for ever'. The Hampi epigraph of January 1510, records the victory of the Raya as an accomplished fact. In his *Amuktamalyada*, he claims to have slain the Adil Khan during an uninterrupted expedition against the northern country. Ferishta does not notice these early wars of the Raya against Yusuf, but admits that he took the fortress of Raichur from Ismail,⁹ son of Yusuf, about the year 1512. Nuniz ignores these early achievements, and describes his military operations against the Gajapati, the lord of the land of Catur, and the Adil Shah (Ismail) in successive order. His account of the Gajapati war carries the Raya only as far 'Symamdary' (i.e. Simhachalam in Vizagapatam district), while the *Manucharitramu*, a Telugu work, states that he went into the interior of Orissa and threatened Cuttack. The name 'Catur' does not occur either in epigraphical records or in Telugu works. The logic of the chronological arrangement of Nuniz has led some scholars to identify it with Cuttack, and others to associate it with different places in South India.¹⁰ But as the description given by Nuniz of this campaign agrees with what is said about the siege and capture of Sivansamudram in the indigenous sources, it is reasonable to assume that the two accounts refer to the same event, and that the Portuguese chronicler committed an error in placing it in a wrong chronological setting.¹¹ There are several other discrepancies in the original material, which are responsible for the diversity of opinion among modern scholars regarding the events of the reign of Krishna Raya. However, the following facts can be gathered from a comparative study of all the available sources bearing upon the subject.

Immediately after his accession to the throne, Krishna Raya found himself at war with Yusuf Adil Shah of Bijapur, and defeated him sometime before January 1510. Timoja, the commander of the fleet on the west coast, persuaded Albuquerque to seize Goa, and 'intrigued with the Hindoos of the land to deliver up the city to the Portuguese'. The Raya, who had so far refrained from associating himself openly with the Portuguese enterprise in India, now informed the King of Garsopa, one of his vassals, that he would assist the Portuguese in retaining the place.¹² But he did not give any direct

⁹ Briggs, III, 44-45.

¹⁰ K. Iswara Dutt, *Campaigns of Krishna-Devaraya* in the JAHRS, IX, Pt. 4, 57-60; TTDI, Report, 181; and JAHRS, XVII, 154-61.

¹¹ S. K. Aiyangar in the *Hindustan Review*, 1917, 340.

¹² *Commentaries*, II, Chs. XIX-XXII, 138-39, 144.

assistance to them when Yusuf retook the city in May 1510. He, however, created a diversion by attacking the territory of Bijapur. Yusuf had to hurry back to defend his southern frontier against this 'more dangerous enemy', and in this struggle he appears to have perished sometime before November, 1510.¹³ His son, Ismail Shah, was a mere boy when he succeeded to the throne of Bijapur. His enemies fully exploited the situation; Albuquerque overpowered the small garrison at Goa and permanently occupied the city; the Hindus of Belgaum rose in revolt and renewed their allegiance to Vijayanagara; and the Raya not only occupied the fortresses of Raichur and Mudkal, but also appears to have liberated Mahmud Shah from the custody of Ismail and restored him to his ancestral throne of the Bahmanis at Bidar. It is this incident that seems to have earned for him the title of *Yavanarajya Sthapanacharya*, the earliest reference to which is found in an inscription of September 1514. His northern campaign came to a close in the early months of 1512 with a grand military demonstration against the kings of Ahmadnagar and Golkonda as far as the river Krishna.¹⁴

Now that his northern frontier was free from danger, Krishna Raya proceeded to chastize the rebellious chiefs in the interior of his dominions. His most outstanding achievements in this campaign were the defeat of Gangaraja of Ummattur in Mysore, and the capture of his island-citadel of Sivansamudram by draining off the Kaveri, which flowed round it. By 22 September 1512, this region was thoroughly subdued, and put in charge of Saluva Govinda, a brother of Saluva Timma.¹⁵

Having ensured peace and security at home, he made elaborate preparations to recover the eastern districts of the empire from the clutches of Prataparudra Gajapati, the King of Orissa. It was not an easy task. The Gajapati held a number of strong hill-fortresses fully

13 C. Ramachandraiya, *Date of the Death of Yusuf Adil Shah*, *Proc. Ind. Hist. Congress*, Allahabad Session, 1938.

14 Mahmud Shah appears to have been a prisoner for some time in the hands of Yusuf Adil (as stated by Fr. Luis) in consequence of the struggle for power between the latter and Amir Barid, son of Qasim Barid. After killing Yusuf in battle, Krishna Raya seems to have restored Mahmud to the Bahmani throne, which earned for him the said title. See *Commentaries*, III, Ch. I-IV; Ferishta (Briggs), III, 34; *Commentaries*, III, 36; *Rayavachakamu*, *Krishnamayachayam*, and the official Report of 1604; and JOR, X, 154-76.

15 EI, VII, 11-22; MER, 180 of 1913; *Sources*, Nos. 38, 39 and 41; EC, III, Nj. 195. Nuniz does not refer to the Ummattur campaign. But his description of Krishna Raya's attack on the citadel of the 'land of Catuir' after the Kalinga war agrees with the account of his assault on Sivansamudram as found in Telugu literary works. See *Hindustan Review*, 1917.

garrisoned, and appears to have been in league with the neighbouring Muslim rulers of the Deccan in the later stages of the war. Krishna Raya organized separate campaigns for the reduction of key strongholds, and provided for their administration under trusted generals immediately after their capture. During the intervals between active military operations, he was either at Vijayanagara looking after the state affairs or at some sacred shrine of South India in the company of his wives, Tirumaladevi and Chinnadevi, making precious gifts to the presiding deities of the place.

Udayagiri, the southernmost hill-fortress of the Gajapati, was first to be attacked in this war. The intense anxiety of Krishna Raya for success can be inferred from his three propitiatory visits to Tirumalai (Tirupati) hill in 1513 when he announced valuable donations to God Sri Venkateswara.¹⁶ Nuniz states that the Raya collected 34,000 foot and 800 elephants, and with this force he took it after a siege of a year and a half, and that among the prisoners was an aunt or uncle of the Gajapati. According to inscriptions the fortress capitulated on 9 June 1514, and the royal prisoner was an uncle of the Gajapati. The Raya returned to his capital and brought with him an image of Balakrishna as a trophy. He installed the idol in a 'jewelled *mantapa*' in the Krishnaswami temple at Vijayanagara.¹⁷

Kondavidu formed the centre of his military operation in his second campaign. According to Nuniz, the Raya defeated the Gajapati and put him to flight before taking the fortress. His inscriptions show that he captured the minor fortresses of Addanki, Vinukonda, Bellamkonda, Nagarjunakonda, Tangeda and Ketavaram, laid siege to Kondavidu and captured alive Virabhadra, a son of Prataparudra, and several other chiefs including two Muslim generals, Mallu Khan and Uddanda Khan. The fort of Kondavidu was taken on 23 June 1515. The Raya sent the prisoners to Vijayanagara and himself returned to it after a thanksgiving pilgrimage to the shrine of Amaravati and Srisailam.¹⁸

About the close of 1515 Krishna Raya started on his third

¹⁶ TTDI, Report, 151-52.

¹⁷ *Nellore Inscriptions*, III, Udayagiri, Nos. 37, 38, 40 and 41; SII, IV, No. 253, 25 and 26 of 1889.

¹⁸ EI, VII, 18; TTDI, III, Nos. 76-78, 80 and 81; 196 of 1903; EI, VI, 108 ff; 18 of 1915. Prince Virabhadra was at first treated generously and appointed governor of a small province. EC, XI, Dg. 107. According to Nuniz, 'a wife of the king and one of his sons... and seven principal captains' were taken captive at Kondapalli. But his description of the siege of Kondapalli applies to Kondavidu. *Further Sources*, I, 204-7.

campaign to utterly annihilate the power of the Gajapati. He attacked Kondapalli where, according to Nuniz, were collected 'all the chiefs of the kingdom of Oriya'. The Raya made several of them prisoners, among whom was one Bijli Khan. With the fall of this fortress, the Gajapati lost courage and retreated to the north. The Raya followed him into his homeland, taking on his way a number of strongholds, like Anantagiri, Kandikonda, Nalagonda, Kambhammettu, etc. Finally he reached Simhadri (i.e. Simhachalam), erected a pillar of victory at Pottanuru, and in the company of his wives presented to God Varaha Narasima¹⁹ several costly jewels on 29 March 1516.

Both Nuniz and the author of the *Rayavachakamu* are agreed that the war was brought to a close by a treaty under which Prataparudra gave his daughter in marriage to Krishna Raya and ceded to him all land south of the river Krishna. But as to the time and circumstances of this treaty, they give different versions.

According to the *Rayavachakamu*, Krishna Raya, while still at Simhadri, compelled the submission of Prataparudra by a stratagem, and after marrying his daughter, he started back for his own country.

Nuniz says that Krishna Raya stayed at Simhadri for six months to meet the 'King of Oriya' (Prataparudra) on the battle-field. As the latter did not accept the challenge, he returned to Vijayanagara. Here he arranged a fencing contest between the 'son of the King of Oriya' and one of his own men. The Gajapati prince felt it extremely humiliating to be called upon to fight with 'a man of humble birth', and 'slew himself'. It was only after hearing about the suicide of his son, and pained by the continued captivity of his wife, that Prataparudra ransomed the latter by agreeing to offer his daughter in marriage to Krishna Raya.

However, other records are more helpful in fixing the appropriate trend of events.²⁰ According to an epigraph of Krishna Raya, he was back at his capital in June 1516. Then one of his inscriptions at Simhachalam indicates his presence there in August 1519. Certain verses in his *Amuktamalyada* refer to his worship of Balarama and Subhadra at Nilachala (i.e. Puri-Jagannatha), and the flight of the Gajapati from Cuttack. These stray hints suggest that the war against the Gajapati did not end with the setting up of the 'pillar of victory' at Simhadri-Pottanuru in March 1516. It looks very likely that while Krishna Raya returned to Vijayanagara in June 1516, he

¹⁹ Nuniz (FE, 319); *Rayavachakamu*, *Amuktamalyada* (Sources, Nos. 38 & 40). *Sangitasuryodayam* (Further Sources, No. 116(a)) and MER, 245 of 1899; and SII, VI, No. 694.

²⁰ MER, 457 of 1923; 244 of 1899; *Amuktamalyada* (Ed. V. Venkataraya Sastry), Canto I, v. 36 and Canto VII, v. 75.

left his army behind to pursue the campaign deep into the enemy's territory. After a short respite at his capital, he rejoined his army to supervise the military operations. Prataparudra was completely defeated and his metropolis was sacked by the Vijayanagara forces; he had, therefore, no alternative but to sue for peace.²¹ This must have happened sometime in 1519. Only on this assumption can the presence of Krishna Raya again at Simhachalam in August 1519 be explained. He was probably returning with his victorious army at this time after signing the treaty with the Gajapati, and on his way performed worship at the temples of Nilachala (Puri) and Simhachalam.

But before long Krishna Raya had to wage another war in defence of his northern frontiers. He had enough warnings of the coming storm. The presence of Muslim officers at Kondavidu and Kondapalli suggested some sort of league between the Muslim powers of the Deccan and the Gajapati. Much reliance could not be placed upon the verbal assurance of friendship given by the former. As a matter of fact, even when the war against the Gajapati was in progress, the officers of Ismail Adil Shah were busy on the west coast undermining the authority of the Raya; they attacked the chief of Honawar, and appear to have retaken Belgaum. The Raya realized his danger and made serious efforts to come to some understanding with the Portuguese for mutual advantage. The assassination of Fr. Luis by a Turk at Vijayanagara did not mar their good relations, and the exchange of embassies continued. Albuquerque at one stage intervened and persuaded Ismail to cease hostilities against Honawar. But the idea of a formal treaty between Vijayanagara and Goa did not materialize, because Albuquerque tried to exploit to his own advantage the rivalry of the Raya and Adil Shah for his assistance in the coming struggle.²² In the meantime Ismail nourished his grudge against Vijayanagara and succeeded in creating a party in his favour at Raichur and occupying the fortress.²³ This completely upset the work of the early years of Krishna Raya, and he had to unsheath the sword once more to decide the issue.

Nuniz has given a full and graphic description of the war which

²¹ 824 of 1822; SGO, 115-18. *Prabodhachandrodayavyakha* refers to the marriage of Krishna Raya with the Gajapati princess, Bhadra by name. *Sources*, 144. *Tukka Panchakam* is attributed to her, in which she is said to bemoan her neglect by her husband. *Sources*, 143.

²² *Commentaries*, 121-29; Danvers, *The Portuguese in India*, I, 307-8; JAHRS, X, 80-83.

²³ It is only on this surmise that we can reconcile the conflicting statements of Nuniz and Ferishta regarding the cause of this war. See S. K. Aiyangar's article in the *Hindustan Review* for 1917.

throws considerable light on the military usage, army organization, camp life and commissariat of the Vijayanagara empire.²⁴ Krishna Raya first secured the neutrality of some Muslim rulers of the Deccan before starting his campaign. He marched with an immense host of foot, horse and elephants and laid siege to the fortress of Raichur. Ismail Adil Shah came to its relief with a large army and a superior contingent of artillery. On the southern bank of the Krishna, within nine miles of Raichur a great battle was fought on Saturday, 19 May 1520, resulting in Adil Shah's total defeat. His army was pushed back into the river with great slaughter, and he barely escaped with his life. His commander-in-chief, Salabat Khan, was taken prisoner while attempting to retrieve the fortunes of the day. An immense booty fell into the hands of the Raya; but he lost more than 16,000 men in the battle. He immediately began the siege of the fortress and compelled the garrison to surrender. His success was hastened by the aid given by a Portuguese horse-dealer, Christovao do Figueiredo, and his twenty musketeers, who with their arquebuses picked off the defenders from the walls. The Raya showed the greatest clemency to the inhabitants of the fallen fortress, guaranteed to them security of life and property and punished all those who indulged in pillage. But he paid no attention to the importunities and threats of the other Muslim rulers of the Deccan, whose ambassadors now waited upon him and pressed for the restoration of the conquered land to the Adil Shah. After making proper arrangements for the government of city, the Raya returned to Vijayanagara amidst general rejoicings.

In the sequel, Nuniz further states, Krishna Raya kept the ambassador of Ismail Adil Shah waiting for over a month before granting him audience, and then told him that he would restore everything and release Salabat Khan provided his master 'would come and kiss his foot'. But this abject surrender never took place, although the Raya led out his armies once more from Vijayanagara in search of the Adil Shah, occupied Bijapur for several days, and destroyed Gulbarga in anger. Ferishta does not corroborate the account of Nuniz regarding these developments after the battle of

²⁴ See Sewell, FE, 323-58. But in the whole of his narrative only the portion relating to the battle and siege of Raichur can be taken as substantially correct, and may be preferred to the account of the same event given by Ferishta. (See *ibid.*, 151-54.) Other portions dealing with the cause of the war, the number of the troops engaged, the date of the battle, and the manner in which the war was brought to a close need some modification in the light of more reliable evidence. In this connection Sewell's scholarly remarks on the date of the battle and the number of troops engaged are very useful. (*Ibid.*, 140-51.) There is only a single inscription which refers to this battle, 47 of 1906.

Raichur. Yet the Raya's attack on Gulbarga cannot be dismissed as imaginery, since it is mentioned not only in the Portuguese chronicle but also in contemporary literary works such as the *Amuktamalyada*, *Sangitasuryodayam* and *Manucharitram*. Nuniz, after making some statements of a highly controversial nature,²⁵ closes his description of this episode with the remark: 'After the return of the king of Bisnaga, which took place in the same year in which he had left, nothing more passed between him and the Ydalcao worthy of record, relating either to peace or war.'

With the triumphant victory at Raichur and the subsequent devastation of Gulbarga, Krishna Raya's active military career came to a close. He applied the closing years of his reign to devotional works and other cultural pursuits. He was the greatest of the Vijayanagara sovereigns. Paes, who spent some time at his court, has given a glowing account of his personality. 'He is a great ruler and a man of much justice, but subject to sudden fits of rage.' His life was a series of efforts to restore to the state its lost power and prestige, and assure it a permanent peace. He proved more than a match for the contemporary powers of the Deccan and South India, and recovered most of the lost territories of the empire. As a warrior, a statesman and a scholar, he excelled all the other rulers of his time in India. There was no campaign in which he did not gain a decisive victory. There was hardly any important shrine in South India which did not receive his benevolent attention. The 'House of Victory', the Hazara Rama temple and the Vitthala temple at the capital amply demonstrate his religious and artistic taste.²⁶ He also built the outlying town of Nagalapur. His solicitude for the welfare of his subjects

25 FE, 358. Nuniz states that in the fort of Gulbarga, the Raya found three sons of the King of the Deccan (whom the Adil Shah had kept there in captivity), made the eldest King of the Deccan, took the other two brothers with him to Vijayanagara, and granted them each an annual allowance of fifty thousand gold *pardaos*. Bandaru Lakshminarayana, a court-poet of Krishna Raya, says that the Raya liberated from Gulbarga three sons of the Sultan who had been harassed by the Sapada (i.e. the Adil Shah). (See *Further Sources*, No. 116(a).) Obviously both the authors are referring to the sons of Mahmud Shah Bahmani, who died in 1518. But according to Saiyyid Ali, Mahmud Shah had three sons, Ahmad, Alauddin and Waliullah, who successively occupied the Bahmani throne between 1518 and 1525, and the role of the king-maker was played by Amir Ali Barid. Nizamuddin Ahmad speaks of four sons, Ahmad Shah, Alauddin, Waliullah and Kalimullah, who succeeded one another successively on the throne of Bidar. Perhaps the Portuguese and Hindu authors post-dated the events, and confused places and persons associated with earlier events, which had won for the Raya the title of *Yavanarajya-sthapanacharya*.

26 See *Hampi Ruins* by A. H. Longhurst. The temple on the Tirupati hill contains three statues representing Krishna Raya and his two wives, Chinnadevi and Tirumaladevi.

became proverbial. Among his public works may be mentioned the enormous tank, which he constructed near the capital for irrigation purposes and which added to his revenues the sum of 20,000 *pardaos*.²⁷

He was a gifted scholar both in Telugu and Sanskrit. He was also somewhat of a voluminous writer, although only two of his works are extant—the Telugu *Amuktamalyada* and the Sanskrit drama *Jambavati Kalyanam*. His reign marked the beginning of a new era in Telugu literature when imitation from Sanskrit gave place to independent compositions, known as the *prabandhas*. His *Amuktamalyada*, Allasani Peddana's *Manucharitram*, and Nandi Timmayya's *Parijatapaharanamu* are some of the fruits of this new literary movement. According to tradition, his court was adorned by eight celebrated poets, who were known as the *ashta-diggajas*. He extended his patronage to Telugu, Kannada and Tamil poets alike. Every year at the time of spring festival he welcomed scholars from various parts of the country and rewarded them suitably.²⁸ Foreign travellers, like Barbosa, Paes and Nuniz, bear eloquent testimony to his efficient administration and the prosperity of the empire under his sway. The graphic description given by Paes of the *Mahanavami* festival, the review of troops and the revenues of the empire are of particular interest in this connection. The greatest achievement of the state under Krishna Raya lay in the toleration that prevailed in the empire. Barbosa writes, 'The king allows such freedom that every man may come and go and live according to his own creed, without suffering any annoyance, and without enquiry whether he is a Christian, Jew, Moor or heathen. Great equity and justice is observed to all not only by the rulers, but by the people one to another.'²⁹

The last years of Krishna Raya, however, were rendered unhappy due to domestic misfortunes and threats of foreign invasion. The trouble commenced about 1524 when he appointed his son, Tirumala, who was only six years old, as *yuvaraja*. Within eight months

²⁷ Paes and Nuniz describe the construction of this tank. Sewell, FE, 244-45, 364-65.

²⁸ N. Venkata Rao, *Krishnadevaraya and his Literary Circle* in the VSCV, 231-232; G. R. Subramaniam Pantulu, *The Augustan Age of Telugu Literature* in the IA, XXVII, 244 ff; T. Achyuta Rao, *Andhra Literature in the Vijayanagara Empire* in the JAHRS, X, 215 ff.

²⁹ Duarte Barbosa was a Portuguese official. He visited Vijayanagara about 1510. His account is rendered into English by M. Longworth Dames in 2 volumes. Dominago Paes was another Portuguese, who was at Vijayanagara about 1520. The English version of his narrative is published by R. Sewell in his *Forgotten Empire*, 286-90.

of this happy event, the crown-prince fell ill and died. According to Nuniz, Saluva Timma and his sons were suspected of poisoning him, and were thrown behind prison-bars. After three years, a son of Saluva Timma escaped from prison and raised the standard of revolt. He was subdued with great difficulty and once more cast into prison.³⁰ Taking advantage of these civil disturbances at Vijayanagara, Ismail Adil Shah marched against Raichur with the intention of recovering it, but retreated on hearing that the Raya was advancing in person to meet him. This was an intolerable situation. The Raya determined to teach him a lesson and retook Belgaum. He opened negotiations with the Portuguese for assistance; but before his project could be carried out, he fell ill and died shortly afterwards, sometime between 27 October and 28 December 1529.

ACHYUTA RAYA

His death created serious problems, the foremost being that of succession. Before his death he had made a will nominating from among the princes confined by him at Chandragiri his half-brother, Achyuta, as his successor, since 'he himself had no son of fit age for the throne, but only one of the age of eighteen months'. But this settlement was challenged by his son-in-law, Rama Raja,³¹ who sponsored the claim of his infant brother-in-law. A civil war was threatened between him and Achyuta's partisans, led by his brothers-in-law, the elder and younger Salakaraju Tirumala. Finally Achyuta Raya made up his quarrel with Rama Raja by giving him a share in the government, and ascended the throne of Vijayanagara in April 1530.

This truce indicated good tactics and came none too soon; for

³⁰ The story given by Nuniz that Saluva Timma and his relatives were blinded after this incident does not seem to be true. Timma and his brother, Govindaraju, figure as free persons in the reign of Achyuta Raya. See TTDI, Report, 194 and 227.

³¹ Rama Raja (popularly known as Aliya Rama Raya) was one of the great-grandsons of Araviti Bukka, who is described as 'the establisher of the kingdom of Saluva Narasimha'. His grandfather and his father greatly distinguished themselves as commanders of Vijayanagara armies. According to the *Anonymous Chronicler of Golkonda*, Rama Raja at first served as a trusted officer of Sultan Quli Qutb Shah. But later, being disgraced by the Sultan for his alleged cowardice, he 'took route to Vijayanagara, and entered the service of Krishna Raya, who shortly afterwards forming a high opinion of him, gave him his daughter in marriage'. Briggs (*Ferishta*), III, 380-81. How Rama Raja started his early military career under the Sultan of Golkonda is rather inexplicable, since all his ancestors held positions of authority and responsibility in the armed forces of Vijayanagara. However, it is a fact that he married Tirumalamba, Krishna Raya's daughter by Tirumaladevi (*Sources*, Nos. 56, 57 and 58) and espoused the cause of his infant brother-in-law. See N. Venkataramanayya, *SHTDV*, Ch. I.

Prataparudra Gajapati and Ismail Adil Shah made simultaneous attacks upon Vijayanagara in the hope of recovering what they had lost during the preceding decades. The Gajapati was, however, defeated and driven away. But the Adil Shah could not be disposed of so easily. He took Raichur and Mudkal after a siege of three months. Achyuta Raya had to acquiesce in this ominous development as he was confronted in the south with a formidable rebellion led by his minister, Sellappa *alias* Saluva Narasingha Nayaka, who had the support of Tiruvadi, the ruler of Travancore. He left the Adil Shah alone for the time being, and marched against the rebel minister. During this southern campaign, he spent most of his time in pilgrimages to the sacred shrines of Tirupati, Kalahasti, Kanchi, Tiruvannamalai and Srirangam, while actual fighting was done by the younger Salakaraju Tirumala. By 1532 the rebels and their allies had been crushed, and the entire south was brought back to allegiance. Rajanatha Dindima in his *Achyutarayabhyudayam* gives an account of this campaign and states that the Rava *then* moved north and invested the fortress of Raichur, 'having heard that the territory of the Adil Shah was seething with rebellion'. It appears that the death of Ismail Adil Shah in August 1534, and the dispute for the crown between his sons, Mallu and Ibrahim, encouraged Achyuta to make a bold bid for the recovery of the lost fortresses. Although Ferishta does not refer to this campaign, Dindima is supported in his account in material particulars by the Portuguese historian, Barros. Mallu Adil Shah could not offer any effective resistance to the Vijayanagara forces due to his domestic troubles, and sued for peace. But he was deposed shortly afterwards, after a reign of six months only, and his place was filled by his younger brother, Ibrahim. From a casual statement of Nuniz it appears that Achyuta reestablished his hold upon Raichur as a result of this war.³²

But these successes enabled the brothers-in-law of Achyuta to gather all power into their own hands, while he lapsed into a life of luxury and sloth. Rama Raja, whose influence considerably waned due to the demise of his infant brother-in-law in 1533, tried to stabilize his position by raising the standard of revolt. According to Saiyyid Ali, 'he rebelled against and overcame his lord, and having imprisoned him, usurped the kingdom'. Supported by the queens of Krishna Raya, he even arranged for his coronation. The opposition of Achyuta Raya's adherents, however, thwarted his ambitious designs. Yet he was not a man to relinquish power easily. He kept Achyuta in captivity and tried to legalize his position as regent by

sponsoring the superior claims of Sadasiva, the son of Ranga, who was an *elder* brother of Achyuta. His *coup d'état* so hoodwinked the world that the Portuguese historian, Correa, was constrained to remark that Achyuta 'had been king contrary to right', and that Sadasiva was 'the king by real right'.

But Rama Raja's triumph over his enemies was illusory. The nobles in the extreme south defied his authority. Hence he had to leave the capital to conduct military operations against them. During his absence, his own friends at the capital betrayed his trust and released Achyuta from prison. On this sudden development, Rama Raja patched up peace with the recalcitrant nobles and hurriedly retraced his steps towards the capital. Civil war was once more imminent in 1536.

In the meantime Ibrahim Adil Shah heard of the disunity in the Vijayanagara empire, and resolved to avenge the defeat sustained by his brother in 1535. He marched upon Vijayanagara and razed Nagalapur to the ground. In the face of such a formidable foe Rama Raja sought safety by retiring to his own jagir. Achyuta Raya, on his part, refrained from offering resistance to the invader, probably owing to the fear that the latter might join hands with Rama Raja. Rescue came to Vijayanagara from an unexpected quarter. Burhan Nizam Shah attacked the homelands of Bijapur and thus compelled Ibrahim to make a precipitate retreat. But the latter did not go back with empty hands. He secured from Achyuta Raya the retrocession of Raichur and ten lakhs of gold *pardaos*.

The remaining years of Achyuta's reign witnessed a deterioration in the moral tone of the administration. Acting upon the advice of his brothers-in-law, he ruthlessly exacted money both from his nobles and the public and alienated his subjects by his violent despotism. While the splendour of the empire was kept up, its *raison d'être* disappeared in an atmosphere of selfishness and brutality. Achyuta's hold over the southern provinces became lax, and the way was paved for the development of semi-independent nayakaships in Madura, Tanjore and other places. About the same time the Portuguese established themselves on the pearl-fishery coast in and round Tuticorin, and took the Paravas under their protection. It was feared that the empire would come to an ignominious end during the reign of Achyuta. Death, however, spared him from witnessing such a tragedy³³ by cutting short his earthly career about the middle of 1542.

³³ *Ibid.*, Ch. III.

SALAKARAJU TIRUMALA (USURPER)

His son, Venkatadri or Venkata I, succeeded him, while his maternal uncle, the younger Salakaraju, continued to exercise all real authority. The attempt of the queen-mother, Varadhambika, to free her son from the clutches of her unscrupulous brother only resulted in the murder of that young prince and other possible claimants to the throne, except Sadasiva, who appears to have been hidden in the fortress of Gutti. Salakaraju Tirumala now put on regal robes and began to indulge in the most atrocious cruelties. When Rama Raja and his brothers planned his destruction, he invited Ibrahim Adil Shah I to his rescue, seated him on the throne of Vijayanagara, and ordered rejoicings for seven days.³⁴

But to patriots this was an unbearable humiliation. A large number of them joined Rama Raja to retrieve the honour of their land. Open opposition under the circumstances being impossible, they feigned submission to the tyrant, and promised to be loyal to him for ever, provided he sent away the Adil Shah. The trick worked. The usurper believed in their protestations of loyalty and persuaded the Adil Shah to return home after paying him 'fifty lakhs of *huns*' as compensation for his trouble. Soon after the latter had made his departure, Rama Raja and his supporters broke their plighted word, and marched upon Vijayanagara with a considerable force. The usurper was taken by surprise, his followers deserted him in the thick of the battle, and he himself was caught and beheaded on the spot. Thus was avenged the murder of young Venkatadri. Rama Raja immediately brought Sadasiva, son of Ranga, from Gutti and crowned him emperor in 1543 with great pomp and festivity.³⁵

SADASIVA RAYA

Sadasiva Raya was recognized by everyone throughout his vast dominions as the emperor of Vijayanagara from 1543 to 1567, as is proved by his inscriptions which are found in every corner of the empire. But the real power in the state was exercised by the Triumvirate of Rama Raja and his two brothers, Tirumala and Venkatadri. Circumstances conspired to reduce Sadasiva Raya to a mere titular sovereign. When he came to the throne, he was not a man of strong character, and the environment in which he had been brought up

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Ch. IV; Ferishta (Briggs), III, 82-83; Correa cited in FE, 182-83; *The Annals of Haidar Anantapuram, Sources*, No. 56.

³⁵ N. Venkataramanayya, SHTDV, Ch. IV; H. Heras, *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Ch. I. Ferishta's dramatic account of the suicide of the usurper cannot be accepted since it is contradicted by contemporary and later literature of the Vijayanagara court.

had denied to him opportunities of training and experience. He owed everything—his life as well as his crown—to the unswerving support of Rama Raja and his brothers. They had considerable political experience and were highly connected. Their ancestor, the famous Aravidu chief, Somadevaraja, had fought against the officers of Muhammad bin Tughluq in the Deccan. A great-grandson of this valiant warrior was Araviti Bukka, who had been a general of the emperor, Saluva Narasimha. Other members of this family held commands of several forts under the sovereigns of the Tuluva dynasty. The fact that Rama Raja and Tirumala were sons-in-law of Krishna Raya and had saved the empire from the tyranny of the Salakaraju brothers further added to their prestige and marked them as natural leaders.³⁶

Indeed efficient leadership was the *sine qua non* for the survival of the empire after the debacle created by Salakaraju Tirumala's wicked conduct. His partisans had to be mopped up; the recalcitrant ruler of Travancore had to be taught a lesson; the activities of Portuguese on the south-east coast had to be curbed; and the neighbouring sultans had to be kept well under restraint from fishing in the troubled waters of Vijayanagara as Ibrahim Adil Shah I had done very recently. Sadasiva Raya was ill-equipped for such a task, and if he could hold the sceptre for about a quarter of a century, and Vijayanagara could witness the revival of the glories of the days of Krishna Raya, it was only due to the vigilance and diplomacy of Rama Raja. The Telugu work, *Ramarajiyamu*, gives a string of titles wherein the various victories of the latter are referred to. Although some of them are greatly exaggerated and even unhistorical, there is no doubt that he achieved enough to be hailed as 'the saviour of the Karnata empire from destruction'. He put down all the centrifugal forces with a strong hand, and his cousin, Vitthala, restored the authority of Vijayanagara over Travancore and the fishery coast.³⁷ But the problem of the neighbouring Muslim rulers was not so easy of solution. The drastic measures taken by him, although extremely successful in the beginning, ultimately recoiled on his own head and ruined his life's work.

The struggle between Vijayanagara and the Muslim powers started early in the reign of Sadasiva—almost on the very day of his coronation. Ferishta states that when Ibrahim Adil Shah I heard of the revolution in Vijayanagara, he sent Asad Khan to reduce the fortress of Adoni, but Venkatadri, who hurried to the relief of the

³⁶ ASI, An. Rep., 1908-9, 197.

³⁷ *Ramarajiyamu*, No. 57 in *Sources*; H. Heras, *The Aravidu Dynasty*, 140-53; *Further Sources*, I, 245-50.

garrison, succeeded in compelling Asad to retreat. But in the midst of his victory, he was overwhelmed by Asad's surprise attack, and was compelled to make peace. But soon afterwards, Ibrahim broke his faith and in alliance with Burhan Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar once more attacked Vijayanagara and occupied some territory. These aggressive acts of the Muslim kings led Rama Raja to abandon the traditional policy of mere defence, and to resort to methods which were most likely to divide and weaken the enemies of the empire. By force and diplomacy he created dissensions between the two Muslim allies, won over Burhan to his side, and, in alliance with him, inflicted a series of defeats on Ibrahim in three successive wars. Venkatadri played a very prominent part in these wars as the leader of Vijayanagara forces. By 1552 the Adil Shah had been completely crushed; Raichur and Mudkal were seized by Rama Raja, while Kalyani and Sholapur were occupied by Burhan Nizam Shah. During the period of these wars Rama Raja further weakened his antagonist by entering into a commercial treaty with the Portuguese by which the supply of horses to him was stopped. But when Burhan died in 1553, his successor Husain Nizam Shah I tried to upset the balance of power, and in alliance with Ibrahim Qutb Shah of Golkonda, he attacked Bijapur territory in 1555. This caused a diplomatic revolution and threw the Adil Shah into the arms of his quondam foe, Rama Raja. The latter immediately marched in person at the head of his army to the assistance of the Adil Shah and forced the sultans of Golkonda and Ahmadnagar to retire to their own dominions.

When Ibrahim Adil Shah died in 1557, his son, Ali, was compelled to seek shelter at the court of Vijayanagara due to the aggressive policy of Husain Nizam Shah. Rama Raja welcomed the young Sultan, treated him as his son, helped him in three successive wars against Husain, and put him in possession of Kalyani. Finally, the ruler of Ahmadnagar had to admit defeat and made peace with Rama Raja in 1559 by signing a most humiliating treaty. The ruler of Golkonda, who often joined hands with the ruler of Ahmadnagar, had also to make a similar submission. Thus for nearly two decades Rama Raja kept the Muslim rulers under his leading strings, and his military machine decided the fortune of every major war in the Deccan.³⁸

BATTLE OF RAKSHASA-TANGADI, 1565

But he had overplayed his hand. His frequent interference in the quarrels of the sultans disgusted them, one and all, although they

³⁸ Ferishta (Briggs), III, 85-123; H. Heras: *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Chs. IV and V; *Further Sources*, I, 252-62.

had themselves keenly sought his alliance in times of their distress. He also grew haughty day by day and regarded the Muslim monarchs as of little consequence. He treated their officers with the utmost contempt, disregarding all diplomatic usage. His soldiers in the wars against Ahmadnagar indulged in all kinds of excesses. Ferishta writes: 'They insulted the honour of Muslim women, destroyed mosques, and did not respect the sacred *Quran*.' The inevitable consequence of this was the formation of a grand alliance of the sultans to humble the pride of the Raja of Bijanagar. Opinion is divided as to the person who took the initiative in this move. According to both Couto and Saivvid Ali, it was the Sultan of Ahmadnagar, while Ferishta states clearly that it was Ali Adil Shah, who first thought of 'curbing Rama Raja's insolence by a League of the Faithful against him'. But there is no doubt that concrete measures were taken by Ibrahim Quth Shah of Golkonda to bring about reconciliation between Ali Adil Shah and Husain Nizam Shah, who had hitherto been fighting for the possession of Sholapur. He persuaded the two sultans to eschew their animosities in the interest of the common cause and to cement their friendship by matrimonial alliances. Accordingly Husain gave his daughter, Chand Bibi, in marriage to Ali with the fortress of Sholapur as dowry, and his eldest son, Murtaza, espoused Ali's sister. Ibrahim Quth Shah was himself a son-in-law of Husain, having married one of his daughters in 1559. Ali Barid Shah of Bidar also joined the confederacy.

While preparations for the war were in progress, Ali Adil Shah demanded from Rama Raja the restitution of Raichur, Mudkal and other fortresses; and when this was contemptuously turned down, as was expected, the combined armies of the four princes began their march on 28 December 1554 towards the south and pitched their main camp at Talikota. Rama Raja accepted the challenge and summoned 'all his dependants and rajas from the banks of the Krishna as far as the island of Ceylon in defence of the empire'. There were rapid movements on both sides, and within a few days the opposing forces found themselves face to face with the river Krishna flowing between them. The Muslim allies finally gained possession of the only safe ford by a ruse, crossed the river and advanced towards the Hindu camp.

On 23 January 1565, the historic battle of Rakshasa-Tangadi was fought in the neighbourhood of the two villages, which have given their name to it. Rama Raja, then seventy years of age, showed conspicuous courage, and his brothers, Venkatadri and Tirumala, fought with great skill and determination. At one time it seemed as if the Hindus had won the day, and Ali Adil Shah and his ally of

Golkonda were preparing to retreat; but the tide soon turned, when the Muslim artillery wrought havoc in the ranks of the Hindus, and a cavalry charge added to their confusion. At this juncture two Muslim generals of the Vijayanagara army went over with their troops to the side of their co-religionists, giving the *coup d'grace* in the thick of the fight. Rama Raja was surrounded, taken prisoner and immediately executed by Husain Nizam Shah I, lest Ali Adil Shah should press for his release. The Hindus, seized with panic, fled pell-mell in all directions. According to Ferishta over one hundred thousand Hindus were slain during the action and in the pursuit that followed, and the plunder was so great that every private soldier in the allied army became rich. Venkatadri died on the battle-field. Tirumala made a hurried retreat to Vijayanagara only to leave it immediately for the interior (Tirupati?) with the titular sovereign, Sadasiva Raya, and his accumulated treasures. The proud city of Vijayanagara was left defenceless and fell a prey, first to the robber tribes of the neighbourhood and then to the revengeful rapacity of the victors. The city was left in ruins, when the four sultans departed from it laden with booty after a sojourn of five months.³⁹

³⁹ Ferishta (Briggs), III, 123-31; Rev. H. Heras: *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Chs. IX and X; Sewell, FE, Chs. XIV and XV; EC, XI, Hk 6 and 7; *Further Sources*, I, Ch. XXI.

IV. THE ARAVIDU DYNASTY

TIRUMALA RAYA

YET THE EMPIRE OF VIJAYANAGARA DID not perish on the field of Rakshasa-Tangadi, nor did the newly forged unity among the sultans, born out of common hatred of Rama Raja, survive for long to annihilate it completely. The defeat in the battle simply reduced the empire's military prestige, economic prosperity, and the extent of its territorial jurisdiction. The empire itself lingered on for nearly a century more, with ever diminishing territories and languishing revenues. Tirumala made peace with the sultans by surrendering to them 'all the places which his brother had wrested from them'. He even returned to Vijayanagara 'after the departure of the Deccanese' and tried to repopulate it. But due to the 'constant attacks of the Musalmans', he changed the capital to Penugonda, and governed the state in the name of Sadasiva Raya. In 1568 this nominal sovereign is still found as the acknowledged suzerain of the entire South. But in the following year Tirumala is said to be 'seated on the diamond throne and ruling the kingdom of Vijayanagara'. According to Caesar Fredrick, the son of Tirumala (Venkata II?) 'put to death the lawful king'. But inscriptions indicate that he survived in retirement until 1576. Thus ended the Tuluva or the 'third dynasty' of Vijayanagara and a fresh lease of life was given to the empire under the Aravidu or the 'fourth dynasty', to which Tirumala belonged.¹

Tirumala Raya started his reign under very trying conditions. The circumstances were worse than what they had been when the Triumvirate had assumed the leadership of the empire and saved it from a grave danger. As a usurper, he lacked the moral support of his subjects. Several nobles refused to acknowledge his authority. Ali Adil Shah began to entertain the idea of acquiring for himself 'a portion of the territory of Beejanuggar', and actually secured the consent of Murtaza, the son and successor of Husain Nizam Shah I. Probably to meet this ominous situation, Tirumala divided the empire into three divisions practically on a linguistic basis, and entrusted their government to his sons, Sri Ranga, Rama and Venkatapati. The first held his court at Penugonda and looked after the Telugu area; the second administered the Kanarese districts from Srirangapatnam; and

¹ Rev. H. Heras, *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Ch. X. Ferishta attributes to Venkatadri many of the acts of Tirumala. For inscriptions of Sadasiva until 1576 see the reference in the *Further Sources*, I, 300.

the third was in charge of the Tamil region and had his headquarters at Chandragiri, with the powerful nayakas of Madura, Tanjore and Gingee under his jurisdiction. Thus freed from the burden of direct administration, Tirumala devoted his entire attention to the major problem of the defence of the state. He did indeed succeed in suppressing some of the rebels and warding off an attack of the Musalmans on Penugonda, as is noted in some of the contemporary epigraphical records. But he could not go to the rescue of the Hindu chieftains of Turgal, Dharwar and Bankapur, when they were attacked and overthrown by Ali Adil Shah. As a matter of fact, he confessed his helplessness when the chief of Bankapur appealed to him for assistance.² In the midst of such depressing events, it is to his credit that he kept up the old cultural traditions of Vijayanagara. He built temples and bathing places for pilgrims at Kanchi, Srirangam, Seshachalam (Tirupati) and other sacred places. He enjoyed the company of poets and received from Bhattu Murti (Ramarajabhushana) the dedication of his work, *Vasucharitramu*. He passed away after a life of varied activity at the beginning of 1572.

SRI RANGA I

His eldest surviving son, Sri Ranga I, the viceroy of the Telugu districts, was immediately 'installed on the throne at Penugonda'. His reign was one of the most critical periods in the history of Vijayanagara. The aggression of the sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda was the chief cause of a further reduction in the extent of his empire. Ali Adil Shah carried his arms into the Kanara country and forced the local Hindu rulers to pay him tribute. He even made an attack upon Penugonda in 1575. It was the timely intervention of Ibrahim Qutb Shah of Golkonda and Hande Malakappa Nayadu of Bukkasamudram that saved the situation. Ali was beaten back and Penugonda was relieved. But soon afterwards worse days overtook Sri Ranga I. Hande Malakappa rebelled against him and joined the camp of his enemies. Ibrahim Qutb Shah also changed his mind, abandoned his Hindu ally and, in emulation of the exploits of the Sultan of Bijapur, began to despoil the Vijayanagara territories. With the cooperation of the Hande chiefs, he conquered the country round Ahobalam; he then laid his hands on the Telugu country and captured successively the fortresses of Vinukonda, Bellamakonda, Tangeda, Kondavidu and Udayagiri. Only the death of the Sultan in 1580 brought a brief respite to Vijayanagara and arrested further losses. But the empire knew no peace. Some time before 1583 Virappa Nayaka of Madura

² Ferishta (Briggs), III, 131, 135-39; *Vasucharitramu* and *Chikkadevaraya Vamsavali*, Nos. 66 and 92 in *Sources*; H. Heras, *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Ch. XI.

had defied the authority of the emperor and refused to pay tribute. Venkatapati, the local viceroy, assisted by Achyutappa Nayaka of Tanjore, quelled the rebellion. Sri Ranga I was not without some achievement to his credit. When opportunity favoured him, he subdued the 'insolent' Maravas of the fishery coast, and recovered the district of Ahobalam from the Musalmans. He died in the early part of 1585, leaving a much attenuated empire and no male issue. He was succeeded by his youngest brother, Venkatapati, the viceroy of the Tamil lands. The better claims of the princes, Tirumala and Sri Ranga, the sons of Rama, who was dead by this time, were overlooked due to their youth and inexperience.³

VENKATA RAYA II

Venkatapati Raya or Venkata II was crowned in January 1586 at Chandragiri, the headquarters of his viceroyalty, and shortly after his coronation he removed his court to Penugonda. The empire, although deprived of some of its northern provinces, was yet sufficiently extensive to demand constant vigilance. The trend of events in the reign of his predecessor had promised great prospects to its enemies, and they immediately proceeded to take advantage of the change of rulers to satisfy their ambitions. But Venkata II soon disillusioned them all. Instead of remaining on the defensive, he carried fire and sword into the camp of his foes, and practically 'conquered the throne of Karnata (Vijayanagara) by the strength of his arms.'⁴

The foremost of his antagonists was Sultan Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah, son of Ibrahim, who had very recently imposed his suzerainty on several of the feudatory chieftains of Vijayanagara. Not long after his accession, Venkata II 'made some incursions and invasions' into his dominions, drew the Muslim forces to Penugonda, and inflicted a crushing defeat upon them. The *Anonymous Chronicler of Golkonda* attributes the withdrawal of the Qutb Shah to the fear of an approaching spate in the river Krishna, which might have cut off all his communications. But the *Raghunathabhyudyam* states that 'many of the enemies of the emperor fled from Penugonda when they learnt of his arrival'. According to the *Ramarajiyamu*, 'Venkatapati Raya collected his army and drove the son of Ibrahim as far as Golkonda'. There is no doubt that it was a remarkable victory for the Vijayanagara empire, and Venkata II deemed it worth recording in several of his grants. It restored confidence in the Vijayanagara arms, and

³ Ferishta and the *Anonymous Chronicler of Golkonda* (Briggs), III, 139-40, 435; *Sources*, Nos. 73 and 74; *Further Sources*, No. 200b; *Aravida Dynasty*, Vol. I, Ch. XII, and also 285-86, 301.

⁴ EI, IV, 270; XII, 187.

encouraged the jagirdars of the Telugu country to expel the alien rulers with the help of the Raya. The Sultan finally made peace with Venkata II and agreed 'that the river Krishna should thence forward form the boundary between their respective territories'. In the north-east corner, the empire regained *almost* the old limits as they had existed in the palmy days of Krishna Raya. Only the region of Kondavidu was still left in the hands of the Qutb Shah. In North Kanara and Mysore, the activities of Ibrahim Adil Shah II of Bijapur did not bear much fruit, and the empire of Venkata II practically remained unshaken in this direction also.⁵

The greatest danger to his realm came not from these external enemies, but from his internal foes. Almost from the day of his assumption of the imperial authority, he had to carry on an incessant struggle against the rebels within the state. Petty chieftains and powerful barons were equally involved in it. But Venkata II was not the man to brook any kind of insubordination. His ministers 'compelled the recalcitrant chiefs to go to him and accept his suzerainty', and subdued those 'who broke their word'. By force of arms he brought back to allegiance the nayakas of Madura, Gingee and Vellore. He fought against three successive rulers of Madura to maintain the unity of the empire. He permanently occupied the fortress of Vellore in 1604 to prevent its nayaka from repeating the mischief. Probably in order to exercise a greater control over the vassal princes of the South, he retransferred his capital to Chandragiri. The earliest reference to him as 'ruling from Chandragiri' is dated 1602. When Vellore was taken, it was used as a secondary capital of the empire.⁶

During the latter part of his reign, Venkata II had to face two problems of unprecedented difficulty, arising from Akbar's imperialism and the advent of the Dutch traders in the eastern waters. Ahmadnagar capitulated to the Mughal arms in 1600, and Asirgarh was on the point of collapse. There was no guarantee that the Hindu empire of the South would be spared after the destruction of the Deccan sultanats. This was in fact suspected by the councillors of Venkata II, when an embassy from Akbar visited Chandragiri on a secret mission about this time, and Venkata II himself appears to have taken some precautionary measures to ward off a possible Mughal invasion. At any rate his military dispositions at this time led Fr. Coutinho, one of the Jesuits at his court, to think that they were intended 'for driving back the army of Akbar'. There was indeed considerable diplomatic

⁵ Ferishta (Briggs), III, 453-68; 186, 286; *Further Sources*, No. 205; *Sources*, Nos. 71, 79, 91; *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Chs. XVI and XX, 416-18.

⁶ *Charuchandrodayam*, No. 78 of the *Sources*; EC, XII, Si 84; *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, Chs. XV, XVII & XX; *Further Sources*, Nos. 206, 207, 211-19, 222, 228(a).

stir in the South when the Mughals began to feel their way across the Vindhyas, and it is found that in 1604 the envoys of both Akbar and Ibrahim Adil Shah II waited at Chandragiri for audience with the Hindu emperor. But things did not pass beyond the diplomatic stage since Akbar died in the following year.⁷

In his dealings with the European traders Venkata II displayed great tact and firmness. The unruly conduct of the Portuguese and their hostility to the Dutch threatened to create disorder in the state. The Vijayanagara sovereign was on the friendliest terms with the Portuguese. There was mutual exchange of embassies between Chandragiri and Goa. Philip III of Spain and Portugal wrote a letter to the Raya from Madrid in January 1607, thanking him for the protection given to the Jesuit Mission in the empire. The Hindu emperor fully reciprocated this friendship and even snubbed his own vassal, the nayaka of Gingee, when the latter permitted the Dutch to build a factory at Devanapatnam. He enforced his sovereign rights and got the Dutch expelled from their own settlement. Yet, when the occasion demanded, he put down the unruly behaviour of the Portuguese at St. Thome. But when in 1610 the Jesuit Mission was withdrawn from the empire due to their alleged subservience to the Hindu sovereign, things took a different turn. The Portuguese were no longer in favour. In the same year the Dutch were allowed to build a stone house and carry on trade at Pulicat with the assurance that their rivals would not be permitted to dwell there.

This created an intriguing situation. The Portuguese took the law into their own hands and expelled the Dutch from Pulicat on 9 June 1612. But their triumph was short-lived. The Dutch returned next year with force, turned out their commercial foes and erected another fortification (afterwards known as Fort Geldria) with the support of Venkata II. His death in 1614 postponed further developments in the matter.⁸

Venkata II was the greatest sovereign of the Aravidu dynasty, a man of ability and character. By his military genius and statesmanship, he succeeded in retaking the lands that had been lost in the days of his predecessor. He raised the status of the empire in the eyes of the foreigners so that 'several embassies' visited Chandragiri in 1604 and presented themselves at his court. He was also in direct correspondence with Philip III of Spain. According to one Portuguese reporter, he was 'a lord of great authority, prudence and understanding as much as any European'. Almost all the Portuguese

⁷ H. Horas, *The Aravidu Dynasty*, I, 337-40.

⁸ *Ibid.*, Ch. XXI.

and Hindu authorities pay a tribute to his wisdom and valour, his generosity and love of learning. He was not behind any ruler of Vijayanagara in his liberal donations to Brahmans and temples. More than this, although himself a staunch Vaishnava, yet he welcomed the Jesuit Fathers to his court at Chandragiri in 1598 and granted them complete freedom to preach their religion and erect churches throughout his dominions. He held 'disputations on God, philosophy and mathematics with the teachers or philosophers almost every day'. The protagonists of Vaishnavism, Saivism and Christianity vied with one another to convince him of the superiority of their respective creeds, and he gave them all a patient hearing. Himself a great scholar, he was 'devoted to the protection of the learned'. Eminent philosophers, like Tatacharya, and poets, like Chennamaraju, Matla Ananta and Tarigoppula Mallana, adorned his court. With a view to foster learning, he and the nayaka of Madura endowed several colleges for the maintenance of professors and students, who were supplied with victuals, clothes and everything they needed. He also took a keen interest in the art of painting and had a number of painters at Chandragiri. He greatly appreciated European pictures and engaged two Jesuits to paint some masterpieces of Christian theology. His copper statue in the Tirupati temple is another proof of his artistic taste. Thus in every field of life, he left his mark on the pages of history. His reign witnessed the last flicker of the Vijayanagara empire before it was extinguished finally under his successors.⁹

SRI RANGA II

For this finale, Venkata II himself was partly responsible. By shifting the imperial headquarters from Penugonda to Chandragiri and then to Vellore about the middle of his reign, he rendered the northern part of the empire more vulnerable to Muslim attacks. More ominous than this was the manner in which he settled the problem of succession to the throne.¹⁰ He had altogether six wives, none of whom gave birth to a male child. One of the queens, who belonged to the influential family of the Gobburi chiefs, practised a fraud upon him by borrowing a baby from one of her maids and passing it off as her own son. To avoid a scandal, the Raya celebrated the occasion with festivities and married him at the age of fourteen to a daughter of Jaggaraya, the brother of the deceitful queen. Yet he never treated him as a son, much less as an heir, although he

⁹ *Ibid.*, 340, 445-46, 509, Chs. XXII, XXIII and XXV.

¹⁰ *The Story of Barradas (1614)* in R. Sewell's FE, Ch. XVII; *the Ramarajtoamu, Sources*, No. 79.

conferred on him the significant title of *Chikka Raya*. Venkata's elder brother, Rama, the late viceroy of Srirangapatnam, had left two sons, Tirumala and Sri Ranga. Venkata II ignored the first and nominated the second as the heir-apparent. Three days before his death he bestowed upon Sri Ranga all the insignia of royalty in the presence of the nobles of the realm. But immediately after the demise of the great sovereign, Jaggaraya swore never to do homage to the ruler, but, on the contrary, to raise in his place his own 'nephew'. Supported by a few other discontented chiefs, he captured Sri Ranga II by surprise, imprisoned him with his family and put the crown on the head of his sister's putative son. The fallen monarch 'was deserted by all save by one captain'—Yachama Nayaka of the Velugoti family. This doughty champion of the legitimist cause cleverly managed to rescue from prison Rama, the 'middle son' of the dethroned emperor, which caused some desertions in the camp of Jaggaraya. When Yachama made persistent efforts to obtain the release of the chief captive also, Jaggaraya answered by massacring the entire royal family still in prison. This holocaust about the end of 1614 precipitated a civil war in which almost all the great feudatories of the empire banded themselves together on the side of the traitor; the Wodeyar of Srirangapatnam remained neutral; only Raghunatha Nayaka of Tanjore hastened to the assistance of Yachama and Prince Rama. After more than two years of warfare with changing fortunes, Jaggaraya was killed in action at Topur (modern Tohur) on the southern bank of the Kaveri; his allies gradually dispersed; and the lawful prince was raised to the throne as Ramadeva Raya early in the year 1617. This war of succession shook the empire to its very foundations, and the battle of Topur proved more disastrous than that of Rakshasa-Tangadi in hastening its dissolution.¹¹

RAMADEVA RAYA

At the commencement of his reign, Ramadeva Raya was a boy-suzerain of a shadow empire. Yatiraja, the younger brother of the traitor, kept up the struggle for some time. But after the death of the putative son of Venkata II in 1619, he made peace with Ramadeva, gave him his daughter in marriage and thus acquired a position of power behind the throne. This created further complications. The rivalry between him and Yachama once more divided the court into

¹¹ *Ibid.* Also *Raghunathabhyudayam* (Sanskrit drama and Telugu historical poem of that name), *Sahityaratnakara*, *Bahulasccharitram*; *Sources*, Nos. 91, 86, 90 and 93; Heras, *Civil War of Vijayanagara in JIHR*, V, 164-84; *Further Sources*, Nos. 231 and 232. Topur = Tohur, a village near Trichinopoly.

two factions. The nayakas of Madura and Gingee practically asserted their independence. The Portuguese at St. Thome forcibly occupied the local fortress and were devising ways and means of expelling the Dutch from Pulicat. There was also a recrudescence of Muslim invasions, and Kurnool was taken permanently by the Sultan of Bijapur in 1624. Ramadeva had to struggle all the years of his reign to get the empire under his control.¹² He passed away in 1630 before he had attained the age of twenty-five. Probably having no son of his own, he nominated Peda Venkata, a grandson of Rama Raja, as his heir.

VENKATA III

Peda Venkata or Venkata III appears to have been a man of peace. He followed a policy of *laissez-faire* towards the great lords of the realm. The chiefs of Madura, Mysore and Kalahasti, on their part, simulated allegiance to him by acknowledging his sovereignty in their grants. Both the suzerain and the feudatories managed their affairs so tactfully that an open clash between the two was avoided during the reign. Venkata's rule is noteworthy for the grant of Kowl in 1639 by his powerful minister, Damerla Venkatappa, to the English factors, allowing them to build a fort at Madraspatam, which in due course developed into Fort St. George. Against the sultans of Bijapur and Golkonda he was not very successful. These sultans secured peace from Shah Jahan in 1636 and once more began to press upon the Hindu empire. The Sultan of Bijapur began to extend his dominions southwards into Mysore and then eastwards into Karnataka, while the armies of Golkonda advanced to the Bay of Bengal and along the Coromandal coast. Venkata III could preserve his position only by surrendering much wealth to the Adil Shah and some territory to the Quth Shah. To prevent further mischief he entrusted the defence of the frontier to his nephew, Sri Ranga, and shortly afterwards passed away on 10 October 1642. After some delay, this nephew was elevated to the throne on 29 October 1642.¹³

¹² S. K. Aiyangar, *Ramaraya of Vijayanagara in Sardesai Com. Volume*, 203-12.

¹³ This and the subsequent paragraphs are based upon: (1) H. Krishna Sastri's article on the *Third Vijayanagara Dynasty* in ASIAR, 1911-12, 189 ff; (2) Mr. R. Satyanatha Aiyer, *Sriranga III of Vijayanagara in the Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference*; (3) Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, *Srirangarayalu* in JIH, XVIII, 1-45; (4) Prof. K. A. Nilakanta Sastri, *The Last Days of Vijayanagara in Sardesai Com. Volume*; (5) Mr. R. Satyanatha Aiyer, *History of the Nayakas of Madura*; (6) Professor J. N. Sarkar, *Aurangzeb*, V; and (7) *Further Sources*.

SRI RANGA III AND AFTER

Sri Ranga III was the last great ruler of the Vijayanagara empire. His entire reign consisted of a series of efforts to vindicate his rights against the encroachments of internal and external foes. An influential section of the nobility did not like his accession to power. The provincial governors treated the sovereign with scant courtesy and behaved almost like independent rulers. There was also a general apprehension that the whole of the east coast might soon become subject to Muslim rule. Damerla Venkatappa actually 'did make proffer to assist the Moors' in their enterprise; and when Sri Ranga III put him in prison, his younger brother, Ayyappa, organized a revolt to rescue the traitor. The attitude of the nayakas of Madura and Gingee at this critical moment was not above suspicion. The factory records of the Dutch and the English as well as the Jesuit letters throw some light on the measures adopted by Sri Ranga III to save the empire, such as it was, from imminent dissolution. His first move was to enforce discipline among his greater lords so that a united stand might be made against foreign enemies. Without losing time in futile negotiations, he set his armies in motion against Tirumala Nayaka of Madura. The latter entered into an agreement with his neighbours of Tanjore and Gingee to arrest the progress of the emperor. But shortly afterwards, Vijaya Raghava, the nayaka of Tanjore, double-crossed his allies and divulged their plans to Sri Ranga III. Tirumala in a desperate mood invited Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golkonda to invade the imperial territory. The emperor was forced to make a retreat to meet the fresh menace. He succeeded in defeating the Qutb Shahi army and securing its withdrawal. Perhaps the defeat of 'Kutupa-Sahu' mentioned in the *Ramarajivamu* refers to this event. By September 1645, his position as emperor was somewhat stabilized, which enabled him to renew the grant of Kowl, already granted to the English factors in the reign of his predecessor.

But this favourable turn of events did not last long. In December 1645, the three rebellious nayakas are said to have 'inflicted a severe defeat on the royal forces'. In a letter from Fort St. George the situation in the early months of 1646 is succinctly described thus: 'This country is at present full of wars and troubles, for the king and three of his nagnes (nayaks) are at variance, and the King of Vizapore's army is come into this country on the one side and the King of Golkonda upon the other, both against this king. The Meir Jumlah (Mir Jumla) is general for the King of Golkonda, who hath already taken three of the king's castles, whereof one of them is reported to be the strongest hold in this kingdom.' Vellore itself was besieged

by the joint armies of Bijapur and Golkonda, and in 1646 Sri Ranga III had to purchase peace by paying a huge indemnity. The nayakas, sobered by the defeats inflicted upon them by the Musalmans, returned to their allegiance, and promised to assist their sovereign in maintaining the independence of the land. This brilliant prospect, however, was frustrated by the selfish policy of Tirumala Navaka. In his anxiety to conquer Gingee for himself, he invited the Sultan of Bijapur to oppose the move of the Sultan of Golkonda to capture it. But the generals of the two sultans came to an agreement so that the coveted fortress was occupied by the Bijapur troops in 1649. Tirumala was left without any recompense, and his folly ultimately paved the way for the ruin of the Vijayanagara empire and the imposition of foreign domination over the South. Once masters of Gingee, the Muslim armies easily overran a large part of South India, imposed a heavy fine upon the two nayakas, and deprived Sri Ranga III of his small remaining territory. Mir Jumla carved out a big jagir for himself in the heart of the eastern Karnataka, the remnant of the Vijayanagara empire. In the words of the French traveller, Thevenot; 'The King of Bisnagar ... was left without a kingdom and constrained to fly into the mountains.' The *Sivatatvaratnakara* refers to the loss of his capital, Vellore, and to his 'wandering without a home'. His appeals to the Mughal emperor for protection did not meet with any response.

Still he did not abandon the idea of reestablishing the empire. He secured the sympathy and cooperation of the chiefs of Mysore and Ikkeri, gradually built up his resources, and waited patiently for a favourable opportunity. This came to him in 1655, when Mir Jumla quarrelled with his master and left the South to take up service with the Mughal emperor. Without wasting a moment, Sri Ranga III emerged from obscurity and within a short time recovered a considerable part of the Karnataka. In order to spite Mir Jumla, the Qutb Shah appears to have given him every encouragement. Sivappa Nayaka of Ikkeri captured Vellore and presented it to Sri Ranga and received in return several titles and costly presents.

But this second attempt of the great Aravidu sovereign to rehabilitate the empire was blasted for ever by the jealousy and suspicion of Tirumala Nayaka. The latter was alarmed at the revival of the imperial power and the formation of a new league by the emperor to sustain it. He determined to wreck it at any cost, and invited the cooperation of the Sultan of Bijapur to serve his nefarious purpose. The Sultan of Golkonda also sent his forces to make conquests on his own account. Thevenot remarks that 'the King of Golkonda seized those (dominions) of the coast of Coromandal,

which lay conveniently for him, and the King of Bijapur, having taken what lay next to him, pursued his conquest as far as the Cape of Negapatam'. In Father Proenza's letter of 1659, it is stated that '(the King of) Bisnagar, betrayed a second time by his vassal, succumbed in the contest, and was obliged to seek refuge, on the confines of his kingdom, in the forests where he led a miserable life'. He was, however, relieved from his wretched state by the timely help of Sivappa Navaka of Ikkeri, who presented to him the districts of Hassan and Belur. The grants of Sri Ranga III in and from Belur relating to the years 1660 to 1663 show that he retired to this place after the loss of the Karnataka. It is not precisely known how long he lived, since some inscriptions refer to his sovereignty till 1678. With him ended the empire of Vijayanagara, although the names of a few scions of the imperial family find mention in stray records down to the beginning of the eighteenth century.¹⁴

The collapse of the empire was followed by a scramble for more territory and power among its provincial lords. They carried on ferocious wars against one another, sometimes in the name of their phantom sovereign, and thus invited their own doom. In 1661 the ruler of Ikkeri invaded Mysore on behalf of Sri Ranga III, but met with utter failure. In 1670 the Mysore army inflicted a crushing defeat upon Madura on the field of Erode and annexed a considerable part of its territory. Madura, in its turn, deprived the nayaka of Tanjore of his territories in 1673. But it was a temporary triumph. Venkaji (Ekoji), a brother of Sivaji in the service of Bijapur, sponsored the cause of the old nayaka family under the orders of the Adil Shah, expelled the agents of Madura, and finally founded the Maratha dynasty of Tanjore. In 1677-78 Sivaji conquered the southern dominions of Bijapur in the Karnataka and appointed a viceroy at Gingee to administer them. After the subversion of the Adil Shahi and Qutb Shahi dynasties in the Deccan in 1686-87, Aurangzeb's chief concern was to acquire their remaining dominions in southern India. On the other hand, Raja Rama, the second son of Sivaji, established himself at Gingee to oppose this move with the help of the Hindu princes of the South. But the mutual feuds of the latter frustrated his designs as they had done in the days of Sri Ranga III. After a prolonged war, Raja Rama was dislodged from Gingee, and his only ally, the Raja of Tanjore, was compelled to accept Mughal suzerainty. A Mughal viceroy, entitled 'Nawab of Arcot', ruled over Karnataka. In 1736-38 Chanda Sahib, a general of

¹⁴ Kodanda Rama, a nephew of Sri Ranga III, is said to have defeated the Mysoreans at Hassan. It is not known whether this happened in the time of his uncle or later. The work *Ramarajiyamu* or *Narapativijayamu* was dedicated to him.

the Nawab, seized Trichinopoly and Madura. Only Ikkeri and Mysore saved themselves from extinction by timely concessions to their foes. The latter, after passing through various vicissitudes of fortune, sometimes almost bordering on annihilation, managed to survive as a relic of the once glorious empire of Vijayanagara till its merger in the Indian Union.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

GINGEE¹

(ITS HISTORY DOWN TO 1600 A.D.)

I

GINGEE WAS NOT A PLACE OF importance in the period of the Cholas of the Vijayala dynasty; an inscription of Aditya I refers to Singapuradu, which evidently centred round Singavaram. In the epoch of the disintegration of the Chola empire in the thirteenth century, consequent on the encroachments of the Pandyas, the Hoysalas and the Kakatiyas, and on the increasing turbulence of the feudatories, Gingee became a fortified place and acquired some importance.

Ananda Kon, the chief of a shepherd tribe, brought under his sway the petty rulers of the neighbouring villages, built a small fort on the main rock of Gingee, and named it Anandagiri after himself. He built forts on the hill at Perumukkal near Tindivanam and at Padaividu in the present North Arcot district. His successor, Krishna Kon, fortified the northern hillock of Gingee and named it Krishnagiri after himself.

After several generations of rulers, the Kon dynasty was displaced by a chief of the Kurumba tribe, named Kobilingam. He built a brick fort at Sendamangalam in the South Arcot district and dug tanks and channels for irrigation purposes. According to the chronicles, Kobilingam fell a prey to the aggressions of the Vijayanagara captains. But it is not definitely known when and by whom the Vijayanagara conquest of Gingee was achieved. The *Karnataka Rajakal Savistara Charitam* says that Kobilingam ruled about Fasli 740 i.e. nearly half a century after the death of Kopperunjinga of the epigraphs; and perhaps this Kobilingam belonged to the clan of the Kadavarayas to which Kopperunjinga belonged and which contributed largely to the dismemberment of the Chola empire in the thirteenth century and which had for its capital, *Kudal*, i.e. Cuddalore

¹ This Chapter on 'Other States of the Deccan and South India' was assigned to the late Professor Srinivasachari, but only the section on Gingee was written by him. It has been included as he left it [EDITORS].

at the junction of the Gadilam and the South Pennar rivers, and later at Sendamangalam.

After Fasli 800, according to the chronicle, one Narasinga Udaiyar became the governor of Gingee, after he had conquered the country of Kobilingam. But even before this time one, Vallala Raya, is said to have become the lord of the Gingee country and to have extended the temple of Tiruvannamalai.

The Hoysalas had made steady encroachments in the lower Karnataka country from the early decades of the thirteenth century. Narasimha II (1220-35) had occupied Conjeevaram. A record of A.D. 1229 informs us that he was ruling from Kanchi with the surrounding ocean as his boundary. We have epigraphic testimony to his driving out of Kanchi the Trikalanga king (probably the Telugu Chola Tikka), who claimed to have been a Chola Sthapanacharya. The next Hoysala ruler, Vira Someswara, claims to have first routed in battle Rajendra Chola III and later to have succoured him in danger. He also engaged in a victorious expedition against the Kadavaraya. On his death there was a division of the Hoysala dominion between his two sons, Vira Narasimha (Narasimha III), who ruled over the greater part of the ancestral kingdom from Darasamudra, and his half-brother Ramanatha (Viraramanatha), who got for his share the Kolar country and the Tamil lands to the east with Kannanur, near Trichinopoly, as his capital. Much of the time of Narasimha was spent in fighting with Ramanatha. The latter's son, Ballala III, became the sole ruler of the entire Hoysala kingdom, including the Tamil districts, about the year 1298. But he soon lost the southern portion of the Tamil country subject to him. About the time of his death, Harihara of Vijayanagara, the founder of the first (Sangama) dynasty, was established in some measure of power on the northern frontier.

Vallappa Dandanayaka, who figures in the later records of Ballala III, was very likely the Senji Raya who was married to the Hoysala princess, sister of King Ballala IV. This Vallappa was probably the same as Vallalaraya of the tradition embodied in the Tamil chronicle. Thus the Gingee country was under the rule of the Hoysalas in the latter half of the thirteenth century and also in the first half of the fourteenth. From the hands of the Hoysalas it passed into the hands of the first rulers of Vijayanagara. Gopnaraya became an independent ruler in the year 1243 and counted his regnal years from that date. He was the able co-adjutor of Sundara Pandya I, whose progress in Tondamandalam was rendered possible largely by his assistance and cooperation. His inscriptions are found largely in the South Arcot, North Arcot and Chingleput districts and

to a lesser extent in the Tanjore and Kurnool districts. He assumed many high sounding titles.

A theory of two Kopperunjingas, father and son bearing the same name, has also been put forward; and also different versions are held of his relations with the Pandyas and of his other acts like the imprisonment of the Chola ruler, Rajendra III. The Kadavarayas became powerful in the South Arcot district and contributed largely to the dismemberment of the Chola empire during the 13th and the early part of the 14th centuries. The Kadavarayas claimed kinship with the Pallavas. Kopperunjinga who ruled, or revived his rule, from 1242 to 1278 should be regarded as a really great personage.² The chief Kadavaraya ruler had several subordinate chiefs under him.

The region of Gingee is associated with Kumara Kampana's famous southern conquests. Kampana (also known as Kamparaya and as Kampana Udaiyar) was the governor of the Mulbhagal Rajya in the years 1356-66. His military exploits are described by his wife, Ganga Devi, in the Sanskrit work, *Virakamparaya-Charitam*. Kampana first advanced on Virinchipuram on the Palar river, and attacked the strong fortress of Rajagambhiran in which the Sambuvaraya chief had taken refuge. He captured the fortress and slew the enemy chief in single combat, according to one source of our information; but according to another source, he is held to have reinstated the defeated chief on his throne. Soon afterwards Kampana entered Kanchi and set up his authority there. Kampana's rule was almost like that of an independent sovereign. His capital was Marakatanagara, identified with Virinchipuram. He was assisted by several able lieutenants of whom the foremost was Gopanaraya, who participated in the recovery of Srirangam from the hands of the Musalmans and in its reconsecration. Another general was Saluva Mangu, the ancestor of the great Saluva Narasimha, the founder of the second dynasty of Vijayanagara. Rajanatha Dindima's *Saluvabhyudayam* details the expeditions of Saluva Mangu against the Sambuvaraya and the Sultan of Madura and notes the several titles that he assumed. Saluva Mangu helped in the reconsecration of Srirangam and made a present to it of 60,000 *madras* of gold, 1,000 *salagramas* and eight villages to represent the eight letters of the

2 Refer to (1) K.A.N. Sastri, *The Colas*, 2, part I, 180-84 *et seq.*; (2) the *Kadavaraya Problem* by Mr. R. Satyanatha Aiyar in the *Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume*; (3) the *Kadavarayas* by Mr. V. Vridhagirisai in the *Journal of Indian History*, XVI, 1937, 137-160, (4) *The Madras Epigraphist's Reports*, 1922 and 1923; (5) *The Kadavarayas* by S. Somasundara Desikar in the *Journal of Indian History* (XVII, part 3).

Ashtakshara. The services of Gopanaraya have been praised by Vedantadesika. It is these generals who helped Kampana in the successful Hindu reaction against Muslim sway in the Tamil country. The reconsecration of the great shrines of Srirangam and Madura was essentially the restoration of Hindu glory and South Indian independence.

The Alampundi grant of Virupaksha Raya is important for our knowledge of the history of Gingee under the early Vijayanagara rulers. It is dated Saka 1305 and records that Virupaksha I, son of Harihara II of the first Vijayanagara dynasty, granted on the *Pushya Sankranti* day of Saka 1305, cyclic year *Raktakshin*, the village of Alampundi in the neighbourhood of Gingee to certain Brahmans as a *Sarvamanyam*. The third verse of the grant refers to Bukka Raya I, son of Sangama; and Bukka's son, Harihara, is described in the following verse. Virupaksha, who conquered the kings of Tundira, Chola and Pandya and the Simhalas, presented the booty of his wars to his father.³

Srirangam was sacked first by Malik Kafur, and the invasion of 1327-28 ordered by Muhammad bin Tughluq resulted in its complete destruction. According to the *Koyilolugu*, a Tamil work, which describes the benefactions conferred on the temple in the different epochs from its foundation down to the 18th century, the Muhammadans entered Srirangam by the north gate and carried away all the treasure. From this sack both Pillailokachary and the famous

3 The day of *Pushya Sankranti* of the year *Raktakshin* only corresponds to Saka Samvat 1307 and not to 1305. Alampundi had been previously granted by Harihara II (according to verse 9) and it had then received the surname of Jannambikabdi. Both these grants of Harihara and of Virupaksha were made at the instance of a princess, who was the sister of Harihara II and whose name must have been Jannambika. The village was very probably named Jannambikasamudram.

The Alampundi plate is the only epigraph which informs us of the name of Sangama's wife, Kamakshi, and also that Malladevi was the queen of Harihara II. It is from this that we first learn that Harihara II had a sister, called Jannambika, and a son, called Virupaksha, who is reported to have made extensive conquests in the Tamil country and whom his father apparently placed in charge of the Gingee country, constituting a portion of the present South Arcot district. The accession of Harihara II is datable between 1293 and 1301 Saka. The grant omits the week day. This and other orthographical as well as calligraphical mistakes, which occur in the inscription, are facts urged against the genuineness of the plate. But we cannot assert that the entire plate is not genuine. It is interesting as the first known copper plate inscription in Grantha characters professing to belong to the Vijayanagara dynasty. (See R. Sewell, *List of the Antiquarian Remains in the Presidency of Madras*, I (1882), 207; J. H. Garstin, *Manual of the South Arcot District* (1878), 2; *Epigraphia Indica*, III, 224-29, wherein the inscription is edited by V. Venkayya; and V. Rangacharya, *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency*, I, 169 (1919).

Vedantadesika escaped, the former going south and the latter to the Mysore country. After prolonged sufferings, the survivors carried the image of the god, rescued by a chain of miraculous circumstances, to Tirupati, from which it was taken over to Gingee by Gopanaraya and ultimately installed at Srirangam and reconsecrated under Kampana's auspices. Gopanaraya was divinely inspired to do this task. According to Anantaraya's *Prapannamrtam* (a work dealing with the history of Srivaishnavism in South India and the lives of its Acharyas) Gopanaraya proceeded from Tirupati to Gingee where he kept the images of the gods for a time—there were two of them—in the neighbouring rock-cut shrine of Singavaram. He then advanced south, destroyed the Muhammadan forces at Samayavaram and consecrated the images once more in the Srirangam temple. Thereupon Vedantadesika, who had returned joyfully to Srirangam, composed a verse in praise of Gopanaraya and his great achievement and had it inscribed on the walls of the temple. The date of the reconsecration is Saka Samvat 1293 (A.D. 1371-72).

The political and cultural significance of the achievements of Kampana, Saluva Mangu and Gopanaraya was, in fact, the destruction of the last vestiges of Muslim sway. It enabled Harihara II to assume imperial titles in full style.

According to tradition, these early Vijayanagara governors of Gingee were hostile to the Kurumbar, who were dominant in the region, and helped the Vellalars and the Vanniyars against them. Gradually the Vijayanagara dominion in the Tamil country was divided into three definite jurisdictions, each under a Nayak who wielded absolute power in his territories. Gingee, Tanjore and Madura were the respective capitals of these three Nayaks.⁴ The jurisdiction of the Gingee Nayak extended along the sea-coast from the Palar river in the north to the Coleroon in the south. Information about the Gingee Nayaks is, however, very scanty, relative to that available for the other two Nayak lines. Two inscriptions at Tirupparankunram in the Madura district give a list of the Nayak rulers of Gingee, and mention that they originally emigrated to Vijayanagara from Maninagapura in northern India and subsequently settled at Gingee under one Vaiyappa Nayak. We find in an inscription of Surappa Nayak, one of the dynasty, the ascription of the title of lord of Maninagapura to the Nayak. We have no other evidence about the Gingee Nayaks having originally migrated from Hindustan.

⁴ The word Nayak is derived from the Sanskrit term, *Nayaka*, meaning a leader, chief or general and frequently indicating an army captain. The use of the terms as meaning a provincial governor is peculiar to the Vijayanagara empire.

According to the *Karnataka Rajakkal Savistara Charitam*, a Vijayanagara army defeated the Kurumba chief of the Gingee country, Kobilingan by name, and took possession of the fort. This event is datable about the time of Kampana and Gopanaraya. Gopanaraya's jurisdiction as the governor extended as far south as Chidambaram, for we find in the *Vaishnava Guruparampara* mention made of Sri Vedantadesika's persuading him to restore the image of the Vaishnava Deity, Govindaraja of Chidambaram, which had been thrown out (1370).

II

A regular viceroyalty or governorship of the Gingee country seems to have begun from 1464 when Venkatapati Nayak became the ruler of the country. There is a copper plate grant of Bala Venkatapati Nayak, who was either a son or a descendant of Vala Krishnappa Nayak of Gingee (dated Saka 1386/A.D. 1464—cyclic year *Pratibha*). This Nayak persecuted the Jains, who were numerous in the region of Tindivanam, and the memory of his persecution still survives in the neighbourhood of Gingee. He is also called in local tradition by the name of Dubala Krishnappa Nayak. The line of Nayak rulers of Gingee mentioned in the chronicles runs as follows:

1. Vaiyappa Nayak, 1490.
2. Tubaki Krishnappa Nayak, 1490-1520.
3. Achyuta Vijaya Ramachandra Nayak, 1520-40.
4. Muthialu Nayak, 1540-50.
5. Venkatappa Nayak, 1570-1600.
6. Varadappa Nayak, 1600-20.
7. Appa Nayak (up to the Muslim conquest).

S. M. Edwardes, writing in the *Indian Antiquary* (Vol. IV) gives the substance of a Modi manuscript entitled in English, *An account of the Chengy Rajas*, as follows. A certain Vijayaranga Nayak came with a permit from Anegondi to *Chandi* (Gingee) and secured it as a jagir. He cleared the forest, amassed riches, and effected the settlement of Chandi. In Fasli 852 (A.D. 1445) a Dhangar, named Anandakona, who was searching in the Gingee hillocks for some stray flocks belonging to his tribe, met a Mahapurusha, and was informed by him that by his exertions Chandi was soon destined to become a great place, and that he should straightaway seek the aid of Vijayaranga Nayak. True to this prophecy, a kingdom was established at Gingee with the help of Anandakona, whose son, Tristapitla, became the minister of the Chandi kingdom.

Thus the dynasties of Vijayaranga Nayak and Anandakona

enjoyed undisputed possession of Gingee for 224 years, i.e. up to Fasli 1077. The names of Vijayaranga's successors are given in the manuscript as follows:

- Fasli 883 (A.D. 1476) Muthiyal Naik.
- „ 918 („ 1511) Krishnappa Naik.
- „ 943 („ 1536) Chenam Naik.
- „ 962 („ 1555) Vijayappa Naik.
- „ 987 („ 1580) Gangama Naik.
- „ 1012 („ 1605) Venkat Krishna Naik.
- „ 1032 („ 1625) Venkat Ram Naik.
- „ 1052 („ 1645) Trimbakmal Krishnappa Naik.
- „ 1062 („ 1655) Varadappa Naik.⁵

Mr. Edwardes says: 'The story of the foundation of Jinji and of the Naik dynasty and the Dhangar ministers seems to me to deserve a closer and more detailed inquiry.' All that we learn from the *Karnataka Rajakkal Savistara Charitam* is that Gopalakrishna Pillai, and his son, Nandagopala Pillai, who were probably of the Yadava (shepherd) caste, were ministers to the Nayaks from the time of Tubaki Krishnappa Nayak to Varadappa Nayak.

This view is opposed to the tradition embodied in the legend that the great Krishnadeva Raya sent *sardars* into the Karnataka country to strengthen his authority. The Raya himself marched into the Carnatic, along with his chief Nayaks, Vaiyappa Nayak, Tubaki Krishnappa Nayak and others. After stabilizing his master's authority in the south, Vaiyappa departed. He appointed Tubaki Krishnappa Nayak, his second in command, to rule over the land; Krishnappa thus initiated the Nayak line of rulers at Gingee. He exercised sway gloriously over all the coast, from Nellore down to the Coleroon, up to 1521 (Saka 1443). We are not able to ascertain the exact extent of his dominions for lack of reliable evidence. The date of the descent of Krishnadeva Raya into the Carnatic could have been only some time after 1509; and if we take it that Vaiyappa had appointed Tubaki Krishnappa as the Nayak of Gingee, the latter could have been the ruler of the place only from after the epoch of the Raya's conquests, i.e. after about 1520-21.

Tubaki Krishnappa and Vaiyappa are credited with having built

⁵ Pages 1-2 of the *Indian Antiquary*, LV (1926), from a manuscript bearing the words, 'Mackenzie Collection, Dec. 3, 1883: No. 38'. The existing catalogue does not include this particular manuscript which has hitherto escaped scrutiny and elucidation. It associates the Kone dynasty of Gingee with the Nayak governors and makes them contemporaneous, whereas it is fairly well established that the Kone rulers preceded the Nayak rulers.

temples at Srimushnam and at Tirukkoilur (both in the South Arcot district). Among the monuments of Gingee, the big granaries, the Kalyanamahal and the thick walls enclosing the three hills are ascribed to Krishnappa, whose long and peaceful administration encouraged the expansion of the town and the growth of its pettahs and suburbs. It was this Krishnappa who gave the big rock citadel (hitherto known as Anandagiri) the name of Rajagiri, and encircled the foot of Rajagiri with a thick battlemented wall. The activities of this Krishnappa are, to some extent, confused with those of a later governor also called Tubaki Krishnappa Nayak, who lived about the middle of the 17th century.

According to the accounts of the Meckenzie manuscript, Krishnappa was succeeded by Achyuta Vijaya Ramachandra Nayak. An inscription in the Venkataramanaswami temple refers to a gift made by Achyuta Vijaya Ramachandra Nayak, the governor of Gingee (No. 244 of 1904). We find a reference to Achyuta Ramachandra Nayak, who was ruling Gingee in Saka 1464 (A.D. 1540-41), as one of the mahamandalesvaras and generals of Achyuta Raya of Vijayanagara. The next Nayak was Muthiyal Nayak, who built the Venkataramanaswami temple at the foot of Rajagiri. He was followed by Venkatappa Nayak. A Tamil inscription (No. 240 of 1904), found on the south wall of the Venkataramanaswami temple at Gingee, dated Saka 1472 (Sadarana), describes a gift made by Surappa Nayak for the merit of Sadasiva Deva and another gift by Adapattu Vallappa Nayak for a festival. Another inscription, dated Saka 1471, expired Saumya, of Sadasiva Raya mentions the gift of a village for the merit of the Raya made by Adappan Surappa Krishnama Nayakar Ayyan. Ratnakhita Srinivasa Dikshita, a poet who lived at the court of Surappa Nayak, dedicated to him a drama, by name of *Bhavanapurushottama*, in which Surappa is held to be the son of Potabhupala and praised as being the firm establisher of the throne of Karnataka. Perhaps the Raya whom he helped was either Tirumala or Ranga I. It is difficult to fix Surappa among the rulers of Gingee at that period, and particularly to indicate his relation of Krishnappa II, who was the Nayak of Gingee under Venkatapati Raya (1585-1614).

According to the Mackenzie manuscript, Venkatappa Nayak is said to have ruled over Gingee from 1570-1600, a period that coincides with the rule of Krishnappa Nayak II, concerning whom the Jesuit records say that he was the contemporary of Venkata I and of Raghunatha Nayak of Tanjore. One writer had identified the Krishnappa Nayak of Jesuit records with Varadappa Nayak, son of Venkatappa Nayak; but this identification is not sustainable. Varadappa Nayak and Appa Nayak ruled during the last decades of the independent

Nayak rule of Gingee. Jesuit and other contemporary records do not mention anybody of the name of Varadappa Nayak, nor do the indigenous literary sources refer to the same name.

Anquetil du Perron (1732-1805) says that Krishnappa Nayak was the contemporary of Venkatapati Raya. According to Father Pimenta and Perron, Krishnappa's succession after his father was delayed by his imprisonment at the hands of an uncle of his. In 1586 Krishnappa rebelled against his overlord, Venkatapati Raya, and was defeated and imprisoned. Raghunatha Nayak of Tanjore interceded with the Raya for Krishnappa and secured his release; and in return the grateful Nayak of Gingee gave his daughter in marriage to Raghunatha. The *Raghunathabhyudayam* of Ramabhadramba and the *Sahityaratnakara* of Yegnanarayana Dikshita both definitely refer to the release of Krishnappa from the Raya's prison being effected through the help of Raghunatha.

Krishnappa's rebellion against his overlord was suppressed by one Venkata, an elder brother of Ankabhupala of Kalahasti. This Venkata seems to have ruled for a fairly long time at Gingee during the imprisonment of Krishnappa and is perhaps identical with the Venkatapati of the traditional list. This Venkata was the eldest of the three Velugoti chiefs of Kalahasti, viz., Damarla Venkatappa, Damarla Ayyappa and Damarla Anka, the author of the *Ushaparinayam*. This Venkata enjoyed power up to a good ripe age, because he was a powerful noble not only during the reign of Venkatapati Raya (1585-1614) and the civil war of 1614-16, but also during the rule of Ramadeva Raya (1616-30), and he continued to be powerful even under his successor, Venkatapati (1630-42). It was from Venkatappa and Ayyappa that the English obtained first the grant of Madraspatnam in 1639.

Father Pimenta, a Portuguese Jesuit who visited Gingee in 1597 to show his gratitude to Krishnappa for his hospitality to several Jesuit missionaries, who had visited his dominions, has given an account of Gingee and its remarkable ruler. He writes: 'We went to Gingee—the greatest city we have seen in India, and bigger than any in Portugal except Lisbon. In the midst thereof is a castle like a city, high-walled with great hewn stones and encompassed with a ditch full of water. In the middle of it is a rock framed into bulwarks and turrets and made impregnable.' Father Pimenta entered the city through the Arcot or Vellore gate and was lodged by the Nayak in the great square tower, which was the most conspicuous building in the fort. The private dwellings in the city were not elaborate, except some belonging to rich and influential persons. The palaces of the Nayak were the most prominent, having been built in a peculiar style with towers and verandahs.

Pimenta adds that he saw much ordnance, powder and shot within the fortress. The Nayak was always guarded by a thousand armed men and 300 elephants were paraded before him.

One of the Jesuit letters of 1606 states that the Nayak of Gingee was at that time the most powerful of the three Nayaks; and among his feudatories were three prominent chiefs, viz. (1) the prince of Tiruvati (on the Gadilam river), (2) the Salavacha or Solaga of the Coleroon mouth, and (3) the Nayak of Vellore. The Solaga occupied Tivakottai at the mouth of the Coleroon, and was one of the most powerful chiefs of the Nayak. The description given of the Solaga by Pimenta agrees with that given of him in the *Raghunathabhyudayam* and in the *Sahityaratnakara*. The former work says that this chief was so powerful that he defied even the great captains of the Raya, like Vittala Raja. Lingama Nayak of Vellore, the son of the famous Chinnabomma Nayaka, rebelled against Venkatapati Raya and laboured to secure independence not only from his immediate overlord, the Nayak of Gingee, but also from the Raya himself.

Krishnappa did not enjoy the confidence of Venkatapati Raya, nor would he pay him his tribute regularly. A few years after his first rebellion, Krishnappa again became disloyal. When the Raya threatened an immediate invasion of his capital, the Nayak pretended madness (*circa* 1600). One of the Raya's lieutenants, Velugoti Yachama, was sent with a large army to capture Gingee. Towards the end of 1607 the Nayak was defeated and fell a prisoner in the invader's hands. The Raya, who had meanwhile conquered Vellore and established his court there, set out for Gingee; and the imprisoned Nayak had to prostrate himself at the Raya's feet, together with his family, and to pay him 600,000 *crusados*. Only at the intercession of the Nayaks of Tanjore and Madura did the Raya allow him to return to his capital.

Krishnappa had relations with the Portuguese and the Dutch. He granted permission to the Dutch traders to build a fort at Devanampatnam (Tegnapatam) by an *olla* (or *farman*) dated 30 November 1608. The Portuguese, who were then the bitter rivals of the Dutch and exercised much influence at the court of Venkata, tried by means of pressure from the Raya on the Nayak of Gingee, to prevent the construction of the Dutch fort at Devanampatnam and to secure their total expulsion from the Gingee territory. The Dutch somehow contrived to cling to Devanampatnam and the neighbouring town of Tirulpapuliyur, because the Nayak hoped to get great profits from them; and the Aya of Gingee, evidently a Brahman officer who was the all-powerful deputy of Krishnappa, protected them, helped them to continue on the coast against the wishes of the Raya and won over the Nayak of Gingee to his side.

Krishnappa was a great devotee of God Vishnu, perhaps under the influence of Tatacharya, the famous Rajaguru of Venkatapati Raya, and rebuilt the Vaishnava shrine at Chidambaram. In the great civil war for succession to the Karnataka throne, Krishnappa was naturally involved, as he joined the side of the rebels. He had to flee from the battle-field at Topur (1617). He was again induced to support the rebels, was opposed by the loyal Tanjore Nayak and defeated on the banks of the Vellar. The campaign against the rebels after the death of Jagga Raya was mainly fought in the region south of the Gingee country. Krishnappa was ultimately reconciled to the loyalists and presented his homage to the new Raya.

The successors of Krishnappa Nayak were insignificant rulers. Varadappa and Appa were both imbecile and weak. There are inscriptions of Saka 1593 (A.D. 1670-71) in which reference is made to Varadappa Nayak, but as the Muhammadans had occupied Gingee some years before, probably the Nayak enjoyed merely a titular dignity. Appa Nayak, the last of the line, has been described in the chronicles as weak and extremely vicious and as being responsible for the easy conquest of Gingee by the Muhammadans. But he is glorified in one of the Mackenzie manuscripts, *Chenji Rajakkal Kaifaiyat*, which describes at some length the heroism he displayed. He led his troops in person, and when he found himself deserted by them, he rode on alone and unsupported into the ranks of the enemy, dealing destruction around him until he was overpowered and slain. The liberality of this Nayak and of his wife is also lauded in the *Kaifaiyat*.

We have already seen that Nayak rule in the Gingee country helped the strengthening and further fortification of the capital and the construction of forts in many strategical places. The temples and *mantapams* still surviving in the ruined capital were largely the handiwork of the Nayaks. The Venkataramanaswami temple at the foot of the Rajagiri hill was built, according to tradition, by Muthialu Nayak. Krishnappa Nayak I is said to have built the Kalyanamahal. He added many pettahs and suburbs to the city of Gingee, and his successor, Achyuta Ramabhadra Nayak, built the temples of Tiruvannamalai and Tindivanam. The Tiruvikrama Perumal temple of Tirukoilur received to a large degree the impress of the Nayaks. The portrait sculptures of some of the Nayaks were carved on the pillars of the Kalyanamantapam in front of the shrine of the goddess in this temple. The Vaishnava shrine of Srimushnam contains a fine and spacious six-pillared *mantapam* which bears on its pillars the sculptures of several of the Nayak rulers of the period, among them being those of Achyutappa Nayak of Tanjore and his three brothers. Venkatammalpettai was named after a lady, who was a sister of one of the Nayaks,

probably Venkatapati Nayak. It is one of the Panchamahals of the South Arcot district and is near Cuddalore. The town of Krishnapatnam, situated to the west of the modern port of Porto Novo and identified with the village of Agaram, was constructed by the famous Krishnappa Nayak II in 1599. The Nayak allowed the Jesuits to build a church in the town. He was a great patron of Vaishnavism and in that respect followed faithfully the policy of his master, Venkatapati Raya. The Nayaks of Gingee paid allegiance to their overlords, even after the disaster of Talikota, and continued to do so, nominally at least, till 1614. The great civil war of 1614-17 threw the Nayaks of Gingee and Madura into open opposition to Nayak of Tanjore and the loyalists. The ill-planned and traitorous policy of Tirumal Nayak of Madura brought about the Muhammadan invasion of Gingee, which also greatly affected the fortunes of Tanjore and Madura.

Tubaki Krishnappa was noted for the construction of a dam across the Varahanadi, a few miles distant from Gingee, which enabled the filling up of the irrigation tank of Sirukadambur. He settled all the castes of the 'left hand' in the village of Jayakondan and in the adjoining market-place at the foot of the Rajagiri and Krishnagiri hills. Further to the north of Rajagiri, other suburban villages were built by him for the settlement of the 'right hand' castes. Nallanchakravarti Satrayagam Seshadri Aiyangar was the Rajaguru of Krishnappa Nayak, who gave to him the *Srotriem* of Singavaram, a rock-cut shrine close to Gingee.

Achyuta Ramabhadra Nayak built the enclosing walls as well as the majestic *gopuram* of Tiruvannamalai temple (Saka 1443); and twenty years later he built the Vishnu temple at Tindivanam and also the temples and *gopurams* at Nedungunram and Settupattu in the North Arcot district. He is likewise credited with the construction of several other temples and *agraharas*. Muthialu Nayak (*circa* 1540-50) constructed the Venkatamanaswami temple at Gingee and a temple to Chakraperumal on the bank of the Varahanadi. His successor, Venkatappa Nayak (*circa* 1570-1600), was equally a great builder. It is said that the great *gopuram* of Tiruvannamalai begun by a previous Nayak was completed only in Saka 1494. This Nayak built a fort and a Shiva shrine at Tindivanam and permitted a Jain temple to be built at Sittamur; while his consort, Mangammal, dug two tanks, one near Gingee and another at Vriddhachalam, both known as Ammakulam. It was also about this time that the great wall and *gopuram* of the Vriddhachalam temple were finished. The architectural achievements of the Gingee Nayaks have, therefore, been considerable, though not as glorious as those of the two other Nayak lines of Tanjore and Madura.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

SIND AND MULTAN

SIND UNDER THE CARMATHIANS; THE GHAZNAVID AND GHURIAN INVASIONS

THE PERIOD OF THIS CHAPTER COMPRISES the last six years of the reign of Mu'izzuddin, the Ghurid sultan, and extends to the fateful first battle of Panipat, in which Babur crushed the power of the Lodi dynasty. Sind, during this whole period, except for the first eight years of Arghunid rule, was governed by her native princes, Sumirahs and Sammahs, who were more or less tributary to the sultanat of Delhi, but who asserted their independent authority, whenever the power at the centre was weak. It is a dark and obscure period, and we are consciously treading on uncertain ground, when we narrate the events belonging to it. We may, however, state at the very beginning that Sind and Multan were closely connected during these three centuries and a quarter, although for paucity of historical material we can only here and there trace the relationship between them.

Sind, after its conquest by Muhammad bin Qasim in 712, was ruled by a succession of Umayyad and Abbasid governors till 258/872, when its government was handed over by the Caliph Mu'tamid (870-892) to Yaqub, the Saffarid, and remained under the rule of this dynasty till its downfall in 902. There seems to have been no centralised government of Sind for a very long time. In 1026 Mahmud of Ghazni, according to Masumi, despatched his general, Abdur Razzaq, to annex Sind to the Sultan's dominions and to expel the Arabs from it. There is, however, no authority for Masumi's sweeping assertion, as none of the generals or ministers of Mahmud bore this name (Abdur Razzaq); nor is there any direct evidence that Sind was effectually conquered by Mahmud or any of his successors. It is, however, a fact that Mahmud, while returning from the plunder of Somnath (1025), crossed the perilous Rann of Cutch and passed through Sind by way of Mansurah, which in those days was the capital of an Ismaili (Carmathian) prince, Khafif,¹ who fled

¹ The only source which gives this name is a *qasidah* by the contemporary poet, Farrukhi, who celebrated in it the victory of Somnath. See, Dr. Nazim, *Mahmud*, 120.

before him, crossed the river Indus and hid himself in a thicket of date-palms, to which he was hotly pursued, while his camp was beleaguered and many of his people were slain.² As Mahmud was slowly winding his way to Multan his army was greatly harassed by the Jats inhabiting the banks of the Indus.³ Now if Sind had been a province of Ghazni, the officers of Sind would have done everything possible to facilitate his march through that country.

From the incident mentioned above, the fact emerges that Sind and Multan at this time were ruled by the Ismailis (Carmathians); and that even though Mansurah and Multan were independent of each other, they formed a close confederacy cemented by Ismaili doctrines.⁴ Multan had remained the Arab capital and the outpost of Islam in India till about 900 when its ruler became independent of Baghdad. About this time it was seized by Abdullah, the Qarmati (Carmathian), and became a stronghold of Carmathian heretics. One of the earliest, if not the earliest, Carmathian rulers was one Jalam bin Shaiban, who destroyed the famous temple which had been spared by Muhammad bin Qasim, and who converted his mansion into a mosque, closing the old mosque on account of the hatred he bore against everything that had been done under the Umayyad caliphs.⁵ After a century or so, in 1005 we come across another Carmathian ruler, Abul Fath Daud bin Nasr of Multan, who had incurred the ire of Sultan Mahmud by reason of his alliance with Anandpal. The Sultan invaded the Multan territory, besieged the ruler for seven months in his capital and compelled him to pay a heavy indemnity after abjuring his heresy. In 1011 Mahmud again invaded the territory of Multan, as Daud had relapsed into heresy, took the capital and, after slaughtering and mutilating a great number of his heretical subjects, sent Daud to end his days as a prisoner in the fortress of Ghurak.⁶ Even then the Carmathian power does not seem to have been destroyed as we find Mu'izzuddin Ghuri wresting Multan once again (1175) and appointing Ali Karmakh as its governor.⁷

2 Ibnul Asir also makes reference to this incident, adding that 'when the Sultan marched, the ruler, who had become an apostate, fled from the capital (Vol. IX, 243).

3 Gardizi, *Zatnul Akhbar*, 87.

4 As is made clear by the epistle of Bahauddin al-Muqtana, addressed in the year 423 A.H. (1032 A.D.) to the 'Unitarians of Multan and Hindustan in general, and to Shaikh Ibn-i Sumir Raja Bal in particular', (vide, *Elliot*, I, 491). In this letter he exhorts Ibn-i Sumir, presumably the so-called second Sumirah ruler, Bhungar, son of Sumirah or Sumir, to bring back Daud, the younger, perhaps a son of Abul Fath Daud bin Nasr, to the fold of his former faith.

5 Albairuni, *India*, 116.

6 Gardizi, *Zatnul Akhbar*, 65, 66, 70.

7 *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, 116; *Tabaqat-i Akbari*, Vol. I, 116.

THE SUMIRAHS

We may safely assume that the advent of the Carmathians in Mansurah also took place by about the beginning of the 10th century. Khafif, of whom mention has already been made, was presumably one of the Sumirah rulers, who, though originally Rajputs, had early embraced Islam.⁸ If this is correct, the statement of Mir Masumi that the Sumirahs attained to power during the reign of the Ghaznavid Sultan, Abdur Rashid, or the reign of Farrukhzad (as stated by Sir Wolseley Haig) must be discounted. In the year 1053, according to Mir Masum, the Sumirahs mustered strong in the neighbourhood of Jharri⁹ and appointed a man, named Sumirah or Sumir, as their prince.¹⁰ Since there were two rulers among the known Sumirahs, who bore the name of Khafif, it must be concluded that the contemporary of Sultan Mahmud, who lived more than 30 years before this event took place, must be one of the many Sumirah rulers, who had governed Sind for many years before this Sumir; or that if this Sumir was actually their first prince, then his accession should be antedated by about 200 years,¹¹ when the Abbasid caliphs, loosing their hold upon their far-flung provinces, handed them over to a plucky adventurer, like Yaqub bin Lais, in fief. Be that as it may, there can be no doubt as to the early rise of the Sumirahs, though in the absence of written records, even their names are not correctly known, not to speak of their reigns and deeds.¹²

8 Ibn-i Battuta, *Rehla*, III, 101-2.

9 The ruins of this town are to be found near Muhabbat Dero in district Hyderabad.

10 *Tarikh-i Masumi* (my edition), 60.

11 According to the author of the *Beglar Namah* (fol. 7A of Mr. Siddiqui's Ms.), the Sumirahs ruled for 505 years, and as their downfall is placed by the *Tuhfatul Kiram* in 752/1351, we can, by going back, date their rise to about 247/861 i.e. nearly 200 years earlier than the date given by Mir Masumi. Historians are at variance as to the years of their rule. According to Abul Fazl (*Ain-i Akbari*, 559) it lasted for 500 years, which is nearly the same as the period given by the author of the *Beglar Namah*, while the *Tarikh-i Tahiri* makes it last for 143 years, which is definitely wrong. In this regard the *Tuhfatul Kiram* makes the significant statement that, before they came into lime-light, the Sumirahs had ruled over some portions of Sind for over 200 years, but as they were tributary to the Muslim rulers, their account has not come down to us (III, 27).

12 Abul Fazl (*Ain-i Akbari* 559) gives their number as 36 which may be regarded as correct, if we are to believe that they reigned for 505 years. Masumi gives only 9 names without dates; the *Tuhfatul Kiram*, 19; and the *Daulat-i Alauiyah*, 21 with dates which are hopelessly incorrect. (See my edition of the *Tarikh-i Masumi*, 289-91). Only a few dates in their long rule of 505 years can be fixed with certainty. We find the redoubtable Mahmud routing the Sumirah chief of Mansurah, viz., Khafif, in 416/1025-26. In 621/1224 when Jalaluddin Mankbarni of Khwarazm reached Daibal,

But if the date of the beginning of the Sumirah rule cannot be traced back, the date of their downfall can be fixed with some accuracy. The statement of the *Tuhfatul Kiram* that this happened in 752/1351 should be accepted as correct, although their actual decline can be dated from 734/1333-34, or even earlier, when the Summahs virtually assumed the power of government under their chief, Jam Unar.¹³ This date is incidentally corroborated by Ibn-i Battuta, who while sojourning at Siwistan (modern Sehwan) in 734/1333-34 records a rebellion, narrating how two chiefs, Wunar-i Samiri and Qaisar-i Rumi conspired to kill a Hindu officer, Ratan, who was entrusted by Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq with the government of Siwistan and its dependencies and given the title of 'Chief of Sind' along with the insignia of that office; and how Wunar, who was dubbed as 'King Firuz' by his partisans, fearing the wrath of the Sultan, deserted Qaisar on the pretext of joining his tribesmen; and how Qaisar was punished by Imadul Mulk Sartez, who at that time was the highest officer of Sind on behalf of the Sultan and resided at Multan, the capital of Sind.¹⁴

Now it seems that this Wunar-i Samiri is the same as Unar, the Sammah chief, who according to Mir Masumi,¹⁵ was appointed ruler by the Sumirah nobles after the slaying of the last Sumirah Prince, Armil. Ibn-i Battuta's mistake in calling him Samiri is perhaps due to the fact that at the time of the occurrence of the incident he mentions, Unar was the elected chieftain of the Sumirahs. Also an Arab would be more inclined to write *Samiri*, a name that occurs in the *Quran*, in preference to Sammah.¹⁶

its ruler, Chanesar, fled from the capital in boats (*Tarikh-i Juhangusha of Juwaini* II, 148). He is the same ruler, whom the author of the *Tabaqat-i Nasri* calls 'Malik Sinanuddin Chanesha, *Wali-i Dewal wa Sind*', who submitted to Nizamul Mulk Junaidi in 625/1228 and went with him to the court of Iltutmish at Delhi. These dates, however, prove the falsity of the years of reigns as given by the *Tuhfatul Kiram* and the *Daulat-i Alawiyah*.

¹³ According to the *Beglar Namah*, the Summahs ruled for 193 years, and if 927/1521 is to be taken as the year of their downfall at the hands of Shah Beg Arghun, we get 734/1333-34 as the beginning of their rule.

¹⁴ *Rehla*, III, 105-8.

¹⁵ *Tarikh-i Masumi*, 61-62.

¹⁶ According to the *History of the South* by Ranchodji Amarji (tr. Burgess, 1882, 240), Anira'o Sammah—Wunar seems to be a corruption of this name—became the ruler of Sind (i.e. Lower Sind adjacent to Cutch) in 682/1283-84, which is nearly 50 years before the above-mentioned event. Probably this Anira'o or Wunar was a much earlier ruler of the same name, who acquired power under the Sumirahs. It is also probable that Mir Masumi's connection of Jam Unar with this event is wrong, in which case Ibn-i Battuta's Wunar-i Samiri may be identified with Unar Sumirah, one of the last Sumirah princes, who is known for his love romances with Maru'i and Ganga.

The five centuries of the Sumirahs are the most obscure period in the annals of Sind. They have left no monuments and even the towns founded by them lie in debris. Nor do we know with certainty who they were by descent. Elphinstone, with whom Elliot concurs, thinks that they were Rajputs, who had early occupied Lower Sind. But while we find the Sammahs and other indigenous tribes, mentioned in the *Chach Nama*, coming to pay homage to Muhammad bin Qasim, the name of the Sumirahs is not mentioned anywhere.¹⁷ We find a casual reference to their origin in Ibn-i Battuta, who while describing Janani, a large and flourishing town on the banks of the Indus, says its people are called Sumirah, who inhabited it a long time ago, their ancestors having established themselves there at the time of the conquest of Sind in the days of Hajaj bin Yusuf. 'They do not dine with anyone, nor is anyone allowed to look at them at their time of eating and they do not intermarry with other people.'¹⁸ This means that according to Ibn-i Battuta the Sumirahs were of Arab origin. The author of the *Daulat-i Alawiyah* asserts on the authority of their ancestral genealogies—which in my opinion are quite spurious—that they were Abidi (Shias), which incidentally would account for their adoption of the Carmathian creed.

The Sumirah territory seems to have extended from Lower Sind to Alor and comprised the entire eastern delta of the Indus, probably going beyond Dewal (Daibal) and almost touching Mekran. A portion of Cutch, too, was under their rule. A few towns of note have been mentioned by historians. Their first seat of power seems to have been Mansurah itself, which they probably occupied after the extinction

17 Shaikh Abdur Rahim Girhori in his commentary on the *Bayaz-i Hashimi*, while denying the descent of the Sumirahs from the Imam Ali Raza, says that both Sammahs and Sumirahs existed at the time of Muhammad bin Qasim and fought with him. The author of the *Tuhfatul Kiram* also holds the same view (35). 'I have not been able', he says, 'to ascertain the origin of this people, except that they are the ancient inhabitants of this land and obviously are descended from an indigenous Sindian race.' *The Tarikh-i Tahiri*, of course, blatantly declares that most of them were Hindus and that no historical matter has been left regarding them.

18 *Rehla*, III, 101-2. Ibn-i Battuta has described Janani (or Chanani) as existing between Multan and Siwistan (Sehwan) at a distance of two days down-sailing from Multan. But it seems that he has confused his account. We should like to locate Janani between Thatta and Sehwan, being nearer to the latter. The author of the *Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, while mentioning the possessions of Sultan Muhammad, son of Balban, says 'Janati (Janani) is 60 *karohs* above Thatta on the river' (43). Since the distance between Thatta and Sehwan is at least 75 *karohs*, we must suppose that Janani was situated south or southeast of Sehwan at a distance of about 30 miles. Probably the town lay between Saun and Amiri, where the ruins of a large flourishing town are still visible. Haig has identified it with Halani, but as this town is more than 75 *karohs* distance from Thatta, his opinion must be held wrong.

of the Arab dynasty of Banu Habbar bin Aswad after 375/985. We find Mahmud of Ghazni expelling one Khafif, presumably a Sumirah chief, from this town.¹⁹ We do not hear any further mention of this Mansurah, the first Arab town in Sind. The most interesting town, held by the Sumirahs, whose identification has exercised the ingenuity of many writers, however, is Dewal or Daibal. References to it are found till 625/1228. Sultan Jalaluddin Khwarazm reached Dewal and Damrilah in 621/1224, when its ruler was Chanesar, another Sumirah prince. The Sultan captured both these places and built a cathedral mosque on the site of the famous temple of which the spire was demolished by Muhammad bin Qasim.²⁰ The same ruler, who is designated as 'Wali-i Dewal wa Sind', presented himself before Iltutmish at Delhi in 625/1228, when the entire country of Sind right up to the Arabian Sea was reduced by his wazir, Nizamul Mulk Junaidi.

By 734/1333-34, when Ibn-i Battuta sailed from Sehwan to the mouth of the river, Dewal had ceased to exist and had given place to Lahari Bandar, which was then the Delta port. In the winter of 1350-51, when Muhammad Tughluq marched from Gujarat into Sind in pursuit of his cobbler-slave, Taghi, who had taken shelter with the Sumirahs of Thatta,²¹ the pair-towns of Dewal and Damrilah had made room for Thatta and Damrilah, which, however, does not mean that Dewal had come to be called by the name of Thatta.²² Thatta has not been mentioned by Ibn-i Battuta; nevertheless, it is evident that Thatta existed as early as 1350 and was probably founded by the Sumirahs themselves as is often mentioned in the so-called spurious passage, translated by Mallet²³ and not by Jam Nindo (Nindah or Nizamuddin), as is vulgarly believed. Tharri and Muhammad Tur (Mahmatpur) were their capital towns. We find Hamu, the wife of the Sumirah ruler, Sanghar, carrying on the government after her

19 Dr. Nazim, *Mahmud*, 120.

20 *Tarikh-i Jahangusha*, II, 146-48.

21 There is some confusion in the account of Barani's *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*. On page 519 it says that 'Taghi fled from Karnal to Thatta and Damrilah and took shelter with them (?)'. Later, on page 523, it says that 'Taghi fled from Karnal to Thatta and joined the Jam of Thatta'. Then again, 'The Sultan passed the third *bishkal* (rainy season) in Kundal (or Gondal), which is in the direction of the Sumirahs of Thatta and Damrilah, near the bank of the river Indus, which he gradually crossed with his army and elephants, marching towards Thatta, with a view to crushing the Sumirahs and the rebel Taghi, who had taken shelter with them.'

22 Dewal was quite distinct from Thatta. It was situated in the land of Sakurah (Sakirah); and Bhambhor, Bakar and Thavara (?), each of them a famous town, were also situated in the same land. When these towns perished one after another, their population migrated to Thatta (*Tuhfatul Kiram*, III, 185).

23 Elliot, I, 216-23.

husband's death from Wagah-Kot (Wakkah-Kot), and sending her brothers to rule at Tharri and Muhammad Tur.²⁴ The latter, founded on a branch of the Indus, now called Gungro, seems to have been a flourishing town and its ruins are to be seen at a spot 28 miles east of Thatta, near the village of Shah Kapur in the old pargana of Durka.²⁵ 'Not I alone but many others have beheld these ruins with astonishment', says the author of *Tarikh-i Tahiri*.²⁶ Its depopulation was due to the diversion of the course of the Indus, which took place towards the end of the 13th century. Besides Janani and Schwan, which have already been mentioned, we come across the name of Nasrpur, which seems to have existed long before the Sumirahs came into prominence, for we find Dodo (Dudlah), a Sumirah ruler, extending his territory up to it.²⁷

We have already stated on the authority of the *Tuhfatul Kiram* that the Sumirahs were overthrown by the Sammahs in 1351, which is the year of the death of Muhammad bin Tughluq in the vicinity of Thatta. While narrating the flight of Taghi to Thatta, Barani says²⁸ only once that Taghi joined the Jam, but all along he has been speaking of the desire of the Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq to extirpate the Sumirahs; and so also does the author of the *Tabaqat-i Akbari*.²⁹ But ten years later, i.e. in 762/1360-61, we find Firuz Shah, his cousin, contending against the forces of Jam Khairuddin.³⁰ It seems that although the Sumirahs ceased to be rulers in 1333, their power was ultimately crushed in 1351. According to Ferishta, whose authority could hardly be relied upon, the Muslims of Sind, towards the end of Muhammad bin Tughluq's reign, combined to overthrow the yoke of the Sumirahs, presumably on account of their heterodox tenets. In this connection it would not be impertinent to observe that the invasion of Sind by Alauddin Khalji's general, Salar Khan, as described in the famous ballad of Dodo Chanesar, is a pure fiction, although it is quite possible that this Khalji monarch might have sent Nusrat Khan in 1297-98 to reduce the unruly Sumirahs to subjection, and establish his capital at Multan.³¹ This might have been the beginning of their end.

Although the Sumirahs may not have been originally Hindus, as

²⁴ *Tarikh-i Masumi*, 61.

²⁵ Haig, *Indus Delta Country*, 75.

²⁶ Elliot, I, 256.

²⁷ *Masumi*, 61.

²⁸ *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi* (Barani), see note (21).

²⁹ Vol. I, 223.

³⁰ Actually Jam Jauna as will be seen later.

³¹ *Masumi*, 43.

averred by the author of the *Tarikh-i Tahiri*, yet by their long intercourse with the indigenous population they may have assimilated some of their customs. Ibn-i Battuta informs us that they did not intermarry with other people and that they would not allow anyone to look at them while they were eating their food. Some of their absurd customs have been described by the *Tarikh-i Tahiri*,³² from which the *Tuhfatul Kiram* and others have borrowed their accounts. Yet when Tahir Nisyani wrote his history, he found among them pious men like Durwesh Daud, Miyan Hamul and Miyan Ismail of Ag-ham, who maintained and fed and clothed at his own expense 500 students of the *Quran* at a college. It is probable that towards the end of their rule the Sumirahs renounced their Ismaili doctrines and became Sunnis under the influence of Saiyyid Jalaluddin Bukhari of Uch.³³

THE SAMMAHS; LIST OF JAMS

The Sammahs, who succeeded the Sumirahs, have also left no records of their own, although our knowledge of them is much greater than of their predecessors, as they were nearer in point of time to the writers of surviving local histories. There were in all 15 princes of this race, who ruled for 175 years, neither more nor less.³⁴ The following list of names is given by Abul Fazl in his *Ain-i Akbari*:³⁵

³² Elliot, I, 269.

³³ Saiyyid Sulaiman, *Arab wa Hind ke Ta'alluqat*, 363.

³⁴ This is the number of princes according to the *Beglar Namah*, which, however, gives the period of their rule as 193 years, going back to 1333-34, the year in which Ibn-i Battuta records the death of Ratan at the hands of Jam Unar-i Samiri. Mir Masum gives 18 names. The number of years given here is also according to the *Tuhfatul Kiram*, III, 54.

³⁵ There is considerable difference between the *Ain-i Akbari* and Masumi, who gives five names for the first three: 1. Jam Unar bin Babinah; 2. Jam Junah bin Babinah; 3. Jam Tamachi bin Unar; 4. Jam Khairuddin bin Tamachi; 5. Jam Babinah bin Khairuddin.

Ferishta gives Mani bin Jauna as the name of the third prince, who opposed the forces of Sultan Firuz Shah Tughluq. This, however, is incorrect in the light of the information given by Siraj-i Afif in his *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*.

According to Afif the names would stand in the following order:

1. Jam Unar.
2. Jam Jauna, brother of Unar, and Unar's son, Babinah.
3. Jam (Mani) and his son.
4. Jam Jauna (second time).

Siraj-i Afif, of course, does not mention other names. Who that 'Jam and his son' were has baffled my attempts to discover. But if Ferishta is to be believed, these rulers may be identified with Mani (Babinah) and Jauna, his father. Jam Khairuddin, mentioned by Masumi, may be identified with Jauna, as the incident of running away from Firuz Shah's camp is connected with Khairuddin by Masumi and with Jam

1. Jam Unar bin Babinah ³⁶	3½ years	752-56 A.H.
2. Jam Jauna bin Babinah ³⁷	14 years	756-70 A.H.
3. Jam Mani bin Jauna ³⁸	15 years	763-78 A.H.
4. Jam Tamachi bin Unar ³⁹	13 years and some months	778-91 A.H.
5. Jam Salahuddin bin Tamachi	11 years and some months	791-802 A.H.
6. Jam Nizamuddin bin Salahuddin	2 years and some months	802-5 A.H.
7. Jam Ali Sher bin Tamachi	6 years and some months	805-12 A.H.
8. Jam Karan bin Tamachi	one or two days	—
9. Jam Fath Khan bin Sikandar	15 years and some months	812-28 A.H.

Jauna by Siraj-i Afif. Mani may stand for 'the son of the Jam', who was left by Firuz Shah to rule over Thatta along with Babinah's brother, Tamachi, when he led Jam Jauna and Babinah bin Unar as captives to Delhi.

³⁶ This name is written as Babiniyah, Banhanah, etc. in various histories, but the name Babinah (Babino) is used in Sindhi, or it may be read as Jam Bambho.

"A contemporary work, the *Insha-i Mahru* (Compositions of Mahru) edited by Professor S. A. Rashid, is now available. Ainul Mulk Mahru was Firuz Tughluq's governor of Multan and other western provinces and his work was certainly completed before 1360. Mahru complains that Jam Jauna and his nephew, Banhaniya, strove to induce the Mongols to attack his provinces. He considers Banhaniya to be the real instigator but says that his uncle, Jam Jauna, was lax in controlling him. The name of the nephew occurs thrice in the text (102, 186 and 230). It is twice spelt as Banbahniyya and once as Banhaniya or Banbania. The editor, Prof. Rashid, prefers Banhaniya. Even Mahru seems to have been unsure about the correct spelling of the name of the man he was condemning" — EDITORS.

³⁷ When Firuz Shah attacked Thatta in 762/1360-61 after the capture of Nagarkot, Afif gave the names of the two rulers of Sind as follows — (a) Jam Jauna, brother of Jam (or Rai) Unar and (b) Banhaniya, the son of Jam Unar. Firuz Shah took Jam Jauna and Banhaniya with him to Delhi in 1362, but after some years, when Tamachi grew recalcitrant, he sent Jam Jauna again to Thatta (Afif, 247, 253-54). It appears that Sind sometimes had two nearly related joint-rulers, but the Jam was superior.

³⁸ It is likely that Mani is a corruption of Banhaniya, and that Jauna might have had a son bearing the same name as his nephew.

³⁹ Jam Tamachi is represented by Abul Fazl as brother of Banhaniya, the third ruler according to him, and therefore son of Unar. But Banhaniya was only a joint-ruler with Jauna and could not be reckoned as a Jam in the strict sense of the term. It was he who instigated Jam Jauna to fight Firuz Shah and not to submit. He was also taken along with the Jam to Delhi, where he remained till 790/1388, when Sultan Tughluq Shah II gave him a white canopy and sent him to Thatta, but he died on the way. This incident precludes the possibility of Banhaniya having been a ruling prince.

10. Jam Tughluq bin Sikandar	28 years	828-56 A.H.
11. Jam Sikandar bin Tughluq	one year and 6 months	836-58 A.H.
12. Mubarak Pardah Dar	3 days	—
13. Jam Sanjar, alias ⁴⁰ Radhan (Rai Dinah)	8 years	858-66 A.H.
14. Jam Nizamuddin ⁴¹ (Nindah) bin Babinah	48 years	866-914 A.H.
15. Jam Firuz bin Nizamuddin ⁴²	13 years	914-27 A.H.

The Sammahs were old inhabitants of Lower Sind and Cutch. They are mentioned in the *Chach Namah* as residents of Sind even before the conquest of Sind by Muhammad bin Qasim. They might have embraced Islam early enough, but they retained their old Hindu surnames. It was only after their contact with the Tughluq sultans and the Delhi court that some of them assumed honorific Muslim names. According to Elliot, the Sammahs were Rajputs of the great Yadava stock, and this is borne out by their family records.

CONFLICT WITH DELHI

It cannot be definitely determined when the Sammahs actually came to power. Their main occupation was agriculture and they held jagirs under the Sumirahs on the condition of helping them in time of war. Their tribes were numerous, but they were divided into two chief groups—the Pachhmais and the Sindhis headed by Jam Unar and Jam Hoto respectively. According to the Sumirah traditions, it was during the reign of their seventeenth ruler, Muhammad Tahir (1373-1410), that the Sammah tribes combined to have Jam Unar as their chief.⁴³ While this statement may be accepted as

40 Masumi assigns a separate reign to Jam Radhan or Rai Dinah, but Abul Fazi seems to be correct in considering them one and the same person. At any rate, the name of the father of neither of them has been given.

41 The *Tuhfatul Kiran* gives his whole pedigree: 'Nizamuddin (Nindo) bin Baniyah (Banbaniya) bin Unar bin Salahuddin bin Tamachi.'

42 Includes 8 months of the reign of the usurper, Salahuddin, also.

43 They are said to have become so bold and unruly that the Sumirahs were compelled to harry them out of Sind with great slaughter. They sought shelter with the Chawda ruler of Cutch, whom they undertook to supply 500 cart-loads of hay every year in lieu of the land given to them for cultivation. Once they concealed 1,000 armed men in the hay-carts and with 500 more men to conduct the carts, they forced their way into the fortress and expelled the Chawda ruler. Gradually they became so powerful that they overran the whole country and began to ravage the Sumirah territory, which they ultimately wrested from their hands by destroying their beautiful capital town of Muhammad Tur and other places, and exterminating the whole of the Sumirah fighting force.

true,⁴⁴ the dates given are incorrect, for we certainly know that in 762/1360-61, when Firuz Shah marched on Thatta, the Sumirahs had ceased to be a power, and the Sammahs had extended their rule over the whole of Lower Sind. In 752/1351 when Muhammad Tughluq came near Thatta in pursuit of his rebel slave Taghi,⁴⁵ the ruler, as mentioned by Barani, was a Jain,⁴⁶ whose army seems largely to have consisted of Sumirahs and who, instigated by Taghi, harassed the Tughluq army for two or three days after the death of Sultan Muhammad on 21 March 1351. But they were compelled to retire to Thatta by the forces dispatched by Firuz Shah immediately after his accession to the throne. By 1360-61, however, when Firuz Shah came back with the determination to annex the Thatta territory to the sultanat of Delhi, Thatta was governed by Jam Jauna, the brother of Jam Unar, and his nephew, Banbaniya, Jam Unar's son.⁴⁷ Their resistance was so great that Firuz Shah had to retire to Gujarat, after losing many of his soldiers and three-fourths of his horses during the siege and in the Rann of Cutch. When in 763/1362 Firuz Shah, after replenishing himself in Gujarat, came suddenly back to Sind, encamped on the eastern side of the river just opposite to Thatta, and seized all the crops, the Sammah opposition which had seized all his boats was so grim that he had to send his armies up the river to cross it at Bakhar and then to come down by the west bank. But after a day of battle he had to direct them to beat a retreat by the same long route. It was only after their provisions ran short that the Sammahs sought the intercession of Saiyyid Jalaluddin Husain Bukhari of Uch, who made it easy for them to submit to the Sultan. The Jam and Banbaniya were taken to Delhi along with their families, leaving behind the Jam's son (Mani) and Banbaniya's brother, Tamachi, to carry on the government.

The subsequent Sammah rulers were more or less tributary to the Tughluq sultan, but soon after the death of Firuz Shah (1388), when weak rulers followed one after another in quick succession, the Sammahs threw off the yoke of submission and became independent, particularly in the days of Jam Tughluq, who established friendly relations with the Muslim kings of Gujarat. The local Persian histories give us only a few glimpses into the reigns of these petty autocrats, and we are not on sure ground until we come to the last.

⁴⁴ Masumi's assertion that the Sumirahs combined to elect Jam Unar as their ruler in preference to Armil, one of their own kith and kin, looks unnatural.

⁴⁵ According to the Sumirah annals, Taghi had taken shelter with their ruler, Unar II, who may be identified with Wunar-i Samiri.

⁴⁶ Presumably Jam Unar.

⁴⁷ *Tarikh-i Masumi*, 75.

but one ruler, Jam Nizamuddin (*alias* Jam Nindo), who died after a long, peaceful and prosperous reign of 48 years in 814/1508.

JAM NIZAMUDDIN

Jam Nizamuddin is by far the greatest Sindhian ruler, whose record is definitely known to us. In his early career he was extremely fond of study and spent much of his time in *madrāsas* and mystic *khanqāhs*. He was exceedingly humble and amiable, and was characterized by many praiseworthy qualities. Shortly after his accession, he went to Bakhar with a large army and within one year extirpated the freebooters and robbers, with whom that part of his territory was infested. He filled the fort of Bakhar with every kind of provision and left it in charge of Dilshad, his household-slave and fellow-student. He so ably administered the outlying parts of Sind that people travelled about in safety without fear of being molested.

He was a scholar and poet of no mean order, and patronized the learned and the pious, with whom he had converse on various subjects. The famous scholar, Jalaluddin Muhammad Asad of Dawwan (1422-1501), author of the celebrated treatise, *Akhlaq-i Jalali*, once expressed his desire to settle in Thatta. The Jam made the necessary arrangements for his stay, and sent two of his pupils, Mir Shamsuddin and Mir Mu'inuddin, to fetch him. But before their arrival at Dawwan, the master had departed the world. His disciples, however, returned to Thatta and settled there.⁴⁸

He was a contemporary of Sultan Husain, the Langah ruler of Multan, and was on intimate terms with him, and the two often sent presents to each other. Once a week he would regularly visit his stables, and caressing the foreheads of his noble steeds, he would say, 'Lucky creatures! I do not wish to ride on you except for the purposes of a religious war. On all sides of our territory are Muslim rulers. Pray that I should not march in any direction without a pious cause, and that no one enters our territory lest the innocent blood of Muslims be shed and I be ashamed in the presence of the glorious God.'⁴⁹

'The reign of this prince', as Haig puts it, 'was the golden age of native rule in Sind. The fact that his name alone among those of Sama, Sumra and other princes continues well-remembered and illustrious among Sindhians to the present day is a striking testimony to his exceptional excellence as a ruler. Among his virtues was that, so rare in the East, of recognizing true worth in others, and

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 75.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 74.

giving his confidence where it was best deserved. His minister, Darya Khan, served him well and wisely, and probably no small part of Jam Nindo's fame was due to this man's loyal and able administration. All Sind, from Bakhar and beyond it to the sea, obeyed the greatest of the Sammah princes, and as the court at Delhi had enough to do in attending to matters that more nearly concerned it than the subordination of a distant province—to say nothing of the memories of what their contests with the Sammahs had cost the Tughluq sovereigns—Jam Nindo enjoyed absolute independence. Nevertheless, the shadow of coming calamity fell upon the Sammahs in his time. The Arghuns now began to threaten Sind.⁵⁰

THE ARGHUNS AND JAM FIRUZ

The Arghuns came into prominence towards the end of the fifteenth century under Amir Zunnun Beg, an alleged descendant of the Il Khans of Persia, who, in return for his distinguished services to Sultan Husain of Herat, was invested with the governorship of Ghur, Sistan, Zamindawar and Garmsir. He fixed his capital at the growing city of Qandhar, where he made himself practically independent. Finding this territory too small for his ambitions, he began to expand southward, with the assistance of his son, Shah (Shuja) Beg, the overthrower of the Sammah dynasty. Having already annexed Pishing, Shal (Quetta) and Mastung in 899/1494, he wrested Siwi (Sibi) from the hands of the governor of Jam Nindo (Nizamuddin), who despatched a strong force under his able minister, Darya Khan, now called Mubarak Khan. Mubarak came upon the Arghuns at Jatugir, a place in the Bolan pass, and inflicted a crushing defeat on them, killing their leader, Muhammad Beg, the brother of Shah Beg. It sufficed for the time being, and so long as Jam Nizamuddin was alive, the Arghuns did not venture into Sind.⁵¹

As the eventful career of Zunnun Beg is not a part of Sind history, we need not go into what happened till 913/1507, when he

⁵⁰ *Indus Delta Country*, 75.

⁵¹ So says Mir Masum (175), but other writers, such as Nizamuddin Bakhshi and Ferishta, assert that the Arghuns promptly avenged the death of Muhammad Beg, and even at this time captured Bakhar and Siwistan (Sehwan). According to Nizamuddin Bakhshi, this battle was fought in 1494, but Mir Masum says that it took place in 914/1508, just a few months before the death of Jam Nindo. This is hardly credible. Mir Masum is so utterly incorrect in recording dates, that even this statement of his could be accepted with a grain of salt, were it not a fact that the forts of Fathpur and Siwi were once again taken by Shah Beg between A.H. 917 and 920 (1511 and 1514). See M. Longworth Dames's article on 'Arguns' in the *Encycl. of Islam*, Vol. I. Similarly the date 890/1485 given by *Ma'asir-i Rahimi* may be rejected.

fell fighting against the formidable forces of the Uzbek chief, Shaibani Khan. His son, Shah Beg, found himself sandwiched between Shaibani Khan and Babur, who claimed to be the lineal heir to the Timurid possessions, and who had already established himself at Kabul and deprived Shah Beg in 1507-8 of Qandhar and his father's priceless treasures. Naturally, therefore, he and his brother, Muhammad Muqim, who by his temerity to capture Kabul in 1505-6 had offended Babur, felt compelled by circumstances to seek alliance with Shaibani Khan, who restored Qandhar back to them. But finding himself insecure there, on account of the continuous harassment of Babur, Shah Beg began to extend his influence southward, and between A.H. 917 and 920 (1511-14) he attacked the Birlas tribes, who had established themselves at Siwistan, and took from them the forts of Siwi and Fathpur.

Time was now opportune for Shah Beg to invade Sind, but he was greatly distressed by the meagreness of his resources, for his new acquisitions had not added much to his revenue. Jam Nizamuddin was succeeded by his unworthy and indolent son, Jam Firuz, who gave himself up to vicious pleasures, not minding the counsels of the old veteran, Darya Khan, who in disgust retired to his estate in Gaha.⁵² Shah Beg was duly informed of this rotten state of affairs by some of his clansmen, who had found shelter at Thatta after the capture of Siur, and everything was ripe for a predatory incursion into Sind. So in 1519⁵³ he made a rush upon Chanduka and onward to Baghban⁵⁴ and Gaha, highly fertile and flourishing tracts, whence he gathered a rich booty.⁵⁵ He now began seriously to contemplate an invasion of Sind. An opportunity soon offered itself. Jam Firuz, desiring to get rid of the influence of old Darya Khan and his sons, and egged on by his mother, Madinah Machhani, sent a messenger to Shah Beg, inviting him to Sind. Shah Beg, who was waiting for

52 In Persian this town is written as Kahan, 'kaf' standing for 'gal', and 'n' being the termination of the Persian plural. But it is actually Gaha, a village 21 miles north-west of Sehwan, inhabited by a people called Gaha.

53 Mir Masum has given 17 Ziqad 921/24 December 1515, placing the event four years before it actually happened. Babur, while recording the events of 925/1519 states that on 28 Rabi I (30 March 1519) when he had reached Qaratu, a messenger of Shah Beg, Qizil by name, brought him news that Shah Beg had captured Kahan (Gaha), sacked it and returned (Beveridge, *Babur Nama*, 396).

54 Baghban (in Persian Mss. Baghbanan) a township 27 miles north of Sehwan, situated between Khudabad and Dadu.

55 Makhdum Jafar of Bubak, a learned man of the time, related from Mirza Isa Tarkhan that in this raid alone 1,000 camels that plied the Persian wheels in the gardens at night were carried away. From this one can judge of the other spoils and the prosperity of the country.

such a pretext, collected a strong army and, without meeting any opposition on the way, suddenly appeared before the very gates of Thatta. Jam Firuz, who had realized his folly only too late, finding resistance impossible, quickly fled to Pir Ar, leaving his family behind. The small band of Sammah warriors, headed by Darya Khan, who had severely berated Jam Firuz for his rashness, fought bravely till they were annihilated, and the victor entered the town on the 11 Muharram 927/22 December 1522, giving it up to plunder for nine days,⁵⁶ after which he granted a general amnesty to the citizens. He also pardoned Jam Firuz, who offered his submission to him in the most abject fashion, called him his son, and restored to him the entire portion of Sind lying south of the latitude of the Laki hills, keeping North Sind for himself.

After settling the affairs of Thatta, he marched back to Sehwan, which had closed its gates against him, and treated it with utmost severity. He also defeated the remnant of the Sammah army under the sons of Darya Khan and other generals, who had assembled at Talti to give final battle. He then proceeded to Bakhar, where he applied himself to the task of suppressing local disorders as well as to the restoration and enlargement of the fort. Having thus conquered Sind, he planted garrisons at Shal (Quetta), Siwi, Fathpur, Ganjava and Baghban, and then repaired to Qandhar, where he had kept a precarious foothold ever since its recapture in 1507-8.

While Shah Beg was absent in Qandhar, Jam Salahuddin, who had contested the Sammah throne with Jam Firuz in 914/1509, once again appeared on the scene with the support of Muzaffar Shah II of Gujarat. The imbecile Firuz left Thatta precipitately and fled to Sehwan, whence, through the good offices of the Arghun chiefs, he sent an appeal to Shah Beg to come to his succour. Shah Beg despatched his son, Mirza Shah Hasan, who was just then in Qandhar after his two years stay at Babur's court, with an army of tried soldiers to expel the pretender. A bloody battle took place near Jatar, resulting in the defeat and death of Salahuddin and his son; the remnant of his followers fled back to Gujarat. Jam Firuz returned to Thatta with great pomp and honour.

It was probably soon after this event that Shah Beg, finding his position at Qandhar altogether untenable, decided to hand over the keys of the fort to Babur, who assumed its possession on the 13 Shawwal 928/1 September 1522, and came down to Bakhar, which he made his capital. In 930/1524 Shah Beg formed the project

⁵⁶ *Kharabi-i Sind* (927)—Destruction of Sind—is the date of the sack (*Tuhfatul Kiram*, II, 54).

of invading Gujarat and declared to Jam Firuz that, if he ever conquered that country, he would leave the entire Sind to Firuz. So leaving the government to Payandah Muhammad Tarkhan, he started with the pick of his men on an expedition to Gujarat. When he reached Chanduka (Larkana), his favourite officer, Fazil Gokaltash, fell sick and had to return to Bakhar, where he soon died. In the loss of his old friend Shah Beg saw his own approaching end. Nevertheless after performing the funeral ceremonies, he resumed his march and reached Ag-ham in Lower Sind, whence he sent summons to Jam Firuz to accompany him. But then he sickened and passed away on 22 Sha'ban 930/25 June 1524.⁵⁷

The news of Shah Beg's death was received with jubilation by Jam Firuz, who had been inwardly wishing to extricate himself from the yoke of the Arghuns. When Shah Hasan, who had succeeded his father, Shah Beg, came to know of the secret preparations of Jam Firuz, he dropped the idea of proceeding to Gujarat and straight-away marched on to Thatta. Jam Firuz, finding all resistance hopeless, took to flight, while the small army under his minister, Manik, and his son-in-law, Shaikh Ibrahim, was cut to pieces. Jam Firuz kept wandering about in Cutch for a number of years⁵⁸ and it was not till 935/1528-29 that he was able to collect an army 50,000 strong, with which he gave battle at a place near Chachikan and Rahiman, but was completely defeated, losing 20,000 of his soldiers

57 While there is agreement as to the date and the month, the year has been disputed. Mir Masum followed by other local historians, gives 928/1522, while Ferishta and Nizamuddin give 930/1524, which has been adopted by Erskine, Beale, Ney Elias and others. (See *Babur Nama*, 437.) All circumstances point out to the correctness of the year 1524, for if Babur took over Qandhar in Shawwal 928/September 1522, Shah Beg could not have died two months earlier. The muddle has been created by Masum's mention of dates which are invariably incorrect in all cases, and therefore, the year A.H. 928 must be rejected in spite of the chronogram 'Sh-h-r Sh-'a-b-a-n' which is brought forward to support it.

58 This is according to Masum (143). The author of *Zafar-ul Walih* (143) says that after the defeat and death of Darya Khan, Jam Firuz, having conceived fear of the Mughals (Arghuns), fled to Gujarat, where Sultan Muzaffar II. appointed him ruler over a portion of his kingdom, and that this happened in 929/1523. After the death of Muzaffar II he once again went to Sind, where he was able to gain a portion of his lost territory, but the Mughals combined against him and compelled him to return to Gujarat, where he was favourably received by Sultan Bahadur. This happened in 935/1528-29. The Sultan gave him 12 lakhs of *tankas* as his annual pension and promised to restore him to his kingdom. In 939/1532-33 Firuz gave his daughter in marriage to Sultan Bahadur and by this connection his hopes to regain his kingdom were further strengthened. But on account of the invasion of Gujarat by Humayun at this time, Bahadur could not attend to his affairs. When Bahadur was defeated by Humayun in 942/1535-36, Jam Firuz, who was in his camp, was captured by the Mughal soldiers and put to death.

on the field. He then made way to Gujarat, where he found an asylum with Sultan Bahadur and lived as his honoured guest till 1535-36, but after the defeat of Sultan Bahadur by Humayun, he was captured by the latter's soldiers and put to death.

Whether the final defeat and overthrow of Jam Firuz took place before the conquest of Multan by Shah Hasan, or after it, cannot be ascertained. Shah Hasan had signalized his accession by declaring his allegiance to Babur as a matter of policy and had the *Khutba* read in his name; and the latter, being naturally flattered, permitted Shah Hasan to annex Multan to his territories.⁵⁹

VICISSITUDES OF MULTAN

Multan at this time was ruled by the Rajput race of Langahs, who had formed an independent kingdom after the dissolution of the Delhi sultanat. After reducing the Baloch and Magasi tribes, who lay on the way and were subject to Sultan Mahmud Langah, the then ruling prince of Multan, Shah Hasan Arghun marched against this old capital of Sind in 930/1524. He defeated the Langah army near Uch and then advanced forward. Mahmud Langah, who went forth to meet him on the Satlej, died suddenly, and an agreement was drawn up between Shah Hasan Arghun and Sultan Husain Langah, the infant son of Mahmud Langah, by which all territory lying south of the Satlej was ceded to the Arghuns. The anarchy at Multan, however, led to a further invasion by Shah Hasan Arghun; after a long and cruel siege of sixteen months he took the fort of Multan by an assault in 934/1527 and ordered a general massacre of its inhabitants. But as he had no idea of holding Multan permanently, he ceded it to Babur, who gave it in fief to his son, Kamran.

This brings us near to the end of the period of this chapter. But it would be relevant to describe in brief the vicissitudes of fortune experienced by Multan after its conquest by the Arabs under Muhammad bin Qasim. Subsequently, it became the seat of government for the Ismailis (Carmathians), who were exterminated by Sultan Mahmud and Mu'izzudin Ghuri; after the latter's death it passed on to Nasiruddin Qabachah, so famous for his patronage of letters. The author of the oldest Persian history of Sind, viz. the *Fath Nama* (wrongly but popularly called the *Chach Nama*) flourished in his days and so did the celebrated Persian writer, Awfi, who dedicated his *Jawamiul Hikayat* to him. After his death by drowning in the river Indus at Bakhar, Multan and Sind were annexed by Iltutmish

⁵⁹ According to *Tabaqat-i Albari* (Vol. III, 540), when Babur, after reducing the whole of the Punjab, came to Delhi in 1526, he issued an edict conferring on Shah Hasan the city of Multan and its surrounding territories.

to the Delhi sultanat. It would be tedious to give a list of the governors, who ruled over Multan on behalf of the Delhi kings; some account of them has been already given in the preceding chapters. The most important of them, however, was Sultan Muhammad (Khan-i Sahid), the elder son of Balban. He was a great patron of learning and had a deep veneration for saints. He had invited the great Sa'di to come and live at his court, but the poet declined the offer on account of his extreme old age and sent instead his autograph copy of the *Gulistan* to him. In the year 734/1333-34, which marks the emergence of the Sammahs, we find one Imadul Mulk Sartezi as governor of Multan and Sind on behalf of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq, as has been already mentioned.

A very rapid process of political disintegration began after the death of Firuz Tughluq in 1388, and the invasion of Timur in 1398-99 completed the process. The Saiyyids and Lodis, who followed the house of the Tughluqs, held but one government out of the many that now existed in India. Thus in 847/1443 when the last Saiyyid ruler, Alauddin Alam Shah, came to the throne, the entire government was disorganized. The people of Multan, which was now without a governor, appointed Shaikh Yusuf Quraishi, a descendant of the famous mystic-saint, Bahauddin Zakariyya, as their ruler; but after a reign of two years he was deposed by his father-in-law, Rai Sihrah, the chief of the Langahs, by means of a ruse. Rai Sihrah, who styled himself as Sultan Quthuddin, ruled wisely and well till 874/1469-70, when he was succeeded by Sultan Husain Langah, who had friendly relations with Jam Nizamuddin of Sind. It was in the last year of the reign of his successor, Mahmud Langah (A.H. 908-931), that Mirza Shah Hasan Arghun led an expedition against Multan, which he finally captured in 934/1527-28. Three years later it became a part and parcel of the Mughal empire.

LITERARY ACTIVITY DURING THE ARGHUN PERIOD

We have already noticed that literary and religious studies came to be fostered in the reign of Jam Nizamuddin. The movement went on apace and gained a great impetus when in 916/1510, owing to the massacre of Sunni divines in Herat by the Safavid Shah Ismail, many Sunni scholars and theologians migrated to Sind. Among them was the traditionist, Abul Aziz al-Abhari, who along with his two learned sons, Asiruddin and Muhammad, established himself at Faha in 918/1512, and laid the foundation of studies in rational sciences. Another learned divine of Gaha was Makhdum Mahmud Fakhr-Potiah, who was largely responsible for the spread of religious sciences throughout Sind, Makhdum Bitah of Taltic (so known after his native

place), who lost his life in 929/1523 on account of his opposition to the Arghuns, was an expert in exegetics and tradition. Shah Beg Arghun and his son, Shah Hasan, were also good scholars and patrons of learning. A fairly complete list of learned men and poets is given by Mir Masum as contemporaneous with Shah Hasan. The chief seats of knowledge in those days were Gaha, Sehwan, Thatta, Bakhar and Darbela. The most remarkable feature is that most of these learned men were scholars of exegetics and tradition. None of them is mentioned as having had any connection with the teaching of jurisprudence and theology, which came to the fore after the decadence of rational studies.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

BENGAL

GOVERNORS OF LAKHNAUTI

BENGAL APPEARS IN THE HISTORY of the Delhi sultanat with the dare-devil attempt of Malik Izzuddin Muhammad Bakhtiyar Khalji to conquer the regions lying to the east of the newly acquired Turkish territory. The history of his exploits in Bengal and his penetration into Tibet and the subsequent annihilation of his army has been narrated earlier.¹ Ali Mardan, who established his authority in Bengal after assassinating Bakhtiyar, was put to death by his officers, who were fed up with his tyrannical rule.²

Husamuddin Iwaz Khalji was then elevated to that position, probably sometime after 1211. He adopted the title of Sultan Ghiyasuddin and began to function as an independent ruler.³ Taking advantage of Iltutmish's preoccupations in the affairs of the Indus Valley, he extended his authority up to Bihar and exacted tribute from the rulers of Jajnagar, Tirhut, Bang and Kamrup.⁴ When Iltutmish was comparatively free from the problems of the north-western frontier, he appointed a governor to look after the districts of Bihar south of the Ganges. In 1225 he himself marched along the Ganges. Iwaz marched out of his capital to challenge him but eventually decided to submit. He recognized the sovereign status of Iltutmish and paid a heavy indemnity.⁵ Iltutmish appointed Malik Jani as governor of Bihar, but soon after Iltutmish's return, Iwaz came back, ousted Jani and assumed an independent status. Iltutmish did not strike immediately; but he alerted his son, Nasiruddin Mahmud, then governor of Awadh, to watch developments carefully and be on the look out for an opportunity to strike. Iwaz interpreted this as a sign of weakness and ventured on a campaign in the east. Nasiruddin immediately invested Basankot⁶ and stormed Lakhnauti.

1 See *supra*, 171-78.

2 See *supra*, 203, 217.

3 *Minhaj*, 161.

4 *Ibid.*, 163.

5 *Ibid.*, 163, 171.

6 A fortress built by Sultan Ghiyasuddin Iwaz (Raverty, 582). Cunningham iden-

Iwaz returned to save his capital but was defeated and beheaded. Iltutmish appointed Shahzada Nasiruddin as governor of his eastern possessions. An inscription on his mausoleum in the village of Malikpur Koye, near Delhi, shows that the Sultan had conferred upon him the title of 'Malikush Sharq'.

Before Sultan Iltutmish could appoint another governor to the province of Lakhnauti, Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Balka Khalji turned out the royalists, occupied Lakhnauti and ruled independently under the title of Daulat Shah bin Maudud till he was defeated and captured by Iltutmish in 628/1230.⁷ The Sultan stayed for some time at Lakhnauti; he expressed his appreciation of the work done by Sultan Ghiyasuddin Iwaz in his territory, and after conferring the governorship of Lakhnauti on Malik Alauddin Jani, formerly governor of Bihar, he returned to Delhi in the same year. The new arrangement did not continue for long; Alauddin Jani was later removed from Bengal⁸ and replaced by Malik Saifuddin Aibak. The latter was a Khitai Turk purchased by Iltutmish and had held Bihar before the new assignment. He effectively ruled over Lakhnauti and captured several elephants from Bang (the region to the east of the Delta) and sent them to the Sultan, who was very much pleased with his performance and granted him the title of 'Yughan-tat'. He died in 631/1233.⁹

Disturbances again broke out in Lakhnauti after the death of Saifuddin Aibak. Probably no governor had been appointed or, if appointed, had not taken charge of Lakhnauti. In the meanwhile Aor Khan Aibak, a Turkish general and probably one of the slave-officers of Saifuddin,¹⁰ occupied Lakhnauti, but his authority was challenged by Malik Izzuddin Tughril Tughan Khan, the governor

tifies it with a mound of Bhasubihar near Mahasthanagarh, more than one hundred miles from Lakhnauti. ASC, XV, 104, *The History of Bengal*, ed. J. N. Sarkar, Dacca, 1948, II, 35.

7 The malik is styled as Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Balka, the Khalji, on page 586 and as Balka Malik Husamuddin Iwaz on page 617 by Minhaj. From the fact that Sultan Ghiyasuddin Iwaz Khalji's real name was Husamuddin Iwaz, it may be inferred that Balka Khalji was Husamuddin's son. He was, however, a malik of Iltutmish and presumably was put to death after his capture.

8 While referring to this incident, Minhaj does not give dates. The *Riyazus Salatin* (trans., 73) assigns Jani a rule of three years, while the *History of Bengal* (II, 45) has one year and a few months. Alauddin Jani is next mentioned as governor of Lahore. He later on created much trouble during the reign of Raziya but was finally beheaded. (Raverty, 634, 640.)

9 See Raverty, 731-32. Sultan Iltutmish had appointed Malik Alauddin Jani in A.H. 628, and Saifuddin died in 631. It means that the two governors together ruled for about four years. Therefore the account of the *Riyazus Salatin* that each of these governors ruled for three years does not seem to be correct.

10 Sarkar, 45.

of Bihar.¹¹ An engagement took place near Lakhnauti in which Aor Khan lost his life. Consequently Malik Izzuddin Tughril Tughan Khan became the master of a vast territory including Radha, Varandra¹² and Bihar. He seems to have extended his power without the permission of the Sultan of Delhi. But he was shrewd enough to receive confirmation as the ruler of Lakhnauti from Sultan Raziya, who honoured him with *chattr*s and standards. Throughout his rule he maintained cordial relations with Delhi by sending gifts and receiving honours. He is reported to have raided and brought much booty from Tirhut but could not occupy it.

Shortly after the accession of Sultan Alauddin Masud Shah (639/1242), Malik Izzuddin Tughril Tughan Khan set out to capture Awadh, Kara, Manikpur and other territories.¹³ He reached the confines of Kara and Manikpur but soon returned to Lakhnauti. It was during this campaign that Minhaj met Tughan Khan near Kara and proceeded to Lakhnauti with him.¹⁴

Immediately after this expedition he sent his envoy, Sharaful Mulk Ash'ari, probably with presents and excuses, to the court of Sultan Alauddin Masud Shah. The Sultan sent Qazi Jalaluddin Kashani along with Sharaful Mulk to Lakhnauti with a red canopy of state and robes of honour for the malik. The envoys reached Lakhnauti in 641/1243.

In the same year the Rai of Jajnagar, Raja Narsimhadeva I, began incursions into territory of Lakhnauti. When Malik Tughan Khan along with Minhaj set out in the month of March 1244, the forces of Orissa seem to have retreated to their frontier fortress, Katasin,¹⁵ where an encounter took place in which the Jajnagar army fled, leaving behind nothing except a few elephants. When the Muslim forces were relaxing and making preparations for their meal at mid-day, a party of Orissan soldiers fell upon the rear of the Muslim army. This surprise attack routed the Muslim forces. Tughan Khan returned to Lakhnauti after suffering heavy casualties.

11 He was a Qara Khitai Turk, who gradually rose in the favour of Sultan Iltutmish and was finally put in charge of Bihar, when its former governor, Malik Saifuddin, was transferred to Lakhnauti.

12 The regions on the eastern and western sides of the Ganges respectively. (See Raverty, 585 and n 5, 7.)

13 This probably refers also to a larger extent of the country further to the north-east, now included in Nepal. (See Raverty, 737, n, 9.)

14 It is not clear why he returned without an engagement. Probably it was due to the march of Malik Ikhtiyaruddin Qara Qash Khan, who had recently been appointed governor of Kara but had not yet entered that province.

15 Dr. Bhattasali identifies it with Kathasanga, 5 miles south-east of Sonamukhi, about 12 miles south of Damodar, situated on the boundary of Vishnupur in the Bankura district. (JRAS, 1935, 109; Sarkar, II, 48, n, 1.)

Realizing his weakness and his precarious condition, Tughan Khan despatched Sharaful Mulk Ash'ari and Qazi Jalaluddin Kashani to Delhi and sought help from the Sultan. The Sultan, as usual, sent royal insignias for the malik and directed Qamaruddin Tamar Qiran Khan, governor of Awadh, to march to the help of Tughan Khan with the forces of Hindustan. In the meantime, however, the Rai of Jajnagar¹⁶ had set out for Lakhnauti at the head of a huge army consisting of a large number of *paiks* (foot-men) and elephants. He captured Lakhnor¹⁷ and killed its governor, Fakhrul Mulk Karimuddin Laghri. When the Jajnagar army arrived before Lakhnauti, Malik Tughan came out to meet the enemy but was forced to seek shelter within the walls of the city. At this critical juncture messengers brought the happy news that the armies of Awadh were soon to join Tughan's forces. This spread panic in the army of Jajnagar, which beat a hasty retreat.

The combined forces of the Muslims did not pursue the Rai; instead, the two commanders, Tughril Tughan and Tamar Qiran, grew suspicious of each other; and this led to an armed conflict between them before the gates of the city of Lakhnauti. After a prolonged engagement, Malik Tughril Tughan was compelled to retire and seek shelter within the walls of the city.

After his entry into the city Malik Tughan Khan employed Minhaj, who negotiated peace between the two khans. Tamar Qiran agreed to allow Tughril Tughan to leave the city with his family, treasures and elephants, provided he handed over Lakhnauti and Bihar to Tamar Qiran. Consequently Tughril Tughan bade farewell to Lakhnauti and proceeded to Delhi along with his followers and Minhaj.¹⁸ The usurper, Malik Tamar Qiran, held Lakhnauti for about two years till his death in 644/1247;¹⁹ Tughan was appointed governor of Awadh.

The next governor of Lakhnauti appointed by Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud was Malik Jalaluddin Masud Jani (son of Malik Alauddin

16 'A vague geographical expression, the northern boundary of which extended from Chota Nagpur to the Delta of the Bhagirath, including roughly portions of the Birbhum, Bankura, Burdwan districts and the western half of the Hooghly district'. (Sarkar, 60.)

17 A city of the province on the western side of the Ganges, on the direct route between Lakhnauti and Katasin. (Raverty, 585 n, 6.)

18 The party reached Delhi in the month of Safar 643/July 1245. The Sultan bestowed his favours upon Tughan, and in the following month he was made the governor of Awadh, but he could not proceed to the new province till the accession of Nasiruddin Mahmud (644/1246). Shortly after his arrival in Awadh, he died in Shawwal 644/14 March 1247. Malik Qiran also died on the same night. (*Ibid.*, 736-41.)

19 His dead body was taken to and buried in Awadh. (*Ibid.*, 744.)

Jani who had been appointed to Bengal in 1230) with the high sounding title of 'Malikush Sharq'. Alauddin Jani called himself 'Shah' but maintained his allegiance to Sultan Nasiruddin.²⁰

The first governor of Lakhnauti who assumed the title of 'Sultan' was Ikhtiyaruddin Yuzbek, who succeeded Masud Jani in 650/1252. Before being assigned the charge of Lakhnauti, he had several times rebelled against the Sultan of Delhi 'for rashness and imperiousness were implanted in his nature and constitution'. After having consolidated his power in Lakhnauti (Varendra), he turned towards Radha in 651/1253, where a son-in-law and feudatory of Rai Narasimhadeva I had established his authority and whose capital was Umurda (Madaran in the north-eastern corner of the Hoogly district). He fought two successful battles against the Rai of Jainagar, but was defeated badly in the third engagement.

Like his predecessor, Tughril Tughan Khan, Yuzbek implored the help of the Sultan of Delhi but in vain. He, therefore, organized his own forces and set out for Radha in 653/1255. This time he made a surprise attack upon and captured Madaran. The Rai fled leaving behind his family and followers, treasures and elephants, to be seized by the Muslims. Malik Yuzbek completed the conquest of Radha by capturing Nadia.

These conquests brought a change in his attitude towards Delhi. More confident of his position now, he assumed three canopies of state—red, black, and white²¹—and adopted the lofty title of 'Sultan Mughisuddin Abul Muzaffar Yuzbek as-Sultan'.

The next year brought an opportunity for Yuzbek to make an attack on Awadh. Balban had ousted its governor, Malik Masud Jani, and had penetrated as far as the frontiers of Tirhut in 554/1250. After his departure Yuzbek marched towards Awadh, entered the province triumphantly and caused the *Khutba* to be recited in his name. But he could stay there for two weeks only, because one of the Turkish nobles spread the rumour that the army of Delhi was proceeding towards Awadh. Yuzbek lost his courage and hastened back to Lakhnauti. This step against the Delhi Sultan, Minhaj states, was condemned by the people of Hindustan, Hindus and Muslims alike.

After his return to Lakhnauti, he decided to bring under his rule the province of Kamrup (Kamrud).²² In the year 655/1257, he crossed

²⁰ Sarkar, 51.

²¹ This is interpreted 'as a token of his sovereignty over the three provinces, Lakhnauti, Bihar and Awadh'. (See *Ibid.*, II, 52.) But according to Minhaj, this incident took place before the occupation of Awadh. (See Raverty, 763.)

²² 'The land of Kamrup', says Sarkar (II, 53), 'was a *terra incognita* to the Turkish rulers of Lakhnauti.' The river Karatoya (or Begmati) formed the dividing line

the river Begmati (Karaṭoya)²³ and occupied the region without any opposition from its ruler, who retired to some place of safety. Yuzbek seized an immense booty and transformed Kamrup into a Muslim region by having the *Khutba* read in his name. But a tragic end awaited him. The shrewd Rai of Kamrup sent his envoys to Yuzbek, requesting him to reinstate him in his territory and promising that he would pay an annual tribute and would allow the *Khutba* to be read and the coins to be struck in Yuzbek's name. Yuzbek declined the offer. The Rai then cleverly sent his agents into the interior; they swore allegiance to Yuzbek, purchased all his grain at the high price he fixed and carried it to their headquarters. Yuzbek, unaware of the circumstances and the tricks, did not keep enough grain for his army. When the rainy season started, the Rai and his followers rose against Yuzbek on all sides.

Shortage of grain brought the Muslim army to the verge of starvation and it decided to retreat. But the Rai and his hidden soldiers surrounded the Muslim army, while the routes were flooded with water and occupied by the Hindus. Ultimately Yuzbek and his army were overpowered by the forces of the Rai. Yuzbek was wounded by an arrow in a skirmish and was then captured with his family. Before his death he made a request for his son being brought to him. He placed his face on the face of his son and breathed his last (1257).²⁴

After the death of Yuzbek, one Malik Izzuddin Balban-i Yuzbeki suddenly emerged as the ruler of Lakhnauti.²⁵ He sent presents to the Sultan who confirmed him as governor of Lakhnauti. When Izzuddin marched to Bang, Arsalan Khan Sanjar, the governor of Kara, besieged Lakhnauti which was defended by the citizens for three days. At last the city fell and Arsalan Khan sacked and plundered it for three days. Malik Izzuddin returned in 657/1259 to Lakhnauti to share the fate that had befallen Sultan Ghivasuddin Iwaz Khalji.²⁶

The new master of Lakhnauti, Tajuddin Arsalan Khan Sanjar, was a slave of Sultan Iltutmish. After having served in various capacities, he finally reached Kara in 657/1259 from where he made a dash for

between the territories of Lakhnauti and Kamrup. There was no centralized kingdom in Kamrup at that time.

²³ Perhaps somewhere near Ghoraghat in the Rangpur district and marched through the modern Goalpara district along the northern bank of the Brahmaputra river. (*Ibid.*, 53.)

²⁴ See Raverty, 762-66.

²⁵ Minhaj gives no details about his early career except that he held the post of Naib Amir-i Hajib at the Delhi court. (*Ibid.*, 827.)

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 827, 766-71.

Lakhnauti.²⁷ The Barahdari inscription of Bihar²⁸ and a much later chronicle²⁹ reveal that Malik Tajuddin Arsalan ruled over Bihar and Lakhnauti independently with the title of Sultan and died in 663/1265. He was succeeded by his son, Tatar Khan, who also was a capable ruler. He also ruled independently but is reported to have sent presents to Sultan Balban on the latter's accession. He received gifts in return from the Sultan. He died probably two years after the accession of Balban. His successor, Sher Khan, a member of Tajuddin Arsalan's family, restored the name of Balban on his coins in 667/1269.³⁰

Probably about this period the provinces of Lakhnauti and Bengal were conferred by Balban upon Tughril.³¹ Although originally a slave, Tughril 'possessed all the characteristic virtues of a Turk, indomitable will, reckless bravery, resourcefulness and boundless ambition.' He soon consolidated his position and extended his power up to the modern districts of Faridpur and Dacca and annexed the river tracts on both banks of the Padma as far as Loricol,³² known as *Arsa-i Bangala*.³³ He established friendly relations with the ruler of Tippera. In addition, he sought the extension of his power in the tract of Radha also. He invaded the territory of Jainagar several times and brought much booty from there. These successes made Tughril arrogant and defiant.³⁴ He did not send the booty to the Sultan, and started using the *chatr*.³⁵ He further assumed the title of Sultan Mughisuddin and caused the *Khutba* to be read and the coins to be

27 *Ibid.*, 766-70. Here his account of Arsalan Khan breaks and Minhaj gives no further information about him.

28 Sarkar, II, 56-57.

29 *Riazus Salatin* (Trans.), 77-79.

30 Sarkar, II, 57.

31 See Barani, *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*. But according to Yahya (40), Amin Khan, the governor of Awadh, was assigned Lakhnauti and Tughril was made his deputy. *The History of Bengal* (II, 58) follows Yahya.

32 'About 25 miles due south of Dacca, and about 10 miles south-west of Rajabari' (Sarkar, 59.)

33 This political unit seems to be a portion of the bigger geographical unit known as *Diya-i Bangala* (still unsubdued) for Balban is later reported to have referred to his conquest of *Arsa-i Bangala* by turning out Tughril and to have ordered Bughra Khan to rule over *Diya-i Bangala*. (See, Barani, 93; Sarkar, 59.)

34 Barani analyses the causes of his revolt. Besides the above-mentioned factors, the distance from Delhi and the preoccupations of the Delhi Sultan on the North-Western Frontiers made Bengal *Balghakpur*. (See Barani, 96-97.)

35 According to Yahya, rumours spread in Bengal about the death of Sultan Balban, and Tughril turned out Amin Khan and assumed royalty. The Sultan directed Malik Turmati, governor of Awadh, to subdue Tughril, but he was defeated. The Mir of Awadh, Malik Shihabuddin, was sent against Tughril but he was also defeated. (*Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi*, pp. 40-42.) According to Isami, Bahadur was sent from Delhi on the second expedition against Tughril. (*Futuh-us Salatin*, pp. 165-66.)

struck in his own name. In order to win the support of the people, he distributed his wealth lavishly.

When the news of his independence reached Delhi, it upset Balban completely. He lost his sleep and was extremely worried about the developments in Bengal, which seemed to compromise his position at Delhi also. He directed Amin Khan Aitigin Mui'daraz, governor of Awadh, to proceed along with other contingents of Hindustan and suppress the revolt of Tughril. The combined forces crossed the river Sarju. An engagement took place between the imperialists and Tughril somewhere between Tirhut and Lakhnauti. Many soldiers deserted Amin Khan and joined Tughril, and as a result the imperialists were routed. At Balban's order the defeated general was gibbeted and his body was hanged on the Awadh gate.

The Sultan then sent another army against Tughril but it also met with the same fate. The Sultan flew into a rage at the defeat of his second army and also assessed the proper dimensions of the Bengal revolt. He decided to march in person and ordered the construction of a fleet of boats on the Jumna and the Ganges. He placed Multan and the Mongol front in charge of his elder son, Prince Muhammad. Malikul Umara Fakhruddin, the Kotwal of Delhi, was appointed as the naib of the Sultan, and Bughra Khan, the younger son, was directed to accompany the Sultan to Lakhnauti. Thus, with vast preparations and determined to crush Tughril, Balban proceeded towards Lakhnauti in the beginning of January 1280.

On reaching Awadh, the Sultan reviewed the army. There were two lakhs of men, including cavalry, infantry, *paiks*, *dhanuks*, *kahars*, *kiwani* (?), *khud-aspas* (irregulars with their own horses), *tirzan* (archers), slaves, *chakars* (servants), *saudagars* (merchants) and *bazaris* (shop-keepers in the camp-bazar). The fleet also moved with these forces. The rainy season had started but the Sultan continued his march.

Tughril avoided a pitched battle; he left Lakhnauti and took the route to East Bengal (Jajnagar)³⁶ with his family and picked soldiers. All those who were afraid of Sultan Balban's fury joined Tughril. They were under the false impression that the Sultan would not stay for long at Lakhnauti and that they would return to Lakhnauti with their booty from East Bengal.

In the meantime the Sultan arrived at Lakhnauti; he reorganised his army and conferred the *shuhnagi* of Lakhnauti upon Husamuddin, Barani's maternal grandfather, with instructions to keep him informed

³⁶ Jajnagar is here incorrectly written by Barani for a place in East Bengal. Tughril obviously could not have gone to Jajnagar, which then meant Orissa.

about news coming from Delhi. The Sultan then proceeded towards East Bengal, determined to follow and capture Tughril. By forced marches he reached the suburbs of Sonargaon within a few days. Bhoj Rai of Sonargaon waited upon the Sultan³⁷ and jointly they planned action against Tughril. The Rai was to be held responsible if Tughril fled by sea or land or crossed the river.

It is said that the Sultan often declared that he had put the kingdom of Delhi at stake for the capture of Tughril, and that he would not return to Delhi without achieving his aim. This determination of the Sultan disappointed his soldiers about returning to Delhi and they despatched farewell letters and their wills to their relatives at the capital.

The Sultan covered seventy or eighty *kos* by continuous marches and reached the frontiers of Sonargaon, but nobody could give him any idea of the whereabouts of Tughril. The Sultan detached a contingent of seven or eight thousand soldiers and dispatched it in advance under Malik Bektars. The malik, in accordance with Sultan's instructions, sent out some scouts every day to discover traces of Tughril. One day these scouts found out the camp of Tughril and at once sent news to Malik Bektars. But they did not wait for the arrival of Bektars and fell upon the camp of Tughril, when many of his soldiers were engaged in drinking. Tughril was taken by surprise; he jumped on to his horse and tried to escape. But before he could cross the river, one of the scouts shot an arrow at him and he fell down. His head was immediately cut off. Balban returned to Lakhnauti and mercilessly executed the relatives and supporters of Tughril. He appointed his eldest son, Bughra Khan, as governor of Lakhnauti, and left for Delhi in 1282.

The rebellion of Tughril during the reign of Balban was not merely an expression of the erratic behaviour of a provincial governor; it was symbolical of a situation arising out of geographical factors, which led the governors of Bengal to defy the authority of the Delhi sultans and attempt to establish independent kingdoms. When Barani wrote that Bengal was known as '*Bulghakpur*', he had before him the political developments in that area since the establishment of the sultanat of Delhi.

After crushing the rebellion of Tughril, which took Balban three

³⁷ *The History of Bengal* (II, 65) gives a slightly different version. It says that Balban, and not the Rai, sought the interview; the latter insisted that the Sultan should receive the Rai (Rai Danuj) standing up from his throne. On the suggestion of a courtier it was arranged that when the Rai came, the Sultan rose up and let loose a hawk upon a bird. The Rai took it to be compliance with his condition, while others took it to be an accidental rising.

years of hard struggle, he sought to create conditions in Bengal which could ensure control of that region by Delhi. While entrusting its administration to his son, Bughra Khan, he made a long speech in which he expatiated on the need and expediency of obeying the central authority. But as things developed, Bughra Khan's appointment itself facilitated the establishment of an independent dynasty in Bengal.

SULTAN NASIRUDDIN BUGHRA (1281-87)

When Balban put the province of Bengal under his son, Bughra, he appointed two advisers to help and assist the prince. One of them, a Khalji noble, was a seasoned civil officer of sound judgement and mature understanding; the other was an experienced warrior from the Salt Range (*Koh-i Jud*). One was expected to help the prince in civil and the other in military affairs.

Bughra Khan ruled over the province of Bengal for about six years (1281-87). It was during his regime that the well-defined divisions of Bengal began to appear—Lakhnauti, Satgaon, Sonargaon and Chatgaon. Balban had advised his son to conquer and consolidate the *Arsa-i Bangala* (Satgaon) and the *Aqlim-i Bangala* (Sonargaon). The prince set up his capital at Lakhnauti.

On Prince Muhammad's death, Balban summoned Bughra Khan to Delhi as he wanted him to be near when the inescapable hand of death seized him. Bughra responded to the call but returned to his provincial capital against the wishes of his father. When Bughra decided to leave for the distant province of Bengal, he must have made up his mind to forego his claims on Delhi and exchange the crown of Delhi for the kingdom of Lakhnauti.

A week after Balban's death, sometime in September 1287, during which he mourned his father's death—Bughra assumed the title of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud and caused the *Khutba* and the coins to be put in his name.³⁸ Barani refers to the cordial relations between Nasiruddin Mahmud and Kaiqubad and says that presents were also exchanged between them. It is not necessary to recapitulate here the developments in Delhi and the circumstances under which Bughra proceeded to Awadh to meet his son.

An important outcome of the historic meeting of the father and the son in Awadh was the implied and tacit acceptance of the independence of Bengal. Kaiqubad's fast life led to paralysis and eventually paved the way for the rise of the Khaljis. No contemporary authority refers to the reactions of Sultan Nasiruddin to the tragic

³⁸ Barani, 128, 141-43, 160.

end of his house at Delhi. The author of the *Riyazus Salatin*, perhaps on the basis of the traditions he found floating down the stream of time, says that Bughra discarded the insignia of royalty. It is difficult to agree with the author that he did this out of fear of the Khaljis. It was perhaps a shock which developed in him disgust of all material glory and power. It cannot be said as to how long Bughra survived this shock.

SULTAN RUKNUDDIN KAIKAUS (1291-1301)

Nasiruddin Bughra's son, Kaikaus, in his teens at that time, was raised to the throne after the abdication of his father. A silver coin minted at Lakhnauti in 690/1291 may be taken as the earliest evidence of his reign. Numismatic and epigraphic evidence shows that he ruled over Bihar and Bengal for about eight years. His reign saw a brisk architectural activity and a number of buildings were put up during his reign. The Devkot and Lakhiserai inscriptions record the construction of mosques in those areas in 697/1297. A madrasa was also built by him at Triveni in 698/1298.³⁹

The kingdom of Bengal at that time comprised of four main political units namely, Bihar, Satgaon (Saptagram), Bang and Devkot, fencing in Lakhnauti and Radha. Sultan Jalaluddin Khalji, the contemporary ruler of Delhi, was busy elsewhere and could not turn his attention to Bengal.

SULTAN SHAMSUDDIN FIRUZ SHAH (1301-22)

Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz, who succeeded Ruknuddin Kaikaus, had been a *de facto* ruler during the reign of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud and was governor of Bihar under his successor. Ibn-i Battuta includes him among the descendants of Sultan Nasiruddin Mahmud but this is not confirmed by any contemporary record.⁴⁰ He and his descendants held sway over Bengal for about forty years till it was again made a province of the Delhi sultanat by Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq.

One of the significant features of the reign of the new Sultan was the expansion of Muslim power into the modern district of Mymensingh and thence across the Brahmaputra into the Sylhet district of Assam. The first invasion of Sylhet seems to have taken place in 703/1303.

Sultan Shamsuddin Firuz seems to have ascended the throne at

³⁹ *Epigraphia Indo-Moslemica*, 1917-18, 13, Plate II.

⁴⁰ The fact that his coins do not contain the phrase, *Sultan bin Sultan*, shows that he did not belong to a royal dynasty. But most writers, relying upon the genealogy reconstructed by Thomas and on the doubtful testimony of Ibn-i Battuta, include Sultan Shamsuddin among the descendants of Nasiruddin Mahmud. (Sarkar, 77.)

the age of fifty. His grown up and ambitious sons were eager to seize the throne. At least three of his six sons assumed kingly power during his lifetime.

According to the numismatic evidence available, Sultan Firuz could peacefully rule over Bihar, Lakhnauti, Satgaon and Bang (Sonargaon) till 707/1307-8 and only over Bihar and West Bengal (Satgaon) during 710-22/1310-22.

Like the Tughluq Sultan, who was his name-sake, Firuz was fond of building cities after his name. He founded Firozabad-Pandua (generally attributed to Firuz Tughluq) and named Tribeni as Firozabad. He died in 1322.⁴¹

GHIYASUDDIN BAHADUR SHAH

Ghiyasuddin Bahadur, the turbulent son of Shamsuddin Firuz, ruled over Lakhnauti and Sonargaon during 710-28/1310-27 with two interruptions. During his father's lifetime he ruled over Lakhnauti or over some part of North Bengal during 710-15/1310-16. In 717/1317 he was ousted from Lakhnauti by his brother, Shihabuddin Bughdah. He, however, captured Sonargaon at this time and Lakhnauti after two years, but his father challenged his authority. After his father's death in 722/1322, he became the virtual ruler of Lakhnauti and Sonargaon. He seems to have been deprived of Lakhnauti once again, but this time by his brother, Nasiruddin Ibrahim Shah, who was ruling over it when Sultan Ghiyasuddin Tughluq came to conquer Tirhut and Bengal in 724/1324. When Sultan Ghiyasuddin captured Tirhut,⁴² Nasiruddin Ibrahim Shah came forward, met the Tughluq Sultan at Tirhut, and offered to capture and bring Bahadur Shah, if the Sultan would send a contingent with him. The Tughluq Sultan accepted the offer and sent Tatar Khan with Nasiruddin along with a strong army. Bahadur Shah was, at that time, in his newly founded city, Ghiyaspur (in the modern Mymensingh district). On the arrival of the imperialists, he hurried to Lakhnauti. Nasiruddin came out of the city to meet him. A severe conflict took place in which Bahadur was defeated. When he was retreating towards Ghiyaspur, the imperialists captured him and presented him to Ghiyasuddin Tughluq as a captive at Lakhnauti, where the Tughluq Sultan was holding his court.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 77-82.

⁴² It was the last Hindu stronghold in Mithila under the Karnatak dynasty, which after its fall became a mint-town of the Tughluq sultans and came to be known as Tughluqpur or Tirhut. (*Ibid.*, 84.) But according to an alternative version, Sultan Ghiyasuddin invaded Tirhut when he was returning from Bengal. Harisimha, the ruler of Tirhut, had not been subdued completely when the Sultan heard disturbing news about the conduct of his son and had to leave Tirhut.

Ghiyasuddin Tughluq stayed at Lakhnauti for some time to make administrative arrangements, and after having confirmed Nasiruddin in Lakhnauti, he assigned the charge of Sonargaon and Satgaon to Bahram Khan *alias* Tatar Khan. After that the Sultan returned to Delhi to meet his tragic end at Afghanpur in 725/1325.

The next Delhi Sultan, Muhammad bin Tughluq (1325-51), adopted a more effective policy towards Bengal. In order to check the power of Tatar Khan and Sultan Nasiruddin, Muhammad bin Tughluq made the following arrangements. He liberated and loaded with honours Sultan Ghiyasuddin Bahadur Shah and sent him to Sonargaon to rule over that province as a 'vassal king',⁴³ while Tatar Khan was to stay there as the representative of the Delhi Sultan. Malik Pindar (or Bedar), entitled Qadr Khan, was appointed governor of Lakhnauti, Malik Abu Rija was made the wazir of Lakhnauti, and Izzuddin Yahya was appointed to the governorship of Satgaon.⁴⁴ Thus all the three centres of political power in Bengal—Lakhnauti, Sonargaon and Satgaon—were effectively controlled. Perhaps the Sultan realized the difficulties of controlling Bengal if local elements were not associated; and the danger of their rebellion was eliminated by placing a permanent representative of the centre at each of the two governments of Bengal.

Sultan Nasiruddin was, like Ghiyasuddin of Sonargaon, a nominal sultan who continued to issue coins in his own and Sultan Muhammad's name till 726/1326. Later he was recalled by the Sultan to join the imperial army against Kishlu Khan. His name was omitted from the coinage of Lakhnauti from 727/1327 onward. He died some time after 728. The exact date and place of his death are unknown.

Sultan Ghiyasuddin ruled over Sonargaon and issued coins both in his own and the Tughluq Sultan's name till 728/1328. When he aspired for the sovereignty of the whole of Bengal and rebelled against the Tughluq Sultan, he was punished by Tatar Khan, who flayed his skin and sent it to Sultan Muhammad who ordered it to be hung from the dome of victory.⁴⁵

Thus came to an end the rule of the house of Shamsuddin Firuz, and the three main divisions of Muslim Bengal—Lakhnauti, Satgaon and Sonargaon—passed under the kingdom of Delhi and were governed by Qadr Khan, Malik Izzuddin Yahya, and Tatar Khan respectively. The system worked successfully till 1338.

43 Isami, 422.

44 Yahya, 98.

45 Isami, 444.

CIVIL WARS IN BENGAL

Disturbances broke out when, on the death of Tatar Khan at Sonargaon in 739/1338, Fakhruddin, a confidential officer of Tatar Khan, rebelled and assumed the title of Sultan Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah. But the combined forces of Lakhnauti and Satgaon, led by Qadr Khan, Izzuddin Yahya and Firuz Khan of Kara, expelled Fakhruddin from Sonargaon. Qadr Khan occupied Sonargaon and the other generals retired to their respective provinces. But after some time Fakhruddin returned to fight with Qadr Khan, who was staying at Sonargaon. On this occasion the supporters of Qadr Khan, who had not been given any share out of the booty acquired from Sonargaon, not only deserted him but killed him and joined Fakhruddin. Fakhruddin then sent his slave, Mukhlis, to capture Lakhnauti but Mukhlis was killed by Ali Mubarak, the *ariz* of Qadr Khan. After this victory, Ali Mubarak applied to Delhi for his confirmation as governor of Lakhnauti. The Sultan, however, sent Malik Yusuf, the *shahna* of Delhi, to assume charge of Lakhnauti, but he died on the way. After that the Sultan could not turn his attention to the affairs of Bengal, which lost all contact with Delhi after 740/1339.⁴⁶

Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah ruled over Sonargaon from 1338 to 1350 and annexed Chittagong.⁴⁷ He was succeeded by Ikhtiyaruddin Ghazi Shah, probably his son, who ruled till 753/1352-53, when Sonargaon was occupied by Haji Ilyas Shah.⁴⁸

Ali Mubarak ruled over Lakhnauti under the title of Alauddin Ali Shah from 1339 to 1342, when he was killed by his officer, Ilyas.

SULTAN SHAMSUDDIN ILYAS SHAH (1342-57)

Ilyas Shah, who captured Lakhnauti in 743/1342 and Sonargaon in 753/1352-53, initiated an era of brilliant achievements in the history of Bengal. After having consolidated his position at Lakhnauti, he began to extend his dominions in the west. Tirhut, then ruled by two rival Hindu rulers, Sakhi Singh and Kamesvara, was conquered by him. Next in 1396 he invaded Nepal which was ruled by Jayrajdeva. He plundered it without much opposition and destroyed the Swayambhunath Stupa at Khatmandu but he did not stay long and retired to his capital. These successive conquests encouraged Ilyas Shah to march

⁴⁶ Yahya, 104-06.

⁴⁷ Sarkar, 99. It was during his reign that Ibn-i Battuta visited Bengal. He gives an interesting account of it in his *Rehla*.

⁴⁸ Sarkar, II, 96. But according to Yahya (105) and Aff (137) Fakhruddin was captured and later beheaded by Ilyas Shah, while the *Riazus Salatin* (96) says that he was killed by Ali Mubarak in 741/1340-41.

into Orissa from where he brought an immense booty, including forty-four elephants. He further extended his authority beyond Tirhut to Champaran and Gorakhpur, whose rajas acknowledged his authority. He, finally, extended his dominions right up to Banaras.⁴⁹

When he was at the peak of his power, Sultan Firuz Tughluq knocked at the gates of his kingdom to measure swords with him. The Delhi Sultan set out in 1353 at the head of a mighty army, 90,000 cavalry, a large infantry, archers and a flotilla of a thousand boats. The imperial army proceeded to Awadh and, marching through Gorakhpur and Champaran (the newly subdued territories of Ilyas) and pushing back the forces of Bengal at every point by its superb strategy, entered Bengal and occupied Firozabad-Pandua. The Sultan granted amnesty to the inhabitants of the city and, in order to win their support, liberally granted lands to the nobles and other deserving people.

Shamsuddin Ilyas Shah had shut himself up in the fort of Ekdala,⁵⁰ which was regarded as one of the strongest forts of Bengal. Sultan Firuz Shah proceeded towards Ekdala and tried to besiege it, but the site where he had encamped was not suitable. Mosquitoes gave much trouble to the imperialists. The Sultan decided to retreat towards Pandua. But he did this in such a manner that Ilyas took it to be a panic-stricken flight, threw all caution to the winds and came out of the fort to deliver a charge upon the retiring imperialists. The Sultan immediately turned towards the enemy, and completely routed the forces of Bengal, which fled to Ekdala leaving behind a large number of dead soldiers and elephants, the latter were captured by the army of Delhi. Ilyas again shut himself in the fort of Ekdala.

Sultan Firuz now made up his mind to punish Ilyas Shah. He marched to storm the fort, but moved by the lamentations of the women, who appeared without their veils on the top of the ramparts, he abstained from an assault. Peace was concluded and the Sultan returned to Delhi in 755/1354.⁵¹

49 Sarkar, 104-05.

50 Westmacott has identified it with a village of the same name in the Dhanjar Pargana of Dinajpur district, about 23 miles north of Pandua in Malda district, 42 miles north of Gaur, 15 miles west of Choraghat on the Malda side of the river Tangan. (Sarkar, 107, n. 1.)

51 For details see, Barani, 587-96, Aff, 109-22; Yahya, 124-25; *Strat-i Firoz Shahi*, 15a-22a.

According to Barani, Firoz started in 754/1353 and returned in 755/1354, i.e. within 10 months. This chronology is found unsatisfactory. Sarkar (105, n. 1) suggests 1353 and 1354 as dates of march and return respectively on the basis of Aff's reference to the campaign and on the authority of an inscription on a tomb at Bihar.

For the rest of his reign Ilyas Shah remained at peace with the Delhi Sultan and exchanged gifts with him.⁵² This amicable settlement with the Delhi Sultan gave Ilyas Shah an opportunity to extend his territory. Kamrup, hitherto unsubdued,⁵³ proved to be a fertile land, which was ruled at that time by a weak raja.⁵⁴ A bold attack in 758/1357 laid Kamrup at the feet of the Sultan of Bengal.⁵⁵

After a peaceful reign, Ilyas Shah died in 759/1358 and was succeeded by his son, Sikandar Shah.

SIKANDAR SHAH (1357-89)

The efforts of the new Sultan to maintain cordial relations with Firuz Shah failed.⁵⁶ Zafar Khan,⁵⁷ a son-in-law of Sultan Fakhruddin of Sonargaon, waited upon Sultan Firuz Shah Tughluq and persuaded him to espouse his cause. Firuz set out for Lakhnauti in 1359 at the head of a huge army consisting of 80,000 cavalry and a large number of infantry and 470 war-elephants. Sikandar adopted his father's tactics and took shelter in the fort of Ekdala. Firuz besieged the fort in vain. Ultimately a peace was concluded, gifts were exchanged and Firuz Shah returned to Delhi.⁵⁸ No other sultan of Delhi, till the rise of the Lodis, disturbed the rulers of Bengal.

After a long and peaceful reign of about thirty-five years Sikandar Shah died in a battle against his rebel son, Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah, near Pandua⁵⁹ (in 1389).

⁵² Yahya, 126, 127.

⁵³ Both Ghiyasuddin Iwaz in 1227 and Malik Yuzbek in 1257 had failed to capture it.

⁵⁴ The ruler of Kamta at that time was Indra Narayan. During his weak rule a Hindu chief had set himself up as an independent ruler at Kamrup in 1329. (Sarkar, 110.)

⁵⁵ Sarkar, II, 109-10.

⁵⁶ Yahya, 128.

⁵⁷ He was a Persian noble and son-in-law of Sultan Fakhruddin of Sonargaon and held an important post in the revenue department. He lost his post and honour when Ilyas Shah captured Sonargaon in 1352-53. He went to Hisar Firoza in A.H. 758 and sought the help of Sultan Firuz, who honoured him with the post of naib wazir and promised to help him. (See Aff, 137-44; Yahya, 126.)

⁵⁸ Aff gives a graphic account of this expedition. (*Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*, 137-41, 144-63; see also Yahya, 127-28.)

⁵⁹ Sikandar had seventeen sons from his first wife and only one (Ghiyasuddin) from his second wife. He loved Ghiyasuddin more than his other sons. This aroused jealousy in the heart of his first wife, who intrigued against the prince. The prince got an inkling of the plot, fled to Sonargaon and openly rose against his father. Ultimately a battle took place at Goalpara in which Sikandar was killed, although the prince had ordered his soldiers not to strike at his father in the battle-field. (See *Riazus Salatin*, 106-8.)

GHIYASUDDIN AZAM SHAH⁶⁰ (1389-1409)

Sultan Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah was one of the most popular sultans of Bengal. He is known for his love of justice⁶¹ and his relations with the outside academic world, including the celebrated poet, Hafiz of Shiraz.

During his reign there occurred a conflict between the Ahom Raja Sudangpha (1397-1407) and the Raja of Kamta. He tried to utilize this opportunity for extending his authority and invaded the territory of the Raja of Kamta; but the two rajas patched up their differences and appeared against the Sultan with their combined forces. Ghiyasuddin could not face them and his army was forced back to the river Karatoya.

Sultan Ghiyasuddin is reported to have established friendly relations with Khwaja Jahan, the ruler of Jaunpur (1394-99). In 1406 a Chinese envoy visited his court, and the Sultan sent his own envoy with some gifts to the court of the Chinese emperor in 1409.⁶² The Sultan had very intimate relations with the famous Chishti saint of his time, Shaikh Nur Qutb-i Alam. He is reported to have met his tragic death at the hands of Raja Ganesh in 813/1409.⁶³

After Sultan Ghiyasuddin Azam Shah several minor and weak successors came to the throne but they were puppets in the hands of the powerful nobles. One such noble was Raja Ganesh of Dinajpur, who rose to power towards the close of Ghiyasuddin's reign. Three weak kings—namely, Saifuddin Hamza, son of Ghiyasuddin with the title of *Sultanus Salatin* (c. 813-14/1410-12),⁶⁴ his adopted son, Shihabuddin Bayazid Shah (c. 815-17/1413-14), and Alauddin Firuz Shah, son

60 Sarkar (116) gives the date of his accession as 1389, *The Delhi Sultanate* (203) places it between 1389 and 1393. In *The Cambridge History of India* (III, 269, n, 1) the date fixed by Staneley Lane-Poole (*The Mohammadan Dynasties*, 307) is quoted as 1389. In view of the fact that the poet Hafiz, with whom Ghiyasuddin corresponded, died in 1388, it is suggested that unless his accession is antedated, it should be assumed that Ghiyasuddin enjoyed royal power at Sonargaon before his father's death.

61 Once an arrow shot by the Sultan accidentally hit a widow's son. She brought her complaint before the qazi, who summoned the Sultan to his court and decided the case against him. The Sultan was pleased with the qazi for his boldness and rewarded him liberally. (For details see the *Riazus Salatin*, 110-11.)

62 The Chinese interpreter, Mahaun, who came to Bengal in 1409, has left an interesting account of Bengal. (See Sarkar, 118-19.)

63. See *Riazus Salatin*, III, but it gives A.H. 775, as the date of his death. We have accepted the date given in *The History of Bengal* (119).

64 One notable thing about his reign is that he continued friendly relations with China and sent a letter written on a gold plate and a giraffe to the Chinese emperor. (Sarkar, 118.)

of Shihabuddin, (817/1414-15)—were raised to the throne one after another, till in 1415 Raja Ganesh himself managed to assume the royal power.⁶⁵ This created a stir in Bengal and a number of *ulama* and saints, including Shaikh Nur Qutb-i Alam, wrote to Sultan Ibrahim of Jaunpur and sought his help to overthrow Ganesh. The ruler of Jaunpur marched into Bengal in 1415. Thereupon peace was concluded on condition that Ganesh would convert his son, Jadusen, to Islam and would raise him to the throne of Bengal.

After the departure of the Jaunpur army, Ganesh placed his twelve-year son on the throne and himself wielded authority under the title of Danuj-mardan Deva. According to Ferishta he ruled effectively and treated Muslims with favour. But he is alleged to have reconverted his son to Hinduism, which made him unpopular. The reconverted son could not secure a proper place in Hindu society and at the same time he lost the support of the Muslims. Ganesh died in 812/1418. After his death the Hindu chiefs placed his younger son on the throne under the title of Mahendra Deva (devoted to the feet of the goddess Chandi), but he was removed in the same year (1418), and the crown then passed on to the elder son of Ganesh, Jadusen.

SULTAN JALALUDDIN MUHAMMAD SHAH (1418-31)

Jadusen (Jalaluddin) agreed to assume the crown on the condition that he was allowed to accept Islam. Thus, after reconversion to Islam, he ascended the throne in 1418.⁶⁶ He then ruled peacefully over the whole of Bengal, from the Kusi river in the north-west to Chittagong in the south-east, and from Fathabad and Satgaon in south Bengal to the border of the Karatoya in the north-east. He annexed a portion of Tipperah and Rohtasgarh in south Bihar to his dominion. He transferred his capital from Panud to Gaur, but decorated the former capital also with fine buildings, mosques and inns.⁶⁷ He was a liberal monarch and conferred several high posts upon his Hindu subjects and patronized several Hindu scholars also.⁶⁸

After a long and peaceful reign he died about 835/1431 and was succeeded by his son, Shamsuddin Ahmad Shah.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 116, 119.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, II, 126-29.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 129.

⁶⁸ For instance, a Brahman, named Brihaspati Misra of Kulingram (in Burdwan district), was made the court-pandit; Sri Rajyadhara, another notable Hindu, was raised to the status of an army commander, and Brihaspati's son, Visvas Rai, was one of his ministers. He patronized a famous Sanskrit scholar, who was probably his teacher also and who wrote commentaries on several works and prepared a digest on Hindu rites. (See *The Delhi Sultanate*, 209-10.)

SHAMSUDDIN AHMAD SHAH (1431-35)

Shamsuddin continued his father's liberal policy and maintained friendly relations with China. A Chinese envoy came to his court in 1431-32. During his reign Ibrahim Sharqi led an invasion against Bengal. Shamsuddin implored the help of Shah Rukh of Herat. Shah Rukh sent a message to the Sultan of Jaunpur asking him not to attack his territory.

His short rule came to an end with his assassination by his slaves, Shadi Khan and Nasir Khan.

RESTORATION OF THE ILYAS SHAHI DYNASTY;
NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD SHAH (1442-58)

Soon dissension broke out among the assassins themselves. Nasir Khan first crowned Shadi Khan and then got him killed and took his place. But he was assassinated by his rivals, who raised to the throne Mahmud, a descendant of Ilyas. He assumed the title of Nasiruddin Abul Muzaffar Mahmud. He enjoyed a peaceful reign from at least 846/1442 to 862/1458.

During this period the Sharqi rulers were engaged in their fateful conflict with the Lodi kings, and so they could not turn their attention to Bengal.

So far as the political achievements of Mahmud are concerned, it may be mentioned that some part of the Jessore and Khulna districts and part of the modern 24 Parganas (in the Satgaon province) seem to have been annexed by him to his large and consolidated kingdom. He further beautified the capital city (Gaur) with many buildings.⁶⁹

RUKNUDDIN BARBEK SHAH (1459-74)

The efficient administration and peaceful reign of Nasiruddin Mahmud enabled his son and successor, Ruknuddin Barbek, to extend his dominions. The new ruler organized a militia of Abyssinian slaves and employed Arab soldiers also. One of these Arab soldiers was a Quraish, named Ismail, whose military exploits are preserved in the *Risalatus Shuhada*.⁷⁰ According to this work, Ismail reoccupied the fort of Madaran, which had previously been captured by the Raja of Orissa, called the Gajapati. The Hindu commandant of the fort was also captured by Ismail. The hero of these exploits was then deputed to lead an army to Kamrup. Here again the expedition led to the

⁶⁹ Sarkar, II, 130-32.

⁷⁰ Compiled in 1633 by Pir Muhammad Shattari and discovered at the shrine of that saint at Kantaduar, a few miles north-east of Choraghat, Rangpur district. The text and an abridged translation of it were published by G. H. Damant in *JASB*, 1874, 216-39. (See *Ibid.*, II, 133, n, 1.)

reoccupation of the cis-Karatoya region, lately overrun by the Kamrup forces. A tough battle was fought near (Mahi) Santosh in Dinajpur, at the end of which the Raja of Kamrup, Kameswar, surrendered and accepted Islam, and the Kamrup forces withdrew. But the warrior-saint, at the instigation of the commandant of the frontier-fort of Ghoraghat on the Karatoya, was executed by the orders of Barbek in 1474.

The reign of Barbek witnessed an all-round expansion. North of the Ganges his empire extended at least up to Barur (a pargana in the Purnia district) while the newly conquered Jessore-Khulna region formed his southern frontier.

Barbek was a great patron of Bengali literature. The celebrated poet, Maladhar Basu, compiler of *Sri Krishna Bijay*, was patronized by him and was granted the title of Gunaraj Khan. His son was honoured with the title of Satyaraj Khan.⁷¹

SHAMSUDDIN YUSUF SHAH (1474-81)

Ruknuddin Barbek was succeeded by his talented and learned son, Shamsuddin Yusuf, who was a capable administrator and had a deep regard for justice. He introduced prohibitionary measures. The Baisdarwaza mosque built by him contains an inscription which indicates that he had acquired some territory in the south-west at the expense of Orissa. He constructed several other buildings also. He died about 886/1481, and was succeeded by Sikandar, probably his son. Sikandar was, however, deposed after three days when it was discovered that he was a lunatic.⁷²

JALALUDDIN FATH SHAH (1481-87)

The next ruler was Husain, son of Nasiruddin Mahmud,⁷³ who styled himself as Jalaluddin Fath Shah. He was an intelligent and enlightened ruler. As the Abyssinian slaves had become turbulent, he tried to curb their power but fell a victim to their dagger. The chief eunuch, Sultan Shahzada, in league with the discontented Abyssinian slaves, assassinated the Sultan in 892/1486. Thus came to an end the Ilyas Shahi dynasty, which had produced several talented and liberal monarchs, who were great builders and were very popular in Bengal.⁷⁴

After the murder of Fath Shah, Shahzada with the title of Barbek

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, II, 132-36.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 136; also *The Delhi Sultanate*, 213.

⁷³ The *Riazus Salatin* (121) calls him the son of Yusuf Shah, but this is contradicted by numismatic evidence and by inscriptions in which he is described as the son of Nasiruddin Mahmud. (Sarkar, 137.)

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 137.

Shah assumed the crown but was assassinated within a few months by Malik Andil, a loyal Abyssinian commander. Andil offered the crown to Fath's infant son, but the mother of the child did not agree to it. Consequently the nobles persuaded Andil to accept the crown.

SAIFUDDIN FIRUZ (1487-90)

Malik Andil then ascended the throne with the title of Saifuddin Firuz. He was loyal to the house of Ilyas Shah and was a just and efficient ruler. After a peaceful rule of three years, he was killed by the *paiks*, who had now assumed the role of king-makers.⁷⁵

NASIRUDDIN MAHMUD (1490-91)

The next ruler was Nasiruddin Mahmud, either the son of Firuz or of Fath Shah. Being a boy-king, he was dominated by his tutor, an Abyssinian noble, Habsh Khan, who himself aspired for the throne. But before he could usurp the throne, another Abyssinian noble, Sidi Badr, killed him. He then assassinated Nasiruddin Mahmud and ascended the throne without much opposition. Nasiruddin reigned for about a year.⁷⁶

SHAMSUDDIN MUZAFFAR (1491-93)

The Abyssinian assassin, nick-named Diwana, ascended the throne as Shamsuddin Muzaffar Shah and inaugurated a reign of terror. He mercilessly put down all Hindu and Muslim nobles suspected of opposition to his authority. He did not spare even the soldiers and the common people. Heavy revenue demands and the reduction in the salaries of the soldiers hastened his fall. His talented wazir, Saiyyid Husain, noticed the tide of opposition and made a common cause with the discontented people. Leading the opposition, the wazir besieged Muzaffar in his fort. The siege continued for four months with heavy casualties on both sides. Subsequently the wazir got Muzaffar killed secretly with the help of the *paiks* about the end of 1493.⁷⁷

ALAUDDIN HUSAIN (1493-1519)

Saiyyid Husain, who assumed the crown in 1493, inaugurated a brilliant epoch in the history of Bengal. A year after his accession he adopted the title of *Khalifatullah*.⁷⁸ Under his peaceful and enlightened rule, the creative genius of the people of medieval Bengal reached

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 138-39.

⁷⁶ *Tabaqat*, III, 440-41; Sarkar, II, 139-40.

⁷⁷ *Tabaqat*, III, 441-42; Sarkar, II, 140-41.

⁷⁸ In an inscription found in Malda he styles himself as such.

its zenith. The vernacular made a tremendous advance. He allowed a fairly liberal share to the Hindus in his administration.

He was, however, a stern administrator, and he executed about twelve thousand soldiers, who had continued to plunder the capital city against his orders. He further disbanded the notorious *paiks*, liquidated the Abyssinian slaves, and restored Hindu and Muslim nobles to their former positions. All these measures won for him the golden opinion of the people of Bengal. His reign witnessed the consolidation of the kingdom. He not only restored the old frontiers of Bengal but also annexed certain other areas to his kingdom.

Alauddin shifted his capital to Ekdala and, after consolidating his position there, adopted a vigorous foreign policy which brought him fame and glory.

The fall of the Sharqi kingdom and its annexation by the vigorous Lodis and their march up to the borders of Bihar threatened the frontiers of the Bengal kingdom. The defeated Sultan of Jaunpur, Husain, had sought shelter with the ruler of Bengal, a fact which Sultan Sikandar Lodi could not ignore.

Incensed at the friendly attitude of the King of Bengal towards the fugitive Sultan of Jaunpur, Sikandar Lodi proceeded from Darweshpur to Tughluqpur, on the Bengal frontier, in 1495. The aggressive designs of the Lodi Sultan brought the Bengal army into action. Alauddin Husain despatched his son, Daniyal, to check Sikandar's progress. No battle, however, was fought but both the armies remained encamped at Barh,⁷⁹ facing each other. Ultimately, on the instructions of Sultan Sikandar, his generals, Mahmud Lodi and Mubarak Nohani, entered into a non-aggression treaty and Prince Daniyal gave a pledge not to give shelter to the Sultan's enemies.

After the departure of Sultan Sikandar Lodi, Husain Shah seems to have occupied the whole of north Bihar, including the trans-Gandak area. Some inscriptions found at Monghyr and Bihar testify to the fact that south Bihar, extending to within few miles of Patna, also formed part of the Bengal kingdom.

During the preceding period of civil wars, Nilambar, the Khen King of Kamtapur, seems to have extended his frontiers on the eastern bank of the Karatoya. In 1498 Sultan Husain despatched Ismail Ghazi to recover the lost territory. Ismail besieged the Khen capital, but the siege continued for many years. According to one tradition it lasted for twelve years. Finally Kamtapur fell and was plundered. Its ruler was captured and brought to Gaur but he managed to escape. His possessions up to Hajo were annexed to the Bengal

⁷⁹ About 30 miles east of Patna.

kingdom and a colony of Afghans was planted in Kamrup. Husain's son, Daniyal, was appointed viceroy of the newly occupied region.

On the frontier of Orissa, the fort of Mandaran, formerly a frontier fortress between the two kingdoms, seems to have come under the control of the Rai of Orissa. Here again Ghazi Ismail is reported to have eventually occupied this fortress.⁸⁰

Another conflict of a protracted nature took place against the ruler of Tipperah. The first attack, launched not later than 1513, was repulsed by the Tipperah army. The second expedition led by Gaur Malik suffered a heavy loss. The third expedition sent under Hatim Khan also met the same fate. During the last two mentioned expeditions most of the retreating Bengali forces were drowned in the Gomati. The fourth and the final attack was launched by Husain Shah in person. A severe battle was fought near the Kailagarh fort. The battle seems to have ended in the occupation of some portion of Tipperah by Husain Shah. It was probably about the same period that Chittagong was also occupied by the Bengali forces, but it seems that, taking advantage of the prolonged conflict between the Orissan and Bengali forces, the ruler of Arakan captured Chittagong.

A powerful army under the command of Prince Nusrat was sent against the King of Arakan, who had occupied Chittagong. The prince recovered Chittagong. After the departure of Nusrat, Paragal Khan and later on his son, Chhuti, continued to press the Arakanese forces southwards. This struggle came to an end by 1517.

The peaceful and glorious reign of Husain Shah came to an end in 1519. He had not only restored the old boundaries of the Bengal kingdom but had also added Kamrup, Saran and part of Tipperah to it. His kingdom comprised of a vast territory bounded by Saran and Bihar on the north-west, on the south-east by Sylhet and Chittagong, Hajo on the north-east, and Mandaran and the 24-Parganas on the south-west.

Himself a learned man, Husain Shah patronized learning and the Bengali language. He won the hearts of his subjects—Hindus and Muslims alike. The former went so far as to honour him as an incarnation of Krishna—*Nripati Tilak* (Crown of Kings) and *Jagat-Bhushan* (Adornment of the Universe). He liberally conferred high posts upon his Hindu subjects. His wazir was a talented Hindu, Gopinath Basu. Mukanda Das was his private physician, Kesava Chhatri held the post

⁸⁰ The exact date of this expedition cannot be determined. *The Mudha Panjika* (a chronicle of the Jagannath temple at Puri) places it in 1509; the biographies of Chaitanya indicate that it took place between 1509 and 1516, while the numismatic evidence puts it on a date earlier than 1504-5. It may have been a war of protracted nature. (Sarkar, 148.)

of the chief of his body-guard, Anup was the master of the mint, and Gaur Malik was the military chief who led the expedition to Tipperah. The two celebrated brothers, Rupa and Sanatan, held high posts, and one of them was his private secretary (*dabir-i khas*).

Maladhar Basu, Bipradas, Bijay Gupta and Jasoraj Khan, the famous Bengali writers, flourished during his enlightened rule. He is reported to have shown great respect to Chaitanya.⁸¹

NASIRUDDIN ABUL MUZAFFAR
NUSRAT SHAH (1519-32)

Nusrat, the eldest son and heir-apparent of Husain Shah, was unanimously raised to the throne after his father's death. Curiously enough, instead of executing his brothers, he increased their allowances and raised their dignities.

His father had witnessed the extinction of the Jaunpur kingdom; he witnessed the fall of the Lodi power and managed to deal with the problems that cropped up.

A new power, the Lohani kingdom, had emerged in Bihar in 1522; it was eager to maintain friendly relations with Bengal in order to safeguard its position against the Lodis. Towards the close of Ibrahim Lodi's reign, the eastern provinces had slipped out of his hands. The Lohanis and Farmulis built their power from Jaunpur to Patna, while Nusrat Shah extended his hold in Bihar up to Tirhut and placed it under his brothers-in-law, Alauddin and Makhdum-i Alam. The latter established himself at Hajipur and brought under his control the whole tract on both sides of the Ghogra, as far as Azamgarh. The Afghan kingdom served as a barrier to the Bengal kingdom and Nusrat Shah maintained cordial relations with it.

When Humayun dislodged Maruf and Nasir Lohani from Kanauj and Jaunpur in 1526 and appropriated the Gangetic region up to the Ghogra (south of the Tons), Nusrat Shah realized the danger of the Mughal threat. He, therefore, assured Babur of his neutrality by sending his envoys to the Mughal court and this led Babur to abandon his campaign against Bengal in 1528.

The disorganized Afghans could not withstand the Mughal pressure, and their collapse in the eastern region created a serious problem for Nusrat Shah, who had to face the Mughals with his own resources and diplomacy.

In 1529 Babur sent his envoy from Buxar and demanded from Nusrat free passage across the Ghogra. The latter evaded an early reply and directed his governor, Makhdum-i Alam, to strengthen the line of defence on the Ghogra-Ganges confluence. Babur sent another

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 142-52.

envoy demanding the acceptance of his terms. Probably no answer came and finally Babur mobilized his forces which crossed into Saran after a severe conflict. After some time Husain Khan and the Shahzada of Monghyr signed an agreement on behalf of Nusrat and thus saved the kingdom of Bengal from a Mughal attack.

After the death of Babur, Nusrat hit upon a plan in order to check Mughal aggressive designs. He sent his envoy, Malik Marjan, to Gujarat to win the support of, and enter into an alliance with, Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Thus he could divert the attention of Humayun. But before the agreement could assume a definite shape, Nusrat was assassinated by one of his slaves in 1532.

Nusrat had, however, certain achievements to his credit. He made an attempt to bring under his control the Upper Brahmaputra valley. The details of the campaign are not known, but it seems that the Ahom king of that region proceeded towards Hajo in 1529 and built a base at Narayanpur, north of the river, two years after the incident; but he was defeated in a naval engagement at Temani (Trimohani), and retreated to Kamrup. Their victory encouraged the Ahoms, who built two more strongholds at Sala and Singiri, opposite Hajo. The Bengali forces later made an attempt upon Singiri but were badly defeated. In the meantime Nusrat died.

Later attempts were again frustrated due to the superior naval forces of the Ahoms. Shortly after that Biswa Singh founded the Kuch dynasty, appropriating much of the Muslim territory in Kamrup, but also at the cost of the Ahom kingdom.

During his reign Nusrat Shah kept the kingdom intact. He, however, could not face Babur, who weakened Nusrat's hold on the trans-Gandak region. Like his father he was a liberal monarch. A Bengali version of the *Mahabharata* was made at his instance.⁸²

ALAUDDIN FIRUZ (1532-33)

Nusrat Shah was not destined to be succeeded by a worthy ruler. The heir-apparent, Abdul Badr (Mahmud), Nusrat's younger brother, was eliminated by Makhdum, the governor of north Bihar. He raised to the throne his son, with the title of Alauddin Firuz, but he was assassinated after a few months by Abdul Badr.⁸³

GHIYASUDDIN MAHMUD (1533-38)

After the assassination of his nephew, Abdul Badr ascended the throne with the title of Ghiyasuddin Mahmud. He was a weak ruler and lacked both tact and courage. He failed to strike at the Mughals

⁸² *Ibid.*, 152-59.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 159.

when they were engaged in Gujarat. Another blunder committed by him was that he not only lost the friendship of a possible ally, Sher Khan, but made him a bitter enemy by joining hands with the Lohanis of Patna. In 1533 Sher Khan defeated and killed Qutb Khan, who was sent by Mahmud to conquer Bihar. As Makhdum was an enemy of Mahmud, Sher Khan won him over to his side and utilized his resources and wealth (even after his death) in his conflict with Mahmud's army and continued to expand his power. In a decisive battle at Surajgarh, Sher Khan defeated the Bengalis in 1534.

When Sher Khan found Humayun engaged in Gujarat, he decided upon a bold and decisive policy towards Mahmud and marched towards his capital in 1536. Mahmud strongly defended the Taliagarhi Pass with the help of the Portuguese. Sher Khan left his son, Jalal Khan, with a detachment to hold the Bengalis at the Pass, while he himself passed through Jharkhand and appeared suddenly before Gaur. Mahmud was so upset that he immediately made a truce with Sher Khan by promising to pay him an indemnity of thirteen lakhs of gold coins. Sher Khan withdrew for the time being but he had made up his mind to overthrow the enemy. Having consolidated his position at the Taliagarhi Pass, Sher Khan marched on Gaur in 1537 on the pretext of the non-payment of the indemnity by Mahmud. The capture of Gaur was, however, delayed as Humayun, realizing the dangers of the rising power of Sher Khan, hurried to check him. But the Mughal emperor, instead of marching direct to Gaur, opened a front at Chunar. Sher Khan left his son, Jalal Khan, and his powerful general, Khwas Khan, to push on the siege of Gaur and himself rushed to save Chunar. The siege of Chunar dragged on, while the siege of Gaur was pressed hard and it finally fell in 1538. Mahmud fled to north Bihar and sought the help of Humayun. Before Humayun could conclude a treaty with Sher Khan, the envoy of Mahmud had changed Humayun's mind and he decided to march on Gaur. He reached the city to find it empty of its treasures, which had been taken away by the Afghans when they evacuated the city. Humayun was not destined to hold Bengal and was badly defeated by Sher Khan in the subsequent fateful engagements. The whole kingdom of Bengal now lay at the feet of Sher Khan—the future Sher Shah. Its former ruler Mahmud disappeared from the scene. When he was marching with Humayun to Gaur, he heard that his two sons had been executed by the Afghans at Gaur. He could not survive the shock and died soon after.⁸⁴

APPENDICES

I. GLOSSARY

- AFTABGIR**—a parasol.
Ahlul ilm—men of knowledge; educated men.
A'in—state laws as distinguished from the laws of the *shari'at*.
Akhurbek—master of the horse.
Alai tanku—the tanka (silver or gold coin) of Alauddin Khalji.
Alamatha-i Sultani—insignia of royalty.
Alp Khan—a title meaning the first or the senior khan.
Amils—revenue officers.
Amir—commander; the third highest official grade (of the Delhi sultanat).
Amir-i dad—officer-in-charge of justice; the public prosecutor.
Amir-i akhur—*amir* or officer commanding the horse.
Amir-i hajib—officer-in-charge of the royal court; also called *barbek* in Turkish.
Amir-i koh—officer-in-charge of agriculture.
Amir-i shikar—officer-in-charge of the royal hunt.
Amir-i tarab—officer-in-charge of royal amusements.
Amirul Muminin—Commander of the Faithful; the Caliph.
Andas—closest friends (among the Mongols).
Ansars—literally helpers; applied to the Muslims of Medina who helped the Arabian Prophet.
Aqida—faith; belief.
Artiz—officer-in-charge of the muster, equipment of the soldiers and their horses.
Ark—inner castle.
Arz-i mamalik—minister in charge of the army of the whole country.
Asalib—rules of state law.
Azhdaha—dragon.
- BACHA-BAZI**—children's games.
Badguman—suspicious.
Badnamt—bad reputation.
Baghban—gardener.
Bahadurs—brave persons.
Bahar-i Hind—a kind of Indian silk cloth.
Bahri wa kahi—relating to the sea and the hills.
Ba'at—allegiance.
Balahar—the lowest grade of the agricultural peasant.
Bandagan-i Turk Chihalgani—the forty families of Turkish slave-officers who governed the Delhi sultanat (between the reigns of Iltutmish and Balban).
Band-i zar—chain or band of gold.

Bandtayan-i Tazik—foreign, but non-Turkish, officers or slaves.
Banjara—a corn merchant.
Baqqals—grocers.
Bar—public royal court.
Barbek—officer-in-charge of the royal court; also called *amir-i haftb* in Persian.
Bargah—court.
Barid—intelligence officer appointed by the state to collect information.
Barid-i mamalik—head of the state intelligence service.
Bastils—ambassadors or agents.
Baward-i khurasan—a high quality cloth brought from or attributed to Khurasan.
Bazzaz—cloth-dealer.
Bhai—brother.
Bhand—a professional joker.
Bhang—an Indian intoxicant herb.
Bek—an officer of high grade.
Birudaries—clans; families belonging to the same group.
Biradar-war—arranged according to clans or related families.
Biranj—bronze.
Birs—wells.
Bisua—a small Indian unit of land measurement.

CARAWANS—group of merchants travelling together (also *Karawans*).
Chadars—sheets.
Chuppa—a very small piece of land.
Charat—meadow.
Chatr—royal umbrella.
Chaudharis—a class of village headmen.
Chaugan—medieval polo.
Chaul—desert; steppe.
Chaul-i Jalali—the desert through which Jalaluddin Mankbarni marched from the Indus towards Delhi.
Chautra-i Subhani—name of a platform or raised ground in medieval Delhi.
Chungi-i ghalla—tax on grain.
Chut—contamination (taken in a religious sense).

DARIR—secretary.
Dahir-i mamalik—chief secretary for the whole kingdom.
Dalbek—officer of justice.
Dalbekt—tax taken for officers of justice.
Dalbek-i hazrat—officer of justice for Delhi (i.e. *hazrat*).
Dagh—mark of branding.
Da't—petitioner.
Daira—circles.
Dallals—brokers.
Dalo—buckets.
Dalail-i bazarha—brokers of the markets.
Danishmand—an educated man; a man of wisdom.
Dargah—the court; mausoleum of a saint.
Darogha—a minor officer in charge of a local office.
Darul Adl—the market of Delhi for cloth and other commodities; literally, place of justice.

- Darul kufr*—land of non-Muslims or *Kafirs*.
Darul Mulk—capital.
Darus Surur—title of Burhanpur; literally, city of delights.
Dasht—steppe.
Dastar—turban.
Dastarband—*ulama* (who wore turbans).
Dastarcha—handkerchief.
Daulat-khana—the palace of Sultan Iltutmish.
Dawatdar—keeper of the ink-pot.
Dhanmaras—landlords; zamindars.
Dhawas—runners.
Dhol—Drum.
Dins—recognised religions.
Dinars—Roman silver coins.
Dirham kharidgan—low-priced slaves.
Dirhams—Roman copper coins.
Diwan—office; the central secretariat.
Diwan-i Arz—office of the ministry of war.
Diwan-i insha—office of the chief secretary.
Diwan-i riyasat—office of the minister of trade and commerce.
Diwan-i wizarat—office of the wazir.
Diwanul mustakhraj—office for collecting taxes.
Doab—land between the Jumna and the Ganges.
Dola—litter.
Du'ago—well-wisher.
Dupatta—sheet which women wear to cover their head and shoulder.
Durbar—royal court.
Durbash—baton.
Durwesh—a mystic; a beggar.
Du-shakhas—pillory.
Duzdi—theft.
- FARMAN**—a royal order.
Farman-deh—person giving orders.
Farman-rawa—persons commanding.
Farrash—a menial servant; literally one who looks after carpets etc.
Farrash khana—a house for keeping carpets.
Farsakh—a measure of distance, about 18,000 feet.
Farsang—a measure of distance, about 12,000 cubits.
Fath nama—letter or message of victory.
Fatiha—prayer; victory; the first seven sentences of the Quran.
Fatwa—a legal decision; a decision according to the *shari'at* or religious law.
Faujdar—commander of an army unit.
Fawazil—Money left after paying the expenses of the administration.
Fida'i—person devoted absolutely to any cause; an Isma'ili.
Ftru-khana—ground floor, possibly a cellar.
- GADDI**—the royal mat or cushion of Hindu princes.
Galtm—blanket.
Gargajes—a structure constructed for capturing forts.
Gaz—yard.

Gazz-i Sikandari—the yard of Sultan Sikandar Lodi.

Gharhi—a measure of time equal to 20 minutes.

Ghulam—slave.

Gosfand—lamb.

Gowmath—cow-pen.

Guftar—discourse; discussion.

Gul faroshi—selling flowers.

Gumashita—agent; representative.

HADISES—acts or words of the Arabian Prophet.

Haftkursi—seven cycles (of heaven).

Haj—the Muslim annual pilgrimage to Mecca.

Hajib—chamberlain.

Hajjam—barber.

Hakims—philosophers; physicians.

Haq—truth; or the Absolute.

Haqq-i btradari—right of kinship.

Haqq-i Shurb—water-right; profits from canal irrigation.

Haram—prohibited.

Harir—silk.

Hashr—Day of Judgement.

Hatim—an Arabian chief reputed for his generosity.

Hawa—air; desire.

Hidaya—a well-known book on Muslim religious law or *shari'at*.

Hilf—agreement, bond, oath, confederacy.

Hilwa—a kind of sweetmeat.

Hilwai—a Hindu cook who sells sweets and cooked foods.

Hisar—fort.

Hudud—frontiers; limits; also Quranic punishments for crimes.

Hukkam—officers; persons in command; the governing class.

Hukm—rule; command; procedure; principle for levying land revenue or other taxes.

Hukm-i baraward—principle of production cost.

Hukm-i hasil—assessment (of land revenue) according to produce.

Hukm-i masahut—assessment (of land revenue) according to measurement.

Hukm-i mushahida—assessment (of land revenue) by inspection only.

Hanjis—boatmen (in Kashmir).

IBAHATYAN—the people of incest; an abusive term used by Sunni Muslims for the Isma'ili heretics.

Id-gah—place for the 'Id prayers; an open space generally enclosed by a low wall.

Idrar—salaries, pensions.

Iftar—breaking of the Muslim fast by eating at sunset.

Ihtikar—regrating, cornering.

Ihtisab—calculating, computing, keeping accounts.

Ihtisabi—appertaining to accounts.

Ikhtira—inventions; new designs; something original.

Ilm-i muhasiba wa hindusa—knowledge of accounts and figures.

Imam—supreme commander, leader; also the person leading the congregational Muslim prayers.

Imamat—leadership.

Iman—the correct faith.

Inam—gift; reward.

Iqta—a governorship; literally a piece of land.

Iqtadar—governor, a person in whose charge an *iqta* has been placed.

Iqta-i istighlal—governorships held at the pleasure of the head of the state; short term governorship.

Iqta-i tamlik—hereditary governorships.

Iradas—a kind of small balista or engine for hurling stone missiles.

Ishraf—persons of noble birth; the nobility.

Ismailism—all groups of Shia Muslims (Isma'ilis) who believe that Ismail, son of Imam Ja'far Sadiq, was the true seventh Imam.

Istidraj—miracles of a sinner.

Istihsan—principle of public welfare.

Istislah—reform; putting things right.

Istisqa—dropsy; asking for water; Muslim prayer for rainfall.

Istiqamat—stability.

Istirza—seeking to please; desire for good will.

Iyalat—guardianship.

JAGIR—a piece of land assigned to a government officer by the state.

Jagir daran—persons holding *jagirs* or assigned lands.

Jahan-dar—possessor of the world; king; emperor.

Jama'at Khana—a house of mystics.

Jamdarkhana—a wardrobe.

Jasus—spy; secret agent.

Jauhar—jewel or jem; also substance as distinguished from attributes.

Jaushan—a coat of mail.

Jawahir-i latrah—vile jems.

Jins—curious invisible persons referred to in the Quran.

Jitals—copper coins of the Delhi sultanat.

Jizya—has two meanings (a) in the literature of the Delhi sultanat: any tax which is not *khiraj* or land tax; (b) in the *shari'at*: a personal and yearly tax on non-Muslims.

Jizya-i tambul—tax on betel-leaves.

Jogis—a class of Hindu mendicants.

Juz—part, portion; a quire of paper.

KARABI—appertaining to fried minced meat.

Kachcha—of unbaked earth; opposed to *pukka* or baked earth.

Kad-khuda—headman of a village.

Kafir—non-Muslim (literally, one who is ungrateful to God).

Kahars—palanquin-bearers; porters.

Katwani—the planet Saturn; a bow.

Kalima—the Muslim oath of affirmation: 'There is no god but Allah and Muhammad in His Messenger.'

Kaman-i ra'd—literally, a bow of lightning or thunder; probably an early name for cannon using gunpowder.

Kang—pillory.

Kanizak-i kinari—slave-girls who were purchased to be used as concubines.

Kardaran—officers; persons in charge of some work.

Karkhanas—royal factories or enterprises divided into two kinds—*ratbi*, for looking after animals and *ghair-ratbi* for producing commodities required by the state

Karkuns—workers; officers.

Kar-i daulat—affairs of state.

Karohs—an Indian measure of length, equal to about two miles.

Khail—horsemen; a tribe.

Khail-bashi—belonging to the same tribe or group of horsemen.

Khalifa—Caliph; Commander of the Faithful.

Khalisa—land controlled directly by the king and not assigned to any zamindar or officer.

Khalq—the people in general; mankind as a whole.

Khan—(a) among the Mongols and Turks, the highest independent ruler; (b) in the Delhi sultanat, the highest group of officers of the state.

Khanate—territory governed by a khan.

Khanqahs—a house of mystics but more commodious than the *jama'at-khana*.

Kharif—the winter crop in India.

Kharitahdar—treasurer.

Khatib—persons delivering a religious sermon.

Khatuns—ladies.

Khayyali—imaginary.

Khazana—treasury.

Khidmat—service due.

Khil'at—robe of honour.

Khilafat—caliphate; commandership of the faithful.

Khiraj—land revenue; also tribute paid by a subordinate ruler.

Khitta—territory; a piece of land.

Khummar—tavern-keeper.

Khuni—shedder of blood.

Khushnuli—trying to win approval or good will.

Khutba—sermon.

Khuts—class of village headmen.

Khuz—silk.

Khwaja—lord, merchant, a person of distinction.

Khwaja-tash—a comrade; fellow-officer.

Kirpas—fine linen.

Kohpayah—foot of the hills.

Kokaltashan—foster-brothers.

Kotla—a residential fort.

Kotwal—officer in charge of a city or a fort.

Kotwali—appertaining to the kotwal's office.

Kufr—ungrateful to God; disbelief.

Kuffar—persons ungrateful to God; non-Muslims.

Kulah—hat; referring to the fact that hats were worn by Turks.

Kulahdars—wearers of hats; Turks; high officers.

Kushak—a residential fort.

Kuza wa khist pazi—(taxes on) baking the earth or earthen vessels.

Khwaja-sera—eunuchs employed in households.

LAKH BAKHSI—a giver of lakhs (a lakh=100,000).

Langar khana—a house providing free food.

Lashkar-gah—army camp.

Lashkari—a soldier.

- MADAD-I MA'ASH**—grant of land or pension to religious or deserving persons.
- Madrassa**—an educational institution.
- Mafruz**—untaxed land.
- Maghrabis**—catapult; ballista; a medieval machine for shooting rounded stones.
- Mahadeva nagiri**—a variety of medieval cloth.
- Mahajans**—bankers.
- Mahi faroshi**—selling of fish.
- Mahi-maratib**—the fish banner of the Delhi sultanat.
- Mahsul**—gross income of a province or a state.
- Mahzar**—an assembly of distinguished persons or scholars called to discuss any matter.
- Majalis**—plural of *majlis* or meeting.
- Majlis-i khas**—a meeting of the king and his high officers.
- Majlis-i khilwat**—a confidential and secret meeting of the king and his high officers.
- Majmuadar**—an officer who keeps or checks accounts.
- Mal**—money; revenue; land revenue.
- Malguzari**—payment of land revenue or tax.
- Mali**—gardener.
- Malik**—owner; proprietor; in the Delhi sultanat it meant the second highest grade of officers, lower than *khans* but higher than *amirs*.
- Malika-i Jahan**—literally, queen of the world; title given to the chief queen of the sultan.
- Malik naib**—regent of the kingdom; an officer, authorised to act on behalf of the king.
- Malik Kabir**—literally, the great malik; maliks were the second highest grade of officers of the kingdom.
- Malikut-Tujjar**—literally, chief of the merchants; a title given to one of the highest officers of the state.
- Mameluks**—slave-officers.
- Mamlakat**—kingdom, state, empire.
- Mandah**—grain market.
- Manshur**—a royal order or command.
- Marasim-i khidmat**—customary tributes or presents.
- Mas'ala**—a problem; a difficult question.
- Mash**—pulse.
- Masjid**—mosque; a Muslim house of prayer.
- Masnad**—a large round pillow in front of which officers used to sit.
- Masnad-i hukumat**—literally the pillow of the government; official authority.
- Masnavi**—a variety of Persian verse distinguished by its continuity.
- Maulazada**—son of a freed man.
- Mawali**—sons of freed man.
- Mawas**—a fortified village.
- Mawazi**—villages (capital of *mauza* or village).
- Mehtas**—a Hindi term for officers, whose status varied in different parts of India.
- Mewa**—dry fruits.
- Mihtar**—leader; senior man; governor.
- Mlecchas**—Hindus below the four well-known castes; *chandalas*; now known as scheduled castes and scheduled tribes.
- Millat**—a religious community.
- Milk**—property; but in the middle ages it meant land assigned or granted by the state.
- Mimbar**—the pulpit of a Muslim mosque consisting of three or more stairs.

- Mis*—copper; bronze; any alloy of copper.
Misal—order; state command.
Misqal—the weight of a dram and three-sevenths.
Mizan—balance; a pair of scales.
Mizan-i ahan—balance of iron.
Mahalla—a section or part of a town; quarter of a city.
Mohannad—a sword of Indian steel.
Moksha—salvation.
Mu'allim-i awwal—literally, the first teacher; Aristotle.
Mublighi mal wa khidmat—total of money and goods required by service.
Mufridan—individuals.
Muhajirs—emigrants; persons who migrated from Mecca to Medina with the Prophet.
Muhassilan—persons collecting taxes and tribute.
Muhassils—taxes collected.
Muhrdar—keeper of the seal or *muhr*.
Muhtasib—an officer appointed to maintain law and order in a municipality.
Mulhid—pagan, heretic, unbeliever.
Mullahs—persons claiming to be the religious leaders of the Musalmans.
Mulukut tawatf—tribal kingships; a disorderly administration.
Munafiqs—one who practises religious dissimulation or hypocrisy; applied to a special group of hypocrites in Mecca during the Prophet's time.
Munazara—a religious disputation.
Mundi—grain market.
Munhis—officers enforcing orders concerning things forbidden.
Munjaniq—a catapult or medieval machine for shooting stone missiles.
Muqam—place; the station (or position) of a Muslim mystic.
Muqaddam—village headman; literally the first or senior man.
Muqta—governor; person-in-charge of an *iqta* or a medieval province.
Murattab—a fully equipped horseman.
Murawwah—the moral code of the pagan Arabs.
Musadarat—fines; monetary punishments.
Mushrif—officer-in-charge of keeping accounts.
Mushrif-i mamalik—accountant for all provinces.
Mushrif-i mamlakat—accountant for the whole kingdom.
Mustaghil—employed in state service.
Mutasarrif—whatever is in one's power or possession (Steingass).
Mustaufi-i mamalik—auditor for the whole kingdom.

NABAT—plant, herb, vegetable.

Nabi—Prophet.

Naddafi—carding.

Nadim—courtier; a person whose duty is to keep the king well pleased but who is not in charge of any administrative work.

Nafs-i gira—an intuitive or overpowering mind.

Nai—a reed; a reed-pipe.

Naib—deputy, assistant, agent, representative.

Naib-i Arz—minister of war; or the deputy of the minister of war.

Naib-i barbek—deputy of the *barbek* (officer-in-charge of the royal court).

Naib-i ghibat—regent authorised to act for the king during his absence only.

Naib-i lashkar—king's deputy for the army.

Naib-i mamlakat—Regent or the king's representative for the whole kingdom, who is authorised to act on behalf of the king.

Naib-i mulk—regent of the kingdom.

Naib-i vakildar—deputy of the *vakildar* or officer placing judicial matters before the king.

Naib-i wazir—deputy of the wazir.

Naik—A Hindi term indicating various groups in various parts of India; an army general; also a merchant.

Nakhud-i bityan—baked gram.

Na'lbaha—cost of an army of invasion or occupation; literally, the price of a horse-shoe.

Namaz-i digar—the second or afternoon Muslim prayer.

Nan—bread.

Naphtha—Greek fire.

Naphtha-i siyah—black *naphtha*, probably an early name for gunpowder.

Naqib—chamberlain.

Naqus—a wooden gong used by Christians in Muslim countries instead of church-bells.

Nargah—surrounding of hunted animals by beaters.

Naubat—beating of the drum before the residence of the king and high officers.

Nawisandas—clerks.

Nayabat wa khwajgi—deputy and controller.

Naza—dispute, contention.

Nazir—superintendent, inspector.

Nil—indigo.

Nirkl-i bar-award—principle of production-cost.

Noyans—a Mongol title meaning a chief or high officer.

Nubuwa—prophethood.

PAGREE—turban.

Pahilwans—wrestlers.

Paibos—kissing the feet.

Paiks—footmen.

Pan—betel leaves.

Pasheb—an earthen mound built so high that it reaches the top of a besieged fort.

Paturs—ministers (in Orissa).

Patwari—a low-grade officer who used to keep village land records.

Pir—spiritual guide.

Piyada—footman.

Pucca—baked earth.

Pundits—learned Hindus.

Purdah—curtain; also the principle of the seclusion of women.

QABA—cloak.

Qaba-wa dagla—cloak and an outer garment stuffed with cotton.

Qadim—old, ancient.

Qalandars—a class of Muslim mendicants, generally uneducated, who did not believe in private property and wandered about from place to place and lived by persistent begging.

Qalb-kari—counterfeit coins.

Qanats—enclosures.

Qanun-i qadim—old law.

Qaraunas—A mixed Mongolian tribe, probably the descendants of Mongol fathers and Muslim mothers.

Qarn—a generation, a century; a space of ten years or any multiple thereof up to 120.

Qasbas—towns.

Qashqa—Hindu forehead mark.

Qasidah—Persian verses in praise of some dignitary.

Qasim—divider, distributor, just, equitable.

Qasr—palace.

Qasr-i Firuzah—the Turquoise Palace.

Qasr-i Sabz—the Green Palace.

Qasr-i Safed—the White Palace of Sultan Iltutmish; it probably consisted of two palaces, the Turquoise Palace and the Green Palace.

Qassabi—taxes on butchers.

Qaumdars—leaders who had a tribe or *qaum* following them.

Qazi—a Muslim judge.

Qazi-i lashkar—the *qazi* or judge for the army.

Qazi-i mamalik—the *qazi* or judge for the whole country.

Qazi-ul qazzat—the *qazi* of *qazis*; the chief *qazi*.

Qiamat—Day of Judgement.

Qila—fort.

Qimar Khana—a gambling house.

Qiyas—guess, computation, estimate.

Qubbutul Islam—the 'dome' or chief city of Islam.

Qurbat—nearness.

Quriltai—an assembly of Mongol princes and high officers.

Qutb—pole star; the axis.

Quza—plural of *qazi*; judges.

RABBUL ALAMIN—Lord of the Worlds.

Rabi'—the winter crop in India, as opposed to the *kharif* or rainy season crop.

Rai—a Hindu chief, usually one having his own territory and army.

Rai Rayan—the Rai of Rais; the title given by Alauddin Khalji to Rama Deva of Devagiri.

Ra'yyat—subjects.

Ra'yyat parwar—looking after the welfare of the subjects.

Rakah khana—a house for keeping stirrups and probably the whole harness of horses.

Rakats—genuflexions of the Muslim prayer.

Rana—a grade of Hindu chiefs; the ruler of Chitor had the title of rana.

Ranis—wives of a rana or a raja.

Rasul—messenger.

Ratibi—providing food for men and animals.

Ratibi Karkhanas—royal *karkhanas* or factories, which made provision for the feeding of men and animals.

Rawat-i Arz—title given to Imadul Mulk, Balban's minister of war.

Rayat-i a'ala—royal standards.

Reveri—a kind of Indian sweet.

Riddah—literally, apostasy; the war of Riddah is the term applied to the revolt of the Arab tribes during the caliphate of Abu Bakr.

Rigistan—desert.

Risman Faroshi—(tax on) the selling of ropes or thread.

Rub-i Maskun—the fourth part of the inhabited (globe).

- Rughan*—oil, butter, ghi.
Rughan garī—manufacturing oil.
Rughan-i chirag—oil for burning lamps.
Rustai—a villager.
- SABATS**—an earthen mound raised to the top of a besieged fort.
Sabungari—manufacturing soap.
Sadah—literally, one hundred; the term *sadah amirs* meant officers controlling territory containing about a hundred villages.
Sadi—century.
Sadaqah—charity.
Sadr-i Jahan—title of the central officer of the Delhi sultanat, who was in charge of religious and charitable endowments.
Sahaba—companions of the Arabian Prophet.
Sahas—merchants, bankers, money-lenders.
Sahib-Qiran—Lord of the fortunate conjunction of stars; a title given to Amir Timur.
Saiyyids—descendants of the Prophet.
Salaam—the Muslim greeting: 'peace be on you'.
Salah—weapons.
Salahdars—weapon keepers.
Sama—an audition party of the mystics.
Samandar—the sea; also salamandar.
Sani—second.
Sardawat-dar—head of the inkpot bearers.
Sar-chatrdar—head of the keepers of the royal *chattr* or canopy.
Sargin—dung.
Sar-jandar—head of the royal body-guard.
Sar khail—a junior military officer.
Sar-purdah-dar—literally, head of the curtain keepers; it probably meant the highest officer in charge of the royal tents.
Sarrafs—money-changers, bankers.
Saudagar-i karwant—transport merchants of standing.
Saudagar-i bazari—bazar merchants of standing.
Saudagaran-i Mizani—merchants in charge of weights and measures.
Sawaran-i muqatala—horsemen for fighting.
Serat—inn.
Sera-i Adl—name given to Alauddin Khalji's market in Delhi for the sale of cloth and other specified commodities.
Shah-nawis—writer at night.
Shafaq-rang—colour of dawn or sunset.
Shahr—city.
Shahs—kings.
Shahzadas—sons of the king.
Shaikhain—the first two Pious Caliphs, Abu Bakr and Umar I.
Shaikh—in Arabic it means a chief or distinguished man; in the terminology of Muslim mysticism or *tasawwuf*, it means a spiritual leader who has been authorised to enrol disciples by his *pir* or *shaikh*.
Shashgani—a small silver coin equal to six *fitals* or copper coins.
Shamsi—appertaining to Sultan Shamsuddin Iltutmish.
Sharafat—nobility.
Sharbat—sweet drinks.

- Sharbatdar*—keeper of sweet drinks.
Shar'at—Muslim religious law.
Shifa khana—hospital.
Shikayat—complaints.
Shiqdar—an officer-in-charge of an area of land described as a *shiq*.
Shirk—belief that there are partners to God.
Shlokas—Sanskrit verses.
Shuhna—head of the police, mayor, provost.
Shuhnagi—appertaining to the police office.
Shuhna-i mandt—officer-in-charge of the grain market.
Shuhna-i pil—officer-in-charge of elephants.
Shutur-gurba—camel-cat business; deception.
Sifat—quality, attribute.
Sikka—coin.
Silsilahs—an order of Muslim mystics or *sufis*.
Silahdar—an armed man.
Sipahsalar—commander of the troops.
Siyyum—the third day after the Muslim burial.
Sondhar—loan.
Suffa—platform.
Sufis—mystics.
Sultan—in the Quran it means a Divine sign, symbol or power; by the tenth century it came to mean a Muslim ruler practically independent of the Abbasid caliphate.
Sultanat—kingdom, state.
Sultani—slave of the Sultan, either literally or metaphorically.
Sunnat—traditions of the Muslim Prophet.

- TABAQAT**—generations, race.
Tabbakh—cook.
Tadaruk-i Ma'navi—moral punishments.
Tafakkuh—repentance, grief.
Tahkimat-i mujaddid—new or novel (royal) orders.
Takbir—proclaiming the greatness of God by saying Allah is great.
Takhtgah-i Daulatabad—the Daulatabad capital.
Takhtgah-i Delhi—the Delhi capital.
Taluk—district.
Tanka—silver coin of the Delhi sultanat.
Taqayya—dissimulation, pretence, hypoerisy.
Tas-ghariyal—water-clock.
Tasht-dar—basin-bearer.
Tauhid—unity of God.
Tauqi'—royal signet.
Tazi—non-Turkish; Persian or Arab; non-Indian and non-Turkish.
Tengiri } God; space; sky—the God of the Mongols; the Supreme Being.
Il-Tengiri }
Thakkuras—Kshatriyas; Hindu chiefs.
Thanas—stations; military or police stations.
Thugs—an Indian name for disguised robbers.
Tika—Hindu forehead mark.
Tikadar rals—Hindu chiefs with forehead marks.

Tola—an Indian weight of 2½ *misqals*.

Top khana—artillery.

Tuman—a group of ten thousand soldiers.

UHDADARAN-I DAFATIR—royal servants in charge of offices.

Ulama—Muslims of religious learning; plural of *alim*.

Ulul amr—person in command.

Uluses—tribes; groups with the same eponymous ancestor.

Umara—plural of *amir*; *amir* means ruler or commander; in the Delhi sultanat the *amirs* were the third grade of officers, coming after *khans* and *muliks*.

Ummal—revenue or finance officers.

Urf—known as, alias.

Urt—group of Turkish or Mongolian tents.

Usar—barren land.

Ushr—one-tenth.

VAKIL—agent, deputy, pleader.

Vakildar—deputy of the king at the court, probably for judicial matters.

Varna—colour, caste.

Vihar—a Buddhist monastery.

WAFD—deputation.

Wajh—money, salary.

Wajhdar—a salaried officer.

Walayat—foreign land, country, territory.

Wali—governor.

Wali-ahad—heir-presumptive.

Waqf—endowment.

Wazir-i mutlaq—wazir with full powers, who could administer without interference by the king.

Wisaq—confederation, pledge.

Wisaq-bashi—person entering into an agreement or making a pledge.

YAK RAI—having one opinion.

Yak wujud—acting as a single body.

Yarligh—a royal mandate.

Yurt—(or *urt*), a group of Turkish or Mongolian tents.

ZABITA—a secular rule or law made by the state.

Zaib-i jama—looking handsome in clothes.

Zakat—a prescribed Muslim charity of 2½ per cent on income, including income possible from unused capital.

Zamindaran-i buzurg—the great land-owners; this term is applied to the great Hindu chiefs and tries to negate the idea that they had a state within the Delhi sultanat.

Zamindari—privately owned and hereditary land.

Zarb—a blow, minting.

Zar kharida—cash purchased (slave).

Zawabits—state laws.

Zillullah fil 'arz—shadow of God on earth; a title given to Muslim kings.

Zimnah—condition of being a protected non-Muslim.

Zimnis—protected non-Muslims.

Zuhr—afternoon.

II. BASIC MATERIAL

Only early and primary sources are mentioned here in alphabetical order.

THE DELHI SULTANAT

A. EARLY SOURCES

Adabul Harb wa'sh Shuja'at, Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Ms. British Museum (Add. 1653); edited by Ahmad Suhaili, Tehran, 1346.

This work, dedicated to Iltutmish, deals with the art of warfare during the medieval period but the introductory chapters are devoted to the essential qualifications and characteristics of the king and his duty to select fit officers of the state.

Adabul Muluk wa Kifayatul Muluk, Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Ms. in I.O. (I.O. 647). Another condensed and rearranged version of the above.

Afsana-i Shahan, Muhammad Kabir b. Shaikh Ismail, Ms. British Museum (Add. 24409).

It gives 140 interesting anecdotes and stories regarding the Afghan (Lodi and Sur) sultans of Delhi. The author was the son of a daughter of Shaikh Khalilullah Haqqani, an Afghan saint of Rajgir, who died in the Punjab in Akbar's time.

Aja'ibul maqdur fi akhbar-i Timur, Shaikh Shihabuddin Ahmad b. Shamsuddin b. Abdullah Hanafi *alias* Ibn Arab Shah, edited by Golius (Leyden). Also by Ahmad b. Muhammad Ansari, Calcutta 1818. Translated into English by J. H. Sanders as *Tamerlane or Timur, the Great Amir*, London, 1936.

This is the most important anti-Timurid work in Arabic. Ibn Arab Shah expresses the opinions of his educated contemporaries about Timur.

Babur Namah, Babur, Turki text edited by N. Ilminski, 1857; Facsimile of Hyderabad Codex edited by A. S. Beveridge, 1905. Persian version by Mirza Abdur Rahim Khan Khanan, Bombay A.H. 1308. English translations: (i) J. Leyden and W. Erskine from Abdur Rahim's Persian version, 1826. Revised by Sir L. King, 1921; (ii) A. S. Beveridge from Hyderabad Codex, 1921.

An autobiographical account of Babur; gives details about the political and cultural conditions prevailing in Hindustan at the beginning of the 16th century.

Dasturul Albab fi Ilmil Hisab, Haji Abdul Hamid Muharrir Ghaznavi, Ms. in Rampur Library.

Abdul Hamid Muharrir completed this work in 760/1358 in order to instruct his son in the science of mathematics and the maintenance of revenue records and dedicated it to the memory of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya. It contains invaluable information on the revenue administration of the sultanat period, and gives details about the various registers maintained in the revenue department, qualifications and functions of officers connected with the ministry of revenue and explains revenue terms. The English translation of Part I, Prof. S. A. Rashid, *Medieval India Quarterly*, I, 3-4.

Dawal Rani Khizr Khani, Amir Khusrau, edited by Rashid Ahmad Salim, Aligarh, 1917.

In this *masnavi* Amir Khusrau gives the story of the love adventures of Khizr Khan with Dawal Rani. It contains also a short account of the military exploits of Alauddin Khalji and his predecessors.

Diwan-i Amir Khusrau, Amir Khusrau, (i) Published by Maulvi Syed Yasin Ali, Delhi; (ii) Published by Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, A.H. 1288.

Contains some *qasidas* of great historical value.

Diwan-i Badr-i Chach, Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow.

Contains some very interesting *qasidas* in praise of Muhammad bin Tughluq and is helpful in constructing the chronology of some important events of his reign. According to Badauni (*Muntakhabat Tawarikh* I, 241), Badr had composed a *Shah Namah* for the Sultan which comprised 30,000 couplets.

Diwan-i Hasan Dehlavi, Amir Hasan Ala-i Sijzi, edited by Masud Ali Mahvi, Ibrahimiah Machine Press, Hyderabad, A.H. 1352.

Amir Hasan Sijzi, a disciple of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, was a friend and companion of Amir Khusrau. He went to Daulatabad during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughluq and died there in circa 737/1337. His *diwan* contains some interesting *qasidas* in praise of Alauddin Khalji.

Diwan-i Jamaluddin Hansvi, Shaikh Jamaluddin Hansvi, Chashma-i Faiz Press, Delhi A.D. 1889.

Shaikh Jamaluddin of Hansi was a senior disciple of Shaikh Farid Gauji Shakar, His elegy on the death of Iltutmish is of great historical value.

al-Durar al-Kaminali, Ibn Hajar Asqalani, Dairatul Ma'arif, Hyderabad, A.H. 1348.

This is a biographical dictionary compiled in Arabic by a distinguished Arab scholar. His account of Muhammad bin Tughluq gives some valuable pieces of information, e.g. his reference to an operation in the spine of the Sultan which made him impotent (Vol. III, 460).

al-Farq bain al-Firaq, Abu Mansur Abdul Qahir Baghdadi, text edited by Muhammad Badr, Cairo, A.H. 1323; English translation by A. S. Halkin, *Moslem Schisms and Sects*, Tel Aviv, 1935.

It gives an account of the Karrami sect to which Sultan Shihabuddin Ghuri belonged in his early years and helps us in understanding the intellectual climate of Ghur in the 12th century.

Futawa-i Jahandari, Ziyauddin Barani, Ms. in India Office Library; English translation with Introduction and notes by Prof. M. Habib and (Mrs.) Dr. Afsar Khan, *The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate*, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad.

This is really the continuation of the author's famous *Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi*. It strives to put into the form of a coherent system of political philosophy the basic ideas which Barani had already expressed in his earlier works. It deals with such topics as the 'Safety of the King', 'Justice', 'Army', 'Intelligence Officers', 'Price Control', etc. It interprets both religion and politics in terms of aristocratic privileges.

Fawa'id-i Firuz Shahi, Sharaf Muhammad Atai, Ms. Asiatic Society of Bengal (No. 1069).

This work, dedicated to Firuz Shah, gives interesting information concerning the folklore and the life of Muslims in medieval India. It is divided into 115 *babs* and numerous *fasls*.

Fawa'idul Fuad, conversations of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, compiled by Amir Hasan Ala Sijzi, (i) Nawal Kishore Press, Lucknow, A.H. 1302, (ii) edited by M. Latif Malik, Lahore, 1936.

This collection of the conversations of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya from 1307 to 1322 gives us a glimpse into the *khanqah*-life of medieval India from the time of Alauddin Khalji to the days of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq. It does not refer by name to any Indian ruler except Iltutmish and Balban.

Futuhat-i Firuz Shahi, Firuz Shah Tughluq,

- (i) Published by Syed Mir Hasan, Rizvi Press, Delhi A.H. 1302;
- (ii) Edited by N. B. Roy, *JASB*, VII, 1941;
- (iii) Edited with English translation and notes by S. A. Rashid and M. A. Makhdoomi, Aligarh;
- (iv) Edited with Urdu translation and notes by M. A. Chaghtai, Poona, 1941.

Originally inscribed on a dome of the Friday mosque of Firuzabad, it is addressed to a Sunni Muslim congregation and as such contains only a partial exposition of the policies and attitudes of Firuz Shah.

Futuh-us Salatin, Isami,

- (i) Edited by Agha Mahdi Husain, Agra 1938;
- (ii) Edited by M. Usha, Madras 1948.

A versified account of the rulers of India from the Chaznavids to the Bahmanids, dedicated to Alauddin Bahman Shah. Its dedication determines its character and complexion. The author paints Muhammad bin Tughluq in lurid colours and extols the achievements of the Bahmanids. The author belonged to a family which had a long record of association with the sultans of Delhi, particularly the Ilbarites. This is the only available work which gives an account of the closing years of Nasiruddin Mahmud's reign.

Ghuniyatul Munyah, anonymous, Ms. India Office Library (No. 2,008).

A treatise on music compiled during the reign of Firuz Shah Tughluq.

Ghurratul Kamal, Amir Khusrau,

- (i) Ms., India Office Nos. 1186, 1187, 1189, 1190, 1192; British Museum Add. 21104;
- (ii) *Dibacha*, edited by Saiyyid Yasin Ali, Matba-i Qaisariya, Delhi.

Khusrau collected this *diwan* in 693/1293. It contains more than 90 *qasidahs*, 9 *masnavis*, besides numerous quatrains. The panegyrics are addressed to Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, Jalaluddin Khalji, Arkali Khan, Alauddin Khalji, Almas Beg and others. A long versified letter written to his friend Tajuddin Zahid in 676/1277 from Awadh throws light on the cultural life in Delhi during this period.

Hasht Bihisht, Amir Khusrau, text edited by Maulana Sulaiman Ashraf, Aligarh 1918.

One of the *khamsah* of Amir Khusrau; the other four being *Matla'ul Anwar* (edited by Muqtada Khan Sherwani, Aligarh, A.H. 1326), *Shirin wa Khusrau* (edited by Ali Ahmad Khan Asir, Aligarh, 1927), *A'ina-i Sikandari* (edited by Said Ahmad Faruqi, Aligarh, 1917) and *Majnun wa Latta* (edited by Habibur Rahman Khan Sherwani). *Qasidahs* dealing with Alauddin Khalji are of considerable historical value.

Ijaz-i Khusraui, Amir Khusrau, Lucknow, 1876 (5 Volumes).

A collection of letters, documents, *fath namas*, petitions, etc. drafted by Amir Khusrau. Some of the documents, e.g. the *Fath Nama* of Lakhnauti, are of great historical importance. Invaluable for a study of the cultural and intellectual trends of the period.

Insha-i Mahru, Ainul Mulk Mahru, edited by Prof. S. A. Rashid, Aligarh; another impression from Lahore 1965.

A collection of 133 private letters and official documents drafted by Ainul Mulk Mahru, a veritable source of information for the administrative and cultural history of the Tughluq period.

Jamiut Tawarikh, Rashiduddin Fazlullah, edited by E. Blochet, London-Leyden 1911.

Its first volume contains an account of the different Turkish and Mongol tribes and the history of Chengiz and his successors down to Ghazan Khan. The second volume gives an account of the Ghaznavids and contains a section on Indians in general and Sakyamuni (Buddha) and his religion in particular. Portion dealing with India, published by Karl Jahn in facsimile as *Rashid al-Din's History of India*, Mouton & Co., 1965.

Jawama'ul Kalim, conversations of Saiyyid Muhammad Gisu Daraz of Gulbarga, compiled by Saiyyid Muhammad Akbar Husaini, Intizami Press, Kanpur, published by M. Hamid Siddiqi from Hyderabad in 1937.

It contains discourses of the saint during the years 1399 and 1400 and gives some pieces of information which are of great value from the point of view of political and cultural history of the period.

Jawamiul Hikayat wa Lawami'ur Riwayat, Sadiduddin Muhammad Awfi, Ms. British Museum (Add. 16862; or 136); Introduction to above by Mohd. Nizamuddin, London 1929.

Contains some anecdotes which throw light on the cultural atmosphere of the early Turkish period.

Khairul Majalis, conversations of Shaikh Nasiruddin Chiragh Dehlavi, compiled by Hamid Qalandar, edited by K. A. Nizami, Aligarh.

Supplies interesting details about the market control of Alauddin Khalji, general economic conditions during the Alai period and the impact of Mongol invasions on Delhi.

Khaza'inul Futuh, Amir Khusrau, editions:

(i) S. Moinul Haq, Aligarh 1927;

(ii) M. Wahid Mirza, Calcutta 1953;

English translation by Prof. M. Habib, *The Campaigns of Alauddin Khalji*, Madras 1931.

Khusrau's account of the campaigns of Alauddin Khalji in the Deccan and the Mongol inroads is based on first hand knowledge and is extremely valuable.

Kitabul Hind, Abu Raihan Alberuni,

(i) Text edited by E. C. Sachau, London 1887;

(ii) English translation by E. C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India*, London 1910.

Gives valuable information about the life and conditions of the Indian people during the 11th century.

Kitabul Milal wan Nihal, Muhammad b. Abdul Karim Shahrastani (ob. 1076/1153). Text edited by Cureton, *Book of Religious and Philosophical Sects*, 2 Volumes, London 1842-46.

Supplies interesting details about the beliefs and ideas of the Karrami sect to which the people of Ghur belonged. The section on India contains an account of the Buddhist doctrines also.

Lubabul Albab, Sadiduddin Muhammad Awfi, edited by E. G. Browne and Mirza Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab Qazwini, London 1903-5.

This biography of Persian poets dedicated to Ainul Mulk Hussain al-Ashari, a wazir of Nasiruddin Qubacha, contains notices of some scholars and poets of the early Turkish period.

Maktubat-i Shaikh Sharafuddin Yahya.

There are several collections of the letters of Shaikh Sharafuddin Yahya of Maner:

- (1) *Maktubat-i Bisht wa Hasht*, addressed to Imam Muzaffar;
- (2) *Maktubat-i du Sadi*, collected by Zain Badr Arabi in 769/1367;
- (3) *Maktubat-i Sadi*, written in 748/1347 to a disciple, Qazi Shamsuddin.

These letters throw light on the religious and cultural conditions during the Tughluq period and are helpful in understanding the policy of the Tughluq sultans with reference to religious sects and movements.

Maktubat-i Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir Samani, Ms. Aligarh University Library.

Saiyyid Ashraf Jahangir, who died in 808/1405, addressed letters to eminent religious and political figures of his period. Apart from being a valuable source of information for the religious history of the period, it contains interesting information about genealogical inquiries made during the reign of Balban.

Masalikul Absar fi mumalikil Amsar, Ibn Fazlullah al-Umari, English translation of the chapter dealing with India, by O. Spies, Aligarh, 1943.

An encyclopaedic work running into several volumes. It contains interesting information about Muhammad bin Tughluq and the social and economic conditions prevailing in the country during his period.

Mutlu'ul Anwar, Amir Khusrau, edited by Muqtada Khan Sherwani, Aligarh, A.H. 1326.

Contains a *qasidah* in praise of Alauddin Khalji.

Miftahul Futuh, Amir Khusrau, text

- (i) Edited by Yasin Khan Niazi, *Oriental College Magazine*, May 1936-Feb. 1937;
- (ii) Edited by S. A. Rashid, Aligarh.

Contains an account of the campaigns of Jalaluddin Khalji.

Muhammad bin Tughluq Fragment, Ms. in British Museum (Add. 25,785).

Appended to a Ms. of *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* are four pages of some autobiographical account which according to Dr. A. Mahdi Husain is a fragment of the memoirs of Muhammad bin Tughluq. Both style and content contradict such an assumption (see, Nizami, *Studies in Medieval Indian History and Culture*, Kitab Mahal, Allahabad).

Mukatibat-i Rashidi, Rashiduddin Fazlullah, text edited by K. B. Mohd. Shafi, London 1947.

A collection of 53 despatches and letters addressed to different persons by Rashiduddin Fazlullah. Letters No. 12, 29, 34, 43, 47, 52 deal with India and throw an interesting light on Alauddin Khalji's relations with the Ilkhanids. For a critical study of the letters, see Levy's article in *JRAS*, 1946 (74-78).

Nihayat-ul Kamal, Amir Khusrau.

Contains *qasidahs* in praise of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, Mubarak Khalji, Ghiyasuddin Tughluq, Prince Ibrahim, etc. A poem addressed to Prince Jauna Khan, describing the charms of Deogir, and an elegy on the death of Mubarak Khalji are of historical importance.

Nuh Sipihr, Amir Khusrau, edited by M. Wahid Mirza, Islamic Research Association Series, No. 12, Calcutta-Madras, 1950.

Contains an account of the campaigns and activities of Mubarak Shah Khalji. One of the sections dealing with India and her contribution to literature and culture is of special interest.

Qir'anus Sa'dain, Amir Khusrau, editions:

- (i) Maulvi Qudratullah, Husaini Press, A.H. 1261;
- (ii) Maulvi Mohd. Ismail, Aligarh, 1918.

Describes incidents relating to Bughra Khan's meeting with his son, Kaiqubad. The poet had himself gone to Awadh with the army of the Sultan. References to life and conditions at Delhi throw valuable light on cultural atmosphere of the period.

Rauzatus Safa fi sirat al Ambiya wa'l Muluk wa'l Khulafa, Muhammad b. Khwand Shah *alias* Mir Khwand; Persian text, Lucknow, A.H. 1270-74; partially translated into English by E. Rehatsek (Oriental Translation Fund, New Series, London 1891-93).

Valuable for a study of the Royal Dynasties of Ajam.

Rehla, Ibn-i Battuta,

- (i) Arabic text, Cairo 1928;
- (ii) Urdu translation Vol. II by K. B. Maulvi Mohd. Husain, Delhi, A.H. 1345;
- (iii) English translation Vol. II by A. Mahdi Husain, *The Rehla of Ibn Battuta*, Baroda 1953;
- (iv) Abridged English translation by H. A. R. Gibb, Broadway Travellers Series, London 1929.

Supplies interesting details about the personal life of the Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq, his various projects and the general social and economic condition of the country. Its wide conspectus, covering the entire region from the north-west frontier to the distant south, makes it a particularly interesting reading. Portion relating to the earlier period is based on hearsay and therefore less reliable.

Sana-i Muhammadi, Ziyauddin Barani, Ms. in Rampur Library.

Deals mainly with the life of the Prophet but one or two events relating to the author's personal life and a reference to Iltutmish's relations with the *ulama* are valuable. For an account of the book, see Prof. Nurul Hasan's article in *Medieval India Quarterly*, Vol. I, nos. 3-4; 100-5.

Saroorus Sadur, conversations of Shaikh Hamiduddin Sufi Nagauri, compiled by his grandson, Ms. Habibgang Collection, Aligarh.

Valuable for a study of Muhammad bin Tughluq's relations with the saints. Perhaps the Nagaur and the Pakpattan khanqahs alone were on good terms with the Sultan. Information about earlier figures, e.g. Balban's assessment of Minhaj, is very interesting.

Sirajul Hidayat, conversations of Saiyyid Jalaluddin Bukhari Makhdum-i Jahanian, compiled by Makhdumzada, Ms. Aligarh University Library (Etawah Collection, Catalogued as *Malfuzat-i Qutb-i Alam*).

Compiled in 787/1385, it contains contemporay information about the Thattā campaign of Firuz Shah Tughluq, his remission of illegal taxes and the religious sects of the period.

Sirat-i Firuz Shahi, anonymous, Ms. Bankipur Library.

Compiled in 772/1370 at the instance of Firuz Shah Tughluq; gives interesting information about the manifold interests and activities of the Sultan.

Siyarul Auliya, Saiyyid Muhammad b. Mubarak Kirmani, known as Amir (or Mir) Khurd, Chiranji Lal edition, Delhi A.H. 1302.

Contains an account of the Chishti saints, particularly Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya and his disciples, by a disciple of the Shaikh; completed in 790/1388. Invaluable for a study of Muhammad bin Tughluq's relations with the contemporary saints.

Siyasat Nama, Nizamul Mulk Tusi, Tehran.

Describes the institution of training slaves for the imperial service. Valuable for a study of the imperial slave-household of the early Turkish sultans, who were inspired by the Samanid traditions in this regard.

Subhul Asha fi sina'at ul insha, Shihabuddin Abul Abbas Ahmad b. Ali b. Ali Ghudda al-Qalqashandi; Arabic text published in 14 volumes by *Darul Kutub-i Khadwiya*, 1331-38/1913-18; portion dealing with India, translated by O. Spies, *An Arab Account of India in the Fourteenth Century*, Aligarh.

An encyclopaedic work, compiled before 821/1418; contains valuable information; based on details supplied by travellers and merchants, about Muhammad bin Tughluq and the social and economic conditions of his empire. According to the author India had two capitals—Delhi and Deogir.

Tabaqat-i Nasiri, Minhajus Siraj Jurjani, Persian text edited by

- (i) Nassau Lees, Khadim Husain and Abdul Hayy, Bib. Indica 1864;
- (ii) Abdul Hayy Habibi, Kabul. English translation by H. G. Raverty, Bib. Indica, 1897.

Written mainly in 1259-60 by Minhaj, who had close contact with the Ghurids and had held posts of *qazi*, *khatib*, *sulr-i Jahan* and Principal of the Nasiriya Madrassa; it is an encyclopaedic history from the patriarchs and prophets to the time of Nasiruddin Mahmud. An invaluable source of information for the history of the early Turkish sultans and their maliks and amirs.

Tajul Ma'asir, Sadruddin Hasan Nizami, Ms. Professor Habib.

A contemporary account of the campaigns of Mu'izzuddin, Aibek and Iltutmish. Verbose and rhetorical but supplies some invaluable pieces of information, particularly regarding the continuance of Rajput princes at Delhi and Ajmer by Shihabuddin. Written in compliance of a royal command.

Tarikh-i Aul-i Subuktigin, Abul Fazl Baihaqi editions:

- (i) by W. H. Morley, B. Indica, Calcutta, 1861-62;
- (ii) Vol. I by Dr. Ghani, Tehran, Vol. II by A. Said Naficy, Tehran, A.H. 1327.

Fragment of a lost work on the history of the family of Subuktigin by a secretary in Sultan Masud's *Diwanur Rasail*. Account of Masud's campaigns in Ghur is extremely helpful in understanding the social and cultural atmosphere of Ghur before the rise of the Shansabanis.

Tarikh-i Daudi, Abdulla, Aligarh.

Written in the time of Jahangir, it gives an account of the Afghan rulers of India, based on tradition and verbal reports.

Tarikh-i Fakhruddin Mubarak Shah, a portion of Fakhr-i Mudabbir's *Shajara-i Ansab*, edited by Denison Ross, London, 1927.

Throws valuable light on the history and traditions of the Turkish tribes and gives an account of Aibek. For *Shajara-i-Ansab*, see Denison Ross's article in *Ajab Nama* (392 et seq.).

Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, Ziyauddin Barani, edited by Sir Saiyyid Ahmad Khan, Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1862.

Compiled by Barani in his old age, without any notes or memoranda, it is parsimonious in dates and does not follow the chronological sequence of events. Nevertheless, it is the most valuable work of the sultanat period which gives an insight into the political activities and cultural affairs of the Khalji and the Tughluq periods. Barani picks up the thread from the point where Minhaj leaves off and carries his narrative to the early years of Firuz Shah's reign. The gap between the two is filled by Isami.

Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, Shams-i Siraj Afif, text edited by Maulvi Wilayat Husain, Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1890.

One of the three books—and the only to survive—written by Shamsi Siraj Afif on the Tughluq sultans. It gives a detailed account of Firuz Shah's life and activities. Written after the cyclonic invasion of Timur (referred to on page 314), it looks back at the age of Firuz Shah as a period of peace and prosperity. The last portion of the book is found torn in most of the manuscripts.

Tarikh-i Guzidah, Hamdullah Mustaufi, text edited by E. G. Browne, Gibb Memorial Series, Leyden-London 1910; abridged English translation by E. G. Browne, Gibb Memorial Series, Leyden-London, 1913.

A general history, compiled in 730/1329 and dedicated to Khwaja Ghiyasuddin Muhammad, son and successor of Rashiduddin Fazlullah, deals with the Mongols of Persia and Trans-Oxiana.

Tarikh-i Jahan Gusha, Alauddin Ata Malik Juwaini. Persian text; Vol. I & II edited by Mirza Abdul Wahhab Qazwini, Gibb Memorial Series 1911-1912; Vol. III, facsimile with an introduction by Denison Ross, London, 1931. English translation by J. Boyle, *The History of the World Conqueror*, 2 Volumes, Manchester University Press, 1958.

Juwaini (ob. 681/1283) gives an account of the Mongols from the rise of Chengiz Khan to the expedition of Hulagu against the Isma'ilis. Portion dealing with Chengiz Khan's pursuit of Mankbarni in India is informative.

Tarikh-i Khan Jahani wa Makhzani Afghani, Khwaja Nizamuddin Harawi, edited by Imamuddin, Dacca, 1960.

Completed at Burhanpur in 1021/1613, it gives an account of the Afghans, particularly the Lodis and the Surs.

Tarikh-i Mubarak Shahi, Yahya Sirhindi, edited by M. Hidayat Husain, Bib. Indica, 1931.

A general history of the sultans of Delhi from Shihabuddin of Ghur to Mu'izzuddin Abul Fath Mubarak Shah of the Saiyyid dynasty. Account of the later Tughluqs and the Saiyyids based on independent and valuable sources; particularly helpful in understanding the role of amirs and maliks during the last phase of the sultanat.

Tarikh-i Muhammadi, Muhammad Bihamid Khani, Ms. India Office Library.

A general history from the time of the Prophet to 842/1438-39; gives interesting information about Kalpi. The author was an *iqtdar* of Irich (in Bundelkhand). The account of the Khalji and the Tughluq sultans, though based mainly on known authorities, contains some bits of information which are new and interesting. The author's evaluation of the sultans is somewhat different from the traditional assessments.

Tarikh Nama-i Harat, Saif b. Muhammad b. Yaqub Harawi, text edited by M. Zuhair Ahmad, Calcutta, 1944.

Gives some interesting information about Mongol invasions during the early period.

Tarikh-i Shahi or Tarikh-i Salatin-Afghana, Ahmad Yadgar, Bibliotheca Indica, 1939.
Written in 1601; it gives an interesting account of the Lodis.

Tughluq Nama, Amir Khusrau, edited by Saiyyid Hashmi Faridabadi, Aurangabad, 1933.

Valuable source of information for the history of the Tughluq dynasty, particularly the circumstances in which Ghiyasuddin Tughluq overthrew Khusrau Khan and established his power. The account was prepared at the instance of the Sultan himself (13).

Tuhfatus Sighar, Amir Khusrau.

A collection of Amir Khusrau's early poetical compositions made in 671/1272; contains *qasidahs* in praise of Balhan, Prince Muhammad, Hatim Khan, Kishlu Khan, Qiwanuddin, etc.

Waq'at-i Mushtaqi, Rizqullah Mushtaqi, Ms. in British Museum.

In this work Mushtaqi (ob. 989/1581), who belonged to a distinguished family of scholars, has collected interesting historical anecdotes relating to the Lodis and their successors.

Wastul Hayat, Amir Khusrau.

A collection of Khusrau's poems made in the 32nd year of his life contains *qasidahs* in praise of Shaikh Nizamuddin Auliya, Balhan; Kaiqubad, Bughra Khan, Kishli Khan, Shamsuddin Dabir and Jalaluddin Khalji. It contains also an elegy on the death of Prince Muhammad.

Zafar Nama, Sharafuddin Ali Yazdi, edited by Maulvi Muhammad Iahdad, Bib. Indica, Calcutta, 1888.

Completed in 828/1424-25, it contains a detailed account of Timur's campaigns.

B. DETAILED BIBLIOGRAPHIES

Detailed bibliographies for the history of the various dynasties of the sultanat period appear in the following works:

Habibullah, *The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India*, Allahabad, 1961.

Halim, A., *History of the Lodi Sultans of Delhi and Agra*, Dacca, 1961.

Husain, A. M., *Tughluq Dynasty*, Calcutta, 1963.

Lal, K. S., *History of the Khaljis*, Asia Publishers, 1967.

Nizami, K. A., *Religion and Politics in India during the 13th Century*, Asia Publishers, 1961.

C. REFERENCE BOOKS

The following books of reference supply detailed information about the location of manuscripts and the periodical literature on the period:

- (i) Nizami, Supplement to Elliot and Dowson's *History of India*, Vol. II, edited with an Introduction by Prof. Habib, Cosmopolitan Publishers, Aligarh.
- (ii) Pearson, J. D., *Index Islamicus*, Cambridge, 1958-62, and supplement.
- (iii) Storey, C. A., *Persian Literature*, Luzac & Co., London, 1935-53.

FOR THE PROVINCIAL KINGDOMS

A. THE SHARQIS

(Same as listed in I above.)

For a detailed bibliography, see Mian Muhammad Saeed, *The Sultanate of Jaunpur* (unpublished thesis, London University, 1965).

B. KASHMIR

Beharistan-i Shahi, anonymous, Ms. in India Office Library.

The most valuable history of Kashmir covering the period from the earliest times to 1035/1025.

- *Jaina Rajatarangini*, Pandit Srivara, English translation, *Kings of Kashmir*, by J. C. Dutt, III, Calcutta, 1898.

Pandit Srivara was a pupil of Jonaraja, and wielded great influence over Sultan Zainul Abidin to whom he dedicated this work in Sanskrit. It is a history of less than 30 years (1459-89).

Rajatarangini, Kalhana, translated into English with Introduction and Notes by Sir Aurel Stein, 2 Volumes, London, Westminster, 1900.

The only available political history of Kashmir up to 1148. Its study is indispensable for a background to the history of medieval Kashmir.

Rajatarangini, Pandit Jonaraja, edition, Calcutta, 1935; English translation, *Kings of Kashmir*, J. C. Dutt, Vol. III, Calcutta, 1898.

Composed at the instance of Sultan Zainul Abidin; it continues the work of Kalhana and brings down the narrative to 1459, but stands no comparison with Kalhana's work.

Rajavallipatika, Prajhabhatta and Suka, Calcutta, 1835; English translation by Jogesh Chandra Dutt, under the title *Kings of Kashmir*, Vol. III, 337-427, Calcutta, 1935.

Srivara's work was continued by Prajhabhatta and later by Suka.

Tarikh-i Kashmir, Haidar Malik Chadura, Ms. in India Office Library.

It is a valuable document for the period 1586-1627 and gives graphic description of places like Shahabuddinpur, Divasar, Lar, Tolamula, Amarnath Cave, Ich, Hokersar, etc. and the description of the Kishtwar campaign.

Tarikh-i Rashidi, Mirza Hyder Dughlat, English translation by Sir Denison Ross.

Indispensable for the study of the history of Kashmir for the period 1420-1540. Gives an eye-witness account of the history and culture of Kashmir.

For a detailed bibliography, see R. K. Parmu, *A History of Muslim Rule in Kashmir*. People's Publishing House, 1969.

C. RAJASTHAN

Apart from the sources indicated earlier (e.g. *Tajul Ma'asir*, *Tabaqat-i Nasiri*, *Babur Nama* which refer to some events of Rajasthan history), the following historical literature may be consulted:

Amarkavya Vamshavali, Ranachhoda Bhatta, Ms., SBLU, No. 720. It gives details of the political and cultural history of Mewar from Bapa Rawal to Raj Singh's time.

Badoa Khyat, in the possession of Surajmal Vagadia; refers to the construction works in Dungarpur during Rawal Pratap Singh's time.

Bankidas Khyat or Bankidas's Itihastikbaten, published by Rajasthan Puratatva Mandir, Jaipur, 1956. Bankidas was a poet and historian of Man Singh's court. His *Khyat* consists of 2,000 *vats* in the form of short-notes.

Bhattisamaha Prashasti Kavya of the fifteenth century. (Unpublished Ms. of Nahata's collection, Bikaner.) It consists of 298 verses, and helps us to study the early history of Jaisalmer.

Bundi-ki-Tawarikh (Ms., palace collection, Bundi), refers to the early rulers of Bundi.

Dayaldas Khyat (Ms., ALB, No. 188/10, Part I, folios 200, Part II, folios 201-394

It covers the history of the house of Bikaner from Rao Bika to the accession of Maharaja Sardar Singh. The work is based on contemporary accounts, *farmans*, *patta* and *bahis*. The description of the foundation of Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaipur is interesting.

Dungarpur Khyat, in the possession of Surajmal Vagadia; refers to Devapal's victory of Galiyakot.

Ektangamahatmya (unpublished Ms., SBLU, No. 352), written during the time of Rana Kumbha, records the events from the time of Bapa Rawal to the time of Rana Kumbha.

Hammiramadarnan, Jaya Singh (13th century), GOS, X, Baroda, 1920, describes the invasion of the territories of Rana Jaitra Singh by the Turks.

Hammirmahakavya, Nayachandra Suri, edited by J. N. Kirtana, Bombay, 1879.

It is the best source of history for the Chauhans of Ranthambhor. It was composed nearly a hundred years after Hammir's death in the fourteenth century.

Haribhushana Mahakavya, Gangaram of v.s. 1710-12 (1653-55), edited by Pt. Jagannath, consists of nine cantos. It is one of our most reliable sources for the history of Pratapgarh from Surajmal to Hari Singh.

Jaisalmer Khyat (Ms., palace collection, Jaisalmer) refers to the dynastic history of Jaisalmer.

Jodhpur Rajya-ka-Khyat, Ms., Pustakprakash library, Jodhpur.

It is in two volumes and gives information regarding the history of Marwar from the origin of the Rathors to the end of the eighteenth century.

Kanhadadeprabandha (Ms., SBLU). Its first volume has been edited by K. B. Vyas, A.D. 1953. It was composed as early as v.s. 1512 by Padmanabha. From the historical point of view it is without a parallel. It seems that the poet based his work on the court-records, chronicles and the current historical traditions of Rajasthan. It deals in a graphic manner with the fight of Kanhadade and Alauddin Khalji.

Karmachandra Vanshotkirtanakam Kavyam, Jaisoma (unpublished Ms., ALB, v.s. 1650). It is a historical *kavya* written in praise of Karmachandra, a minister of Bikaner. It gives the extent of the territory of Bikaner in the 15th century. The accounts of wars and conquests of the early rulers of Bikaner are highly informative.

Kharataragacchapattavali, Jinapala, published by the *Singhi Jain Granthmala*, Bombay, covering the period from v.s. 1211 to 1393, drawn from traditional sources and undated. It is extremely useful for the political and social history of the early Chauhans.

Kirtikaumudi, Someshwara, BSS, XXV, Poona, 1883, refers to Jagat Singh's getting back Vagad from the control of Gujarat.

Mewar-ka-Samkshipta Itihas, Akshaya Nath, Ms. SBLU., No. 921, refers to the battle of Panipat.

the *Khyats* hitherto known, *Nensi's Khyat* is the most exhaustive and to a great extent reliable.

Phutkargita, Ms., SBLU, No. 717, transcribed in v.s. 1781, refers to the valour of Rana Sanga.

Prabandha-Chintamani, Merutunga (v.s. 1361), published in the *Singhi Jain Granthamala*, Calcutta, 1933, refers to important details about Vignaraja II, Arnoraja, Prithviraja III, Parmardin and Mu'izzuddin Ghuri.

Pratapgarh Badva Khyat, in the possession of the court Badva, refers to the early history of the rulers of Pratapgarh and their wars against Mewar.

Prithviraja-Raso, published by the Nagari Pracharini Sabha, deals with the life and career of Prithviraja III and his ancestors.

Prithviraja Vijaya, Jayanaka, composed between A.D. 1193-1200, edited by G. H. Ojha and C. Guleri, Ajmer, 1941. It is one of the most reliable sources for the history of the Chauhans of Sapadalaksha and Ajmer.

Puratanprabandhasangraha, noticed in *Singhvirgranthamala*, 1936, believed to have been compiled as early as v.s. 1920, deals with the accounts of Prithviraja III, Lakha of Nadol, etc.

Rao Jetsi-ro-Chhanda, edited by Dr. Tessitori, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal. It consists of 23 folios. This is a dingal poem composed by Vithu Sujo, a bard in the service of Rao Jetsi of Bikaner, about the year 1535, to celebrate his victory over Kamran.

Raj Ratnakar, Sadashiva, dated v.s. 1733, Ms., SBLU, No. 718. It deals with the history of Mewar from Bapa Rawal to Rana Raj Singh.

Rawal-Ranaji-ri-vat (Ms., SBLU, No. 876), refers to the events of the history of Mewar.

Suryavamsha (Ms., SBLU, No. 827), gives a brief account of the ranas of Mewar from Bapa Rawal to Rana Raj Singh.

Vamsha Bhaskara, Suryamalla Misra, edited by Asopa; refers to the history of Kota and Bundi in particular and Rajasthan in general. The work is based on contemporary accounts, *farmans* and *bahis*.

Vamshavali (Ms., SBLU, No. 878), gives a brief account of the ranas of Mewar.

For a detailed bibliography, see G. N. Sharma, *Bibliography of Medieval Rajasthan*, 1935.

D. GUJARAT AND KHANDESH

Ganj-i Ma'ani, Mu'izzi, Ms., Asiatic Soc. of Bengal, Curzon collection (No. 251).

Completed in 911/1534-35, it is the only surviving contemporary record of the reign of Bahadur Shah.

Gangadasa Pratapaullasa, Gangadhara, summarised by B. J. Sandesara in *Journal of the Oriental Institute*, Ms., University of Baroda, IV, No. 1, September 1954.

A Sanskrit play of nine acts depicting the strife between his patron and Muhammad Shah II of Gujarat, composed in 1449.

Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, Abdul Husain, Ms., Commonwealth Relations Library (No. 3842).

It was at the instance of Mahmud Begarah that Abdul Husain prepared this work, which is primarily a detailed dynastic history of the Muzaffarids.

Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, Shamsuddin, Commonwealth Relations Library (No. 3841).

Ma'asir-i Mahmud Shahi, Shihabi Hakim, Ms., Bodleian Library (No. 270).

Mahamudasurtranacarita, also called *Rajavinoda*, Udayaraja, ed. G. N. Bahura, Jaipur, 1954.

Udayaraja was a court-bard of Mahmud Begarah. He depicts his Muslim sovereign in the Hindu religious idiom.

Mandalikanripacarita, Gangadhara, ed. H. D. Velankar in *Bharitya Vidya*, XIV-XV, 1953-54.

Composed in circa 1460; it describes the life of Rao Mandalika of Junagarh.

Mir'at-i Sikandari, Sikandar b. Muhammad alias Manjhu, ed. S. C. Misra, Baroda.

A dynastic history of the Muzaffarids till the death of Muzaffar III in 1000/1591.

Tabaqat-i Mahmud Shahi, Abdul Karim, Ms., Eton College Library (No. 160).

Compiled at the instance of Mahmud Begarah, it is a universal history of Islam from the dawn of creation to 905/1499-1500. Information about the Deccan, Gujarat and Khandesh is based upon personal knowledge.

Tarikh-i Gujarat, Sharafuddin, Ms., Maulana Azad Library, Aligarh (No. 162).

Sharafuddin enjoyed the patronage of Muzaffar II (1511-26). Of the three *taabaqas* of his work, only one has reached us. It contains a contemporary account of Mahmud Begarah.

Tarikh-i Gujarat, Mir Abu Turab Vali, ed. by E. Denison Ross, Bib. Indica, 1909.

It begins abruptly with the year 932/1525 when Muhammad Zaman Mirza fled to the court of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat and suddenly breaks off with the revolt of Muzaffar III against the Mughals.

Tarikh-i Sadr-i Jahan, Faizullah, Ms., Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris (No. 315, New 183).

Compiled at the instance of Mahmud Begarah, it is a universal history from the earliest times to 907/1501. Account of the Muzaffarids is interesting.

Tarikh-i Muzaffar Shahi, Qanii, ed. M. A. Chaghtai, Poona, 1947.

A short account of Muzaffar Shah II's expedition to Malwa in 923/1517.

Tarikh-i Salatin-i Gujarat, Saiyyid Mahmud Bukhari.

Compiled soon after the fall of the Muzaffarids. Chronological order is defective.

The Commentaries of the Great Afonso D'Albuquerque, Eng. tr. Walter de Gray Birch (Hakluyt Society-I-IV, 1875-84).

Governor of the Portuguese possessions in India from 1509 to 1515, Albuquerque's letters and despatches were collected by his son. Valuable information about the relations of the Portuguese with Muzaffar II.

The Book of Duarte Barbosa, Eng. tr. M. L. Dames, Hakluyt Society, 1918.

The author was an official in the service of the Portuguese authorities in India, mainly at Cochin and Cannanore from circa 1500 to 1517. The value of this work is mainly geographical and ethnographical.

Travels of Varthema, Eng. tr. Jones and Winter, ed. Dr. Badgar.

Zafarul Walih bi Muzaffar wa Alihi, Abdulla Muhammad b. Umar-al-Makki, commonly known as Hajiud Dabir, edited by Sir E. Denison Ross, in three volumes as *An Arabic History of Gujarat*, London, 1910-28.

D. MALWA

The following works (most of which have already been noticed earlier) may be consulted for the history of Malwa :

Ma'asir-i Mahmudshahi, Ali bin Mahmud al-Kirmanī *alias* Shihab Hakim, Ms., Bodleian Library, Oxford, No. Elliot 237.

Maktubat-i Ashrafia, Ashraf Jahangir Samnani, Ms., Ashrafia Library, Kichhouchha, Faizabad.

Mir'at-i Sikandari, Shaikh Sikandar, University of Baroda, 1961.

Riyazul Insha, Mahmud Gawan, ed. Shaikh Chand, Hyderabad (Deccan), 1948.

Tarikh-i Muhammadi, Muhammad Bihamid Khani, Ms., British Museum, No. Or. 137.

Tarikh-i Muzaffar Shahi, Anonymous, Ms., British Museum, No. Add. 26279.

Tarikh-i Nasir Shahi, Anonymous, Ms., British Museum, No. Or. 1803.

Zafarul Walih bi Muzaffar wa Alihi, Abdullah Muhammad bin Umar al-Makki (*An Arabic History of Gujarat*), 3 Vols., London, 1910-28.

For a detailed bibliography, see U.N. Day, *Medieval Malwa*, Delhi, 1965.

F. ORISSA

Main sources have been indicated under the section of the Delhi sultanat and Bengal.

G. BAHMANIDS

Besides Isami's *Futuh-us Salatin*, Hajiud Dabir's *Zafarul Walih* and Ibn-i Battuta's *Rehla* (noticed earlier), the following works may be mentioned here :

Burhan-i Ma'asir, Ali b. Azizullah Tabatabai, Hyderabad, 1936.

A history of the Bahmanids of Gulbarga, the Bahmanids of Bidar and the Nizam-shahis of Ahmadnagar to the year 1004/1596. The author reached India in circa 1580 and joined the service of Burhan Nizam Shah II.

Riyazul Insha, Mahmud Gawan, edited by Shaikh Chand, Hyderabad, 1948.

Valuable collection of letters, documents and despatches of Mahmud Gawan, the famous Bahmanid wazir.

Tazkirat-ul Muluk, Rafiuddin Shirazi.

Completed in 1611, the work gives an account of the Adil Shahis of Bijapur.

For a detailed bibliography, see H. K. Sherwani, *The Bahmanis of Deccan*, Hyderabad, 1953.

H. MADURA

Apart from numismatic and epigraphic sources, the *Futuh-us Salatin* of Isami and the *Rehla* of Ibn-i Battuta (both noticed earlier) constitute our principal sources for the sultanat of Madura.

I. VIJAYANAGARA AND GINGEE

Apart from the epigraphic and numismatic sources, the following works may be consulted :

The Book of Duarte Barbosa, (noticed earlier).

Burhan-i Ma'asir, (noticed earlier).

Chronicle, Nuniz.

The Commentaries of the Great Afonso D'Albuquerque (noticed earlier).

Futuh-us Salatin, Isami (noticed earlier).

India in the Fifteenth Century, being a narrative of the travels in India of Abul Razzaq, Nicolo Conti, Athanasius Nikitin and Santo Stefano. Hakluyt Society, London 1857.

Khazainul Futuh, Amir Khusrau (noticed earlier).

Matlaus Sa'dain, Abdur Razzaq bin Ishaq Samarqandi, Ms., India Office (Nos. 27 1580).

Rehla, Ibn-i Battuta (noticed earlier).

Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi, Barani (noticed earlier).

For an account of the archaeological relics at Gingee, see :

Archaeological Survey of India Reports, 1908-9 and 1911-12.

A Topographical List of the Inscriptions of Madras Presidency Collected till 1915, V. Rangacharya, Vol. I.

District Manual of South Arcot, Garstin (1878).

List of Antiquarian Remains in the Presidency of Madras, compiled by R. Sewell, Vol. I (1882).

For other sources, see :

Karnataka Rajakkal Savistaracharitham (Mackenzie Ms.).

Koyilolugy (Ms. in the Mackenzie Collection).

Kulottuga Cholan Ula (1925).

Madhuravijayam or Vira Kamparaya Charitram by Gangadevi, ed. Harihara Srinivasa Sastri, Trivandrum, 1916.

Madurai Talavaralaru (Ms.).

Raghunathabhyudayam of Ramabhadramba, ed. Dr. T. R. Chintamani, University of Madras, 1934.

Raghunathabhyudaya Natakam of Vijayaraghava Nayaka.

Sources of Vijayanagar History (Madras University Historical Series, I), edited by Dr. S. K. Aiyangar, 1919.

Tanjavuri Andhra Rajula Charitramu.

Vaishnavi Guruparampara.

J. MULTAN AND SIND

Chach Nama, Ali b. Hamid Kufi, Persian version, edited by U. M. Daudpota, Hyderabad (Deccan), 1939.

Gives an account of the conquest of Sind by Muhammad bin Qasim. The original Arabic text was translated by Ali Kufi into Persian and dedicated to Ainul Mulk Fakhruddin Husain, a wazir of Qubacha.

Tarikh-i Sind, Muhammad Ma'sum Nami, edited by U. M. Daudpota, Poona, 1938.

A history of Sind from the Arab conquest to its annexation by Akbar. The author was a mansabdar of Akbar whose service he joined in 1595.

Tarkhan Nama, Mirza M. Salih Tarkhan.

A history of the Arghun and Tarkhan rulers of Sind.

Tarikh-i Tahiri, Tahir Muhammad Nisyani.

A history of Thatta from the earliest time to 1609, completed in 1030/1620. The author was in the service of Mirza Ghazi Beg Tarkhan Waqari, governor of Sind.

Tuhfatul Kiram, Ali Sher Qani Tattawi, Lucknow, 1886-87.

In three volumes, the last being a history of Sind.


K. BENGAL

No separate history of Bengal was written in Persian before the *Riyazus Salatin*, which mixes facts with fiction and is incorrect in details and dates. Facts about the early history of Bengal have to be culled from the general histories of the Delhi sultanat. *Maktubat-i Nur Quth Alam* (Letters of Saiyid Nur Quth-i Alam) contains some valuable information about the rise of Raja Ḳans.


For bibliography see, *The History of Bengal*, Vol. II., edited by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, University of Dacca, 1948, 501-8.

ILLUSTRATIONS

(13 *Plates*)



Jam Minaret.




The Qutb Minar.




Jalaluddin Mankburni on the banks of the Indus.



*Sword of Alauddin
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Wales Museum,
Bombay).*



Currency of Muhammad bin Tughluq.



Asoka's Pillar in Kotla Firuz Shah.



The citadel at Daulatabad



The entrance to the tunnel in the citadel at Daulatabad




Tomb of Firuz Shah Tughluq



The ruined college and tomb of Mahmud, with Tower of Victory on the left.



The Jahaz Mahal at Mandu.



The palace of Baz Bahadur with Rupmati's pavilion crowning the hill in the distance.



The Delhi Gate of Mandu from within

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